

Identity, Capital, Geopolitics: US Presidential Discourses of China from 1844 to 2016

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“China doesn’t matter very much. It’s not very important. It’s never going to be powerful.”

- George Kennan, 1949

“Every time during the last half-century or more that the sleeping Chinese dragon flicked his tail, there were American China watchers anxiously sure it was coming awake.”

- Harold Isaacs, 1958

“At any given time the ‘truth’ about China is in our heads, a notoriously unsafe repository for so valuable a commodity.”

- John Fairbank, 1976.

“Our fashion is to have the enemy of the year. China is big, it’s large on the map, it’s yellow, so there is an under-the-surface racist element, and it fits very nicely an obsessive state of mind.”

- Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1997

“This new focus reflects a fundamental truth – the United States has been, and always will be a Pacific power”.

- Barack Obama, 2012

“We can't continue to allow China to rape our country”.

- Donald Trump, 2016

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Abstract

This thesis analyses US presidential discourses of China from 1844 to 2016. Provoked by the contemporary trope of the ‘rise of China’ and Barack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to the Asia Pacific, I demonstrate how specific US discourses of China have emerged over time to condition how the US thinks about and acts towards China. Through an interdisciplinary analytical framework, motivated by a poststructural ethos, appreciative of the contributions of political economy and inspired by the methodological approach of Michel Foucault, I conduct an intertextual discourse analysis and genealogical critique of US Presidential discourses on China.

By focusing on ‘official’ sources, predominantly the speeches and statements of US Presidents, I analyse US discourses of China from the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of Barack Obama’s Presidency in 2016. Through this genealogical discourse analysis I argue that three logics, of identity, capital, and geopolitics, emerge over time and are predominant in shaping US foreign policy towards China. I do not take these as pre-existing assumptions but inductively conceptualise them through a hermeneutic engagement with the history of US Presidential discourses regarding China. These logics function to frame, organise and limit what is politically possible and subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China.

The logic of capital addresses the need for US capital to reproduce itself by expanding internationally. The logic of geopolitics functions primarily as the organising principles for the logic of capital and US foreign relations specifically in relation to China. The logic of identity functions as a conditioning limit on the logics of capital and geopolitics. From this, I conclude that US anxiety over the ‘rise of China’ is a manifestation of historic US conceptions of its identity, its geopolitical imagining of the Asia-Pacific, and the perceived imperatives of contemporary capitalism.

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I Thinking About US Presidential Discourses of China

Part I of this thesis sets out the problem this research addresses and the analytical approach it adopts. Chapter 1 introduces the focus of this research through the initial context of Barack Obama's pivot to Asia and outlines the argument revolving around the presence of three logics – identity, capital, and geopolitics- in US presidential discourses towards China. Chapter 2 outlines the existing literature on US foreign policy towards China to situate my argument and indicate how this research reacts and contributes to further analysis. Chapter 3 presents my analytical framework beginning with the major arguments regarding the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics and then setting out the methodology of a genealogical discourse analysis that underpins this thesis.

Chapter 1 – US Foreign Policy and China

1.1 China in the US Imagination

During the 2012 Super Bowl, a campaign advert released by a Republican candidate for the House of Representatives featured a Chinese woman mocking the US in broken English. She declared: “You borrow more and more from us. Your economy get very weak. Ours get very good. We take your jobs”.¹ The ad, though heavily criticised, was not unusual. In the 2010 US mid-term elections, nearly 30 candidates ran pieces referring to China as a threat to US interests.² In a 2012 Republican debate on National Security, one candidate, Rick Perry, declared that “Communist China is destined for the ash heap of history because they are not a country of virtues”.³ China ‘bashing’ during US political campaign season though, was not necessarily a new phenomenon.⁴ More recently in May 2016, then Republican candidate for the Presidency, and now US President, Donald Trump when making the case for protecting US jobs remarked, somewhat crudely, “we can't continue to allow China to rape our country”.⁵ The last few years have seen the increasing prevalence of China in US political discourse and foreign policy. How the US thinks about China though, has a history, and that history can help illuminate how the US thinks today.

Writing in 1976, the renowned historian of US-China relations, John Fairbank captured these dynamics where he argued how “at any given time the ‘truth’ about China is in our heads, a notoriously unsafe repository for so valuable a commodity”.⁶ Tinged with irony, this remark suggests that the ‘truth’ of what China is or is not, is at once an intangible and tangible “commodity” inhabiting the imagination. Harold Isaacs understood this claim when he observed that “every time during the last half-century or more that the sleeping Chinese

¹ Rachel Weiner, ‘Pete Hoekstra’s China ad provokes accusations of racism’, *The Washington Post* (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/pete-hoekstras-china-ad-provokes-accusations-of-racism/2012/02/06/gIQAPD6buQ_blog.html 15 February 2012).

² David Chen, ‘China Emerges as a Scapegoat in Campaign Ads’, *The New York Times* (<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/politics/10outsource.html?pagewanted=all> 5 February 2012).

³ ‘Part IV: 21:30-22:00, CNN National Security Debate’, *CNN* (<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1111/22/se.05.html> 14 March 2013).

⁴ Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘China Bashing: A US political tradition’, *Reuters* (<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/11/china-bashing-a-political-tradition/>, 10 February 2015).

⁵ Jeremy Diamond, ‘Trump: ‘We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country’, *CNN* (<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trump-china-rape/>, 24 October 2016); David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labour Market Effects of Import competition in the United States’, *American Economic Review* 103(2013): 2121-2168; Claire Miller, ‘The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation’, *The New York Times* (<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html>, 24 October 2016).

⁶ John Fairbank, *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976): xiv.

dragon flicked his tail, there were American China watchers anxiously sure it was coming awake”.⁷ James Baker reflected these observations in 1991 when as US Secretary of State, he observed that US views of China had “oscillated between extremes of fascination and confrontation”, and alluded to the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949 as a sign that US attempts to remake China in its image was now a “conversion that failed”.⁸ Not long after this one the of the first explicit references to the ‘rise of China’ appeared in print in William Overholt’s 1994 book *The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New Superpower*.⁹ This was soon followed by a trend of sensationalist texts, ranging in degrees of orientalism, which argued conflict with China was deliberately undermining the US and conflict was imminent or necessary.¹⁰ More recent texts consider the historical parallel of the breakout of World War or suggest that China has a secret strategy to replace the US as the global superpower.¹¹

Contemporary US-China relations have also been depicted by a number of popular culture artefacts that constitute the broader US imagination as the intersubjective background within which political practices take place.¹² In a stage play called *Chimerica*, which examines the changing fortunes of the US and China, a character expresses concern about China’s foreign policy, “you know how much they’ve expanded their military? How much of Africa they’ve got in their shopping carts?...they seem pretty intent on putting every factory in Ohio out of

⁷ Harold Isaacs, *Scratches on our Minds* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1980): 209.

⁸ James A. Baker III, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community’, *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 15.

⁹ William Overholt, *The Rise of China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993). For his more recent take on the issue see William Overholt, *Asia, America, and The Transformation of Geopolitics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

¹⁰ Bill Gertz, *The China Threat How the People’s Republic Targets America* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2000); Richard Bernstein, and Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998); Constantine Menges, *China The Gathering Threat* (Tennessee: Nelson Current, 2005); Ethan Gutmann, *Losing the New China* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004); Sterling Seagrave, *Lords of the Rim The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese* (London: Bantam Press, 1995); Reed Hunt, *In China’s Shadow The Crisis of American Entrepreneurship* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Steven Mosher, *China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and The World* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Craig Simons, *The Devouring Dragon* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2013); Eamon Fingleton, *In the Jaws of the Dragon* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007); Christopher Coker, *The Improbable War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2015); Daniel Burstein and Arne de Keijzer, *Big Dragon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998); Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon, *A War Like No Other The Truth about China’s Challenge to America* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2007); Peter Kiernan, *Becoming China’s Bitch and Nine More Catastrophes We must Avoid Right Now* (Tennessee: Turner Publishing, 2012); Ted Galen Carpenter, *America’s Coming War With China* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Robert Haddick, *Fire on the Water China, America, and he future of the Pacific* (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014).

¹¹ Richard Rosencrance and Steven Miller (eds), *The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S. China Conflict* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2015); Michael Pillsbury, *The Hundred-Year Marathon China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower* (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2015).

¹² Patrick Hayden, ‘Systemic evil and the international political imagination’, *International Politics* 51 (2014): 426.

business”.¹³ More prominently China has also featured as part of a major political plotline in the second season of *House of Cards* in 2014, where it was depicted as infiltrating the US political process.¹⁴ This takes concurrently with a growing body of fictional texts whose plot centres on potential US-China conflicts including the 1995 science fiction novel *China Mountain Zhang* where the US is a defeated satellite state of China’s and most recently *Ghost Fleet* which imagines a naval conflict in the Pacific and claims to be based on real world trends.¹⁵ At the very least, China has become increasingly prominent in the broader political imagination of the US.

James Mann has reflected on the major narrative tropes that have dominated US media coverage of China since the 1950s. He observed how “in the 1950s, the coverage in the United States was of Chinese as disciplined automatons. In the 1980s, it was “China goes capitalist”. In the early 1990s, it was “crackdown in China”. Now it’s “China Rising” (and “China gets rich”).¹⁶ These tropes reflect some of the popular and dominant narratives of China in the US imagination that at times would filter through into official political rhetoric. More recently there is an emerging body of memoirs and books from former government officials how to deal with China.¹⁷ There have also been more varying theoretical attempts to understand what China’s ‘rise’ means for the US and how the US should respond¹⁸, what it

¹³ Lucy Kirkwood, *Chimerica* (London: Nick Hern Books, 2013): 81. Gregory Lee, *Chinas Unlimited Making the Imaginaries of China and Chineseness* (Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003).

¹⁴ ‘House of Cards Episode List’, *IMDB* (<http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1856010/episodes?season=2> , 10 January 2017);

¹⁵ Maureen McHugh, *China Mountain Zhang* (Great Britain: Orbit, 1995); Tom Clancy, *SSN* (London: HarperCollins, 1996); Tom Clancy, *The Bear and The Dragon* (London: Penguin, 2001); Tom Clancy, *Threat Vector* (London: Penguin, 2012); John Updike, *Toward the End of Time* (London: Penguin, 2006); Philip Nowlan, *Armageddon- 2419 AD & The Airlords of Han* (USA: Verneysbooks, 2013); Peter Singer and August Cole, *Ghost Fleet* (New York: Mariner Books, 2016); Peter Tasker, *Dragon Dance* (New York: Kodansha International, 2002); Chuck DeVore and Steven Mosher, *China Attacks* (Silkworm, 2013);

¹⁶ ‘CDT Bookshelf: Interview with James Mann’, *China Digital Times* (<http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/02/cdt-bookshelf-interview-with-james-mann/> 1 June 2014).

¹⁷ Jeffrey Bader, *Obama and China’s Rise* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2012); Henry Paulson Jr., *Dealing with China* (Great Britain: Headline, 2015); Kurt Campbell, *The Pivot The future of American Statecraft in Asia* (New York: Twelve, 2016). For a recollection of the Nixon era normalization with China, John Holdridge, *Crossing The Divide* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

¹⁸ David Kang, *China Rising* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael Brown, Owen Cote Jr., Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds), *The Rise of China* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000); Robert Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, *Security Studies* 15(2006): 355-395; June Dreyer, ‘US-China Relations: engagement or talking past each other’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 17(2008): 591-609; Thomas Wilkins, ‘The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China” an international relations perspective’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 64(2010): 381-405; Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, The United States, and Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Nina Hachigian (ed.), *Debating China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng (eds), *America, China, and the Struggle for World Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu (eds), *Managing the China Challenge* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009); Stephen Fruhling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014); James Steinberg and Michael Hanlon, *Strategic Reassurance and Resolve U.S.0China*

might mean more broadly for global politics¹⁹, as well as a burst of ‘think tank’ reports on how to manage US-China relations.²⁰ Richard Heydarian’s *Asia’s New Battlefield* is the most engaging of these that explores how “Washington’s imperial ‘pivot’, China’s aggressive moves and Japan’s opportunistic moves add up to a volatile brew”.²¹ The potential for general geopolitical crises as well as challenges to US primacy in Asia has also become a prominent concern for orthodox IR scholarship.²² What is clear from this variety of sources is that the topic of China has become increasingly salient across the varied sites that constitute US politics.

Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Bill Hayton, *The South China Sea The Struggle for Power In Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Lyle Goldstein *Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015).

¹⁹ Ming Li, *The Rise of China and The Demise of the Capitalist World-Economy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008); Paul Bowles and Baotai Wang, ‘The rocky road ahead: China, the US and the future of the dollar’, *Review of International Political Economy* 15 (2008): 335-353; Mark Beeson, ‘Comment: Trading Places? China, the United States and the evolution of the international political economy’, *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (2009): 729-741; Gerard Strange, ‘China’s Post-Listian Rise: Beyond Radical Globalisation Theory and the Political Economy of Neoliberal Hegemony’, *New Political Economy* 16 (2011): 539-559; Mattias Vermeiren and Sacha Dierckx, ‘Challenging Global Neoliberalism? The global political economy of China’s capital controls’, *Third World Quarterly* 33 (2012): 1647-1688; Ho-fung Hung, ‘Rise of China and the global accumulation crisis’, *Review of International Political Economy* 15 (2008): 149-179; William Callahan, ‘Forum: The Rise of China – How to understand China: the dangers of being a rising power’, *Review of International Studies* 31(2005): 701-714.

²⁰ Paul Stares, Scott Snyder, Joshua Kurlantzick, Daniel Markey and Evan Feigenbaum, ‘Managing Instability on China’s Periphery, March 2011’, *Council on Foreign Relations* (<http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/managing-instability-chinas-periphery/p25838>, 26 March 2016); Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisu, ‘Addressing US—China Strategic Distrust, March 2012’, *Brookings* (<https://www.brookings.edu/research/addressing-u-s-china-strategic-distrust/>; 26 March 2016); Robert Blackwell and Ashley Tellis, ‘Revising US Grand strategy Toward China, March 2015’, *Council on Foreign Relations* (<http://www.cfr.org/china/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china/p36371>, 26 March 2016); Kevin Rudd, ‘US-China 21: The future of US-China Relations Under Xi Jinping, April 2015’, *Belfer Center* (<http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>, 25 March 2016).

²¹ Richard Heydarian, *Asia’s New Battlefield* (London: Zed Books, 2015): xii.

²² Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Primacy or World Order?’, *International Security* 38(2013): 153-175; Avery Goldstein, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations’, *International Security* 37(2013): 49-89; Evan Montgomery, ‘contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection’, *International Security* 38(2014): 115-149; Ja Choong and Todd Hall, ‘The Lessons of 1914 for East Asia Today: Missing the Trees for the Forest’, *International Security* 39(2014): 7-43; Yiwei Wang, ‘Rethinking the South China Sea Issue: A Perspective of Sino-U.S. Relations’, *Pacific Focus* 21(2006): 105-135; Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The tragedy of offensive realism: classical realism and the rise of China’, *European Journal of International Relations* 18(2012): 53-75; Michel Beckley, ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge will Endure’, *International Security* 36(2011): 41-78; Thomas Christensen, ‘fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia’, *International Security* 31(2006): 81-126; Thomas Christensen, *Worse Than a Monolith* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Robert Kelly, ‘The ‘pivot’ and its problems: American foreign policy in Northeast Asia’, *The Pacific Review* 27 (2014): 479-503; Christopher Le Miere, ‘America’s Pivot to East Asia: The Naval Dimension’, *Survival* 54 (2012): 81-94; Matteo Dian, ‘The Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and contested commons in the Asia Pacific region’, *Pacific Review* 28 (2015): 237-257; Amitai Etzioni, *Avoiding War with China: Two Nations, One World* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2017).

The increasing salience of China in US politics has not arisen from nowhere. Gideon Rachman described the post 2008 world as “the age of anxiety” as opposed to, age of optimism from 1991-2008, where “a shrinking economy and a rising China have changed the way America thinks about the world”.²³ This sense of US insecurity is similar to what Richard Hofstadter called “the paranoid style” in US politics, a kind of broad crisis in the national consciousness which lead to humanitarian or aggressive actions.²⁴ With this sense of anxiety in mind Barack Obama made the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, a large multi-state free trade agreement a cornerstone of his policy in the Pacific where one of it’s main goals was to isolate China in the region. Obama’s signature foreign policy development has been his much advertised and much maligned ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance to Asia. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, economic anxiety about the US’s place in the world, especially in comparison to China has become not only campaign fodder in US elections, but a general concern in US politics.²⁵ Some were prompted to ask if the American century was over, while others reflected on the economic interdependence of the US and Chinese economies.²⁶

How the US imagined China came into stark view when in 2014 China launched an initiative to formulate what would become the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a more regionally focused development bank, modelled on the International Monetary Fund. Although China explicitly stated it was not to be a competitor to existing global institutions, it raised questions about the construction of power and international order in East Asia.²⁷ The US, in unusual bluster stated that it would not participate and encouraged its traditional Western allies to also refrain.²⁸ In 2015 Britain became the first Western state to apply for membership and was soon followed by Germany, Australia, and a number of others much to the chagrin of the US.

²³ Gideon Rachman, Gideon, *Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011): 262.

²⁴ Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).

²⁵ Aaron Friedberg, ‘Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US-China Rivalry’, *Survival* 52 (2010): 31-54.

²⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Is the American Century Over?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); Jonathan Fenby, *Will China Dominate the 21st Century?* (Cambridge, Polity, 2014); Patrick Smith, *Time No Longer Americans After the American Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Helen Thompson, *China and the Mortgaging of America* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

²⁷ Ming Wan, *The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Construction of Power and the Struggle for the East Asian International Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

²⁸ Shawn Donnon, ‘White House declares truce with China over AIIB’, *Financial Times* (<https://www.ft.com/content/23c51438-64ca-11e5-a28b-50226830d644>, 24 October 2016); Nicholas Watt, Paul Lewis and Tania Branigan, ‘US anger at Britain joining Chinese-led investment bank AIIB’, *The Guardian* (<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/13/white-house-pointedly-asks-uk-to-use-its-voice-as-part-of-chinese-led-bank>, 24 October 2016); Jane Perez, ‘China Creates a World Bank of Its Own, and the U.S. Balks, December 4, 2015’, *The New York Times* (<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/business/international/china-creates-an-asian-bank-as-the-us-stands-alooft.html>, 24 October 2016).

The US response and its lack of effect on the willingness of its allies to join the bank lead to the question of what this incident reveals about how the US thinks about China.

The contrasting depictions above exemplify the complexities and ambiguities of US-Sino relations. For Americans, China is neither a friend nor an enemy: it is, rather, a ‘frenemy’.²⁹ It seems to be simultaneously a partner, an ally, an adversary, and an enemy. Generally understood along a spectrum of either being ‘on the rise’ as a potential threat or an opportunity for peaceful cooperation, the tangled interdependence between the two, combined with China’s perceived challenge to US military ‘pre-eminence’ signify the unstable yet vital role this relationship has on contemporary international politics.³⁰ If this is the case, as I would argue here, then it is worth investigating the history of how the US has thought about China by way of contextualising the present.

In an early articulation of what is now commonly referred to as critical geopolitics Gerard Toal and John Agnew argued that “to designate a place is not simply to define a location or setting [but] to open up a field of possible taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, subjects and appropriate foreign policy responses”.³¹ ‘China’ has in this reading, become a signifier and a trigger, for a broad, varied and contradictory spread of ideas, passions, beliefs, fears, emotions and arguments. China though, as it appears in US presidential discourses, also invokes what I call logics as a way of the US making sense of what to think and how to act towards China. The ‘rise of China’, as a discursive trope exemplifies what John Agnew has termed “making the strange familiar”.³² This familiarising of China occurs through what can be understood as geopolitical imaginations. These are a form of aesthetic engagement with politics, recognising the difference between the form of representation and the ‘real’ object it seeks to represent.³³ As Roland Bleiker states, “representation is always an act of power”.³⁴ As an act of power then, a representation is entirely subjective, contingent on a variety of contextual particularities. This makes clear that particular representations are taken

²⁹ Michael Barr, *Who’s Afraid of China? The Challenge of Chinese Soft Power* (London: Zed Books, 2011).

³⁰ Michael Evans, ‘Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century’, *Orbis* 54(2010): 85-113.

³¹ Gerard Toal and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy discourse’, *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 194.

³² John Agnew, ‘Making the Strange Familiar: Geographical Analogy in Global Geopolitics’, *The Geographical Review* 99 (2009): 426-443.

³³ Roland Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic turn in International Political Theory’, *Millennium* 30 (2001):509-533. This is opposed to a mimetic understanding of politics which “seek to represent politics as realistically and authentically as possible, aiming to capture world politics as-it-really-is”. Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic turn in International Political Theory’, 510.

³⁴ Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic turn in International Political Theory’, 515.

as accurate and ‘real’ portrayals of that which they represent. What is particular, contextual and contingent becomes obvious, universal and fixed. For instance, the notions that China is on the rise and this implies that China is a threat or an opportunity appear as truisms desperately indeed of critique.

The geopolitical imaginations evident in how the ‘the rise of China’ functions in US presidential discourse exerts something akin to the disciplinary power described by Michel Foucault where discipline “functions to the extent that it isolates a space”, it “concentrates, focuses and encloses...by definition discipline regulates everything. Discipline allows nothing to escape”.³⁵ Obama’s declaration, for instance, that “the currents of history...move decidedly, decisively, in a single direction” is an attempt to subsume the potentials of world politics a US-centric teleological vision.³⁶ The argument I make here is that these geopolitical imaginations evident in US presidential discourses are conditioned by the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics. I derive the framing of ‘geopolitical imagination’ from Edward Said’s use of “imaginative geographies” in his *Orientalism* as an arbitrary, yet “universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’”.³⁷ Derek Gregory expanded on this notion to describe them as “fabrications” that combined the “fictionalised” and the “real”.³⁸ We can say then that ‘true’ knowledge about the world is “a function of learned judgement” that determines what constitutes a legitimate political understanding of another state, a perception Said describes as “only a fictional reality”.³⁹ What is important is not whether these imaginations are ‘the’ truth or not, but that these imaginations have consequences for what is deemed politically possible and necessary. How China is presented, constructed and imagined in US presidential discourses does not indicate some kind of truth as to what China really ‘is’ or ‘is’ not, but how the US understands and thinks about China. And here I argue this is constituted by the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics.

³⁵ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78* trans. By Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 44-45.

³⁶ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

³⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 2003): 54.

³⁸ Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 16.

³⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, 59; 54. See the following for more discussion of the geographical imagination: David Harvey, ‘The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations’, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 18 (2005): 211-255; Derek Gregory, ‘Imaginative geographies’, *Progress in Human Geography* 19 (1995): 447-485.

Obama's remarks represent the enclosure of US geopolitical imaginations into a singular hegemonic understanding of how the world should be organised, where China can only and should follow the US prescribed path, itself premised on a series of historical myths, or as Agnew determines, "the discursive process of domesticating the exotic".⁴⁰ This process of "making the strange familiar", and sense of 'knowing' the 'Other' as Zhang Longxi articulates, "begins with interpretive givens, the *epistemes* or fundamental codes of a cultural system, but as the hermeneutic process evolves, those givens will be challenged and revised".⁴¹ The "familiarity" in how the US thinks about China and how this has been rendered in the secondary literature is indeed of continuing reassessment. This is precisely what I intend to achieve with the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics. They are intended to constitute an analytical framework to make sense of US presidential discourse towards China and this thesis is about demonstrating simultaneously how I derived them and how they can be used.

There are historical precedents of states becoming 'problems' in US foreign policy in one way or another, for instance, Cuba under Fidel Castro, Iran following the 1979 revolution, the USSR for much of the 20th century and then Japan in the late 1980s. Japan is one of the most significant with regards to this research as much of the literature regarding its threat to the US is relatively interchangeable with the recent growth of 'China threat' publications.⁴² Richard Leaver for instance wondered if at the end of the 1980s we were witnessing a shift from "pax Americana to pax Nipponica".⁴³ Toal explored how Japan was used in US discourses regarding the 'New World Order' and the perception of Japan as an existential economic threat, similar in many ways to how China is characterised today in US politics.⁴⁴ What we can say is that the 'problem' of China then, has become increasingly salient in US politics

⁴⁰ Agnew, 'Making the Strange Familiar', 427.

⁴¹ Zhang Longxi, *Mighty Opposites From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998): 47.

⁴² See section 2.6 in the following chapter or a list of references in this regard.

⁴³ Richard Leaver, 'Restructuring in the Global Economy: From Pax Americana to Pax Nipponica', *Alternatives* 14 (1989): 429-462.

⁴⁴ Gerard Toal, 'Japan as threat: geo-economic discourses on the USA- Japan relationship in US civil society, 1987-91', in Colin Williams (ed.), *The Political Geography of the New World Order* (London: Bellhaven Press: London, 1993):181-209; Gearoid Tuathail, 'Pearl Harbor without bombs': a critical geopolitics of the US-Japan 'FSX' debate', *Environment and Planning A* 24 (1992): 975-994; Gerard Toal, 'The New East-West Conflict? Japan and the Bush Administration's 'New World Order'', *Area* 25 (1993): 127-135; David Campbell, 'Foreign Policy and Identity: Japanese "Other"/American "Self"', in Stephen Rosow, Naem Inyatullah and Mark Rupert (eds), *The Global Economy as Political Space* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994): 147-169; Michael Hodges, 'The Japanese Industrial Presence in America: Same Bed, Different Dreams', *Millennium* 18 (1989): 359-376.

over the last decade and how the US thinks about and acts towards China is a concern this thesis attempts to address.

The question emerges though, given, the immense quantity, breadth and calibre of academic and popular analysis on the US and China, as will be indicated throughout the rest of this introduction and in chapter two, why add another one?

With this in mind it becomes possible and necessary to consider what I call the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics and how they produce and depend on particular imaginative renderings of China, as a site to exert practices of US identity, as a space for capital investment or potential consumers for US exporters, or a potential geopolitical threat to economic prosperity in Asia.

1.2 The Logics of US Presidential Discourses of China

This thesis analyses how China has been understood in US foreign policy from the mid 19th century up until the end of the Obama Presidency in 2017. To do so, I present a genealogical discourse analysis of how China features in official US presidential discourse from 1844 to 2016. The significance of conducting this genealogy is to contextualize the present within its historical conditions. I argue that when it comes to thinking about China the US has done so through three major frameworks, which have emerged historically. I call these the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics. These logics essentially represent and function as the discursive conditions of possibility for US foreign policy towards China while also attempting to capture why the US acts in the way it does. They are at times, contradictory, contrarian and complimentary, at other times one takes precedence over the two and rarely do they overlap in perfect coherence. Their analytical significance is that they do not simply emerge from the present, nor do they exist as some kind of transcendental national interest. They form the intellectual horizons within which US foreign policy towards China takes place. These three logics explain the parameters in which China has come to be 'known' in US foreign policy and are evident in the foreign policies of Presidents from John Tyler up to Barack Obama.

In this thesis I am making an empirically informed argument that has required the engagement with a broad, heterodox body of literature. It is my intention that this research speaks to questions of 'how possible' and 'why' when it comes to US presidential discourse of China, rather addressing one or the other. Where these logics emerge from and their relationship to domestic and transnational social forces is beyond the remit of this thesis, as I am focused on how they are discernable and how they function in relation to US foreign policy towards

China. What I will say is that I acknowledge that the social and potentially domestic origins of these logics is worthy of further study, as is their comparison across other case studies, for example US foreign policy towards Iran, Russia or Britain

I make no general conclusions of how these logics may or may not function towards some universalized theory of foreign policy or international relations. It is a central understanding of mine that this kind of universalisation is not strictly possible even if potentially desirable as one might succumb to the potential reductionism or parsimonious theorising or analysis. I do see them though, as potentially useful starting concepts to spur further investigation, in terms of the domestic or international relations of power, and whether they may be discernable in other situations. If genealogy is to be understood as Foucault intended and Colin Koopman has so masterfully captured, then it is about the analysis of particular context bound cases – with the potential to develop broader analytical concepts like biopolitics or disciplinary power.⁴⁵ For the argument here, I have determined these three logics best capture how US foreign policy towards China has been conceptualised in US presidential discourses. The logics I describe inform US foreign policy, give it its overall sense of ‘rationality’ and constitute the parameters and criteria for what constitutes this rationality. The logics in this light inform what can be considered as legitimate choice but they do not determine a particular choice. They function as the discursive spectrum in which agency operates.

The scope of my research covers ‘official’ sources, predominantly the speeches and statements from US Presidents from the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of the Barack Obama Presidency. This includes discourses engaging with the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia and the 1882 Exclusion Act. I move on through the open door policies of William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt to William Taft’s dollar diplomacy and the later discourses of Woodrow Wilsons. Following this I analyse the discourses of, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson as China went from being considered ally to to an enemy. I examine the rapprochement under Richard Nixon and its continuation through the Presidencies of, Jimmy Carter’s and Ronald Reagan. I then examine the more recent discourses of China in the George H.W. Bush, William Clinton and George W. Bush Presidencies. Finally I examine Barack Obama’s discourses of China. Taking into account the long temporal focus of my thesis my research narrows in on official US government discourses. This is not to say other sources are of less value or irrelevant, the

⁴⁵ Colin Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013).

contrary has been insightfully explored elsewhere⁴⁶, but given the constraints of time and space and the agenda setting importance of US presidential discourses this was the most appropriate material to begin with when addressing my overall concern of US foreign policy towards China.

1.3 Research Trajectory

At this stage, a brief outline of how this research agenda emerged in response to some of the initial dilemmas with my original focus is worth recounting to grasp some of the rationale to cover such an extensive time frame. This initial digression is intended to make transparent the larger ‘messy’ process of research.

This thesis began initially as a discourse analysis of US foreign policy towards China after 1989 using the Tiananmen Square protests and subsequent Communist party response as a cut off point for examining the role identity narratives play in US foreign policy. Upon further reflection though, the limits of this type of analysis became more evident and increasingly problematic. The role that identity, the self/other nexus, and poststructural arguments about foreign policy being a reflection of these dynamics is well established in the literature, even if deemed insignificant by orthodox IR scholars focusing on security and geopolitics.⁴⁷ The question emerges then, of what would a study of this kind add to the debate, or in more cynical terms, would it provide anything beyond an interesting but analytically weak set of categories of different discourses of ‘Chinas’ in US foreign policy. The subsequent scope of this thesis has expanded through back through history, and through seemingly irreconcilable theoretical paradigms.

The limits of my initial approach became more acute in two ways. Firstly, I could articulate the different categories of discourse used to describe China including a serial abuser of human rights, a state that needed to learn how to be a responsible stakeholder in international politics or a competitor to US interests in Asia and globally. I could also explain how these were juxtaposed to lofty visions of a mature, responsible US self. These discursive tropes though, relied on particular historical interpretations that functioned as ideological givens in US foreign policy. In a way, these discourses reflected a historical common sense about the role of the US in world politics and how it related to China. The significance of conducting a genealogy addresses this by generating effective and appropriate analytical concepts within a

⁴⁶ See section 2.2 in this thesis.

⁴⁷ Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006).

particular problematisation. This is where my argument emerges from, that three logics are discernable in US presidential discourse as they condition US foreign policy towards China. It is my intention that these logics contribute an original contribution to the analysis of US foreign policy towards China that can be expanded on in further research.

The second issue is to do with the scope of my analytical focus. Identity is an important feature of US foreign policy and Presidents often articulate their foreign policy visions through appeals to some sort of US identity, but this did not feel like an approach that comprehensively grasps the varied aspects of US foreign policy towards China specifically, and foreign policy more broadly.⁴⁸ Since the 1990s the constructivist and more critically orientated strands of IR, led by scholars like Alexander Wendt, Ted hopf, David Campbell and Lene Hansen to name a few, have demonstrated the role identity plays in shaping foreign policy choices, and the performative role that foreign policy plays in constituting those very identities. Yet, this line of argument appeared to exclude the role that capitalism plays in US-China relations. In the short term, US concern with regards to China was amplified in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.⁴⁹ Now, there is an abundant and rich literature on the economic significance of China in US foreign policy but this was rarely partnered with arguments centred on identity. If identity and capitalism are important features of US foreign policy then another axis of limitations to emerge came from the importance that geopolitics, in its classical sense regarding inter-state rivalry and strategic goals of national interests featured in US foreign policy.

Identity, following my research's expansion in a longer historical focus became too narrow a framework to understand US foreign policy towards China because capitalism and the prerogatives of capital were of much more explicit concern previously, for instance during the Presidencies of Teddy Roosevelt and William Taft in particular. In the 2011 Obama 'pivot' to Asia, it was evident, that identity, geopolitics and capital were core features in US foreign policy though it remained unclear how to best capture these dynamics. What became apparent is that neorealist arguments, for all their limitations and unexplained assumptions⁵⁰, with regard to state practices of pursuing hegemony and acting in the 'national interest' provide some insight into US considerations of the geopolitical rivalries, tensions and relationships in

⁴⁸ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Politic and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly* 35(1991): 211-239.

⁴⁹ Hugo Meijer (ed.), *Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance Toward Asia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁵⁰ Richard Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', *International Organization* 38(1984): 225-286.

East Asia. Neorealism alone though, offers insufficient explanation of the broader spectrum of US foreign policy towards China or why for instance China has sometimes been considered an ally, during the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek for instance, and other times, an enemy, like during Mao's leadership in the 1950s.

My research then was orientated around the specific problem of China in the US imagination and I made use of the necessary theoretical considerations to engage with it. I maintained my focus on US presidential discourses, as an expansion of this, although in many ways desirable, would prove too overwhelming for a study of this kind. Though I would emphasise that a study that incorporates a broader range of sources of US discourses of China following my methodological approach would be highly desirable. Oliver Turner for instance provides an excellent long-term overview of what he terms 'American Images' of China in official and popular contexts.⁵¹ One of the limitations of this study though, excellent as it is, is how it excludes the role of what I see as the logic of capital in shaping US foreign policy. Bruce Cummings signalled a promising direction when he set out to generate a theoretically and historically informed approach to the problem of contemporary US-East Asian relations in response to what he saw as historical works compromised by an "epistemology of progress", where international politics was on a teleological path to increasing interconnection via the promises of liberal democracy and free markets.⁵² Cummings though, took a broad approach focusing on US relations with countries other than China like Japan and South Korea as well as issues in civil society, but importantly focused his critique on what he called "American liberalism", which I understand here as an overarching political rationality that the logics I describe might inform.⁵³

This thesis is not intended to be a comprehensive account of US foreign policy and China as this has been done effectively many times before.⁵⁴ This thesis is also not about providing a revisionist history of US foreign policy towards China and is concerned with developing a

⁵¹ Oliver Turner, *American Images of China* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).

⁵² Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2002): 11.

⁵³ Cumings, *Parallax Visions*, 1.

⁵⁴ Warren Cohen, *America's Response to China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Chi Wang, *The United States and China since World War II* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2013); Gordon Chang, *Fateful Ties A History of America's Preoccupation with China* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015); Dong Wang, *The United States and China A History from the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (New York: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2013); John Pomfret, *The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom America and China, 1776 to the Present* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2016); James Thompson Jr., Peter Stanley and John Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1981).

novel analytical framework with which to approach contemporary US discourses of China. My research in this regard is indebted to these works for providing an entry point into the history of US-China relations. There are also many authoritative studies that engage either US-China relations either through constructivist approaches regarding the imagining of China in US foreign policy during specific periods, or emphasise the significance of China for various constructions of US identity.⁵⁵ These texts constitute a body of literature that this thesis will hopefully speak to.

There are a number of other important studies that have examined issues ranging across the following: the role of the US congress⁵⁶ in influencing China policy, George W. Bush's approach to China and Asia⁵⁷, the role of emotions in US-China relations⁵⁸, the role of interest groups in US policy towards China⁵⁹, the changing security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific⁶⁰, the origins of the island disputes in East Asia⁶¹, US policy towards Taiwan⁶², or debates regarding potential hegemonic transition in Asia⁶³. This thesis is an attempt to add to the

⁵⁵ Chengxin Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012); Jarrod Hayes, *Constructing National Security U.S. Relations with India and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *The China Threat Memories, Myths and Realities in the 1950s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); See Seng Tan, *The Making of the Asia Pacific* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013); T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China 1931-1949* (California: Stanford University Press, 1996); Joyce Mao, *Asia First China and the Making of Modern American Conservatism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

⁵⁶ Tao Xi, *Us-China Relations China Policy on Capital Hill* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010); Guangqui Xu, *and the US-China Relationship 1949-1979* (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2007); Nicola Nymalm, 'The End of the 'Liberal Theory of History'? Dissecting the US Congress' Discourse on China's Currency Policy', *International Political Sociology* 7(2013): 388-405; Joseph Gagliano, *Congressional Policymaking in Sino-U.S. Relations during the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).

⁵⁷ Mark Beeson (ed.), *Bush and Asia America's evolving relations with East Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Guy Roberts, *US Foreign Policy and China Bush's First Term* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015);

⁵⁸ Taryn Shepherd, *Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action: Understanding Post-Cold War Crisis Interactions* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

⁵⁹ Robert Sutter, *U.S. Policy Toward China An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

⁶⁰ S. Mahmud Ali, *Asia-Pacific Security Dynamics in the Obama Era* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Rex Li, *A Rising China and Security in East Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009); David Martin Jones, Nicholas Khoo, M.L.R. Smith, *Asian Security and the Rise of China* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013); Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald (eds), *Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *China-US Relations Transformed* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).

⁶¹ Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific Divided territories in the San Francisco System* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

⁶² Oystein Tunsjo, *US Taiwan Policy: Constructing the Triangle* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Ramon Myers (ed.), *A Unique Relationship The United States and the Republic of China Under the Taiwan Relations Act* (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1989).

⁶³ Russell Ong, *China's Strategic Competition with the United States* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Maximilian Terhalle, *The Transition of Global Order* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); David Rapkin and William Thompson, *Transition Scenarios China and the United States in the Twenty-First Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013); Evelyn Goh, *The Struggle for Order Hegemony, Hierarchy & Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

broad array of existing literature on US foreign policy and China but with an exclusive⁶⁴ focus on official presidential sources. At times I mention how other sources of discourse influenced official rhetoric and revealed the broader landscape of China in the US imagination. But this is not the major focus of my thesis even if it is occasionally important to indicate.

The analysis I present and the analytical logics I derive from my genealogical engagement address how China came to be a problem in US foreign policy and how this conditions the way the US perceives its imperatives and potential ‘solutions’. In one sense, what becomes apparent in the genealogy I present is how China was perceived as the solution to another problem, the on-going crises in US capitalism dating back to at least the 1890 recession⁶⁵, and the potential regional hegemony of Japan, a concern dating back to the 19th century as well. China would not emerge as a problem in its own right for the US until the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949. Although I indicate these features where relevant they remain secondary to my concern of demonstrating the presences of the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics in US presidential discourses of China.

1.4 Chapter Outline

In Chapter 2 I will outline how my thesis relates to the existing literature on US foreign policy towards China. In Chapter 3 I establish my analytical framework focusing on how I conceptualise my argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics; the genealogical approach I adopt; the method of discourse analysis which complements this and the manner in which I read US presidential discourses.

Chapters 4 to 9 contain the main substantive elements of this thesis where I present my genealogical analysis of US presidential discourse of China from 1844 until 2016. Chapter 10 will draw this analysis together and reflect on the limitations of this thesis and consider some of the promising questions emerging from the arguments presented here.

⁶⁴ The majority of my analysis is on presidential sources though I include a couple speeches of key importance when it came to setting out US China policy by other administration officials.

⁶⁵ Julian Go, *Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History* (London: Verso, 2011).

Chapter 2 – Approaches to US Foreign Policy and China

2.1 Introduction

The approach this thesis adopts falls within the broad tent of critical theory, described by Robert Cox as a theoretical disposition that “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. ... Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts”.⁶⁶ Cox contrasts this to problem-solving theory, an approach that “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble”.⁶⁷

In this light, the investigation will adopt an understanding suggested by Campbell that US foreign policy is a political practice central to the “constitution, production, and maintenance” of US political identity and its discursive constructions of ‘others’ such as the Chinese.⁶⁸ Consequently, how China is characterised in US discourses is a “practice of interpretation”, contingent on how the US understands itself and its role towards China, and vice versa.⁶⁹ Arthur Waldron calls for a more open process of thinking China is needed, one that necessitates in depth historical knowledge, imagination and the ability to think beyond existing philosophical and geopolitical imaginations.⁷⁰ My concern in the rest of the thesis takes a step back from this important concern to establish the specific logics that inform US presidential discourses towards China.

This chapter will briefly demonstrate how this thesis organises the extensive literature on US China relations in the context of my theoretical inclinations and argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics in US presidential discourses towards China. I begin with the body of literature that has inspired my approach and that I wish to associate this

⁶⁶ Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory’, *Millennium* 10(1981): 129. This is not to be equated with the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School even if substantial parallels exist.

⁶⁷ Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order’, 128-129. For an engaging though at times limited critique of Coxian inspired approaches see Tara McCormack, *Critique, Security and Power: The Political Limits to Emancipatory Approaches* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

⁶⁸ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 8.

⁶⁹ William Callahan, *The Pessimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁷⁰ Arthur Waldron, ‘The rise of China: military and political implications’, *Review of International Studies* 31 (2005): 733.

research with. This includes work that can be loosely categorised as critical in Cox's sense. I then summarise the debate between what should be overall considered as problem solving approaches including the texts that argue China is a threat to the US or global interests and the corresponding literature that sees China as an opportunity for the US to take advantage of. Following this I outline the general historical surveys of US China relations before considering some of the historical texts that focus on more specific periods.

2.2 Critical Approaches to China in the US Imagination

In chapter 1 I indicated some of the critical literature that this thesis attempts to engage with and contribute too. In this section I will briefly extend this outline to indicate the broad areas of scholarship I have been influenced by. Despite the prevalence of sources emphasising a potential China threat an increasing number of critical approaches have emerged that interrogate how and why China has come to be constituted as threat, is geopolitically imagined and how these imaginings and renderings are related to capitalism more broadly.⁷¹ This includes Chengxin Pan, Daniel Vukovich, Michael Barr and Lily Ling who formed the approximate literary landscape for my theoretical entryway into US foreign policy and China by interrogating how China features in the US imagination.⁷² In a general sense, Zhang Longxi has asked, "what could be a better sign of the Other than a fictionalized space of China? What [could] furnish the West with a better reservoir for its dreams, fantasies and

⁷¹ Andrew Latham, 'China in the Contemporary American Geopolitical Imagination', *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 28 (2001): 138-145; Zhang Longxi, 'The Myth of The Other: China in the Eyes of the West', *Critical Inquiry* 15 (1988): 108-131; Chengxin Pan, 'The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: the Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 29 (2004): 305-331; Lily Ling, 'Worlds beyond Westphalia: Daoist dialectics and the 'China threat'', *Review of International Studies* 39 (2013): 549-568; Oliver Turner, 'Threatening' China and US security: the international politics of identity', *Review of International Studies* 39 (2013): 903-924; Daniel Vukovich, 'China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy', *Cultural Critique* 76 (2010): 148-172; David Martin Jones, *The Image of China in Western Social and Political Thought* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001); A Aldridge, *The Dragon and the Eagle The Presence of China in the American Enlightenment* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993); Peter Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), *Anglo-America and its Discontents* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *Sinicization and the Rise of China* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Gregory Moore, 'The Difference a Day Makes: Understanding the End of the Sino-American "Tacit Alliance"', *International Studies Review* 16 (2014): 540-574; Brice Harris, 'United States Strategic Culture and Asia-Pacific Security', *Contemporary Security Policy* 35 (2014): 290-309; Christopher Connery, 'Pacific Rim Discourse: The U.S Global Imaginary in the Late Cold War Years', *boundary 2* (1994): 30-56.

⁷² Chengxin Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012); Barr, *Who's Afraid of China?*; Lily Ling, *The Dao of World Politics and the Rise of China: US-China Relations Post-Westphalia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Daniel Vukovich, *China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the PRC* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013); Timothy Kendall, *Ways of Seeing China From Yellow Peril to Shangri-La* (Western Australia: Curtin University Books, 2005); Eric Hayot, Haun Saussy and Steven Gao (eds), *Sinographies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); Wang Hui, *The Politics of Imagining Asia* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).

utopias?”.⁷³ China is in this regard the exemplar space to be filled by US imaginations. Barr has engaged with how “the West’s own past, hopes and fears shape the way it thinks about and engages with China and how the West expresses its own moral confusion and cultural divide through a fear of China”.⁷⁴

Vukovich analyses the integral relationship between capitalism and orientalism to critique how knowledge about China has been produced in the West through a colonial discourse analysis.⁷⁵ Vukovich argues that the Western understanding of China has progressed from one of “essential difference” to one the inevitable process of “becoming-the-same”.⁷⁶ This “sameness” though is still structured by “a hierarchical difference” and confers a sense of positional superiority on the West.⁷⁷ Vukovich argues that the “rise of China and its economy must have effects on intellectual production”, and this is reflected in the literature referece in the preceding chapter and the following section.⁷⁸ Vukovich’s declaration that “it should no longer be possible to speak of orientalism and China without also speaking of capitalism and the enduring presence of the Cold War” contributed to my concern with the logic of capital in US discourses of China.⁷⁹ Put plainly, Vukovich states that “it is no accident that the orientalist logic of sameness dovetails with capital’s own logic of a homogenising, abstract sameness”.⁸⁰ Vukovich argues that China’s transformation by capitalism and the increasing global flows-including of authorised knowledge producers- between it and the West are the necessary background and conditions of possibility for sinological-orientalism in its current form”.⁸¹ For Vukovich, there is general consensus that the West’s understanding of China has been constituted on an economic basis, though he argues that the consequences are yet to be adequately investigated.

Ming Dong Gu has also adapted Said’s understanding of orientalism specifically in reference to Western knowledge productions of China through his conception of “Sinologism”.⁸² For Gu, not all knowledge production regarding China demonstrates such traits described by

⁷³ Zhang Longxi, *Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China* (California: Stanford University Press, 1998): 21-22.

⁷⁴ Barr, *Who’s Afraid of China?*, 7.

⁷⁵ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 7-8.

⁷⁶ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 1.

⁷⁷ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 3.

⁷⁸ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 142.

⁷⁹ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 21.

⁸⁰ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 5.

⁸¹ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*, 143.

⁸² Ming Dong Gu, *Sinologism: An alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism* (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

Vukovich as orientalist, dominative and contingent on “Cold War-era sinology”, or the prevalence of binary Cold War frames of reference.⁸³ Gu defines sinologism as “an implicit system of ideas, notions, theories, approaches, and paradigms first conceived and employed by the West in the encounter with China to deal with all things Chinese”.⁸⁴ Sinologism then “is both a system of knowledge and a practical theory of knowledge production” where the former covers the complex phenomena in Western based China studies and the latter describes the way the West is engaged in generating knowledge about China.⁸⁵ William Callahan for example, has investigated the manner in which various ‘China threat’ theories simply assume this as self-evident, where as discussion on China constitutes a “practice of interpretation”, and the notion of threat is what should be problematized not assumed.⁸⁶

Chengxin Pan has critiqued the manner in which many US scholars, when debating what China is or is not, consider that “China is ultimately a knowable object”.⁸⁷ He sets out to question the underlying ontological epistemological commitments in the “mainstream IR community”, contending that how these thinkers and many policy makers see themselves as “disinterested observers”, or problem solvers in Cox’s formulation as I classify them here.⁸⁸ Pan claims that in fact their claims are “not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, pre-existing Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice” that legitimises US foreign policy. Pan expands on these criticisms in an extensive critique of how China is rendered across of a variety of sources arguing that the threat and opportunity narratives, that I detail in the following section, emanate from the same basis of colonial desire.⁸⁹ Pan and Vukovich served as some of the major inspirational provocations that guided the initial steps of this thesis and I hope that their concerns are reflected throughout my analysis.

Turner, as mentioned previously, argues that a “key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect the components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological)

⁸³ Daniel Vukovich, ‘China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy’, *Cultural Critique* 76 (2010): 163. For example see William Callahan, *The Pessoptimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); William Callahan and Elena Barabantseva (eds), *China Orders the World* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011); Agnew, ‘Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics; Marcus Power and Giles Moran, ‘Towards a critical geopolitics of China’s engagement with African development’, *Geopolitics* 15 (2010): 462-495; Barr, *Who’s Afraid of China?*

⁸⁴ Gu, *Sinologism*, 7.

⁸⁵ Gu, *Sinologism*, 7.

⁸⁶ William Callahan, ‘Forum: The Rise of China – How to understand China: the dangers of being a rising power’, *Review of International Studies* 31 (2005): 703.

⁸⁷ Pan, ‘The “China Threat” in American Self-Imagination’, 305.

⁸⁸ Pan, ‘The “China Threat” in American Self-Imagination’, 306.

⁸⁹ Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics*.

deemed most fundamental to its being”.⁹⁰ He adopts a scope similar to the one adopted here where he outlines his contribution as along the lines that “no volume has yet been designed to explore American images of China and their significance to US China policy across the full history of their relations”.⁹¹ He does though, focus on a broader array of sources including official, media, art and literature. Turner traces how four identity constructions of China as “Idealised, Opportunity, Uncivilised and Threatening” emerged in the US during the 19th century and then returned in varying ways through the history of US-China relations to shape how the US thought about China and itself.⁹² Turner aims to address what he sees an imbalance in the analysis of China that focuses more on the material than the ideational and argues that these images of China have been fundamental to “formulation, enactment and justification” of US China policy.⁹³ Turner’s approach constitutes what can be described as an archaeological approach in the Foucauldian sense that will be described in chapter 3. His text ultimately provided an excellent initial framework to thinking about US foreign policy towards China but as this thesis will demonstrate, identity, or as I understand it the logic of identity is only part of the analysis.

Recently there has been steady stream of other studies that take a broadly critical approach to the US foreign policy towards China, their relations in general and the effect this might have on Asia. John Agnew has critiqued the linear narrative embedded in Western geopolitics and its construction of “China’s rise”⁹⁴, Eric Blanchard has demonstrated the role that metaphors played in early US-China relations⁹⁵, Jonna Nyman has looked at the securitisation of energy by US elite actors during the failed bid of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation for US company Unocal in 2005⁹⁶, Jarrod Hayes has examined how the role of threat construction in US relations with India and China⁹⁷, Kean Lim has examined the tension between state centric geopolitical concerns and transnational geo-economic formations in US-

⁹⁰ Turner, *American Images of China*, 30.

⁹¹ Turner, *American Images of China*, 31.

⁹² Turner, *American Images of China*, 6.

⁹³ Turner, *American Images of China*, 7.

⁹⁴ John Agnew, ‘Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese Particularity’, *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51 (2010): 569-582.

⁹⁵ Eric Blanchard, ‘Constituting China: the role of metaphor in the discourses of early Sino-American relations’, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16 (2013): 177-205. See also Edward Slingerland and Eric Blanchard, ‘Collision with China: Conceptual Metaphor Analysis, Somatic Marking, and the EP-3 Incident’, *International Studies Quarterly* 51 (2007): 53-77.

⁹⁶ Jonna Nyman, ‘Red Storm Ahead’: Securitisation of Energy in US-China Relations’, *Millennium* 43 (2014): 43-65.

⁹⁷ Hayes, *Constructing National Security*.

China relations concerning Taiwan⁹⁸, Cotton Seiler has explored how the US media imagines the future potential of Chinese automobility as reflective of the same dynamics in the US⁹⁹, Jan Hanska deploys the 2013 film *Pacific Rim* as a interpretive tool for examining Obama's 'pivot' to Asia¹⁰⁰, Pan has more recently looked at how the 'Indo-Pacific' is manufactured as a "super-region" to buttress anxiety about China's rise¹⁰¹ and Turner has examined Obama's Asia policy through a critical geopolitical and postcolonial lens focusing on the significance of identity.¹⁰²

In a similar manner to my approach here a number of other texts engage with how the US has imagined the Pacific spatially and explored the implications of how this imagining related to US practices and what this signified about the US itself.¹⁰³ There are also more culturally focused texts concerned with how China has been encountered in Western history more broadly.¹⁰⁴ For instance Bruce Cummings argues we should erase the domestic-international line when considering how the US expanded first Westward across the continent and then into East Asia as a way of conceptualising how US power today is conditioned much more by its relations with East Asia than Europe.¹⁰⁵ Teemu Ruskola has considered how a form of legal Orientalism towards China was visible in US law and traced how this contributed to the constitution of a legal modernity and a legal exceptionalism as the basis of US foreign policies in the 20th century.¹⁰⁶ Although comparatively small compared to the body of

⁹⁸ Kean Lim, 'What You See is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-economic Realities, and the 'China Threat' Imaginary', *Antipode* 44 (2012): 1348-1375.

⁹⁹ Cotton Seiler, 'Welcoming China to Modernity: US Fantasies of Chinese Automobility', *Public Culture* 24 (2012): 357-384.

¹⁰⁰ Jan Hanska, 'Popular culture, US Security Policy, and the Asian pivot: reading *Pacific Rim* as a justification of American strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region', *Critical Studies on Security* 2 (2014): 323-336.

¹⁰¹ Chengxin Pan, 'The 'Indo-Pacific' and geopolitical anxieties about China's rise in the Asian regional order', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 68 (2014): 453-469.

¹⁰² Oliver Turner, 'China, India and the US Rebalance to the Asia Pacific: The Geopolitics of Rising Identities', *Geopolitics* 21 (2016): 922-944.

¹⁰³ Paul Lyons, *American Pacificism: Oceania in the US Imagination* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Rob Wilson, *Reimagining the American Pacific* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2000); Arif Dirlik (ed.), *What Is In A Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); John Eperjesi, *The Imperialist Imaginary Visions of Asia and the Pacific in American Culture* (USA: University Press of New England, 2005); David Weir, *American Orient* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011).

¹⁰⁴ David Hall and Roger Ames, *Anticipating China Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995); Zhijian Tao, *Drawing the Dragon Western European Reinvention of China* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009); Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik (eds), *Asia/Pacific as the Space of Cultural Production* (Chapel hill: Duke University Press, 1995); Jonathan Spence, *The Chan's Great Continent China in Western Minds* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998).

¹⁰⁵ Bruce Cummings, *Dominion from Sea to Sea Pacific Ascendancy and American Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Teemu Ruskola, *Legal Orientalism China, The United States, and Modern Law* (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2013).

literature concerned with addressing the “China Threat”, these texts constitute the approximate theoretical milieu within which my thesis is related to.

As should be clear, critical approaches that analyse US foreign policy towards China and US-China relations in general are an increasingly extensive body of literature. The thesis intends to add to this by incorporating some of their insights regarding the role of images, capitalism and the role of the imagination when conducting genealogical discourse analysis of US presidential discourses of China.

2.3 The Problem-Solving Approaches: China as Threat or Opportunity

This thesis began initially as a response to the overwhelming production of texts that approached China as a problem to be addressed by US foreign policy. The majority of these texts adopted a line of argument indicating that China was a threat to US interests and hegemony either regionally or globally. Closely related to this trend was the genre that considered China as an opportunity and promoted cooperation between the US and China. It is in this genealogy, so to speak, that it is worthwhile engaging more substantially with this genre of political analysis.

A number of events contribute to this narrative, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism in Eastern Europe, the events at Tiananmen Square, George H.W. Bush’s declarations of a New World Order, and the collapse of Japan’s economy and subsequently its perceived threat to the US. This is not an exhaustive list but relevant to the emergence of what can be described as the ‘China threat’ literature whose central motif is “the inevitable enmity with China” and subsequent US decline or endurance.¹⁰⁷ This literature tends to constitute a narrow neorealist approach to politics, which when subjected to critique appears more as reactionary nationalism than implied ‘objective’ analysis.

¹⁰⁷ Wooseon Choi, ‘Structural realism and Dulles’s China policy’, *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012): 119. A brief overview of the China Threat literature includes: Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). More recent texts include: Reed Hundt, *In China’s Shadow: The Crisis of American Entrepreneurship* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Christopher Menges, *China The Gathering Threat* (Tennessee: Nelson Current, 2005); Peter Navarro, *The Coming China Wars* (New Jersey: FT Hall, 2008), Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, *Death by China* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2011); Michael Beckley, ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure?’, *International Security* 36 (2011): 41-78; Thomas Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability of Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. policy toward East Asia’, *International Security* 31 (2006): 81-126; Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World* (New York: Penguin, 2009); John Mearsheimer, ‘China’s Unpeaceful Rise’, *Current History* (April, 2006): 160-162; John Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (2010): 381-396; Herbert Lee and Ian Storey (eds), *The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths, and Reality* (Oxon: Routledge, 2004); Bruce Jones, *Still Ours to Lead* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014).

This dynamic finds its popular articulation in a genre of China threat literature which includes books such as Robert Kaplan's *Asia Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of A Stable Pacific*, Geoff Dyer's *The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition* and Aaron Friedberg's *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*.¹⁰⁸ This literature reproduces a zero-sum logic where space exists objectively as something to master and dominate rather than a material descriptor that is given meaning through socially constructed discourses. From this it follows that the China threat literature understands China as an objective threat rather than a subjectively interpreted entity. In one more hyperbolic formulation, a group of authors declared, "Asia is not a theatre at peace...suspicions rooted in rivalry and nationalism run deep. The continent harbours every traditional and non-traditional challenge of our age".¹⁰⁹ China, unspoken of in this formulation was central to those suspicions and rivalries.

John Mearsheimer is emblematic of the threat-orientated analysis evident when he asked, "can China rise peacefully? My answer is no".¹¹⁰ He argues that "America is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the cold war", a policy approach he deemed necessary to contain China.¹¹¹ Mearsheimer encapsulates the neorealist propensity to displace observation and context with 'theory'. Daniel Vukovich describes this process as a form of "economism" where an argument tends towards abstraction as "the proper arena of truth".¹¹² He has also updated his 'canonical' text on offensive realism, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, to include a new chapter that incorporates these thoughts where his argument briefly stated is that "China and the United States are destined to be adversaries if China's power grows".¹¹³ Through a reductionist reading of US international history, Mearsheimer comments "I expect China to act the way the United States has acted over its long history", exemplifying Vukovich's argument that China is deemed a

¹⁰⁸ Robert Kaplan, *Asia Cauldron: The south China Sea and the End of A Stable Pacific* (New York: Random House, 2014); Geoff Dyer, *The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition* (London: Penguin Group, 2014); Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012).

¹⁰⁹ Kurt Campbell, Nirav Patel and Vikram Singh, *The Power of Balance: America in Asia* (Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2008): 14-15.

¹¹⁰ John Mearsheimer, 'China's Unpeaceful Rise', *Current History* (April, 2006): 160.

¹¹¹ Mearsheimer, 'China's Unpeaceful Rise', 162.

¹¹² Daniel Vukovich, 'China in Theory: The Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy', *Cultural Critique* 76 (2010): 149.

¹¹³ John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014): 4.

seamless fit for a reductionist theory.¹¹⁴ From this perspective there is no need to interrogate the broader aspects of China and how the US relates to it as this is deemed secondary to the obvious nature of China's 'threat'.

Chengxin Pan notes that objectifying China as a 'threat' "has much to do with the particular mode of U.S. self-imagination", one characterised as utopia achieved, or in Hegelian inspired notions of the "End of History".¹¹⁵ This universalising imagination can only behave in an imperial manner when it encounters something alien to its formulations, an inside/outside dynamic to borrow from Rob Walker, where these imaginations can be read as "historically specific understanding[s] of the character and location of political life in general".¹¹⁶

Particularly representative of this outlook is Robert Kaplan's 2010 publication *Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*. Kaplan's views are worth analysing due to his position in the US policy establishment.¹¹⁷ Adopting a particular American-centric perspective in relation to the Indian Ocean he presumes a pre-political state of enmity where difference is constituted as conflict and any potential state on 'the rise' is to be contained.

Kaplan describes the current era as one of a "fading empire alongside rising powers, benign and unbenign" where, should the US's engagement with world lessen, there would be devastating consequences for humanity and the preservation of a balance of power among China and other rising powers like India and Japan.¹¹⁸ He interprets China's growing significance in the Indian Ocean as suspicious due to its dual-use civilian-military facilities and goes on to assert that US ability to comprehend this will determine its own destiny "and that of the West as a whole".¹¹⁹ This vision, this imaginative imperative that the Western order is at risk in the Indian Ocean due to China's 'rise', reveals a privileging of the particularity described by Walker as a universalising framework for understanding world politics. This encloses the future within strict confinements of 'legitimate' behaviour and

¹¹⁴ John Mearsheimer, 'The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3 (2010): 389; Vukovich, 'China in Theory', 153.

¹¹⁵ Pan, 'The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination', 313; 312; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Penguin, 1993).

¹¹⁶ R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 5.

¹¹⁷ Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House, 2010). His profile for *The Atlantic* states he has "been a consultant to the U. S. Army's Special Forces Regiment, the U. S. Air Force, and the U. S. Marines... a distinguished Visiting Professor in National Security at the United States Naval Academy... [and]... lectured at the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Pentagon's Joint Staff, major universities, [and] the CIA". 'Robert D. Kaplan', *The Atlantic* (<http://www.theatlantic.com/robert-d-kaplan#bio> 17 May 2012). He is by no means unique but is a useful exemplar of the views expressed here.

¹¹⁸ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 330-331.

¹¹⁹ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 11; xiv.

prevents adequate interpretation of existing conditions in world politics. Here, this manifests itself through a ‘rising’ China attempting to articulate, enact and legitimate its increasing political role and a hegemonic Western, if not principally US discourse, of pre-eminence in world politics. This enmity-driven discourse over China’s political existence often leads to reflexive referencing to military technology as solutions to differences of political understanding.¹²⁰

W. Wertheim, writing in 1954, decisively captured an underlying assumption that remains prevalent regarding contemporary fetish for ‘the Rise of China’ discourse in contemporary US imaginations:

The temporary hegemony of western European civilisation has distorted our view of the past and made our interest one-sided. Because the world had been dominated by the West for a hundred twenty years...the West came to consider itself as the focus of world history and the measure of all things.¹²¹

This process of confining discourse to particular assumptions is described by Herbert Marcuse as “the closing of the universe of discourse”, where such a “closed language does not demonstrate and explain- it communicates decision, dictum, command”.¹²² Marcuse’s argument is relevant here as it captures the how the threat literature exist within its own particular discursive framework whilst taking this particularity to be universal. So China being a threat is logical conclusion of the discursive parameters that the threat literature operates within. The threat literature most importantly, does not interrogate how it is China comes to be understood as a threat or not, or how the practices of US foreign policy become meaningful through discourses and other social practices.

The smaller body of opportunity inclined authors often locate China within the narrow confinement of a ‘liberal world order’ of possibilities and potentialities are evident in the US discourse surrounding China’s ‘rise’. Even in this line of argument, the opportunity they described relies on the need to ‘do’ something about China. The major premise of these arguments when they do differ from the more threat orientated approaches is that this is an opportunity for the liberal order to demonstrate its credentials by peacefully incorporating China in to it. For example John Ikenberry claims that the major task of the current liberal

¹²⁰ U.S.A. Department of Defence, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century’, *Council for Foreign Relations* (<http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/sustaining-us-global-leadership-priorities-21st-century-defense/p26976> , 14 May 2012).

¹²¹ W.F. Wertheim, ‘Early Asian Trade: An Appreciation of J. C. van Leur’, *The Journal of Asian Studies* 13 (1954): 172.

¹²² Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (New York: Routledge, 1991). 87; 105

international order “is to make it so expansive and so institutionalised that China has no choice but to become a full-fledged member of it”.¹²³ Order though, implied the ‘order’ imposed by Ikenberry’s liberal system. Bruce Gilley has commented more optimistically, that “China’s embrace of democracy will be one of the defining moments of modern political history”.¹²⁴ Other authors that adopt an opportunity-orientated approach include Hugh White, Thomas Christensen and Donald Gross.¹²⁵ Stephen Roach develops the most nuanced of these approaches arguing that there is now a state of economic co-dependency between the US and China and only cooperation can safely manage this relationship.¹²⁶ China is less an opportunity in Roach’s assessment than a necessity.

2.4 US-China Surveys

The most useful survey based texts used to guide this thesis have been by Warren Cohen, Michael Schaller, Chi Wang and Gordon Chang.¹²⁷ Their work helped guide my focus as well as provide invaluable context to how the US had interacted with China more broadly over the time period I engage with. I should emphasise that this thesis is not attempt to develop a new narrative or offer some kind of revisionist history of US-China relations, but an attempt to derive a more precise analytical framework for approaching the history and present of US foreign policy to China via analysis of presidential discourses.

Michael Oksenberg and Robert Oxnam’s *Dragon and Eagle: United States –China Relations Past and Future* and David Shambaugh’s *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* both capture the complicated and popular imaginations of US-China relations.¹²⁸ More importantly for my focus there is a history of literature engaging with the role that image and perception

¹²³ Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West’, 37. For other similar analyses see: Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power’, *International Security* 27 (2003): 5-56; E. Timperlake and W. Triplett, *Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America* (Washington D.C.: Regnery, 1999); Hugh White, ‘Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable’, *Survival: Global Politics* (2008): 85-103.

¹²⁴ Bruce Gilley, *China’s Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and Where it Will Lead* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004): 243.

¹²⁵ Hugh White, *The China Choice Why we Should Share Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Thomas Christensen, *The China Challenge* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015); Donald Gross, *The China Fallacy How the US Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Patrick Mendis, *Peaceful War How the Chinese Dream and the American Destiny Create a Pacific New World Order* (New York: University Press of America, 2014);

¹²⁶ Stephen Roach, *Unbalanced The Codependency of America and China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).

¹²⁷ Cohen, *America’s Response to China*; Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twenty-First Century*; Chi Wang, *The United States and China since World War*; Gordon Chang, *Fateful Ties A History of America’s Preoccupation with*; Dong Wang, *The United States and China A History from the Eighteenth Century to the*.

¹²⁸ Michael Oksenberg and Robert Oxnam (eds), *Dragon and Eagle: United States –China Relations Past and Future* (New York: Basic Books, 1978); David Shambaugh (ed.), *Tangled Titans: The United States and China* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013).

perform in the political relationship between the US and China.¹²⁹ These deal explicitly with how China is perceived and how the various images of China impact on policy. They do not however engage with more explicit debates regarding the logics of geopolitics or capital but are useful reference points for understanding contemporary perceptions. There are also a number of other excellent historical surveys by the likes of Harry Harding¹³⁰, John Fairbank¹³¹, David Lampton¹³², Rosemary Foot¹³³, Robert Sutter¹³⁴. The body of literature in this regard is the most extensive with regard to the US and China, of which many contributed to the background knowledge of my analysis and in this in this vein they are worth citing here.¹³⁵

While these texts provide excellent points of reference and context, they are not intended to offer significant analytical insight into why the US thought or behaved in a particular way. Now, this is by no means an argument that these texts are irrelevant or any less useful, without my research would have been substantially more adrift than it was at times, but I attempt a form of analysis and argument that they do not.

2.5 Historically Specific Texts

Many authors have focused on specific periods to establish what happened in a narrative sense and these have proved an invaluable context to developing my argument and considering the events US presidents would refer to. There has been a recent boom in broad assessments of US-China relations in the 21st century and how the US should respond and has responded to a 'rising' China.¹³⁶ There have been a number of important and insightful texts

¹²⁹ John Fairbank, John, *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976); Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong (eds), *Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations* (New York: University Press of America, 1998); Harold Isaacs, *Scratches on our Minds* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1980).

¹³⁰ Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship The United States and China since 1972* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992).

¹³¹ John Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

¹³² David Lampton, *Same Bed Different Dreams Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002).

¹³³ Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power U.S. Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹³⁴ Robert Sutter, *U.S.-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present* (New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2010).

¹³⁵ Michael Hunt, *The Making of a Special Friendship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); James Mann, *About Face A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Bruce Elleman, *International Competition in China, 1889-1991* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015); Radha Sinha, *Sino-American Relations* (New York: Palgrav Macmillan, 2003); Arnold Jiang, *The United States and China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Thomas Etzold (ed.), *Aspects of Sino-American Relations Since 1784* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978).

¹³⁶ William Tow and Douglas Stuart (eds), *The New US Strategy towards Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015); Li Mingjiang and Kalyan Kumburi (eds), *New Dynamics in US-China Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015); Michael

on issues surrounding Chinese immigration into the US during the 19th century the subsequent manner in which popular resentment towards these immigrants fed into official narratives and actions into the 20th century.¹³⁷ Some have focused on engaging with the historical ‘origins’ of the US encounter with China.¹³⁸ And there are a number of texts that present broad histories of the US in Asia.¹³⁹ These texts are generally historical in orientation and none adopt a genealogical approach or discourse analysis.

I will also indicate in the brief introductions to my genealogy chapters 4 through 9 the more specific texts that cover particular presidencies but it is useful to indicate here how some of these more general texts constitute the larger ecosystem in which my analysis takes place.¹⁴⁰ I am not particularly concerned with indicating which of these sources are in most agreement with the argument I present mainly because the nature of what I am attempting to do is substantially different to what these more historical accounts are intended to do. I would like

Tai, *US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015); Jean-Marc Blanchard and Simon Shen (eds), *Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-US Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

¹³⁷ Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labour and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975); Stuart Creighton Miller, *The Unwelcome Immigrant The American Image of the Chinese, 1785-1882* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); Sucheng Chan (ed.), *Entry Denied Exclusion and the Chinese Community in America, 1882-1943* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Roger Daniels, *Not Like US Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890-1924* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997); Jean Pfaelzer, *Driven Out The Forgotten War Against Chinese Americans* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007); Charles McClain, *In Search of Equality The Chinese Struggle against Discrimination in Nineteenth-Century America* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); R. David Arkush and Leo Lee (eds), *Land Without Ghosts Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989); Martin Gold, *Forbidden Citizens Chinese Exclusion and the U.S. Congress: A Legislative History* (Virginia: TheCapital.net, 2012); Iris Chang, *The Chinese in America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003).

¹³⁸ Macabe Keliher, ‘Anglo-American Rivalry and the Origins of U.S. China Policy’, *Diplomatic History* 31 (2007): 227- 257; Eric Dolin, *When America First Met China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012); John Haddad, *America’s First Adventure in China: Trade, Treaties, Opium, and Salvation* (USA: Temple University Press, 2014).

¹³⁹ Richard O’Oonnor, *Pacific Destiny* (Canada: Little, Brown & Company, 1969); Jean Heffer, *The United States and the Pacific* trans. By W. Wilson (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2002); John Perry, *Facing West Americans and the Opening of the Pacific* (London: Praeger, 1994); Alfred Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Tyler Dennett, *Americans In East Asia* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922); Marvin Kalb and Elie Abel, *Roots of Involvement: The US in Asia 1784-1971* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971); Arthur Cotterell, *Western Power in Asia Its Slow Rise and Swift Fall* (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2009); Warren Cohen (eds), *Pacific Passage The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); David Finkelstein, *Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950* (Virginia, George Mason University Press, 1993).

¹⁴⁰ Jean Garrison, *Making China Policy From Nixon To G.W. Bush* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Nancy Bernkop Tucker (eds), *China Confidential American diplomats and sino-american relations, 1945-1996* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Gordan Chang, *Friends and Enemies The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (California: Stanford University Press, 1990); Bevin Alexander, *The Strange Connection U.S. Intervention in China, 1944-1972* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992); Thomas Lutze, *China’s Inevitable Revolution Rethinking America’s Loss to the Communists* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Robert McClellan, *The Heathen Chinese A Study of American Attitudes toward China, 1890-1905* (USA: Ohio State University Press); Tan Qingshan, *The Making of U.S. China Policy From Normalization to the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992).

to reinforce though how the argument and analysis I make had benefitted greatly from the existing accounts of US-China relations by way of contextualising the speeches that I analyse.

2.6 Beyond the US and China

I do not explicitly address the broader literature on US foreign policy though it is worth briefly indicating that a number of sources outline the broader context to understanding US foreign policy towards China. For example, Perry Anderson has majestically considered the relationship between the geopolitical thought of US grand strategists and the practices of US foreign policy to chart the way US imperial practices are intertwined with its role as the guarantor of capital.¹⁴¹ Although not explicitly as a discourse analysis but with a similar goal in mind, Joseph Siracusa and Aiden Warren have traced the development of US national security doctrines from Washington to Obama and William Walker III does so in a similar vein to determine the core values contributing to a sense of exceptionalism in US foreign policy.¹⁴² Joan Hoff detects a Faustian tone at the heart of US foreign policy from Wilson to George W. Bush, where it considers itself a moral force for good in the world despite the harms that this engenders when practiced, which is not to dissimilar from the arguments made by Peter Gowan on how US business elites and foreign policy thinkers attempted to ensure US global dominance.¹⁴³

Frank Ninkovich makes the argument that early 20th century US Presidents constructed foreign policy on the basis of civilizational values, as a discursive precursor to ideas about modernization.¹⁴⁴ Walter McDougall traces a similar tension between the US as a superior moral entity and its more ‘crusader’ like urges.¹⁴⁵ There are important arguments made regarding the economic basis of American empire and how this has affected the global capitalism.¹⁴⁶ Similar to my approach although from a distinctly different theoretical background, Wesley Widmaier has attempted a more general analysis on how US presidents

¹⁴¹ Perry Anderson, *American Foreign Policy and its Thinkers* (London: Verso, 2015).

¹⁴² Joseph Siracusa and Aiden Warren, *Presidential Doctrines US National Security From George Washington to Barack Obama* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016); William Walker III, *National Security and Core Values in American History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹⁴³ Joan Hoff, *A Faustian Foreign Policy From Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance* (London: Verso, 1999).

¹⁴⁴ Frank Ninkovich, *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): xi.

¹⁴⁵ Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (New York: Mariner Books, 1997).

¹⁴⁶ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism The Political Economy of American Empire* (London: Verso 2012); Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (eds), *American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Radhika Desai, *Geopolitical Economy After US Hegemony, Globalization and Empire* (London: Pluto Press, 2013).

have constructed crises from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama. He demonstrates in genealogical fashion, even if he does not do so in those terms, how crises were constructed in ways that led to foreign overreach which were then followed by more limited counter commitments.¹⁴⁷

There is a broader body of literature on US foreign policy specifically which can be categorised in similar fashion as I have here with US-China texts. These include critical texts¹⁴⁸ which consider the role of ideas and narratives in US foreign policy, problem-solving approaches¹⁴⁹ which tend to adopt neorealist approaches to developing some notion of grand strategy, general historical surveys¹⁵⁰ which present a broad narrative of US foreign policy, historically specific analyses¹⁵¹ which focus on particular time periods Presidencies and approaches concerned explicitly with economic dynamics¹⁵². This is not to say that all of

¹⁴⁷ Wesley Widmaier, *Presidential Rhetoric from Wilson to Obama* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015).

¹⁴⁸ Walter Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Walter Hixson, *American Foreign Relations A New Diplomatic History* (Oxon: Routledge 2016); Michael Krenn (ed.), *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Colonial Period to the Present* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998); Gretchen Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings The Monroe Doctrine* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005); John Thompson, *The Roots of America's Global Role* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Michael Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Henry Nau, *Conservative Internationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); David Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, Or Empire The American Debate over International Relations, 1789-1941* (Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2009); Michael Adas, *Dominance by Design* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Victor Kiernan, *America From White Settlement to World Hegemony* (London: Verso, 2005); Alyosha Goldstein (ed.), *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2014).

¹⁴⁹ Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004); Christopher Hemmer, *American Pendulum: Recurring Debates in US Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Barry Posen, *Restraint A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Peter Trubowitz, *Politics and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

¹⁵⁰ Noel Maurer, *The Empire Trap* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); David Wrobel *The End of American Exceptionalism* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993); Anders Stephenson, *Manifest Destiny* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Alfred Eckes Jr., *Opening America's Market US Foreign Trade Policy since 1776* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1997); Stephen Sestanovich, *Maximalist America in The World from Truman to Obama* (New York: Vintage Books, 2014); Seyom Brown, *Faces of Power Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy From Truman to Obama* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

¹⁵¹ David Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire"* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); Stephen Cohen, *Failed Crusade America and the Tragedy of Post-communist Russia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000); Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire* (London: Verso, 2003); Richard Falk, *The Declining World Order America's Imperial Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 2004); Frederik Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds), *Nixon in the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Colin Dueck, *The Obama Doctrine American Grand Strategy Today* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland (eds), *The Obama Doctrine* (Oxon: Routledge, 2017).

¹⁵² Henry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Modern Reader, 1969); Ernest May, *Imperial Democracy* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961); Lloyd Gardner, *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*

these can be categorised as one or the other but is a useful means for summarising some of the literature on US foreign policy more broadly that were nonetheless relevant to developing the argument I present here.

The literature that examines US foreign policy towards Japan especially towards the end of the 1980s was also at times remarkably similar in its variety and analytical focus to the literature on the US and China.¹⁵³ This is notable as some of the China threat literature has direct links to the Japan threat literature of the 1980s.¹⁵⁴ Significantly, the arguments made by the likes of Toal and David Campbell with regards to US foreign policy and Japan are similar to the critical texts on the US and China indicated in section 2.2.¹⁵⁵

(Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Thomas McCormick, *America's Half Century* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Martijn Konings, *The Development of American Finance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Yanis Varoufakis, *The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy* (London: Zed Books, 2013); Ravi Palat, *Capitalist Restructuring and the Pacific Rim* (Oxon: Routledge, 2004); Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power* (New York: The New Press, 2003); Carl Parrini, *Heir To Empire United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923* (USA: University of Pittsburgh, 1969); Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974); P. Eric Louw, *Roots of the Pax Americana Decolonization, development, democratization and trade* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010); Lloyd Gardner, Walter LaFeber and Thomas McCormick (eds), *Creation of the American empire: U.S. Diplomatic History* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1973); Marc-William Palen, 'The Imperialism of Economic Nationalism, 1890-1913', *Diplomatic History* 39 (2015): 157-185.

¹⁵³Clyde Prestowitz, *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Ian Littlewood, *The Idea of Japan: Western Images, Western Myths* (London: Martin Secker & Warburg, 1996); George Friedman and Meredith LeBar, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992); Sheila Johnson, *American Attitudes toward Japan, 1941-1975* (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975); Ivan Hall, *Bamboozled: How America Loses the Intellectual Game with Japan and Its Implications for Our Future in Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Robert Kearns, *Zaibatsu America: how Japanese Firms are Colonising Vital US Industries* (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Dennis Encarnation, *Rivals Beyond Trade: America Versus Japan in Global Competition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Phil Hammond (ed.), *Cultural Difference, Media Memories Anglo-American Images of Japan* (London: Cassell, 1997); Roger Daniels, *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977); William Neumann, *America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur* (USA: The John Hopkins Press, 1963); Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Massachusetts, :Harvard University Press, 1972); Yong Wook Lee, *The Japanese Challenge to the American Neoliberal World Order* (California: Stanford University Press, 2008); Gavin McCormack, *Client State Japan in the American Embrace* (London: Verso, 2007); Sheila Johnson, *The Japanese Through American Eyes* (California: Stanford University Press, 1988); Endymion Wilkinson, *Japan Versus the West: image and reality* (London: Penguin Books, 1980); Arron Forsberg, *America and the Japanese Miracle* (Chapel hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000);

¹⁵⁴Narrelle Morris, *Japan-Bashing Anti-Japanism since the 1980s* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); William Dietrich, *In The Shadow of the Rising Sun: The political Roots of American Economic Decline* (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991); Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Jean-Pierre Lehmann, *The Image of Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850-1905* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978); Phillip Oppenheim, *Trade Wars: Japan vs. The West* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992); Daniel Burstein, *Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and its Threat to America* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1988);

¹⁵⁵Gerard Toal, 'Japan as threat: geo-economic discourses on the USA-Japan relationship in US civil society, 1987-91', in Colin Williams (ed.), *The Political Geography of the New World Order* (London: Bellhaven Press,

I have attempted to briefly outline the major categories of literature relevant to this thesis that address US foreign policy towards China or US-China relations more broadly. This is to draw attention to the broader aspects of US foreign policy worth keeping in mind throughout my genealogy. What should be significant is that despite the quantity and quality of this body there remains the space for an analysis that takes a genealogical approach to US presidential discourses of China.

1993): 181-209; Gerard Toal, 'Pearl Harbour without bombs': a critical geopolitics of the US-Japan 'FSX' debate', *Environment and Planning A* 24 (1992): 975-994; David Campbell, 'Foreign Policy and Identity: Japanese "Other/American "self"', in Stephen Rosow, Naeem Inayatullah, and Mark Rupert (eds), *The Global Economy as Political Space* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994): 147-169.

Chapter 3 – Analytical Framework: Logics, Genealogy, and Discourse Analysis

3.1 Introduction

Edward Said argued that the role of the intellectual is “by the very virtue of this vocation, an opponent of consensus and orthodoxy...so the role of the intellectual is not to consolidate authority, but to understand, interpret, and question it”.¹⁵⁶ Although Said saw the intellectual as someone outside of the academy, his thoughts are relevant to what this thesis attempts to disrupt in considering US Presidential discourses of China. As indicated in the previous chapter, my approach falls within the broad umbrella of critical theory, an approach “stands back from the existing order of things to question how that order came into being, how it may be changing, and how that change may be influence or channelled”.¹⁵⁷ Following Cox’s remarks that “theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose” and “all theories have a perspective” than it is imperative, if one is going to challenge consensus and orthodoxy to make my approach and purpose as transparent as possible.¹⁵⁸ Steve Smith reflects this line of reasoning arguing that “there is no view from nowhere, no secure, isolated academic refuge, away from power...all knowledge is partial”.¹⁵⁹ If all academic activity takes place in the context of power then theory and practice as Smith indicates, are constitutive and so it is imperative to make clear the analytical basis of the argument I will present here.¹⁶⁰ Before doing so, I will set out a brief reflection on the importance of analysing US Presidential discourses.

While trying to clarify who should be considered an official voice of US foreign policy, President Clinton once remarked that:

“in dealing with the United States, unless there is some clear signal to the contrary, you should assume that a statement by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, the Secretary of the Treasury, the National Security Adviser, the Trade Ambassador, the people in our direct line of authority—they represent our policy”.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Edward Said, ‘On Defiance and Taking Positions’ in *Reflections on Exile and Other Literary & Cultural Essays* (London: Grant, 2012): 502.

¹⁵⁷ Robert Cox, ‘The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization’, *Cooperation and Conflict* 29 (1994): 101.

¹⁵⁸ Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order’, 128.

¹⁵⁹ Steve Smith, ‘International Relations and international relations: The Links Between Theory and Practice in World Politics’, *Journal of International Relations and Development* 6(2003): 235.

¹⁶⁰ Smith, ‘International Relations and international relations’, 237.

¹⁶¹ William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference with President Jiang Zemin of China," October 29, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53468>.

Clinton was making the point that statements by the US president or other senior administration officials represented US policy. This might seem an obvious point but is worth drawing attention to when outlining the importance and value of dealing with presidential statements and discourse. These remarks were similar to a statement by Donald Rumsfeld's, George W. Bush's first Secretary of Defence when he outlined the centrality of the President in US foreign policy. Rumsfeld declared in response to a question about the ambiguity of US foreign policy in Asia that "there isn't any ambiguity about our strategy. Our strategy is published. It's written. It's put out by the White House, not the Department of Defence. The President signs it, and it exists".¹⁶² Rumsfeld's assertion captures how the President essentially authorises US foreign policy and this underlines the focus of this thesis on Presidential discourses. The Presidential discourses I analyse then, are made up of the words, described Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan, which "were the world of the officials who uttered them, and those words helped create the world in which millions of people of other people lived, suffered, or died".¹⁶³ The point they were making is that words matter. And in analysing US foreign policy towards China, the words of the US President matter for what they reveal about their conception of the world, and in this case China.

More specifically in relation to US presidents and China, Michael Riccards, in an excellent account of how the US presidency has been the fundamental influence in US policy towards China, has demonstrated that "to a remarkable extent, American policy toward the most populous nation on earth was extensively dictated, managed, and implemented by American Presidents and their secretaries of state".¹⁶⁴ Riccards had earlier established how the presidency refracts through its own prism American society more broadly.¹⁶⁵ To be clear, I do not subscribe the great man theory of history that Riccards also warns against, but I do maintain that US presidential discourses are important to account for, especially with regards to China, though they are by no means the only source worth engaging with. In more precise terms Gerard Toal and John Agnew have described the US president as "the chief *bricoleur* of American political life, a combination of storyteller and tribal shaman".¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² 'Media Roundtable with Secretary Rumsfeld at Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld June 4, 2006', *U.S. Department of Defense* (<http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=12>, 1/6/2014).

¹⁶³ Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan, 'Soft Bodies, Hard Targets, and Chic Theories: US Bombing Policy in Indochina', *Millennium* 25(1996): 323.

¹⁶⁴ Michael Riccards, *The Presidency and The Middle Kingdom* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2000): Xiii.

¹⁶⁵ Michael Riccards, *The Ferocious Engine of Democracy* (Maryland: Madison Books, 1995).

¹⁶⁶ Gerard Toal and John Agnew, 'Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy discourse', *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 195.

In light of these observations this chapter has 2 main purposes. Firstly, it will set out the analytical argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as they appear and function within US presidential discourses of China. The second is to outline how genealogy, discourse analysis and symptomatic reading can be seen as a complimentary set of interpretive tools to analyse US presidential discourses. To do so I will first outline an understanding of Michel Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approaches complemented by the interpretation of Foucault's work by Colin Koopman. I turn to Koopman as he has been the most effective interlocutor for understanding Foucault's work and his methodological practices. This is significant as Koopman argues that the point of a genealogy is to demonstrate how certain problems emerged over time and establish analytical concepts that can contribute to understanding the problem at hand.¹⁶⁷ I will then describe how a method of discourse analysis compliments my genealogical approach focusing on the prescriptions of Lene Hansen, before a brief outline of how a hermeneutic practice of symptomatic reading enables me to derive the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics from the presidential discourses I analyse.¹⁶⁸ These 4 sections are intended to demonstrate how I interpreted the sources present from Chapters 4 to 9. To be clear here, the genealogical chapters have a dual purpose, to present the body of evidence from where I derived the three logics from and demonstrate how the logics conditioned US foreign policy towards China as presented in US presidential discourses over time.

What should become apparent is the broad theoretical basis this thesis takes to analysing US presidential discourses of China. A varied, complex, and at times seemingly contradictory body of literature has influenced the basis and arguments of this thesis, some of which was outlined in the preceding chapter. This includes approaches ranging from constructivist and poststructural IR theory¹⁶⁹, postcolonial approaches¹⁷⁰, arguments emerging from the broad areas of critical geopolitics¹⁷¹, Marxist approaches to political economy¹⁷² and the Wisconsin School of history led by William Appleman Williams¹⁷³.

¹⁶⁷ Koopman and Matza, 'Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian Inquiry', *Critical Inquiry* 39 (2013): 819.

¹⁶⁸ Hansen, *Security as Practice*; Koopman *Genealogy as Critique*.

¹⁶⁹ Jenny Edkins, *Poststructuralism and International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).

¹⁷⁰ Lily Ling, *Postcolonial International Relations conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West* (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002); Albert Paolini, *Navigating Modernity Postcolonialism, Identity, and International Relations* edited by Anthony Elliot and Anthony Moran (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); Sanjey Seth (ed.), *Postcolonial Theory and International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

¹⁷¹ Gerard Toal *Critical Geopolitics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Simon Dalby, Simon, 'Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security and America's New War', *Geopolitics* 8 (2003): 61-86; Simon Dalby,

The theoretical literature where this work is primarily situated is extensive, rich and diverse including focus on topics as varied as foreign policy and discourse analysis¹⁷⁴; Swedish foreign policy in the Thirty Years War¹⁷⁵; the relationship between security, identity and drugs in Canada¹⁷⁶; discursive critiques of IR theory¹⁷⁷; Tibet in the Western imagination¹⁷⁸; the colonial politics of representation in North-South relations¹⁷⁹; how danger and security can be understood as culturally produced¹⁸⁰; US interventions in Latin American¹⁸¹; the role of the US military in Hawaii¹⁸²; how identities and various social mobilisations are occurring across territorial boundaries¹⁸³; European identity formation and its Eastern ‘others’¹⁸⁴; post-war German reconstruction and the concept of the West¹⁸⁵; the discourse of terrorism in US politics¹⁸⁶; discourse of civilisation and barbarism¹⁸⁷; Russian foreign policy and identity¹⁸⁸; identity and geopolitics in Europe¹⁸⁹; dialogical approaches to international relations and

‘Gender and critical geopolitics: reading security discourse in the new world order’, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12 (1994): 595-612; Simon Dalby, ‘Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics’, *Geopolitics* 13 (2008): 413-436.

¹⁷² David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Karl Marx, *Capital Vol. 1* ed. By Frederick Engels (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, [1867] 2003)

¹⁷³ William Appleman Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York: Random House, 1969); William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972).; William Appleman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York: Ig Publishing, 2007); William Appleman Williams, *The Contours of American History* (London: Verso, 2011).

¹⁷⁴ Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis* (Oxon: Routledge, 1997); Jack Holland, *Selling the War on Terror Foreign Policy Discourses after 9/11* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

¹⁷⁵ Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action A cultural explanation of Sweden’s intervention in the Thirsty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹⁷⁶ Kyle Grayson, *Chasing Dragons: Security, Identity and Illicit Drugs in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

¹⁷⁷ Jim George, *Discourse of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).

¹⁷⁸ Dibyesh Anand, *Geopolitical Exotica Tibet in Western Imagination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

¹⁷⁹ Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

¹⁸⁰ Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, Raymond Duvall (eds), *Cultures of Insecurity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

¹⁸¹ Cynthia Weber, *Faking It U.S. Hegemony in a “post-Phallic” Era* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

¹⁸² Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai’I* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

¹⁸³ Michael Shapiro and Hayward Alker (eds), *Challenging Boundaries* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

¹⁸⁴ Iver Neumann, *Uses of the Other “The East” in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

¹⁸⁵ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

¹⁸⁶ Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

¹⁸⁷ Mark Salter, *Barbarians & Civilization in International Relations* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

¹⁸⁸ Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics Identities & Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

¹⁸⁹ Stefano Guzzini, *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanism and Foreign Policy Identity Crises* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

identity¹⁹⁰; and the general relationship between identity and international relations¹⁹¹. This is also includes more specific texts that address US foreign policy through a method of discourse analysis, that engage the concepts of identity, or the imagination.¹⁹²

Significantly, as I engaged with the texts of US presidential speeches it became clear that identity was merely one aspect of US foreign policy towards China. As my genealogy will demonstrate, it would become clear that I would need some way to conceptualise and analyse how the dynamics of identity construction amongst other factors as articulated by poststructuralists interacted with the perceptions of economic imperatives and geopolitical considerations within US foreign policy towards China. With this in mind, the research became more and more problem orientated and driven. My initial approach had been to explore how US identity constructions shaped its policy towards China focusing on the post 1989 world, with the political repression in Tiananmen as a starting point. This would have involved a broader discourse analysis of US foreign policy towards China including other official government sources like the State and Defence Departments as well as taking into account Congressional discourses.

The initial expansion of my research came with the insight that US identity narratives concerning China invoke the much longer history of the US-China encounter, the notion that the US is a Pacific power for instance and this entitled and enabled it to taking a more prominent role in the politics of the Asia Pacific. As the scope of my research extended

¹⁹⁰ Xavier Guillaume, *International Relations and Identity A dialogical approach* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).

¹⁹¹ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Patricia Goff and Kevin Dunn (eds), *Identity and Global Politics Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); David Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006); Frank Bille, *Sinophobia Anxiety, Violence, and the Making of Mongolian Identity* (USA: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015); David Mislan, *Enemies of the American Way: Identity and Presidential Foreign Policy Making* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *This Violence Empire: The birth of an American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Henry Nau, *At Home Abroad Identity and Power in American foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Brent Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Eva Herschinger, 'Hell is the Other': Conceptualising Hegemony and Identity through Discourse Theory', *Millennium* 41(2012): 65-90.

¹⁹² Campbell, *Writing Security*; Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1999); Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War The Discourse of Politics* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Karl Schonberg, *Constructing 21st Century U.S. Foreign Policy* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Ty Soloman, *The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015); Kenneth Christie (ed.), *United States Foreign Policy and National Identity in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); David Bernell, *Constructing US Foreign Policy The curious Case of Cuba* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Louis Perex Jr., *Cuba in the American Imagination* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Kimberly Williams, *Imagining Russia Making Feminist Sense of American Nationalism in U.S.-Russian Relations* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012); Lee Jarvis, *Times of Terror Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Francois Debrix and Mark Lacy (eds), *The Geopolitics of American Insecurity* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009); Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*.

further back historically, it became necessary to narrow the focus down to Presidential discourses to account for issues of space. This also explains the addition of genealogy to my initial method of a discourse analysis. I also felt, that a discourse analysis of US foreign policy towards China in a recent time period would appear too descriptive and lack useful analysis. Intuitively, after examining the discourses of this period I felt there was something more worthwhile at stake. My encounter with the William Taft's Presidency and their explicit concern with finding outlets for surplus US capital raised a concern accurately captured by Mark Laffey when he observed that "leaving out capital and Marx skews analysis of historicity and defangs analysis of world politics".¹⁹³ Yet, this left me with a new conundrum of how to reconcile the theoretical divisions and tensions between a variety of theoretical approaches with seemingly divergent ontological and epistemological commitments. My analysis and theoretical approach is drawn from an eclectic body of theory including poststructuralism, postcolonialism, Marxism and critical theory more generally.

What became apparent was how the US need to reproduce its identity, find foreign markets and outlets for its surplus capital and commodities and account for its geopolitical commitments to allies were all fundamental features in its foreign policy towards China. I came to see my research as being specifically problem orientated – how to account for US foreign policy towards China in US Presidential discourse considering the significance of these at times contradictory and contrarian concerns. More generally, my approach builds on Foucault's description of critique where he has observed how critique "is not a matter of saying things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought that practices we accept".¹⁹⁴ I combine this ethos with the critical perspective as outlined by Cox where critical theories attempt to register how changes in the existing order of things are changing and how and where they those changes should be influenced.¹⁹⁵ Critique in this sense is less ambivalent than Foucault articulates it above. This thesis intends to demonstrate the modes of thought, and their guiding imperatives in the form of the logics, that condition US foreign policy towards China as present in US presidential discourses.

¹⁹³ Mark Laffey, "Things lost and found: Richard Ashley and the silence of thinking space", *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010): 911.

¹⁹⁴ Michel Foucault, 'So is it Important to Think?', in Paul Rainbow and Niklas Rose (eds), *The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential works of Foucault* (New York: The New Press, 2003): 172.

¹⁹⁵ Cox, 'The Crisis in World Order', 101.

I do not explicitly argue for how US foreign policy should be changed or adjusted but one of the implications of articulating these three logics in US presidential discourses of China is that they indicate what needs to be taken into account if one is going to consider what it is that needs to be changed. It would not be a matter of calling for a reassessment of the US's identity, geopolitical concerns, or economic structure but more of challenging at least, the concerns and imperatives of all three logics if one were to desire more substantial change. Koopman has made the argument that "critique in its most general sense is a procedure for explicating the conceptual conditions that make experiences, thoughts and activities possible".¹⁹⁶ The logics I describe can be considered as the conceptual conditions that contain assumptions found in, though not solely located, presidential discourses towards China. To accomplish this it is necessary to outline the multifaceted nature of my argument concerning identity, capital, and geopolitics.

To clarify my intentions and aims, it is useful to explain what it is I am not attempting to do. This is not intended to be an empirical study of specific sites of discourse or policy. Exploring how policy is framed and its consequences does help inform how US identity and its constructions of 'China' are established. Although I take the US to be understood as a series of discourses regarding the self and other, I only intend to explore the official presidential conceptions it circulates in its foreign policy towards China as rendered through US presidential discourses. This is not a desire to judge China's, the US's or the West's perception of what constitutes legitimate behaviour in world politics, but an exploration of how the US frames China within its foreign policy. Analysing US discourses of China can include many more sources beyond that of official policy, however I limit myself here to this spectrum for the purposes of space and analytical depth.¹⁹⁷ There exists an array of literature exploring how the US media and other aspects of popular culture imagine China but any engagement with that material goes beyond my concern here.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 113.

¹⁹⁷ Said, *Orientalism*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*; Francous Debrix, *Tabloid Terror: War, Culture, and Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 2008); Cynthia Weber, *Imagining America at War: Morality, Politics and Film* (London: Routledge, 2006).

¹⁹⁸ John Joo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats (eds), *Yellow Peril An Archive of Anti-Asian Fear* (London: Verso, 2014); Shu-mei Shih, *Visuality and Identity Sinophone Articulations Across the Pacific* (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2007); Christopher Frayling, *The Yellow Peril Dr Fu Manchu & the Rise of Chinaphobia* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2014); Ruth Mayer, *Serial Fu Manchu The Chinese Supervillain and the Spread of Yellow Peril Ideology* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2014); Naomi Greene, *From Fu Manchu to Kung Fu Panda* (USA: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014); Ariane Knusel, *Framing China Media Images and Political Debates in Britain, the USA and Switzerland, 1900-1950* (England: Ashgate, 2012); Ming Dong Gu, *Sinologism An alternative to Orientalism and postcolonialism* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013).

This also accounts for why I do not engage significantly with discourses regarding the ‘yellow peril’ or ‘loss of China’ narratives, as these were not found in US presidential sources. This is not to say they were not important features in the US imagination of China or in domestic political debates in the US, they clearly were, but they go beyond the scope of this thesis.¹⁹⁹ As David Campbell has demonstrated how US identity has emerged constitutively over time in the US’s multiple encounters with numerous ‘others’ beyond China, I do not claim that US identity emerged through solely through its encounter with China. I am thus interested in how US identity as it was deployed towards and then increasingly through the latter parts of the 20th century constitutively constituted with and against its imaginations of China.

My thesis attempts, through a genealogical discourse analysis to determine how the US thinks about China and offer an analytical framework for how to make sense of this. As reflected in chapter 2, my thesis speaks with, through and against a number of key arguments from Vukovich, regarding the significance of knowledge about China being produced under conditions of capitalism²⁰⁰, Turner, regarding the significance of US images of China in impacting how it acts towards China²⁰¹, Ling, and the significance of how China both in a material sense discursive sense contributes the US sense of itself²⁰², Hayes, and the significance of China as a “non-democratic other” in the process of threat construction in US imaginations of China²⁰³, Pan, regarding the colonial basis of the threat and opportunity narratives in US discourses of China²⁰⁴, and Barr, who considers the “failures” of the Western imagination when it comes to imagining China and what China’s rise means for the world²⁰⁵. To repeat I do not attempt to synthesise the arguments and theoretical claims of the different theoretical approaches to international politics, US foreign policy and political economy, but make use of the broad spectrum of analytical insight to understand how China has been imagined in US presidential discourses. My argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics discernable in US presidential discourse, is the conclusion of this process.

I will now turn to describing in more detail how I conceptualise these logics, before explaining the 3 main features of my analytical framework.

¹⁹⁹ Oliver Tuner in his *American Images of China* provides an excellent overview of some of these issues.

²⁰⁰ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*.

²⁰¹ Turner, *American Images of China*.

²⁰² Ling, *The Dao of World Politics*, 87-102.

²⁰³ Hayes, *Constructing National Security*, 99-168

²⁰⁴ Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics*, 42-65.

²⁰⁵ Barr, *Who’s Afraid of China?*, 131- 135.

3.2 The Logics of Identity, Capital, and Geopolitics

Hillary Clinton, speaking in March 2012 at the US Institute of Peace in Washington D.C., described how “the link between power and responsibility is built into the logic of global politics. As countries become more powerful, their stake in the success of the international system naturally rises, because they have more to lose when that system fails”.²⁰⁶ “The international system is not static. Rules and institutions designed for an earlier age may not be suited to today”.²⁰⁷ A few years later on June 4th, 2016 in Singapore at a conference on security, Ash Carter, US Secretary of Defence, also invoked the notion of a logic of US foreign policy. He described how “US engagement in the Asia-Pacific is in America’s interests... America’s commitment to the region – and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in particular- is not transient. It is enduring. And that’s because the logic of, and the need for, and the value of American engagement in the Asia Pacific is irrefutable. And it is proven over decades”.²⁰⁸ Now, Clinton and Carter were not US Presidents, and nor is their use of logic identical to mine, but they do indicate the notion that US foreign policy contains or operates in regards to certain logics.

In brief, I argue that these logics function to frame, organise and limit what is politically possible and subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China. The logic of capital addresses the need for the US to secure its economic basis through the reproduction and profitability of capital by expanding internationally. The logic of geopolitics primarily functions as the organising principles for the logic of capital although it also exerts contrasting political imperatives in how the US thinks about political stability in relation to China. The logic of identity functions as a conditioning limit on the logics of capital and geopolitics as well as compelling the imperative to reproduce the US conception of itself. By this I mean that the logic of identity both enables and limits certain understandings and application of the other two logics. In this section I will unpack what it is I mean by the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics.

²⁰⁶ ‘Remarks at the US Institute of Peace China Conference March 7th 2012’, *United States Institute of Peace* (<https://www.usip.org/press/2002/03/secretary-state-clinton-address-us-china-conference>).

²⁰⁷ ‘Remarks at the US Institute of Peace China Conference March 7th 2012’, *United States Institute of Peace* (<https://www.usip.org/press/2002/03/secretary-state-clinton-address-us-china-conference>).

²⁰⁸ “Remarks on ‘Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security Network’ at 2016 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue ad Delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Singapore, June 4, 2016”, *US Defense Department* (<https://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS.Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=2575&Article=791213>, 19 January 2017).

To begin, I make use of the concept of logic as distinct from other terms like reason, judgement and rationality. They can and are at times used interchangeably in political discourse, however I find it useful to consider the specificity of why I use logic as the basis of my analysis. This also allows me to demonstrate some of the important limits to my research, as well as foreshadow some of the further research that is implied by many of my claims. It is also worth noting here that these logics I describe do not just give rise to or determine a particular policy, but those policies and their articulation reproduce those very logics. The relationship then, between logics and policy as I discern them here, is constitutive rather than simply causal. The discourses of China I discuss in this thesis then reflect particular logics while also giving substance to those very logics. The invocation of a particular logics at a particular time is dependent on a variety of other determining factors, most notably the various agencies involved with US foreign policy making and the other contextual or structural factors at the time. This type of detail though is beyond the scope of this thesis, even if it is a point worth indicating.

Fundamentally I argue that the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics in US presidential discourses of China function to frame, organise and limit what is politically possible and subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China. Before expanding on this though I will first engage with some of the ways ‘logic’ has been deployed as an analytical device in existing literature on international politics.

Doug Stokes has described “dual logics” as visible in US energy security and US practices of empire more broadly.²⁰⁹ G. John Ikenberry discussed two logics of order, one with liberal characteristics and another organised imperial characteristics, as the choice the US faced in its “unipolar” moment after the end of The Cold War.²¹⁰ Edward Rhodes²¹¹ detected an imperial logic in George W. Bush’s foreign policy and Franz Schurman wrote about the “logic of world power” where he looked at the origins, currents and contradictions in world politics where the “chief thrust of American imperialism” was control and “the chief thrust of international capitalism is and has to be profit”.²¹² John Hobson and J. Sharman attempt to trace the social logics related to identity formation that govern the reproduction of hierarchical

²⁰⁹ Doug Stokes, ‘Blood for oil? Global capital. Counter-insurgency and the dual logic of American energy security’, *Review of International Studies* 33(2007): 245-264; Doug Stokes, ‘The Heat of Empire? Theorising US empire in an era of transnational capitalism’, *Third World Quarterly* 26(2005): 217-236.

²¹⁰ G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberalism and empire: logics of order in the American unipolar age’, *Review of International Studies* 30(2004): 609-630.

²¹¹ Edward Rhodes, ‘The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda’, *Survival* 45(2003): 131-154.

²¹² Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974): xxvi.

formations in international politics.²¹³ David McCourt, most usefully has drawn attention to “everyday logic in world politics” which constitute “context-dependent practical imperatives”, frustratingly though this only occurs in the abstract and lacks expanded engagement in his text.²¹⁴ Edward Luttwak spoke of a logic of strategy which imposed imperatives on US leaders when it came to China, though unlike my understanding he saw this as deterministic and universal.²¹⁵ Where I see the logics present in US presidential discourse of China I describe them as particular to the example at hand. More usefully, though distinct to my approach Vincent Pouliot, influence Pierre Bourdieu, has outlined a logic of practicality when making the case for a practice turn in international relations theorising.²¹⁶ Pouliot makes the case for deploying a logic of practicality as ontological prior to other logics of social action, namely the logics of consequences, appropriateness and arguing, so that one can explore the constitutive relationship between agency and structure.²¹⁷ None of these authors except for Pouliot offer significant or theoretical engagement with what logic meant in their case other than the implication it was a set of ideas that influences reasoning, or some kind of social process.

Robert Heilbroner offers a similar, yet significantly distinct application of ‘logic’ to the one used in this thesis. Heilbroner’s argument concerns the logic of social formations that “refers to the movements of and changes in the ‘life processes’ and institutional configurations of a society”.²¹⁸ However, he understood this logic as generating certain political trajectories that we could identify in a causal relationship to particular outcomes and other processes.²¹⁹ He draws close to how I understand the logic of capital functioning in US presidential discourses of China but I do not make the case for causality and place emphasis on how the logics are only evident in particular discourses, even if they themselves are contingently and discursively constituted. I am not articulating a logic of capital as something that exists independent of US presidents as a systemic imperative, but as a set of constructed imperatives and conditions evident in how US presidents construct US interests towards China that takes place within the broader economic, political and social context.

²¹³ John Hobson and J. Sharman, ‘The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change’, *European Journal of International Relations* 11(2005): 63-98.

²¹⁴ David McCourt, ‘Practice theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism’, *International Studies Quarterly* 60(2016): 475-485.

²¹⁵ Edward Luttwak, *The Rise of China Vs. The Logic of Strategy* (Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2012): 1; 7.

²¹⁶ Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’, *International Organization* 62 (2008): 257-288.

²¹⁷ Pouliot, ‘The Logic of Practicality’, 275-278.

²¹⁸ Robert Heilbroner, *The Nature and Logic of Capitalism* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1985): 24.

²¹⁹ Heilbroner, *The Nature and Logic of Capitalism*, 24; 18.

Gerard Toal and Agnew detect a “distinctive cultural logic” in US geopolitical reasoning. In this reasoning they argue that representations of the US as a place are “pervasively mythological” in orientation, a tension between the expressions of US uniqueness and its belief in the universalisation of its principles and a tendency to draw a distinct line between the self and the other.²²⁰ The first two aspects they describe correspond to what I have observed as the logic of geopolitics in US discourse on China and the third corresponds more precisely to what I describe as the logic of identity. Walter Mignolo has described what he sees as a more general logic of coloniality, which contains an imperial epistemology, as constitutive of Western modernity.²²¹ In specific terms this logic of coloniality describes the “implementation of capitalist appropriation of land, exploitation of labour and accumulation of wealth in fewer and fewer hands”.²²² What I take from Mignolo in this case is the manner in which a particular logic and my case three logics, contain and delimit knowledge production of, and practices towards China.

My conceptualisation of the logics present within US presidential discourse builds on David Harvey’s arguments in *The New Imperialism*. Harvey argues that two logics of power constitute contemporary US imperial practices.²²³ Drawing on Giovanni Arrighi’s conception of a “territorial” and “capitalist” logic of power, Harvey outlines how they exist in a dialectical relationship, inherently distinct from one another yet intertwined, and to analyse US imperial practices, “one must not lapse into either a solely political or predominantly economic mode of analysis”.²²⁴ The logic of territory for Harvey was a distinctively political project where actors assumed power through the command of territory and mobilisation of its resources for various ends.²²⁵ It emphasised the political, diplomatic, and military strategies invoked and used by the state. The capitalist logic is similar but the command over capital takes primacy, where economic power flows across and through continuous space evident in the daily practices of production, trade, commerce and other flows.²²⁶ The relationship Harvey was trying to trace was that between the politics of state and empire on the one hand and the movements of capital accumulation. Harvey describes the “general thrust of any capitalistic logic of power is not that territories should be held back from capitalist development, but that

²²⁰ Gerard Toal and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy discourse’, *Political Geography* 11 (1992): 196-199.

²²¹ Walter Mignolo, ‘Delinking’, *Cultural Studies* 21 (2007): 449-514.

²²² Mignolo, ‘Delinking’, 477.

²²³ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*.

²²⁴ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 27.

²²⁵ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 26.

²²⁶ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 27.

they should be continuously opened up”.²²⁷ Harvey used these logics to outline how “the political and military containment of China would be ...essential to the maintenance of US global hegemony” in light of increasing Chinese assertiveness in Asia.²²⁸ US foreign policy in a broad sense then is a result of the interplay between these two distinct logics

As useful as Harvey’s conception of his two logics have been, I diverge significantly from his understanding, not least because he does not definitively set out what he means by logic.²²⁹ Bob Jessop also criticises his attempt to integrate the territorial logic into his analysis and relying on the over determinate logic of capital to order his argument.²³⁰ What I take from Harvey though is the notion that US foreign policy might contain certain logical prescriptions and imperatives that compel certain types of practices and action. I am not trying to capture a geopolitics of capitalism as Harvey does effectively elsewhere²³¹ but demonstrate how within US presidential discourses on China it is possible to discern three distinct logics.

Building on Harvey from an approach he describes as a “radical geopolitics”, Julien Mercille has articulated what he sees as a geopolitical and a geoeconomic logic to interpret political events.²³² Mercille attempts to incorporate the concerns of political economy in his approach to geopolitics to account for the “why” of policy with regards to US foreign policy with regards to Iran in the late 2000s and the Iraq War in 2003.²³³ In a paper with Alun Jones, they describe the geopolitical logic as capturing the US “need to maintain international credibility, a symbolic process whereby US officials of statecraft signal to others that challenges to US hegemony will be resisted” and the geoeconomic logic through Harvey’s “spatial fix” which they describe here as the expansion of capitalist activities to resolve “the tendential over-accumulation of capital and labour power that threatens the devaluation of capital”.²³⁴

Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith also attempted to articulate a geoeconomic logic to capture

²²⁷ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 139.

²²⁸ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 84.

²²⁹ See Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Logics of Power: A Conversation with David Harvey’, *Historical Materialism* 14(2006): 9- 34 and Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher, ‘The Changing ‘logic’s of capitalist accumulation’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20 (2007): 565-580 for critical engagements with Harvey’s notion of logic.

²³⁰ Bob Jessop, ‘Spatial Fixes. Temporal Fixes and Spatio-Temporal Fixes’, in Noel Castree & Derek Gregory (eds), *A Critical David Harvey Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 156-157.

²³¹ David Harvey, *Spaces of Capital Towards a Critical Geography* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), chapters 12 and 15 in particular.

²³² Julien Mercille, ‘The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: Geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of power’, *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 570-586.

²³³ Julien Mercille and Alun Jones, ‘Practicing Radical Geopolitics: Logics of Power and the Iranian Nuclear ‘Crisis’’, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 99 (2009): 856-862; Julien Mercille, ‘The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: the 2003 Iraq War’, *Geojournal* 75 (2010): 327-337.

²³⁴ Mercille, ‘Practicing Radical Geopolitics’, 857-858.

how geopolitical forms had been recalibrated by market logics.²³⁵ This conception of logic significantly influenced the conception of logic deployed in this thesis although I also take into account the logic of identity where the US needs to perpetually reproduce its identity through practice and that this logic limits the manner in which the logics of capital and of geopolitics can solely condition US foreign policy towards China.

In another case of using the notion of logic to understand US foreign policy, Brian Massumi has described the existence of a US strategy of pre-emption after 9/11 as an “operative logic of power”. By operative logic he means a logic “that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency that's is not in the sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible sweeps them up in its own dynamic”.²³⁶ Massumi describes an operative logic as having no set boundaries and “a potent shape shifting capacity” to take into account how problems change.²³⁷ I take from Massumi this understanding that logics have a self-propelling tendency within them and are dynamic, in the sense that their focus and propositions change over time depending on how material circumstances, the influence of other actors, how the US prioritises its immediate interests.

Jason Glynos and David Howarth offer the most useful discussion of logics for the purpose of this thesis.²³⁸ Situated in poststructuralist theory, they develop their notion in opposition to causal laws, causal mechanisms and contextualised self-interpretations.²³⁹ They understand ‘logics’ in three distinct senses. The first focuses on theory construction and explanation, the second as referring to a particular approach or ‘style of reasoning’ and a third in a “more substantive sense to constitute the basic unit of explanation of [their] approach”.²⁴⁰ It is this third sense in which I make use of the concept of logics as the basic unit of explanation of US presidential discourses of China. Glynos and Howarth take as their principal objects of investigation the “practices or regimes of practices, where [their] aim is to critically explain their transformation, stabilization, and maintenance”.²⁴¹ In general, their conception of logic

²³⁵ Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, ‘After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to Geoeconomics’, *Antipode* 41(2009): 24-25.

²³⁶ Brian Massumi, *Ontopower War, Powers, and the State of Perception* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015): 5.

²³⁷ Massumi, *Ontopower*, 223.

²³⁸ Jason Glynos and David Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation in Social and Political Theory* (Oxon: Routledge, 2007).

²³⁹ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 5.

²⁴⁰ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 8.

²⁴¹ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 15.

“refers to the purposes, rules and ontological presuppositions that render a practice or regime possible and intelligible”, which translate to case I analyse here with US foreign policy towards China as capturing what are the possibilities, limits and necessities for how the US thinks about China as rendered in US presidential discourses of China.²⁴²

As they put it, the logic of a practice aims “not just to describe or characterise it, but also to capture the various conditions that make that practice ‘work’ or ‘tick’”.²⁴³ Overall, “the logic of a practice comprises the rules or grammar of the practice as well as the conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable”.²⁴⁴ Howarth has since affirmed that what they meant by logic was “designed to capture the point, rules, and ontological preconditions of a policy, practice, or regime”.²⁴⁵ The logics articulated then were not to be understood as independent of the specific historical context and empirical circumstances in which they were rooted.²⁴⁶ This is similar to the argument Koopman makes about Foucault, discussed in the following section, that one should be cautious about transposing analytical concepts derived from specific local analyses in to other substantially different contexts.²⁴⁷

Logics, then are an explanatory concept where their function “in social scientific analysis is not only to make social processes more intelligible, but in the process of describing and explaining it should also furnish the possibility of a critical engagement with practices and processes under investigation”.²⁴⁸ Critical here essentially means contingent, arbitrary, revisable and contestable. To put this more succinctly, things could be otherwise but it is necessary to know why things are the way they are now.. This conception of logic allows me to critically explain US presidential discourses of China by identifying and outlining the major logics within them. I identify particular statements or arguments as comprising or indicating one logic or another by whether or not they refer to issues relating to identity, the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific or invoking economic concerns.

Essentially, logics as I use them, give a particular order to reason. Logics constitute what can be considered reasonable. They provide the limits and organising principles for what can be thought, even if those very logics emerges out of those thoughts. With this in mind I do not attempt to locate the origins of these logics, though I would emphasise that would be a

²⁴² Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 15.

²⁴³ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 15.

²⁴⁴ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 136.

²⁴⁵ David Howarth, *Poststructuralism and After* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 261.

²⁴⁶ Howarth, *Poststructuralism and After*, 261.

²⁴⁷ Koopman and Matza, ‘Putting Foucault to Work’, 821.

²⁴⁸ Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*, 153.

worthwhile project. The logics I discuss function as the discursive conditions of possibility for a particular rationality or practice. Wendy Brown describes how Foucault's genealogy was a method for asking "what are the logics of power that have produced this condition and within which we operate?"²⁴⁹ I do not claim that these logics, explain history or historical change, but are visible in how the US thinks about China. Reason adjudicates between logics and allows for judgements to be made about what China is or is not or what should or should not be done about China. The combination of logic informed reason and judgement amount to what can be described as rationalities, in a way that one might understand neo-conservatism, liberalism or in Foucault's case, governmentality. Brown writes for instance that "political rationalities are orders of reason, not systems of rule" and genealogy is capable of exposing their contingent nature.²⁵⁰ The logics I derive from genealogy then allow me to describe the processes that constitute what one author has called traditions of US foreign policy.

Walter Mead has raised the question of whether the US "foreign policy system had a logic of its own, a different logic from the one that governed the foreign policy of the traditional great powers of Europe".²⁵¹ In an attempt to capture this 'logic' he described four traditions of US foreign policy. They were, a Hamiltonian regard for close relationship between national government and big business, a Wilsonian sense of moral obligation to spread US values, a Jeffersonian sense of hawkish isolationism, protective of the US and what he describes as a "large populist school" of Jacksonian beliefs that the US should prioritise "the physical security and the economic well-being of the American people".²⁵² Significantly, Mead appears to undervalue the effects of the US existing in a capitalist world system and some of the geopolitical consequences of previous US foreign policy practices on its present behaviour. It is as though the US exists in a vacuum where the international context does not exert any substantial influence on the foreign policy process or discourse beyond notions of a dangerous world or a civilising mission. What I mean by this is US foreign policy towards China for instance, exist within the historic legacy of previous encounters and the broader international context which can and do lead to new dynamics and imperatives within the logics I describe.

²⁴⁹ Wendy Brown, 'Genealogical Politics' in Jeremy Moses (ed.), *The Later Foucault* (London: Sage Publishers, 1998): 34.

²⁵⁰ Brown, 'Genealogical Politics', 44.

²⁵¹ Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001): Xv.

²⁵² Mead, *Special Providence*, Xvii.

There can be multiple contrarian logics that inform a judgement about practice or a particular rationality as the impact of each is determined or reasoned by a broader array of factors. So where as the logics I discuss manifest themselves in different ways depending on the interpretation of material conditions and other social forces, a political rationality operates at a more general level. There may be an overarching rationality to describe US foreign policy although that would go beyond the scope of this thesis. My thesis then can be seen as a first step to deducing broader political rationalities in US foreign policy, but it would be premature to such a broad claim based on the relatively narrow scope of my focus on US foreign policy towards China.

I deduce what these logics entail from the US presidential discourses that I analyse, and through a genealogy I can determine which logics were prominent in US reasoning and when changes occurred. The reasons for why one logic was more dominant than another though, requires an approach more in line with historical sociology to examine a more comprehensive set of factors, both domestic and international. I do, where possible indicate how the US justified its policy towards China in terms of the broader political context though this captures only a partial understanding of US foreign policy decisions as I do not focus in detail on domestic factors like congressional politics or other social or international forces.

The major point regarding how I develop my argument regarding these logics is that they are what Jennifer Milliken has described as “grounded theory”. This means that “rather than selectively choosing data according to *a priori* theoretical categories” one “formulates the theory from the data by developing provisional categorisations via empirical study and abstracting, comparing on the basis of new data, whether these categories fit and, if necessary reformulating these categories so that they are empirically valid”.²⁵³ In this light, I determined the logics after having engaged with the source material even if I had an inclination from early engagement with the post 1989 US discourses of China that I would need a way to conceptualise how the US imagined China in terms of issues pertaining to identity, capitalism and geopolitics. The hope is that they might be useful analytical concepts for further research or refinement, but for now my focus is on demonstrating their existence via a discourse analysis of US presidential sources.

²⁵³ Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’, *European Journal of International Relations* 5(1999): 234.

I use logics to capture how the US frames the conditions of possibility for its foreign policy towards China. I characterize the core features of these conditions as it relates to China as being structured through the logics identity, capital and geopolitics. They emerge out of existing ideas and responses to historical events. They are not necessarily linear in their development, and there is no teleological value in my critique, even if some of the logics themselves contain teleological premises. I do not argue that they become more refined as time goes on but recognise that their character and emphasis do change and reflect adaptations to on going events. Often particular political statements speak to and reflect more than one logic at the same time and at times the logics operate in concert with one another, while at others in tension, with no conclusive closure or synthesis.

Additionally, while structuring her discourse analysis, Roxanne Doty outlines three concepts, thought of as textual mechanisms, of presupposition, predication and subject positioning. Presuppositions describes forms of background knowledge to be true, predication involves the linking of certain qualities to particular subjects through the use of adverbs and adjectives and subject positioning captures how the relationships established between various subjects and objects comes about.²⁵⁴ Doty uses these as a way to make discourses intelligible and describe their particular function. The logics I describe in my genealogy function to do all three by drawing on and implying a certain body of background knowledge about the US, its relationship to China, and China itself to be true. The logics also link certain qualities to the US and China and construct a particular kind of relationship between the US and China as rendered in US presidential discourses. They do this by reflecting, and bringing into being the varying meanings of China in US presidential discourse. When a president makes a statement or remark about China, they are simultaneously reflecting a particular logic or multiple logics, and re-establishing the very pertinence of that logic. Although I frame the qualities of these logics in terms of framing, organising and limiting how the US thinks of and acts towards China, Doty's concepts contributed to understanding how these logics functioned.

Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein have suggested adopting analytical eclecticism as an approach to world politics. This eclecticism was about “making intellectually and practically useful connections among clusters of analysis that are substantively related but normally

²⁵⁴ Roxanne Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (1993): 306-307.

formulated in separate paradigms”.²⁵⁵ Sil and Katzenstein defined as eclectic “any approach that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements- concepts, logics, mechanisms, and interpretations- of theories or narratives that have been developed with separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems that have both scholarly and practical significance”.²⁵⁶ This would enable researchers to “take on problems as they are understood and experience by political actors, without excessively simplifying such problems simply to fit the scholarly conventions or theoretical boundaries established by any one tradition”.²⁵⁷ It can be considered a way or approaching a complex problem in a way that makes that complexity intelligible without attempting to reduce this complexity to one theoretical paradigm or theory. Sil and Katzenstein also indicate that analytical eclecticism should not be taken to mean, “anything goes”, nor should it be considered “theoretical synthesis” nor as simply mixing methods.²⁵⁸ It should be a “flexible approach that needs to be tailored to a given problem”.²⁵⁹ The basis for analytical eclecticism depends on the “multiplicity of connections between different mechanisms and logics normally analysed in isolation in separate research traditions”.²⁶⁰

Taking Sil and Katzensteins’ arguments into consideration, this thesis is not about reconciling the debates between poststructuralists, Marxists, and postcolonial approaches or reconciling the space between neorealist and post-positivist approaches to IR. If that could be done, or if that were desirable, that is mostly certainly not a task of mine here. This thesis remains much more modest as I aim to demonstrate the presence of the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics in US presidential discourses regarding China. Yes, my approach remains committed to exploring discourse, rather than ideology, I understand the logic of identity, based on my empirical analysis, to operate on the lines observed by the likes of Hansen, Connolly and Campbell²⁶¹, where identity is constituted, not necessarily always, through

²⁵⁵ Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics* (Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, 2010): 2. Also see Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Analytic Eclecticism in the study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions’, *Perspectives on Politics* 8(2010): 411-431. Jeremie Cornut also outlined how analytic eclecticism could be understood though his arguments regarding how different theories are primed to addressing different question was less useful in capturing my concern here. Jeremie Cornut, ‘Analytic Eclecticism in Practice: A Method for Combining International Relations Theories’, *International Studies Perspectives* 16(2015): 50-66. This concern is also distinct from, though inspired by Michael Shapiro’s arguments regarding trans-disciplinary method in his *Studies in Trans-Disciplinary Method* (London: Routledge, 2013).

²⁵⁶ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 10.

²⁵⁷ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 10.

²⁵⁸ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 16-18.

²⁵⁹ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 17.

²⁶⁰ Sil and Katzenstein, *Beyond Paradigms Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*, 18.

²⁶¹ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 37-54; Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9-10; Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 64.

difference. This takes the form of how a ‘self’ can only distinguish itself from other entities through performances of difference, of which foreign policy is the signature feature of this for states. Campbell for instance, adopts a “logic of interpretation” as the medium through he can describe a “logic of identity and the dispositions and orientations it encourages in diverse times and places”.²⁶² Fundamentally for Campbell, “identity is an inescapable dimension of being and as “identity is constituted in relation to difference”, “difference is constituted in relation to identity”.²⁶³ This sense of identity though, is inherently unstable and in need of perpetual performative reconstitution, which in terms of the state takes place through the differentiation practices of foreign policy.²⁶⁴

The logic of geopolitics contains much of the reasoning about state behaviour under conditions of international anarchy as described by neorealists.²⁶⁵ They do tend to act in their own ‘self-interest’ though what that self-interest is, how states understand that, and the relationship between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ concerns is often more complicated than neorealists would have us believe.²⁶⁶ The logic of geopolitics also captures how the US’s understanding of how space is to be produced, organised, governed and then acted upon according to expectations of how a state should behave, arguments that have been detailed by scholars of critical geopolitics.²⁶⁷ The logic of geopolitics as analyse it pertains to both of these issues, the manner in which the US understands geopolitical ‘realities’ and imperatives, and the manner in which this has effects of producing certain types of spaces.

The logic of capital is reflected in the work of David Harvey on the manner in which the contradictions of capitalism lead to what he calls the “spatio-temporal fix”, a solution to over-accumulation within a given territorial system. This over-accumulation leads to surpluses of labour and capital where two solutions are possible, either the temporal displacement of capital through long-term investment projects or social expenditures such as higher education

²⁶² Campbell, *Writing Security*, 4; 43.

²⁶³ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 9.

²⁶⁴ Hansen *Security as Practice*; Campbell, *Writing Security*.

²⁶⁵ Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism After the Cold War’, *International Security* 25(2001): 5-41; Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (1990): 21-37.

²⁶⁶ Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, *International Organization* 38 (1984): 225-286; Toal, *Critical Geopolitics*.

²⁶⁷ Simon Dalby and Gerard Toal, ‘The critical geopolitics constellation: problematizing fusions of geographical knowledge’, *Political Geography* 15 (1996): 451-456; Toal, *Critical Geopolitics*; Simon Dalby, ‘Recontextualising violence, power and nature: the next twenty years of critical geopolitics?’, *Political Geography* 29 (2010): 280-288; Simon Dalby, ‘Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security and America’s New War’, *Geopolitics* 8 (2003): 61-86; Gerard, Toal, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society’, *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22 (1999): 107-124.

funding or the spatial displacement of capital by opening up new markets, production capacities and labour possibilities elsewhere.²⁶⁸ In the second spatial fix, the forces of capital move across boundaries into new spaces or markets in other states, in an attempt to alleviate the surplus and maintain higher levels of profitability.²⁶⁹ Harvey outlines the manner in which a combination of the two spatial and temporal fixes produces a particular kind of response to capitalist crises through “temporal deferral and geographical expansion”.²⁷⁰ Harvey outlines some of these practices as consisting of “the production of space, the organisation of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resource complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the penetration of pre-existing social formations by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements”.²⁷¹ China in this case came to represent a potential solution to domestic and international crises of capitalist accumulation as experienced by the US. As important as this argument is, especially in regards to US foreign policy practices and as evident in US presidential discourses, my analysis indicates how this phenomenon encounters the other imperatives of the other logics of identity and geopolitics.

I am not here saying that neorealists, critical IR scholars and Marxist based approaches should be reconciled into some unifying theory of foreign policy. But, that each approach offer important, yet partial understandings when it comes to interpreting US foreign policy towards China. I do not here elaborate on how the more modest task of attempting to locate overlapping points of analysis, but my genealogy indicates that we should do more than settle for mutually exclusive interpretations. I make this case based on my empirical analysis of US presidential discourses where concerns regarding self-interest, identity, capital and broader geopolitical considerations all feature in regards to the US foreign policy towards China. In terms of the actual process, I simply found that US presidents invoke issues pertaining to identity, capital, and geopolitics when considering China and it would be academically suspect to suggest one concern, expressed here through the concept of logics adequately captured the complex and interwoven concerns in US presidential discourses of China. There is no convenient or parsimonious statement to capture the spectrum of US interest with regards to China either historically or in the present. What I attempt to do here is make a

²⁶⁸ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 109.

²⁶⁹ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 115-118; David Harvey, *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): See Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Logics of Power: A Conversation with David Harvey’, *Historical Materialism* 14 (2006): 9-34 and Alex Callinicos, *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* (London: Polity, 2009) for alternative approaches to this conceptualization.

²⁷⁰ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 115.

²⁷¹ Harvey, *The New Imperialism*, 116.

complex set of concerns more intelligible without reducing their complexity to a simplicity which is not present.

What my logics try to do then is make sense of the arguments in US presidential discourses in light of what we already ‘know’ across multiple theoretical perspectives. A disconcerting thought is that these varied theoretical approaches and the conclusions they make will remain permanently irreconcilable and unable to grasp the complexity of US foreign policy in a manner that does not oversimplify or overemphasise particular aspects. This genealogically orientated research is in this regard, an attempt to make the complexity of US discourses of China not more simply, but more intelligible. And fundamentally the logics I articulate not only capture how the US thinks about China, but they function to produce China as the very problem they attempt to resolve. What I mean by this is that China is not some ‘problem’ out there in the world needing to be solved, but that the notion of China as a ‘problem’ that can and needs to be solved is contingent on the very discourses which portray it as a problem in the first place. And it is in this manner that I expand on Foucault’s comments on critique above to imply that it is on the terrain of these logics that US foreign policy should be challenged if one has in mind reducing the tension between the US and China.

These considerations also reflect the arguments of John Law regarding methodological mess. Law considers that “if much of reality is ephemeral and elusive, then we cannot expect single answers, if the world is complex and messy, then at least some of the time we’re going to have to give up on simplicities”.²⁷² To Laws, the world is “a set of possibly discoverable processes”, that can exceed our capacity to know it, though we can be sure that “*everything* is constructed in a specific historical context and there can be no escape from history”, hence the necessity of genealogy in this case.²⁷³ It is also worth clarifying here, that these logics are not meant to be totalising, all encompassing frameworks that explain all of US foreign policy in general, nor specifically towards China. My argument is that they are present, predominant and irreducible in US Presidential discourses. This is in recognition of Gerard Toal’s critique of what he calls postmodern geopolitics as approaches that “tend to smooth out the messy historicity and complex spatiality of geopolitical discourses and practices, attributing a deep logic and underlying coherence to these that may not necessarily have”.²⁷⁴ The mess that Toal is referring to here I take to mean the particular reasons for why these logics emerged, and

²⁷² John Laws, *After Method mess in social science research* (London: Routledge, 2004): 2

²⁷³ John Laws, *After Method*, 9; 5.

²⁷⁴ Gerard Toal, ‘Postmodern Geopolitics? The modern geopolitical imagination and beyond’, in Gerard Toal and Simon Dalby (eds) *Rethinking Geopolitics* (London: Routledge, 1998): 17.

why they are rendered and deployed in their specific manner through each Presidency. Any attempt to explore the specific historical, political, and cultural context of any particular decision making or policy regarding China would have to do adopt a different theoretical approach.²⁷⁵

The specific manifestations of this nexus are most certainly related to transient perceptions of state capability, class interests and antagonisms, other global circumstances, the sway of congressional and domestic politics as well as personal preference of state officials. However, I do not explore these issues in as much depth as would be required as my main aim has been to articulate and demonstrate the existence of these logics in US foreign policy through presidential rhetoric. I am aware that this thesis appears to adopt a state centric conception of international politics, though I readily admit that the relationship between the US and China is constituted by a constellation of multiple actors across multiple forums where the state is but one of many actors. However, in the interests of time, personal ability and analytical focus, I limit my focus to presidential rhetoric as this best captures how the US state thinks about and acts towards China. I am not articulating the internal relations of the three logics as they relate to each other. When it comes to foreign policy they function in a particular manner. They exert a force that simultaneously produces meaning and yet limits what can be thought and done. I am not attempting an explanation of how identity broadly features in the US, nor how capitalism in general functions in the US, or every aspect of geopolitics the US participates in but how specific instances of these, in the form of particular logics are visible in US presidential discourse of China.

3.3 Genealogy

Michel Foucault remarked, in his essay ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, that “genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary”, reflecting the laborious task of piecing together analysis from a broad body of source materials.²⁷⁶ More pointedly he remarked that “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting”.²⁷⁷ Knowledge, and the inquiries that produce knowledge are about intervening in the world. Foucault describes how “to do criticism is to make harder, those acts which are now too easy”.²⁷⁸ In this sense, it has become too easy to limit debate to whether China is a threat, without considering the

²⁷⁵ In chapter 10 I suggest that analysis that emerges from historical sociology or international political sociology would be productive approaches in this regard.

²⁷⁶ Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in Paul Rainbow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader* (Penguin: London, 1981); 76.

²⁷⁷ Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, 88.

²⁷⁸ Foucault, ‘So Is It Important to Think’, 172.

assumptions embedded in this line of questioning even in the spaces where there is a more considered approach to what China and its growing economic power might mean for the US. In this section though, I will outline my engagement with Foucault's arguments on genealogy through Colin Koopman's engagement with Foucault.

Colin Koopman argues that the point of conducting a genealogy is "to use history to show the way in which certain practices have structured some of the core problematics which a given period of thought, most notably our own modernity, must face".²⁷⁹ Foucault indicated that genealogy is generally more concerned with "local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claim of a unitary body of theory" which would order those in the name of some arbitrary and truth.²⁸⁰ Although it may seem strange to approach US presidential discourses as an example of disqualified or illegitimate knowledge, as demonstrated in chapter 2 a genealogical analysis of them remains missing from the extensive literature on US-China relations. What I am interested in here is the more meticulous task of documenting how the US presidents have come to imagine China rather than form normative judgements on whether China is a threat or not. The analytical concepts of the three logics I develop through my genealogy are intended to contribute to the debates over the US and China today by situating the present in the context of the past.

Genealogical analysis is premised on problematising ideas and practices that are taken for granted and the demonstrating the assumptions that guide these practices. There have been a number of effective genealogies in IR investigating subjects as diverse as finance²⁸¹, diplomacy²⁸², territory²⁸³, US exceptionalism²⁸⁴, racial identities²⁸⁵, US imaginative geographies²⁸⁶ and sovereignty²⁸⁷. This thesis aims at documenting the logics of US foreign policy discourses towards China as a way of establishing analytical tools to interrogate US foreign policy to China more broadly. Combining discourse analysis with genealogy is a response to the charge, and something that I found, that a discourse analysis on its own tends

²⁷⁹ Colin Koopman, 'Two uses of genealogy' Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams', in C. G. Prado (ed.), *Foucault's Legacy* (London: Continuum, 2009): 100.

²⁸⁰ Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures' in Colin Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge* (England: The Harvester Press, 1980): 83.

²⁸¹ Marieke de Goede, *Violence, Fortune, and Faith* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

²⁸² James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

²⁸³ Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).

²⁸⁴ David Hughes, 'Unmaking an exception: A Critical genealogy of US exceptionalism', *Review of International Studies* 41(2015): 527-551.

²⁸⁵ Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere* (California: Stanford University Press, 2011).

²⁸⁶ Matthew Farish, *The Contours of America's Cold War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).

²⁸⁷ Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995).

towards the ahistorical. This is not necessarily a problem though in the case of this research it became clear that solely a discourse analysis of the more recent period of US discourses of China would be of limited analytical value as it became clear through my initial engagement Obama's discourses of China that US residents exist within, build upon and constantly refer back to more historical discourses.

In a recent summary, archaeology has been described as working "to unearth historically contingent truths through their archival traces" and "genealogy is the immanent, historical and critical exploration of power relations and their constitutive effects".²⁸⁸ Foucault described the two in the following manner:

"archaeology" would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and 'genealogy' would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of these descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play".²⁸⁹

The logics I describe as present in US presidential discourses of China then are an attempt to make sense of the "local discursivities" where US presidents refer to China. The archaeological work then is here, the invisible practice of determining what was said and when, and the genealogical is represented by my rendering of the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics.

The understanding and deployment of genealogy is diverse, and there is not necessarily a 'correct' way of engaging with an issue genealogically. One's understanding of genealogy may very well be determined by the problem or issue one wishes to address. In one concerted engagement with how to think about and deploy genealogy, Srdjan Vucetic outlines how it is "primarily a method/methodology for historicising social items" and is a "distinctive historical, interpretive research tool suited for the making of epistemologically varied truth-claims".²⁹⁰ Vucetic argues that "effective genealogies are those that focus on a 'problem' - a social phenomenon that appears (seems, feels) normal or true (commonplace, natural, intuitive) and then turns it into a question" of how the problem came about.²⁹¹ On the other hand, Seantel Anais has described genealogy as a "methodological process concerned with telling the story of how a set of discursive and non-discursive practices come into being and

²⁸⁸ Philippe Bondditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz and Chris Zebrowski, 'Genealogy', in Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner (eds), *Critical Security Methods* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015): 166; 167.

²⁸⁹ Foucault, 'Two Lectures', 85.

²⁹⁰ Srdjan Vucetiv, 'Genealogy as a research tool in International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 37(2011): 1296.

²⁹¹ Vucetiv, 'Genealogy as a research tool in International Relations', 1301.

interact to form a set of political, economic, moral, cultural, and social institutions which define the limits of acceptable speaking, knowing, and acting”.²⁹² In Koopman’s words though, genealogy is “an initiating rather than concluding phase of thought” and it “seeks out the limits that condition our possibilities for being, acting, and thinking in the present”.²⁹³ A genealogy is thus intended to yield particular analytical concepts to be applied through other methods to the task at hand. In this regard, my argument regarding the logics of US presidential discourse towards China begins the process of analysing US foreign policy towards China more broadly, rather than generating some kind of conclusive statement.

Koopman describes Foucault as a “critical empiricist insofar as his best legacy involved the patient use of empirical analytics as a check against the speculative use of abstract conceptualisation”.²⁹⁴ This is underpinned by Koopman’s excellent distinction between Foucault’s analytics and his concepts. For Koopman analytics are understood as “the broadly methodological constraints that Foucault brought to bear upon his inquiries” like archaeology or genealogy and concepts “specify the formulations through which Foucault made sense of the objects of his inquiry”.²⁹⁵ Koopman also defines categories as “the lenses through which inquiry takes place”.²⁹⁶ So in the case of this research on US presidential discourses on China, discourse is the category through which my research takes place, genealogy and discourse analysis are the analytics, or method, I deploy, and the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics are the concepts I describe and develop.²⁹⁷ It is worth mentioning that my description of analytical concepts is distinct from how Koopman uses the term analytics to describe Foucault’s “high-order methodological constraints” archaeology or genealogy.²⁹⁸ Koopman distinguishes these from concepts like discipline or biopower whereas I describe the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as analytical concepts for how they contribute specifically to the analysis presented here.

²⁹² Seantel Anais, ‘Genealogy and critical discourse analysis in conversation: texts: discourse, critique’, *Critical Discourse Studies* 10(2013): 125.

²⁹³ Koopman, ‘Two uses of genealogy’, 103

²⁹⁴ Colin Koopman and Tomas Matza, ‘Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian Inquiry’, *Critical Inquiry* 39(2013): 821.

²⁹⁵ Koopman and Matza, ‘Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian Inquiry’, 822.

²⁹⁶ Koopman and Matza, ‘Putting Foucault to Work 822-823.

²⁹⁷ Koopman goes on to provide a more extensive taxonomy of Foucault’s thought including topics, sites, conclusions, doctrines and writing styles but for my purposes the three I have used are sufficient.

²⁹⁸ Koopman and Matza, ‘Putting Foucault to Work’, 824.

Despite the prevalence of Foucault in the study of IR²⁹⁹ Jan Selby has argued convincingly that theorists should be aware of the difficulties of how to translate Foucault, “primarily a historian/theorist of the domestic realm of liberal capitalist societies, into the international or global arena, into a realm which, while no doubt a social and historical construct, has certain quite specific, enduring and irreducible qualities”.³⁰⁰ Selby also cautions against limited readings of Foucault’s analytical arguments, the tendency to read Foucault only in a poststructuralist framing, and the misappropriation of selective resources. Taking these warnings into account I do not attempt to use Foucault’s specific and substantive arguments about biopolitics or disciplinary power to analyse US foreign policy, but I am more interested in his methodological approach to analyse the discourses and practices of US foreign policy. Although Selby argues that the more useful applications of Foucault occur when engaging with the “historically shifting relations between knowledge, practices, institutions, and subjectification”, I consider my genealogy as a starting point for the broader analysis of US foreign policy practices towards China.³⁰¹ In this sense, my use of Foucault’s method to generate the analytical concepts of the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics should be useful if, in future study, one were to expand the scope of discourses beyond that of the presidential.

To more appropriately grasp what is meant by genealogy, it is necessary to consider Foucault’s own philosophical development. Genealogy as a methodological approach evolves out of and in response to the limits of archaeology as Foucault saw them, but as Koopman argues, an archaeology is a prerequisite to conducting a genealogy.³⁰² I will briefly explain the basis of Foucault’s archaeological approach and how it is relevant to how he understands genealogy but also why archaeology and genealogy are inherently part of his overall intention of critique.³⁰³ Foucault’s archaeology provides a framework for discerning how certain rules regarding US discourses of China function, and genealogy offers a method for understanding how these rules come to constitute the logics I describe. It is not that the content and understands of the logics remain static throughout the time period I cover but that they refer to

²⁹⁹ Nicholas Kiersey and Doug Stokes (eds), *Foucault and International Relations New Critical Engagements* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011).

³⁰⁰ Jan Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault: Discourses, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR’, *Review of International Studies* 21 (2007): 338-9.

³⁰¹ Selby, ‘Engaging Foucault’, 332.

³⁰² For example in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983);

³⁰³ Colin Koopman describes this process in blistering detail in Colin Koopman, ‘Foucault’s Historiographical Expansion: Adding Genealogy to Archaeology’, *Journal of the Philosophy of History* 2(2008): 338-362.

a certain set of concerns where their content and relevance is contingently dependent on a variety of other social and political factors that I go beyond my analysis here.

For Foucault an archaeological investigation was intended to understand how objects were regulated by certain discursive rules. Foucault indicated that archaeology was intended to study objects without referencing an essential “foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourses and this constitute the conditions of their historical appearance”.³⁰⁴ He continued stating this was “to write a history of discursive objects that does not plunge them into the common depth of a primal soil, but deploys the nexus of regularities that govern their dispersion.”³⁰⁵ Foucault was here interested in establishing the ‘rules’ for what could and could not be said and these contributed to the understanding of a particular object. In many ways this was essentially descriptive in nature, and similar to the type of project I initially envisioned on post 1989 US discourses of China. Foucault offered a more succinct explanation in an interview describing archaeology as “the description of the record” by which he meant “all the rules at a given period for and for a definite society defined the limits and forms of”, “expressibility”, “conservation”, “memory”, “reactivation”, and “appropriation”.³⁰⁶ What this means in a practical sense is I had to first engage with the source material and describe what US presidents had said about China and then establish how these discourses related to each other. Archaeology it can be said is the preceding work that documents what was said and the limits of what was said to enable a genealogical analysis to take place.

Koopman makes the case that Foucault did not move from one methodological approach to the other but expanded on archaeology by complementing it with a genealogy which had more of a focus on the nexus between power and knowledge where one always implemented the other.³⁰⁷ Koopman describes this as the view that “power and knowledge are neither reducible to nor identical with one another, and yet neither are the two ever wholly separable”.³⁰⁸ Foucault identified clearly how “studying their relation was precisely [his] problem” and he never intended to develop a theory of power or of knowledge but was

³⁰⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* trans. by A. M. Sheridan Smith (Oxon: Routledge, 2002): 52-53.

³⁰⁵ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 52-53.

³⁰⁶ Michel Foucault, ‘History, Discourse, Discontinuity’ in Sylvere Lotringer (ed.), *Foucault Live Collected Interviews, 1961-1984* (New York: Semiotext(E), 1996):39-40.

³⁰⁷ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 37.

³⁰⁸ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 37.

concerned with how they function in particular practices, institutions and discourses.³⁰⁹

Foucault would describe genealogy in the following terms:

“Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today... It is not therefore via an empiricism that the genealogical project unfolds, now even via a positivism in the ordinary sense of that term. What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects”.³¹⁰

More precisely, genealogy “opposes itself to the search for origins... the image of primordial truth”.³¹¹ It is “not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that [things] have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms”.³¹² I am in this light not interested in articulating the origins of the logics themselves or claiming that there is some kind of transcendental essence to US foreign policy. The question though, of where these logics do emerge from and how they come to constitute US political thinking towards China is most definitely worth engaging in.

Foucault would elsewhere describe the relationship between archaeology and genealogy in the following manner:

“If we were to characterize it in two terms, then ‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play”.³¹³

If archaeology was intended to describe the rules governing what could and could not be said or thought, then genealogy would offer the tools to analyse how the discursive rules changed by providing concepts with which to make sense of that change. Koopman makes the case that it is through the “master key” of problematisation that we understand the relationship between archaeology and genealogy. Foucault again in this light described the two as follows:

“It was a matter of analysing, not behaviours, or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies’, but the problematisations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought- and the practices on the basis of which these problematisations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me to analyse their formation out of the practices and modifications undergone by the latter”.³¹⁴

³⁰⁹ Michel Foucault, ‘Structuralism and Poststructuralism’, in Michael Foucault, *Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume 2* ed. By James Faubion (London: Penguin Books, 1998): 455.

³¹⁰ Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Colin Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge* (England: The Harvester Press, 1980): 83.

³¹¹ Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 140.

³¹² Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, 142.

³¹³ Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’, 85.

³¹⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure* (London Penguin Books, 1985): 11-12.

This allowed Foucault to develop a form of inquiry that would enable help to define and articulate the problematisations that are the conditions of possibility for the present state of things.³¹⁵ The research presented here then is orientated towards identifying useful analytical concepts for studying US foreign policy to China more broadly without engaging in detail how US conceptions of China have changed over time. This follows Koopman's reading of Foucault where genealogy can help generate new analytical concepts that might then contribute to analysing in more specificity why particular discursive rules and norms changed.

Through a genealogy I offer a reading organised around the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics that traces how China has been discursively rendered in US presidential discourses and how present US discourses of China are intimately bound up with 'historical' narratives. A genealogy then in Colin Koopman's words involves a "practice of critique in the form of historical problematisation of the present".³¹⁶ Koopman's main argument is that Foucault is concerned with problematising how the power-knowledge nexus works, not what power or knowledge necessarily are.³¹⁷ Conducting a genealogy then is about articulating "strange singularities by fashioning concepts that make visible linkages, assemblages, and networks, particularly with an eye to their overall coherence".³¹⁸ Rather than deploying the terminology of an assemblage, or a *dispositif* that Foucault uses in his later works, I develop the analytical concepts of the logic of identity, capital, and geopolitics through a genealogical analysis pertinent to the particular context of US presidential discourses and China. If US presidential discourses of China are understood in a broad sense as being 'coherent', despite some of the tensions that I will go into demonstrate, then that coherence is determined by the three analytical logics I describe.

Koopman's underlying premise is that Foucault must be read through a Kantian, rather than Nietzsche or Heidegger, and that Foucault internally transformed a Kantian transcendental plane to an immanent historical one. Koopman argues that "whereas Kant undertook a transcendental critique of the various employments of our reason, Foucault undertook a historical critique of the various deployments of our thought".³¹⁹ Foucault's critique "should be understood as investigations of the conditions of possibility of the practices whose critique

³¹⁵ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 45.

³¹⁶ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 2.

³¹⁷ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 9.

³¹⁸ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 4.

³¹⁹ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 15.

they perform”.³²⁰ This is important to note as Koopman categorises the genealogy of Bernard Williams and Friedrich Nietzsche as being conducted in the name of vindicating a particular truth and subverting a particular norm or tradition respectively. What distinguishes Foucault from Kant in this regard, and aligns Foucault more with the notion of critical theory described by Cox is his interest in an “inquiry that provokes us to transform ourselves into being otherwise”.³²¹ The advantage of a Foucauldian genealogy is how it “shows the precise ways in which our knowledges, powers, and ethics have contingently formed”.³²²

The primary goal of a genealogy then is an “explication and conceptualisation of a complex set of practices that have contingently coalesced”.³²³ Koopman also indicates that genealogies should be understood as an “initiating, rather than concluding, phase of thought”, where it is not concerned with judgement but “bings into focus the problems to which further critical work must develop responses”.³²⁴ With this in mind, I do not intend the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics to be universal or transferable concepts to other contexts, though they should be useful when assessing the broader issues, and broader sources of discourses of US foreign policy towards China. This is something that Koopman warned about when he distinguishes between Foucault's concepts and his analytics and laments at times, how Foucault’s historically derived concepts and categories are unfortunately universalised.³²⁵ The logics are also, despite being the most prominent, not the only logics present in US discourse of China. But I maintain that they are fundamental when analysing US presidential discourses of China.

3.4 Discourse Analysis

Iver Neumann explains discourse analysis can be a way of “specifying the bandwidth of possible outcomes” in political practice or it can demonstrate the preconditions for a specific outcome indicating concurrently that it might have been different.³²⁶ To Ole Waever “discourses organise knowledge systematically, and thus delimit what can be said and what

³²⁰ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 15.

³²¹ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 16.

³²² Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 44.

³²³ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 93.

³²⁴ Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 95.

³²⁵ Koopman, ‘Putting Foucault to work’, 819. For a more critical take on Foucault’s approaches, opposed to Koopman, see Rudi Visker, *Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique* trans. By Chris Turner (London: Verso: 1995).

³²⁶ Iver Neumann, ‘Discourse Analysis’, in Audie Klots and Deepa Prakesh (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 62-63.

not”.³²⁷ Discourses in Waever’s approach “are made up of statements, and what makes for the unity and coherence of a discourse is simply the regularities exhibited by the relations between different statements”.³²⁸ Can Mutlu and Mark Salter argue that “language is political, social, and cultural” and “discourse analysis is the rigorous study of writing, speech, and other communicative events in order to understand these political, social, and cultural dynamics”.³²⁹ For Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillip “language is a ‘machine’ that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world”.³³⁰ Jack Holland describes how “discourses occur where language becomes relatively stable, producing meaning in a comparatively systematic way”.³³¹ It is through the production of meaning through language that the logics I describe are apparent in US presidential discourses.

Roxanne Doty usefully describes discourse as “a structured, relational totality” that “delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular ‘reality’ can be known and acted upon”.³³² Doty in this light describes how discourse analysis “can reveal the necessary but not sufficient conditions of various practices”.³³³ Martin Mueller distinguishes between narratives and discourse where narratives are “assembled through texts” and associated with the representations of events whereas “discourse is always more than the text, reflecting contextual, supra-subjective meaning structures that are not exclusively expressed by textual means”.³³⁴ Jennifer Milliken outlines how there are three major commitments to understanding discourse; they are structures of signification, they are productive of the things they define, and there is a relationship between the meanings produced by discourses and the practices that they implement.³³⁵

Lene Hansen remarks that foreign policy debates are “about the definition of what is objectively at stake”.³³⁶ The articulation of a ‘security threat’ or ‘national interest’ is not an exercise in non-discursive or objective observation but embodies the use of a discourse of

³²⁷ Ole Waever, ‘Identity, communities and foreign policy: Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory’, in Lene Hansen and Ole Waever (eds), *European Integration and National Identity* (London: Routledge, 2002): 29.

³²⁸ Waever, ‘Identity, communities and foreign policy’, 29.

³²⁹ Can Mutlu and Mark Salter, ‘The Discursive Turn Introduction’, in Can Mutlu and Mark Salter (eds), *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013): 113.

³³⁰ Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillip, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (London: Sage Publications, 2002): 8.

³³¹ Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, 3.

³³² Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, 6.

³³³ Roxanne Doty, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines’, *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (1993): 303.

³³⁴ Martin Muller, ‘Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice’, *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 334.

³³⁵ Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations’, 229-230.

³³⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 215.

what one thing 'is' or 'isn't'. For Hansen security discourses in particular imply a dual political dynamic, "they invest those enacting security policies with the legitimate *power* to undertake decisive and otherwise exceptional actions, but they also construct those actors with a particular *responsibility* for doing so".³³⁷ Discourse analysis then is a method concerned with re-politicising seemingly objective statements and in Foucault's terms, problematising the taken for granted.

For Foucault in his archaeological writings, discourses are the "practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak".³³⁸ They are more than just a series of signs and signifiers, irreducible to language and speech. His genealogical writings expand to examine the impact of social practices on discursive patterns that enable the production and understanding of objects and statements.³³⁹ David Howarth elaborates on this, taking discourse "to refer to historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and object".³⁴⁰ Howarth understands discourse analysis through the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, where it is about determining "the historically specific rules and conventions that structure production of meaning in a particular social context".³⁴¹ As I use discourse analysis here I do not mean it as the study of 'pure' meanings within a particular text but as the more expansive understanding that includes the manner in which discourse reproduces meanings within a broader set of social practices.

Hansen describes discourse as "framings of meanings and lenses of interpretation" as opposed to objective eternal truths.³⁴² Discourses then constitute patterns of meaning and sense making, existing in a constitutive relationship with the objects and things that they help describe. This is to say that US imaginations regarding China respond to as well as shape how China is imagined. Policy discourses and discourses of identity as outlined by Hansen are subsequently conceptualised as ontologically related, inherent in the constitution of one another. As Hansen makes clear, this conception of discourse is concerned with the constitution of material facts and the structures that support them.³⁴³

³³⁷ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 35.

³³⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2010): 54.

³³⁹ Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, genealogy, history', in Paul Rainbow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader* (Penguin: London, 1981).

³⁴⁰ David Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000): 9.

³⁴¹ Howarth, *Discourse* 11.

³⁴² Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 7.

³⁴³ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 22.

I follow Hansen's work in a number of ways. I adopt similar ontological and epistemological assumptions, where I am ontologically concerned with the language used in discourses of China in US presidential statements, and adopted a non-casual epistemology where these discourses are constitutively related to US foreign policy practices towards China.³⁴⁴ My concern then is explicitly not what China essentially is or is not but with how the US comes to understand what China is. The ontological status of 'China' is thus beyond the scope of my analysis even if that status itself is similarly contingent and arbitrary. Hansen describes how "an intertextual understanding of foreign policy argues that texts build their arguments and authority through references to other texts: by making direct quotes or adopting key concepts and catchphrases".³⁴⁵ This intertextuality forms the underpinning assumption of the relationship between the different speeches and documents I analyse, even though they are drawn from an extensive time period. Most usefully Hansen outlines how to design a discourse analysis focusing on the number of 'selves' analysed, the intertextual source base, the number of events and the temporal perspective considered.³⁴⁶ For my purposes I focus on a single 'self' embodied by the US president, I rely on official discourses and focus on multiple events over a substantial period of time.

The President for instance, circulates many dominant imaginaries of and for the US political entity.³⁴⁷ The importance of historically contextualising China within US discourses is signified by Hansen's observation that "the meaning of security is tied to historically specific forms of political community" where identity practices are a performance of a particular imagination.³⁴⁸ This requires an understanding of the manner in which the 'self' is regarded in relation towards the 'other' and the forming of identity through difference, or as Hansen and others formulate, that identity is constitutively related to foreign policy and security practices.³⁴⁹ This process captures how the logic of identity functions as I describe in US presidential discourses towards China. I maintain though, that despite the centrality of identity in Hansen's analysis it is not merely through the logic of identity that US presidential discourses imagine China and construct US foreign policy towards and China.

³⁴⁴ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 17; 29.

³⁴⁵ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 8.

³⁴⁶ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 81.

³⁴⁷ Cynthia Weber, *Faking It: U.S. Hegemony in a "Post-Phallic" Era* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999): xiv. Frank Austerlind, *The Great American Scaffold Intertextuality and identity in American Presidential discourse* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Company, 2014): 275-296.

³⁴⁸ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 34.

³⁴⁹ Anna Agathangelou and Nevzat Soguk, 'Rocking the Kabash: Insurrectional Politics, the "Arab Streets" and Global Revolution in the 21st Century', *Globalizations* 8 (2011): 511-558; Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2006).

In a practical sense, I focused my analysis on US presidential sources taken from the *American Presidency Project*, which is a digital archive hosted by the University of California in Santa Barbara.³⁵⁰ The archive contains over 123,000 individual sources relating to US Presidents from George Washington up until the current President Donald Trump. It includes State of the Union addresses, major speeches, executive orders, some interviews, press office statements, news conferences, some government reports and other documents related to the US presidency. I searched the archive for all documents containing the word China in a presidential source, not including documents from the press office. There were 5887 relevant documents from George Washington up until the end of Barack Obama's second term in January 2017. Although my genealogy is focused on the years from 1844 to 2016 it was useful to establish what US presidents before 1844 had to say about China and although they provide some useful context in the following chapter they do not represent the major analytical focus of this thesis. From the 5887 I concluded that 403 contained meaningful statements regarding US policy towards China and they form the basis of my analysis. By meaningful here I was looking for statements that reflected some kind of judgement and opinion rather than factual accounts of events. The main sources I used are listed at the beginning of the bibliography, and although I do not quote everyone individually they remained important for contextualising and understanding the ones that I do include. I have also at times engaged with key texts from outside this archive, predominantly including the major statements of senior government officials, based on their intertextual significance in articulating the logics of US foreign policies towards China.

Luis Lobo-Guerrero describes approaching an archive as a site of interrogation, rather than a store of knowledge, thus, understanding the archive is a space where “imaginaries are negotiated”.³⁵¹ It is in this narrow sense that I understand the US imagination in this thesis. The presidential discourses I analyse constitute the US imagination of itself, China and the US relationship to China. I recognise though that the US imagination exists more broadly in a variety of different sources, mediums and discourses beyond official presidential statements.

3.5 A Note on Reading

In his later reading of Karl Marx's *Capital*, Louis Althusser articulates a form of hermeneutic exploration he calls “symptomatic reading” to “discern in the apparent continuity of the

³⁵⁰ ‘The American Presidency Project’, *The American Presidency Project* (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php>, 15 January 2017).

³⁵¹ Luis Lobo-Guerrero, ‘Archives’ in Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu (eds) *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2013): 124.

discourse, the lacunae, blanks and failures of rigour”.³⁵² It is an intuitive exploration of the unsaid and the silences that arise from a text, a form of reading in-between the lines, that takes into account the broader discourse within which a particular text or imagination is constructed. Through these silences, Althusser contended it was possible to locate “*an answer to which does not correspond to any question posed* (emphasis in original)”, where the text is symptomatic of a broader schema of thought, absent from the text.³⁵³ This form of reading is intended to reveal the absences within, and yet outside a text. It is this “conceptual emptiness” beneath the presence of a word that Althusser describes as a symptom where his reading is a process of “making manifest what is latent”.³⁵⁴ This makes it clear that although US presidents do not invoke a particular logic in their statements regarding China, despite the rare occurrences I have noted, they do appear to invoke a particular set of perceived interests, understandings and priorities. I am not seeking to unveil a hidden meaning within US presidential discourses, but articulate the logics that they appear to invoke.

Complementary to Althusser’s symptomatic reading is Foucault’s remark that “we must not imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would only decipher” to understand the significance of imaginations.³⁵⁵ My reading of US presidential discourse of China is intended to locate the perceptions of imperatives and logics within US foreign policy towards China, yes these are socially constituted and contingent discourses but as the texts I analyse testify, they function and exert an influence over US foreign policy towards China. Reading then, is a brand of intellectual habitus that necessitates a continual process of reflectivity with regards to the texts I choose to analyse and the concepts I adopt in doing so. I have stated explicitly here that I adopt and build on a variety of analytical concepts and theoretical framings from a heterodox body of authors with deliberate scepticism towards some kind of tidy disciplinary boundary.

Reading and writing, in this regard, is always a form of constructing meaning as a constitutive bond between author and reader. Not only can this be said for myself in my reading of texts, but for the manner in which the US ‘reads’ China. How US presidents articulate these perceptions can be said to be symptoms of the logics that I describe. The interpretation of the various physical absences in the texts is similar to Jacques Derrida’s

³⁵² Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital* trans. By Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2009): 159.

³⁵³ Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, 29.

³⁵⁴ Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, 36.

³⁵⁵ Michel Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’, in Michael J. Shapiro (ed.), *Language and Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1984): 127.

notion of *différance* and his framing of deconstruction. *Différance* refers to the “movement that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, postponement, reserving”.³⁵⁶ What can be said for now is that the absences Althusser intended to discern with his form of reading are perpetually deferred, initially in their absence and thereafter in the constant negotiations over their meaning. In his descriptions of genealogy as a method, Michael Shapiro posits that established meaning is “one possible emergence from an interpretive agonistics” where the “genealogical imagination construes all systems of intelligibility”.³⁵⁷ The broader networks of discourse that shape intelligibility can be discerned through a hybrid of Althusser’s symptomatic reading that accounts for absent but invoked assumptions, in my case logics, and a genealogical reading that accounts for the absent legacies of earlier thought.

Reading is not so much a process of simply inferring apparent meaning, but a negotiation between the ‘said’ and the ‘unsaid’, the present and the absent. It is a process of adjusting one’s hearing to the loud silences that circulate various texts and practices. The ‘said’ and the ‘unsaid’ are thus mutually implicated in a text or any other formulation of meaning. F. M. Cornford in his *The Unwritten Philosophy* observed that often philosophic discussion “rested on tacit assumptions, which were enshrined in the ambiguities of language”.³⁵⁸ He borrows from William James when he asserts how “the most potentest of all our premises is never mentioned”.³⁵⁹ The logics I describe then, are never mentioned explicitly, yet are regularly invoked and conditioned through the discourses that I analyse. Reading then is a process of sense making and sense breaking. This is not to say that assumptions of various kinds are universally shared but that in the case of US imaginations, universally presumed, a point I shall return to later. What is vital though is to display a certain degree of scepticism and curiosity especially in regards to the unsaid, unwritten, and unacknowledged.³⁶⁰

Symptomatic reading is then, aimed at exploring what is unsaid as much as what is said in US presidential discourses of China. For the texts I analyse do not explicitly name a particular logic but they do invoke a series of ideas, imperatives, and concerns that I determine can be described as particular logic. I am not looking for some deeper hidden truth of what the US is nor am I trying to make the case for a comprehensive and parsimonious theory of US foreign

³⁵⁶ Derrida, *Positions*, 7.

³⁵⁷ Michael J. Shapiro, *Reading the Postmodern Polity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992): 2-3.

³⁵⁸ F. M. Cornford, *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967): 43.

³⁵⁹ Cornford, *The Unwritten Philosophy*, 34.

³⁶⁰ Cornford, *The Unwritten Philosophy*, 39.

policy. In this regard it is helpful to understand symptomatic reading as a process of inductive reasoning where I begin by engaging a body of source material rather than a stated hypothesis regarding US foreign policy and China. The combination of a genealogy and discourse analysis as set out here are intended to produce new analytical concepts to understand US foreign policy towards China, the outcome of which are the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics. This is not to say that any prior theorising was or is unnecessary, as I have remarked previously that I began the process expecting to identify the importance of identity in US foreign policy towards China, but it has been empirically and theoretically necessary to engage more openly with US presidential discourses of China. The result of which is my argument regarding the primary presence of three logics in US presidential discourse of China. It is also important to reiterate that my goal here is not to work from an inductive analysis to a deductive one where I start to build a more general theory of US foreign policy premised on these three logics but that I merely want to identify their presence in US presidential discourses and explain how it is they function in regards to China.³⁶¹

Rita Felski captures this nicely in her observation that “political linkages and effects are not immanent, hidden in the convoluted folds of texts, but derive from connections and mediations that must be tracked down and described”.³⁶² Felski also describes poststructuralist critique, which I no doubt am engaged in, as a “*second-level hermeneutics* –a method of reading that looks beyond the individual text to decipher larger structures of cultural production”, where the logics I describe contribute and are part of these structures.³⁶³ Yes the US can emphasise its values, or the search for new markets, or concerns about political stability in the Asia-Pacific, but what these statements ‘mean’, is that there are particular conceptions of logical practice and thought being deployed and invoked in how China is represented in US presidential discourses. I am open to the possibility and indeed potential ‘logic’ of the logics I describe being consistent with broader US foreign policy expectations, beliefs and potential logics but my goal here is more focused.

In short, symptomatic reading explains how I determine from the source material I engaged with, through a genealogical discourse analysis, the three logics of identity, capital, and

³⁶¹ For some discussion of the role of deductive and inductive reasoning in IR see Yong-Soo Eun, ‘Rethinking Logic of Inference and Explanation in the Field of International Relations’, *Politics* 32 (2012): 162-174 and David Blagden, ‘Induction and Deduction in International Relations: Squaring the Circle Between Theory and Evidence’, *International Studies Review* 18 (2016): 195-213.

³⁶² Rita Felski, *the Limits of Critique* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press): 11.

³⁶³ Felski, *the Limits of Critique*, 55.

geopolitics as evident in US presidential discourses of China. The statements I analyse are in this regard symptomatic of these broader logics I discern.

II A Genealogy of US Presidential Discourses of China

Part two of this thesis is comprised of 6 substantive genealogical chapters and a conclusion. This section presents my genealogical analysis of US presidential discourses of China from the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of Barack Obama's presidency in 2016. I outline the prevalence, constitution and function of the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as they are apparent in these discourses. These chapters are not intended to be an exhaustive historical account of US-China relations but an analysis of US presidential discourses of China and how they reveal, articulate and reflect the three logics of practice. The chapters have a dual purpose: to present the material basis from where I derived the three logics of practice from and demonstrate how those logics functioned in US presidential discourses of China.

Chapter 4 covers the period from the John Tyler's Presidency and the Treaty of Wangxia in 1844 until the end of Grover Cleveland's second term in 1897. Chapter 5 covers the Presidencies of William McKinley to Woodrow Wilson. Chapter 6 presents analysis from Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency to Lyndon Johnson's. Chapter 7 covers the Presidencies of Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Chapter 8 covers the Presidencies of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Chapter 9 returns to the initial origins of my research where I analyse Barack Obama's discourses of China. Finally in chapter 10 I summarise my main arguments while elaborating on the notion that the research presented here best serves as the initial analysis of a broader research agenda into US foreign policy towards China.

Chapter 4 – 1844-1897: Early Encounters with China

4.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the period from 1844 and the Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of Grover Cleveland's second term in 1897.³⁶⁴ I begin with a brief section on some earlier discourses of US presidents with regards to China but this is not the main focus of the chapter. I examine discourses from the presidencies of John Tyler, James Polk, Ulysses S. Grant, Chester Arthur and Grover Cleveland. This period begins with the US securing commercial access to Chinese ports on the back of the British military victory in the first Opium War from 1839-1842 which lead to a gradual increase in trade through the rest of the century.³⁶⁵ During the 1850s and onwards the US started to see a rise in Chinese immigration, predominantly labours who were coming to work on the West coast. This was coupled with growing hostility and racism culminating in the passage of the Chinese Exclusions Acts in 1882 that banned all Chinese immigration.³⁶⁶

What I demonstrate is the early prominence of the logic of capital in US presidential discourses towards China. This provides the predominant organising principle for US thinking towards China up until the end of the 19th century when more explicit geopolitical interests start to form, reflecting the growing recognition that the imperatives of the logic of capital required some kind of organisation of the US geopolitical presence in Asia.

4.2 Early Encounters

One of the first substantial Presidential remarks on China occurred in the first annual message to Congress on December 6th 1825 by John Quincy Adams. He emphasised the liberal character of US trade where it was “the policy of the United States in their commercial

³⁶⁴ Michael Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship The United States and China to 1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Kenneth Latourette, *The History of Early Relations between the United States and China 1784-1844* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917); Kenneth Rea (ed.), *Early Sino American Relations, 1841-1912: The Collected Articles of Earl Swisher* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977); Nick Cleaver, *Grover Cleveland's New Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

³⁶⁵ John Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842-1854* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Caroline Frank, *Objectifying China, Imagining America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Francis Carpenter, *The Old China Trade* (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1976); Kendall Johnson (ed.), *Narratives of Free Trade The Commercial Cultures of Early US-China Relations* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012).

³⁶⁶ Najia Aarim-Heriot, *Chinese Immigrants, African Americans, and Racial Anxiety in the United States, 1848-82* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Diana Ahmad, *The Opium Debate and The Chinese Exclusion Laws in the Nineteenth-Century American West* (Las Vegas, University of Nevada Press, 2007)

intercourse with other nations has always been of the most liberal character".³⁶⁷ Adams reflected on the necessity of maintaining a strong navy to protect US seafaring commerce as "the constant maintenance of a small squadron in the Mediterranean is a necessary substitute for the humiliating alternative of paying tribute for the security of our commerce in that sea... similar motives have rendered expedient the keeping of a like force on the coasts of Peru and Chile on the Pacific".³⁶⁸ This relationship between geopolitical concerns and economic interest reflects the early close relationship between the logic of capital and the logic geopolitics. Trade with allies required sufficient policing of the seas to protect US economic activity. A point further emphasised by Adams when he remarked that "an unsettled coast of many degrees of latitude forming part of our own territory and a flourishing commerce and fishery extending to the islands of the Pacific and to China still require that the protecting power of the Union should be displayed under its flag as well as upon the ocean as upon the land".³⁶⁹ Adams was reflecting on the case for a US naval presence in the Pacific to defend its territory and its trade with countries like China indicating how the logic of geopolitics here was contingent on the primary importance of the logic of capital.

Soon after Adams, Andrew Jackson described the growing commercial relations between the US and China in his third annual message to Congress on December 6th 1831. Jackson described how "to China and the East Indies our commerce continues in its usual extent, and with increased facilities which the credit and capital of our merchants afford by substituting bills for payments in specie."³⁷⁰ Echoing the concerns of Adams he observed how "Chile and Peru seem to be still threatened with civil commotions, and until they shall be settled disorders may naturally be apprehended, requiring the constant presence of a naval force in the Pacific Ocean to protect our fisheries and guard our commerce".³⁷¹ Jackson had elaborated further on how the US needed a Pacific naval presence to protect US commerce against political disturbances in regional countries. This reflects the early geopolitical concerns with regards to the Pacific and how this would affect US commerce. If the logic of capital

³⁶⁷ John Quincy Adams: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1825. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29467>.

³⁶⁸ John Quincy Adams: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1825. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29467>.

³⁶⁹ John Quincy Adams: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1825. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29467>.

³⁷⁰ Andrew Jackson: "Third Annual Message," December 6, 1831. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29473>.

³⁷¹ Andrew Jackson: "Third Annual Message," December 6, 1831. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29473>.

necessitated the existence and expansion of trade, then the logic of geopolitics began to emerge as a way to secure US international commerce.

Martin van Buren also echoed these sentiments in his second annual message to Congress December 3rd 1838. Buren remarked described how “the unsettled state of a portion of South America renders it indispensable that our commerce should receive protection in that quarter; the vast and increasing interests embarked in the trade of the Indian and China seas, in the whale fisheries of the Pacific Ocean, and in the Gulf of Mexico require equal attention to their safety”.³⁷² This reflected the dual concerns regarding South American politics and US commerce in Asia. Buren also noted how “the rapid increase and wide expansion of our commerce, which is every day seeking new avenues of profitable adventure” implied “the absolute necessity of a naval force for its protection precisely in the degree of its extension”. In a comment directed at the need for increased congressional funding for the navy Buren emphasised how “the anticipation of its future triumphs whenever opportunity presents itself, which we may rightfully indulge from the experience of the past all seem to point to the Navy as a most efficient arm of our national defence and a proper object of legislative encouragement.”³⁷³ The significance of the US navy then was rendered through the logic of capital with a focus on securing US commerce as well as a a more minor concern where the navy reflected through the logic of identity, a source of social prestige.

Buren signified a notable shift in his understanding of the scope of the US navy in his fourth annual message to Congress on December 5th 1840. He described how “the Navy...has been usefully and honourably employed in the protection of our commerce and citizens in the Mediterranean, the Pacific, on the coast of Brazil, and in the Gulf of Mexico”.³⁷⁴ Reflecting the increasing commercial ties between US merchants and China, Buren’s comments reflected the close relationship between the expanding tendency of the logic of capital, and its corresponding considerations described by a logic of geopolitics. He also described how “a small squadron, consisting of the frigate Constellation and the sloop of war Boston, under Commodore Kearney, is now on its way to the China and Indian seas for the purpose of

³⁷² Martin van Buren: "Second Annual Message," December 3, 1838. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29480>.

³⁷³ Martin van Buren: "Second Annual Message," December 3, 1838. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29480>.

³⁷⁴ Martin van Buren: "Fourth Annual Message," December 5, 1840. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29482>.

attending to our interests in that quarter".³⁷⁵ What this begins to indicate is that geopolitical concerns were closely related to the imperatives of a logic of capital. Although in this early stage in US imaginations of China, the logic of geopolitics was restricted to the securing of US commerce in the spaces it was expanding into, US policy towards China specifically, and more generally would come to be the securing and administration of that very space.

These initial references to China reflect a concern more specifically with expanding commerce rather than any meaningful considerations of China's domestic politics. These early US imaginations then suggest US foreign policy towards China was motivated by a logic of capital as the relatively new US state sought out the necessary commercial contacts to guarantee its survival.³⁷⁶ What is apparent though is the intimate connection between economic interests and geopolitical consideration of how to secure the Pacific for safe trade.

4.3 First Contact: The Treaty of Wangxia and the Speculative Promise of the China Market

The first official contacts between the US and China occurred during the Presidency of John Tyler. Taking advantage of British military successes during the first Opium War, Tyler dispatched a diplomatic mission to China to secure equal access rights to Chinese ports. The First Opium War should be understood as the early conditions of possibility for contemporary US imaginations of China where economic access was a priority. If, as the following chapter will argue, the early 20th century saw strong US interest in the "myth of the China market", these myths began to take shape in the very initial encounters between the US and China. The notion though, that this market across the Pacific would not become apparent until the end of the century.

In a special message to Congress on December 30 1842 John Tyler described the British military successes in China where "events of considerable importance have recently transpired in China. The military operations carried on against that Empire by the English Government have been terminated by a treaty, according to the terms of which four important ports hitherto shut against foreign commerce are to be open to British merchants, Amoy, FooChooFoo, Ningpo, and Chinghai".³⁷⁷ Tyler here understands the significance of the

³⁷⁵ Martin van Buren: "Fourth Annual Message," December 5, 1840. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29482>.

³⁷⁶ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

³⁷⁷ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

British imperial war to be the access to four ports, significant as until then foreign trade had been limited to Canton. Tyler continues expressing concern about the potential for the US to gain equal access, "it can not but be interesting to the mercantile interest of the United States, whose intercourse with China at the single port of Canton has already become so considerable, to ascertain whether these other ports now open to British commerce are to remain shut, nevertheless, against the commerce of the United States".³⁷⁸ His conclusion is that "the treaty between the Chinese Government and the British commissioner provides neither for the admission nor the exclusion of the ships of other nations. It would seem, therefore, that it remains with every other nation having commercial intercourse with China to seek to make proper arrangements for itself with the Government of that Empire in this respect".³⁷⁹ In this light, Tyler's immediate concerns for China were constituted through the logic capital whereby the US desires similar economic access to the British.

Notable here, is the absence of US concerns for the integrity of the Chinese empire, or any reference to US values and their corresponding logic of identity. Tyler does though comment on how these "events appear likely to break down and soften this spirit of non-intercourse and to bring China ere long into the relations which usually subsist between civilized states".³⁸⁰ China here is positioned as outside the civilized world order which the US inhabits. Tyler articulates the general otherness of China when he observes how "the peculiarities of the Chinese Government and the Chinese character are well known". He goes on to consider the "peculiarities" of how "an Empire supposed to contain 300,000,000 subjects, fertile in various rich products of the earth, not without the knowledge of letters and of many arts, and with large and expensive accommodations for internal intercourse and traffic, has for ages sought to exclude the visits of strangers and foreigners from its dominions, and has assumed for itself a superiority over all other nations".³⁸¹ In this early formulation of China representing another example of the difference authors like Campbell and Connolly describe as necessary to the reproduction of meaningful stable identities reflects a partial influence of the exclusionary aspects of the logic of identity.

³⁷⁸ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

³⁷⁹ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

³⁸⁰ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

³⁸¹ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

Tyler speculates on how recent US “experience proves that the productions of western nations find a market to some extent among the Chinese; that that market, so far as respects the productions of the United States, although it has considerably varied in successive seasons, has on the whole more than doubled within the last ten years”.³⁸² For Tyler, “it can hardly be doubted that the opening of several new and important ports connected with parts of the Empire heretofore seldom visited by Europeans or Americans would exercise a favourable influence upon the demand for such productions”. The China market then appears as a potentially desirable opportunity for US production. Tyler uses these conclusions to request Congressional appropriation for a permanent commission in China. He makes the case that “the commercial interests of the United States connected with China require at the present moment a degree of attention and vigilance...for the compensation of a commissioner to reside in China to exercise a watchful care over the concerns of American citizens and for the protection of their persons and property.”³⁸³ This mission was undertaken by Caleb Cushing who would return two years later with the Treaty of Wangxia that conferred on the US the same commercial rights the British had taken by force.³⁸⁴ This marks the beginning of official US concern with China and which primarily characterised by the logic of capital where it was extended commercial relations that the US was interested in. A more minor concern reflected the entwining of the logics of geopolitics and identity with the US’s desire to assist in the ‘civilising’ of China.

Next year, in his third annual message to Congress in 1843 Tyler articulated an expansionist message in the context of US territorial expansion across the continent where “under the influence of our free system of government new republics are destined to spring up at no distant day on the shores of the Pacific similar in policy and in feeling to those existing on this side of the Rocky Mountains, and giving a wider and more extensive spread to the principles of civil and religious liberty”.³⁸⁵ This is significant as in later decades the US would come to see this expansion as not necessarily stopping on these Pacific shores, but logically extending across the ocean into Asia. For Tyler this was the promise of the civilized world and US “national greatness”. He describes triumphantly how “the tide of population continues

³⁸² John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

³⁸³ John Tyler: "Special Message," December 30, 1842. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67360>.

³⁸⁴ For information on this mission see: William Donahue, ‘The Caleb Cushing Mission’, *Modern Asian Studies* 16 (1982): 193-216.

³⁸⁵ John Tyler: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1843. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29647>.

unbrokenly to flow into the new States and Territories, where a refuge is found not only for our native born fellow citizens, but for emigrants from all parts of the civilized world, who come among us to partake of the blessings of our free institutions and to aid by their labour to swell the current of our wealth and power".³⁸⁶ This is indicative of the emerging logic of geopolitics and identity as entwined where the US would logically expand spatially as a natural process of civilization. Although here this is limited to the North American continent, this represents the beginnings of what would become a more international approach.

In January 1845 Tyler described the success of Cushing's mission where "the accomplishment so far of the great objects for which it was appointed, and in placing our relations with China on a new footing eminently favourable to the commerce and other interests of the United States".³⁸⁷ Tyler also implied that US concern with establishing amicable relations with China was speculative towards the potential they held. He argued to Congress that "in view of the magnitude and importance of our national concerns, actual and prospective, in China, I submit to the consideration of Congress the expediency of providing for the preservation and cultivation of the subsisting relations of amity between the United States and the Chinese Government, either by means of a permanent minister or commissioner with diplomatic functions."³⁸⁸ China then, was not just important in the present, but existed as a speculative prospect to US commercial interests.

While James Polk is known more for his annexation of Texas and war with Mexico, he contributed significantly to US presidential discourses of China. In his third annual message to Congress on December 7th 1847 he envisioned how "the Bay of San Francisco and other harbors along the Californian coast would afford shelter for our Navy, for our numerous whale ships, and other merchant vessels employed in the Pacific Ocean, and would in a short period become the marts of an extensive and profitable commerce with China and other countries of the East".³⁸⁹ Polk articulated a more explicit concern with the potential of the China trade for US interests. With regards to his comments on the Californian coast, Polk saw

³⁸⁶ John Tyler: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1843. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29647>.

³⁸⁷ John Tyler: "Special Message," January 22, 1845. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67439>.

³⁸⁸ John Tyler: "Special Message," January 22, 1845. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=67439>.

³⁸⁹ James K. Polk: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1847. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29488>.

domestic prosperity as intimately linked to international commerce. The logic of capital in this light encompassed the domestic imperatives behind international expansion.

Extolling Congress over the details of the laws of extraterritoriality of US citizens in China, Polk commented on the need for laws and tribunals to manage these legal aspects. Noting how, “under our treaty with that power American citizens are withdrawn from the jurisdiction, whether civil or criminal, of the Chinese Government and placed under that of our public functionaries in that country”, Polk captured one of the specific manifestations of exceptionalism in the US imagination.³⁹⁰

Polk described how “crimes may be committed with impunity and debts may be contracted without any means to enforce their payment. Inconveniences have already resulted from the omission of Congress to legislate upon the subject, and still greater are apprehended”. Here Polk reveals the international tensions by the apparent absence of the law for US citizens in China. Polk was concerned with how tensions “might disturb, if not destroy, our friendly relations with that Empire, and cause an interruption of our valuable commerce”.³⁹¹ China’s significance then was rendered through the logic of capital.

In a special message on July 6th 1848 to Congress Polk drew attention to the potential for a US empire based on its continental expansion and how this held promise for increasing commercial relations across the Pacific. He remarked how:

“New Mexico and Upper California have been ceded by Mexico to the United States, and now constitute a part of our country. Embracing nearly ten degrees of latitude, lying adjacent to the Oregon Territory, and extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Rio Grande, a mean distance of nearly 1,000 miles, it would be difficult to estimate the value of these possessions to the United States. They constitute of themselves a country large enough for a great empire, and their acquisition is second only in importance to that of Louisiana in 1803... The possession of the ports of San Diego and Monterey and the Bay of San Francisco will enable the United States to command the already valuable and rapidly increasing commerce of the Pacific”.³⁹²

Continental expansion for Polk was creating the conditions for the US to “command...the rapidly increasing commerce of the Pacific”. Apparent here is the extension of securing US trade across the Pacific to commanding and ordering Pacific commerce. Polk saw the acquisition of new Western territories as bringing the US “into immediate proximity with the west coast of America, from Cape Horn to the Russian possessions north of Oregon, with the

³⁹⁰ James K. Polk: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1847. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29488>.

³⁹¹ James K. Polk: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1847. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29488>.

³⁹² James K. Polk: "Special Message," July 6, 1848. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68017>.

islands of the Pacific Ocean, and by a direct voyage in steamers we will be in less than thirty days of Canton and other ports of China".³⁹³ This was significant for Polk as he declared that "in this vast region, whose rich resources are soon to be developed by American energy and enterprise, great must be the augmentation of our commerce, and with it new and profitable demands for mechanic labour in all its branches and new and valuable markets for our manufactures and agricultural products".³⁹⁴ The continental expansion of the US then was seen as closely related to the success and expansion of trade across the Pacific. Present here was the close relationship between the logics of capitals and geopolitics in the US conceptualisation of its geopolitical and economic need for physical expansion.

In his fourth annual message in 1848 Polk continued to define the virtues of San Francisco in terms of the potential to increase commercial activity with China. He declared that by "embracing the only safe and commodious harbours on that coast for many hundred miles...it is scarcely possible to estimate its wealth until it shall be brought under the government of our laws and its resources fully developed".³⁹⁵ The West coast of the US held promise not only in its domestic sources of wealth but, Polk demanded that "from its position it must command the rich commerce of China, of Asia, of the islands of the Pacific, of western Mexico, of Central America, the South American States, and of the Russian possessions bordering on that ocean". This would in Polk's projections, lead to "a great emporium...on the Californian coast which may be destined to rival in importance New Orleans itself. The depot of the vast commerce which must exist on the Pacific will probably be at some point on the Bay of San Francisco, and will occupy the same relation to the whole western coast of that ocean as New Orleans does to the valley of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico".³⁹⁶ This great emporium that Polk envisioned would be made possible by increased commercial ties across the Pacific. In a sense, the successful expansion of the continental US created the conditions for improved Commercial relations with Asia, while those commercial relations would also create the conditions for a more successful and wealthy West coast of the US.

³⁹³ James K. Polk: "Special Message," July 6, 1848. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68017>.

³⁹⁴ James K. Polk: "Special Message," July 6, 1848. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68017>.

³⁹⁵ James K. Polk: "Fourth Annual Message," December 5, 1848. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29489>.

³⁹⁶ James K. Polk: "Fourth Annual Message," December 5, 1848. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29489>.

In one of his few mentions of China in public during his fourth annual message to Congress in 1864, Abraham Lincoln drew attention to the how China was increasingly accepting “conventional laws” of international relations. Lincoln described the need for increased US consular presences amidst the on-going Taiping “rebellion which has so long been flagrant in China has at last been suppressed, with the cooperating good offices of this Government and of the other Western commercial States. The judicial consular establishment...will need legislative revision to adapt it to the extension of our commerce and to the more intimate intercourse which has been instituted with the Government and people of that vast Empire”.³⁹⁷ Lincoln referred to the positive prospect of how “China seems to be accepting with hearty good will the conventional laws which regulate commercial and social intercourse among the Western nations”.³⁹⁸ These conventional laws were by all means Western norms and customs for international relations. This constitutes an early interpretation of China accepting the requirements for participating in a Western based international system.

By no means a source of regular study in US-China relations, Ulysses S. Grant made a number of important discursive elaborations in US imaginations of China and itself. In his first annual message December 6th 1869 he reflected on the potential of the US where “the vast resources of the nation, both developed and undeveloped, ought to make our credit the best on earth”.³⁹⁹ Making the case for the anti-colonial nature of US interests he declared that “the United States have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions on this continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other European powers will find their interest in terminating those relations and establishing their present dependencies as independent powers members of the family of nations. These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another”.⁴⁰⁰ More forcefully, he described how “when the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self control in

³⁹⁷ Abraham Lincoln: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1864. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29505>. The Taiping rebellion was a Christian inspired revolt against the Chinese imperial order. See Thomas Reilly, *The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of Empire* (USA: University of Washington Press, 2014).

³⁹⁸ Abraham Lincoln: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1864. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29505>.

³⁹⁹ Ulysses S. Grant: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1869. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29510>.

⁴⁰⁰ Ulysses S. Grant: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1869. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29510>.

the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers”.⁴⁰¹ This anti-colonial stance reflects an important dynamic in the logic of geopolitics where the US is concerned with the management of international politics but conditioned by the anti-colonial principles within the logic of identity.

Grant drew special attention to the US’s Pacific trading partners when he declared, “our neighbours south of us and China and Japan, should receive our special attention. It will be the endeavour of the Administration to cultivate such relations with all these nations as to entitle us to their confidence and make it their interest, as well as ours, to establish better commercial relations”.⁴⁰² The framing of these relations again, emphasised the logic of capital for improved commerce. Grant described the diplomatic activities of Anson Burlingame, a US representative in China who had since taken up a position as a representative for China in the US and how they were going to contribute to a more “enlightened policy” towards China.⁴⁰³ He described how “through the agency of a more enlightened policy than that heretofore pursued toward China, largely due to the sagacity and efforts of one of our own distinguished citizens, the world is about to commence largely increased relations with that populous and hitherto exclusive nation”. Grant was describing the 1868 treaty between the US and China, which granted China greater trade access to the US, acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over its territory, and was designed to foster increased Chinese immigration to the US.⁴⁰⁴

Grant celebrated US initiative in granting China a relatively equal treaty as opposed to the imposition of unequal demands in the First and Second Opium War treaties. He described the treaty in a positive light:

“as the United States have been the initiators in this new policy, so they should be the most earnest in showing their good faith in making it a success. In this connection I advise such legislation as will forever preclude the enslavement of the Chinese upon our soil under the name of coolies, and also prevent American vessels from engaging in the transportation of coolies to any country tolerating the system. I also recommend that the mission to China be raised to one of the first class”.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ Ulysses S. Grant: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1869. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29510>.

⁴⁰² Ulysses S. Grant: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1869. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29510>.

⁴⁰³ Frederick Wells Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to Foreign Powers* (USA: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1912).

⁴⁰⁴ Cohen, *America’s Response to China*, 8-28.

⁴⁰⁵ Ulysses S. Grant: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1869. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29510>.

For Grant, the US was obliged to honour the integrity of the treaty and that the US was at the forefront of international cooperation with the Chinese empire. There was little to suggest any potential anxiety that Chinese immigration would later cause.

In his second annual message to Congress on December 5th 1870 Grant described an important dynamic in the logic of capital where domestic economic crises were to find their solution in international commercial expansion. He lamented that “our depressed commerce is a subject to which I called your special attention at the last session, and suggested that we will in the future have to look more to the countries south of us, and to China and Japan, for its revival”. In this sense, what would become the 20th century problem of China, found its origins in the domestic problems of US capitalism. Grant was also frustrated by the lack of US merchant ships as “the fact exists that the carrying is done almost entirely in foreign bottoms, and while this state of affairs exists we can not control our due share of the commerce of the world; that between the Pacific States and China and Japan is about all the carrying trade now conducted in American vessels”.⁴⁰⁶ As long as this was the case, the US was at the mercy of others when it came to international trade.

Grant echoed many of these themes in his third annual message to Congress in December 1871 where he was now frustrated by the lack of capable US translators in China. He described how “our representatives in Japan and China have to depend for interpreters and translators upon natives of those countries who know our language imperfectly, or procure for the occasion the services of employees in foreign business houses or the interpreters to other foreign ministers”.⁴⁰⁷ The importance of improved diplomatic relations with China and Japan was “in retaining the good opinion of those peoples, and to secure to the United States its share of the commerce destined to flow between those nations and the balance of the commercial world”.⁴⁰⁸ Again, the speculative prospects increased commercial activity between the US and China was a constitutive feature of the logic of capital.

Grant drew attention to the potential conflict between China and Japan in the early 1870s on the basis that it might harm US commercial interests and would stunt the civilising of these Asian states. Grant described this in his sixth annual to Congress in December 1874:

⁴⁰⁶ Ulysses S. Grant: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1870. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29511>.

⁴⁰⁷ Ulysses S. Grant: "Third Annual Message," December 4, 1871. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29512>.

⁴⁰⁸ Ulysses S. Grant: "Third Annual Message," December 4, 1871. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29512>.

“During the past year the fear of hostilities between China and Japan, growing out of the landing of an armed force upon the island of Formosa by the latter, has occasioned uneasiness. It is earnestly hoped, however, that the difficulties arising from this cause will be adjusted, and that the advance of civilization in these Empires may not be retarded by a state of war.”⁴⁰⁹

War and conflict then, are an impediment to US hopes for the civilizing of the region. An early example of US consternation over the islands of the Asia-Pacific, Grant emphasized how US “representatives in those countries have been instructed to impress upon the Governments of China and Japan the firm intention of this country to maintain strict neutrality in the event of hostilities”.⁴¹⁰ The US was more concerned with geopolitical stability for the sake of maintaining profitable commercial ties and the expansion of civilization into the region. The logics of geopolitics, identity and capital are all visible in these concerns.

In comparison to the lack of explicit concern about Chinese immigration Grant indicated his frustration over the increasing immigration of Chinese women. He articulated concern over how “the great proportion of the Chinese immigrants who come to our shores do not come voluntarily, to make their homes with us and their labour productive of general prosperity, but come under contracts with headmen, who own them almost absolutely”.⁴¹¹ This concern was heightened as “in a worse form does this apply to Chinese women. Hardly a perceptible percentage of them perform any honourable labour, but they are brought for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of the communities where settled and to the great demoralization of the youth of those localities”. Grant here is referring to the importation of Chinese women to function as se workers for the growing number of Chinese men working on the West coast of the US. He also articulated his openness to support legislation addressing this by declaring, “if this evil practice can be legislated against, it will be my pleasure as well as duty to enforce any regulation to secure so desirable an end”.⁴¹² This was echoed in his next annual message where he described the “evil [of] the importation of Chinese women, but few of whom are brought to our shores to pursue honourable or useful occupations”.⁴¹³ Grant’s statements captured the growing tensions between the logics of capital and identity as the increasing

⁴⁰⁹ Ulysses S. Grant: "Sixth Annual Message," December 7, 1874. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29515>.

⁴¹⁰ Ulysses S. Grant: "Sixth Annual Message," December 7, 1874. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29515>.

⁴¹¹ Ulysses S. Grant: "Sixth Annual Message," December 7, 1874. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29515>.

⁴¹² Ulysses S. Grant: "Sixth Annual Message," December 7, 1874. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29515>.

⁴¹³ Ulysses S. Grant: "Seventh Annual Message," December 7, 1875. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29516>.

effect of domestic economic crises needed to be addressed through solutions in international commercial expansion.

In a more general sense in his seventh annual message in 1875 Grant addressed the political maturation of the US when he remarked “as we are now about to enter upon our second centennial commenting our manhood as a nation it is well to look back upon the past and study what will be best to preserve and advance our future greatness”.⁴¹⁴ For Grant this entailed recalling how “from the fall of Adam for his transgression to the present day no nation has ever been free from threatened danger to its prosperity and happiness. We should look to the dangers threatening us, and remedy them so far as lies in our power”.⁴¹⁵ The US was like any other state in the sense that Grant saw a permanent state of insecurity as the permanent existential condition of existence. This sense of insecurity, or a general anxiety about the future was for Grant an inherent aspect of the logic of identity. There was always some kind of potential threat to US security, and Grant’s articulations of the dishonourable activities of emigrant populations of Chinese women captured the material and ontological varieties of this insecurity.

4.4 The Chinese Exclusion Act and US Identity

Anxiety over Chinese immigration came to political culmination in the 1880s. Chester Arthur in his first annual message to Congress in December 1881 described the “demoralizing and destructive traffic” of Chinese immigration.⁴¹⁶ Arthur commended the Chinese government for accepting potential changes in “prompt and friendly spirit” to existing treaty statutes regarding immigration.⁴¹⁷ He also described US relations with Japan in a very positive manner. Describing the on-going conversion of Japan he described how “the intimacy between our own country and Japan, the most advanced of the Eastern nations, continues to be cordial. I am advised that the Emperor contemplates the establishment of full constitutional government, and that he has already summoned a parliamentary congress for the purpose of effecting the change”.⁴¹⁸ For Arthur this was “a remarkable step toward complete assimilation

⁴¹⁴ Ulysses S. Grant: "Seventh Annual Message," December 7, 1875. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29516>.

⁴¹⁵ Ulysses S. Grant: "Seventh Annual Message," December 7, 1875. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29516>.

⁴¹⁶ Chester A. Arthur: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1881. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29522>.

⁴¹⁷ Chester A. Arthur: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1881. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29522>.

⁴¹⁸ Chester A. Arthur: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1881. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29522>.

with the Western system [which] can not fail to bring Japan into closer and more beneficial relationship with ourselves as the chief Pacific power”.⁴¹⁹ Although he was describing conditions in Japan, This reflected Arthur’s general hopes for political conditions in Asia more broadly. In effect here, was US desire to see the assimilation of Asian states into the Western system via the conversation of those states by Western ‘standards of civilization’, a process articulated in detail by Gerrit Gong.⁴²⁰

In his 1882 message to Congress describing his veto over a bill to ban all Chinese immigration Arthur captured the tension between domestic political concerns and international commercial interests. He state how “a nation is justified in repudiating its treaty obligations only when they are in conflict with great paramount interests... The present treaty relations between that power and the United States spring from an antagonism which arose between our paramount domestic interests and our previous relations”.⁴²¹ This international-domestic tension was to in effect become ever-present in US policies towards China and will be highlighted again in chapter 9 with Barack Obama’s trade initiatives in the Asia-Pacific. Arthur described how “the treaty commonly known as the Burlingame treaty conferred upon Chinese subjects the right of voluntary emigration to the United States for the purposes of curiosity or trade or as permanent residents, and was in all respects reciprocal as to citizens of the United States in China”. It was designed to give “the voluntary emigrant coming to the United States the right to travel there or to reside there, with all the privileges, immunities, or exemptions enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation”.⁴²²

He was now aware though that the increasing domestic tensions over this encounter was beginning to undermine domestic political stability in the West coast states. Arthur accepted the need for modifying the 1880 Treaty affirming immigration rights when he conceded that “I think it may fairly be accepted as an expression of the opinion of Congress that the coming of such labourers to the United States or their residence here affects our interests and endangers good order throughout the country. On this point I should feel it my duty to accept the views of Congress”.⁴²³ He did though maintain his position that the provision of the act

⁴¹⁹ Chester A. Arthur: "First Annual Message," December 6, 1881. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29522>.

⁴²⁰ Gerrit Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

⁴²¹ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴²² Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴²³ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

suspending immigration for 20 years was “a breach of our national faith, and being unable to bring myself in harmony with the views of Congress on this vital point the honour of the country constrains me to return the act with this objection to its passage”.⁴²⁴ Thus, for Arthur, the logic of identity exerted some influence on his decision-making.

Arthur described how the acquisition of California created the conditions for more promising commercial relations with China. He explained how “our intercourse with China is of recent date. Our first treaty with that power is not yet forty years old. It is only since we acquired California and established a great seat of commerce on the Pacific that we may be said to have broken down the barriers which fenced in that ancient Monarchy”.⁴²⁵ Arthur noted how Chinese immigration had been beneficial for the US, as Chinese labour had contributed to US prosperity. Describing the 1868 Treaty as a natural progression of the US encounter with China he declared, “no one can say that the country has not profited by their work. They were largely instrumental in constructing the railways which connect the Atlantic with the Pacific”.⁴²⁶ The contribution of Chinese bodies then has been critical to the development of the Western US, “the States of the Pacific Slope are full of evidences of their industry. Enterprises profitable alike to the capitalist and to the labourer of Caucasian origin would have lain dormant but for them”.⁴²⁷ China had contributed to the material construction of the US and, as implied by Arthur, US capital would have been worse off without this engagement. What is essentially encountered here, is the tension between the logic of capital which necessitated an influx of cheap labour for the production and reproduction of US capitalism on its Western states and the logic of identity as practiced by everyday Americans in those states.

Arthur continued, by arguing that “experience has shown that the trade of the East is the key to national wealth and influence. The opening of China to the commerce of the whole world has benefited no section of it more than the States of our own Pacific Slope”.⁴²⁸ Specifically, “the State of California, and its great maritime port especially, have reaped enormous

⁴²⁴ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴²⁵ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴²⁶ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴²⁷ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴²⁸ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

advantages from this source. ... San Francisco has before it an incalculable future if our friendly and amicable relations with Asia remain undisturbed".⁴²⁹ Arthur's protestations at the action of the US Congress emphasised the logic of capital as he feared that the "policy which we now propose to adopt must have a direct tendency to repel Oriental nations from us and to drive their trade and commerce into more friendly lands".⁴³⁰ Foreshadowing contemporary debates about protectionism in the face of Asian competition Arthur suggested that "it may be that the great and paramount interest of protecting our labour from Asiatic competition may justify us in a permanent adoption of this policy" while warning that it would be "wiser in the first place to make a shorter experiment, with a view hereafter of maintaining permanently only such features as time and experience may commend".⁴³¹ For Arthur it was evident that commercial relations with China, and Chinese workers were necessary to the social reproduction of US life on its West coast. In this line of reasoning the logic of capital provided the material basis with which the logic of identity would concurrently justify and perpetuate from.

In another prelude to contemporary debates about the role of US capital Arthur warned, in 1883, that "the transference to China of American capital for the employment there of Chinese labour would in effect inaugurate a competition for the control of markets now supplied by our home industries".⁴³² Although it was becoming apparent in Arthur's words that US capital needed an outlet but also a source of cheaper labour to reproduce itself, this would undermine the need for US capital to secure domestic US industries.

In a special message to Congress on December 10th 1884 Arthur celebrated the emerging empire on the western US coast. He stated how "within a generation the western coast has developed into an empire, with a large and rapidly growing population, with vast, but partially developed, resources".⁴³³ He was calling for a canal to be dug through the American isthmus so that US "vessels and productions will enter upon the world's competitive field with a

⁴²⁹ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴³⁰ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴³¹ Chester A. Arthur: "Veto Message," April 4, 1882. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68779>.

⁴³² Chester A. Arthur: "Third Annual Message," December 4, 1883. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29524>.

⁴³³ Chester A. Arthur: "Special Message," December 10, 1884. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69004>.

decided advantage, of which they will avail themselves".⁴³⁴ A major interest in doing so is that a shorter route to the Pacific would "give to the manufacturers on the Atlantic seaboard economical access to the cities of China, thus breaking down the barrier which separates the principal manufacturing centres of the United States from the markets of the vast population of Asia, and placing the Eastern States of the Union for all purposes of trade midway between Europe and Asia".⁴³⁵ The speculative potential of the China market within the logic of capital, was an increasingly important factor in US presidential discourse.

4.5 Cleveland, Domestic Tensions and US Commercial Interests

During his first term, Grover Cleveland affirmed the continuity of US-China relations but indicated that domestic tensions were proving "beyond the power of the Executive to remedy, and calling for judicial determination".⁴³⁶ Although he claimed "the harmony of our relations with China is fully sustained...the condition of the Chinese question in the Western States and Territories is, despite this restrictive legislation, far from being satisfactory". He was alluding to an 1885 incident in Wyoming known as the Rocks Spring massacre where 28 Chinese labourers were killed by White miners in a labour dispute. Cleveland voiced concern that "there [was] apprehension lest the bitterness of feeling against the Mongolian race on the Pacific Slope may find vent in similar lawless demonstrations. All the power of this Government should be exerted to maintain the amplest good faith toward China in the treatment of these men, and the inflexible sternness of the law in bringing the wrongdoers to justice should be insisted upon".⁴³⁷ In his first annual message to Congress in December 1885 he claimed "every effort has been made by this Government to prevent these violent outbreaks and to aid the representatives of China in their investigation of these outrages; and it is but just to say that they are traceable to the lawlessness of men not citizens of the United States engaged in competition with Chinese labourers".⁴³⁸

In one of the clearest statements by a US president of the role of race in these domestic cases of violence Cleveland stated that "race prejudice is the chief factor in originating these

⁴³⁴ Chester A. Arthur: "Special Message," December 10, 1884. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69004>.

⁴³⁵ Chester A. Arthur: "Special Message," December 10, 1884. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69004>.

⁴³⁶ Grover Cleveland: "First Annual Message (first term)," December 8, 1885. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29526>.

⁴³⁷ Grover Cleveland: "First Annual Message (first term)," December 8, 1885. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29526>.

⁴³⁸ Grover Cleveland: "First Annual Message (first term)," December 8, 1885. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29526>.

disturbances, and it exists in a large part of our domain, jeopardizing our domestic peace and the good relationship we strive to maintain with China".⁴³⁹ Cleveland here reveals the direct relationship between domestic and foreign issues. The logic of identity as it was functioning in a domestic sense, had the potential to undermine the international aspects of the logic of capital for as has already been clear, US interest in China was primarily motivated by commercial concerns.

Cleveland referred to the incidents in Wyoming again in a special message to Congress on March 1st 1886. Reflecting on the domestic tensions he stated, "the oppression of Chinese subjects by their rivals in the competition for labour does not differ in violence and illegality from that applied to other classes of native or alien labour. All are equally under the protection of law and equally entitled to enjoy the benefits of assured public order".⁴⁴⁰ What this reveals is the domestic tensions over labour as Chinese labourers were paid less than their white counterparts.

Later in his presidency, Cleveland concluded that the racial tensions that governed the encounter between US citizens and immigrant Chinese labourers rendered the "experiment" a failure. He observed in 1888 that "the experiment of blending the social habits and mutual race idiosyncrasies of the Chinese labouring classes with those of the great body of the people of the United States has been proved by the experience of twenty years, and ever since the Burlingame treaty of 1868, to be in every sense unwise, impolitic, and injurious to both nations".⁴⁴¹ The logic of identity where the self is constitutively constructed against and through the other, had ultimately proved uncompromisingly exclusionary. Cleveland concluded that "with the lapse of time the necessity for its abandonment has grown in force, until those having in charge the Government of the respective countries have resolved to modify and sufficiently abrogate all those features of prior conventional arrangements which permitted the coming of Chinese labourers to the United States".⁴⁴²

The racial divisions reflected what Cleveland described as "the inoperative and inefficient condition of the treaty and law has produced deep seated and increasing discontent among the

⁴³⁹ Grover Cleveland: "First Annual Message (first term)," December 8, 1885. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29526>.

⁴⁴⁰ Grover Cleveland: "Special Message," March 1, 1886. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=71869>.

⁴⁴¹ Grover Cleveland: "Special Message," October 1, 1888. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=71605>.

⁴⁴² Grover Cleveland: "Special Message," October 1, 1888. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=71605>.

people of the United States, and especially with those resident on the Pacific Coast". This led Cleveland to the position where he had "to answer the earnest popular demand for the absolute exclusion of Chinese labourers having objects and purposes unlike our own and wholly disconnected with American citizenship".⁴⁴³ The Chinese then, as they were encountered in the US, were understood to be distinctly un-American to the point where their general exclusion was deemed the only possible political position. This was one of the rare instances where race was explicitly articulated in US presidential discourse as a feature of the logic of identity whereby the Chinese were understood as a distinct and inferior racial other to the US labourer.

In his second term, Cleveland spoke more specifically about the US's relations with China itself. Reflecting the concern of his predecessors when it came to conflicts in Asia, he observed during his second term in 1894 that "although the war between China and Japan endangers no policy of the United States, it deserves our gravest consideration by reason of its disturbance of our growing commercial interests in the two countries and the increased dangers which may result to our citizens domiciled or sojourning in the interior of China".⁴⁴⁴ Priority was again reserved for US commercial concerns. This reflected a somewhat passive geopolitical consideration in terms of US commercial interests. He described an anxiety over any disruption to commercial interests in the region. Cleveland declared that the US was "deploring the destructive war between the two most powerful of the eastern nations and anxious that our commercial interests in those countries may be preserved and that the safety of our citizens there shall not be jeopardized". Cleveland though also offered US assistance in the resolution of the Sino-Japanese war stating that he "would not hesitate to heed any intimation that our friendly aid for the honourable termination of hostilities would be acceptable to both belligerents".⁴⁴⁵

In 1895 following the end of the Sino-Japanese war Cleveland again gave expression to US anxiety, but this time over China's domestic political context. He was frustrated at how the conflict had "developed a domestic condition in the Chinese Empire which has caused much

⁴⁴³ Grover Cleveland: "Special Message," October 1, 1888. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=71605>.

⁴⁴⁴ Grover Cleveland: "Second Annual Message (second term)," December 3, 1894. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29535>.

⁴⁴⁵ Grover Cleveland: "Second Annual Message (second term)," December 3, 1894. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29535>.

anxiety and called for prompt and careful attention".⁴⁴⁶ He could not decide though whether it was the war itself or what he saw as "the aversion of the Chinese population to all foreign ways and undertakings" that had led to an outbreak of what Cleveland saw as "the old fanatical spirit against foreigners, which, unchecked by the local authorities, if not actually connived at by them, have culminated in mob attacks on foreign missionary stations, causing much destruction of property and attended with personal injuries as well as loss of life".⁴⁴⁷ He made sure to emphasise the non-colonial interests of US foreign policy when dealing with China at this time, stating "that we desire only the liberty and protection of our own citizens and redress for any wrongs they may have suffered, and that we have no ulterior designs or objects, political or otherwise". He hoped that "China will not forget either our kindly service to her citizens during her late war nor the further fact that, while furnishing all the facilities at our command to further the negotiation of a peace between her and Japan, we sought no advantages and interposed no counsel".⁴⁴⁸ For Cleveland the US was not interested in territorial acquisitions in the Pacific but merely the security of US commercial interests.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the prominence of the logic of capital in early US presidential discourses regarding China. This was the prime conditioning feature of how the US imagined China. As the century goes on the emerging features of what I call a logic of geopolitics and a logic of identity begin to form. The speculative potential of the China market within the logic of capital, was an increasingly important factor in US presidential discourse. Cleveland marked the rare instance where race was explicitly articulated as a feature of the logic of identity when considering the distinctions between Chinese and US labourers. This period marks the early formations of the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics in US presidential discourses. I do not analyse where they emerged or the domestic conditions that might have influenced them but that would make for productive further analysis in light of the arguments present here.

The following chapter turns to focus on US presidential discourses of China from 1898 to 1922.

⁴⁴⁶ Grover Cleveland: "Third Annual Message (second term)," December 2, 1895. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29536>.

⁴⁴⁷ Grover Cleveland: "Third Annual Message (second term)," December 2, 1895. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29536>.

⁴⁴⁸ Grover Cleveland: "Third Annual Message (second term)," December 2, 1895. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29536>.

Chapter 5 – 1898-1922: The Open Door Notes and Dollar Diplomacy

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the discourses from the presidencies of William McKinley⁴⁴⁹, Theodore Roosevelt⁴⁵⁰, William Taft⁴⁵¹ and Woodrow Wilson⁴⁵². What starts to become apparent during this period is how China comes to be perceived as a solution to domestic economic problems while also becoming more of a geopolitical concern regarding how the US understands the nature of its role in Asia. The period covers the events of the international response to the Boxer rebellion in China from November 1899 to September 1901, the Open Door Notes⁴⁵³ proposed by US Secretary of State John Hay in response to creeping territorial claims by the world's imperial powers, Taft's 'Dollar Diplomacy'⁴⁵⁴, through to the aftermath of WWI and Woodrow Wilson's attempts to negotiate the return of Shandong province to China.⁴⁵⁵

In a statement akin to how I understand the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics Taft made reference to the “*logical modern corollaries* of the undisputed and traditional fundamentals of the foreign policy of the United States”(emphasis added) when trying to justify his approach to US foreign policy.⁴⁵⁶ Taft is of significant value in this genealogy despite one view that describes his presidency in the following manner, “no wars, no major crises, no enduring doctrines, only the deriding label of ‘dollar diplomacy’ remains of what

⁴⁴⁹ Thomas McCormick, ‘Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the Spanish-American War’, *Pacific Historical Review* 32 (1963): 155-169.

⁴⁵⁰ Gregory Moore, *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy Theodore Roosevelt and China, 1901-1909* (New York: Lexington Books, 2015); Delber McKee, *Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy 1900-1906* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1977).

⁴⁵¹ Richard Collin, ‘Symbiosis versus Hegemony: New Directions in the Foreign Relations Historiography of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft’, *Diplomatic History* 19 (1995): 473-497.

⁴⁵² Daniel Crane and Thomas Breslin, *An Orrinary Relationship American Opposition to Republican Revolution in China* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1986).

⁴⁵³ Raymond Esthus, ‘The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910’, *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 46 (1959): 435-454; Marilyn Young, *The Rhetoric of Empire American China Policy* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968); Michael Hunt, *Frontier Defense and the Open Door* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Jerry Israel, *Progressivism and the Open Door* (USA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); Paul Varg, *The Making of a Myth The United States and China, 1887-1912* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1968).

⁴⁵⁴ Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy 1900-1930* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Cyrus Veaser, *A World Safe for Capitalism Dollar Diplomacy and America's Rise to Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Charles Vevier, *The United States and China 1906-1913 A Study of Finance and Diplomacy* (New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1955).

⁴⁵⁵ Bruce Elleman, *Wilson and China* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Tien-yi Li, *Woodrow Wilson's China Policy 1913-1917* (New York: University of Kansas Press, 1952).

⁴⁵⁶ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

Taft and his secretary of state Philander Knox, tried to do”.⁴⁵⁷ What this chapter demonstrates is that despite the increasing importance of the logic of geopolitics and identity, the logic of capital remained primary in US presidential discourses of China.

5.2 McKinley, the Open Door Notes and Access to China

William McKinley expressed concern for US access to Chinese empire in his second annual message to Congress in 1898. The US, for McKinley had “not been an indifferent spectator of the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire, whereby portions of its maritime provinces are passing under the control of various European powers”.⁴⁵⁸ Although implying US concern for Chinese sovereignty, McKinley’s main concern was “the prospect that the vast commerce which the energy of our citizens and the necessity of our staple productions for Chinese uses has built up in those regions may not be prejudiced through any exclusive treatment by the new occupants has obviated the need of our country becoming an actor in the scene”.⁴⁵⁹ McKinley located the US right to be involved in China in the US’s geographic position and commercial interests. He stated that “our position among nations, having a large Pacific coast and a constantly expanding direct trade with the farther Orient, gives us the equitable claim to consideration and friendly treatment in this regard”.⁴⁶⁰ The lack of genuine concern for Chinese territorial sovereignty was revealed in his remarks that “the territories of Kiaochow, of Weihaiwei, and of Port Arthur and Talienwan, leased to Germany, Great Britain, and Russia, respectively, for terms of years, will, it is announced, be open to international commerce during such alien occupation”.⁴⁶¹ US concern here was motivated primarily by the logic of capital where commercial access was prioritised.

McKinley would also recommend that Congress allocate funds to a study on “the commercial and industrial conditions in the Chinese Empire and report as to the opportunities for and obstacles to the enlargement of markets in China for the raw products and manufactures of the United States”. The opportunities that a potential China market held were in McKinley’s

⁴⁵⁷ Lewis Gould, *The William Howard Taft Presidency* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009): 79.

⁴⁵⁸ William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539>.

⁴⁵⁹ William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539>.

⁴⁶⁰ William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539>.

⁴⁶¹ William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539>.

words potentially of “timeliness merit”.⁴⁶² McKinley was also concerned about any “revival of the old sentiment of opposition and prejudice to alien people which pervades certain of the Chinese provinces. As in the case of the attacks upon our citizens in Szechuen and at Kutien in 1895”. To enable a rapid response to any potential unrest McKinley made clear that US “war ships have been stationed at Tientsin for more ready observation of the disorders which have invaded even the Chinese capital, so as to be in a position to act should need arise”.⁴⁶³ This reflects a desire to maintain general stability and order for the continuation of US commercial expansion. Again, the logic of geopolitics was configured along lines determined by the logic of capital.

In his third annual message to Congress on December 5th 1899, McKinley assured Congress that “the interests of our citizens in that vast Empire have not been neglected during the past year”.⁴⁶⁴ More importantly for McKinley, “American capital has sought and found various opportunities of competing to carry out the internal improvements which the Imperial Government is wisely encouraging, and to develop the natural resources of the Empire”.⁴⁶⁵ US relations with China were beneficial as US “trade with China has continued to grow, and our commercial rights under existing treaties have been everywhere maintained during the past year, as they will be in the future”.⁴⁶⁶ Looking ahead McKinley was hopeful when describing how “the extension of the area open to international foreign settlement at Shanghai and the opening of the ports of Nanking, Tsingtao (Kiao chao), and Talienwan to foreign trade and settlement will doubtless afford American enterprise additional facilities and new fields”.⁴⁶⁷ The partial colonisation of China was for McKinley relevant for the economic expansion it offered, an issue to be mediated through the logic of identity.

Recalling his request the previous year for Congress to fund a study of potential commercial expansion in China, McKinley renewed the “recommendation, as the importance of the subject has steadily grown since it was first submitted to you, and no time should be lost in

⁴⁶² William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539>.

⁴⁶³ William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539>.

⁴⁶⁴ William McKinley: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1899. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540>.

⁴⁶⁵ William McKinley: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1899. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540>.

⁴⁶⁶ William McKinley: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1899. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540>.

⁴⁶⁷ William McKinley: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1899. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540>.

studying for ourselves the resources of this great field for American trade and enterprise”.⁴⁶⁸ Summarising the general policy of his administration, McKinley clarified that “markets are being sought and opened up for surplus farm and factory products in Europe and in Asia”.⁴⁶⁹ This is one of the first explicit references to the US need to find outlets for its domestic economic surpluses. This was to constitute one of the central elements of the logic of capital, the need for expansion to ensure social reproduction. And this imperative was to be a key feature in US foreign policy towards China.

When accepting the Republican nomination for re-election on July 12 1900, McKinley celebrated how the US had “happily ended the European alliance in Samoa, securing to ourselves one of the most valuable harbours in the Pacific Ocean, while the open door in China gives to us fair and equal competition in the vast trade of the Orient”.⁴⁷⁰ The territorial expansion into the Pacific, was valuable for its economic potential, rather than any inherent value in acquiring territory. As mentioned previously, although the notion of a “vast” market was more potential than actuality, it functioned as a discursive trope of US geopolitical interest in China and Asia more broadly. In describing the on-going Boxer rebellion in China, McKinley drew upon the US logic of identity by where its civilised qualities compelled its concern for the welfare of China, even if this appeared as secondary to US commercial interests as guaranteed by various treaties.⁴⁷¹ McKinley extolled how the US had “the ultimate object of the peace and welfare of China, the safeguarding of all our treaty rights, and the maintenance of those principles of impartial intercourse to which the civilized world is pledged”.⁴⁷² For McKinley, the US interest in securing the reproduction of US capital, was understood to constitute “impartial intercourse”, rather than the political consideration it was.

McKinley located the causes of the rebellion in racial terms, where insubordination was as an inherent and flawed feature of the Chinese. He claimed that” the recent troubles in China spring from the anti-foreign agitation which for the past three years has gained strength in the

⁴⁶⁸ William McKinley: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1899. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540>.

⁴⁶⁹ William McKinley: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1899. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29540>.

⁴⁷⁰ William McKinley: "Address Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination," July 12, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76197>.

⁴⁷¹ For more information on the Boxer Rebellion see David Silbey, *The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013).

⁴⁷² William McKinley: "Address Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination," July 12, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76197>.

northern provinces. Their origin lies deep in the character of the Chinese races and in the traditions of their Government". China's relative isolation, from McKinley's perspective, was ending as events like "the Taiping rebellion and the opening of Chinese ports to foreign trade and settlement disturbed alike the homogeneity and the seclusion of China".⁴⁷³ The advancement of "foreign activity made itself felt in all quarters, not alone on the coast, but along the great river arteries and in the remoter districts, carrying new ideas and introducing new associations among a primitive people which had pursued for centuries a national policy of isolation".⁴⁷⁴ Like Cleveland before him, McKinley saw the Chinese through the logic of identity, where they were the primitive others to the civilised colonial powers, specifically the US.

McKinley celebrated the early technological advancements of the 20th century where "the telegraph and the railway [were] spreading over their land, the steamers plying on their waterways, the merchant and the missionary penetrating year by year farther to the interior". This encroachment McKinley argued, "became to the Chinese mind types of an alien invasion, changing the course of their national life and fraught with vague forebodings of disaster to their beliefs and their self control".⁴⁷⁵ This Chinese antipathy to Western practices was emblematic in McKinley's reasoning of the Chinese aversion to the civilised world. He observed that "all the resources of foreign diplomacy, backed by moral demonstrations of the physical force of fleets and arms, have been needed to secure due respect for the treaty rights of foreigners and to obtain satisfaction from the responsible authorities for the sporadic outrages upon the persons and property of unoffending sojourners".⁴⁷⁶ The Chinese appeared belligerent and disrespectful of the "impartial" aspects of Western policy. It was though "the imminence of peril to our own diversified interests in the Empire, as well as to those of all the other treaty governments" that motivated US interest in China the most.⁴⁷⁷

In his fourth annual message to Congress on December 3rd 1900, McKinley made explicit reference to what would come to be known as the Open Door Notes. He called for "united

⁴⁷³ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁷⁴ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁷⁵ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁷⁶ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁷⁷ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

action of the powers at Peking to promote the administrative reforms so greatly needed for strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China, in which we believed the whole western world to be alike concerned".⁴⁷⁸ The notes, circulated by his Secretary of State John Hay, called for mutual respect of China's territorial integrity, while maintaining various spheres of influence of the colonial powers. The notes reflected an appreciation of the limit of US power at the time and the intentions of the US to maintain equal access to Chinese commerce. Hay spoke of how this led him to distribute "to the several powers occupying territory and maintaining spheres of influence in China the circular proposals of 1899, inviting from them declarations of their intentions and views as to the desirability of the adoption of measures insuring the benefits of equality of treatment of all foreign trade throughout China".⁴⁷⁹ Geopolitical order, understood here, as the maintenance of Chinese territorial cohesion, was necessary to facilitate US economic interest. McKinley described the success of the notes as reflecting how "the various powers interested in the untrammelled development of commerce and industry in the Chinese Empire as a source of vast benefit to the whole commercial world".⁴⁸⁰ Again the logic of capital was prioritised as it has necessary implications for the logic of geopolitics.

McKinley summarised US policy as determined "to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".⁴⁸¹ What is apparent from this declaration is the overriding importance of maintaining uninhibited economic access to China. It is worth recalling that this project is not concerned with establishing the veracity of the China market for US interests, but the discursive construction of what China means for the US through analysing its foreign policy discourses. McKinley made the self-serving suggestion that China compensate foreign powers

⁴⁷⁸ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁷⁹ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁸⁰ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁸¹ William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

for maintaining its territorial cohesion by neo-colonial means and that this could be done most effectively “by the opening of China to the equal commerce of all the world”.⁴⁸²

In his second inaugural address on March 4th 1901 McKinley spoke more emphatically about the need for economic expansion as a solution to apparent overproduction. McKinley spoke of how US “ diversified productions...are increasing in such unprecedented volume as to admonish us of the necessity of still further enlarging our foreign markets by broader commercial relations”.⁴⁸³ This is not a revisionist claim, as historians like Williams and LaFeber have long ago established the significance of economic outlets in US expansion.⁴⁸⁴ McKinley saw a solution in establishing “reciprocal trade arrangements with other nations should in liberal spirit be carefully cultivated and promoted”.⁴⁸⁵ In this light he reflected on “the part which the United States bore so honourably in the thrilling scenes in China, while new to American life, has been in harmony with its true spirit and best traditions, and in dealing with the results its policy will be that of moderation and fairness”.⁴⁸⁶ The US contribution to maintaining Chinese territorial integrity reflected one of the early cases of the US intervening militarily outside the American continent. McKinley saw this as a reflection of US “spirit and best traditions” implying it was compatible with how the US saw itself through the logic of identity.

In his last address before his assassination, McKinley again spoke of the need to increase exports and find suitable foreign outlets for surplus produce. Speaking Buffalo, New York on September 5th 1901, he described how US “industrial enterprises which have grown to such great proportions affect the homes and occupations of the people and the welfare of the country”. The impacts on everyday life in the US aside, McKinley was more concerned with how US “capacity to produce has developed so enormously and our products have so multiplied that the problem of more markets requires our urgent and immediate attention”.⁴⁸⁷ The solution was for McKinley was achieved through the negotiation of “sensible trade

⁴⁸² William McKinley: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1900. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29541>.

⁴⁸³ William McKinley: "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25828>.

⁴⁸⁴ Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*; LaFeber, *The New Empire*.

⁴⁸⁵ William McKinley: "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25828>.

⁴⁸⁶ William McKinley: "Inaugural Address," March 4, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25828>.

⁴⁸⁷ William McKinley: "President McKinley's Last Public Utterance to the People in Buffalo, New York," September 5, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69326>.

arrangements which will not interrupt our home production we shall extend the outlets for our increasing surplus. A system which provides a mutual exchange of commodities, a mutual exchange is manifestly essential to the continued and healthful growth of our export trade".⁴⁸⁸ A vision not to distinct from Barack Obama's justifications for the Tran-Pacific Partnership as chapter 9 will explain.

In his most explicit reference statements on the issue, McKinley declared, "what we produce beyond our domestic consumption must have a vent abroad".⁴⁸⁹ Foreign markets were then a solution to domestic crises of capitalism. The China myth as described by Thomas McCormick or understood here as discourses of China within the US imagination considered China as a solution to domestic economic issues.⁴⁹⁰ As this thesis will eventually demonstrate, China itself was to become a problem in its own right, rather than a solution to a prior crisis. McKinley continued, demanding that "the excess must be relieved through a foreign outlet and we should sell everywhere we can, and buy wherever the buying will enlarge our sales and productions, and thereby make a greater demand for home labour... The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of good will and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals".⁴⁹¹ US presidential discourses of China then, were still primarily constituted through the logic of capital even if this was facilitated and conditioned by the logics of identity and geopolitics.

5.3 Theodore Roosevelt, the World, and Japan

Inheriting the Presidency from McKinley in September 1901, Theodore Roosevelt built on his concerns regarding the need for foreign markets. In his first annual message to congress on December 3rd 1901, Roosevelt envisioned business and commercial concerns as an enterprise to dominate. He elaborated on "business concerns which have the largest means at their disposal and are managed by the ablest men are naturally those which take the lead in the strife for commercial supremacy among the nations of the world".⁴⁹² With this commercial

⁴⁸⁸ William McKinley: "President McKinley's Last Public Utterance to the People in Buffalo, New York," September 5, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69326>.

⁴⁸⁹ William McKinley: "President McKinley's Last Public Utterance to the People in Buffalo, New York," September 5, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69326>.

⁴⁹⁰ McCormick, *China Market*.

⁴⁹¹ William McKinley: "President McKinley's Last Public Utterance to the People in Buffalo, New York," September 5, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69326>.

⁴⁹² Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

supremacy in mind Roosevelt outlined how “America has only just begun to assume that commanding position in the international business world which we believe will more and more be hers”. This sense of entitlement to commercial supremacy, or hegemony as is more commonly understood meant it was “the utmost importance that this position be not jeopardised, especially at a time when the overflowing abundance of our own natural resources and the skill, business energy, and mechanical aptitude of our people make foreign markets essential”.⁴⁹³ Again, this reference to foreign markets, perceived as integral to the growth of US power, was sought out in the name of the economic security of the US.

Roosevelt though envisioned the necessary deployment of US military power in “wars with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples”. He described how “over the entire world, of recent years, wars between the great civilized powers have become less and less frequent” and that it was these “wars with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples...being merely a most regrettable but necessary international police duty which must be performed for the sake of the welfare of mankind”.⁴⁹⁴ This police duty took, when seen alongside the following claim, the “we have not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighbours” indicated Roosevelt’s position that the US would work to secure the geopolitical stability of regions inhabited by barbarous peoples.⁴⁹⁵ Roosevelt here reflected the anti-colonial administrative urges within the logic of geopolitics. He also invoked the logic of identity when phrasing US interest in terms of “the welfare of mankind”.

Roosevelt saw the improvement and expansion of the US navy as vital to US prestige and the conduct of foreign policy. He declared how “no one point of our policy, foreign or domestic, is more important than this to the honour and material welfare, and above all to the peace, of our nation in the future. Whether we desire it or not, we must henceforth recognize that we have international duties no less than international rights”.⁴⁹⁶ Most importantly for Roosevelt was the need to secure US commerce, “unless our commerce is always to be carried in foreign bottoms, we must have war craft to protect it”.⁴⁹⁷ This reflected arguments made previously

⁴⁹³ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁴⁹⁴ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁴⁹⁵ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁴⁹⁶ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁴⁹⁷ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

by Buren as discussed in the previous chapter, though Roosevelt differed as his statements began to reflect the on-going entanglement of the imperatives of the three logics.

The construction of a more powerful navy was for Roosevelt a matter that linked concerns about economic security with a conception of its 'place' in international politics. He saw the issue in the following terms:

"The American people must either build and maintain an adequate navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a secondary position in international affairs, not merely in political, but in commercial, matters. It has been well said that there is no surer way of courting national disaster than to be "opulent, aggressive, and unarmed".⁴⁹⁸

This reflected how the logics of capital and identity were rendered in geopolitical terms where the space of commercial interaction and international 'affairs' needed to be secured.

Roosevelt was to emphasise this point again in his second annual message to Congress in 1902 when he declared that "there should be no halt in the work of building up the Navy...we have deliberately made our own certain foreign policies which demand the possession of a first class navy".⁴⁹⁹ Roosevelt's desire for and presumption of US pre-eminence is evident in his speculation about US desires for a commercially secure peace. He postulated that "probably no other great nation in the world is so anxious for peace as we are. There is not a single civilized power which has anything whatever to fear from aggressiveness on our part. All we want is peace".⁵⁰⁰ The US desire for peace was premised on the mutual recognition of rights aimed "to insure fair treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the American people".⁵⁰¹ Here Roosevelt reflected all three of the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as he set out his priorities for US foreign policy.

For the most part, Roosevelt extended his predecessors interests in China. He described how "owing to the rapid growth of our power and our interests on the Pacific, whatever happens in China must be of the keenest national concern to us".⁵⁰² In this way, the logic of capital shaping US commercial interests in China was beginning to necessitate an increasing concern with the regions geopolitical stability. Roosevelt commented positively on the settlements

⁴⁹⁸ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁴⁹⁹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Second Annual Message," December 2, 1902. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29543>.

⁵⁰⁰ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁵⁰¹ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁵⁰² Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

with the Chinese over the Boxer rebellion.⁵⁰³ Roosevelt described the colonial style “provisions made for insuring the future safety of the foreign representatives in [Beijing] by setting aside for their exclusive use a quarter of the city which the powers can make defensible and in which they can if necessary maintain permanent military guards”.⁵⁰⁴ Most significantly for Roosevelt and US interest was that “under the provisions of the joint note of December, 1900, China has agreed to revise the treaties of commerce and navigation and to take such other steps for the purpose of facilitating foreign trade as the foreign powers may decide to be needed”.⁵⁰⁵ China was now at the explicit behest of the colonial powers.

Roosevelt portrayed US actions in the most positive of lights where the US “government has unswervingly advocated moderation, and has materially aided in bringing about an adjustment which tends to enhance the welfare of China and to lead to a more beneficial intercourse between the Empire and the modern world”.⁵⁰⁶ Roosevelt here understood US military intervention as being undertaken to encourage further Chinese interaction with the international system. This colonial style compulsion was framed by Roosevelt’s continuation of McKinley’s Open Door policies. Roosevelt declared that “we advocate the "open door" with all that it implies; not merely the procurement of enlarged commercial opportunities on the coasts, but access to the interior by the waterways with which China has been so extraordinarily favoured”. This captured the increasing commercial expansion of the US into Chinese territory. It becomes increasingly apparent that a logic of capital, requiring increased US access to foreign markets, was fostering the need for a more refined logic of geopolitics, for as political geographers have demonstrated, politics, as do commercial activities, occur in particular spaces that have been meaningful constituted by political considerations. For all the concern about China’s territorial integrity, China’s territorial sovereignty was of secondary concern to the logic of capital and US economic interests.

The attempt to incorporate China into the colonial structures of the international system should be seen as the start what can essentially be understood as a 20th century US project. Roosevelt summarised the essence of the Open Door policy when he commented that “only

⁵⁰³ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁵⁰⁴ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁵⁰⁵ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁵⁰⁶ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

by bringing the people of China into peaceful and friendly community of trade with all the peoples of the earth can the work now auspiciously begun be carried to fruition". The priority was mutual economic access or rather the desire for "parity of treatment, under the conventions, throughout the Empire for our trade and our citizens with those of all other powers".⁵⁰⁷ Roosevelt saw the incorporation of China into the civilised world as a necessary act for the general welfare of the world. To him declining examples of warfare between "civilised powers" was increasingly a normal condition, and he understood intervention in China as an example where "wars with uncivilized powers are largely mere matters of international police duty, essential for, the welfare of the world".⁵⁰⁸ Roosevelt here would foreshadow arguments made most prominently by Obama to China's importance in contributing to the maintenance of the international order.

Speaking in San Francisco at a mechanics pavilion on May 13th 1903, Roosevelt elaborated on his expansionist beliefs. He remarked "before I came to the Pacific Slope I was an expansionist, and after having been here I fail to understand how any man convinced of his country's greatness and glad that his country should challenge with proud confidence its mighty future, can be anything but an expansionist".⁵⁰⁹ Expansion was for Roosevelt, a rational effect of the logic of identity, where the US was seen as a great country and this necessarily meant it should expand its territory and ideas. This was a vision that found similar conclusions from the logics of geopolitics and capital. Roosevelt emphasised how "in the century that is opening, the commerce and the command of the Pacific will be factors of incalculable moment in the world's history".⁵¹⁰ US commercial interest in China, and its perceived necessity within the logic of capital led the US to understand "the commerce and the command of the Pacific" as vital to its material, economic and ontological security.

Roosevelt's interest in China was also conditioned by his more positive interpretation of Japan. For him, "Japan, shaking off the lethargy of centuries, has taken her rank among

⁵⁰⁷ Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542>.

⁵⁰⁸ Theodore Roosevelt: "Second Annual Message," December 2, 1902. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29543>.

⁵⁰⁹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

⁵¹⁰ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

civilized, modern powers”.⁵¹¹ Japan was seen favourably as it had adopted Western norms and discarded its non-Western “lethargy”. This was juxtaposed immediately to his more dour consideration of China. He observed how “European nations have seated themselves along the eastern coast of Asia, while China by her misfortunes has given us an object lesson in the utter folly of attempting to exist as a nation at all, if at the same time both rich and defenceless”.⁵¹² To Roosevelt, China’s on-going political issues were the result of its own decisions rather than the colonial policies of the European powers Roosevelt referred to.

In a rhetorical flourish predating contemporary axioms of US interest in the Pacific, Roosevelt declared that “our own mighty republic has stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and now in California, Oregon, and Washington, in Alaska, Hawaii and the Philippines, holds an extent of coast line which makes it of necessity a power of the first class in the Pacific”. The US, by its mere geographic existence was in this reasoning a power with the right to seek out its interests in Asia. Worth mentioning here is Roosevelt’s inclusion of the Philippines in his understanding of the US republic. For all intensive purposes the US had become an empire after its 1898 victory over Spain, even if most Presidential rhetoric adopted an anti-colonial stance.⁵¹³ This geographical expansion began to develop the logic of geopolitics in a more distinct manner to the logic of capital. The US’s geopolitical position as it was constructed, started to dictate US interest, even if this expansion into Asia had initially been motivated by the logic of capital. Roosevelt continued, declaring that “the extension in the area of our domain has been immense, the extension in the area of our influence even greater. America's geographical position on the Pacific is such as to insure our peaceful domination of its waters in the future if only we grasp with sufficient resolution the advantages of that position”.⁵¹⁴ Roosevelt established the discursive norm that perceived the nature of the US’s geographical position, as legitimising its interest and activities in Asia. His reference to “peaceful domination” of the Pacific, created the discursive conditions for what is more regular referred

⁵¹¹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

⁵¹² Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

⁵¹³ Alfred McCoy and Francisco Scarano (eds), *Colonial Crucible: Empire n the Making of the Modern American State* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.

⁵¹⁴ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

to as US hegemony. At the time of Roosevelt though, this was more of an aspiration than anything more substantive.

Tangential to US interest in China, although indicative of the general US attitude was policy towards the Philippines.⁵¹⁵ Roosevelt described how “the inevitable march of events gave us the control of the Philippine Islands at a time so opportune that it may without irreverence be called Providential”, inferring that the colonial expansion of the US had a sense of natural progression to it.⁵¹⁶ This was combined with a masculine rendering of political perception where “unless we show ourselves weak, unless we show ourselves degenerate sons of the sires from whose loins we sprang, we must go on with the work we have undertaken”. Now that the US had a colonial possession, it had to act accordingly to demonstrate strength. Although Roosevelt made it clear that he had “hope that this work will ever be of a peaceful character”, the necessity of appearing strong led to the inconsistent claim that “we infinitely desire peace, and the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war”.⁵¹⁷

Roosevelt’s romanticised rendering of colonial expansion was captured by the following remarks, “for our proper place is with the great expanding peoples, with the peoples that dare to be great, that accept with confidence a place of leadership in the world...for much of our expansion must go through the Golden Gate”. Roosevelt here was invoking a sense of identity to be found in US expansion. This idea of being great, and holding some kind of leadership in the world was constitutively a component of the logic of identity. This presumption, found geopolitical expression in his following remark directed at the audience in San Francisco:

“And inevitably you who are seated by the Pacific must take the lead in and must profit by the growth of American influence along the coasts and among the islands of that mighty ocean, where East and West finally become one”.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁵ Julian Go and Anne Forster (eds), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003); Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989); Alfred McCoy *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, The Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

⁵¹⁶ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>

⁵¹⁷ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

⁵¹⁸ Theodore Roosevelt: "Address at Mechanics' Pavilion in San Francisco, California," May 13, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97733>.

Roosevelt here, invoked the promise of unification of East and West via commercial interaction, even if this would more fundamentally turn out to be the attempted homogenisation of the East through Western capitalist powers.

In his third annual message to Congress, on December 7th 1903, Roosevelt described the activity of the executive branch as focusing on “strengthening our domestic and foreign markets, in perfecting our transportation facilities, in building up our merchant marine, in preventing the entrance of undesirable immigrants, in improving commercial and industrial conditions, and in bringing together on common ground those necessary partners in industrial progress - capital and labour”.⁵¹⁹ These activities were designed to function in concert for the benefits of US economic security. Promisingly for Roosevelt, “commerce between the nations is steadily growing in volume, and the tendency of the times is toward closer trade relations”. In this sense the logic of capital, as manifested in desire for expanding areas of trade took on a sense of inevitability. Despite this Roosevelt warned that “constant watchfulness is needed to secure to Americans the chance to participate to the best advantage in foreign trade”.⁵²⁰ In this light, the logic of capital remained vital to US conceptions of its foreign policy priorities.

One of the potentially fruitful areas of foreign trade was again, China. Roosevelt celebrated how “the signing of a new commercial treaty with China, which took place at Shanghai on the 8th of October, is a cause for satisfaction. This act, the result of long discussion and negotiation, places our commercial relations with the great Oriental Empire on a more satisfactory footing than they have ever heretofore enjoyed”. The agreement was most notable as it contained “an important extension of our commerce by increased facility of access to Chinese ports, and for the relief of trade by the removal of some of the obstacles which have embarrassed it in the past”.⁵²¹ This marked a success for the logic of capital and this success had promising potential for further expansion.

Roosevelt saw how the new treaty as “an indispensable condition for the advance and development of our commerce in Manchuria, China...opened to foreign commerce the cities of Mukden, the capital of the province of Manchuria, and Antung, an important port on the Yalu River, on the road to Korea. The full measure of development which our commerce may

⁵¹⁹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544>.

⁵²⁰ Theodore Roosevelt: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544>.

⁵²¹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544>.

rightfully expect can hardly be looked for until the settlement of the present abnormal state of things in the Empire; but the foundation for such development has at last been laid".⁵²² The significance of China emphasised through the logic of capital was for the US as much about the future as the present.

The US also started to develop significant geopolitical concerns in Asia. Roosevelt remarked how the construction of a naval base in the Philippines was a necessary interest to secure US trade and economic activity. He declared, "the establishment of a naval base in the Philippines ought not to be longer postponed. Such a base is desirable in time of peace; in time of war it would be indispensable, and its lack would be ruinous. Without it our fleet would be helpless".⁵²³ US colonial expansion was thus motivated by the logic of capital and its concern for secure economic trade in Asia. The acquisition of territory was justified on the basis of management and administration of regional and international trade, rather than for the mere sake of physical expansion.

It is worth reflecting on the contrast between the US approach to China and the Philippines. Roosevelt described the Philippines in more regular colonial terms where "at present they are utterly incapable of existing in independence at all or of building up a civilization of their own. I firmly believe that we can help them to rise higher and higher in the scale of civilization and of capacity for self-government".⁵²⁴ US interest in the Philippines was as much to do with a sense of civilised responsibility as it was securing geopolitical station in Asia. Roosevelt acknowledged how "in the development of our interests in the Pacific Ocean and along its coasts, the Philippines have played and will play an important part; and that our interests have been served in more than one way by the possession of the islands". This was qualified by his remark that the "chief reason for continuing to hold them must be that we ought in good faith to try to do our share of the world's work, and this particular piece of work has been imposed upon us by the results of the war with Spain". The US was now confronted with the administrative issues of colonialism, a point also recognised by Roosevelt when he stated "the problem presented to us in the Philippine Islands is akin to, but not exactly like, the problems presented to the other great civilized powers which have possessions in the

⁵²² Theodore Roosevelt: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544>.

⁵²³ Theodore Roosevelt: "Third Annual Message," December 7, 1903. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29544>.

⁵²⁴ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

Orient".⁵²⁵ US interest in Asia was now justified through the logic of capital, of geopolitics and of identity.

Roosevelt explicitly mentioned the significance of continuity in foreign policy between US Presidents in his fourth annual message to Congress in 1904. He described that "the growing importance of the Orient as a field for American exports drew from my predecessor, President McKinley".⁵²⁶ McKinley can be seen then as important for opening the door, so to speak, to increased US interest in Asia. Roosevelt drew on and expanded McKinley's request for a "a commission to study the industrial and commercial conditions in the Chinese Empire and to report as to the opportunities for and the obstacles to the enlargement of markets in China for the raw products and manufactures of the United States".⁵²⁷ The administrative aspects of capitalism were of significance to Roosevelt as he emphasised "the importance of securing proper information and data with a view to the enlargement of our trade with Asia is undiminished". This could be done for example by "a place for permanent display of American products in some prominent trade centre of that Empire, under Government control and management, as an effective means of advancing our export trade therein".⁵²⁸ The logic of capital as rendered by Roosevelt then compelled the management and administration of geopolitics.

In a candid reflection on the US interest in securing a "peace of justice... which comes when each nation is not merely safeguarded in its own rights, but scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others", Roosevelt revealed the importance of the logic of identity in US foreign policy. Significantly, "if there is conflict between the two [peace and a policy of righteousness], then our fealty is due first to the cause of righteousness".⁵²⁹ Cynically, this can be read as utilising the cause of righteousness to legitimise violence in the name of morality. This is relevant here as Roosevelt also invoked a conditional understanding of state sovereignty as a legitimate cause for US military intervention abroad. Intervention would be "the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do

⁵²⁵ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵²⁶ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵²⁷ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵²⁸ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵²⁹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations". Roosevelt declared it "a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it".⁵³⁰ Roosevelt here was invoking a global application of the Monroe Doctrine where US military power could be deployed for righteous means, whatever that may entail.

The previous point is significant as Roosevelt then recounted that "in asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavouring to circumscribe the theatre of war in the Far East, and to secure the open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large".⁵³¹ US intervention in the boxer rebellion in China, was recast as being justified by the Monroe doctrine, and as an act of global interest, even if it was more common to hear US policy towards China justified through the logic of capital and the necessary attention to potential foreign markets. Roosevelt thus, reiterated his call for a stronger navy as justified through US interest in Asia. He emphasised how the US "have undertaken to secure for ourselves our just share in the trade of the Orient".⁵³² Through the logic of capital, access to Chinese markets was now a matter of justice, not just economic necessity.

The discourse of a moral and civilised identity ran more generally through aspects of Roosevelt's foreign policy beliefs. He mused, foreshadowing later goals of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt that a US "aim should be from time to time to take such steps as may be possible toward creating something like an organization of the civilized nations, because as the world becomes more highly organized the need for navies and armies will diminish".⁵³³ US foreign policy towards China then can be seen a matter of administrative common sense. This is not to say he was preoccupied with some kind of teleology regarding the convergence of international relations in international institutions, but that the US saw international relations as an administrative issue. As Roosevelt remarked, this was about "organisation"

⁵³⁰ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵³¹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵³² Theodore Roosevelt: "Fourth Annual Message," December 6, 1904. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29545>.

⁵³³ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546>.

where civilised states could manage all aspects of international politics. This attitude, was combined with the more dubious declaration that:

“Not only there is not now, but there never has been, any other nation in the world so wholly free from the evils of militarism as is ours...Never at any time in our history has this Nation suffered from militarism or been in the remotest danger of suffering from militarism”.⁵³⁴

To Roosevelt, the US military was to be used in technical interventions to restore political order in the name of stable commercial conditions and as described earlier, the “general welfare” of the world. The US in this reasoning was more concerned with the administration of closer ‘civilised’ ties, than any attempt to remake the world in its image.

In his fifth annual message to Congress on December 5th 1905, Roosevelt reflected in detail on the issue of Chinese immigration. He relayed orthodox US concerns about Chinese immigration “the entire Chinese coolie class, that is, the class of Chinese labourers, skilled and unskilled, legitimately come under the head of undesirable immigrants to this country, because of their numbers, the low wages for which they work, and their low standard of living”.⁵³⁵ It was thus, “not only is it to the interest of this country to keep them out, but the Chinese authorities do not desire that they should be admitted”.⁵³⁶ Despite this, Roosevelt conceded that “in the effort to carry out the policy of excluding Chinese labourers, Chinese coolies, grave injustice and wrong have been done by this Nation to the people of China, and therefore ultimately to this Nation itself”. Roosevelt was attempting to distinguish between desirable and undesirable immigrants where “Chinese students, business and professional men of all kinds not only merchants, but bankers, doctors, manufacturers, professors, travellers, and the like should be encouraged to come here, and treated on precisely the same footing that we treat students, business men, travellers, and the like of other nations”.⁵³⁷ This reveals the tensions between the economic imperatives of the logic of capital and the prejudices embedded within the logic of identity during this period.

Roosevelt was motivated the potential economic disturbances due to and organised Chinese boycott of US products. In accepting the prejudicial basis of the Chinese exclusion acts he announced, “we cannot expect to receive equity unless we do equity. We cannot ask the

⁵³⁴ Theodore Roosevelt: "Seventh Annual Message," December 3, 1907. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29548>.

⁵³⁵ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546>.

⁵³⁶ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546>.

⁵³⁷ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546>.

Chinese to do to us what we are unwilling to do to them".⁵³⁸ Roosevelt observed that "much trouble has come during the past summer from the organized boycott against American goods which has been started in China" where "the main factor in producing this boycott has been the resentment felt by the students and business people of China, by all the Chinese leaders, against the harshness of our law toward educated Chinamen of the professional and business classes".⁵³⁹ The reciprocity Roosevelt alluded to then, was motivated not by a moral sense of justice and the logic of identity, but by a threat to US economic interests and the logic of capital.

In his seventh annual message to congress on December 3rd 1907, Roosevelt spoke explicitly about US interest in incorporating China into the international system. He announced, "this Nation should help in every practicable way in the education of the Chinese people, so that the vast and populous Empire of China may gradually adapt itself to modern conditions".⁵⁴⁰ China was to be introduced into the civilised international system by "promoting the coming of Chinese students to this country and making it attractive to them to take courses at our universities and higher educational institutions".⁵⁴¹ This strand of thinking is similar to the interest and concerns of US missionaries in China.⁵⁴² It also reflected one of the more common colonial tropes that the colonised needed to be "educated" if they were to join the ranks of civilisation. This had the constitutive effect of not only constructing the Chinese as uneducated and uncivilised, but also juxtaposing them to a civilised and educated US.

In special message to Congress on April 14th 1908, Roosevelt repeated his claim that "we are not a military nation. Our army is so small as to present an almost absurd contrast to our size, and is properly treated as little more than a nucleus for organization in case of serious war".⁵⁴³ The issue now though was captured by the following remark that the US was "a rich Nation,

⁵³⁸ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546>.

⁵³⁹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546>.

⁵⁴⁰ Theodore Roosevelt: "Seventh Annual Message," December 3, 1907. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29548>.

⁵⁴¹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Seventh Annual Message," December 3, 1907. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29548>.

⁵⁴² John Fairbank, *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America* (USA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-Of-The-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

⁵⁴³ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

and undefended wealth invites aggression".⁵⁴⁴ Roosevelt drew a comparison between this peaceful yet rich US and an unstable and weak China. Although China desired peace Roosevelt remarked how "for centuries China has refused to provide military forces and has treated the career of the soldier as inferior in honour and regard to the career of the merchant or of the man of letters". To Roosevelt, China's lack of military preparedness had been detrimental to its international standing, "there never has been so large an empire which for so long a time has so resolutely proceeded on the theory of doing away with what is called 'militarism'...all the advanced reformers and farsighted patriots in the Chinese Empire are at present seeking - I may add, with our hearty good will-for a radical and far reaching reform in internal affairs".⁵⁴⁵ Roosevelt reiterated here, through the logics of geopolitics and identity, the US aim to see a reformed China incorporated into the 'civilised' international system.

China's domestic weaknesses to Roosevelt had created the conditions for its potential "absolute dismemberment". He observed how "in external affairs the policy has resulted in various other nations now holding large portions of Chinese territory, while there is a very acute fear in China lest the Empire, because of its defencelessness, be exposed to absolute dismemberment". This was one of the clearest public statements from Roosevelt, invoking the logic of geopolitics, concerning the interest maintained by the US in the territorial integrity of China.

His reflection on China's international predicament was used by Roosevelt to justify US military build-up with the emphasis on legitimate security concerns rather than a preoccupation with militarism. Other states were "able to help [China] only in a small measure, because no nation can help any other unless that other can help itself".⁵⁴⁶ He implied that the Chinese been lazy in their lack of preparedness for international politics and he is worth considering at length here:

"it is idle to assume, and from the standpoint of national interest and honour it is mischievous folly for any statesman to assume, that this world has yet reached the stage, or has come within measurable distance of the stage, when a proud nation, jealous of its honour and conscious of its great mission in the world, can be content to rely for peace upon the forbearance of other powers. It would be equally foolish to rely upon each of them possessing at all times and under all

⁵⁴⁴ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

⁵⁴⁵ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

⁵⁴⁶ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

circumstances and provocations an altruistic regard for the rights of others...They are blind to what has happened in China".⁵⁴⁷

For Roosevelt, the world could not yet be fully trusted. Roosevelt used these concerns to justify the construction of a stronger naval force. As he remarked, "the United States can hope for a permanent career of peace on only one condition, and that is, on condition of building and maintaining a first class navy".⁵⁴⁸ Although he had previously described the world as becoming increasingly more civilised Roosevelt also made the case that "Great Britain has been saved by its fleet from the necessity of facing one of the two alternatives of submission to conquest by a foreign power or of itself becoming a great military power".⁵⁴⁹ In some ways, this reflects the arguments of defensive neo-realists that a state should accrue enough material capability to deter foreign aggression, though I am more interested in here how Roosevelt used China to justify an expansive military build-up as well as to juxtapose a weak and idle to China to a more enlightened and militarily prepared US.

The more commonly recognised colonial trope of China as uncivilized was a minor theme in Roosevelt's eighth annual message to Congress in 1908. He described how "the lesson of deforestation in China is a lesson which mankind should have learned many times already from what has occurred in other places".⁵⁵⁰ He continued, "this ruthless destruction of the forests in northern China has brought about, or has aided in bringing about, desolation...short sighted man, whether barbaric, semi-civilized, or what he mistakenly regards as fully civilized, when he has destroyed the forests, has rendered certain the ultimate destruction of the land itself. In northern China the mountains are now such as are shown by the accompanying photographs, absolutely barren peaks".⁵⁵¹ China's environmental ignorance was evidence, through the logic of identity of its 'uncivilised' nature.

Most of his references to China had invoked the logic of capital this thesis describes; yet it was evident that this was not the only guiding influence in US foreign policy. Roosevelt also declared that US "foreign policy is based on the theory that right must be done between nations precisely as between individuals, and in our actions for the last ten years we have in

⁵⁴⁷ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

⁵⁴⁸ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

⁵⁴⁹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Special Message," April 14, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=69650>.

⁵⁵⁰ Theodore Roosevelt: "Eighth Annual Message," December 8, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29549>.

⁵⁵¹ Theodore Roosevelt: "Eighth Annual Message," December 8, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29549>.

this matter proven our faith by our deeds”.⁵⁵² Not only did Roosevelt invoke the moral influence in US foreign policy, he was also equating the behaviour of individuals with the behaviour of the state. He stated further that the US had “behaved, and are behaving, towards other nations as in private life an honourable man would behave towards his fellows”.⁵⁵³ US foreign policy towards China under Roosevelt then, had been motivated by the need for access to foreign markets, concordant geopolitical and colonial concerns about US standing in Asia, and a sense of moral honour. This captures the main argument of this thesis that to reduce US imaginations of China as being motivated by a singular narrative as only partially accurate.

The basis of US interest in China was captured by an article Roosevelt wrote while still President entitled “The Awakening of China”, for a periodical called *The Outlook*, published on November 28th 1908. His central claim was that at this moment “China is awakening” and this called to the US’s “Christian obligations to this great awakening people across the sea”.⁵⁵⁴ For Roosevelt, this was “one of the great events of our age” where “the remedy for the ‘yellow peril’, whatever that may be, is not the repression of life but the cultivation and direction of life”.⁵⁵⁵ In Roosevelt’s view, it was necessary for the US to shape the future of China to prevent any future conflict. Foreshadowing contemporary discourses on the ‘rise of China’ Roosevelt saw this moment as the “time for the West to implant its ideals in the Orient, in such a fashion as to minimize the chance of a dreadful future clash between two radically different and hostile civilisations; if we wait until tomorrow, we may find that we have waited too long”.⁵⁵⁶ The possibility that difference between China and the West might lead to conflict was to be mediated by the increasing Westernisation of China and its politics. This reflects the arguments made by Vukovich about the homogenising tendencies of capitalism as practiced by the US.⁵⁵⁷ Rather than the perpetuation of difference, Western and US policy here was about making China more similar to the West, an overall process that occurred through the deployment of the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics.

⁵⁵² Theodore Roosevelt: "Eighth Annual Message," December 8, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29549>.

⁵⁵³ Theodore Roosevelt: "Eighth Annual Message," December 8, 1908. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29549>.

⁵⁵⁴ “The Awakening of China by Theodore Roosevelt, The Outlook November 28, 1908” *Theodore Roosevelt* (<http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/treditorials/o157.pdf>, 15/10/2014).

⁵⁵⁵ “The Awakening of China by Theodore Roosevelt, The Outlook November 28, 1908” *Theodore Roosevelt* (<http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/treditorials/o157.pdf>, 15/10/2014).

⁵⁵⁶ “The Awakening of China by Theodore Roosevelt, The Outlook November 28, 1908” *Theodore Roosevelt* (<http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/treditorials/o157.pdf>, 15/10/2014).

⁵⁵⁷ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*.

5.4 Strictly Business: Taft and Dollar Diplomacy

I begin this section with a brief diversion from analysing the public statements of US Presidents to some more complimentary sources that nevertheless are vital to understanding Taft's foreign policy towards China. In the broader scope of this thesis, Taft's formulations are seen as possessing an effervescent presence in US discourses of China.

Speaking in Shanghai in 1907 while serving as Roosevelt's Secretary of War, Taft declared made clear that "for our present purpose the attitude of the United States toward China must be regarded not alone as a country interested in the trade of China, but also as a Power owning territory in China's immediate neighbourhood".⁵⁵⁸ This sentiment was echoed later by Philander Knox when Secretary of State under Taft when he remarked "so long as the U.S. holds the Philippines...the domination of China by other nations to our exclusion would be fraught with danger, and it is unthinkable that this country should be squeezed out of any combination [of powers] exercising an influence in Peking".⁵⁵⁹ Existing geopolitical configurations as Taft saw them, compelled the US to behave in a particular manner. This is precisely what I mean when I argue for the presence of a logic of geopolitics. The ownership of territory, in Taft's words, endowed the US with a certain set of expectations if it was to remain credible and maintain access to Chinese markets.

Taft would also invoke the logic of identity when justifying US foreign policy in East Asia. During a speech campaigning for President in Ohio on September 19th 1908, Taft presented a defence of US policy in the Philippines and Asia more broadly. When describing US treatment of the Philippines Taft declared, "our recognition of the rights of the people there, our attempt to teach them practical self-government, our exaltation of the individual, have had an excellent effect throughout the Orient. It is felt in China...we are pioneers in spreading Western civilisation in the East".⁵⁶⁰ This sense of a civilising mission represented the logic of identity in US foreign policies toward China.

During his Presidency, in a personal conversation with Prince Chun of China on the 15th of July 1909, Taft made clear that he had "an intense personal interest in making the use of American capital in the development of China an instrument for the promotion of the welfare

⁵⁵⁸ William Taft, *Essential Writings and Addresses* ed. By David Burton (New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2009): 215.

⁵⁵⁹ Alfred Griswold, the *Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962): 144-45.

⁵⁶⁰ Taft, *Essential Writings and Addresses*, 233.

of China...and the preservation of her territorial integrity”.⁵⁶¹ Later that year in November, Taft emphasized again to the Chinese that “I want to make it known to your government that it can trust us implicitly, for we do not want any of your territory. We only want your trade”.⁵⁶² US interest in China was conditioned by the logic of capital though as Taft’s previous statements made clear, this was complimented by a logic of geopolitics, a logic not just capturing how the US thought about international prestige and legitimacy, but as a rendering of how space is discursively produced in international politics, in particular in relation to how the US conceived of Asia as a natural area of US interest based on its location across the Pacific.

In his first annual message to Congress on December 7th 1909, Taft reiterated the now common US refrain that “in the Far East this Government preserves unchanged its policy of supporting the principle of equality of opportunity and scrupulous respect for the integrity of the Chinese Empire, to which policy are pledged the interested Powers of both East and West”.⁵⁶³ Taft though was taking a more proactive approach to the Open Door in China. One of his signature policies was a railroad loan which “represented a practical and real application of the open door policy through cooperation with China by interested Power” where “the Administration deemed American participation to be of great national interest”.⁵⁶⁴ This was significant as Taft saw participation in an international consortium as a case where “opportunity should not be lost” and was pleased that “the indispensable instrumentality presented itself when a group of American bankers, of international reputation and great resources, agreed at once to share in the loan upon precisely such terms as this Government should approve”.⁵⁶⁵ For Taft it was “gratifying that Americans will thus take their share in this extension of these great highways of trade, and to believe that such activities will give a real impetus to our commerce and will prove a practical corollary to our historic policy in the

⁵⁶¹ Quoted in Lewis Gould, *The William Howard Taft Presidency* (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009): 84.

⁵⁶² Archie Butt, *Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt, Military Aide, 2 vols.* (New York: Doubleday, 1930): 1:215.

⁵⁶³ William Howard Taft: "First Annual Message," December 7, 1909. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29550>.

⁵⁶⁴ William Howard Taft: "First Annual Message," December 7, 1909. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29550>.

⁵⁶⁵ William Howard Taft: "First Annual Message," December 7, 1909. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29550>.

Far East".⁵⁶⁶ Taft was invoking the logic of capital by drawing on the historic US concern with access to the Chinese economy as a potential market for domestic US surpluses.

During his second annual message to Congress on December 6th 1910, Taft dwelled on how "the centre of interest in Far Eastern affairs during the past year has again been China".⁵⁶⁷ Championing US participation in the Hukuang Loan railway loan, he described the settlement of the loan as "one of exact equality between America, Great Britain, France, and Germany in respect to financing the loan and supplying materials for the proposed railways and their future branches".⁵⁶⁸ This was an example of the Open Door policy in practice, equal participation of Western states in the Chinese economy. As Taft was to state, "the application of the principle underlying the policy of the United States in regard to the Hukuang Loan, viz., that of the internationalization of the foreign interest in such of the railways of China as may be financed by foreign countries". Taft had been eager to secure the US access to the construction of railways in China and saw it as part of a broader "proposal for internationalization and commercial neutralization of all the railways of Manchuria".⁵⁶⁹ Difficulties in getting the Russian and Japanese governments to agree to US participation in the loans, as they were to lose out on monopolies, this was an example of the logic of capital and of geopolitics in operation.

Taft made this abundantly clear when he declared "the policy of this Government in these matters has been directed by a desire to make the use of American capital in the development of China an instrument in the promotion of China's welfare and material prosperity without prejudice to her legitimate rights as an independent political power".⁵⁷⁰ US capital then would now start to have a dual purpose, it would seek foreign outlets to relieve domestic surpluses, but it would also be used to help 'develop' China. He described the railway loan as being of "the greatest importance to the commercial interests of the United States and the civilized world at large".⁵⁷¹ Taft also notes with positivity how it was "a matter of interest to

⁵⁶⁶ William Howard Taft: "First Annual Message," December 7, 1909. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29550>.

⁵⁶⁷ William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

⁵⁶⁸ William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

⁵⁶⁹ William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

⁵⁷⁰ William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

⁵⁷¹ William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

Americans to note the success which is attending the efforts of China to establish gradually a system of representative government".⁵⁷² The logic of identity, where the US saw itself as a self proclaimed exemplar of democratic governance was invoked to suggest that the US should set about promoting political reform and development in China. The logic of identity in this sense compelled the US to produce a certain kind of China in its own image.

The central organising principle of Taft's foreign policy was conditioned by the logic of capital. He stated clearly that:

"our foreign trade merits the best support of the Government and the most earnest endeavour of our manufacturers and merchants, who, if they do not already in all cases need a foreign market, are certain soon to become dependent on it. Therefore, now is the time to secure a strong position in this field".⁵⁷³

Taft was explicitly trying to combine the policies of US foreign policy with the interests of private capital in the US. This was part of what has now come to be known as 'Dollar Diplomacy', at the time a derisory label attached to Taft's disposition in using US diplomacy to benefit private US based capital.⁵⁷⁴

In his third annual message to Congress in December 1911, Taft recalled the US's role in trying to ensure China's political stability while gaining further access to its markets. In attempts to help the Chinese reform their currency Taft described how "this was originally to be solely an American enterprise" but "the American Government, consistently with its desire to secure a sympathetic and practical cooperation of the great powers toward maintaining the principle of equality of opportunity and the administrative integrity of China, urged the Chinese Government to admit to participation in the currency loan the associates of the American group in the Hukuang loan".⁵⁷⁵ Taft was determined to maintain the premises of the Open Door policy in China while also ensuring Chinese political stability. This was merely the start of a longer term objective as Taft observed that "while of immense importance in itself, the reform contemplated in making this loan is but preliminary to other and more comprehensive fiscal reforms which will be of incalculable benefit to China and foreign interests alike, since they will strengthen the Chinese Empire and promote the rapid

⁵⁷² William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

⁵⁷³ William Howard Taft: "Second Annual Message," December 6, 1910. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>.

⁵⁷⁴ Gould, *The William Howard Taft Presidency*.

⁵⁷⁵ William Howard Taft: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1911. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29552>.

development of international trade”.⁵⁷⁶ Securing US access to the Chinese market and fostering political stability were seen as complimentary enterprises. The logics of capital and of geopolitics then were closely related then even if at times they did not always function in concert.

Reflecting on the civil in China, Taft saw it as “especially important at the present, when the ancient Chinese Empire is shaken by civil war incidental to its awakening to the many influences and activities of modernization, are the cooperative policy of good understanding which has been fostered by the international projects referred to above and the general sympathy of view among all the Powers interested in the Far East”. Taft saw it as plausible to distinguish the activities of foreign powers in China from the collapse of the imperial system and the emergence of a Chinese Republic. He described how “while safeguarding the interests of our nationals, this Government is using its best efforts in continuance of its traditional policy of sympathy and friendship toward the Chinese Empire and its people, with the confident hope for their economic and administrative development”.⁵⁷⁷ Taft revealed a somewhat ambivalent concern to China’s political conditions where economic and administrative development were prioritised with the primary concern minimal disruption to the US’s economic interests.

In one of the rare invocations of ‘logic’ to describe US foreign policy by a US President during his fourth annual message to Congress in 1912, Taft made clear his “desire to touch upon some of the essentials to the safe management of the foreign relations of the United States and to endeavour, also, to define clearly certain concrete policies which are the *logical modern corollaries* of the undisputed and traditional fundamentals of the foreign policy of the United States”(emphasis added).⁵⁷⁸ Taft here is articulating how US policies were informed by and conditioned by, logical corollaries of “traditional fundamentals”. Although this is not precisely the conceptualisation I adopt in my argument regarding the three logics of US foreign policy towards China, Taft makes clear that policies emerge out of certain conditions that are structured and informed by particular logics of US concerns. Missing from Taft’s remarks though, is the awareness that these policies also constitutively constitute those very logics, or in Taft’s words “traditional fundamentals”, rather than these fundamentals simply

⁵⁷⁶ William Howard Taft: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1911. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29552>.

⁵⁷⁷ William Howard Taft: "Third Annual Message," December 5, 1911. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29552>.

⁵⁷⁸ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

giving rise to these policies. The traditional fundamentals Taft's refer to do not exist independent of particular US interests and concerns even if Taft appears to implicitly understand them as transcendental truisms. I find it more useful to understand these traditional fundamentals as being comprised of particular logics of interpretation, concern and disposition that produce certain imperatives and actions as more desirable, if not necessary to the reproduction of themselves and the US way of life. In this sense, it is not just that these logics I describe give rise to policy, but those policies and their articulation reproduce those very logics. The relationship then between logics and policy as I discern them here is constitutive rather than simply causal.

Taft's general approach to foreign policy saw "diplomacy a hand maid of commercial intercourse and peace".⁵⁷⁹ US foreign policy practices then were about the joint pursuit of foreign markets and the political stability to facilitate "commercial intercourse". Taft declared, "the diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims". Essentially he is making the case that his foreign policy sought to unite the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics into a coherent framework with the emphasis on US economic interests. This is especially pertinent in the following remark that "it [was] an effort frankly directed to the increase of American trade upon the axiomatic principle that the Government of the United States shall extend all proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American enterprise abroad".⁵⁸⁰ Here he makes it clear that the logic of capital, the imperative for US capital to reproduce and secure itself though its extension into foreign markets as the primary guiding principle of US foreign policy. Taft draws no distinction between diplomatic initiatives and commercial interests; he observes that "because modern diplomacy is commercial, there has been a disposition in some quarters to attribute to it none but materialistic aims. How strikingly erroneous is such an impression may be seen from a study of the results by which the diplomacy of the United States can be judged".⁵⁸¹ Alluded to here is the conviction that US foreign policy has been

⁵⁷⁹ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸⁰ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸¹ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

about more than just economic gain, though considering some of his remarks one should be forgiven for seeing it so.

Taft turned to US foreign policy towards China to exemplify his arguments. Recognising the continuity in US foreign policy back to McKinley he described how “in China the policy of encouraging financial investment to enable that country to help itself has had the result of giving new life and practical application to the open door policy”.⁵⁸² In a summation of his administration’s policy, but also loosely capturing US interest in China over the first half of the 20th century he declared:

“The consistent purpose of the present administration has been *to encourage the use of American capital in the development of China* by the promotion of those essential reforms to which China is pledged by treaties with the United States and other powers.”(Emphasis added)⁵⁸³

Taft also made apparent how it was a general concern of missing out to other foreign powers in China that the US was so determined to be involved in the railways deals, “the hypothecation to foreign bankers in connection with certain industrial enterprises, such as the Hukuang railways...led the Department of State early in the administration to demand for American citizens participation in such enterprises, in order that the United States might have equal rights and an equal voice” in the economic reforms taking place in China.⁵⁸⁴ Qualifying this declaration though were the remarks of his Secretary of State Philander Knox who in a speech in Ohio in December 1910 made it clear that “when we support the ‘open door’ in China, that is not so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’, but the recognition of a high moral duty”.⁵⁸⁵ Knox here was invoking the effects of the logic of identity in US foreign policy.

In one of the few remarks on the on-going revolutionary turmoil in China, he was sympathetic but not explicitly interventionist. He described “the natural sympathy of the American people with the assumption of republican principles by the Chinese people”, but refrained from any further public statements of support. He had made his general foreign policy approach clear when he remarked, “if this government is really to preserve to the American people that free opportunity in foreign markets which will soon be indispensable to our prosperity, even

⁵⁸² William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸³ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸⁴ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸⁵ Quoted in Walter Scholes and Marie Scholes, *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration* (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1970): 110.

greater efforts must be made".⁵⁸⁶ He was more concerned with the economic security of the US than intervening for the sake of political goals. He warned that for the US government to not assist with the interests of US capital, private and public that "the American merchant, manufacturer and exporter will find many a field in which American trade should logically predominate pre-empted through the more energetic efforts of other governments and commercial relations".⁵⁸⁷ Trade and the logic of capital were seen as a zero sum game, to adopt modern parlance, where the US should remain pre-eminent at the expense of other states.

Taft proved a pivotal moment of clarification and coherency in US foreign policy towards China. His expansion on the Open Door policy initiated by John Hay under McKinley was accurately captured by the tagline Dollar Diplomacy. Taft attempted to streamline the three logics of US foreign policy towards China claiming to be acting in the interests of capital, geopolitics and identity or as he remarked, "legitimate commercial aims", "strategy" and "humanitarian sentiments". What is worth mentioning and reflecting on briefly, is a remark in an undated Knox memo found in his papers. It captures the power relations embedded in the creditor-debtor relation, though its limited provenance explains my limited usage of it here. Knox writes that "the borrower is the servant of the lender, we propose in all cases to claim the right to proportional representation in the influence which attaches to the holding of the credits of the Chinese government".⁵⁸⁸ The US then saw dollar diplomacy and its utilisation of capital as a form of control and domination over countries like China. Was this neo-colonialism? Colonialism without the conquering of territory? These are important questions to flag here, even if their answers require other forms of analysis and inquiry to the one outlined here. It is my hope though that my arguments would contribute to addressing these other lines of questioning. In prescient form, the application of US capital and its corresponding logics was the original governing logic of US imperial practices. The US in this sense was more concerned with establishing the conditions for continued economic expansion and prosperity and the acquisition of territory would be to merely further these concerns.

⁵⁸⁶ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸⁷ William Howard Taft: "Fourth Annual Message," December 3, 1912. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>.

⁵⁸⁸ Quoted in Scholes and Scholes, *The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration*, 141.

5.5 Woodrow Wilson and the Logic of Identity

Although Wilson was President for eight years including during World War I, my analysis focuses on the later years of his Presidency. This was notable for how he prioritised the logic of geopolitics as he sought a solution to the issues regarding the province of Shandong in Eastern China as it was claimed by the Japanese via treaty agreement with the British, despite having been Chinese territory before German occupation in. First though, Wilson's rendering of the logic of capital is worth recognising.

Speaking in Indiana on September 4th 1919. Wilson emphasised the economic power of the US. He remarked to the audience: "I want you to realize that this war was won not only by the armies of the world. It was won by economic means as well. Without the economic means the war would have been much longer continued. What happened was that Germany was shut off from the economic resources of the rest of the globe and she could not stand it".⁵⁸⁹ Embedded in this was the logic of capital where state power depended participation in a global system of finance and exchange. Just as the extension of US capital was used by Taft to attempt to shape conditions in China, Wilson inverted the logic whereby "a nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon that nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist".⁵⁹⁰ Through the logic of capital, access to the international system was necessary for the domestic reproduction of political life.

Turning to the issue of Shandong, Wilson spent considerable time on a speaking tour around the US using the issue to build up popular support for US entry into the League of Nations. He describes the complexity of issue well:

"When we came to the settlement of the Shantung matter with regard to China, we found that Great Britain and France were under explicit treaty obligation to Japan that she should get exactly what she got in the treaty with Germany, and the most that the United states could do was to urge upon Japan the promise, which she gave, that she would not take advantage of those portions of the

⁵⁸⁹ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum at the State Fair Grounds in Indianapolis, Indiana," September 4, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117363>.

⁵⁹⁰ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum at the State Fair Grounds in Indianapolis, Indiana," September 4, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117363>.

treaty but would return to the Republic of China, without qualification, the sovereignty which Germany had enjoyed in Shantung Province".⁵⁹¹

Although the US had wanted the province returned to Chinese sovereignty, the limits of US international authority were revealed when it could do nothing to prevent the Japanese treaty with the French and the British. Wilson lamented that the US could not ask the Japanese, British and French to break their secret agreement because "this war had been fought in part because of the refusal to observe the fidelity which is involved in a promise, because of the failure to regard the sacredness of treaties".⁵⁹²

Wilson made it clear in a speech in Missouri on September 5th 1919, that the US had been excluded from the secret negotiations, further accentuating the limited authority possessed by the US. He remarked that "it was very embarrassing, my fellow citizens, when you thought you were approaching an ideal solution of a particular question to find that some of your principal colleagues had given the whole thing away". Wilson pointed out that "as everybody now knows, in order to make it more certain that Japan would come into the war and so assist to clear the Pacific of the German fleets, had promised that any rights that Germany had in China should, in the case of the victory of the Allies, pass to Japan".⁵⁹³ The US concern with Chinese territorial integrity remained an important aspect of US concern for China. Wilson emphasised later that he did "not like that settlement any better than you do... In order to induce Japan to cooperate in the war and clear the Pacific of the German power England, and subsequently France, bound themselves without any qualification to see to it that Japan got anything in China that Germany had".⁵⁹⁴ This reflected an indication that the logic of geopolitics, and the requisite respect for territorial integrity was an influential part of Wilson's reasoning, even if the logic of geopolitics until now had mostly featured more explicitly as a corollary to the logic of capital.

At a speaking event in Iowa on September 6th 1919, Wilson bluntly made the case that US isolation, continental expansion aside, was over due to the international conditions of politics.

⁵⁹¹ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum at the State Fair Grounds in Indianapolis, Indiana," September 4, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117363>.

⁵⁹² Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum at the State Fair Grounds in Indianapolis, Indiana," September 4, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117363>.

⁵⁹³ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at a Luncheon at the Hotel Statler in St. Louis, Missouri," September 5, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117364>.

⁵⁹⁴ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum in Des Moines, Iowa," September 6, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117367>.

He stated “the isolation of the United States is at an end, not because we chose to go into the politics of the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of our power we have become a determining factor in the history of mankind, and after you had become a determining factor you can not remain isolated, whether you want to or not”.⁵⁹⁵ The material conditions produced by US economic expansion established a new set of discursive conditions of possibility for US interaction with the world. The logic of capital appeared to dictate how the US perceived its ‘place’ in international politics. Wilson saw this process in somewhat teleological if not prophetic terms claiming that this “isolation ended by the processes of history, not by the processes of our independent choice, and the processes of history merely fulfilled the prediction of the men who founded our Republic”.⁵⁹⁶ He prescribed a degree of inevitability about it. This reveals the successful naturalisation and depoliticising of political decisions and consequences as natural and preordained occurrences. This explains how the logics I describe are rarely articulated in such overt terms as expressed by Taft in the previous section.

In a speech in Nebraska on September 8th 1919, Wilson expressed his determination to use the arbitration clauses within the League of Nations to resolve the Shantung issue. International politics was to be mediated by legal and administrative procedures. His ultimate goal was that “Japan promises and we guarantee that the territorial integrity and political independence of China will be respected and preserved. That is the way to serve China. That is the only possible way in the circumstances to serve China”.⁵⁹⁷ Implicitly here, is an expression of the logic of identity where the US is concerned for international norms and standards of self-determination.

In Montana September 3 days later, Wilson used the Chinese issue to make the case that a form of global inter-connectedness was inevitable. He argued how “it [was] not only we, my fellow citizens, who are caught in all the implications of the affairs of the world; everybody is caught in it now, and it is right that anything that affects the world should be made

⁵⁹⁵ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum in Des Moines, Iowa," September 6, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117367>.

⁵⁹⁶ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Coliseum in Des Moines, Iowa," September 6, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117367>.

⁵⁹⁷ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Omaha Auditorium in Omaha, Nebraska," September 8, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117368>.

everybody's business".⁵⁹⁸ He made this in the context of his concern for China where he invoked a narrative of helplessness commenting that "I do not know when any nation that could not take care of itself, as unfortunately China can not, ever had such a humane advantage accorded it before".⁵⁹⁹ Wilson understood this increasing "connectedness" through the logic of capital, even if his concern here was the specific geopolitical issue facing China.

On September 17th 1919, at luncheon in California, Wilson expressed an altruistic basis of US concern for China when he remarked in reference to the other colonial empires that "nowhere will they countenance a disregard for the territorial integrity or the political independence of that great helpless people, lying there hitherto as an object of prey in the great Orient. It is the first time in the history of the world that anything has been done for China".⁶⁰⁰ Adopting a more explicit turn of phrase later that day at an event in San Francisco Wilson asked, "why should not the Chinaman hate the foreigner? The foreigner has always taken from him everything that he could get... Other civilized nations had done the same thing to China".⁶⁰¹ This question raised Wilson's major concern with the US's recent approach to China. He was critical of Hay and McKinley for focusing on commercial relations alone in their articulation of the Open Door Policy. He had also been critical of Taft's Dollar Diplomacy even if he later adopted similar rhetoric on the use of US foreign policy.⁶⁰²

Wilson criticised Hay and McKinley in relation to their acceptance of German occupation of Shandong as "they did not even protest against this compulsory granting to Germany of the best part of a rich Province of a helpless country, but only stipulated that the Germans should keep it open to the trade of the United States".⁶⁰³ He was frustrated by the pair's moral inaction where "they did not make the least effort to save the rights of China; they only tried to save the commercial advantages of the United States... there was not a single attempt made

⁵⁹⁸ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Opera House (Marlow Theater) in Helena, Montana," September 11, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117376>.

⁵⁹⁹ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Opera House (Marlow Theater) in Helena, Montana," September 11, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117376>.

⁶⁰⁰ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at a Luncheon at the Palace Hotel in San Francisco, California," September 17, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117385>.

⁶⁰¹ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the San Francisco Civic Auditorium in San Francisco, California," September 17, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117386>.

⁶⁰² Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World*, 77-90.

⁶⁰³ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the San Francisco Civic Auditorium in San Francisco, California," September 17, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117386>.

by the Government of the United States to do anything except to keep those regions open to our traders.”⁶⁰⁴ Wilson here expressed frustration with the centrality that the logic of capital had played in US foreign policy from McKinley until now, implying it lacked a sense of reciprocity.

This point on reciprocity was made clear when Wilson spoke in Los Angeles on September 20th 1919, where he continued his criticism of Hay and McKinley. To Wilson, “they only insisted that the door should not be shut in any of these regions [in China] against the trade of the United States. You have heard of Mr Hay's policy of the open door. That was his policy of the open door—not the open door to the rights of China, but the open door to the goods of America”.⁶⁰⁵ Wilson expressed what was to become a more prominent resonance within the logic of US identity. This was a concern, in public at least, for fairness and morality when it came to US dealings with China specifically, and the world more generally. The arguments made by Wilson here are similar in nature to those by my Richard Nixon as discussed in section 7.2.

Despite his frustration with the overly economic focus of US foreign policy until now, Wilson continued to link the logic capital, geopolitics and identity in his declaration that the US was now “tied into the rest of the world by kinship, by sympathy, by interest in every great enterprise of human affairs. The United States has become the economic centre of the world, the ' financial centre’”.⁶⁰⁶ This was part of his determination to make the case for the US joining the League of Nations appear as legal recognition of a *de facto* state of global interconnectedness. He charged that “It is impossible for the United States to be isolated, it is impossible for the United States to play a lone hand, because it has gone partners with all the rest of the world with regard to every great interest that it is connected with”. In a challenge to isolationist he asked “What are you going to do? Give up your foreign markets? Give up your influence in the affairs of other nations and arm yourselves to the teeth and double your taxes

⁶⁰⁴ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the San Francisco Civic Auditorium in San Francisco, California," September 17, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117386>.

⁶⁰⁵ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393>.

⁶⁰⁶ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393>.

and be ready to spring instead of ready to cooperate?”.⁶⁰⁷ The proclamation that the US was the economic centre of the world was built on the understanding that this was now something the US needed to continue to reproduce its way of life. This acknowledgement, of the necessity of foreign markets and the international system to the security of the US was to become a lasting truism in US foreign policy, especially in relation to China following the Chinese economic reforms after the death of Mao Zedong.⁶⁰⁸

Wilson observed how US “economic engagements run everywhere, into every part of the globe. Our assistance is essential to the establishment of normal conditions throughout the world”.⁶⁰⁹ To Wilson, the US was now the essential stabiliser of international politics. In its most extreme he considered the US, a necessary component in international stability. This sense of centrality expressed a more inflated sense of self within the logic of identity. Wilson continued, “our advice is constantly sought. Our standards of labour are being extended to all parts of the world just so fast as they can be extended. America is the breeding centre for all the ideas that are now going to fecundate the great future”, the US as the life source of international politics. In the context of US foreign policy accounting for its expansion across the North American continent, regular interventions abroad and war making fecundity from Vietnam through to Iraq, this appeared, in the kindest sense, a disingenuous metaphor. The homogenising tendencies Vukovich described in relation to a capitalist system was now embedded within all three logics of US foreign policy towards China, and in some sense generally.⁶¹⁰ Wilson ended this parable with the refrain “you can no more separate yourselves from the rest of the world than you can take all the tender roots of a great tree out of the earth and expect the tree to live”.⁶¹¹ The Shandong question for Wilson then, was a matter of US identity and sense of justice where the logic of identity was more influential than the logic of capital.

Wilson’s occasional disdain for the primacy of the logic of capital in US foreign policy is captured by the following statement, where for him, the logic of identity supersedes the logic

⁶⁰⁷ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393>.

⁶⁰⁸ More on this in chapters 7 and 8.

⁶⁰⁹ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393>.

⁶¹⁰ Vukovich, *China and Orientalism*.

⁶¹¹ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393>.

of capital. He proclaimed “the only immortal thing about America is her conscience. America is not going to be immortal because she has immense wealth. Other great nations had immense wealth and went down in decay and disgrace, because they had nothing else”. If the logic of capital is to dominate un-qualified, it would lead to domestic ruin. Thus in Wilson’s vision, “America is great because of the ideas she has conceived. America is great because of the purposes she has set herself to achieve”.⁶¹² Implicit here is the nexus between identity and practice as accounted for by David Campbell in *Writing Security*, where US identity is constitutively related to foreign policy practices as a way of re-establishing and affirming that particular sense of identity.⁶¹³ This is exemplary of how the logic of identity was prioritised by Wilson when approaching the logics of capital and geopolitics.

Returning to the issue of China, speaking in Nevada on September 22nd 1919, Wilson set out a vision where “China lay rich and undeveloped and the rest of the world was covetous and it had made bargains with China, generally to China's disadvantage, which enabled the world to go in and exploit her riches”.⁶¹⁴ The sense of exploitation spoke to the moral concerns within the logic of identity.⁶¹⁵ Wilson compounded his criticisms of Hay and McKinley stating that “they took no interest, I mean so far as what they did was concerned, in the liberties and rights of China. They were interested only in the rights of the merchants of the United States”.⁶¹⁶ Although he did not say it, Wilson implied a sense of moral bankruptcy to the US’s ambivalence about China’s sovereignty. If anything, the distinction tacitly made by McKinley of the separation between sovereignty and territorial integrity, lacked a moral integrity that a logic of identity could now provide. The US was ‘great’ to Wilson because of its ideas and sense of self, not because of its economic prowess in its search for foreign markets.

In Wyoming on September 24th 1919, Wilson captured his frustration with the colonial states and his sympathy with China. He bluntly stated, “you know that China has been the common prey of the great European powers... Nation after nation has demanded rights, semi-sovereign

⁶¹² Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393>.

⁶¹³ Campbell, *Writing Security*.

⁶¹⁴ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Reno Auditorium in Reno, Nevada," September 22, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117396>.

⁶¹⁵ Although not a major focus of mine one might also detect a highly sexualised language here used to construct China as a feminine, vulnerable and exploited.

⁶¹⁶ Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Reno Auditorium in Reno, Nevada," September 22, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117396>.

rights, and concessions with regard to mines and railways and every other resource that China could put at their disposition”.⁶¹⁷ To Wilson then the logic of capital compelled by geopolitical concerns about credibility and competition, were hollow and self-defeating without a mediating logic of identity. Wilson was frustrated with how “China has never been able to say "No"—a great learned, patient, diligent people, numbering hundreds of millions; has had no organized force with which to resist, and has yielded again and again and again to unjust demands”.⁶¹⁸ Wilson constituted a realignment in the operative primacy of the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity. He did not abandon economic or geopolitical concerns, but mediated them through a concern with how the US should behave as a just and moral state, with clear prescriptions of justice.

Finally, indicating his concerns with the logic of capital in a domestic sense, Wilson set forth a warning, that merits parity with that of Eisenhower’s caution with regards to the military-industrial-complex. In his seventh annual message to Congress on December 2nd 1919, Wilson cautioned that:

“The great unrest throughout the world, out of which has emerged a demand for an immediate consideration of the difficulties between capital and labour, bids us put our own house in order. Frankly, there can be no permanent and lasting settlements between capital and labour which do not recognize the fundamental concepts for which labour has been struggling through the years... Labour must not be longer treated as a commodity. It must be regarded as the activity of human beings, possessed of deep yearnings and desires”.⁶¹⁹

Wilson was no Marxist. But his concerns about the logic of capital were not only present in his thinking about US foreign policy, but his domestic thought too. The uninhibited logic of capital called for expansion, regardless of consequences. And Wilson’s reflections on the relations between capital and labour, reflected his international concerns about a US foreign policy governed in the name of capital alone. In this sense, in reaction to the historical primacy of the logic of capital, the logics of identity and eventually geopolitics, were deployed and positioned by Wilson as contrarian to the logic of capital, exerting a constraint on its imperatives for endless expansion and reproduction. This tension was to play out in US foreign policy towards China right up until and through Barack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia.

⁶¹⁷Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Princess Theater in Cheyenne, Wyoming," September 24, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117398>.

⁶¹⁸Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Princess Theater in Cheyenne, Wyoming," September 24, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117398>.

⁶¹⁹Woodrow Wilson: "7th Annual Message," December 2, 1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29560>.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics begin to operate in a form of contrarian tension in US presidential discourses of China. China comes to be perceived as a solution to domestic economic crises and the notion that as a potential market it could satisfy US economic needs. McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft especially, and Wilson despite the prevalence of the logic of identity in his speeches all prioritised the logic of capital to varying degrees. Taft's formulations of what would become dollar diplomacy became one of the fundamental principles of the logic of capital. The US need and search for foreign markets though necessitated the continued prominence of the logic of capital in shaping the logic of geopolitics as evidenced by McKinley's concern for the territorial integrity of China in the worry that the US might miss out on securing commercial access to the other imperial powers.

The next chapter moves considerably forward to the Franklin Roosevelt presidency during WWII. I pass over the presidencies of Calvin Coolidge, Warren Harding and Herbert Hoover for varying reasons but mostly regarding the issue of discernable discourses on China. This is despite the on-going political turbulence in China resulting in conflict between the emerging Nationalist and Communist factions.⁶²⁰ A secondary consideration was also one of space and the frustrating fact that I could not cover everything in this thesis. Due to the lack of explicit literature focusing on US foreign policy towards China during the 1920s this either suggests there is not much to analyse, or that there is a potential area for further scholarship.

⁶²⁰ Mechthild Leutner, Roland Felber, M Titarenco and A. Griegoriev (eds), *The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster* (Oxon: Routledge, 2002).

Chapter 6 – 1941-1968: From Allies to Alienation and Back Again

6.1 Introduction

The largest chapter in the thesis, this chapter covers the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt⁶²¹, Harry Truman⁶²², Dwight Eisenhower⁶²³, John Kennedy⁶²⁴ and Lyndon Johnson⁶²⁵ following the general arc of China going from a key ally to an estranged enemy. It was necessary to cover this period as it reflected a boomerang like trajectory of US relations from China going from admirable ally to estranged enemy and the beginnings of a potential reconciliation forming under Johnson. Broadly there was significant debate over how the US should understand China, indeed there was some debate about whether to ally with the Communists over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war⁶²⁶, during Roosevelt's presidency but this gave way to a more hostile attitude following his death. Truman's presidency witnessed the emergence of two Chinas essentially in the People's Republic of China on the mainland and the Republic of China⁶²⁷ on Formosa, now Taiwan.⁶²⁸ Truman had maintained some of the hope Roosevelt displayed but this was overcome by the Communist victory in 1949. Eisenhower was fundamentally hostile to China and during this time, his discourse on China very much invoked the logic of identity. Kennedy would articulate clearly the manner in

⁶²¹ Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Marc Gallicchio, 'The Other China Hands: U.S. Army Officers and America's Failure in China, 1941-1950', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 4 (1995): 49-72.

⁶²² Lewis Purifoy, *Harry Truman's China Policy* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976); June Grasso, *Truman's Two-China Policy* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1987); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy 1949-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs (eds), *Uncertain Years Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); US Department of State, *The China White Paper 2 Volumes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

⁶²³ Tucker, *The China Threat*; Rosemary Foot, 'The Eisenhower Administration's Fear of Empowering the Chinese', *Political Science Quarterly* 3 (1996): 505-521; Qiang Zhai, 'Crisis and Confrontation: Chinese-American Relations during the Eisenhower Administration', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 9 (2000): 221-249; John Garver, 'Polemics, Paradigms, Responsibility, and the Origins of the U.S.-PRC Confrontation in the 1950s', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 3 (1994): 1-34.

⁶²⁴ Noam Kochavi, *A Conflict Perpetuated China Policy During the Kennedy Years* (London: Praeger, 2002); Gordan Chang, 'JFK, China, and the Bomb', *The Journal of American History* 74 (1988): 1287-1310; Zach Fredman, "'The Specter of an Expansionist China': Kennedy Administration Assessments of Chinese Intentions in Vietnam', *Diplomatic History* 38 (2014): 111-136; Jean Kang, 'Food for Communist China' A U.S. Policy Dilemma, 1961-1963', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 7 (1998): 39-70.

⁶²⁵ Michael Lumbers, *Piercing the Bamboo Curtain Tentative Bridge-Building to China during the Johnson Years* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); Robert Garson, 'Lyndon B. Johnson and the China Enigma', *Journal of Contemporary History* 32(1997): 63-80; Victor Kaufman, 'A Response to Chaos: The United States, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution, 1961-1968', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 7 (1998): 73-92.

⁶²⁶ Richard Bernstein, *China 1945 Mao's Revolution and America's Fateful Choice* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

⁶²⁷ John Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (London: Routledge, 2015).

⁶²⁸ I refer to the People's Republic of China as China for the sake of continuity as my concern is with US presidential discourses of mainland China rather than 'island' China in the form of Taiwan.

which the imperatives of the logic of identity, the spreading of democracy for one, would create the best conditions for the logic of capital to function. Under Johnson, the US would come to consider reconciliation with China though this would not come to fruition until the Nixon presidency.

What this chapter demonstrates is the emerging primacy of the logic of geopolitics in US presidential discourse in this period. The logic of capital remained significant though as the US sought to outline how capital expansion should be organised under the Cold War conditions of superpower rivalry. This period covers WWII, the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the Korean War in the early 1950s and the breakout of the US phase of the Vietnam War in the 1960s.⁶²⁹

6.2 FDR, War and the Hope for a Democratic China

Roosevelt's discourse on China was characterised by hope. Hope of what China might become. To Roosevelt, this was not so much a question of might, but one of should. He hoped that China would come to be a powerful democratic ally in Asia and he made it clear that the US would do what would need to assist in this. In his 1941 address at annual dinner of White House Correspondents' Association he declared that China "expresses the magnificent will of millions of plain people to resist the dismemberment of their historic Nation. China, through the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek, asks our help. America has said that China shall have our help".⁶³⁰ Roosevelt used this as an example to illustrate his broader point that the US "is going to be what our people have proclaimed it must be—the arsenal of democracy. Our country is going to play its full part".⁶³¹ Roosevelt returned to this idea in his report to Congress on the Lend-Lease Act on June 10th 1941. He stated that "beginning with the outbreak of the war the American public began to realize that it was in our own national

⁶²⁹ Thomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); C. X. Wei, *Sino-American Economic Relations, 1944-1949* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997); Paul Varg, *The Closing of the Door Sino-American Relations 1936-1946* (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1973); Anthony Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost* (London: Intercotex Publishers Limited, 1971); James Peck, *Washington's China The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006); Robert Herzstein, *Henry R. Luce, Time, and the American Crusade in Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Harry Harding and Yuan Ming (eds), *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955* (Delaware: SR Books, 1989).

⁶³⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Address at the Annual Dinner of White House Correspondents' Association.," March 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16089>.

⁶³¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Address at the Annual Dinner of White House Correspondents' Association.," March 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16089>.

interest and security to help Britain, China and other democratic nations".⁶³² By expanding on the premise that the US would promote democratic institutions and practices, Roosevelt's comments here essentially constitute the militarisation of the logic of identity.

Speaking to the International Labour Organization on November 6th 1941, Roosevelt reflected on US support for China and others. He reflected on the inability of the US to "grasp the full extent of the sacrifices that the people of China are making in their struggle for freedom from aggression...the epic stand of Britain, of China and of Russia receives the full support of the free people of the Americas".⁶³³ Comments such as these were indicative of Roosevelt's attempts to establish US support and sympathy through the logic of identity to make it easier for the US to enter WWII even if his reasons for doing so were more complex.⁶³⁴

In Asia more specifically Roosevelt emphasised, during a press conference on November 28th 1941, how "our one desire has been peace in the Pacific, and the taking of no steps to alter the prospects of peace, which of course has meant nonaggression. It really boils down to that".⁶³⁵ The significance of the US desire for peace was not so much an end in itself as Roosevelt would elaborate. He remarked how "talking along the line of general peace for the Pacific, based on a settlement of the war between China and Japan the restoration of peace there, plus a permanent arrangement for nonaggression in the Pacific" was aimed at "the restoration of normal economic relations, access to raw materials".⁶³⁶ Although Roosevelt framed the overall goal of US foreign policy as being motivated by the logic of identity, in relation to Asia, it became clear that the logic of capital still featured significantly. This concern was also mediated through the logic of geopolitics when Roosevelt remarked on US concern regarding "the possible extension of control by aggression into the whole of the Pacific area. And we are thinking about what it would mean to this country if that policy were to be used against us

⁶³² Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Report to Congress on the Operations of the Lend-Lease Act.," June 10, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16128>.

⁶³³ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Address to the International Labor Organization.," November 6, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16037>.

⁶³⁴ Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

⁶³⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference," November 28, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16047>.

⁶³⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference," November 28, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16047>.

in the whole Pacific area".⁶³⁷ US interest in China was discussed through the emphasis of the logic of geopolitics.

Roosevelt again invoked the logic of geopolitics in a press conference a few days later on December 2nd 1941, when he wanted to make "it perfectly clear that the objective which we were seeking meant the taking of no additional territory by anybody in the Pacific area".⁶³⁸ It was not entirely apparent if this meant a return to the status quo before Japanese territorial aggression in the 1930s or a defence of the current status quo, nevertheless it was clear that the US was imagining Asia through the logic of geopolitics. Significantly for my purposes, Roosevelt indicated a general lack of interest in expanding US territory in the Asia-Pacific.

The emphasis on the resumption of commercial relations was evident in Roosevelt's appeal to Japanese Emperor Hirohito to avoid war in the Pacific made on December 6th 1941. Roosevelt again articulated the link between peace and commerce stating that "We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion...and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favour of any Nation".⁶³⁹ This is not to say that peace was not desirable in its own right, but that Roosevelt regularly deployed the US desire for peace as a condition for successful commerce in the region.

On December 15th 1941, Roosevelt spoke at length to Congress on the history of relations between the United States and Japan and more generally about US interest in Asia. Roosevelt reconstructed a narrative of US interest in Asia outlining how "a little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships. Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China".⁶⁴⁰ This was an attempt to justify contemporary US interest in Asia through its historical encounter. Turning to Japan Roosevelt continued, "in 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on

⁶³⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference," November 28, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16047>.

⁶³⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference," December 2, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16050>.

⁶³⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Appeal to Emperor Hirohito to Avoid War in the Pacific," December 6, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16052>.

⁶⁴⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan.," December 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16061>.

Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage".⁶⁴¹ Significant here is the subtle exclusion of the unbalanced power relations from Roosevelt's narrative as there is no mention of US economic concerns initiating its desire to profit off of British colonial practices in China or militaristic nature of US excursion into Japan as I have indicated earlier in Chapter 4.

Turning to the end of the 19th century, Roosevelt focused on China, positioning the US as the lead defender of Chinese territorial integrity. He remarked, "at that time there was going on in China what has been called the 'scramble for concessions'. There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down".⁶⁴² Building on the notion of US altruism, while making it apparent that this was motivated by the logic of capital, Roosevelt continued, "in 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to 'seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China ...to protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire". For Roosevelt the US has since McKinley's declarations has "consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East".⁶⁴³ Roosevelt here was articulating the continuity of the logics of capital and geopolitics in the US approach to China.

Roosevelt drew on the 1921 Washington Conference as a further example of this concern. He stated that "one great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas". The most important aspect for his argument now, was the Nine Power Treaty, which "contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle

⁶⁴¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan.," December 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16061>.

⁶⁴² Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan.," December 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16061>

⁶⁴³ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan.," December 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16061>.

of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all Nations throughout China”.⁶⁴⁴ What is evident here is the qualifying of US concern for Chinese sovereignty, with US interest in Chinese markets. Turning to his negotiations with Japan, Roosevelt set out what he saw as some basic principles for international relations:

“In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were: The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all Nations. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The principle of equality including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies”.⁶⁴⁵

In many ways these were to become normative staples in US rhetoric regarding international politics as Roosevelt formulated the logic of geopolitics as one where states did not have the right to intervene in other states while affirming the logic of capital where states had the right to the equality of opportunity in commercial treatment and so US intervention to secure this notional ‘equality’ would be permissible.⁶⁴⁶

In a message to Chiang Kai-Shek on February 7th 1942, Roosevelt celebrated a Congressional act to aide China as a testament “to the wholehearted respect and admiration which the Government and people of this country have for China”.⁶⁴⁷ He was here emphasising how it was the logic of identity that drew the US and China closer together as he remarked on the “earnest desire and determination to be concretely helpful to our partners in the great battle for freedom”. In an inversion of the more historical trope of China as uncivilised, Roosevelt commented on “the gallant resistance of the Chinese armies against the ruthless invaders of your country has called forth the highest praise from the American and all other freedom loving peoples”.⁶⁴⁸ For now, China was located within the world of “freedom loving peoples”, a euphemism for the civilised world. He would remark in a fireside chat later that month on February 23rd that the US “look at the vast area of China, with its millions of fighting men... it is essential that we help China in her magnificent defence and in her inevitable

⁶⁴⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan.," December 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16061>.

⁶⁴⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on the History of Relations Between the United States and Japan.," December 15, 1941. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16061>.

⁶⁴⁶ Maurer, *The Empire Trap*; William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* (London: Zed Books, 2014).

⁶⁴⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Aid for China.," February 7, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16217>.

⁶⁴⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Aid for China.," February 7, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16217>.

counteroffensive – for that is one important element in the ultimate defeat of Japan”.⁶⁴⁹

Alluding to the significant size of China, Roosevelt was making it clear that support for China as a matter of democratic solidarity was also coupled with the more practical assessment of defeating the Japanese.

Roosevelt’s observations regarding the constitutive nature of the material and the discursive are worth noting here. In describing the Japanese threat he touched on the manner in which material circumstances affected discursive constructions of space. He observed that “the broad oceans which have been heralded in the past as our protection from attack have become endless battlefields on which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies”.⁶⁵⁰ The Pacific has in the past been romantically constituted as a space of inevitable US expansion and commercial success where now it was understood as a site of military contestation, a source of insecurity rather than security.⁶⁵¹

Roosevelt would also begin to outline one of the longer term US interests in China when he reflected on China’s significance in the war and to the US more broadly. In a fireside chat on April 28th 1942, he declared, “we remember that the Chinese people were the first to stand up and fight against the aggressors in this war; and in the future a still unconquerable China will play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity, not only in eastern Asia but in the whole world”.⁶⁵² In this sense, Roosevelt envisioned a China that would help maintain the international system regionally and globally. China was then to feature in the US’s geopolitical imagination as a joint administrator of capitalism and the geopolitical configurations that sustained it. China was no longer something to merely exploit through the logic of capital, but was becoming constructed as a necessary condition for the reproduction of the logic of capital and of the logic of geopolitics. This was also conditioned by the logic of identity in US foreign policy as Roosevelt had framed US support for China as standing on the foundation of democratic solidarity.

In a joint press conference with Winston Churchill at Casablanca on January 24th 1943, Roosevelt remarked that they had “agreed on giving all possible aid to the heroic struggle of China—remembering that China is in her sixth year of the war—with the objective, not only

⁶⁴⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat," February 23, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16224>.

⁶⁵⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat," February 23, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16224>.

⁶⁵¹ See Footnote 101 on page 31.

⁶⁵² Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat.," April 28, 1942. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16252>.

in China but in the whole of the Pacific area, of ending any Japanese attempt in the future to dominate the Far East".⁶⁵³ China was to become the geopolitical foundation of US interest in Asia. These concerns were captured during one of Roosevelt's press conferences with Madame Chiang Kai-Shek on February 19th 1943. He remarked that "her visit to us is going to be of real help in the days to come, because the people of China well over a century have been, in thought and in objective, closer to us Americans than almost any other peoples in the world—the same great ideals".⁶⁵⁴ It was the logic of identity, reflected in the concern for ideals that underpinned Roosevelt's vision for China. He continued, declaring, "China, in the last—less than half a century has become one of the great democracies of the world, remembering always that their civilization is thousands of years older than ours. And that is why I feel that we in this country have a great deal more to learn about China than China has to learn about us".⁶⁵⁵ It was democratic kinship in Roosevelt's words that characterised the bond between the US and China.

This sentiment, and the necessity of war in the Asia Pacific underpinned Roosevelt's push to repeal the Chinese exclusion laws passed around the end of the 19th century. In a message to Congress on October 11th 1943, Roosevelt declared, "China is our ally. For many years she stood alone in the fight against aggression. Today we fight at her side. She has continued her gallant struggle against very great odds... China's resistance does not depend alone on guns and planes and on attacks on land, on the sea, and from the air. It is based as much in the spirit of her people and her faith in her allies".⁶⁵⁶ The construction of affinity between the US and China was again performed through the logic of identity. In a rare acknowledgement of a mistake for the US, Roosevelt remarked, "nations, like individuals, make mistakes. We must be big enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and to correct them. By the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda. It would be additional proof that we regard China not only as a partner

⁶⁵³ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Joint Press Conference with Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca," January 24, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16408>.

⁶⁵⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Joint Press Conference with Mme. Chiang Kai-shek," February 19, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16366>.

⁶⁵⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Joint Press Conference with Mme. Chiang Kai-shek," February 19, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16366>.

⁶⁵⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws.," October 11, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16325>.

in waging war but that we shall regard her as a partner in days of peace".⁶⁵⁷ Roosevelt positioned China as more than a necessary and conditional ally, by setting out his hope for a more permanent era of cooperation rendered through the logic of identity.

In a radio broadcast on December 24th 1943, Roosevelt made clear that "essential to all peace and security in the Pacific and in the rest of the world is the permanent elimination of the Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression".⁶⁵⁸ This was to be achieved with the help of Chiang-Kai-Shek's China. Roosevelt publically celebrated Chiang describing how he had "met in the Generalissimo a man of great vision, great courage, and a remarkably keen understanding of the problems of today and tomorrow...I believe I can say that he returned to Chungking with the positive assurance of total victory over our common enemy".⁶⁵⁹ As a case where Chiang was seen to embody all of Roosevelt's hopes for China, Roosevelt declared "today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship and in unity of purpose".⁶⁶⁰ For now, the US and China, imagined through the logic of identity, were allies.

Roosevelt also spoke at length about the broader aspects of US foreign policy. He declared, in what is now a common refrain in US foreign policy that "the doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it. But, at the same time, we are agreed that if force is necessary to keep international peace, international force will be applied for as long as it may be necessary".⁶⁶¹ Military force was for Roosevelt an undesirable yet justifiable practice for the US when acting to maintain the international system. Roosevelt also returned to his thoughts on the US's understanding of its geographical position was changing. He considered that "through [the US's] early history the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were believed to be walls of safety for the United States. Time and distance made it physically possible, for example, for us and for the other American Republics to obtain and

⁶⁵⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Message to Congress on Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws.," October 11, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16325>.

⁶⁵⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat.," December 24, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16356>.

⁶⁵⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat.," December 24, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16356>.

⁶⁶⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat.," December 24, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16356>.

⁶⁶¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat.," December 24, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16356>.

maintain our independence against infinitely stronger powers".⁶⁶² The rise of Japan, so to speak, had changed affected the specific configuration of the logic of geopolitics in US imaginations of Asia.

On May 20th 1944 when announcing his Vice-President Wallace's trip to China, Roosevelt declared, "Eastern Asia will play a very important part in the future history of the world. Forces are being unleashed there which are of the utmost importance to our future peace and prosperity".⁶⁶³ Roosevelt was covering familiar discursive ground here as he increasingly emphasised the importance of Asia to the US's future. Like arguments presented by McKinley and others at the turn of the century, the US's concern with Asia was rendered through the logics of capital and geopolitics and based as much on what China might become as its present importance.

Roosevelt described the geopolitical conditions necessary for the US to defeat Japan and after, maintain its interests in Asia. In a radio address on August 12th 1944, he spoke of Hawaii's geopolitical significance to US foreign policy. He remarked, "the Hawaiian Islands are no longer a mere outpost. They constitute a major base from which, and from the Pacific coast, frontline operations are being conducted twice as far away as the distance between the coast and Hawaii itself. The Hawaiian Islands have helped to make possible the victories at Guadalcanal and New Guinea and the Marshalls and the Marianas". Their present significance constituted the geopolitical conditions for US war aims in Asia. He continued, "the Islands will make possible future operations in China will make possible the recapture and independence of the Philippines and make possible the carrying of war into the home islands of Japan itself and their capital city of Tokyo".⁶⁶⁴ Although he was here focusing on immediate war aims, his arguments reveal the geopolitical necessities for US foreign policy goals to occur. The US desire for expanding its territory was limited though. As he commented elsewhere in the same address, "everybody in Siberia and China knows that we have no ambition to acquire land on the Asiatic continent" it is "natural and proper for us to think of the economic and the commercial future. It is logical that we should foresee great

⁶⁶² Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Fireside Chat.," December 24, 1943. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16356>.

⁶⁶³ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Statement Announcing Vice-President Wallace's Mission to China.," May 20, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16511>.

⁶⁶⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Radio Address from Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington.," August 12, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16543>.

interchange of commerce between our shores and those of Siberia and China".⁶⁶⁵ There was essentially a geopolitical threshold to facilitate the conditions for economic exchange to occur. In this sense the logic of geopolitics has been complimentary to the logic of capital, if not mostly determined by it.

In a statement on the landing of American troops in the Philippines on October 20th 1944 Roosevelt declared, "we promised to return, we have returned".⁶⁶⁶ The Philippines had proved a significant aspect of US imaginations of Asia, in more explicit rendering of the logic of identity, Roosevelt state that "the United States promised to help build a new Nation in the Pacific, a Nation whose ideals, like our own, were liberty and equality and the democratic way of life a Nation which in a very short time would join the friendly family of Nations on equal terms".⁶⁶⁷ This aim though had immediate geopolitical consequences as he declared "we shall strangle the Black Dragon of Japanese militarism forever".⁶⁶⁸ The point worth mentioning here is that although it is possible to describe US foreign policy to Asia in broad terms, there were significant differences with regards to specific countries. China was more often than not visualised through the logic of capital and during Roosevelt's Presidency, the logic of identity. The Philippines held geopolitical significance for the US but this significance was more emphatically constructed through the logic of identity where the Philippines represented an example of altruistic US democracy promotion, despite its obvious colonial aspects.⁶⁶⁹

In his last State of the Union address on January 6th 1945, Roosevelt touched on the broader aspects of his foreign policy. He reflected on how "nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any Nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue. In the future world the misuse of power, as implied in the term "power politics," must not be a controlling factor in

⁶⁶⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Radio Address from Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Washington.," August 12, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16543>.

⁶⁶⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Statement on the Landing of American Troops in the Philippines.," October 20, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16582>.

⁶⁶⁷ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Statement on the Landing of American Troops in the Philippines.," October 20, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16582>.

⁶⁶⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Statement on the Landing of American Troops in the Philippines.," October 20, 1944. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16582>.

⁶⁶⁹ Go and Forster (eds), *The American Colonial State in the Philippines*.

international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed".⁶⁷⁰ What Roosevelt is indicating here is the notion that there are limits to state power. He elaborated on this further with the claim that "we cannot deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world, as in a democratic Nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good".⁶⁷¹ In this sense, the logic of capital and the logic of geopolitics were limited by the logic of identity. If the logic of capital produced expansionary tendencies that manifested themselves through the logic of geopolitics, then they were both conditioned by the logic of identity. What becomes increasingly apparent under Roosevelt is the on going evolution and refinement of the logics which I located in the US's early encounters with China. Essentially, the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics converge here to condition how the US imagined China.

Roosevelt was hopeful here that "the atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and determination to find a common ground of common understanding, which surrounded the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed".⁶⁷² He was describing the negotiations between Allied powers attempting to establish the United Nations out of the existing wartime alliance.⁶⁷³ He nevertheless emphasised though that for the US, "we support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce".⁶⁷⁴ In his designs for a world security system, it would become evident that China held a prominent position in this vision with regards to the management of that system in Asia. This would become towards the end of the 20th century a particular important feature of the logic of geopolitics in US imaginations of China.

In a press conference on route to Yalta on February 23rd 1945, Roosevelt discussed the complexities of colonialism in South East Asia. Recalling a conversation with China's Chiang, he remarked,

⁶⁷⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "State of the Union Address.," January 6, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16595>.

⁶⁷¹ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "State of the Union Address.," January 6, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16595>.

⁶⁷² Franklin D. Roosevelt: "State of the Union Address.," January 6, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16595>.

⁶⁷³ Mark Mazower, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (USA: Princeton University Press, 2013), Dan Plesch, *America, Hitler and the UN* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

⁶⁷⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "State of the Union Address.," January 6, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16595>.

“The first thing I asked Chiang was, ‘Do you want IndoChina?’ He said, ‘It’s no help to us. We don’t want it. They are not Chinese. They would not assimilate into the Chinese people’. I said, ‘What are you going to advocate? It will take a long time to educate them for self-government’. He said they should not go back to the French, that they have been there over a hundred years and have done nothing about educating them, that for every dollar they have put in, they have taken out ten, and that the situation there is a good deal like the Philippines were in 1898”.⁶⁷⁵

As significant as the conversation regarding the future of the colonies in Asia, Roosevelt was engaging with China as potential partner in the future of Asia, rather than as a state to be organised explicitly by US foreign policy. He continued, “With the Indo-Chinese, there is a feeling they ought to be independent but are not ready for it. I suggested at the time, to Chiang, that Indo-China be set up under a trusteeship have a Frenchman, one or two Indo-Chinese, and a Chinese and a Russian because they are on the coast, and maybe a Filipino and an American— to educate them for self-government”.⁶⁷⁶ Evident in these remarks though is the colonial trope that the Vietnamese were incapable of self- rule, though importantly for the present argument, China was implied to be on the US side of the equation.

6.3 Truman, Trauma and the ‘Loss of China’

Harry Truman’s Presidency covers the most ‘traumatic’ period of US relations with China from the US perspective. From the hope of a united democratic China when he became President, Truman presided over what critics called the ‘Loss of China’ to Communism.⁶⁷⁷ Significantly Truman marks the period when the US publically developed two China policies to cope with the defeated Nationalists fleeing to the island of Taiwan. The focus of this research is very much on US presidential discourses of China, though I do make reference to the US’s Taiwan policy by way of documenting an ever present tension in US China relations.

In his statement on the 34th anniversary of the Chinese Republic on October 10th 1945, Truman commented amicably on China’s contribution to the Allied victory in WWII. He made reference to “the tremendous sacrifices which the Chinese people made for so long in their stirring and effective resistance to the Japanese invader have finally been rewarded in complete victory over the enemy, and the American people take pride in the decisive role

⁶⁷⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference Aboard the U.S.S. Quincy En Route From Yalta," February 23, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16589>.

⁶⁷⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference Aboard the U.S.S. Quincy En Route From Yalta," February 23, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16589>.

⁶⁷⁷ Purifoy, *Harry Truman’s China Policy*.

played by our gallant ally in this titanic struggle for world freedom”.⁶⁷⁸ As Roosevelt had made clear, China at this time was very much an ally. Truman though was also acutely aware of the issues facing China despite the defeat of Japan, he observed that “China now faces the urgent problems of reconstruction of her devastated nation a task which will require all of the inspired leadership and full cooperation of the Chinese people which have been so evident during these years of desperate struggle for survival and without which Japan's savage aims of aggression might have succeeded”.⁶⁷⁹ This was significant as the following comment made clear that this reconstruction was going to take the form of a democracy, “on behalf of the American people I take pleasure in reaffirming our abiding faith in the ability of the Chinese nation to accomplish the democratic objectives established for it by Dr. Sun Yatsen and in pledging our assistance and support to the attainment of this end”.⁶⁸⁰ This continues the approach taken by Roosevelt but also draws a historical lineage to the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1912. China was understood through a projection of the logic of identity as being on a similar democratic trajectory to that of the US.

In an address on foreign policy in New York City on October 27th 1945, Truman set out his broad approach on US foreign policy at the time. He commented that the US has “assured the world time and again and I repeat it now that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power”.⁶⁸¹ The significance of this qualifying comment should not be undervalued. The US was not interested in the territorial empires that dominated the world up until WWII but was explicitly interested in securing what is now described as an ‘archipelago of bases’.⁶⁸² Although seen in the broader perspective of US concerns for economic and commercial exchange, Truman made explicit reference to the geopolitical aspects of US foreign policy, in full he argued that there were four principal tasks motivating the US’s geopolitical thought:

⁶⁷⁸ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President on the 34th Anniversary of the Chinese Republic.," October 10, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12315>.

⁶⁷⁹ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President on the 34th Anniversary of the Chinese Republic.," October 10, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12315>.

⁶⁸⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President on the 34th Anniversary of the Chinese Republic.," October 10, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12315>.

⁶⁸¹ Harry S. Truman: "Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City.," October 27, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12304>.

⁶⁸² Mark Selden, ‘String of Pearls: The Archipelago of Bases, Military Colonization, and the Making of the American Empire in the Pacific’, *International journal of Okinawan studies* 3(2012): 45-61.

“First, our Army, Navy, and Air Force, in collaboration with our allies, must enforce the terms of peace imposed upon our defeated enemies. Second, we must fulfil the military obligations which we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization to support a lasting peace, by force if necessary. Third, we must cooperate with other American nations to preserve the territorial integrity and the political independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, in this troubled and uncertain world, our military forces must be adequate to discharge the fundamental mission laid upon them by the Constitution of the United States to ‘provide for the common defence’ of the United States. These four military tasks are directed not toward war not toward conquest but toward peace”.⁶⁸³

These amounted to securing some semblance of geopolitical stability. Truman expanded on these by articulating 12 principles of US foreign policy, 4 of which are pertinent to the discussion here. The first three consisted of affirmation that the US did not desire any territorial expansion, self-determination and that admittance to the international system would enable equal access to trade. Truman stated that “we seek no territorial expansion...we believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them...we believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world”.⁶⁸⁴ One of the more fundamental principles was the US belief “that full economic collaboration between all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the world”.⁶⁸⁵ Here, the logic of capital begins to contain a globalising imperative that compels the US to establish economic access to the world rather than just specific regions.

In a statement regarding US foreign policy towards China, on December 15th 1945, Truman emphasised the US’s main goal where it was “the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world peace”.⁶⁸⁶ The US had important goals for China, and it was apparent that these were becoming increasingly important to the US’s broader goals in Asia. Truman would accentuate how “a China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an

⁶⁸³ Harry S. Truman: "Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City.," October 27, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12304>.

⁶⁸⁴ Harry S. Truman: "Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City.," October 27, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12304>

⁶⁸⁵ Harry S. Truman: "Address on Foreign Policy at the Navy Day Celebration in New York City.," October 27, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12304>.

⁶⁸⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 15, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12261>.

undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future".⁶⁸⁷ He made it clear that the US desired the unification of China whereby it "and the other United Nations have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified China".⁶⁸⁸ For Truman, a unified China had to be a democratic China. And this was necessary to the reproduction of an international system designed to facilitate international commerce. Reflecting the policies of Taft in his desire to use US capital to develop China while increasing US economic access Truman declared that the US "would be prepared to give favourable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States".⁶⁸⁹ Although it appeared that Truman was primarily invoking the logics of identity and geopolitics, the logic of capital remained fundamental to US interests in China.

Truman would summarise his policy towards Asia and China specifically in his 1946 State of the Union message. He remarked, "our basic policy in the Far East is to encourage the development of a strong, independent, united and democratic China. That has been the traditional policy of the United States".⁶⁹⁰ Truman here is implying that US foreign policy towards China is partially legitimised by its longevity, its status as tradition. More broadly Truman articulated the significance of the logic of capital in US foreign policy, remarking that "the foreign economic policy of the United States is designed to promote our own prosperity, and at the same time to aid in the restoration and expansion of world markets and to contribute thereby to world peace and world security".⁶⁹¹ There is a slight inversion here as Truman indicates that the expansion of markets will produce conditions more favourable to

⁶⁸⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 15, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12261>.

⁶⁸⁸ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 15, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12261>.

⁶⁸⁹ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 15, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12261>.

⁶⁹⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947," January 21, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12467>.

⁶⁹¹ Harry S. Truman: "Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947," January 21, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12467>.

peace despite previous statements that peace and stability would facilitate the expansion of international commerce and markets.

In an address in Chicago on army day on April 6th 1946, Truman celebrated the role of the US army while reflecting on the tension between particular foreign policy concerns and more general, universal ones. Truman trumped the armies prowess declaring that “our Army has written many glorious chapters in the Nation's history, but none so brilliant as the last. Its story in this war has been written in every corner of the globe on the continent of Europe; in the wastes of the Arctic; over the vast expanse of the Pacific...It is a glorious history of men against the forces of nature as well as against the forces of evil”.⁶⁹² He would also declare “we still have to protect and preserve American property all over the world”.⁶⁹³ The logic of capital thus, remained fundamental to US foreign policy concerns.

Truman would articulate the new global arrangement and perspective in US foreign policy. He made it clear that the US “must have a policy to guide our relations with every country in every part of the world. No country is so remote from us that it may not some day be involved in a matter which threatens the peace”.⁶⁹⁴ The logic of geopolitics now had a fully global dimension. Truman justified this by invoking recent historical examples, “remember that the First World War began in Serbia; that the peace of Versailles was first broken in Manchuria; and that the Second World War began in Poland. Who knows what may happen in the future? Our foreign policy must be universal”.⁶⁹⁵ The US could no longer focus on particular regions as it had done so historically. US foreign policy was now effectively organised on a global scale of which China policy was a smaller part.

In Asia, Truman touched on the material conditions of possibility that the US was interested in establishing. He declared that “in the Far East our program for peace is designed to combat and remedy the conditions that made it possible for Japan to turn upon her neighbours”.⁶⁹⁶

Truman was attempting to create the discursive space to affect material conditions in Asia. He also maintained a promising outlook on China, describing how the US was “supporting a free

⁶⁹² Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

⁶⁹³ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

⁶⁹⁴ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

⁶⁹⁵ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

⁶⁹⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

and democratic government. Through the wise counsel of General Marshall the Chinese leaders are on the road to achieve political unity by peaceful and democratic processes”.⁶⁹⁷ Truman had dispatched General George Marshall to attempt to establish peace between the Nationalist and Communist forces, a mission that ultimately failed even if it had some short-term success.⁶⁹⁸ Truman would make it clear that democracy and peace could be required economic stability and expansion. He argued, “the roots of democracy...will not draw much nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic distress. It is a part of our strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabilitation and development of the Far Eastern countries. We seek to encourage a quick revival of economic activity and international trade in the Far East”.⁶⁹⁹ The US thus sought to establish the conditions under which the logic of capital could function unhindered by geopolitical instability.

In a statement on US policy towards China made on December 18th, 1946, Truman again restated his support for unified and democratic China. He remarked that “a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace, that a broadening of the base of the National Government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China's progress toward this goal, and that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace”.⁷⁰⁰ Making it clear where the US stood in the reignited civil war, Truman stated, “we recognized the National Government of the Republic of China as the legal government”. US plans for an interim, coalition government were put under pressure as General Marshall “pointed out that these agreements could not be satisfactorily implemented and given substance unless China's economic disintegration were checked and particularly unless the transportation system could be put in working order. Political unity could not be built on economic chaos”.⁷⁰¹ This explained the US desire to establish economic stability in China. Truman located China’s significance through the logic of geopolitics on a global scale where

⁶⁹⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

⁶⁹⁸ Steven Levine, ‘A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria’, *Diplomatic History* 3 (1979): 349-376.

⁶⁹⁹ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Chicago on Army Day.," April 6, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12625>.

⁷⁰⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 18, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12562>.

⁷⁰¹ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 18, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12562>.

China was necessary for “world peace”, and China’s economic stability was a necessary foundation for this.

In a case of a rhetorical sleight of hand, Truman declared, “China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the Government will find a peaceful solution. We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China”.⁷⁰² Truman was attempting to position the US as a neutral observer with regards to Chinese sovereignty, despite the on-going aid to the Nationalists. As shown above, Truman aimed to assist in the establishment of a unified democratic China, as opposed to a Communist lead China. His following statement thus appeared to soften the US position even as he remarked, “our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country”.⁷⁰³ Missing from this statement was the previous emphasis on democratic ideals with a noticeable concern for the logic of capital.

While describing the Marshall Plan on December 19th 1947, the US’s loan based economic recovery plan for Europe, Truman declared that “the United States has taken the lead in worldwide efforts to promote industrial and agricultural reconstruction and a revival of world commerce”.⁷⁰⁴ This concern with the logic of capital was based on the premise that “we know that enduring peace must be based upon increased production and an expanding flow of goods and materials among nations for the benefit of all”.⁷⁰⁵ Truman was now positioning the US as the necessary protagonist in securing the global conditions of possibility for the social and political reproduction of the international system. The three logics I describe featured in a larger need to secure the conditions for the perpetuation of the international political and economic system as Truman saw it.

Truman made the case to Congress for economic assistance to China on February 18th 1948. He invoked a history of amity between the US and China when he spoke of “a genuine

⁷⁰² Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 18, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12562>.

⁷⁰³ Harry S. Truman: "Statement by the President: United States Policy Toward China.," December 18, 1946. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12562>.

⁷⁰⁴ Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan.," December 19, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12805>.

⁷⁰⁵ Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on the Marshall Plan.," December 19, 1947. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12805>.

friendship has existed between the American people and the people of China over many years. This friendship has been accompanied by a long record of commercial and cultural association and close cooperation between our two countries. Americans have developed a deep respect for the Chinese people and sympathy for the many trials and difficulties which they have endured".⁷⁰⁶ Identity and capital thus underpinned the US imagination of China as an ally. In broader geopolitical terms, Truman would state that the US:

"has long recognized the importance of a stable Chinese nation to lasting peace in the Pacific and the entire world. The vast size and population of China make her an important factor in world affairs. China is a land with rich tradition and culture and a large and energetic population. It has always been our desire to see a strong progressive China making a full contribution to the strength of the family of nations".⁷⁰⁷

As Truman was now making clear, the US understood China as a fundamental feature of the future of the international system. This was in jeopardy though as Truman would also depict how "the continued deterioration of the Chinese economy is a source of deep concern to the United States".⁷⁰⁸ US concern for China was in many ways framed through the logic of identity through the use of terms like progressive and democratic, but was motivated by the logics of capital and geopolitics when it came to describing the necessity of China's involvement in securing the international system.

Speaking in Wyoming on May 9th 1950, Truman would articulate what I have described as the US geopolitical imagination. He began by reflecting on the significance of the Western frontier, "the West exerts a strong influence on the imagination of all of us of all Americans, in fact. The stirring drama of the opening of the West is a part of our national folklore. And there isn't a thing like it in the history of the world anywhere".⁷⁰⁹ This opening and the invocation of an exceptionalism, featured significantly in the US's early 20th century desire to expand into foreign markets. Reflecting on the manner in which conceptions of space and distance informed a sense of isolation Truman continued, "it is a tradition that the West is a country of great distances and of isolated communities... That tradition has left a deep impression on all Americans... the notion that many of us once held in the United States, that

⁷⁰⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on the Need for Assistance to China.," February 18, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13107>.

⁷⁰⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on the Need for Assistance to China.," February 18, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13107>.

⁷⁰⁸ Harry S. Truman: "Special Message to the Congress on the Need for Assistance to China.," February 18, 1948. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13107>.

⁷⁰⁹ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming.," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

the United States was a vast distance away from foreign neighbours that our Nation was an isolated community separated by days of travel from the other communities on the globe”.⁷¹⁰ Now though, as Truman would remonstrate, “you know how the West has shrunk. Distances seem to have been wiped out by a network of railroads and highways, and now by the huge airliners”.⁷¹¹ Changing material circumstances though, were creating the conditions for a new US conception of its place in the world. It is also notable, how Truman made use of a domestically focused discourse regarding the West, to explain the basis for a US foreign policy of isolationism.

Truman would from here, begin to elaborate the change in the US’s imagination of itself within international politics. He stated that “the first reason I have already mentioned the elimination of distances. Where once we could ignore a far off tyranny, there no longer are far off places on this earth. Today, everybody on the globe is our neighbour”.⁷¹² As observed previously, US foreign policy now had an explicitly global orientation. In a juxtaposition of Communism to US democratic identity Truman described how “Communism has clearly shown its purpose to penetrate free countries, to divide free peoples and confuse them, to subvert their institutions, and to weaken their resistance...we cannot compromise our own moral or ethical beliefs...Communism denies all that we have come to know as democracy”.⁷¹³ Communism was portrayed as rejection of US democratic beliefs. Challenging the historical discourse of isolationism, Truman responded by demanding that “we cannot isolate ourselves... We cannot compromise our principles. We cannot withdraw from the world”.⁷¹⁴ Most importantly, this imperative was articulated through the logic of identity, “the free world must demonstrate moral superiority. It must demonstrate material superiority”.⁷¹⁵ For Truman, rendering US foreign policy through the logic of identity, it was the US’s moral superiority that was at stake.

⁷¹⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹¹ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹² Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹³ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹⁴ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹⁵ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

It is here that Truman turned to the aftermath of the Chinese Communist's victory in 1949. Observing how "since the Chinese National Government disintegrated and the Chinese Communists seized control on the mainland, the plight of hundreds of millions of Chinese has been tragic. Their new taskmasters have been heartlessly indifferent to the worst famine which has occurred in China in 100 years".⁷¹⁶ The Chinese communists were portrayed as "taskmasters" and "heartlessly indifferent" towards their own citizens. These representations functioned through the logic of identity where China was the morally vacant 'other' to the morally superior US. Significant though is the manner in which geopolitical concerns were expressed through the logic of identity.

More broadly, Truman would remark that "in Asia, and in the rest of the world, we are trying to do far more than to bring relief to people who are in want... This is of great importance, because there can never be political stability and peace unless there is a reasonable degree of economic stability and prosperity".⁷¹⁷ For Truman the US's "world economic policies are aimed at breaking down the barriers to world trade. We believe that a high level of trade can raise standards of living in our own country and in every other country in the world".⁷¹⁸ As such, US "economic policies are also aimed at increasing the international flow of investment capital. The industrial growth of underdeveloped areas will mean more production, better markets, and a stronger world economy".⁷¹⁹ The logic of capital was to underpin the logic of geopolitics in this line of argument.

In a statement on December 8th 1950 after a discussion with British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, the US adopted the basis for what would become its public policy on Taiwan for the rest of the century. The US and Britain agreed that "on the question of Formosa... we agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends".⁷²⁰

⁷¹⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹⁸ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷¹⁹ Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming,," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478>.

⁷²⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Joint Statement Following Discussions With the Prime Minister of Great Britain,," December 8, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13681>.

The logic of geopolitics and the requisite need for geopolitical stability took priority over any partisan concern for who should constitute the legitimate 'one' China.

On April 11th 1951, Truman discussed Korea and US Far East policy in a radio report, alluding to his clash with General Douglas MacArthur over Korean War policy. He considered why the US had not been more aggressive towards to China, "you may ask why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?"⁷²¹ These options, proposed by MacArthur were seen as highly dangerous to US interests in Asia. Truman clarified his position that "if we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent. If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world".⁷²² Reflecting on the geopolitical tensions of the Cold War, Truman asked rhetorically "what would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full scale war with Red China?"⁷²³ The US now had to take into account what the USSR's interests might have been when considering how to act towards China. This reflected how the at times depending on the broader regional or global context, the logic of geopolitics became more prominent in US discourses of China.

In a speech entitled "the Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy published on November 19th, 1951, then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk set out the guiding rationale for US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. Arguing for the need to elaborate ideas as well as courses of action Rusk called for US leadership "in the field of ideas, to explain the meaning of American policy, the reality of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the mockery of the hollow promises of communist agents, the nature of the threat which communist imperialism poses against the newly won freedom and independence of the new nations of

⁷²¹ Harry S. Truman: "Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East.," April 11, 1951. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14059>.

⁷²² Harry S. Truman: "Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East.," April 11, 1951. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14059>.

⁷²³ Harry S. Truman: "Radio Report to the American People on Korea and on U.S. Policy in the Far East.," April 11, 1951. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14059>.

Asia”.⁷²⁴ It was up to the US in Rusk’s terms to articulate the integrity of US ideals and beliefs in the face of a “hollow” communism in Asia. Rusk remarked that “underlying [US] policy to the Far East [was] the persistence of a historical sympathy between the American people and their friends across the Pacific”.⁷²⁵ Rusk here is drawing upon the historical narratives about the US being a Pacific power, reflecting the logic of identity where it is friendship between the US and the countries of Asia that guides US policy. And for Rusk it was vital to effectively shape the discourse around US interests in Asia.

In an address at the Oakland Auditorium October 4th 1952, Truman ruminated over the failed US effort to secure a democratic China. He described it as the “the one tragic exception” to US aid programs.⁷²⁶ The US had “sent over \$2 billion worth of economic and military aid to China, but in spite of this, the Chinese Government was unable to marshal its resources or lead its people successfully. We helped China, but China proved unable to help herself”.⁷²⁷ Again, China proved a demonstration of the limits of US foreign policy as Truman remarked that “except for China, the free nations, with our aid, have held the line throughout the rest of the world”.⁷²⁸ This was not just the limits of US material capability and discursive authority, but the limits of the US imagination in constructing China. There was significant internal debate over who the US should ultimately support in the Chinese civil war and it was the anti-communist influence that proved successful despite much expert analysis that suggested the US would be better positioned in Asia by supporting the communists. This debate took place during the Roosevelt administration but only now were its consequences becoming apparent.⁷²⁹

The Communist invasion of South Korean and the commencement of the Korean War for Truman represented a battle over the nature of the international order. He described it as “the great and crucial test...this was the great challenge. If the Communists could get away with this, no other international boundary would be safe... We have held the dike of international

⁷²⁴ The Department of State, *The Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy by Dean Rusk* (Department of State Bulletin: Washington DC, November 19th 1951): 822.

⁷²⁵ The Department of State, *The Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy by Dean Rusk* (Department of State Bulletin: Washington DC, November 19th 1951): 823.

⁷²⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Address in the Oakland Auditorium.," October 4, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14282>.

⁷²⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Address in the Oakland Auditorium.," October 4, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14282>.

⁷²⁸ Harry S. Truman: "Address in the Oakland Auditorium.," October 4, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14282>.

⁷²⁹ Richard Bernstein, *China 1945: Mao's Revolution and America's Fateful Choice* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

order at the point where the flood of aggression threatened to burst through”.⁷³⁰ China’s support for North Korea during the conflict positioned itself as a direct threat to the international system the US wished to defend. This marked the inversion from China as ally during WWII to China as an enemy, a conclusion derived from the three logics of capital, geopolitics and identity.

At an address at Naval War College December 19th 1952, Truman effectively demonstrated the constitutive relationship between domestic and foreign policy as outlined by Hansen and other poststructuralists. Worth quoting extensively here, he stated that:

“our national policy is not simply our foreign policy or our military policy or our domestic policy. It is a combination of all three. The international domestic policies which a nation follows are the foundations of its foreign policy. Unless the domestic policy is sound, you can’t have a foreign policy; and its military policy also is based on the soundness of the domestic policy. What we can do and ought to do abroad depends upon the kind of nation we are at home”.⁷³¹

This captures the basis of how the logic of capital and the logic of identity emanate from domestic origins and concerns outward into the world. Truman’s reflections on the importance of the Western frontier in US history also suggests then, that the logic of geopolitics originated in a more local, though not necessarily domestic context, during the US colonial expansion across the North American continent. Although this thesis is not primarily concerned with the overall origins of these logics or their sources, this is a theme worth mentioning here and consider for further research.

Truman also captured here a sense of anxiety following WWII. He remarked how “at the end of World War II, the people of the United States were anxious to return to peaceful concerns. We wanted to forget about the problems of national security and national defence. We were, indeed, too eager to do this, and, in our hasty demobilization, we impatiently threw away a great deal of what we needed”.⁷³² US anxiety about its possible role in the world, or from the perspective of the executive, its necessary role in the world, led it to miscalculate immediate political developments after the war. Truman drew attention to the then, emerging conflict with the USSR, “that nation that former ally set out to expand its own power by taking advantage of the weariness and yearning for peace that were prevalent throughout the world

⁷³⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Address in the Oakland Auditorium.," October 4, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14282>.

⁷³¹ Harry S. Truman: "Address at the National War College.," December 19, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14366>.

⁷³² Harry S. Truman: "Address at the National War College.," December 19, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14366>.

in the chaotic aftermath of World War II. This threat was global”.⁷³³ He again reflected on limits of US power in China where “in this great world struggle there have been some burdens we could not undertake because our resources are not unlimited. China was one of those”.⁷³⁴ The US’s understanding of the Communist success in China was clear. The US’s understanding of the emerging conflict with the USSR and China was rendered through the logic of geopolitics, even if it was the features of the logic of identity and capital that distinguished the opposing sides.

Truman implored that “no one think that this administration underestimates the effects of the Communist victory in China. We know that the capture of the great Chinese people by a clique of ruthless Communist fanatics was a tragic loss to the cause of peace and progress in Asia and elsewhere. We hope it will not be an irrevocable loss”.⁷³⁵ The Chinese were now in the US imagination, “ruthless” “fanatics”, outside the international system whose name the US acted in. This rumination on the limits of US geopolitical abilities was explicitly put in Truman’s response to his critics, “they forget that our power is not unlimited and that we cannot commit ourselves everywhere”.⁷³⁶ The logic of geopolitics in this regard was also conditioned by the perception of material capability.

In his 1953 State of the Union address on January 7th, Truman invoked the historical trope of the US’s founding to legitimise its current foreign policy. He recalled how “we in this Republic were and are free men, heirs of the American Revolution, dedicated to the truths of our Declaration of Independence: ‘... That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights...That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed’”.⁷³⁷ This is, in essence, the fundamental narrative fulcrum of US identity. Truman established the contemporary linkage remarking that “our post-war objective has been in keeping with this great idea”. He also wanted to make it clear that the US did not desire an empire; it “did not

⁷³³ Harry S. Truman: "Address at the National War College.," December 19, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14366>.

⁷³⁴ Harry S. Truman: "Address at the National War College.," December 19, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14366>.

⁷³⁵ Harry S. Truman: "Address at the National War College.," December 19, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14366>.

⁷³⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Address at the National War College.," December 19, 1952. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14366>.

⁷³⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

want satellites but partners”.⁷³⁸ Conversely “the Soviet Union, however, took exactly the opposite course”.⁷³⁹ Invoking the logic of identity, Truman remarked, “our whole moral position, our leadership in the free world today, is fortified by that fact. Truman lay the blame for the Cold War with Soviet expansion, “the world is divided, not through our fault or failure, but by Soviet design. They, not we, began the Cold War”.⁷⁴⁰ He described the USSR and China as an economic threat to the US as they constituted a “vast land mass contains an enormous store of natural resources sufficient to support an economic development comparable to our own”.⁷⁴¹ The USSR and China were thus perceived through the convergence of the logics of capital and of geopolitics.

Truman painted the Communist bloc as:

“a world of great manmade uniformities, a world that bleeds its population white to build huge military forces; a world in which the police are everywhere and their authority unlimited; a world where terror and slavery are deliberately administered both as instruments of government and as means of production; a world where all effective social power is the state's monopoly yet the state itself is the creature of the communist tyrants”.⁷⁴²

China was categorised with the USSR as being led by tyrants. Truman also invoked the uncivilised trope present through more historical discourses of US foreign policy declaring, “the Soviet Union, with its satellites, and China are held in the tight grip of communist party chieftains”.⁷⁴³ Truman described the Communist threat in vivid terms as “the time when the whole world outside their sway will be so torn by strife and contradictions that it will be ripe for the communist plucking”. The opportunistic basis of this threat was “the heart of the distorted Marxist interpretation of history. This is the glass through which Moscow and [Beijing] look out upon the world, the glass through which they see the rest of us. They seem really to believe that history is on their side. And they are trying to boost "history" along, at

⁷³⁸ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷³⁹ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴⁰ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴¹ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴² Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴³ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

every opportunity, in every way they can".⁷⁴⁴ Truman was implying, with no sense of irony, that the Communist claim to embodying historical inevitability was preposterous. Here, Truman was deploying the logic of identity to locate the Chinese Communists as distinctly 'other' to the US and subsequently the broader 'Western' world.

Truman made it clear that he saw China as a victim of this grand Communist distortion. Not dissimilar from China's victimisation at the end of the 19th century by the now, disintegrating colonial empires. He observed how "in the Far East, the tactics of communist imperialism have reached heights of violence unmatched elsewhere and the problem of concerted action by the free nations has been at once more acute and more difficult. Here, in spite of outside aid and support, the free government of China succumbed to the communist assault".⁷⁴⁵

Despite this, Truman demanded that the US "must go on, working with our free associates, building an international structure for military defence, and for economic, social, and political progress".⁷⁴⁶ For Truman, the international structure he had been determined to build, following Roosevelt, was to be comprised of democracies and facilitated by capitalist based processes of exchange and commerce. Truman had described the need for a universal basis of US foreign policy, as a response to US's perceived pre-eminence. China, he had hoped was to be a fundamental administrator of that international structure.

In his reflections on nuclear technology, Truman set out the epistemological basis of the rational universalism that reflected US approaches to the world. He claimed that "the language of science is universal, the movement of science is always forward into the unknown".⁷⁴⁷ In this light, US foreign policy was increasingly constituted through increasingly universal and expansionist logic of capital and a logic of identity premised on universal values, where it became necessary to systematise the world through a logic of geopolitics to facilitate the imperatives of the previous two logics.

⁷⁴⁴ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴⁵ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴⁶ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

⁷⁴⁷ Harry S. Truman: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 7, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14379>.

6.4 Eisenhower and Alienation

In his first State of the Union address on February 2nd 1953, Dwight Eisenhower attempted to define a new foreign policy vision for the US. Implicitly distancing himself from the policies of his predecessor, he remarked, “we have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension, leaving forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself. This administration has, therefore, begun the definition of a new, positive foreign policy”.⁷⁴⁸ Remaining though, was the global focus of US foreign policy, “the policy we embrace must be a coherent global policy”.⁷⁴⁹ Eisenhower was dedicated to making “the free world secure”.⁷⁵⁰ He also maintained that the US would continue to “recognise the importance of profitable and equitable world trade”.⁷⁵¹ In what looks like a reformulation of Taft’s dollar diplomacy, Eisenhower declared that the US would be “doing whatever Government properly can to encourage the flow of private American investment abroad. This involves, as a serious and explicit purpose of our foreign policy, the encouragement of a hospitable climate for such investment in foreign nations”.⁷⁵² The logic of capital remained prominent, despite his broad statements regarding a new vision. He would touch on this a year later when he claimed, “the American economy is one of the wonders of the world. It undergirds our international position, our military security, and the standard of living of every citizen”.⁷⁵³ The logic of capital then captures the manner in which the domestic US economy was constitutively related to US foreign economic policy.

On the issue of Formosa, or Taiwan as it is now more known, Eisenhower reflected on what he saw as the inconsistencies of Truman’s approach to China. He was concerned with how,

⁷⁴⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁴⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵³ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 7, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10096>.

following the outbreak of the Korean War, the US Seventh Fleet had been “instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland. This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China”.⁷⁵⁴ Eisenhower was frustrated by the unwillingness of the China to negotiate a settlement to the issue and stated that “consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists, thus permitting those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea”.⁷⁵⁵ The logic Eisenhower was referring to was premised on the hope that the China and Taiwan, would be able to come to kind of peace settlement. Eisenhower though was ignoring the previous administration’s belief that the US needed to prevent the spread of the conflict beyond Korea, though he argued that “the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. This order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea”.⁷⁵⁶

In his 1954 State of the Union message to Congress, Eisenhower declared, “American freedom is threatened so long as the world Communist conspiracy exists in its present scope, power, and hostility”.⁷⁵⁷ The Communist threat was existential in other words. In describing a security pact with the Republic of Korea he invoked the US “security system for the Pacific”.⁷⁵⁸ This security system was in many ways targeted at China. He described how the US “shall also continue military and economic aid to the Nationalist Government of China. In South Asia, profound changes are taking place in free nations which are demonstrating their ability to progress through democratic methods. They provide an inspiring contrast to the

⁷⁵⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," February 2, 1953. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9829>.

⁷⁵⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 7, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10096>.

⁷⁵⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 7, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10096>.

dictatorial methods and backward course of events in Communist China".⁷⁵⁹ US foreign policy towards Asia, was now very much rendered through the logic of geopolitics and orientated around the threat, or potential of what China might become or do.

In a special message to Congress on March 30th 1954, Eisenhower spoke at length on the priorities of US foreign economic policy. He remarked "the national interest in the field of foreign economic policy is clear. It is to obtain, in a manner that is consistent with our national security and profitable and equitable for all, the highest possible level of trade and the most efficient use of capital and resources".⁷⁶⁰ This was not significantly different from Taft's priorities. Now though, the benefits would not just accrue to the US but to its allies as well as Eisenhower indicated, "that this would also strengthen our military allies adds urgency. Their strength is of critical importance to the security of our country".⁷⁶¹ Eisenhower would also articulate the need for trade expansion to accommodate US surpluses. He made it clear that "the United States stands ready and able to produce and sell more than the rest of the world can buy from us. The inability of many foreign countries to buy our goods in the volume we would like to sell does not arise from any lack of desire for these goods. Such is far from the case. Instead it arises out of an inability of these nations to pay in dollars for the volume we have to sell".⁷⁶² The logic of capital has since Polk, Grant and Cleveland been organised around the search for foreign consumers and investment opportunities but now Eisenhower was making an explicit link between the need to secure the reproduction of US capital to material security of the US and its allies.

Eisenhower indicated that to overcome the lack of foreign demand that "dollar grants are no lasting solution to this impasse. The solution is a higher level of two-way trade. Thus we can sell and receive payment for our exports and have an increasing volume of investment abroad

⁷⁵⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 7, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10096>.

⁷⁶⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

⁷⁶¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

⁷⁶² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

to assist economic development overseas and yield returns to us".⁷⁶³ The aim of the logic of capital then was now to establish the conditions for "greater freedom from restrictions and controls and the increased efficiencies which arise from expanding markets and the freer play of economic forces are essential to the attainment of this higher trade level".⁷⁶⁴ The domestic and international were now discursively linked as being symbiotically necessary to each others reproduction, indicated by Eisenhower's remarks that "an increased flow of United States investment abroad could contribute significantly to the needed expansion of international trade. It also could help maintain a high level of economic activity and employment in the United States".⁷⁶⁵ This comment embodies the central feature of the logic of capital that unites US 'domestic' concerns with its 'foreign' policy interests.

Eisenhower captured the essence of the Taft's dollar diplomacy and the contemporary manifestation of the logic of capital when he claimed that "further to encourage the flow of private investment abroad, we shall give full diplomatic support, through our activities here and through our missions and representatives in the field, to the acceptance and understanding by other nations of the prerequisites for the attraction of private foreign investment".⁷⁶⁶

Eisenhower also reflected the continuity in US foreign economic thought when he argued, "for our own economic growth we must have continuously expanding world markets; for our security we require that our allies become economically strong. Expanding trade is the only adequate solution for these two pressing problems confronting our country".⁷⁶⁷ The logic of capital exhibited how continuous economic growth and the search for foreign markets were fundamental to maintaining the conditions for US way of life to continue.

Eisenhower returned to the issue of the defence of the Taiwan and the island of Formosa on January 24th 1955. The US "recognized that it was important that these islands should remain in friendly hands. In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate

⁷⁶³ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

⁷⁶⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

⁷⁶⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

⁷⁶⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

⁷⁶⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Economic Policy.," March 30, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10195>.

the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends".⁷⁶⁸ To Eisenhower, the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics were vital in maintaining peace in the Asia Pacific. He argued that were Formosa to be invaded by China, this "would create a breach in the island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes, for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that Ocean. In addition, this breach would interrupt North South communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly to us".⁷⁶⁹ This "backbone" and "security structure" amounted to the basis of the policy of containment where the US sought to deter the spread of Communism.

In a speech on US security policy in Asia on April 20th 1955, Eisenhower outlined the major features of Asia in the US imagination. He argued that "the immediate threats to world security and stability are now centred in Asia... Within the vast arc of free Asia, which extends from the Republic of Korea and Japan to the Middle East, 770 million people... most of them are citizens of newly independent states. Some have been engaged in recent war against the Communists. All are threatened".⁷⁷⁰ Eisenhower was outlining what should be considered the original China threat thesis. China now constituted the predominant threat to US interests and values in Asia. Eisenhower described how that "capital is very scarce... now is the time for accelerated development of the nations along the arc. The major responsibility must necessarily lie with the countries themselves. At best, foreign capital as well as foreign aid can only launch or stimulate the process of creating dynamic economies".⁷⁷¹ The logic of capital in US foreign policy then featured the need to use US economic support to facilitate the "accelerated development" of countries threatened by the China. The logic of capital was thus closely intertwined with the logic of geopolitics as the US felt an obligation to its allies, and was also concerned with the need for political stability.

⁷⁶⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress Regarding United States Policy for the Defense of Formosa.," January 24, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10355>.

⁷⁶⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress Regarding United States Policy for the Defense of Formosa.," January 24, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10355>.

⁷⁷⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program.," April 20, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10456>.

⁷⁷¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program.," April 20, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10456>.

To this end “the United States has the capacity, the desire, the concern to take the lead in friendly help for free Asia. For example, we can assist in providing and mobilizing capital for useful and constructive development. We can encourage our successful private industry to join with the people of free Asia in building their private industry and facilitate the way”.⁷⁷² In this manner, Eisenhower captured the sense of obligation motivating US foreign policy. This was necessary, as he put it, because the US “economy cannot be strong and continue to expand without the development of healthy economic conditions in other free nations, and without a continuous expansion of international trade”.⁷⁷³ The conditions for this continuous expansion of trade required that the US act to contain the potential military expansion of China in Asia as they saw it. Again, the logics of geopolitics, and of capital converge.

Two years later on May 21st 1957, Eisenhower again reflected on the need for mutual security in securing peace, declaring that US “safety depends upon recognition of the fact that the Communist design for such encirclement must be stopped before it gains momentum before it is again too late to save the peace”.⁷⁷⁴ The communist threat, including the USSR and China, was constructed through a discourse of geopolitics. This invoked the logics of geopolitics and of identity as Eisenhower warned that “wherever moderate government disappears, Communist extremists will extend their brand of despotic imperialism”.⁷⁷⁵ Eisenhower explicitly captured the how the logic of identity functioned in US foreign policy arguing that foreign policy “reflects our own national character. We are stirred not only by calculations of self-interest but also by decent regard for the needs and the hopes of all our fellowmen. I am proud of this fact, as you are. None of us would wish it to be otherwise. This is not mere sentimentality. This is the very nature of America realistically understood and applied”.⁷⁷⁶ Invoking the logic of identity here, Eisenhower indicated that how the US understood itself was fundamental to how it acted. Despite the prominence afforded to the logic of capital and

⁷⁷² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program.," April 20, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10456>.

⁷⁷³ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on the Mutual Security Program.," April 20, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10456>.

⁷⁷⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Need for Mutual Security in Waging the Peace.," May 21, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11042>.

⁷⁷⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Need for Mutual Security in Waging the Peace.," May 21, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11042>.

⁷⁷⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Need for Mutual Security in Waging the Peace.," May 21, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11042>.

the logic of geopolitics, it was the logic of identity in this case that conditioned the limits to their rendering in practice.

In a speech on June 28th 1957, Secretary of State John Dulles outlined US policy towards Communism in China. Touching on the discursive significance of recognition he observed how “diplomatic recognition is always a privilege, never a right. Of course, the United States recognizes that the Chinese Communist regime exists, we well know that it exists...but diplomatic recognition gives the recognized regime valuable rights and privileges”.⁷⁷⁷ Dulles situated China as a state outside of the civilised world stating “internationally the Chinese Communist regime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to its international obligations; has not been peaceful in the past, and gives no evidence of being peaceful in the future”.⁷⁷⁸ While making clear the US intention to influence the passing of Communism in China Dulles also signified the potential of US foreign policy adjusting to the international context when he remarked that “our policies are readily adjustable to meet the requirements of changing questions”.⁷⁷⁹ The logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics can in this regard be reconfigured depending on changes in material circumstances.

In a speech at the National Press Club on January 14th 1959, Eisenhower spoke explicitly about a China “problem”. In response to a question from the press corps that asked “do you consider Red China a potentially greater threat to the free world than Russia?” Eisenhower responded by stating he did not “believe in the measurable time, that on this you could make a really worthwhile conclusion or prediction. There is no question that the leaders of Red China are determined, by methods with which we are all familiar, to become an industrial power, which means that behind it, so far as we can see, they want to be a big military power, and they are going at that just as hard as they can”.⁷⁸⁰ Eisenhower encapsulated how the US thought of China when he remarked that, “we have indeed got a bleak problem that must be

⁷⁷⁷ “Address by the Secretary of State, San Francisco, June 28, 1957, 10:30 a.m.”, *Department of State Office of the Historian* (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v03/d268>, 10/1/2017).

⁷⁷⁸ “Address by the Secretary of State, San Francisco, June 28, 1957, 10:30 a.m.”, *Department of State Office of the Historian* (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v03/d268>, 10/1/2017).

⁷⁷⁹ “Address by the Secretary of State, San Francisco, June 28, 1957, 10:30 a.m.”, *Department of State Office of the Historian* (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v03/d268>, 10/1/2017).

⁷⁸⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Remarks and Discussion at the National Press Club.," January 14, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11696>.

solved”.⁷⁸¹ This marks the explicit problematising of China through all three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics, as something to be solved in presidential discourses.

At a speech commemorating the Presidency of Abraham Lincoln, Eisenhower drew a comparison between the democratic ideals espoused by Lincoln, and the once future potential for a democratic China. He described how “the first President of modern China, Sun Yatsen, found his three basic principles of government in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address”.⁷⁸² Implicit in this, was the lost democratic potential of China, an aspiration that featured prominently in Franklins Roosevelt and Truman’s discourses. China had at a time then, and still at present been understood through the logic of identity, where it was on the trajectory to become increasingly similar to the US.

In a speech on the “importance of understanding” on April 4th 1959, Eisenhower set out some of the broader US concerns in Asia. He elaborated on how “for Vietnam's economic growth, the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary”. He used this to position China as a tyrannical other to the US considering that the Vietnamese could “create the capital needed for growth by stealing from the already meagre rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work battalions. This enslavement is the commune system adopted by the new overlords of Red China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile outside action whatsoever”.⁷⁸³ China then, was characterised by its lack of freedom in the US sense. This need to assist the Vietnamese was constricted on the basis of the concern regarding the expansionist “overlords of Red China”. While discussing the US economic relationship with Japan, Eisenhower indicated the need to balance imports and exports in light of domestic manufacturing and US security interests in Asia. He stated that “quite naturally we must guard against a flooding of our own markets by goods, made in other countries, to the point where our own industries would dry up...we too must export in order to buy, and we must buy if we are to sell our surpluses abroad. Moreover, unless Japan's exports to us are at least maintained at approximately their present levels, we would risk the free world stake in

⁷⁸¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Remarks and Discussion at the National Press Club.," January 14, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11696>.

⁷⁸² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Remarks at the National Lincoln Sesquicentennial Dinner.," February 11, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11612>.

⁷⁸³ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address at the Gettysburg College Convocation: The Importance of Understanding.," April 4, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11698>.

the whole Pacific”.⁷⁸⁴ Trade with Japan then, was necessary to the security of the countries bordering the Pacific. The logic of capital then, also accounted for the domestic consequences of international trade.

At a mass rally in Taipei June 18th 1960, Eisenhower deployed the logic of identity to signify solidarity between the US and Taiwan. He declared that “we Americans are in a very real sense your close neighbours: we look out with you upon the same ocean the Pacific. This largest of oceans has been narrowed by the marvels of modern communication and transportation. No longer is it a formidable barrier separating America from the Nations of the Far East”.⁷⁸⁵ The narrowing of geographical space in the US imagination due to technological and material developments affected how the logic of geopolitics functioned in US conceptions of the Pacific Ocean. Rather than a barrier, it appeared more as a conduit Asia. Eisenhower restated the US’s anti-colonial stance remarking that “though the United States provides assistance to the nations of the Pacific Region, many of them recently emerged from Colonial status, we have not sought to impose upon them our own way of life or system of government. We respect their sovereignty as we do our own”. Invoking the logic of identity he declared that “to do otherwise would be a betrayal of America's own traditions. Our purpose is to help protect the right of our neighbours of the Pacific to develop in accordance with their own National aspirations and their own traditions”.⁷⁸⁶ In specific reference to the China’s claim to the Chinese UN seat Eisenhower outlined how “the United States does not of course recognize the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in [Beijing]”.⁷⁸⁷ The uncivilised construction of China, as perceived through the logic of identity located China outside of the traditional, civilised space of international order governed by US foreign policy.

During a toast in honour of Chiang Kai-Shek during that same day, Eisenhower drew on the historical narratives that saw Chiang as embodying the democratic spirit championed by the logic of identity. He celebrated how “for a third of a century, president Chiang has played a decisive role in the shaping of relations between our two countries. He first won America's

⁷⁸⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address at the Gettysburg College Convocation: The Importance of Understanding.," April 4, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11698>.

⁷⁸⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address at a Mass Rally in Taipei.," June 18, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11832>.

⁷⁸⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address at a Mass Rally in Taipei.," June 18, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11832>.

⁷⁸⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Address at a Mass Rally in Taipei.," June 18, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11832>.

admiration and respect as a brilliant young revolutionary leader who unified China in a series of masterly campaigns".⁷⁸⁸ Chiang was positioned within the same revolutionary tradition the US saw itself as embodying. Eisenhower could thus declare that Chiang "set it on the road to becoming a modern democratic nation. He further deepened our respect and earned our gratitude by his indomitable leadership of our great far Eastern ally in the Second World War".⁷⁸⁹ In this sense, the logic of identity shaped how the US recalled Chiang's China before the communist victory in 1949 as being one of similar virtuous nature.

Speaking to the American people about his Far East trip on June 27th 1960, Eisenhower reminded the US of how in the early 1950s "China and its half billion people had been lost to the free World. The war in Korea, then in condition of stalemate, still dragged on".⁷⁹⁰ He attempted to disassociate the US from accepting responsibility for this as he argued "we in the United States must not fall into the error of blaming ourselves for what the Communists do; after all, Communists will act like Communists".⁷⁹¹ Drawing upon the logic of geopolitics he outlined how the success of the Communists on mainland China necessitated increased US cooperation with the other countries in Asia. Eisenhower described how "since the loss of mainland China to the Communists in 1949, the need to link the other nations of the Far East with the United States more strongly, in their mutual interest, should be apparent to all".⁷⁹² This need was premised on the geopolitical imperatives of containing China as "the other free countries of the Far East, small in relation to the massive area and immense population of Red China, can survive in freedom and flourish only in cooperative association with the United States and a free Japan".⁷⁹³ The US sense of obligation to assist other 'free' countries in the

⁷⁸⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Toast by the President at a Dinner Given in His Honor by President Chiang Kai-shek.," June 18, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11833>.

⁷⁸⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Toast by the President at a Dinner Given in His Honor by President Chiang Kai-shek.," June 18, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11833>.

⁷⁹⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Trip to the far East.," June 27, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11850>.

⁷⁹¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Trip to the far East.," June 27, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11850>.

⁷⁹² Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Trip to the far East.," June 27, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11850>.

⁷⁹³ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Trip to the far East.," June 27, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11850>.

face of potential Chinese tyranny was coupled with the geopolitical need to contain China reflecting the increasingly inseparable logics of geopolitics and identity.

Eisenhower's discursive rendering of the China problem in his final State of the Union address on January 12th 1961 located China as outside the space of respectable geopolitical behaviour. He stated how the US "has continued to withhold recognition of Communist China and to oppose vigorously the admission of this belligerent and unrepentant nation in the United Nations. Red China has yet to demonstrate that it deserves to be considered a 'peace-loving' nation".⁷⁹⁴ China in Eisenhower's discourse, and the US imagination more broadly, had still not met what amounted to the criteria for civilised behaviour.

In the following section I analyse the Presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson together due to similarities in their discourse of China and the manner in which Johnson expanded on several tenets of Kennedy's imaginations of China.

6.5 Kennedy, Johnson and the Opening for Nixon

In the second presidential debate, as the democratic candidate, against Richard Nixon on October 21st 1960 Kennedy observed the potential benefits for the US of a Sino-Soviet split: "Secondly, the relations between Russia and China. They are now engaged in a debate over whether war is the means of Communising the world or whether they should use subversion, infiltration, economic struggles and all the rest. No one can say what that course of action will be, but I think the next president of the United States should watch it carefully".⁷⁹⁵ In distinction to Eisenhower's discourses of China, Kennedy did not see China as an inevitable ally of the USSR. This understanding was to function as important discursive opening for the initial considerations of reconciliation between the US and China, which would culminate, poetically, in Nixon's rapprochement with China.

In his first State of the Union address on January 30th 1961, Kennedy outlined how "the American economy is in trouble. The most resourceful industrialized country on earth ranks among the last in the rate of economic growth".⁷⁹⁶ The US's domestic economic conditions

⁷⁹⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 12, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12074>.

⁷⁹⁵ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate in New York," October 21, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29403>.

⁷⁹⁶ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 30, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8045>.

were again, a problem.⁷⁹⁷ As previously recognised by Cleveland and Taft, the logic of capital, furnished by imminent economic issues in the US would again influence its foreign policy towards China. Turning to Asia, Kennedy described how “the relentless pressures of the Chinese Communists menace the security of the entire area from the borders of India and South Viet Nam to the jungles of Laos, struggling to protect its newly won independence”.⁷⁹⁸ Kennedy would emphasise how the US needed to focus on countries other than the USSR and China and to do so, “we must improve our economic tools. Our role is essential and unavoidable in the construction of a sound and expanding economy for the entire noncommunist world”.⁷⁹⁹ The US contribution to the world in this light was presented through the logic of capital.

Speaking in Paris on June 2nd 1961, Kennedy commented on the potential for normalisation between the US and China. Reflecting on the possibility for the normalisation of relations between China and the Kennedy remarked that “we desire peace and we desire to live in amity with the Chinese people”.⁸⁰⁰ Although cautious, Kennedy left open the space for normalisation when he reflected on how “the debate which took place last fall between Communist parties indicated that the Chinese planned to take an extremely belligerent attitude and role towards us and those with whom we are associated”. Despite this frustration he claimed, “we hope that policy changes. We want good will. But it takes two to make peace, and I am hopeful that the Chinese will be persuaded that a peaceful existence with its neighbors represents the best hope for us all. We would welcome it. But I do not see evidence of it today”.⁸⁰¹ This is not to say that Kennedy was relentlessly naïve in his approach as he

⁷⁹⁷ Kennedy would describe these issues in more detail” “It is true that, since 1958, the gap between the dollars we spend or invest abroad and the dollars returned to us has substantially widened. This overall deficit in our balance of payments increased by nearly \$11 billion in the 3 years and holders of dollars abroad converted them to gold in such a quantity as to cause a total outflow of nearly \$5 billion of gold from our reserve. The 1959 deficit was caused in large part by the failure of our exports to penetrate foreign markets the result both of restrictions on our goods and our own uncompetitive prices. The 1960 deficit, on the other hand, was more the result of an increase in private capital outflow seeking new opportunity, higher return or speculative advantage abroad”.

⁷⁹⁸ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 30, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8045>.

⁷⁹⁹ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 30, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8045>.

⁸⁰⁰ John F. Kennedy: "Remarks and Question and Answer Period at the Press Luncheon in Paris," June 2, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8170>.

⁸⁰¹ John F. Kennedy: "Remarks and Question and Answer Period at the Press Luncheon in Paris," June 2, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8170>.

made it clear while speaking in New York on December 14th 1962. He recalled how “we have been digging our way out of the loss of China for the last 12 years, and my successor in office may have to deal with the problem of a China which is carrying out an expansionary policy with nuclear weapons and missiles”.⁸⁰² The ‘problem’ of China remained very much in this sense, constructed through the logic of geopolitics.

In his 1963 State of the Union address Kennedy attempted to position the US as explicitly anti-colonial and on the side of freedom in juxtaposition to the USSR and China. He claimed that the nonaligned states “were shocked by the Soviets' sudden and secret attempt to transform Cuba into a nuclear striking base and by Communist China's arrogant invasion of India”.⁸⁰³ Reflecting on the broader global trends, he remarked that “as the older colonialism recedes, and the neocolonialism of the Communist powers stands out more starkly than ever, they realize more clearly that the issue in the world struggle is not communism versus capitalism, but coercion versus free choice”.⁸⁰⁴ The logic of capital, and its dependency on the system of capitalism, was articulated through the logic of identity where the US embodied freedom and choice.

In his comments on the emerging dispute between the USSR and China, Kennedy again tried to present the Cold War as a social issue rather than an economic one. He argued that “the Soviet Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends” and that “a dispute over how best to bury the free world is no grounds for Western rejoicing”.⁸⁰⁵ Despite this observation, Kennedy argued it was “clear that the forces of diversity are at work inside the Communist camp, despite all the iron disciplines of regimentation and all the iron dogmatism's of ideology”. This discursive piercing of the supposed Sino-Soviet front, constituted Kennedy’s championing of the logic of identity as juxtaposing the US to its Cold War adversaries. He elaborated on this thought claiming that “Marx is proven wrong once again: for it is the closed Communist societies, not the free and open societies which carry within themselves the seeds

⁸⁰² John F. Kennedy: "Address and Question and Answer Period at the Economic Club of New York.," December 14, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9057>.

⁸⁰³ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 14, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138>.

⁸⁰⁴ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 14, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138>.

⁸⁰⁵ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 14, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138>.

of internal disintegration”.⁸⁰⁶ Ultimately for Kennedy “the disarray of the Communist empire has been heightened by two other formidable forces”, nationalism and the desire for freedom were one. The second force argued by Kennedy, in a statement capturing the linking of the logic of capital and the logic of identity in US foreign policy discourses, was “the gross inefficiency of their economies. For a closed society is not open to ideas of progress and a police state finds that it cannot command the grain to grow”.⁸⁰⁷ The logic of identity was here considered by Kennedy to establish the conditions where the logic of capital could function most efficiently.

In a message to Congress on April 2nd 1963, regarding US international assistance programs, Kennedy argued that US military economic assistance to countries in Asia had enabled threatened peoples to stay free and independent, when they otherwise would have either been overrun by aggressive communist power or fallen victim of utter chaos, poverty and despair”.⁸⁰⁸ Kennedy described how “Free Asia [was] responding resolutely to the political, economic and military challenge of Communist China's relentless efforts to dominate the continent”.⁸⁰⁹ This made clear the main US goal in Asia of preventing the expansion and influence of China. He would also outline a number of recommendations for US foreign policy going forward, “including stricter criteria on aid, reduce the need for US assistance, securing more international support for providing aid, defend countries under threat from communism and lastly “to increase the role of private investment and other non-Federal resources in assisting developing nations”.⁸¹⁰ If China constituted a geopolitical threat regarding the territorial security of Asian states, Kennedy maintained that the use of US capital could be used to facilitate the economic development of other Asian states.

Kennedy’s assassination would leave the Presidency in the hands of Lyndon Johnson who would go on to expand Kennedy’s reasoning towards Asia more broadly, and China

⁸⁰⁶ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 14, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138>.

⁸⁰⁷ John F. Kennedy: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 14, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9138>.

⁸⁰⁸ John F. Kennedy: "Special Message to the Congress on Free World Defense and Assistance Programs.," April 2, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9136>.

⁸⁰⁹ John F. Kennedy: "Special Message to the Congress on Free World Defense and Assistance Programs.," April 2, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9136>.

⁸¹⁰ John F. Kennedy: "Special Message to the Congress on Free World Defense and Assistance Programs.," April 2, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9136>.

specifically. Johnson though would prove to be one of the more forthright presidents in his articulation and justification of US foreign policy. For the purpose of this argument, Kennedy's discourses regarding China functioned as creating the immediate conditions in which Johnson's foreign policy towards China emerged from.

In a speech on foreign affairs in New York City on April 20th 1964, Johnson spoke at length on US foreign policy. He argued that "the unity of communism is being eroded by the insistent forces of nationalism and diverging interest. A whole new group of societies is painfully struggling toward the modern world".⁸¹¹ With that in mind Johnson's comments would outline almost explicitly how the logics I discuss shape US foreign policy. Johnson argued that the US's

"basic principles are adequate to this shifting world. But foreign policy is more than just a set of general principles. It is the changing application of those principles to specific dangers and to specific opportunities. It involves knowledge of strengths and awareness of limitations in each new situation".⁸¹²

Johnson here captures the constitutive relationship between the logics I describe, or in his case "general principles", and US foreign policy practices within the material world. The logics have evolved through the various Presidencies, but how they are rendered in practice, or in response to a particular situation are immanently contextual. How, and why this is the case, are issues I consider in what I acknowledge is a relatively superficial manner, but the motivation of this thesis is to describe these general principles as they became legible in relation to US foreign policy towards China. The three logics I describe through this genealogy are not necessarily the only logics at work in US foreign policy generally, but my argument is that they are the most dominant in US imaginations of China. Johnson also reflects the arguments presented by Chengxin Pan regarding the binary of opportunity and threat in US imaginations of China. This binary though, often fails to capture the complete spectrum of US foreign policy interests especially in relation to China. The logics I describe, at times do not always render the world in terms of danger or opportunity, leaving space for thought beyond this binary.

⁸¹¹ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press Luncheon in New York City.," April 20, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26168>.

⁸¹² Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press Luncheon in New York City.," April 20, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26168>.

Johnson, like some of his predecessors invoked the US's early encounters with Asia to legitimize his policy. He described how "the first American diplomatic mission to the far East was instructed to inform all countries 'we will never make conquests, or ask any nation to let us establish ourselves in their countries'. That was our policy in 1832. That is our policy in 1964...if we have desired no conquest for ourselves, we have also steadfastly opposed it for others. The independence of Asian nations is a link in our own freedom".⁸¹³ US foreign policy was now increasingly being increasingly articulated through the logic of identity.

Turning to China, Johnson's position was that "so long as the Communist Chinese pursue aggression, so long as the Communist Chinese preach violence, there can be and will be no easing of relationships. There are some who prophesy that these policies will change. But America must base her acts on present realities and not on future hopes. It is not we who must reexamine our view of China. It is the Chinese Communists who must reexamine their view of the world".⁸¹⁴ China then, needed to accommodate itself to the US understanding of international politics. The logics of US foreign policy then were not so much partial approaches to the world, but the for the US captured the fundamental essence of international politics which other states needed to adhere to.

In his statement on the first Chinese nuclear device on October 16th 1964, Johnson implied the reckless nature of China, commenting, "scarce economic resources which could have been used to improve the wellbeing of the Chinese people have been used to produce a crude nuclear device which can only increase the sense of insecurity of the Chinese people".⁸¹⁵ Johnson would later imply China was an irresponsible state, a comment that would become increasingly pertinent in the US understanding of China. To Johnson, China's "nuclear pretensions are both expensive and cruel to its people...It shocks us by its readiness to pollute the atmosphere with fallout... Communist China's expensive and demanding effort tempts

⁸¹³ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press Luncheon in New York City.," April 20, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26168>.

⁸¹⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the Associated Press Luncheon in New York City.," April 20, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26168>.

⁸¹⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device," October 16, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26615>.

other states to equal folly”.⁸¹⁶ China was subsequently judged via the logic of identity to be a reckless and irresponsible state.

In a speech entitled “Peace Without Conquest” at Johns Hopkins University on April 7th 1965, Johnson attempted to justify US policy in the Vietnamese war as being indicative of US concern about China. He argued that “over this war and all Asia is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by [Beijing]. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent”.⁸¹⁷ US policy towards Vietnam then, was part of a broader concern about China in Asia, and the USSR more globally. Johnson argued that “the contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes...we are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe”.⁸¹⁸ These events signified that “this will be a disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations”.⁸¹⁹ Johnson here described US foreign policy in terms of the logic of geopolitics where “world order” was at stake. Evident here, is the slow decline of explicit reference to the logic of capital. US foreign policy was no longer imagining the world in terms of outlets for US capital, but in terms of a geopolitical struggle over territory and influence, a shift that was articulated most forcefully by Eisenhower.

Johnson, commenting on US interests in Vietnam, declared, “there is nothing that we want in Communist China. There is nothing the American people want from Communist China”.⁸²⁰ This constituted a direct consequence to Roosevelt’s hopes that China would become a joint administrator of the international system. In a speech on US Asia Policy on July 12th 1966, Johnson would argue that the primary motivation of US foreign policy towards Asia was “to

⁸¹⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Radio and Television Report to the American People on Recent Events in Russia, China, and Great Britain.," October 18, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26627>.

⁸¹⁷ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest.," April 7, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877>.

⁸¹⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest.," April 7, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877>.

⁸¹⁹ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest.," April 7, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877>.

⁸²⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson: ""Two Threats to World Peace" - Remarks in Omaha on the Occasion of the Sending of the Five-Millionth Ton of Grain to India," June 30, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27695>.

meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power”.⁸²¹ In response to the criticism that the US has little economic or, security or social interest in Asia, Johnson declared that these “do not stand the test of geography because we are bounded not by one, but by two oceans. And whether by aircraft or ship, by satellite or missile, the Pacific is as crossable as the Atlantic. They do not stand the test of commonsense”.⁸²² US involvement in Asian affairs then was justified as a form of commonsense. Claiming this as commonsense functioned to conceal the contingency, history and motivations that underpinned US interests in Asia. This common sense is what I try to capture through my argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics in how the US imagined China.

In response to critiques of US expansionist folly, Johnson argued that “they do not stand the test of reality, either. Asia is no longer sitting outside the door of the 20th century. She is here in the same world with all of us to be either our partner or our problem. Americans entered this century believing that our own security had no foundation outside our own continent. Twice we mistook our sheltered position for safety. Twice we were dead wrong”.⁸²³ In specific relation to China and its importance to US interests in Asia, “a peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia. A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation. For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of Mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world”.⁸²⁴ To Johnson, China was the major determining factor of conditions in Asia and US foreign policy towards Asia. It was also not just the US’s understanding of its Pacific identity, but the logic of geopolitics compelled the US to secure the international foundations of its security.

In important remarks regarding US attempts to restart relations with China through people to people contacts, Johnson foreshadowed the opening to towards China which was to become Nixon’s signature achievement. Johnson described how:

⁸²¹ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy.," July 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27710>.

⁸²² Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy.," July 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27710>.

⁸²³ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy.," July 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27710>.

⁸²⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy.," July 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27710>.

“for many years, now, the United States has attempted in vain to persuade the Chinese Communists to agree to an exchange of newsmen as one of the first steps to increased understanding between our people. More recently, we have taken steps to permit American scholars, experts in medicine and public health, and other specialists to travel to Communist China. And only today we, here in the Government, cleared a passport for a leading American businessman to exchange knowledge with Chinese mainland leaders in Red China. All of these initiatives, except the action today, have been rejected by Communist China”.⁸²⁵

If the US was attempting to knock at the door it had forced open in the 19th century, in the name of security in Asia, China was currently not interested.

Johnson would return to the theme of the US as a Pacific power and speculating on its future significance recalling how “as our great President Theodore Roosevelt once remarked this may be the greatest of all human eras the Pacific era. As a Pacific power we must help achieve that outcome”.⁸²⁶ Speaking in Hawaii on October 16th 1966, Johnson captured the variety of reasons that the West had been interested in Asia:

“In centuries past, men of the West went to Asia for many reasons. Some made the long ocean trek in search of wealth. Others went as the agents of governments that wanted colonial possessions. Still others went to teach; to treat the sick; to spread the gospel; to aid the farmer; to help build factories; to advise officials; to translate Western works of literature and technology”.⁸²⁷

This wide recollection of past Western interests reflects the broader variety of logics that shaped how Asia and China specifically were imagined in the US. In a rare moment of public reflection on Western colonial practices, Johnson reflected on how “through colonialism and by other means the West intruded its then superior power into the East. And, of course, there was a reaction”.⁸²⁸ This is by no means an inaccurate understanding of how the Chinese Communist party has recalled this same history, but more importantly for my concern here, reflected the prevailing emphasis on the logic of identity as conditioning presidential discourse on China.⁸²⁹

Johnson posed a series of reflective and critical questions of US foreign policy in Asia during his speech in Hawaii, which are worth recalling in full here:

⁸²⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy.," July 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27710>.

⁸²⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy.," July 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27710>.

⁸²⁷ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

⁸²⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

⁸²⁹ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); William Callahan, *China: The Pessimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

“How well have we understood the complex causes of conflict in the Pacific's time of troubles? How well have we understood the feelings and the aspirations of Asia's peoples during the century of turbulence? How well have we understood the impact of West upon East of Western arms, industry, and ideas upon Venerable Asian cultures? How well have we understood the course of revolution in Asia? How well have we understood the shocks as well as the benefits that modernization can bring to developing societies? How well have we understood the shifting tides of nationalism in all its forms? Well, in almost three decades of elective office I have had to answer these questions for myself”.⁸³⁰

Indicating the limitations of his own perspective, Johnson responded that “for two decades I answered them as one who conceived America's destiny almost entirely in relation to Europe”.⁸³¹ In a statement pertinent to contemporary US debates over China, Johnson observed that “there are still those who cannot understand the Pacific's role in America's future... Only by answering these questions with candor can we build solid foundations for our future relations with Asia. Only then can we really understand the depth of the desire in Asia for independence, for modernization, and for dignity. American policy toward Asia today must be the policy of an open mind”.⁸³² In no uncertain terms this was a very public display of candor that reflected the limitations of the three logics the US had so far imagined China through. It was this discursive openness that created the conditions for Johnson's remarks concerning the issue of reconciliation with China.

Johnson explained how the US “think[s] sooner or later this new perception will spread as well to the closed societies of Communist Asia. Sooner or later the pragmatic and compassionate spirit of the Chinese people will prevail over outmoded dogmatism. We in America look to that day with hope and with confidence. For our part, we shall do what we can to hasten its coming. We shall keep alive the hope for a freer flow of ideas and people between mainland China and the United States”.⁸³³ Johnson's rhetoric here marks a return to the hope evident Franklin Roosevelt's discourses regarding China. Johnson continued, stating how it was “only through such exchange can isolation be ended and suspicion give way to trust. We do not believe in eternal enmity. All hatred among nations must ultimately end in reconciliation. We hopefully look to the day when the policies of Mainland China will offer

⁸³⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

⁸³¹ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

⁸³² Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

⁸³³ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

and will permit such a reconciliation”.⁸³⁴ Effectively Johnson was invoking the logics of identity and capital when he spoke of “freer flow of ideas and people” but he was also alluding to what might be described as a logic of social interaction that falls outside the three logics I describe, even if this was motivated by the economic, geopolitical and identity narratives I have described up until now.

In a television interview on December 19th 1967, when discussing the prospects for reconciliation with China Johnson described how he has “said to them in several public statements that we hope that they can conduct themselves in such a way as will permit them to join the family of nations and that we can learn to live in harmony with each other”.⁸³⁵ Johnson would capture in the next statement, the ambiguity and apparent opaqueness of China in the US imagination. He contemplated openly that:

“We don't know all that we would like to know about what is going on in China. It is a rather closed society and we don't have all the information that we would like to have. But we are hopeful and we believe that over a period of time, that the opportunity exists for them to gain a better understanding of the other peoples of the world and thus be able to live more harmoniously with them”.⁸³⁶

The US under Johnson and primarily through the logic of identity was very much in this case, leaving the door open for reconciliation.

6.6 Conclusion

What occurs during the period this chapter covers is the more globalised orientation of US foreign policy. Roosevelt envisioned a China that would help maintain the international system regionally and globally. China was to feature more prominently in the US understanding as a potential joint administrator of capitalism and the geopolitical configurations that sustained it in Asia. Importantly, both Roosevelt and Truman had understood China through the logic of identity, where it was on the trajectory to become a democratic state in the mould of the US itself. This aspiration was to essentially disappear under Eisenhower in the aftermath of the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war.

⁸³⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Remarks at the East-West Center in Honolulu.," October 18, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27941>.

⁸³⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson: ""A Conversation With the President," Joint Interview for Use by Television Networks," December 19, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28621>.

⁸³⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson: ""A Conversation With the President," Joint Interview for Use by Television Networks," December 19, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28621>.

China though, as imagined by Roosevelt and Truman was no longer something to merely exploit through the logic of capital, but was becoming constructed as a necessary participant to creating the conditions for the interests and reproduction of the logics of capital and geopolitics in US foreign policy. This was desire, was to be repressed during the Cold War but would ultimately return to US presidential discourse under Bill Clinton, something I will describe in chapter 8. The emerging prominence of a logic of geopolitics, that was not only concerned with the structuring of international politics to facilitate the imperatives of the logic of capital, began to exert its own pressures on US foreign policy as it felt compelled to maintain international credibility.

For Eisenhower China would become rendered through the logic of geopolitics and identity as a hostile enemy though the inversion from ally to enemy would begin under Kennedy and Johnson, paving the way for Nixon's overtures to China. Johnson would also start to demonstrate a sense of reflectivity on US foreign policy practices. Although US foreign policy would come to be increasingly constituted through the logic of capital that had become increasingly universal and expansionist and a logic of identity emphasising universal nature of US values, US interests were becoming more predominantly expressed through a logic of geopolitics. The consequences of this increasing universalisation and expansion were it became necessary to systematise the world through a logic of geopolitics to maintain the imperatives within the other two logics. One might speculate and inquire as to this shift in discourse to an increasing emphasis and expression of geopolitical concern at the expense of the logic of capital which although important in shaping interests, was no longer the dominant form of expression with regards to China.

The space in US presidential discourses, created by Johnson, for reconciliation with China contributed to the manner in which the Nixon administration would be able to take along its logical trajectory as demonstrated in the following chapter.

Chapter 7 – 1968-1988: Nixon to Reagan

7.1 Introduction

This period is characterised by the major narrative of rapprochement or reconciliation between the US and China. This chapter analyses the discourses of Richard Nixon⁸³⁷, Jimmy Carter⁸³⁸ and Ronald Reagan. This covers the normalisation of relations between the US and China, with official recognition coming under Carter in 1979, and increasing commercial ties and state visits during the Reagan Presidency.⁸³⁹ Nixon channelled the logic of capital in his public statements regarding the need for rapprochement with China. Although he often indicated that US attempts to re-establish official relations with China were not about geopolitical manoeuvring with the USSR in mind, he would also subtly contradict this claim on a regular basis. Carter introduced the issue of human rights into the logic of identity as it functioned towards China though as I will demonstrate this always remained secondary to the logic of capital. Reagan for one, despite some of his early comments would go on to emphasise the logic of capital as the US sought to take advantage of the market orientated reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping in China.

7.2 Nixon and Reconciliation

In the first 1960 US presidential debate against then Senator Kennedy, Nixon asked “what do the Chinese Communists want? They don't want just Quemoy and Matsu; they don't want just Formosa; they want the world. And the question is if you surrender or indicate in advance that you're not going to defend any part of the free world, and you figure that's going to satisfy them, it doesn't satisfy them. It only whets their appetite; and then the question comes, when do you stop them?”.⁸⁴⁰ Although he was unsuccessful in that first Presidential bid, Nixon's

⁸³⁷ Yukinori Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China* (Oxon: Routledge, 2016); Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2008); Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China*; Geoffrey Warner, 'Nixon, Kissinger and the *rapprochement* with China, 1969–1972', *International Affairs* 83 (2007): 763-781.

⁸³⁸ Jimmy Carter, "'Maximum flexibility for Peaceful Change": Jimmy Carter, Taiwan, and the Recognition of the People's Republic of China', *Diplomatic History* 33 (2009): 595-613.

⁸³⁹ Robert Sutter, *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972-1982* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); S. Mahmud Ali, *US-China Cold War Collaboration, 1971-1989* (Oxon: Routledge, 2005); Patrick Tyler, 'The (Ab)normalization of U.S.-China Relations', *Foreign Affairs* 78 (1999): 93-122; John Dumbrell, *American Foreign Policy Carter to Clinton* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1997). Worth noting here is the comparatively small body of literature that deals with the China policies of Nixon, Carter, or Reagan specifically. Many useful analyses on this period are found in the broad surveys outlined in chapter 3. There is a notable lack of analytical literature on US-China relations during this period; whether this is due to the primary focus on the Cold War and the US-USSR relations, an interesting gap in the literature or my inability to locate relevant literature is as of yet, undetermined.

⁸⁴⁰ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate Broadcast from New York and Los Angeles," October 13, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29402>.

remarks reflected his beliefs and that of the Eisenhower administration that he was Vice-President of, that China was insatiably expansionist. US discourses of China then during this period were rendered through the logic of geopolitics where the US concern about China's intentions, was pressing, immediate and required US opposition.

Now as President, and speaking at the United Nations on September 18th 1969, Nixon adopted amore conciliatory position towards China. In a general sense he attempted to "describe peace as a process embodied in a structure".⁸⁴¹ The structure he was considering was the structure and relations of international politics, though his more important point was that peace simply does not emerge or materialise. This peace was process that could be mediated by actors. In this light, he offered an early signal to China of US desire for engagement stating, "whenever the leaders of Communist China choose to abandon their self imposed isolation, we are ready to talk with them in the same frank and serious spirit".⁸⁴² Nixon was reiterating and expanding on the offer presented by the Johnson administration. As will be shown below, Nixon justified this through the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics.

In an address to the nation on November 3rd 1969, Nixon set out his understanding of the war in Vietnam. One of his major points revealed the constraints limiting the logic of geopolitics. He declared, "a nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends".⁸⁴³ Nixon outlined what he referred to as the Nixon Doctrine, which was comprised of keeping treaty agreements, providing a nuclear shield to allies, providing military and economic assistance to other states under threat from communism while also encouraging them to defend themselves.⁸⁴⁴ What was important here, is the notion of greatness that compelled the US to remain loyal to its allies, an example of the convergence of the logics of identity and geopolitics.. What this indicates is the constitutive nature of identity formation and geopolitical practice, to be great, the US had to act in such a way concerning geopolitical issues, and those very performances of geopolitics were compelled by identity discourses.

⁸⁴¹ Richard Nixon: "Address Before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.," September 18, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2236>.

⁸⁴² Richard Nixon: "Address Before the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.," September 18, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2236>.

⁸⁴³ Richard Nixon: "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," November 3, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>.

⁸⁴⁴ Richard Nixon: "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," November 3, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>.

During his State of the Union address on January 22nd 1970, Nixon emphasised the global changes that had taken place since the end of WWII. He claimed, “we have based our policies on an evaluation of the world as it is, not as it was 25 years ago at the conclusion of World War II. Many of the policies which were necessary and right then are obsolete today”.⁸⁴⁵ US foreign policy then, had to account for the change, material and discursive, in international politics over this time period. This was implicit in his comments regarding the initial attempts at US-China dialogue in light of increasing cooperation with Japan. He stated, for instance, that it “it [was] with this same spirit that we have resumed discussions with Communist China in our talks at Warsaw. Our concern in our relations with both these nations is to avoid a catastrophic collision and to build a solid basis for peaceful settlement of our differences”.⁸⁴⁶ It was necessary through the logic of geopolitics by following this strand of thought, to establish the geopolitical conditions for peace in the Asia-Pacific by engaging with China.

The Nixon administration was the first to submit an annual report to Congress on US foreign policy. These reports offered a detailed discussion for US foreign policy and offer extensive insight into the Nixon administration’s interests and reasoning. The first one, in February 1970, set out Nixon’s vision for US foreign policy in the 1970’s began with the statement this it was “this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of international relations”.⁸⁴⁷ The change Nixon had been referring to in his State of the Union address was describing the US’s understanding of a growing fracture between China and the USSR. Nixon called that during the 1950s the US was “confronted by a monolithic Communist world” and that “today, the nature of that world has changed the power of individual Communist nations has grown, but international Communist unity has been shattered”.⁸⁴⁸ Despite his protestations, discussed below, that his policies towards China were not about isolating the USSR through the logic of geopolitics, these prominent opening comments imply otherwise.

⁸⁴⁵ Richard Nixon: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 22, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2921>.

⁸⁴⁶ Richard Nixon: "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union.," January 22, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2921>.

⁸⁴⁷ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁴⁸ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

Nixon described the USSR and China as “once a unified bloc, [now] its solidarity has been broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and Communist China, once bound by an alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the mid-1960s...the Marxist dream of international Communist unity has disintegrated”.⁸⁴⁹ Although not stated explicitly here, Nixon implied that the US had to respond to this disintegration. This response would be characterised, as mentioned above, by the Nixon Doctrine whose “central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defence and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot and will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defence of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest”.⁸⁵⁰ Nixon was essentially arguing that the US would take a more selective approach to its foreign policy, stimulated by the manner in which the Vietnam War had revealed the limitations of US military capability.⁸⁵¹ The logic of geopolitics was rendered under Nixon as more cautious and reserved, at least in his public statements.

The report located Nixon’s foreign policy within the general approach of US foreign policy after WWII. It claimed, despite Nixon’s focus on change that the approach set out as his Doctrine could be seen beginning “in 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, offering American economic and military assistance to countries threatened by aggression”.⁸⁵² Essentially US foreign policy was organised around the belief that “democracy and prosperity, buttressed by American military strength and organized in a worldwide network of American led alliances, would insure stability and peace”. The logic of geopolitics held that democracy and economic prosperity would establish the conditions for peace and political stability. Nixon saw the logic of geopolitics in this case as primary and facilitated by the logics of capital and identity. For Nixon “this great effort of international political and economic reconstruction was a triumph of American leadership and imagination,

⁸⁴⁹ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵⁰ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵¹ James Lebovic, *The Limits of U.S. Military Capability: Lessons from Vietnam and Iraq* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2010).

⁸⁵² Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

especially in Europe”.⁸⁵³ This was in short, a positive assessment of how the logic of geopolitics had organised US foreign policy since the end of WWII.

This is not to say Nixon overlooked the logic of capital. He indicated that, “in an ever more interdependent world economy, American foreign policy will emphasize the freer flow of capital and goods between nations”.⁸⁵⁴ This growing independence led Nixon to claim that “this is also the spirit in which we have resumed formal talks in Warsaw with Communist China. No nation need be our permanent enemy”.⁸⁵⁵ Enmity then, was a contingent state of relations, rather than inevitable. In a neat indication of how US foreign policy was characterised by the need to solve problems, China being one of them Nixon described how “our policymaking must be systematic: our actions must be the products of thorough analysis, forward planning, and deliberate decision. We must master problems before they master us”.⁸⁵⁶ The US in this light could be seen a problem solver in the tradition outlined by Cox where the US was taking the world “as it is” and responding within existing global frameworks.

For the US “a foreign policy for the 1970's demands imaginative thought. In a world of onrushing change, we can no longer rest content with familiar ideas or assume that the future will be a projection of the present”. Nixon was returning to the issue of change. Reflecting a similar binary understanding of the US’s encounter with the world as Johnson had, the report declared that “if we are to meet both the peril and the opportunity of change, we require a clear and positive vision of the world we seek and of America's contribution to bringing it about”.⁸⁵⁷ US foreign policy then was also about establishing the conditions necessary for its interests to come to fruition. This was to be done by what the Nixon administration described as “systematic planning”. What the report goes on to describe is similar to how I see the logics I discern functioning in US foreign policy. The reports argues that US

⁸⁵³ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵⁴ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵⁵ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵⁶ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵⁷ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

“foreign policy must not be merely the result of a series of piecemeal tactical decisions forced by the pressures of events. *If our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the products of rational and deliberate choice.* We need a system which forces consideration of problems before they become emergencies, which enables us to make our basic determinations of purpose before being pressed by events, and to mesh policies”(emphasis added).⁸⁵⁸

From this it follows that the logics I describe are what inform US foreign policy and give it its overall sense of rationality. They constitute the parameters and criteria for what constitutes this rationality. The logics in this light inform what can be considered as legitimate choice but they do not determine a particular choice. They function as the discursive spectrum in which agency operates.

Turning to Asia, the report describes how “three times in a single generation, Americans have been called upon to cross the Pacific and fight in Asia. No region of the world has more engaged our energies in the post-war period”. Referring to the wars with Japan, over Korea and over Vietnam, looming is the issue of China. The report continues, “no continent has changed more rapidly or with greater complexity since World War II. Nowhere has the failure to create peace been more costly or led to greater sacrifice”.⁸⁵⁹ This emphasis on the significance of Asia to US interests is summed up by the following affirmation that “first, we remain involved in Asia. We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia”.⁸⁶⁰ “We are a Pacific power”, returns as an axiomatic signifier, at once stating a geographical ‘fact’ while legitimising a certain set of practices. This is not to say it functions as an empty signifier with no meaning, but a highly emotive signifier that when problematized, as this thesis intends to do, reveals a set of political interests at the heart of a seemingly benign factual statement about geographic solidarity.

The second issue as regards to Asia that the report flags, lends exemplary justification to the focus on identity in international politics.⁸⁶¹ The report describes how “constructive nationalism and economic progress since World War II have strengthened the new nations of Asia internally. A growing sense of Asian identity and concrete action toward Asian cooperation are creating a new and healthy pattern of international relationships in the

⁸⁵⁸ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁵⁹ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶⁰ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶¹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

region”. This reflects how the US understands the logic of identity to operate in a more general sense, as a co-constitutive feature of foreign policy practice. The report observes, facilitated by US policy, that “despite its troubled past, Asia's future is rich in promise. That promise has been nurtured in part by America's participation”.⁸⁶² The third point of reference with regards to Asia that the report clarifies is that “while we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them, the changes taking place in that region enable us to change the character of our involvement”.⁸⁶³ This sense of change does not imply that the logics I describe fundamentally change as they can be emphasised in different ways and allow for a variety of practices within certain conditions.

The report sets out the Nixon administration’s understanding of the logic of capital. It states, “peace has an economic dimension. In a world of independent states and interdependent economies, failure to collaborate is costly in political as well as economic terms”. To the Nixon administration, the logic of capital is embedded within US foreign policy or rather, “good U.S. economic policy is good U.S. foreign policy”. The logic of capital as now understood by the US leads the report to the argument that “the preeminent role that we play in the world economy gives us a special responsibility”.⁸⁶⁴ This responsibility was premised on improving the conditions for free trade. The report argues that “freer trade among all nations provides greater economic benefits for each nation. It minimizes potential political frictions as well. These conclusions are truer today than ever before, as the growing interdependence of the world economy creates new opportunities for productive exchange. But growing interdependence also means greater reliance by each nation on all other nations”.⁸⁶⁵ The logic of capital, now encapsulates more than just the search for foreign markets, but the imperatives of maintaining the capitalist economic system as it lead to increasing interdependence. Essentially the unilateral tendencies of earlier conceptions of the logic of capital in US foreign policy no longer suited the global economic conditions the US now inhabited.

⁸⁶² Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶³ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶⁴ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶⁵ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

The report set out the significance of subjective experience in state foreign policy practices. It declared that the “we will regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations pursuing their own interests as they perceive these interests, just as we follow our own interests as we see them”. Following this the report described “a second principle we shall observe in negotiating with the Communist countries relates to how these negotiations should be conducted how they should be judged by peoples on both sides anxious for an easing of tensions”.⁸⁶⁶ This was a recognition that the USSR and China acted out of a sense of what their interests were, rather than being beholden to an ideology as implied by previous Presidential statements regarding the will to global expansion.

This is most significant here for the specific remarks with regards to China. The report admired China declaring, “the Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the international community”. Within the logic of geopolitics and the US desire for a stable geopolitical order, the report speculated that “in the long run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more than 700 million people”.⁸⁶⁷ The international system as perceived by the US, would soon come to need China to secure its own reproduction. China, despite its recent pariah status in US foreign policy, was not just perceived as necessary to the reproduction of US capital as was the case under the likes of McKinley and Taft, but was envisioned as necessary to the reproduction of the global economic system.

Demonstrating a publically more nuanced understanding of China than most previous administrations, the report considered how “Chinese foreign policy reflects the complexity of China's historical relationships with the outside world. While China has the longest unbroken history of self-government in the world, it has had little experience in dealing with other nations on a basis of equal sovereignty”. Nixon’s administration was in this way positioning US foreign policy as exhibiting what might be considered a logic of understanding or reciprocity, similar in nature to some ideas professed by Wilson. This was a formative attempt to think about how China might perceive the world and recognition that the US should take this into account. A tacit recognition that perspective and subjectivity are important when thinking about how states behave in the world. Continuing this historical sensitivity, the

⁸⁶⁶ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶⁷ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

report described how China, “predominant in Asia for many centuries, these gifted and cultured people saw their society as the centre of the world. Their tradition of self imposed cultural isolation ended abruptly in the Nineteenth Century, however, when an internally weak China fell prey to exploitation by technologically superior foreign powers”.⁸⁶⁸ China was again a victim of colonial exploitation. This sense of historical sensitivity led to the major conclusion that “the history inherited by the Chinese Communists, therefore, was a complicated mixture of isolation and incursion, of pride and humiliation. We must recall this unique past when we attempt to define a new relationship for the future”.⁸⁶⁹ China then, was granted agency in a manner that the US had refused since the Communist revolution and after.

Despite the report outlining the potential for reconciliation, it made sure to emphasise how the logic of identity underpinned a perception of significant differences between the US and China. It argued that the US could not “underestimate the gulf of ideology...or the apparent differences in interests and how we interpret world events”. The highlighting of interpretation was a key theme of the report as it indicated an awareness that states do not approach the world from some objective viewpoint. The report maintained that “while America has historic ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and many of our basic interests are not in conflict, we must recognize the profound gulf of suspicion and ideology”.⁸⁷⁰ Significantly, the report aimed at establishing the discursive potential for reconciliation as it acknowledged that US “policy is not likely soon to have much impact on China's behaviour, let alone its ideological outlook. But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking”.⁸⁷¹ Rather than compelling China to act, as US foreign policy had done so previously, the focus was on creating the conditions of possibility for reconciliation.

This fostering of reconciliatory conditions did not simply occur discursively as the report outlined a number of practical policies the US had implemented to indicate its genuine

⁸⁶⁸ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁶⁹ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁷⁰ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁷¹ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

interest. The report remarked, “we have taken specific steps that did not require Chinese agreement but which underlined our willingness to have a more normal and constructive relationship”.⁸⁷² This included easing measures for tourists to purchase Chinese goods and the automatic validation of passports for a wider number of groups from journalists to students. The report also conveyed a sense of inevitability as it stated how “the resumption of talks with the Chinese in Warsaw may indicate that our approach will prove useful. These first steps may not lead to major results at once, but sooner or later Communist China will be ready to re-enter the international community”.⁸⁷³ This sense of inevitability was tempered by the US desire to foster more likely conditions for rapprochement. The report though made a curious claim that the US’s “desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of exploiting the clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no benefit to us in the intensification of that conflict, and we have no intention of taking sides”.⁸⁷⁴ This was despite the basis of a new approach to US foreign policy being premised on the widening divisions between the USSR and China in terms of global communism, and constituted an example of the influence of the logic of geopolitics than Nixon had previously tried to distance himself from.

The following year in a radio address outlining the second annual report on February 25th 1971, Nixon repeated the intention of re-establishing relations with China. He declared that the US “will search for consecutive discussions with Communist China while maintaining our defence commitment to Taiwan. When the Government of the People's Republic of China is ready to engage in talks, it will find us receptive to agreements that further the legitimate national interests of China and its neighbours”.⁸⁷⁵ The speculative nature of US interest Asia was clear as the report indicated that, “In Asia, we can see tomorrow's world in microcosm. An economically powerful democratic free nation, Japan, is seeking new markets; a potentially powerful Communist nation, China, will one day seek new outlets and new

⁸⁷² Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁷³ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁷⁴ Richard Nixon: "First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's.," February 18, 1970. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2835>.

⁸⁷⁵ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address About Second Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3322>.

relations".⁸⁷⁶ This future speculation was articulated through the logic of capital where it was markets and outlets that interested the US.

The second annual report on US foreign policy presented by the Nixon administration to Congress expanded on many of the arguments of the first one. It emphasised the disappearance of "the conditions which have determined the assumptions and practice of United States foreign policy since 1945".⁸⁷⁷ In a statement that contradicted some of the administration's previous remarks about not seeking to exploit a communist schism, the report stated how "one of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist China and the Soviet Union... Around the globe, East and West, the rigid bipolar world of the 1940's and 1950's has given way to the fluidity of a new era of multilateral diplomacy".⁸⁷⁸ More precisely the report outlined how "the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines. That the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities".⁸⁷⁹ China then, primarily through the logic of geopolitics was imagined as one of these opportunities.

The report also expanded on the importance of identity to US foreign policy. It asserted, "America has always had a belief in a purpose larger than itself. Two centuries ago our mission was to be a unique exemplar of free government. Two decades ago it was to take up worldwide burdens of securing the common defence, economic recovery, and political stability".⁸⁸⁰ This sense of purpose is characterised by the logic of identity, where the US is determined to act in a way that appears to transcend interests that emerge from the logic of capital and of geopolitics. Reflecting on the Nixon Doctrine, the report qualified that it "recognised that the Doctrine, like any philosophic attitude, is not a detailed design".⁸⁸¹ In this

⁸⁷⁶ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address About Second Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3322>.

⁸⁷⁷ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁷⁸ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁷⁹ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸⁰ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸¹ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

manner, the Nixon Doctrine was a combination of various logics reflecting an approach rather than as the report phrases it, “a detailed design”. Compounding this was the remark that “in this case ambiguity is increased since [the Doctrine] is given full meaning through a process that involves other countries”.⁸⁸² The logics then, especially the logic of identity only become fully realised through the US encounter with the other.

The report also echoed previous statements when it affirmed the US axiom that “Asia and the Pacific region lie at the heart of the task of creating a stable structure of world peace”.⁸⁸³ Asia, the Pacific, and China as previously indicated were constructed as necessary to the reproduction and stability of the international order. This significance was indicated by the account that “since the Second World War, it is only in this region that developments have impelled America to send her sons to war. Asia and the Pacific includes territories of the seven most populous and the three wealthiest powers, with all that implies for the vital nature of their interests”. The logic of capital, and the promise that Asia held, revealed the significance of the region to US foreign policy. Ultimately report described the US as “a Pacific power ourselves, our security and economic interests are inextricably involved with the future of Asia”.⁸⁸⁴ The logic of geopolitics, capturing this geographical imagining of US disposition, the logic of capital and the sense of identity as a “Pacific power” compelled and legitimised US foreign policy towards Asia.

Signifying a moment of change in international politics, the report declared how “a new Asia is emerging”. This sense of change was to be met by the Nixon Doctrine, which according to the report was “only the beginning of the adjustment of the American role to an era in which the last vestiges of the post-war period will be gone”.⁸⁸⁵ For the US then, the report stated that “it is therefore essential to our national wellbeing that we accept the truth and that our policies

⁸⁸² Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸³ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸⁴ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸⁵ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

reflect the fact that an era has ended in Asia”.⁸⁸⁶ The reconfiguration of US foreign policy was intended to create the space for reconciliation in Asia. The report called for a reassessment of how Asia featured in the US imagination. It described how “for several decades, our approach to Asia has been rooted in conceptions, once valid, but now increasingly overtaken by time”.⁸⁸⁷ The significance of time in this regard suggests an increasing lag between US discourse of Asia and China, and their relation to changing material circumstances. The previously valid conceptions were more appropriate to the post WWII world where Asia was viewed as generally fragile and unstable. The report makes this clear observing that the conceptions “stemmed from our experiences, for World War II and its aftermath served to dramatize the fragility of Asia, and nowhere was the menace of the cold war more strongly evident”.⁸⁸⁸ This fragility was related to the parochial recognition of the emergence of Asian identities as the report claimed, “Asian nations now generally have a strong and confident sense of their own national identity and future”.⁸⁸⁹ This suggested that the US perceived Asia as a place with no meaningful identity to enable action and considerations of the future. It was not so much that the logics of US foreign policy towards China needed to be modified but their implementation with regards to the material world needed to be reassessed.

The report outlined how the US envisioned a new structure of international order in Asia. It claimed, “in restructuring our own posture, we have set in train the readjustment of the whole international order in the Pacific region”. How the geopolitical order of things in Asia was understood, was to undergo a US lead rearrangement. Reflecting on this, the report described how “in the past twenty years the American people have sacrificed much, both in blood and treasure, to help set the stage where such a structure can be created in the Pacific region. It is

⁸⁸⁶ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸⁷ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸⁸ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁸⁹ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

now in sight”.⁸⁹⁰ This general outline of US thinking about Asia through the logic of geopolitics turned towards a more specific discussion on how this related to China.

China was still an unresolved problem, but this problem was no longer the issue of threatening Asia or Communist expansion, but one of alienation from the US. This alienation was framed around the logic of capital and the potential of China’s large population. The report “Communist China must expose herself to contact with the outside world... The twenty two year old hostility between ourselves and the People's Republic of China is another unresolved problem, serious indeed in view of the fact that it determines our relationship with 750 million talented and energetic people”.⁸⁹¹ The report stylised this around the “truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile toward it”. Curiously, the international order, could not secure its existence and reproduction if it excluded such a state of significant economic potential. The report’s attempt to further make the space for rapprochement can be seen in the following declaration that “in this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia”.⁸⁹² This implication of “world community” alluded to the logic of identity in US foreign policy with regards to an international order of civility.

One of the more significant contributions of the report was its historical sensitivity to China’s historical experience. In this regard it displayed a recognition akin to more contemporary critical analysis on China by William Callahan and his arguments regarding the role that humiliation discourses play in guiding China’s foreign policy thinking.⁸⁹³ In full the report recognises that:

“China's long historical experience weighs heavily on contemporary Chinese foreign policy. China has had little experience in conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations. For centuries China dominated its neighbours, culturally and politically. In the last 150 years it has been subjected to massive foreign interventions. Thus, China's attitude toward foreign countries retains elements of aloofness, suspicion, and hostility. Under Communism these historically shaped

⁸⁹⁰ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁹¹ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁹² Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁹³ Callahan, *China: The Pessimist Nation*.

attitudes have been sharpened by doctrines of violence and revolution, proclaimed more often than followed as principles in foreign relations”.⁸⁹⁴

Embedded in this recognition though was a trope of immaturity where China had “little experience in conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations”, though the colonial powers were as responsible for this as China was. This was a clear attempt to understand China’s foreign policy actions in a way that respected the subjective constitution of interests even if it was patronising in its judgement.

The report also restated the dubious claim, as remarked above in light of some of Nixon’s other statements, that “We, therefore, see no advantage to us in the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. We do not seek any. We will do nothing to sharpen that conflict nor to encourage it. It is absurd to believe that we could collude with one of the parties against the other”. Again this statement was qualified by the remarks that “at the same time, we cannot permit either Communist China or the USSR to dictate our policies and conduct toward the other”.⁸⁹⁵ These attempts to underplay the logic of geopolitical thinking of the Nixon administration were undermined by the previous statements regarding the on going split between China and the USSR with regards to communism as a global movement. This became increasingly evident in the following observation that:

“The Soviet Union wishes to see our influence diminished, and yet fears that diminution as enhancing the possibility of expanded Chinese influence. At the same 'time, it has to consider that a lesser American influence could contribute to a normalization of relations between ourselves and Mainland China, and might permit and encourage a focus of Chinese energies not possible under the present realities”.⁸⁹⁶

The US was essentially aware of its emerging position to foster discord between the two communist states. This kind of reasoning is one of the more conventional ways that the logic of geopolitics underpinned US foreign policy in a general sense where it engaged with who might be pitted against who for US gain.

⁸⁹⁴ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁹⁵ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
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⁸⁹⁶ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

In one of the report's more declarative statements, it made clear that for the US, "We are prepared to establish a dialogue with [Beijing]".⁸⁹⁷ There was also a commendable degree of nuance to the US position. With regards to initiating dialogue with China the report clarified the limits of US compromise, "we cannot accept its ideological precepts, or the notion that Communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests. The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments".⁸⁹⁸ The potential engagement with China then was to occur within the international conditions shaped by the US. There was a definitive statement of Nixon's intent as he stated, "I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations".⁸⁹⁹ Nixon was determined to consider how the US "might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these opportunities" and that the US would "hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, reciprocity".⁹⁰⁰ The report outlined how through the logic of capital the US became interested in re-establishing relations with China and that this could potentially be done via the logic of geopolitics.

In an interview on April 16th 1971, Nixon reflected on his desire to open up relations with China. He recalled how he "wrote an article for Foreign Affairs...which I pointed out that we could not have what will be by the end of the century a billion of the most creative and able people in the world isolated from the world and that whoever was President of the United States had to develop a policy which would bring the isolation of a billion Chinese from the rest of the world to an end".⁹⁰¹ I was not entirely clear if the Chinese were seen as consumers, or producers, or other economic agents, but it was apparent that China and its people held some kind of speculative importance in US foreign policy. Nixon declared that "the long

⁸⁹⁷ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁹⁸ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁸⁹⁹ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁹⁰⁰ Richard Nixon: "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 25, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3324>.

⁹⁰¹ Richard Nixon: "Panel Interview at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.," April 16, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2982>.

range goal of this Administration... must be two things: one, a normalization of the relations between the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and two, the ending of the isolation of Mainland China from the world community".⁹⁰² China was thus, an increasingly important feature of how the US conceptualised international politics. Alluding to the potential shift in international dynamics, Nixon would declare, "America and Mainland China, after more than 20 years of hostility and isolation, are beginning to move toward a new and more normal relationship".⁹⁰³ This sense of normality, implied a kind of abnormal estrangement between the US and China in the post WWII world.

Describing the invitation of a future visit China Nixon made the case that "our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends. It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy".⁹⁰⁴ He presented the rationale for doing this in an interview with Dan Rather of CBS on January 2nd 1972. Nixon recalls how earlier in his Presidency he "said then that the United States, looking to the future, had to find a way to open communications with the leaders of 750 million people who lived in Mainland China, and so the long process began".⁹⁰⁵ Importantly, Nixon alluded to a sense of geopolitical inevitability present in US-China relations when he argued that "this trip, of course, will have as its major purpose setting up that long dialogue which may avert what would otherwise be an inevitable clash".⁹⁰⁶ It appeared in this line of reasoning that US interest was being determined by the logic of geopolitics despite constant references to the larger Chinese population.

Nixon also maintained a line of reasoning through the logic of identity that there were significant philosophical differences between the US and China. Nixon stated that "the differences that we have with those great powers, their governments that is, is not because we

⁹⁰² Richard Nixon: "Panel Interview at the Annual Convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.," April 16, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2982>.

⁹⁰³ Richard Nixon: "Remarks to the Corps of Cadets at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York.," May 29, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3029>.

⁹⁰⁴ Richard Nixon: "Remarks to the Nation Announcing Acceptance of an Invitation To Visit the People's Republic of China.," July 15, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3079>.

⁹⁰⁵ Richard Nixon: "'A Conversation With the President,'" Interview With Dan Rather of the Columbia Broadcasting System," January 2, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3351>.

⁹⁰⁶ Richard Nixon: "'A Conversation With the President,'" Interview With Dan Rather of the Columbia Broadcasting System," January 2, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3351>.

do not know them or they know us, but because we do know them and they know us. The philosophic gulf is enormous. It will continue".⁹⁰⁷ If the philosophic gulf were to continue as he predicted, his previous statements implied that the logic of identity and its emphasis on constitution via processes of differentiation, could be overcome by other concerns.

In a speech entitled the "Industrial World Ahead" given on February 7th 1972, Nixon made clear the continued importance of the logic of capital in US foreign policy. These remarks offer a useful light within which to understand his previous statements regarding China's potential importance to the future of Asia. Nixon described how "nations never stand still. They go forward or they fall backward. Other nations in the world today are going forward some of them rapidly forward. And America has to exert itself, we have to be at our very best, if we are to remain competitive in the world".⁹⁰⁸ The logic of capital not only exerted an expansionary pressure on US foreign policy, but a sense of forward motion on the basis of economic prosperity. The logic of capital now also contained the need to "remain competitive" in a global context. This sense of capital expansion was by no means limited to China. Describing this potential Nixon claimed, "we have the new Europe with Britain in the Common Market. We have the Soviet Union...We have Mainland China with all of its potential in the future. We have Japan...We have also the future possibilities in Latin America, and Asia, the Mideast, and Africa".⁹⁰⁹ The world was essentially viewed through the logic of capital as constituting a space of potential, and relentless commercial expansion.

In his address regarding the third annual foreign policy report to congress February 9th 1972, Nixon spoke extensively of his China initiative. Outlining the challenge he remarked that "when it came to dealing with the People's Republic of China, 25 years of hostility stood in the way... We do not expect instant solutions to deep seated differences. But the visit is a beginning".⁹¹⁰ Engagement was now going to represent relations rather than exclusion, as Nixon observed how "in the relations between our countries, the old exchange of

⁹⁰⁷ Richard Nixon: "Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast," February 1, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3597>.

⁹⁰⁸ Richard Nixon: "Remarks to the White House Conference on the "Industrial World Ahead: A Look at Business in 1990.," February 7, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3728>.

⁹⁰⁹ Richard Nixon: "Remarks to the White House Conference on the "Industrial World Ahead: A Look at Business in 1990.," February 7, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3728>.

⁹¹⁰ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address About the Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3734>.

denunciations can be replaced with a constructive exchange of views”.⁹¹¹ This adjustment was also to have further geopolitical consequences as Nixon described how “not so long ago, our alliances were addressed exclusively to the containment of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. But now there has to be more to our alliance. It is fairly simple to unite about what you are against. It is a lot more complicated to hold together an alliance on the basis of what you are for”.⁹¹² These alliances, necessary according to the logic geopolitics, had come to have problematic effects on the US economy. In a now prescient concern, Nixon argued that “our former dependents have become our competitors...But as the roles change, the rules change. The old international monetary and trading system had become unfair to the American workers and to American business”.⁹¹³ The logic of capital, in response to domestic economic issues had come to supersede the logic of geopolitics that underpinned US foreign policy in the Cold War.⁹¹⁴

The third annual report to Congress from the Nixon administration on US foreign policy delivered in 1972 continued on the themes of the previous two. It began by reflecting on “the philosophy of a new American foreign policy” which acknowledges “the end of the bipolar post-war world” and the “unique opportunity to create a new and last structure of peace”.⁹¹⁵ Its emphasis on the mutability of international politics and the need for US foreign policy to take this into account was captured by the following remark, “our enmities are not immutable, and we must be prepared realistically to recognize and deal with their cause”.⁹¹⁶ It positively recorded how with China, the US had “ended a 25 year period of implacable hostility, mutually embraced as a central feature of national policy. Fragile as it is, the rapprochement between the most populous nation and the most powerful nation of the world could have

⁹¹¹ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address About the Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3734>.

⁹¹² Richard Nixon: "Radio Address About the Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3734>.

⁹¹³ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address About the Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3734>.

⁹¹⁴ Judith Stein, *Trading Factories for Finance: The Economics and Politics of the 1970s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). Part 3 and 4 in Robert Brenner, *The Economics of Global Turbulence* (London: Verso, 2006): 97-229.

⁹¹⁵ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹¹⁶ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

greater significance for future generations than any other measure...taken this year".⁹¹⁷ China then, contained future potential as imagined through the logic of geopolitics and the logic of capital.

The report presented the Nixon administration's narrative of US-China relations and their historical evolution. It recalled how "the earliest Sino-American contacts developed in the early 1800'S. At that time the ancient Chinese empire, secure and preeminent, was just beginning the painful process of adapting itself to the outside world".⁹¹⁸ This historical awareness continued as it referred to how the Chinese "were exploited by technologically superior foreign powers". This was also an attempt by the Nixon administration to positively position the US as although "isolationist and bending its energies to national development favoured the territorial integrity of China; but our 'open door' doctrine of equal treatment for all foreigners carried ambiguity in Chinese eyes".⁹¹⁹ In an attempt to signal an awareness of China's historical predicament, the report outlined how "the Communist leaders thus inherited a tradition marked by both pride and humiliation; the Chinese experience had not been one of dealing with the outside world as equals but one of their Chinese superiority or foreign exploitation".⁹²⁰ In this manner, China's experience appeared as tangible to the Nixon administration, rather than the consequences of some tyrannical ideology. This sensitivity to Chinese history was also marked by a new respect in general for China as Nixon recalled how in "1970, in a toast to visiting President Ceausescu of Romania, I deliberately used Peking's official title, 'the People's Republic of China'. This was the first time an American President had ever done so".⁹²¹

The sense of changing geopolitical considerations also returned as a theme. The US had "perceived the Communist countries, including China, as a monolithic bloc with central direction. Today, two and a half decades after the war, new realities are reflected in a new

⁹¹⁷ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹¹⁸ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹¹⁹ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²⁰ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²¹ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

American approach to foreign policy".⁹²² To Nixon this new reality constituted a significant restructuring of international politics. He remarked, "in January 1969 I entered office convinced that a new policy toward the People's Republic of China was an essential component of a new American foreign policy".⁹²³ To put the issue concisely, Nixon declared that was "in America's interest, and the world's interest, that the People's Republic of China play its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns".⁹²⁴ China was no longer to be excluded from the international system but to contribute to its functioning and reproduction.

The report made reference to the Republic of China and US regret that the Peoples' Republic of China had been awarded China's seat in the UN. Despite this, it maintained the US position that "the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide. A peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would do much to reduce tension in the Far East".⁹²⁵ Evident here was the manner in which the imperatives of the logics of capital and geopolitics regarding the US relationship with Mainland China were more important than the logic of identity.

Setting out the principles of engagement the report made clear how the US was "confident that a peaceful and prospering China is in our own national interest" and was "assured that peace in Asia and the fullest measure of progress and stability in Asia and in the world require China's positive contribution".⁹²⁶ China then had something to offer the US more generally as a prosperous country, and was necessary to a stable geopolitical order in Asia. If China was perceived through a geopolitical framing, rapprochement was also rendered significant through the logic of capital.

⁹²² Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²³ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²⁴ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²⁵ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²⁶ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

In detailing the expanding trade with Communist countries the report alluded to a Taft like understanding of the logic of capital. The emphasis of this logic was very much orientated towards the future as the report considers how “although trade with these nations is less than one percent of our exports at present, they are an important potential market for our products. As relations have improved, trade has grown. As the former continues, so will the latter”.⁹²⁷ The logic of capital in this regard is seen as part of a positive feedback loop with improving relations. To summarise the US position, the report stated, “a continuing and consistent policy of this Administration has been to encourage the China to play a constructive role in the community of nations”.⁹²⁸ This sense of community and being constructive reflected the logic of identity where China should become productive member of the international system.

During a toast to Zhou En-Lai in Beijing on February 21st 1972, Nixon revealed the contingent relevance of the logic of identity in US foreign policy towards China. He reflected on US-China relations remarking, “we have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences”.⁹²⁹ Any sense of difference as recognised through the logic of identity could be relegated to the imperatives of the logic of capital or of geopolitics. Nixon appeals Zhou through a rejection of historical geopolitical violations of China by colonial powers. He proclaims that “there is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other; neither of us seeks domination over the other; neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world”.⁹³⁰ Enmity to Nixon is not an inevitable condition between the US and China and this reflects the malleability of the three logics I describe. Although they exert certain pressures they can also be adapted and reconfigured by particular presidents.

In a radio address on foreign policy given on November 4th 1972, Nixon speaks of a “structure of peace” which for him reflects an “important truth about the nature of peace in

⁹²⁷ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²⁸ Richard Nixon: "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy.," February 9, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3736>.

⁹²⁹ Richard Nixon: "Toasts of the President and Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China at a Banquet Honoring the President in Peking.," February 21, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3748>.

⁹³⁰ Richard Nixon: "Toasts of the President and Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China at a Banquet Honoring the President in Peking.," February 21, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3748>.

today's world. Peace cannot be wished into being".⁹³¹ Peace for Nixon, was a process. A process that had to be:

“carefully and painstakingly built in many ways and on many fronts, through networks of alliances, through respect for commitments, through patient negotiations, through balancing military forces and expanding economic interdependence, through reaching one agreement that opens the way to others, through developing patterns of international behaviour that will be accepted by other powers”.⁹³²

This reflection on the geopolitical basis for peace was commensurate with Nixon’s initiatives to re-evaluate how the US thought about China.

Nixon would extensively discuss some of the precepts of the logic of geopolitics as it relates to the ‘balance of power’. He described how “those who scoff at balance of power diplomacy should recognize that the only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power, and history shows that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance”.⁹³³ For Nixon it was “precisely the fact that the elements of balance now exist that gives us a rare opportunity to create a system of stability that can maintain the peace, not just for a decade but for a generation and more”.⁹³⁴ Nixon here is outlining the manner in which the logics of geopolitics is aimed at establishing the conditions for either the logics of capital or identity to function.

7.3 Carter and the End of Alienation

Jimmy Carter’s Presidency marked the restoration of official diplomatic recognition between the US and China. This effectively brought to an end the official alienation of China from the US. Carter prioritised the logic of capital as championed China’s economic reforms, while introducing the discourse of human rights into US concerns about China. The logic of identity then was more important for Carter than Nixon, even if it did not significantly affect how the US acted towards China. What Carter valued most though, was what the US saw as a movement towards modernisation by China, specifically in terms of its economic reforms.

In a speech welcoming the visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Jimmy Carter observed that under his and Premier Hua Guofeng’s leadership that China had “begun to move boldly

⁹³¹ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address on Foreign Policy.," November 4, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3692>.

⁹³² Richard Nixon: "Radio Address on Foreign Policy.," November 4, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3692>.

⁹³³ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address on Foreign Policy.," November 4, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3692>.

⁹³⁴ Richard Nixon: "Radio Address on Foreign Policy.," November 4, 1972. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3692>.

toward modernisation".⁹³⁵ China had "chosen to broaden your cultural, trade, and diplomatic ties with other nations".⁹³⁶ Modernisation in this regard meant assimilation into the international system. This modernisation was also perceived through the logic of identity where China was perceived as continually falling short of US expectations. In an address to the American people on February 2nd 1977, Carter for instance, emphasised how the US "will continue to express our concern about violations of human rights, as we have during this past week, without upsetting our efforts toward friendly relationships with other countries".⁹³⁷ What is notable is that despite the significance of the logic of identity to Carter, it did not supersede the logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China.

Speaking on June 22nd 1977, Carter located the logic of identity as fundamental to US foreign policy and conception of itself. He declared, "the human rights issue is one that I consider to be of crucial importance. I think it re-establishes our country as kind of a beacon light for something that's right and decent and proper and humane and compatible with the basic concepts on which our country was founded 200 years ago".⁹³⁸ The logic of identity was an apparent key configuration in Carter's foreign policy vision, but with regards to China, it remained mostly secondary in influence.

In an address on US-China diplomatic relations on December 15th 1978 concerning a joint Communiqué, Carter made stated the basis for the US understanding of the One China policy. The statement embodied clarity and ambiguity as the US recognised One China but remained discursively ambivalent with regards to the issue of who exactly was sovereign over that One China.⁹³⁹ Carter remarked that "the Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of

⁹³⁵ Jimmy Carter, "Visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony." January 29, 1979, *The American Presidency Project*. (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31335>. 12 September 2014).

⁹³⁶ Carter, "Visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony."

⁹³⁷ Jimmy Carter: "REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE - Remarks From the White House Library," February 2, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7455>.

⁹³⁸ Jimmy Carter: "Advertising Council, Inc. Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Members of the Council.," June 22, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7713>.

⁹³⁹ Oystein Tunsjo, *US Taiwan Policy: Constructing the Triangle* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China* (USA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

China".⁹⁴⁰ What Carter was more concerned with though was how improved relations with China would improve US commercial interests and the geopolitical stability in Asia. He described how "normalization—and the expanded commercial and cultural relations that it will bring—will contribute to the wellbeing of our own Nation, to our own national interest, and it will also enhance the stability of Asia".⁹⁴¹ Again, the logics of capital and geopolitics featured prominently.

In a welcoming ceremony for Deng Xiaoping on January 29th 1979, Carter considered how the US and China could foster the conditions for peace in Asia. He declared that "the United States of America has major interests in the Asian and in the Pacific regions. We expect that normalisation of relations between our two countries will help to produce an atmosphere in the Asian and Pacific area in which the right of all peoples to live in peace will be enhanced".⁹⁴² Later, Carter would emphasise how "a strong and secure China which contributes constructively to world affairs is in our interest, and a globally engaged, confident, and strong America is, obviously, in China's interest".⁹⁴³ This interest in encouraging China to become more involved in international politics reflected the concerns of the logics of capital and geopolitics in US foreign policy.

Speaking on June 21st 1979, Carter invoked the logics of capital and of geopolitics again stating that US "policy toward East Asia is based on several consistent principles designed to maintain stability, further prosperity, and take account of changes occurring in the region".⁹⁴⁴ He also invoked the geographical imagining of the US as a Pacific power as contained within the logic of geopolitics as a status he desired to maintain, for Carter this meant that "the basic ingredients of that policy are well known to you: American determination to remain actively

⁹⁴⁰ Jimmy Carter: "Address to the Nation on Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," December 15, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30308>.

⁹⁴¹ Jimmy Carter: "Address to the Nation on Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China," December 15, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30308>.

⁹⁴² Jimmy Carter: "Visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony.," January 29, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31335>.

⁹⁴³ Jimmy Carter: "Visit of Vice Premier Deng of China Remarks Following the Signing of Agreements Between the United States and the People's Republic of China.," January 31, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31535>.

⁹⁴⁴ Jimmy Carter: "Korean and East Asian Issues Questions and Answers for Publication in the Orient Press," June 21, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32536>.

involved as a Pacific power”.⁹⁴⁵ The reproduction of the imperatives of the logic of geopolitics exerted a significant influence then, on how Carter understood US interests in Asia.

In his State of the Union address on January 23rd 1980, Carter reflected on a sense of friendship between the US and China that he had fostered. He presented US efforts to improve relations with China as contributing to peace and stability in Asia, but framed these efforts through the logic of identity where it was friendship that had been attained. He described how for the US “we’ve also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World”.⁹⁴⁶ Specifically, the US “decision to normalise relations with the People’s Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the Western Pacific”.⁹⁴⁷ The success of normalising relations with China was in this event framed through the logic of geopolitics as well.

Carter would explicitly emphasise China’s importance through the logic of capital in one of his last remarks on their relations. At a signing ceremony for various US China maritime agreements on September 17th 1980, Carter declared that “for the first time in more than 30 years, all United States ports will be open to Chinese merchant ships and American ships will have access to all Chinese ports of call. This will mean a stronger American maritime industry”.⁹⁴⁸ The significance of geopolitical access was for how it would “mean revenue for United States shippers from the growing Chinese market for American goods, and growing trade and commerce will benefit the people of both China and the United States”.⁹⁴⁹ The normalisation of US-China relations then was rendered as beneficial for its geopolitical and economic potential even if Carter at times emphasised the general importance of human rights and the logic of identity in US foreign policy.

⁹⁴⁵ Jimmy Carter: "Korean and East Asian Issues Questions and Answers for Publication in the Orient Press," June 21, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32536>.

⁹⁴⁶ Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress.," January 23, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>.

⁹⁴⁷ Jimmy Carter: "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress.," January 23, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>.

⁹⁴⁸ Jimmy Carter: "United States-People's Republic of China Agreements Remarks at the Signing Ceremony.," September 17, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45069>.

⁹⁴⁹ Jimmy Carter: "United States-People's Republic of China Agreements Remarks at the Signing Ceremony.," September 17, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45069>.

7.4 Reagan

Ronald Reagan's China policy is regularly characterised by his disdainful reference to China as "so-called communists" due to the perception of a changing political system and how US businesses were beginning to transfer manufacturing to China.⁹⁵⁰ His attitude to China would move from more aggressive to conciliatory through his Presidency. Significantly, his Presidency would return to the early 20th century myth of the China market as being a potential source of expanding prosperity for the US economy.

In his address to members of the British Parliament on June 8th 1982, Reagan exhibited the logic of identity in juxtaposing the civilised and peaceful identity of the West with the imperial recklessness of the Communists. He considered that:

"historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the West. They will note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear monopoly in the forties and early fifties for territorial or imperial gain. Had that nuclear monopoly been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe - indeed, the world would look very different today".⁹⁵¹

Exemplifying the logic of identity, the Chinese were implicitly understood as the corollary other within the binary that Reagan was celebrating between a virtuous democratic West and a reckless Communist world.

In a joint Communiqué with China on US arms sales to Taiwan August 17th 1982, the US made clear that it "recognised the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China".⁹⁵² Continuing, the communiqué affirmed that within this "context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalised".⁹⁵³ This constituted the lasting formula for the US in thinking about the geopolitical issue of Taiwan's status in regards to China. In a statement of clarifying ambiguity, The US attached "great importance

⁹⁵⁰ Hendrik Smith, 'Reagan, in U.S., Says China Trip Advanced Ties', *New York Times* (<http://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/02/world/reagan-in-us-says-china-trip-advanced-ties.html>), 15 February 2015).

⁹⁵¹ Ronald Reagan: "Address to Members of the British Parliament," June 8, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42614>.

⁹⁵² Ronald Reagan: "United States-China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan," August 17, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42861>.

⁹⁵³ Ronald Reagan: "United States-China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan," August 17, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42861>.

to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'Two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan'".⁹⁵⁴ This essentially constituted a deferral of the resolution, where traditional conceptions of sovereignty were displaced by a non-specific answer, displaced in to some indeterminate future. The logic of capital and the logic of geopolitics would in this sense, permit the existence this tension in the name of stability and economic prosperity.

In a statement regard arms sales to Taiwan and US-China relations on August 17th 1982, Reagan emphasised that "building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a relationship is vital to our long term national security interests and contributes to stability in East Asia".⁹⁵⁵ The contemporary configuration of US foreign policy towards China then is dated back to the Nixon administration even if the organising logics can be traced back much further as I throughout this thesis. Emphasising the logic of geopolitics, Reagan declared that "it is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be advanced. This communiqué will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the people of Taiwan".⁹⁵⁶ The US was not to maintain an uneasy balance between tis obligations to Taiwan, which rested on the need for credibility through the logic of identity and its interests with China rendered through the logic of capital and of geopolitics. Reagans here would also touch on another source of tension within the logic of capital as he was wary of Chinese textile imports flooding the domestic US market but while maintaining the desire to secure export benefits for farming surpluses to the China.⁹⁵⁷

When welcoming Premier Zhao Ziyang to the US on January 10th 1984, Reagan spoke admirably of China's on-going modernisation. He declared that China had "now embarked on an exciting experiment designed to modernize the economy and quadruple the value of its national economic output by the year 2000...we welcome the opportunity to walk at China's

⁹⁵⁴ Ronald Reagan: "United States-China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan ," August 17, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42861>.

⁹⁵⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Statement on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan ," August 17, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42862>.

⁹⁵⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Statement on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan ," August 17, 1982. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42862>.

⁹⁵⁷ Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on International Trade ," August 6, 1983. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41691>.

side in this endeavour".⁹⁵⁸ Signifying the benefits of the US-China relationship through the logic of capital Reagan described how in "the last few years, each of our countries has tried to help the other build a better life. Our trade has flourished. The United States is now China's third largest trading partner. American investment in China exceeds that of all other countries".⁹⁵⁹ During a toast for Zhao's visit, Reagan celebrated what he called "the rebirth of China's economy".⁹⁶⁰ He announced how the US had "been watching with interest and admiration your efforts to modernise by offering incentives to your people in stimulating economic competition. We have been pleased to contribute what we could as you expand the vistas of economic opportunity for the Chinese people".⁹⁶¹ China was thus, considered as engaging with a more general neoliberal rationality concerning primarily though not only, the expansion of free markets and reducing government intervention in the market while this process was being seen as a success through the logic of capital in US foreign policy.⁹⁶²

Reagan also commented positively on the US's involvement in helping China modernise and become more attuned to US economic practices. In regards to two further trade agreements he described how "China is now engaged in a vast modernisation program, and this agreement will encourage further cooperation between our countries, especially in those industrial sectors on which China has placed a top priority". The logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China was reflected in Reagans remark that "American knowhow and investment should prove invaluable in these endeavours, and this accord will stimulate participation by

⁹⁵⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Premier Zhao Ziyang of China ," January 10, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39595>.

⁹⁵⁹ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Premier Zhao Ziyang of China ," January 10, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39595>.

⁹⁶⁰ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for Premier Zhao Ziyang of China ," January 10, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39595>.

⁹⁶¹ Ronald Reagan: "Toasts of the President and Premier Zhao Ziyang of China at the State Dinner ," January 10, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39661>.

⁹⁶² For various outlines of what a neoliberal rationality entails see the following: Will Davies, *The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty, and the Logic of Competition* (London: Sage Publications, 2016); Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism* (London: Penguin, 2008); Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2015); Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval, *The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society* (London: Verso, 2017).

our private sector in China".⁹⁶³ The US would now become economically involved in the development of China's economy.

While speaking at a meeting of Asian and Pacific-American leaders on February 23rd 1984, Reagan drew on the speculative imaginings of a promising future in Asia. He stated, "when we look toward that great and grand Pacific Basin, there's a promising future there, as well...it's not all foreign policy; America is part of the Pacific. There's Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, the soon to be commonwealth status of the Northern Mariana Islands".⁹⁶⁴ Although US Presidents had previously made the case that the US was a Pacific power, Reagan spoke explicitly of US territories when invoking this sentiment. The Pacific was again, constructed through the three logics of capital, identity and geopolitics as a potentially lucrative space for the US future.

Reagan was more explicit in an interview with Chinese journalists on trip to China on April 16th 1984. He commented, "I know it has been my thinking for a long time that the United States is truly a nation of the Pacific Basin. And certainly the largest and most important state in that Pacific Basin is the People's Republic of China".⁹⁶⁵ Reagan's point was that the US and China could cooperate for mutual benefit, he stated, I "believe that the entire Pacific Basin is the world's future. It is the fastest growing area. And we can cooperate in some of the modernisation that is going on in industry in the People's Republic".⁹⁶⁶ This cooperation was not just within the immediate framing of the logic of capital and of geopolitics but Reagan attempted to frame a continuous of period of "friendship". He remarked that "we have a long history of friendship between our two peoples. It began 200 years ago when an American clipper ship visited China and trade began...And I think the future in trade and development for both of us holds out a great promise for our people".⁹⁶⁷ The logic of identity and the

⁹⁶³ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks of the President and Premier Zhao Ziyang of China on Signing Two United States-China Agreements," January 12, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39695>.

⁹⁶⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at a Meeting With Asian and Pacific-American Leaders," February 23, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39556>.

⁹⁶⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Interview With Chinese Journalists on the President's Trip to China," April 16, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39786>.

⁹⁶⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Interview With Chinese Journalists on the President's Trip to China," April 16, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39786>.

⁹⁶⁷ Ronald Reagan: "Interview With Chinese Journalists on the President's Trip to China," April 16, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39786>. Also made this historical reference again in Ronald Reagan: "Toast at a Dinner Hosted by President Li Xiannian of China in Beijing," April 26, 1984. Online by

notion of friendship were deployed to accentuate how the logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China had been conducted in good spirit. As this thesis has shown, this was not necessarily the case according to the discourses of previous Presidents. Signifying the importance of the logic of capital with regards to the reproduction of the US as political and social entity, Reagan made the remark that “the Pacific Basin is one of the fastest growing markets for American goods, services, and investments. To a great extent, our nature's future is in the Pacific”.⁹⁶⁸ The logic of capital then, conditioned how the US understood its potential future while remaining essential to that future.

In a speech to Chinese community leaders in Beijing on April 27th 1984, Reagan reiterated many of these themes. He declared that “America's door is open to you, and when you walk through, we'll welcome you as our neighbours and our friends... America's interest in China, our friendship for your people, and our respect for China's many contributions to the progress of civilization date back to the beginning of our own history”.⁹⁶⁹ This sense of continuous US-China relations accentuated the US concerns for the logic of capital. This was especially evident in Reagan’s recounting of the first encounter as being embedded in the early new US republic’s logic of capital. Reagan described how “back in 1784, when the first American trading ship, the Empress of China, entered your waters, my country was unknown to you. We were a new republic, eager to win a place in international commerce”.⁹⁷⁰ The encounter between the US and China occurred through the imperatives of the logic of capital.

Reagan also drew on Ulysses Grant, discussed in Chapter 4, when signalling the potential for China’s future.⁹⁷¹ He narrated how “A little over a century ago, Ulysses S. Grant, who was then a former President, visited your country and saw China's great potential. ‘I see dawning . . .’ Grant wrote, ‘the beginning of a change. When it does come, China will rapidly become a powerful and rich nation . . . The population is industrious, frugal, intelligent, and quick to

Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39830>.

⁹⁶⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks on Arrival at Hickam Air Force Base in Honolulu, Hawaii ," April 22, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39825>.

⁹⁶⁹ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders in Beijing, China ," April 27, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39831>.

⁹⁷⁰ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders in Beijing, China ," April 27, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39831>.

⁹⁷¹ Grant’s views are discussed in chapter 4.

learn”⁹⁷² Grant rendered China’s potential in economic terms, reflecting Reagan’s contemporary interest in China. In this sense, Reagan spoke approvingly of Deng’s early economic reforms commenting on China’s “commitment to attract capital and scientific knowledge to create a high technology base for the future” and how “all this reflects China's new role in the international economic community and your determination to modernize your economy and raise the standard of living of your people”.⁹⁷³ The logic of capital then very much dominated Reagan’s approach to China.

During a welcoming banquet in Beijing on April 27th, Reagan observed how “as China moves forward to modernise and develop its economy, the United States is eager to join in a cooperative effort to share the American capabilities that helped turn our country from a vast wilderness into an industrial giant”.⁹⁷⁴ This very much reflected some of Taft’s motivations with regards to China, though Reagan was more concerned with assisting the development of “a strong China, dedicated to peace” which to Reagans was “clearly...in the best interest of international stability and in the best interest of the United States”.⁹⁷⁵ China was becoming increasingly perceived, through the logics of capital and geopolitics, as a necessary ally to US regional and global interests.

The logic of capital, at the heart of Reagan’s China policy, featured again during a speech in Beijing April 28th 1984. Recalling Nixon’s diplomatic initiatives, Reagan remarked how “our relationship since that time has been a force for peace in the world and will continue to serve that end”.⁹⁷⁶ This geopolitical consideration was perceived as complimentary to the logic of capital as Reagan conceived of US-China cooperation as originating when “China and the United States recognise[d] that we have many other areas of mutual interest, particularly since 1978, when Chinese leaders decided to foster the growth of the Chinese economy and open

⁹⁷² Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders in Beijing, China ," April 27, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39831>.

⁹⁷³ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders in Beijing, China ," April 27, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39831>.

⁹⁷⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Toast at a Welcoming Banquet Hosted by Premier Zhao Ziyang of China in Beijing ," April 27, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39832>.

⁹⁷⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Toast at a Welcoming Banquet Hosted by Premier Zhao Ziyang of China in Beijing ," April 27, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39832>.

⁹⁷⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at a Reception for Members of the American Community in Beijing, China ," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39835>.

more to the West".⁹⁷⁷ The logic of capital for Reagan, then would have a mutually reinforcing effect on the US's geopolitical interests regarding China and international stability.

Again speaking in Beijing at a dinner with Zhao Ziyang, Reagan touched on the sense of "allure" that China had for the US. He described how:

"the very mention of China holds a sense of allure. It conjures up images of the Yangtze River alive with traditional [sailboat] and modern steamers, with the wide deserts of the north, of the bamboo forests in the southwest that are home to pandas, golden monkeys, and so many other animals native only to China, of the rich, productive fields and farmlands of the east, and of the huge cities like Beijing and Shanghai".⁹⁷⁸

This reflected how China featured in the US imagination. This "sense of allure" also suggested how despite the emphasis on the logics of capital and of geopolitics, the logic of identity constituted a formative component of US foreign policy towards China. That China was more than just an economic and geopolitical consideration. Reagan would also emphasize the absence of a US desire for territorial expansion. He assured the Chinese that US "aims and commitments are fully consistent with the sovereignty, independence, and economic development of all nations, including China. [The US] seek[s] no expansion but the expansion of good will and opportunity; no victory but the victory of peace".⁹⁷⁹ US interest, was very much constituted through the logic of capital.

In a radio address about his trip to China on April 28th 1984, Reagan emphasised the economic role that the Pacific would play in the US's future. He described how his trip "demonstrates our awareness of America's responsibility as a Pacific leader in the search for regional security and economic wellbeing".⁹⁸⁰ Again, identity met capital and geopolitics in US imaginations of the Pacific as Reagan also described how "the stability and prosperity of this region are of crucial importance to the United States. The nations comprising the Pacific Basin represent our fastest growing trading markets. Many say that the 21st century will be the century of the Pacific".⁹⁸¹ In one of the few comments regard China's geopolitical

⁹⁷⁷ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at a Reception for Members of the American Community in Beijing, China," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39835>.

⁹⁷⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Toast at a Dinner Honoring Premier Zhao Ziyang of China in Beijing," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39836>.

⁹⁷⁹ Ronald Reagan: "Toast at a Dinner Honoring Premier Zhao Ziyang of China in Beijing," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39836>.

⁹⁸⁰ Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on the Trip to China," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39837>.

⁹⁸¹ Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on the Trip to China," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39837>.

significance with regards to the USSR, Regan explained how “China's efforts to modernize, foster the spirit of enterprise, open its doors to the West, and expand areas of mutual cooperation while opposing Soviet aggression make it a nation of increasing importance to America and to prospects for peace and prosperity in the Pacific”.⁹⁸² Reagan’s China policies were thus motivated by the logics of capital and of geopolitics within the context of the Cold War, as well as the US’s other economic and geopolitical concerns.

Reagan returned to the sense of allure he mentioned previously while speaking at Fudan University on April 30th 1984. He stated how “to many Americans, China is still a faraway place, unknown, unseen, and fascinating. And we are fascinated”.⁹⁸³ Allure and fascination implied a sense of orientalist wonder at China. Reagan also expanded on the differences between the US and China, many rendered through the logic of identity. He claimed that “there's much that naturally divides us: time and space, different languages and values, different cultures and histories, and political systems that are fundamentally different. It would be foolish not to acknowledge these differences. There's no point in hiding the truth for the sake of a friendship, for a friendship based on fiction will not long withstand the rigors of this world”.⁹⁸⁴ This recognition of divergent concerns reflected the attempts by Johnson and Nixon to recognise the China’s sense of agency in international politics.

Reagan also discussed regional geopolitics as a site where the US and China had aligned interests and much in common. He spoke of how “both the United States and China oppose the brutal and illegal occupation of Kampuchea. Both the United States and China have stood together in condemning the evil and unlawful invasion of Afghanistan. Both the United States and China now share a stake in preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we share a stake in preserving peace in this area of the world”.⁹⁸⁵ These similarities extended to more general concerns in foreign policy, Regan declared that “neither of us is an expansionist power. We do not desire your land, nor you ours. We do not challenge your borders. We do not provoke your anxieties. In fact, both the United States and China are forced to arm

⁹⁸² Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on the Trip to China ," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39837>.

⁹⁸³ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843>.

⁹⁸⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843>.

⁹⁸⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843>.

themselves against those who do”.⁹⁸⁶ US-China relations then were in this regard, highly beneficial with regards to the geopolitics of the region more broadly.

Speaking on his return from China, Reagan emphasised how he had tried to explain US identity as a way of helping the Chinese understand how the US behaves. He remarked, “many of the Chinese people still don't understand how our democracy works or what impels us as a people. So, I did something unusual. I tried to explain what America is and who we are—to explain to them our faith in God and our love, our true love, for freedom. They'll never understand us until they understand that”.⁹⁸⁷ Understanding how US foreign policy was predicated on understanding US identity. Even if the logic of identity was not a singular motivation in US foreign policy, it was often the register through which US foreign policy was rendered and legitimised.

Responding to written questions from Pacific Magazine on May 4th 1984 Reagan described the importance of the Pacific to the US where he:

“would like to have our administration remembered as one which fully recognized the importance of Asia and the Pacific. Focus is shifting increasingly to the Pacific, which is now—as I said earlier—the fastest growing economic region of the world... And when we look toward that great and grand Pacific Basin, there's a promising future”.⁹⁸⁸

He did not use the language of a pivot or rebalance in the manner that the Obama administration did, but the discourse was similar. In some ways it might be worthwhile considering US foreign policy towards China as one of a perpetual pivoting towards.

When responding to questions from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* Reagan again reiterated the importance of the Pacific and specifically, China's approach to foreign capital as vital to the US's future. He repeated how he “happen[ed] to be a believer in the Pacific Basin as the place of the future”, but more interestingly he described how “an American once said: ‘Go west, young man’. Well, we're still going west”.⁹⁸⁹ Reagan here is deploying the frontier logic exhibited by the US during its 19th century continental expansion. The Pacific Ocean and Asia, were portrayed as a natural progression of US expansionary interest even if it

⁹⁸⁶ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843>.

⁹⁸⁷ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks Upon Returning From China ," May 1, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39848>.

⁹⁸⁸ Ronald Reagan: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Pacific Magazine on United States Policy in the Pacific Island Region ," May 4, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39862>.

⁹⁸⁹ Ronald Reagan: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by the Far Eastern Economic Review ," May 9, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39902>.

was now rendered by more in economic than territorial terms. Reagan was locating US geopolitical and economic interests within a logic of geopolitics that finds its origins in the origins of the US itself. More specifically Reagan envisioned how “the two biggest nations—the United States and China—can contribute a great deal to stability in the whole Pacific Basin and East Asia”. And that he “was struck by the changes the Chinese are making as part of their modernization, including their welcome to outside capital”.⁹⁹⁰ The ability of China to assist in regional geopolitical concerns was premised on its economic stability and acquiescence to the US logic of capital.

In a speech on National Security on February 26th 1986, Reagan reflected on the state of anxiety in US politics. He declared the “need to remember where America was 5 years ago. We need to recall the atmosphere of that time: the anxiety that events were out of control, that the West was in decline, that our enemies were on the march”.⁹⁹¹ Anxiety in this sense was contingent on the US sense of decline. This was no longer the case according to Reagan and he celebrated how the US has “sought to promote prosperity and social progress through a free, open, and expanding market-orientated global economy”.⁹⁹² These initiatives implied Reagan, reflecting the logic of capital’s imperatives to establish foreign markets had alleviated much of US anxiety during the decade.

In one of his final speeches, at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research on December 7th 1988, Reagan declared that the US must pursue a “foreign policy based on our bedrock principles allows us to offer a practical solution to the suffering peoples of the world, a means of achieving prosperity and political stability that all Americans take for granted as their birth right”.⁹⁹³ US foreign policy was in this sense grounded in the logic of identity and its principles, even if it was shaped and mostly motivated by the logic of capital and its subsequent pressures on the logic of geopolitics. He spoke confidently about the functioning of the US’s superior political system declaring, “tyranny fails. Freedom works. These facts, so little accepted only a decade ago, are now indisputable...The tiny free

⁹⁹⁰ Ronald Reagan: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by the Far Eastern Economic Review," May 9, 1984. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39902>.

⁹⁹¹ Ronald Reagan: "Address to the Nation on National Security," February 26, 1986. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36927>.

⁹⁹² Ronald Reagan: "Message to the Congress on Freedom, Regional Security, and Global Peace," March 14, 1986. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36995>.

⁹⁹³ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research," December 7, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35239>.

exchange experiments in the East bloc and the liberalization in the People's Republic of China are stunning evidence of the Communist world's desperate efforts to find a way out of the economic morass of state socialism".⁹⁹⁴ In a succinct statement embodying his general approach to foreign policy and politics more broadly Reagan declared that "freedom works, and freedom is on the march".⁹⁹⁵ Unbeknownst to him, these claims about the world's politics were to be put into question by subsequent events in China that posed a number of issues for George H.W. Presidency.

7.5 Conclusion

Nixon's attempts to justify rapprochement with China started to exhibit what could be considered a logic of understanding or reciprocity that exists outside of the three major logics I have described so far. This was an important formative attempt to take into account how China might perceive the world and an acknowledgment that the US should take this into account. This was a tacit recognition that perspective and subjectivity are fundamental to thinking about how other states act in international politics. This might be something that is fairly obvious to the more critically orientated scholars of international politics today, but in public statements of US foreign policy towards China, it was a major change to previous understandings.

For the most part, Nixon channelled the logic of capital in his public statements regarding the need for rapprochement with China as he often indicated that US attempts to re-establish official relations with China were not about geopolitical manoeuvring with regards to the USSR. As I have indicated though he would also subtly contradict this claim on a regular basis. Carter's contribution to the genealogy was to introduce the issue of human rights in to the logic of identity, a modern incarnation of the civilising discourses of the previous century. His discourses on China though would ultimately prioritise the logic of capital. Reagan for one, despite some of his initial comments which emphasised the logic of identity as distinguishing the US and China would go on to emphasise the logic of capital as the US sought to take advantage of the market orientated reforms under way in China. He displayed an on-going sense that despite the logic of geopolitics and identity as being increasingly significant in US foreign policy towards China, it was the logic of capital that provided the

⁹⁹⁴ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research," December 7, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35239>.

⁹⁹⁵ Ronald Reagan: "Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research," December 7, 1988. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=35239>.

overarching framework for US foreign policy towards China. The lasting effects of these reconfigurations of US relations with China and the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics are discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 8 – 1988-2008: ‘The ‘Rise of China’

8.1 Introduction

As it became clear that the US was going to outlast the disintegrating USSR at the end of the Cold War a Soviet political scientist and advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev Georgi Arbatov remarked in a speech in California that “Our major secret weapon is to deprive you of an enemy”.⁹⁹⁶ The ‘rise of China’ it would seem would fill the void described by Arbatov. The increasing concern in US presidential discourses of what China’s rapidly growing economy would mean in relation to the world culminate in Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia and his subsequent comparisons of Chinese technological proficiency to the lack of US infrastructure development after the 2008 financial crisis.⁹⁹⁷ The general sentiment of US discourses on China described below is captured by Warren Christopher’s comment during his confirmation hearings in 1993 when in regards to China he described how US “policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy”.⁹⁹⁸ The US would deploy the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics to foster and produce a certain kind of China.

This is similar to a conversation that journalist Ron Suskind recalled having with a senior George W. Bush aide. Writing in the *New York Times* in October 2004, Suskind outlined a conversation where the aide, generally considered to be Karl Rove, captured one of the underlying beliefs of the Bush administration, which is applicable to the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics. He recalled:

“The aide said that guys like me were ‘in what we call the reality-based community’, which he defined as people who ‘believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality’. I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. ‘That’s not the way the world really works anymore’, he continued. ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do’.”⁹⁹⁹

Embedded within the logic of geopolitics during the Bush Presidency, was the perception that the US created the reality within which it, and everyone else acted and existed in. This captures the very manner in which the logics I describe underpin US discourses to the world

⁹⁹⁶ Jean Davidson, ‘UCI Scientists Told Moscow’s Aim Is to Deprive U.S. of Foe, December 12 1988’, *The Los Angeles Times* (http://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-12/local/me-14_1_uci-scientists, 15 January 2017).

⁹⁹⁷ This point is elaborated further in the next chapter.

⁹⁹⁸ Quoted in Overholt, *The Rise of China*, 365.

⁹⁹⁹ Ron Suskind, ‘Without a Doubt’, *New York Times*

(<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05EFD8113BF934A25753C1A9629C8B63&pagewanted=all>, 14 October 2016).

generally and China specifically. The logics compel the US to behave in a certain way in which to ensure their imperatives and the conditions for their reproduction. The US did not just participate in international politics, it perceived it self as manufacturing the conditions through which international politics takes place. In this light, the logic of identity situated the US outside of the regular political world in which other actors were located where it could deploy the logics of capital and identity to produce a world as it saw fit. The significance of this is that this is what the hope would come to be with regards to US foreign policy towards China.

This chapter will analyse the discourse of the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies.¹⁰⁰⁰ The 20 years this chapter covers were characterised by a number of important political events, the end of the Cold War, Chinese political repression in Tiananmen, the US War on Terror and the early period of the 2008 financial crisis. What will become evident over the course of this chapter is how under Clinton, the US went from just wanting to contribute the democratisation of China, but wanted to China to contribute more to the administration of the international order.

8.2 George H.W. Bush and Tiananmen

Taking questions from Xinhua news agency February on 16th 1989, George H.W. Bush outlined how China offered significant opportunities for exercising the logic of capital. He announced, “we should also seek to expand our economic relationship. The opportunities for trade and investment between our countries are enormous. We have to find ways of taking advantage of them”.¹⁰⁰¹ China became more explicitly an opportunity that the US needed to act on. Although Bush mentioned that “to do this will require efforts on both sides”, he place the emphasis on China to reform its behaviour with regards to international trade. For instance he stated that “continued steps by China to make its trade practices compatible with those of its major trading partners and remove barriers to trade and investment are important if China

¹⁰⁰⁰ Much of the literature covering this period in US-China relations has already been covered in chapter 1 and 2. Ramon Myers, Michael Oksenberg and David Shambaugh (eds), *Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Jason Edwards, *Navigating the Post-Cold War World President Clinton's foreign Policy Rhetoric* (New York: Lexington Books, 2008); Chi Wang, *George W. Bush and China* (New York: Lexington Books, 2009); Alex Callinicos, *The New Mandarins of American Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Sheng Lijun, ‘Bush’s New China Policy: Air Collision, Arms Sales and China-U.S. Relations’, *Pacific Focus* 16 (2001): 57-86, Ian Jackson, ‘The Geopolitics of President George W. Bush’s Foreign Economic Policy’, *International Politics* 44 (2007): 572-595.

¹⁰⁰¹ George Bush: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency of China," February 16, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16675>.

is to expand commerce and attract capital for its modernisation".¹⁰⁰² Bush here was invoking the logic of capital in an attempt to demonstrate why China needed to adjust its economic policy.

If China wanted to benefit from international trade, it would have to adapt and as Bush put it, modernise. Bush recognised though that the US also had to act to facilitate trade with China, remarking "the United States, for its part, must keep its markets open to Chinese exports and continue to give China access to advanced technology needed for modernization".¹⁰⁰³ Bush would also maintain the continuity of geopolitical inertia with regards to Taiwan affirming that, "the United States is committed to abide by the three communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982, which provide a firm basis for the further development of our relations".¹⁰⁰⁴ The logic of capital then remained primary when approaching relations with China despite the prevailing importance of the logics of identity and geopolitics for presidential discourses on China.

Speaking in Alaska on February 22nd 1989 before a trip to China, Bush outlined his hope to "build on the friendly and stable and enduring relationship that now exists".¹⁰⁰⁵ Significantly, Bush described his visit as "something more than symbolism. That relationship is fundamental in any foreign policy equation of the United States. We don't want to take our friends for granted be they Japan, be they China, be they Korea".¹⁰⁰⁶ China was now considered a friend, and fundamental to US foreign policy thinking. Despite the remark regarding symbolism, Bush would repeat the axiom that "we are a Pacific power, and this visit will demonstrate that we tend to stay a Pacific power".¹⁰⁰⁷ Most important was how

¹⁰⁰² George Bush: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency of China," February 16, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16675>.

¹⁰⁰³ George Bush: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency of China," February 16, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16675>.

¹⁰⁰⁴ George Bush: "Written Responses to Questions Submitted by Xinhua News Agency of China," February 16, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16675>.

¹⁰⁰⁵ George Bush: "Remarks to Armed Forces Personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska," February 22, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16689>.

¹⁰⁰⁶ George Bush: "Remarks to Armed Forces Personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska," February 22, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16689>.

¹⁰⁰⁷ George Bush: "Remarks to Armed Forces Personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base in Anchorage, Alaska," February 22, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16689>.

China was constructed through the logic of identity as a friend, rather a foe or something to contain.

While in China at a welcoming banquet in Beijing on February 25th 1989, Bush declared to the Chinese, “your new and farsighted economic program is already improving the lives of the people, as it will for generations to come”.¹⁰⁰⁸ From Bush’s perspective, China seemed to assimilating appropriately into the international system, he remarked, “the expansion of your international relationships is also creating new possibilities for peace, prosperity, and world leadership, and the United States welcomes the enlarged role that China has taken in the world”.¹⁰⁰⁹ The issue of Taiwan, an ever-present area of tension, remained subsidiary to US relations with China. Bush announced accordingly that as US policy was “based on the bedrock principle that there is but one China, we have found ways to address Taiwan constructively without rancour. We Americans have a long, historical friendship with Chinese people everywhere”.¹⁰¹⁰ The overall relationship was framed through the logic of identity and a discourse of friendship as China was becoming increasingly seen in a positive light through the concerns of the logics of capital and of geopolitics.

In an interview with journalists in Beijing on February 26th 1989, Bush celebrated what he saw as “a worldwide movement toward greater freedom: freedom of human creativity and freedom of economic opportunity”.¹⁰¹¹ In glowing terms, Bush claimed “we've all begun to feel the winds of change sweep us toward an exciting and challenging new century”. Bush saw China through this general movement towards freedom arguing that “China was one of the first nations to feel this new breeze, and like a tree in a winter wind, you've learned to bend and adapt to new ways and new ideas and reform”. This positive assessment of China promised benefits for the logic of capital from a US perspective. He would argue that, “together, we must find political solutions to regional conflicts. We must foster global growth”.¹⁰¹² While remaining concerned with creating the conditions for economic growth,

¹⁰⁰⁸ George Bush: "Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing," February 25, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16694>.

¹⁰⁰⁹ George Bush: "Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing," February 25, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16694>.

¹⁰¹⁰ George Bush: "Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing," February 25, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16694>.

¹⁰¹¹ George Bush: "Interview With Chinese Television Journalists in Beijing," February 26, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16697>.

¹⁰¹² George Bush: "Interview With Chinese Television Journalists in Beijing," February 26, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16697>.

Bush acknowledged the political nature of regional issues, like tensions with North Korea, indicating that China could play a positive role in their resolution. The next day on February 27th 1989, Bush would make clear that his approach to China featured the imperatives of the logics of capital, of geopolitics and of identity remarking that despite his positive assessment of the US in Asia, “work is yet to be done: opening foreign markets to U.S. competition, continuing to encourage the growth of democracy and human rights, and strengthening of our alliances”.¹⁰¹³

In a speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on March 7th 1989, Bush would make clear how the US viewed positively China’s on-going economic reforms, and the economic opportunity these offered. He observed how “much of what is occurring in the world presents us, I think, with remarkable opportunities. I said China is one. China really continues to experiment with free market capitalism”.¹⁰¹⁴ He was describing what he saw as the increasing benefits of technological and economic change that were spreading generally throughout the world. The positive manner that Bush had viewed China up until this moment, was not to last though as it would be fractured by the political repression that took place in Tiananmen Square in mid 1989.

In some of his first comments on events in Tiananmen Square, given on May 21st 1989, Bush declared, “we do support freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press; and clearly, we support democracy. I don't want to be gratuitous in giving advice, but I would encourage restraint. I do not want to see bloodshed”.¹⁰¹⁵ His approach to these events were characterised by their rendering of the logic of identity as he stated, “I would urge the Government to be as forthcoming as possible in order to see more democratization and to see a peaceful resolution of this matter”.¹⁰¹⁶ In the political moment, it was the logic of identity in US foreign policy that was being challenged. Bush made clear the US position when he remarked, “we aspire to see the Chinese people have democracy, but we do not exhort in a

¹⁰¹³ George Bush: "Remarks Upon Returning From a Trip to the Far East," February 27, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16701>.

¹⁰¹⁴ George Bush: "Remarks to Members of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars," March 7, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16740>.

¹⁰¹⁵ George Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Mitterrand of France," May 21, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17047>.

¹⁰¹⁶ George Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Mitterrand of France," May 21, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17047>.

way that is going to stir up a military confrontation".¹⁰¹⁷ Bush viewed the protest movement forming in Tiananmen as "an enormous expression on the part of many people students and others for change, toward movement toward democracy". Bush would also invoke a level of personal reflection not usually offered with regards to China. Invoking his time spent as Chief US Liaison Officer in 1975, Bush recalled, "I lived there; I saw a society totally different than the one that exists in China today. China has moved, in some areas, towards democracy".¹⁰¹⁸ Despite the predominant expression of US interests in terms of geopolitical and international trade, the logic of identity remained an important aspect of US foreign policy practices.

In a statement, on June 3rd 1989, regarding "Chinese government suppression" Bush declared, "I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent loss of life. We have been urging and continue to urge nonviolence, restraint, and dialog. Tragically, another course has been chosen".¹⁰¹⁹ Bush described how "the United States and People's Republic of China over the past two decades have built up through great efforts by both sides a constructive relationship beneficial to both countries". Ultimately he expressed a hope that "China will rapidly return to the path of political and economic reform and conditions of stability so that this relationship, so important to both our peoples, can continue its growth".¹⁰²⁰ Distressed by a disturbance to the logic of identity, Bush would draw attention to the US concerns regarding China's political and economic reforms and their benefits to US interests.

Speaking on June 5th 1989, at the annual meeting of the Business Roundtable, Bush alluded to the logic of capital as he made clear that he did not want to disturb business or economic relations with China. He exclaimed, "I know that many in this room do what we have encouraged you to do business with the People's Republic of China. And I don't want to disturb that. I don't want to hurt the very business community in China and here that has

¹⁰¹⁷ George Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Mitterrand of France," May 21, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17047>.

¹⁰¹⁸ George Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Mitterrand of France," May 21, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17047>.

¹⁰¹⁹ George Bush: "Statement on the Chinese Government's Suppression of Student Demonstrations," June 3, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17101>.

¹⁰²⁰ George Bush: "Statement on the Chinese Government's Suppression of Student Demonstrations," June 3, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17101>.

moved things forward toward democracy”.¹⁰²¹ The logic of capital as expressed by Bush here was seen as having contributing to the imperatives within the logic of identity in US imaginations of China. There was a return to the trope of an uncivilised China as Bush claimed that he hoped “to convince the leaders of the Chinese military to go back to the policy of restraint and negotiation and peace, as opposed to this crushing of the human spirit in Tiananmen Square”.¹⁰²² China at this moment of crisis was very much rendered through the logic of identity even if the logic of capital remained fundamental to US interests in China.

In a news conference later that day, Bush would expand on the notion of a belligerent uncivilised China. He described how “during the past few days, elements of the Chinese Army have been brutally suppressing popular and peaceful demonstrations in China. There has been widespread and continuing violence, many casualties, and many deaths”.¹⁰²³ In a successful act of balancing the immediate concerns of the logic of identity with the longer term imperatives of the logic of capital and of geopolitics Bush would make clear that the US “cannot condone the violent attacks and cannot ignore the consequences for our relationship with China, which has been built on a foundation of broad support by the American people” and the US had to present “a reasoned, careful action that takes into account both our long term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in China”.¹⁰²⁴ If the acts of the Chinese government were brutal and violent, abhorrent within the logic of identity, this was not enough to supersede the logic of capital in the long term.

The US remained motivated to encourage political change in China. Bush recalled how “the budding of democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much to the relationship we have developed since 1972. And it's important at this time to act in a way that will encourage the further development and deepening of the positive elements of that relationship and the process of democratisation”.¹⁰²⁵ The US then, remained committed to producing a certain kind of China, a democratic and liberal one. The success with which Bush had previously

¹⁰²¹ George Bush: "Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Business Roundtable," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17113>.

¹⁰²² George Bush: "Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Business Roundtable," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17113>.

¹⁰²³ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>

¹⁰²⁴ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰²⁵ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

described China's emergence into the international system, meant that in this context "it would be a tragedy for all if China were to pull back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and repression".¹⁰²⁶ Bush was effectively, intertwining the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics that revealed the historical US concern in transforming Chinese society so it could feature more prominently in the international system in a way the US would approve of.

The inevitability of this process as understood by the US was evident in Bush's following remarks that "the process of democratisation of Communist societies will not be a smooth one, and we must react to setbacks in a way which stimulates rather than stifles progress toward open and representative systems".¹⁰²⁷ The logic of identity in this sense, had a teleological aspect to it that shaped US imaginations of China. Bush again alluded to this sense of teleological destiny when he remarked, "I am convinced that the forces of democracy are going to overcome these unfortunate events in Tiananmen Square".¹⁰²⁸ The significance in the logic of capital in facilitating the imperatives of the logic of identity were made clear in Bush's considerations that "on the commercial side, I don't want to hurt the Chinese people. I happen to believe that the commercial contacts have led, in essence, to this quest for more freedom. I think as people have commercial incentive, whether it's in China or in other totalitarian systems, the move to democracy becomes more inexorable".¹⁰²⁹ Evident here is the manner in which the logic of capital and identity appear to be mutually beneficial to one another when the US approached China.

Bush outlined plainly how he did not wish to return to the state of mutual isolation as a response to Chinese actions remarking, "I don't want to see a total break in this relationship, and I will not encourage a total break in the relationship".¹⁰³⁰ This again reflected how the US was in this sense motivated by the logic of identity as Bush explained how "when you see these kids struggling for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time for the United States to withdraw and pull back and leave them to the devices of a leadership that might decide to crackdown further". Bush wanted to see the US "stay involved and continue to work

¹⁰²⁶ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰²⁷ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰²⁸ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰²⁹ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰³⁰ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

for restraint and for human rights and for democracy”. Bush would then affirm that the logic of identity provided the conditional foundations for the logic of capital and of geopolitics to function with regards to China. He stated that “down the road, we have enormous commonality of interests with China, but it will not be the same under a brutal and repressive regime...and I would like to encourage them to continue their change”.¹⁰³¹

Bush would also reflect on what he understood as the Chinese perspective in this moment. He argued, “China has historically been less than totally interested in what other countries think of their performance. You have to just look back to the Middle Kingdom syndrome. And you look back in history when outsiders, including the United States, were viewed as barbarians”.¹⁰³² This acknowledgement was significant as it not only alluded to the limits of US capabilities, but also displayed a sensitivity to China’s past. To Bush, “China, with its immense pride and its cultural background and its enormous history of conflict internal and external has been fairly independent in setting its course” and he “had the feeling that China wants to be a more acceptable in the family of nations”.¹⁰³³ Bush though would also return to the sense of teleological inevitability embedded within his rendering of China. He pronounced, “I do think this change is inexorable. It may go a couple of steps forward and then take a step back, but it is on the move. The genie will not be put back in the bottle”. This “inexorable” change then, could be encouraged by US actions and by the US conceit to know China. Bush exemplified this when he remarked “I am trying to take steps that will encourage a peaceful change, and yet recognize the fact that China does have great pride in its own history. And my recommendations are based on my knowledge of Chinese history”.¹⁰³⁴ Underpinning Bush’s use of the logic of identity to affirm the inevitable development of political order in this regard is the claim to ‘know’ China and its history.

It was now that Bush also referred to the logic of geopolitics and the US’s geopolitical concerns. He stated, “I will not overlook fundamental abuse of the human rights because of a strategic concern; but of course, when you look at all your relationships, a President must be concerned about the strategic importance of the relationships”. The logic of geopolitics then

¹⁰³¹ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰³² George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰³³ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

¹⁰³⁴ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 5, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17103>.

simply had to be taken into account. With regards to China though, all three logics were visible as Bush remarked that “not only is our relationship with China of strategic importance, it has this whole cultural and educational and art and hopefully, someday human rights side of it”.¹⁰³⁵ The events in Tiananmen revealed the extent to which the logic of identity could function prominently alongside the logics of capital and geopolitics.

Defending his handling of the Tiananmen suppression the following year on February 21st 1990, Bush remarked, “I am not condoning tyranny. I am not doing as the Democratic leader said up there today: turning my back on human rights. What I am trying to do is preserve enough contact so the United States can have some influence”.¹⁰³⁶ Bush though, would also invoke the sense of mysticism and allure that occasionally became explicit in US discourse on China stating, “I have a feeling that China works in more mysterious ways than other countries”.¹⁰³⁷ There appeared here, despite his previous remarks, a certain kind of un-knowability to China and so the logics of US foreign policy towards China were orientated towards creating the conditions for US interest, rather than casual mechanisms of political change.

In a statement regarding his decision to renew Most Favoured Nation trading status for China made on May 24th 1990, the Bush administration “concluded that not to renew MFN would harm rather than help U.S. interests and concerns”.¹⁰³⁸ Bush was also “determined to help and not harm the people of China, who aspire for a better and more open life”.¹⁰³⁹ The logic of capital then remained predominant to how the US considered its foreign policy towards China even if the other logics remained important.

In another statement, this time on the anniversary of the suppression in Tiananmen made on June 4th 1990, Bush reflected on the difficulty of fostering a certain kind of China. He described how “transforming China with its 4,000 year old civilization, its own distinct and extraordinary traditions, an undeveloped economy, and an historically authoritarian political

¹⁰³⁵ George Bush: "The President's News Conference," June 27, 1989. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17216>.

¹⁰³⁶ George Bush: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the Annual Dinner of the Business Council," February 21, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18175>.

¹⁰³⁷ George Bush: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the Annual Dinner of the Business Council," February 21, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18175>.

¹⁰³⁸ George Bush: "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 24, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18518>.

¹⁰³⁹ George Bush: "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Renewal of Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 24, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18518>.

system is a monumental task”.¹⁰⁴⁰ China remained, through the logics of US foreign policy, a problem to be solved, a task to be completed. Bush reflected on how “China made great strides from 1978 to 1988 in the face of difficulties, and the dramatic growth in U.S. China relations during those 10 years was testimony to that progress”.¹⁰⁴¹ The continued improvement in US-China relations from the US perspective was predicated on the success of the logic of identity in US foreign policy.

In a speech to a joint session of Congress in September 1990, Bush reflected on US foreign policy more broadly. He declared that after the Cold War and in response to UN authorized intervention in Iraq a new world order was emerging.¹⁰⁴² Later in his 1991 State of the Union address, Bush declared, “we are a nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed idealism. We are Americans. We are the Nation that believes in the future. We are the Nation that can shape the future”.¹⁰⁴³ This articulation of the US as not merely a future orientated state, but *the* future orientated state, invoked how the logic of identity where the US saw it self as the exceptional embodiment of a global teleology. US sentiment, that it was a time of great possibility, signifies that the US saw itself somewhere between a state of anxiety with regard to the boundless potential of having ‘defeated’ the USSR, and potentially more specific ‘fear’ as to where the net ‘threat’ might emerge from. Conceiving the idea of an American led new world order to shape the world’s future revealed a form of post-Cold War anxiety. This anxiety was temporally relieved by the First Gulf War, but would soon find its antidote in an (un)familiar other as the US would become increasingly concerned about how it should think about China in the 21st century.

Speaking later in the year about his visions for a new world order and China’s potential role in it Bush reflected on the significance of events in Tiananmen. He recalled, “I took on some shots for trying to keep relations with China. I was offended as anybody else was by the human rights abuses at Tiananmen Square and spoke out on it. But I think it is in the interest

¹⁰⁴⁰ George Bush: "Statement on the Anniversary of the Suppression of the Demonstrations at Tiananmen Square," June 4, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18562>.

¹⁰⁴¹ George Bush: "Statement on the Anniversary of the Suppression of the Demonstrations at Tiananmen Square," June 4, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18562>.

¹⁰⁴² George Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," September 11, 1990. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18820>.

¹⁰⁴³ George Bush: 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union January 29, 1991', *The American Presidency Project* (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253> 6 June 2014).

of the United States to have continued relations with China". These relations with China were to Bush, "vital to this new world order that that veto holding member of the Security Council go along and be with us on these matters of trying to bring peace to troubled corners of the world".¹⁰⁴⁴ With regards to the logic of geopolitics then, China was a "vital" ally in managing "the troubled corners of the world", the periphery of the international system as the US viewed it.

It is worth considering in brief here, before turning to Bill Clinton's Presidency, the arguments of Bush's Secretary of State, James Baker III who published an article in *Foreign Affairs* outlining the administrations broad approach to Asia.¹⁰⁴⁵ He paid homage to the axiom that "America's destiny lies no less across the Pacific than the Atlantic".¹⁰⁴⁶ Baker described how to "visualize the architecture of US engagement in the region, imagine a fan spread wide, with its base in North America and radiating West across the Pacific".¹⁰⁴⁷ Baker drew an analogy between the development of the US frontier in the 19th century and the goal of US regional security ties, "one could draw a 21st century Pacific analogy from a nineteenth-century experience: the development of the American continent".¹⁰⁴⁸ Explicitly here, was the invocation that US perceived expansion across the Pacific as a natural geopolitical process that comprised an essential part of the history within the logic of identity.

Baker captured the historical fluctuations in and orientalist nature of US imaginations of China aptly when he described how the US "view of China has oscillated between extremes of fascination and confrontation...we have long admired China's exotic culture and its hardworking and long suffering people".¹⁰⁴⁹ He continued, "when the Chinese seemed to adopt our principles- either religious or secular – we enthusiastically welcomed them into the fold. But when periodic upheavals led to disappointment and frequently bloodshed,

¹⁰⁴⁴ George Bush: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Meeting of the Economic Club in New York, New York," February 6, 1991. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19288>.

¹⁰⁴⁵ James A. Baker III, 'America in Asia' Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community', *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 1-18

¹⁰⁴⁶ James A. Baker III, 'America in Asia' Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community', *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 1.

¹⁰⁴⁷ James A. Baker III, 'America in Asia' Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community', *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 4.

¹⁰⁴⁸ James A. Baker III, 'America in Asia' Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community', *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 6.

¹⁰⁴⁹ James A. Baker III, 'America in Asia' Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community', *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 15.

Americans felt the anger of rejection – a conversion that failed”.¹⁰⁵⁰ This reflection made explicit what only been implied through the Presidential discourses analysed so far, that the US has attempted to convert China into a mirror image of itself. More significantly, how the US imagined China and how the logics were expressed was contingent on the US interpreted material changes. While stating that “the pendulum of US relations with China must stop its sharp swings”, Baker signalled the enduring importance of the logic of identity in US foreign policy, remarking that “our ideals and values must be an essential part of our engagement with China”.¹⁰⁵¹ Baker’s arguments serve as additional legitimacy to the analysis presented here concerning the multiple logics informing US foreign policy towards China.

8.3 Bill Clinton and The Rise of the ‘Rise of China’

Although not the first to make use of China to attack an incumbent President, Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign in 1991 released a statement chastising Bush for maintaining friendly relations with the “Butcher of Beijing” despite the Chinese state repression in Tiananmen Square.¹⁰⁵² As this section will come to illustrate though, this type of language was not to feature prominently in Clinton’s discourse regarding China.

Speaking with reporters on May 3rd 1993, Clinton channelled Bush’s arguments and claimed “we obviously hope that we can maintain the maximum good relationship with the Chinese. I have no interest in trying to isolate them”.¹⁰⁵³ Turning to the intertwining of the logics of capital and identity Clinton continued, “I’m encouraged by the successes of their economic reforms. And that’s got to be in the interest of the whole world if it is accompanied with responsible behaviour and respect for human rights and movement toward a more democratic society”.¹⁰⁵⁴ Clinton represented a near seamless continuity with the manner in which Bush had approached China even if his emphasis on differences envisioned through the logic of identity initially prevailed.

¹⁰⁵⁰ James A. Baker III, ‘America in Asia’ Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community’, *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 15.

¹⁰⁵¹ James A. Baker III, ‘America in Asia’ Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community’, *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991): 16.

¹⁰⁵² Ted Carpenter, ‘China Bashing: A U.S. political tradition’, *Reuters* (<http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/11/china-bashing-a-political-tradition/> 5 June 2014).

¹⁰⁵³ William J. Clinton: "Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Governor Chris Patten of Hong Kong," May 3, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46509>.

¹⁰⁵⁴ William J. Clinton: "Exchange With Reporters Prior to Discussions With Governor Chris Patten of Hong Kong," May 3, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46509>.

During a town hall meeting on May 27th 1993, Clinton spent time outlining the details of what the Most-Favoured Nation, MFN, status meant in US trade policy with regards to China. Clinton described how “China is a huge trading partner of ours, I think now our second biggest trading deficit, with China just behind Japan. They've got one of the fastest growing economies in the world. They're moving away from communism to market economics very quickly”.¹⁰⁵⁵ Despite the positive change in terms of the logic of capital, Clinton outlined some issues related to the logic of identity that complicated US imaginations of China; he observed, “they still put political prisoners in jail. They still, we think, have used prison labour to make products, and we have some other problems with them”.¹⁰⁵⁶ This was the premise on which Clinton tried to make trade conditional on political reforms. He outlined how “the issue [was] should we revoke that or should we put conditions on it” and he “decided to extend most favoured nation status for a year...to support modernization in China, and it's a great opportunity for America there. But I want to make it clear to them that there has to be some progress on human rights and the use of prison labour”.¹⁰⁵⁷ The logic of capital could then be implemented in a way that would reflect the interests of the logic of identity, and the US could take advantage of a China opportunity, rather than address an explicit China problem.

In a statement on MFN on May 28th 1993, Clinton declared that China’s “future will do much to shape the future of Asia, our security and trade relations in the Pacific, and a host of global issues from the environment to weapons proliferation. In short, our relationship with China is of very great importance”.¹⁰⁵⁸ China in this sense, was fundamental to the success of the US’s more global interests. Commenting on the essential incorporation of China into the international system, Clinton outlined how “China's coastal provinces are an engine for reform throughout the country” and that “the residents of Shanghai and Guangzhou are far more motivated by markets than by Marx or Mao”.¹⁰⁵⁹ China to the US then, was more

¹⁰⁵⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town Meeting," May 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46624>.

¹⁰⁵⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town Meeting," May 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46624>.

¹⁰⁵⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town Meeting," May 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46624>.

¹⁰⁵⁸ William J. Clinton: "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46632>.

¹⁰⁵⁹ William J. Clinton: "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46632>.

capitalist than communist, and as such becoming an increasingly important concern regarding global issues, rather than just regional ones.

Clinton would comment further on the conditions attached to the extension of MFN to China. To Clinton, the US needed to consider “how best to cultivate these hopeful seeds of change in China while expressing our clear disapproval of its repressive policies. The core of this policy will be a resolute insistence upon significant progress on human rights in China”.¹⁰⁶⁰ In an echo of the standards of civilisation once propagated throughout the 19th century by the colonial empires, Clinton stated, “we expect China to meet basic international standards in its treatment of its people, its sales of dangerous arms, and its foreign trade”.¹⁰⁶¹ Significantly, Clinton would draw attention to one of the emerging contradictions regarding the logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China, the tension between domestic interests regarding labour, and international interests regarding the reproduction of capital. Clinton considered how “the large and growing U.S.-China trade deficit is unacceptable. The over \$40 billion trade surplus China has accumulated with the United States since June 1989 has been very destructive to American industries, particularly the textile and footwear sectors, resulting in the loss of American jobs”.¹⁰⁶² The logic of capital then, was to lead to a rendering of China as both opportunity, and potential threat.

In a speech to the Korean National Assembly on July 10th 1993, Clinton took his turn reciting one of the hymns of US Asia policy, “America is, after all, a Pacific nation”.¹⁰⁶³ Clinton made it clear that his approach to China was somewhat ambiguous. He proclaimed, “we believe China cannot be a full partner in the world community until it respects human rights and international agreements on trade and weapon sales. But we also are prepared to involve China in building this region's new security and economic architectures”.¹⁰⁶⁴ Ultimately Clinton would turn to a more contemporary geopolitical mantra, that “we need an involved

¹⁰⁶⁰ William J. Clinton: "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46632>.

¹⁰⁶¹ William J. Clinton: "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46632>.

¹⁰⁶² William J. Clinton: "Report to Congress Concerning Extension of Waiver Authority for the People's Republic of China," May 28, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46635>.

¹⁰⁶³ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul," July 10, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46829>.

¹⁰⁶⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul," July 10, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46829>.

and engaged China, not an isolated China".¹⁰⁶⁵ He would though continue the link between the logic of capital and the logic of identity stating, "we believe their movement toward market reform and decentralization will promote more democracy in China and better policies".¹⁰⁶⁶

Speaking to the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 27th 1993, Clinton outlined his general conception of the forces compelling global economic integration. For Clinton, "from beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over the globe are compelling the world towards integration. These forces are fuelling a welcome explosion of entrepreneurship and political liberalization", those same forces would "also threaten to destroy the insularity and independence of national economies, quickening the pace of change and making many of our people feel more insecure".¹⁰⁶⁷ He argued how "in a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies". This notion of expansion emerged from the logics of capital and identity as Clinton sought to deploy them both to make the world more secure and profitable. Specifically, Clinton described how "during the cold war we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions".¹⁰⁶⁸ The premises of the logic of geopolitics and identity were here linked to that of the logic of capital.

Clinton considered how "there are still those who claim that democracy is simply not applicable to many cultures, and that its recent expansion is an aberration, an accident in history that will soon fade away".¹⁰⁶⁹ His response, would make explicit, the universalising tendencies embedded within the US imagination. He declared, "I agree with President Roosevelt, who once said, 'the democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase of human

¹⁰⁶⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul," July 10, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46829>.

¹⁰⁶⁶ William J. Clinton: "Interview With Timothy Russert and Tom Brokaw on "Meet the Press"," November 7, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46080>.

¹⁰⁶⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.

¹⁰⁶⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.

¹⁰⁶⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.

history. It is human history”¹⁰⁷⁰ In this light, the logic of identity situated the US as embodying the central tenet of human history, the movement towards democracy. It is necessary to stress here, that this thesis is less concerned with whether this statement is true or not, but with how it functions in US foreign policy. This belief then condition how the US would “work to reduce the threat from regimes that are hostile to democracies and to support liberalization of nondemocratic states when they are willing to live in peace with the rest of us”¹⁰⁷¹ The three logics that organised US foreign policy towards China were thus visible in this more general consideration of US foreign policy.

On November 19th 1993, following a meeting with President Jiang Zemin of China, Clinton acknowledged the human rights issues complicating US-China relations while making the case “for greater market access and for the protection of intellectual property rights. I think our trade relationships alone indicate that the United States has not attempted to isolate China but instead has attempted to assist its movement into the global economy”¹⁰⁷² In a rhetorical sleight of hand, Clinton would state, “I do not seek nor would it be proper for the United States or for any other nation to tell a great nation like China how to conduct all its internal affairs or to treat all its citizens or what laws it should have. That would be wrong”¹⁰⁷³ This ran counter to the logic of identity as it had been practised by Clinton himself and his predecessor and relied on the distinction between telling China how to conduct itself, and conditioning how the international system would approach China based on China conducted itself.

Speaking at the Nixon Centre for a Peace and Freedom Policy Conference on March 1st 1995, Clinton captured the sense of triumphalism in the US imagination at the time. He recalled how “the implosion of communism and the explosion of the global economy have brought new freedoms to countries on every continent. Free markets are on the rise. Democracy is

¹⁰⁷⁰ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.

¹⁰⁷¹ Clinton UN speech William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City," September 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47119>.

¹⁰⁷² William J. Clinton: "Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters Following Discussions With President Jiang Zemin of China in Seattle," November 19, 1993. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46139>.

¹⁰⁷³ William J. Clinton: "Interview on CNN's "Global Forum With President Clinton"," May 3, 1994. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50095>.

ascendant”.¹⁰⁷⁴ Through the logics of identity and capital, Clinton rendered the US’s approach to the world a success. He would though, make clear the limits to US foreign policy. He reflected on how:

“We know now, as President Nixon recognized, that there must also be limits to America's involvement in the world's problems, limits imposed by clearheaded evaluation of our fundamental interests. We cannot be the world's policemen. We cannot become involved in every problem we really care about”.¹⁰⁷⁵

Taken in combination with his statements on China, the US had perceived China as a problem it could address and indeed now saw China as an opportunity. In a sense, this statement made clear the limits within each of the logics of capital, geopolitics, and identity.

In a speech to the Pacific Basin Economic Council on May 20th 1996, Clinton recited how the US “must remain an Asia-Pacific power... It is...important to our future prosperity. The Asia-Pacific region is the largest consumer market in the world, accounting already for more than half of our trade and supporting millions of American jobs”.¹⁰⁷⁶ Geography then, was a gateway to the logic of capital and Asia, increasingly necessary to the reproduction of American life. Clinton would reflect on the US response to China’s 1995-96 naval exercises in the Taiwan Straits as an example of how the logic of geopolitics also underpinned US policy towards Taiwan in light of China. He recalled how “when China expanded its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, we made clear that any use of force against Taiwan would have grave consequences. The two carrier battle groups we sent to the area helped to defuse a dangerous situation and demonstrated to our allies our commitment to stability and peace in the region”. The link between geopolitics and the imperatives identity was visible in his remarks that “in the long run, we also strengthen security by deepening the roots of democracy in Asia”.¹⁰⁷⁷ Clinton outlined how the expansion of democracy compelled by the logic of identity would also exert an influence on the political stability of the region.

¹⁰⁷⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference," March 1, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51049>.

¹⁰⁷⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference," March 1, 1995. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=51049>.

¹⁰⁷⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council," May 20, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52835>.

¹⁰⁷⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council," May 20, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52835>.

Clinton made clear that despite these tensions, US relations with China, now the most important globally, would shape the global future.¹⁰⁷⁸ When reflecting on how China would choose to define itself he asked, “will it choose the course of openness and integration or veer toward isolation and nationalism? Will it be a force for stability or a force for disruption in the world?” These concerns captured US uncertainty about what China might become. To that end, Clinton claimed US “interests are directly at stake in promoting a secure, stable, open, and prosperous China, a China that embraces international non-proliferation, and trade rules, cooperates in regional and global security initiatives, and evolves toward greater respect for the basic rights of its own citizens”.¹⁰⁷⁹ The logics of US foreign policy towards China then, compelled transformative policies. Perhaps, the most acute manner to summarise this was Clinton’s remarks regarding how “China has become our fastest growing export market” and that revoking MFN status from China “would cede one of the fastest growing markets to our competitors”.¹⁰⁸⁰ The logic of capital remained the major conditioning imperative in US foreign policy towards China.

In an interview on July 15th 1996 Clinton reflected on the tension between the US preference for expanding democracies and meeting its economic interests, a tension essentially between the logics of identity and capital. He claimed that the US believed “over the long run between the United States and China, the thing that’s most important is democracy, because I think the freer the people are the more likely they will be to be responsible partners”.¹⁰⁸¹ To Clinton the implication of that was “we should subordinate our economic goals, or we should withhold most-favoured-nation status from them and not treat them like ordinary partners if they’re not as democratic as we think they should be”. He disagreed with this notion that “imposing some sort of economic sanctions will not make China more democratic” and believed that “they’re more likely to become democratic if they progress economically, if we have regular relationships with them... So I believe that economic development and democracy will go

¹⁰⁷⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council," May 20, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52835>.

¹⁰⁷⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council," May 20, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52835>.

¹⁰⁸⁰ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Pacific Basin Economic Council," May 20, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=52835>.

¹⁰⁸¹ William J. Clinton: "Interview With Tom Brokaw of MSNBC's "InterNight"," July 15, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53067>.

hand in hand".¹⁰⁸² To Clinton then, the tension between the logic of capital and of identity could be overcome as viewed them as mutually serving the imperatives of the other.

In his State of the Union address on February 4th 1997, Clinton set out the importance of China to US foreign policy. He announced that the US:

“must look to the East no less than to the West. Our security demands it. Americans fought three wars in Asia in this century. Our prosperity requires it... We must pursue a deeper dialog with China for the sake of our interests and our ideals. An isolated China is not good for America; a China playing its proper role in the world is”.¹⁰⁸³

China in this line of argument was necessary within the logics of geopolitics and capital. In terms of security, Clinton would expand this to include environmental concerns. During a speech to the Business Roundtable on June 12th 1997, Clinton recalled a conversation with Jiang Zemin worth presenting here at length:

“I had an interesting conversation with Jiang Zemin in New York about a year ago, when he said, ‘I don't want you to have a containment policy toward China.’ ...I said, ‘I don't want to have a containment policy toward China.’ I said, ‘My biggest worry about you is that you'll get rich the same way we did. And if you do that, you might burn the air up because you've got 1.2 billion people.’ And we need to find an environmentally responsible way for China to grow”.¹⁰⁸⁴

This strand of reasoning forms the basis for what might be considered a globally orientated logic of environmentalism. This logic was very much concerned with the responsibility for maintaining and preserving the basic conditions for life and material existence. This is more than just a consideration of the environment but encapsulates the broader requirements and policies needed to sustain the environmental conditions for human life. This logic might also interact more broadly with the other three logics I focus on but in terms of US presidential discourses on China remains for the most part subsidiary.

Speaking on October 24th 1997 to the Asia Society, Clinton restated his preference for a “China as a power that is stable, open, and nonaggressive, that embraces free markets, political pluralism, and the rule of law, that works with us to build a secure international order, that kind of China, rather than a China turned inward and confrontational, is deeply in

¹⁰⁸² William J. Clinton: "Interview With Tom Brokaw of MSNBC's "InterNight", July 15, 1996. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53067>.

¹⁰⁸³ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," February 4, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53358>.

¹⁰⁸⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Business Roundtable," June 12, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=54256>.

the interests of the American people".¹⁰⁸⁵ These remarks again reveal the expression of three logics of capital, geopolitics and identity. In a notable elaboration, Clinton described how the construction and maintenance of a secure international order "will be much easier if China is a part of that process, not only playing by the rules of international behaviour but helping to write and enforce them".¹⁰⁸⁶ China was no longer to merely participate in the reproduction of international order, but was being encouraged to shape that international order. This included confronting the issue of climate change and its relationship to the logic of capital as Clinton remarked that the US "has a profound interest in ensuring that today's progress does not come at tomorrow's expense...China is the fastest growing contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, and we are the biggest greenhouse gas emitter".¹⁰⁸⁷ Implicitly then, Clinton saw the US and China being fundamental to addressing the climate change.

During a news conference with Jiang Zemin on October 29th 1997, Clinton exemplified how the logic of capital shaped US reasoning. He described how "access to China's market remains restricted for many America goods and services...the United States will do everything possible to bring China into the World Trade Organization as soon as possible, provided China improves access to its market".¹⁰⁸⁸ Market access remained a priority for the US. Clinton would also again repeat his concerns regarding climate change and retelling how he "also discussed with President Jiang the special responsibility our nations bear, as the top two emitters of greenhouse gases, to lead in finding a global solution to the global problem of climate change".¹⁰⁸⁹ It is now apparent that as his Presidency went on Clinton became more concerned with how the US and China could act on climate change, a concern that exists independently of the three main logics I articulate here.

In an interview on June 19th 1998, Clinton reflected on how China considered the issue of instability. He argued that to China "instability in the context of their history is something that

¹⁰⁸⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Asia Society and the United States-China Education Foundation Board," October 24, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53450>.

¹⁰⁸⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Asia Society and the United States-China Education Foundation Board," October 24, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53450>.

¹⁰⁸⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the Asia Society and the United States-China Education Foundation Board," October 24, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53450>.

¹⁰⁸⁸ William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference with President Jiang Zemin of China," October 29, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53468>.

¹⁰⁸⁹ William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference with President Jiang Zemin of China," October 29, 1997. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53468>.

was just around the corner, only yesterday. And it becomes a significant problem".¹⁰⁹⁰ He would also describe a Chinese "psyche, which is very much seared with past instabilities".¹⁰⁹¹ He would return to these concerns again in an interview with Radio Free Asia on June 24th 1998, stating, "countries are like people; they have a collective memory".¹⁰⁹² Displaying what has been a growing US sensitivity to China's perspective on international politics, Clinton stated, "to deal with nations effectively when you have differences with them, it's important to understand what their worst nightmare is. Because if we're dominated by our nightmares, we make decisions that are not rational in the eyes of other people".¹⁰⁹³ Specifically to China Clinton described how "their worst nightmare is disintegration, you know, because they have these memories of when China was weakened and vulnerable to foreign attack, vulnerable to government by warlords, vulnerable to the opium trade, vulnerable to everything because of the disintegration of the central authority". What this constitutes is an increasing sense of reflectivity in US imaginations of China. Similar thoughts were expressed by Johnson and Nixon, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively, and thus constitute a growing complexity in the logics of US foreign policy towards China. A sense that China is not merely to be acted on or towards, but engaged with on terms of equal agency.

The fundamental point of this critical reflection for Clinton was in the context of China's territorial sovereignty. An issue that permeates US concern for China from McKinley to Clinton to varying degrees of priority. Clinton would remark:

"to an outsider who knows nothing of China's history, the importance to China, which is so large and so big, of the "one China" policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, of getting back Hong Kong, of making sure that nothing could ever happen and Tibet—to promote any separatism. To us, we see only the downsides of those things. To them, a lot of the things they do which to us are unacceptable, they do, I believe, because they're too much in the grip of the historic memory of disintegration".¹⁰⁹⁴

If this historical reflexivity is to be located anywhere, it is in the logics of identity and geopolitics as a consideration of how China conceives of its own geopolitical interests and sense of place in the world.

¹⁰⁹⁰ William J. Clinton: "Interview With the Los Angeles Times, Bloomberg Business News, and Business Week," June 19, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56208>.

¹⁰⁹¹ William J. Clinton: "Interview With the Los Angeles Times, Bloomberg Business News, and Business Week," June 19, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56208>.

¹⁰⁹² William J. Clinton: "Interview With Radio Free Asia," June 24, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56201>.

¹⁰⁹³ William J. Clinton: "Interview With Radio Free Asia," June 24, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56201>.

¹⁰⁹⁴ William J. Clinton: "Interview With Radio Free Asia," June 24, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56201>.

When taking questions from students at Beijing University on June 29th 1998, Clinton sought to establish a historical narrative regarding US-China relations. He made it clear the US was not trying to contain China, “do I really want to contain China? The answer is no”.¹⁰⁹⁵ The logic of geopolitics has been undergoing a reconfiguration from Nixon’s Presidency until now where the US did not want to contain China, but was more concerned with transforming China into a reliable international partner in the administration of the international system. Despite how the relationship had “been interrupted from time to time when we have had problems...if you go back through the history of our country, there's always been a feeling on the part of our people that we ought to be close to the Chinese people”.¹⁰⁹⁶ This administration was becoming most apparent with regards to the environment as Clinton, in a speech to the people of Guilin in Southern China on July 2nd 1998, would again emphasise. Describing common US-China interests in a variety of economic and security issues Clinton declared “a big part of that cooperation must rest on our common understanding that we live on the same planet, sharing the same oceans and breathing the same air”.¹⁰⁹⁷

In a major speech on US foreign policy in San Francisco on February 26th 1999, Clinton outlined his vision for US foreign policy and declared, “for the first time since before the rise of fascism early in this century, there is no overriding threat to our survival or freedom”.¹⁰⁹⁸ For Clinton, “the world clearly is coming together... the United States has the opportunity and, I would argue, the solemn responsibility to shape a more peaceful, prosperous, democratic world in the 21st century”.¹⁰⁹⁹ Without a clearly defined other in the form of enemy with which to define US identity against, Clinton saw the expansion of democratic states as the overarching imperative in US foreign policy. He saw this “coming together”, by way of the logic of capital, as reflected in arguments made by McKinley almost a century previous. The McKinley passage captured the essence of what Clinton saw as globalisation:

¹⁰⁹⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Students at Beijing University in Beijing, China," June 29, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56236>.

¹⁰⁹⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Students at Beijing University in Beijing, China," June 29, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56236>.

¹⁰⁹⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the People of Guilin," July 2, 1998. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56254>.

¹⁰⁹⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

¹⁰⁹⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

“The world's products are exchanged as never before and with increasing transportation comes increasing knowledge and larger trade. We travel greater distances in a shorter space of time and with more ease than was ever dreamed of. The same important news is read, though in different languages, the same day, in all the world. Isolation is no longer possible. No nation can longer be indifferent to any other.’ That was said by President William McKinley 100 years ago”.¹¹⁰⁰

As Clinton remarked, “what we now call globalization was well underway even then. We, in fact, had more diplomatic posts in the world than we have today, and foreign investment actually played a larger role in our own economy than it does today”.¹¹⁰¹ Isolation in an economic and geopolitical sense was impossible under Clinton’s reasoning.

Turning his attention to China he reiterated a long US narrative with regards to managing Chinese political developments remarking “I do not believe we can hope to bring change to China if we isolate China from the forces of change”.¹¹⁰² He had made this point earlier in the year during his State of the Union address where he argued that “stability can no longer be bought at the expense of liberty...It's important not to isolate China. The more we bring China into the world, the more the world will bring change and freedom to China”.¹¹⁰³ The impossibility of isolation featured in Clinton’s considerations of China. He discussed how “the question China faces is how best to assure its stability and progress. Will it choose openness and engagement? Or will it choose to limit the aspirations of its people without fully embracing the global rules of the road? In my judgment, only the first path can really answer the challenges China faces”.¹¹⁰⁴ This open engagement though would also require the transformation of Chinese society as Clinton observed, “we can see in China the kinds of problems a society faces when it is moving away from the rule of fear but is not yet rooted in the rule of law”.¹¹⁰⁵ The logic of capital now perceived what had previously been thought

¹¹⁰⁰ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

¹¹⁰¹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

¹¹⁰² William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

¹¹⁰³ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 19, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

¹¹⁰⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

¹¹⁰⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on United States Foreign Policy in San Francisco," February 26, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57170>.

necessary to the reproduction of US capital and its way of life, as part of an increasingly inevitable trajectory regarding increasing international interdependence.

In April 1999, in a speech at U.S. Institute for Peace focused on the US relationship with China, Clinton repeated his earlier declaration that “we all know it's an extraordinary moment when there is no overriding threat to our security, when no great power need feel that any other is a military threat, when freedom is expanding, and open markets and technology are raising living standards on every continent, bringing the world closer together in countless ways”.¹¹⁰⁶ Observing that “we all know that perceptions affect policies. And American perceptions about China have often changed in this century”, Clinton captured succinctly the manner in which US perceptions had shifted over the century:

“In the early 1900's, most Americans saw China through the eyes of missionaries seeking open hearts or traders seeking open markets. During World War II, China was our ally, during the Korean War, our adversary. During the cold war, we debated whether China was a solid stone in the monolith of world communism or a country with interests and traditions that could make it a counterweight to Soviet power”.¹¹⁰⁷

If one considers Clinton’s description as an archaeology of US imaginations of China, it is the logics I outline that underpin these interpretations of what China meant for the US. Clinton outlined how “more recently, many Americans have looked to China to see either the world's next great capitalist tiger and an enormous mother lode of economic opportunity for American companies and American workers or the world's largest great Communist dragon and next great threat to freedom and security”.¹¹⁰⁸ The debate then was very much between how to understand the US in terms of the logics of capital and geopolitics.

In one of the more reflective and insightful Presidential remarks included in this thesis Clinton considered how “for a long time, it seems to me, we have argued about China with competing caricatures. Is this a country to be engaged or isolated? Is this a country beyond our power to influence or a country that is ours to gain and ours to lose?”.¹¹⁰⁹ His concern was with the confinements these limited binaries produced for US foreign policy. He considered how “now we hear that China is a country to be feared” and that “a growing number of people

¹¹⁰⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹⁰⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹⁰⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹⁰⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

say that it is the next great threat to our security and our wellbeing".¹¹¹⁰ Setting out the premise of the argument that China might become an enemy for the US Clinton reflects on how "those who say it point out, factually, that if China's economy continues to grow on its present trajectory, it will be the world's largest in the next century. They argue, correctly, that the Chinese Government often defines its interests in ways sharply divergent from ours. They are concerned, rightly, by Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan and at others. From this they conclude that China is or will be our enemy".¹¹¹¹ Clinton argues that proponents of the line of thinking that "China could pursue such a course, pouring much more of its wealth into military might and into traditional great power geopolitics" are "acting as if that decision has already been made".¹¹¹² To Clinton then, the logic of geopolitics need not inevitably lead to enmity and conflict.

Setting out the case for engagement with China, Clinton states he is aware that "this approach will clearly put us at odds with those who believe America must always have a great enemy." Clinton considered the question of "how can you be the great force for good in the world and justify all the things you do if you don't have a great enemy?" and responded succinctly, "I don't believe that".¹¹¹³ In one of his most significant contributions to US thought on China, Clinton considers the issue of perception in how the US imagines China. What he draws close to here is reflecting on how the logics of US foreign policy shape how the US imagines China as a knowable object in international politics, and how the logics condition what the subsequent policies might be. Clinton argues,

"we should not look at China through rose-colored glasses, nor should we look through a glass darkly to see an image that distorts China's strength and ignores its complexities. We need to see China clearly, its progress and its problems, its system and its strains, its policies and its perceptions of us, of itself, of the world".¹¹¹⁴

The assumption that the US could objectively capture what China is and how it thinks reflects Clinton's previous remarks concerning the need to take into account China's history and fears of instability. What Clinton makes the case for, is that three logics that underpin US foreign

¹¹¹⁰ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹¹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹² William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹³ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

policy towards China can demonstrate a sense of reflexivity that begins to account for China's experience and perspective.

Clinton warns of the potential geopolitical risks “of a weak China, beset by internal conflicts, social dislocation, and criminal activity, becoming a vast zone of instability in Asia”.¹¹¹⁵ The potential for lies in what Clinton summarises as “in short, we're seeing in China the kinds of problems a society can face when it is moving away from the rule of fear but is not yet firmly rooted in the rule of law”.¹¹¹⁶ The logic of geopolitics then infers that the US desires a political stable and ‘strong’ China. What he calls for then is to “continue a policy of principled, purposeful engagement with China's leaders and China's people... That is the purpose of engagement: not to insulate our relationship from the consequences of Chinese actions but to use our relationship to influence China's actions in a way that advances our values and our interests”.¹¹¹⁷ He also draws on the logic of capital to make the case for China joining the World Trade Organization, “if China is willing to play by the global rules of trade, it would be an inexplicable mistake for the United States to say no.”¹¹¹⁸ The logic of capital under Clinton is now explicitly concern with encouraging China to adopt “the global rules of trade”, essentially acquiescing to a US organised regime of trade. Again though the broader emphasis is on producing a certain type of China as global actor.

Clinton also frames what has been generally considered by this thesis as issues related to the logic of identity as necessary to the logic of capital and US economic interest in China. Clinton described how “encouraging China to respect the human rights of its people and to give them a chance to shape the political destiny of their country...cuts to the heart of our concerns about China's future”. He continued, emphasising the economic benefits of a democratic society, “because wealth is generated by ideas today, China will be less likely to succeed if its people cannot exchange information freely. China also will be less likely to succeed if it does not build the legal and political foundation to compete for global capital, less likely to succeed if its political system does not gain the legitimacy that comes from

¹¹¹⁵ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹¹⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

democratic choice”.¹¹¹⁹ What was the domain of the logic of identity, a concern for spreading democracy and rule of law, becomes complimentary to US interest in the conditions for circulating and reproducing US capital.

In a statement reflecting what is sometimes called the unipolar moment¹¹²⁰, Clinton argued that the US “is at the height of its power and the peak of its prosperity. Democratic values are ascendant throughout much of the world. And while we cannot know where China is heading for sure, the forces pulling China toward integration and openness are more powerful today than ever before”.¹¹²¹ As shown above, Clinton had dismissed the idea that “America must always have a great enemy”, but what his description of the US-China relationship betrayed, was a growing concern with China and its relationship to the US.¹¹²² It was not that China was becoming an enemy in conventional terms, but that China is becoming the US’s significant other. This speech by Clinton are emblematic of the growing relevance of China in US conceptions of itself and its perceived role in the world. What the speech also marks is the beginning of a transition from the triumphant delirium of a post-Cold War world with no clear enemies to the emerging concern with China’s global role and what this might mean for the US, despite the sense of inevitability Clinton ascribes to the forces of integration and globalisation. What Clinton also exemplified here, was the manner in which the logics of US foreign policy towards China could be modified to consider how China might perceive the world. What remains though, is the fundamental way in which concerns about the need for circulating US capital, regional geopolitical concerns and the imperatives of US identity conditioned US foreign policy towards China.

In a news conference with Premier Zhu Rongji on April 8th 1999 Clinton outlined the geopolitical and economic benefits of close cooperation with China, “, we have lessened the tensions on the Korean Peninsula for several years. China has participated with us in any number of arms control initiatives...China is a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And China has worked very hard...to stabilize the Asian economy at a time when it

¹¹¹⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹²⁰ Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1990): 23-33; Hal Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016)

¹¹²¹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

¹¹²² William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368>.

was not only hurting people in Asia but it was beginning to affect the American economy".¹¹²³ Clinton would go on to situate these recent benefits in a longer-term narrative:

"Since 1784, Chinese and Americans have shared a lively dialog over how to achieve common cause in the countless pursuits that animate great nations. Thomas Jefferson took care to promote what he called "good dispositions" between the United States and China. Abraham Lincoln, in his first annual message to Congress, predicted our extensive trade with China. And of course, Franklin Roosevelt made it America's purpose to join with China in defence of freedom".¹¹²⁴

The benefits of contemporary cooperation, the historical lineage of US interest and concern for China and the potential economic advantages of increased trade with China helped to underpin US foreign policy towards China. In his 2000 State of the Union Address Clinton summarised his overarching approach to China and Russia when he declared, "we must continue to encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, prosperous, democratic nations".¹¹²⁵ These sentiments reflected the convergence of the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity in US foreign policy towards China. In a sense, the US was achieving benefits that Clinton suggests had long been projected by past US Presidents.

In another key speech on US foreign policy at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies on March 8th 2000, Clinton reiterated many of the key themes of his San Francisco speech the previous year. He emphasised the logic of capital when he declared that the US had "signed the agreement to bring China into the WTO on terms that will open its market to American products and investments".¹¹²⁶ For Clinton this marked the logical outcome of the longer term US policy since Nixon to transform China. Clinton argued that the China's entry "represents the most significant opportunity that we have had to create positive change in China since the 1970's, when President Nixon first went there, and later in the decade when President Carter normalized relations".¹¹²⁷ Clinton spoke of what he saw as the one constant in US imaginations of China. He explained how "we understand that America

¹¹²³ William J. Clinton: "The President's News Conference With Premier Zhu Rongji of China," April 8, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57373>.

¹¹²⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the State Dinner Honoring Premier Zhu Rongji of China," April 8, 1999. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57376>.

¹¹²⁵ William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 27, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58708>.

¹¹²⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

¹¹²⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

has a profound stake in what happens in China and how China relates to the rest of the world. That's why, for 30 years, every President, without regard to party, has worked for a China that contributes to the stability of Asia, that is open to the world, that upholds the rule of law at home and abroad".¹¹²⁸ In effect, Clinton argued here that the logics of capital and geopolitics had remained consistently prominent since Nixon's initiatives to re-establish relations with China in the early 1970s.

Clinton would again reflect on the historical variations in how the US imagined China. He considered how "for a long time now, the United States has debated its relationship with China, through all the changes, particularly, of the last century. And like all human beings everywhere, we see this relationship through the prism of our own experience". He captured here, how the logic of identity often provided the overall framework through which the US imagined China, even if its interests were compelled by the other two logics. He expanded on the archaeology that he previously offered recounting how:

"In the early 1900's, most Americans saw China either through the eyes of traders seeking new markets or missionaries seeking new converts. During World War II, China was our ally; during the Korean war, our adversary. At the dawn of the cold war, when I was a young boy beginning to study such things, it was a cudgel in a political battle: Who lost China? Later, it was a counterweight to the Soviet Union. And now, in some people's eyes, it's a caricature. Will it be the next great capitalist tiger with the biggest market in the world, or the world's last great communist dragon and a threat to stability in Asia?"¹¹²⁹

What is significant is how Clinton's formulation of the history of US imaginations of China encompasses the three logics of explanation I argue for in this thesis. In Clinton's era then, the question remained whether China should be considered a necessary ally or would become a threat to Asian geopolitical stability. This question represented the tension between the logic of capital in US foreign policy as China being potentially necessary to the reproduction of US capital and capitalism in a more global sense, and some of the tendencies in the logic of geopolitics that potential challengers to US geopolitical hegemony needed to be confronted. Clinton, like his more immediate predecessors following Nixon, prioritised the logic of capital and engagement with China over the isolation of the 1950s.

To this end, Clinton positioned China adopting the qualities necessary to participate in the liberal international order the US was attempting to foster after the Cold War. He remarked

¹¹²⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

¹¹²⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

how “by joining the WTO, China [was] not simply agreeing to import more of our products; it [was] agreeing to import one of democracy's most cherished values, economic freedom”.¹¹³⁰ Clinton saw the logics of capital and identity as contributing to China’s increasing involvement in the liberal order. He also restated the reasoning that “the more China liberalises its economy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people...and when individuals have the power not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a greater say”.¹¹³¹ To Clinton, political freedom thus necessary followed economic freedom exhibiting the corollary relationship between US interests, with regards to the logics of capital and identity. In one of the more colourful metaphors, Clinton inferred to the inevitability of political freedom describing how “there's no question China has been trying to crackdown on the Internet. Good luck! [Laughter] That's sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall”.¹¹³² China, despite its efforts could not, according to Clinton, escape from the liberal teleology emerging from the logics of capital and identity as expressed towards China where economic freedoms inevitably lead to demands for greater political freedoms.

In a statement on the need for permanent normal trade relations with China, Clinton outlined how better market access to China would help to alleviate US anxiety over globalization. He described how “people are anxiety ridden about the forces of globalization, or they're frustrated over the human rights record of China, or they don't like all the procedures of the WTO”.¹¹³³ Clinton was attempting to mediate the domestic and international tensions within the logic of capital. He tried to explain how what the US was giving is “China membership in the WTO in return for greater access to their markets, the right to sell things there without having to manufacture things there”.¹¹³⁴ Significantly, Clinton also tied the logic of capital to concerns within the logic of geopolitics. He declared that he also thought China’s ascension to the WTO as “more important for our national security. Why? Because if we let China in the

¹¹³⁰ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

¹¹³¹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

¹¹³² William J. Clinton: "Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies," March 8, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87714>.

¹¹³³ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," May 9, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58457>.

¹¹³⁴ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," May 9, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58457>.

WTO, they will be inside the world trading system. They will have a strong interest in working with other people and cooperating with other people. They will have a strong disincentive not to have trouble with Taiwan, even though there's a lot of tension between the two of them".¹¹³⁵ In a plea to Congress to approve the WTO agreement, Clinton argued that "if you want to reduce tensions along the Taiwan Strait, if you want a more stable Asia, if you want to maximize the chances of avoiding proliferation of dangerous weapons and a new arms race, a yes is the right vote".¹¹³⁶ Engaging with China in an economic sense, would thus also address some of the imperatives within the logics of identity and geopolitics.

Clinton would again emphasise the varying benefits of increased trade with China, including the potential to continue shaping China's international policies. He described how, reminiscent of the early 20th century beliefs that, "with more than a billion people, China is the largest new market in the world. Our administration has negotiated an agreement which will open China's markets to American products made on American soil, everything from corn to chemicals to computers".¹¹³⁷ To Clinton, it was clear that the logic of capital took priority in conditioning US foreign policy towards China. Clinton would also note though, that what the US has "granted is full membership in the WTO, which brings China into a rule-based international system".¹¹³⁸ In terms of the logics of geopolitics and capital, Clinton argued that this rule-based system would benefit from China's increasing participation but would also condition China's politics in a way concordant with the logic of identity in US foreign policy. The intertwining of these logics was apparent in the following statement that "the more China is involved in the global economy, the global society, the more likely it is to change and become more democratic, to become more open, to become more transparent, and to become a better partner instead of a competitor with us in the Pacific region".¹¹³⁹ Clinton

¹¹³⁵ William J. Clinton: "Opening Remarks at a Roundtable Discussion in Akron on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," May 12, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58140>.

¹¹³⁶ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," May 18, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58503>.

¹¹³⁷ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on House of Representatives Action on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," May 24, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58543>.

¹¹³⁸ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on House of Representatives Action on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," May 24, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58543>.

¹¹³⁹ William J. Clinton: "Remarks in Tampa, Florida, on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," July 31, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1501>.

here was expressing the possibility that China could be a geopolitical and economic partner and ally, rather than an enemy or competitor.

This partnership, and incorporation of China into the liberal, rules based order represented to Clinton the logical outcomes of US policy since Nixon. He reconstructed this linear narrative when celebrating granting China Permanent Normal Trade status declaring that:

“this is a great day for the United States and a hopeful day for the 21st century world. This signing ceremony marks the culmination of efforts begun almost 30 years ago by President Nixon, built on by President Carter, who normalized our relations with China, pursued firmly by Presidents of both parties to normalize ties with China in ways that preserve our interests and advance our values”.¹¹⁴⁰

These remarks reflected the self-propelling sense of expansion across the Pacific within the logic of geopolitics that the US had expressed towards Asia and China since the 19th century. Clinton’s foreign policy towards China then, was characterised by the convergence of the three logics of capital, geopolitics and identity within US imaginations of China.

8.4 The Ambiguity of George W. Bush’s China

While George W. Bush was still Governor of Texas and campaigning for the Republican Presidential nomination he gave a wide-ranging speech outlining what he saw as “a distinctly American internationalism” at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library on November 19th 1999. It was an attempt to affirm his foreign policy credentials but would also offer significant insight into his foreign policy preferences when President.¹¹⁴¹ Most notable, was the manner in which US foreign policy was framed through the logic of identity, in a much more explicit manner than previously. Bush described how “some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and American interests – between who we are and how we act. But the choice is false. America, by definition and destiny, promotes freedom”.¹¹⁴² He argued that the US had a tendency to withdrawal and drift where instead, “foreign policy must be more than the management of crisis”.¹¹⁴³ He described his approach as “idealism, without illusions.

¹¹⁴⁰ William J. Clinton: "Remarks on Signing Legislation on Permanent Normal Trade Relations With China," October 10, 2000. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1246>.

¹¹⁴¹ “Bush lays out foreign policy vision, November 19th 1999”, *CNN* (<http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/11/19/bush.speech/index.html> October 17 2014).

¹¹⁴² ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

¹¹⁴³ ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

Confidence, without conceit. Realism, in service of American ideals”.¹¹⁴⁴ This amounts to what is now described as neo-conservatism. A militaristic liberalism in other words.¹¹⁴⁵ Bush wanted US foreign policy to be about more than the administration or management of international order and through the logic of identity the US could present a transformative foreign policy.

He described Europe and Asia as “the world’s strategic heartland” and outlined how “China is a competitor, not a strategic partner. We must deal with China without ill-will-but without illusions”.¹¹⁴⁶ This was a clear break from Clinton’s rendering of China as a partner. Bush would allude to the changing imaginations of China in US discourse over the preceding century. Bush remarked how “China, in particular, has taken different shapes in different eyes at different times. An empire to be divided. A door to be opened. A model of collective conformity. A diplomatic card to be played. One year, it is said to be run by ‘the butchers of Beijing’. A few years later, the same administration pronounces it a ‘strategic partner’.”¹¹⁴⁷ He was implying a sense of contradiction in Clinton’s foreign policy and that China should be understood more as foe than ally. Deploying a more extensive logic of identity Bush would situate the China as implicitly threatening to the US.

In an early pronouncement of a now common axiom, Bush declared that “China is rising, and that is inevitable”. He denounced China as “an enemy of religious freedom” and that “it will be unthreatened but not unchecked”.¹¹⁴⁸ In line with the logic of identity, he declared, “China will know that America’s values are always part of America’s agenda”. In similar reasoning to Clinton and Reagan, Bush stated that “the case for trade is not just monetary, but moral. Economic freedom creates habits of liberty”.¹¹⁴⁹ Although he continued the policy of engaging China economically to foster change, there was a new degree of hostility in his

¹¹⁴⁴ ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

¹¹⁴⁵ Danny Cooper, *Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012).

¹¹⁴⁶ ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

¹¹⁴⁷ ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

¹¹⁴⁸ ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

¹¹⁴⁹ ‘Governor George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

remarks. In reference to criticisms of the US as an empire, Bush claimed US aims were not imperial and “America has never been an empire”. He attempted to outline a middle way between isolationism and empire calling for the US to “reject the blinders of isolationism, just as we refuse the crown of empire”. The significance of identity for Bush was clear when he called for “an American foreign policy that reflects American character”.¹¹⁵⁰ If the US was not an empire in the strict territorial sense, Bush outlined his vision for a US that would not so much be the policeman of the world, but its architect, engineer and priest. The sense of mutual engagement and friendship that Clinton had articulated was increasingly replaced by abrasiveness, albeit still situated within the logics of geopolitics and identity.

Although Bush appeared to chart a more adversarial approach while campaigning he repeated many of the traditional mantras now in US imaginations of China. On March 22nd 2001, Bush proclaimed that “China is a great country, China has got vast potential, and we’ve got common interests in China”.¹¹⁵¹ This “vast potential” reflected the historical interest the US had in China with regards to potential economic benefits, but its potential for social and political transformation. This included Bush’s comments on the aftermath of a fighter plane incident on April 1st 2001, where a US intelligence aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter jet off the coast of the Chinese island Hainan resulting in the death of a Chinese pilot. Bush made clear, in reference to the US aircrew being held captive that “the message to the Chinese is: We should not let this incident destabilize relations. Our relationship with China is very important, but they need to realize that it's time for our people to be home”.¹¹⁵² Despite the potential for a more extensive conflict, Bush affirmed the importance of the US-China relationship.

Bush would describe this relationship predominantly through the logic of capital as he remarked, “China ought to be a trading partner of ours. I think it's in our economic interests to open up the Chinese markets to U.S. products—to U.S. agricultural products”.¹¹⁵³ Bush

¹¹⁵⁰ ‘Governor George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999’, *Mount Holyoke*.
<https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.

¹¹⁵¹ George W. Bush: “Remarks Prior to Discussions With Vice Premier Qian Qichen of China and an Exchange With Reporters,” March 22, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45800>.

¹¹⁵² George W. Bush: “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” April 5, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45678>.

¹¹⁵³ George W. Bush: “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper Editors,” April 5, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45678>.

repeated the close link between the logic of capital and the logic of identity affirming the Clinton position when he stated, “I not only believe it's in our economic interest, I believe it's in our interest to promote U.S. values. And I believe the marketplace promotes the values. When people get a taste of freedom in the marketplace, they tend to demand other freedoms in their societies. And so, I'm an advocate of China's entering into the WTO”.¹¹⁵⁴ The imperatives of the logic of capital, spreading democracy and promoting US ‘values’ could be achieved through the logic of capital. In a curious and in some ways tragic stumble, Bush tried to make clear that his administration saw the relationship with China in more antagonistic terms than the Clinton administration. He remarked, “China is a strategic partner—I mean, strategic competitor. But that doesn't mean we can't find areas in which we can partner, and the economy's a place where we can partner”.¹¹⁵⁵ The space for cooperation remained even if Bush was attempting to indicate a few degrees more suspicion of China.

On May 29th 2001, in Los Angeles, Bush reiterated his stance on the close relationship between the imperatives of the logics of capital and identity. Broadly, he described how “the growth of the world economy depends on world trade. The growth of world trade depends on American leadership. And America will lead toward freer trade, toward wider and more lasting prosperity for ourselves and for the world”.¹¹⁵⁶ What this meant in terms of China was that “open trade is a force for freedom in China, a force for stability in Asia, and a force for prosperity in the United States”.¹¹⁵⁷ The logics of capital, geopolitics and identity were all present in the Bush China discourse. Importantly, Bush also reflected on the significance of China for the everyday social reproduction of US citizens observing, “Trade is in the interests of American consumers, especially those who live from paycheck to paycheck and depend on inexpensive goods from China to enhance their quality of life”.¹¹⁵⁸ This reveals the contemporary configuration of the logic of capital in US imaginations of China. If at the end

¹¹⁵⁴ George W. Bush: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper Editors," April 5, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45678>.

¹¹⁵⁵ George W. Bush: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the American Society of Newspaper Editors," April 5, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45678>.

¹¹⁵⁶ George W. Bush: "Remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, California," May 29, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45922>.

¹¹⁵⁷ George W. Bush: "Remarks to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, California," May 29, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45922>.

¹¹⁵⁸ George W. Bush: "Statement on Renewal of Normal Trade Relations Status for China," June 1, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45928>.

of the 19th century the US was searching for markets to invest surplus capital and sell surplus produce, Chinese labour had now become essential to the reproduction of the American way of life domestically. This was a tension, between the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity, which would expand through the Obama Presidency, discussed in the following chapter, as a contradiction without any apparent synthesis or resolution.

During a meeting with Chinese President Jiang on October 19th 2001, Bush set out the broad US interests towards China. He remarked, “China is a great power, and America wants a constructive relationship with China. We welcome a China that is a full member of the world community, that is at peace with its neighbours”.¹¹⁵⁹ Bush also made the claim, premised on the logics of capital and identity that “in the long run, the advance of Chinese prosperity depends on China's full integration into the rules and norms of international institutions. And in the long run, economic freedom and political freedom will go hand in hand”.¹¹⁶⁰ He would also later observe while speaking at Tsinghua University in Beijing on February 22nd 2002 that, “China is on a rising path, and America welcomes the emergence of a strong and peaceful and prosperous China”.¹¹⁶¹ This sense of China on the rise, prevalent in popular commentary on China had yet to be articulated meaningfully in official US discourses. The spatial implications of a rising China though, reflected more the temporal premises of development, where China was catching up to a certain stage of modern development rather reaching a certain plane of the spatial.

During a commencement address at West Point Military Academy on June 1st 2002, Bush traversed the arguments of Fukuyama’s end of history narrative and the triumph of liberal democracy and free markets.¹¹⁶² He described how “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, and private property and free

¹¹⁵⁹ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Jiang Zemin of China in Shanghai, China," October 19, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64116>.

¹¹⁶⁰ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Jiang Zemin of China in Shanghai, China," October 19, 2001. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64116>.

¹¹⁶¹ George W. Bush: "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at Tsinghua University in Beijing," February 22, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64976>.

¹¹⁶² Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*.

speech and equal justice and religious tolerance".¹¹⁶³ This was the discursive core of the logic of identity in US foreign policy broadly, but also specifically in relation to China. In an attempt to dispel accusations of neo-imperialism, Bush conceded that "America cannot impose this vision, yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people".¹¹⁶⁴ US foreign policy then, was about discursively creating the material conditions for certain outcomes to become more likely. From this strand of reasoning, the logic of identity was infused with teleological rendering of political order where the only possible way to legitimately develop and exist as a political entity was as a liberal, capitalist, democracy.

The dynamics of this teleological rendering in Bush administration are generally more commonly associated with the events of September 11th 2001 and its subsequent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as part of its global War on Terror.¹¹⁶⁵ Its imagining of China though, was also filtered through this dominant narrative as the logic of geopolitics in its specificity towards China came to be framed by US interventions in the Middle East. In a news conference with Jiang for instance, Bush, in a sense inverting how he had previously deployed the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics, described China as an ally against global terror.¹¹⁶⁶ On December 9th 2003, Bush again reiterated the significance of China's support for the war on terror, "we are fighting to defeat a ruthless enemy of order and civilization. We are partners in diplomacy working to meet the dangers of the 21st century. We are full members of a world trading system that rewards enterprise and lifts nations".¹¹⁶⁷ He also emphasised US-China cooperation on nuclear issues relating to North Korea and the importance of China integrating in to "rules and norms of the international trading and finance system" for prosperity to spread through all of China.¹¹⁶⁸ These were all examples then of

¹¹⁶³ George W. Bush: "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," June 1, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62730>.

¹¹⁶⁴ George W. Bush: "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," June 1, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62730>.

¹¹⁶⁵ Gregory, *The Colonial Present*.

¹¹⁶⁶ George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference With President Jiang Zemin of China in Crawford, Texas," October 25, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18>.

¹¹⁶⁷ George W. Bush: "Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for Premier Wen Jiabao of China," December 9, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63881>.

¹¹⁶⁸ George W. Bush: "Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for Premier Wen Jiabao of China," December 9, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=63881>.

China adapting to the liberal world order that US Presidents, as demonstrated, were so adamant for China to join.

Bush's Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, set out one of the dominant contemporary narratives of US imaginations of China on September 21st 2005. In a speech to the National Committee on US-China Relations entitled "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Zoellick concluded that "our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon has joined the world".¹¹⁶⁹ The main thrust of the speech was that now:

"for the United States and the world, the essential question is – how will China use its influence? To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China's membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a *responsible stakeholder* in that system. China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success" (emphasis in original).¹¹⁷⁰

The descriptor of "responsible stakeholder" became a nodal point in US discourse of China. In terms of the logic of geopolitics, China now has a responsibility to help manage the global system that it had benefitted from. This responsibility also extended through the logic of capital as the international system constitutes not only the geopolitical qualities of the international system as perceived by the US, but the economic infrastructure of contemporary capitalism as well. As evidence by Zoellick's remark that "the global economy of the 21st century is a tightly woven fabric. We are too interconnected to try to hold China at arm's length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense".¹¹⁷¹ In this framing, it was imperative that the US cooperate with China in an economic sense and not just in terms of managing the geopolitical aspects of the international system.

Zoellick reflected on one of the key concerns in the US about the 'rise of China' when he observed that "there is a cauldron of anxiety about China".¹¹⁷² He described the recent history of US policy towards China where "for thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the

¹¹⁶⁹ "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005", *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

¹¹⁷⁰ "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005", *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

¹¹⁷¹ "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005", *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

¹¹⁷² "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005", *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

People’s Republic of China”.¹¹⁷³ He does so to ask “how should we view China at the dawn of the 21st Century? On both sides, there is a gulf in perceptions... many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about China”.¹¹⁷⁴ This anxiety reflects a general uncertainty about China’s future. It remains anxiety in the sense described by Soren Kierkegaard, as a phenomenon distinct to fear.¹¹⁷⁵ If fear is in relation to something specific, the US was concerned about what China might become and what this uncertainty might mean for the US. This also reflects the manner in which discourses of a potential China threat are twinned with discourses of opportunity as described by Chengxin Pan.¹¹⁷⁶ By approaching foreign policy in the manner that Campbell and other poststructuralists do, as constitutive of identity, the remark by Zoellick that “how we deal with China’s rising power is a central question for American foreign policy” captures the significance of how the logic of identity condition US foreign policy towards China even if concerns were also economic and geopolitical in nature.¹¹⁷⁷ It is through the logic of identity in this regard that the US has drawn China into the liberal international order defended by the US.

The logic of identity becomes clear in Zoellick’s concluding remarks where he states that “as a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success...we can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow”.¹¹⁷⁸ For the US, China’s involvement in administering the international system and its component geopolitical and economic aspects has become necessary, while the logic underpinning US foreign policy also aims to democratise China while doing so. It becomes increasingly apparent then, that China’s cooperation is necessary to the reproduction of the international system and thus the US way of life.

¹¹⁷³ “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005”, *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

¹¹⁷⁴ “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005”, *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

¹¹⁷⁵ Soren Kierkegaard, *The Politics of Anxiety* trans. By Alastair Hannay (New York: Liveright, 2015).

¹¹⁷⁶ Pan, *Knowledge, Desire, and Power in Global Politics*.

¹¹⁷⁷ “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005”, *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

¹¹⁷⁸ “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations New York City September 21, 2005”, *US State Department Archive* (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>, 27/1/2013).

The notion that China needs to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ revealed a particular attitude to what it means to be modern today and how ‘modernity’ functions as a form of temporal ordering of the world. To part of the modern world, one had to be responsible. This echoed 19th century discourses where one had to be civilised to be an active part of the international order. This reflected how the US utilised a specific linear and progressive conception of time to locate other states as less developed but on the same path towards the Western capitalist present. As mentioned above, the notion that China is own the rise, is a rephrasing of the notion that China is catching up in terms of development. It is currently serves then, through implications of its need to catch up or rise up, the constitutive other of US capitalist present. This rendering of China as either rising up from below or catching up from behind was enabled by David Harvey’s arguments that capital resorts to a “spatial fix” to alleviate its recurrent crises by moving between spaces of time.¹¹⁷⁹ China had been the beneficiary of one such fix from Deng’s economic reforms onward, and thus as indicated by the previous chapters focus on Carter and Reagan, was seen to be adopting US economic norms.¹¹⁸⁰

In Kyoto on November 16th 2005, Bush replayed a common theme in US imaginations of East Asia, “As a Pacific nation, America is drawn by trade and values and history to be a part of the future of this region. The extraordinary economic growth in the Pacific Rim has opened new possibilities for progress”.¹¹⁸¹ Central to Bush’s rendering of the mantra, was less the geographical underpinnings of US interest in Asia, then the logics of capital and identity, inflected in his mentioning’s of trade and values. He reflected more on China through the logic of capital describing how “access to American markets has played an important role in China's economic development” with the point being one of fairness as he argued that “China needs to provide a level playing field for American businesses seeking access to China's market”.¹¹⁸² The initial adversarial positioning had given way to the more benign conventions of cooperation, “we're important trading partners. We benefit from a system of free and fair trade. We'll continue to work with China to open up markets and level the playing field for

¹¹⁷⁹ David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹¹⁸⁰ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Chapter 5.

¹¹⁸¹ George W. Bush: "Remarks in Kyoto," November 16, 2005. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73665>.

¹¹⁸² George W. Bush: "Remarks in Kyoto," November 16, 2005. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73665>.

American goods".¹¹⁸³ Despite the bravado of earlier Bush discourses, he returned to more measured dialect of economic cooperation and the opening of markets.

In his 2006 State of the Union address Bush captured a growing sense of anxiety in the US about its relative position to China and how this affected the US's sense of itself. What this reflected was how the anxiety embedded within the logic of identity as the US needed to locate some kind of constitutive other was starting to focus more exclusively, in economic terms, on China. He considered how "in a dynamic world economy, we are seeing new competitors like China and India, and this creates uncertainty, which makes it easier to feed people's fears".¹¹⁸⁴ Somewhat confusingly, though perhaps explained by the audience, China had again become a competitor. The concern Bush was getting at though, was "seeing some old temptations return. Protectionists want to escape competition... Others say that the government needs to take a larger role in directing the economy".¹¹⁸⁵ Bush was defending the neoliberal orthodoxy in this case, though his neglect here, of the authoritative role that the Chinese Communist Party played in China becoming a competitor appeared to be beyond consideration. Through the logic of capital then, China was becoming more of an economic concern. He would though emphasise the on-going liberalisation of the Chinese economy and the possibility of new markets in remarks after a meeting with President Hu Jintao on April 20th 2006. Bush commented, "I appreciate the Government's commitment to that evolution, because as there's more consumers and market access, it will mean that U.S. small businesses and businesses and farmers will have a chance to be able to find new markets".¹¹⁸⁶ Adopting the language set out by Zoellick, Bush remarked how "as stakeholders in the international system, our two nations share many strategic interests".¹¹⁸⁷ The notion then of a responsible stakeholder reflected the a concern with the logic of identity with regard to the notion of a

¹¹⁸³ George W. Bush: "Remarks Following Discussions With President Hu in Beijing," November 20, 2005. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=73751>.

¹¹⁸⁴ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 31, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65090>.

¹¹⁸⁵ George W. Bush: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 31, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65090>.

¹¹⁸⁶ George W. Bush: "Remarks Following a Meeting With President Hu Jintao of China and an Exchange With Reporters," April 20, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72426>.

¹¹⁸⁷ George W. Bush: "Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for President Hu Jintao of China," April 20, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72428>

responsible, read civilised, state, and the logics of capital and geopolitics with regards to the shared “strategic interests”.

Bush touched on the issue of economic anxiety again at a speech in Kentucky on American Competitiveness on May 19th 2006, where he spoke of the “worried” US workers and who are “troubled by competition from places like China and India”. He followed this up outlining how a state unwilling to trade freely indicated it had lost its confidence, reflecting on how “people’s concerns about imports coming in from China”.¹¹⁸⁸ If the logic of capital, so fundamental to US foreign policy towards China was beginning to foster a sense of anxious unease with regards to China, Bush maintained that it was the historic, militaristic aspects of the logic of geopolitics that served as the foundations for US foreign policy in Asia. At West Point on May 27th 2006 Bush drew upon the logic of geopolitics to reflect on how Truman had “ kept US forces in Japan as a counterweight to Communist China” where the “the military footprint Truman established on two continents has remained virtually unchanged to this day and has served as the foundation for security in Europe and in the Pacific”.¹¹⁸⁹ Implications about his audience aside, the logic of geopolitics served as the organising principle for US foreign policy in East Asia while the logic of capital compelled certain imperatives in the name of reproducing the international system and the US domestic way of life. The logics of US foreign policy would ultimately lead Bush to succinctly capture how the US imagined China and its global significance. He would make clear this approach in an interview with foreign journalists in August 2007, stating, “I view China as an opportunity”.¹¹⁹⁰

Speaking in Lima on November 22, 2008 Bush would articulate an interpretation of global political and economic change which was to motivate much of Obama’s foreign policy towards China. Bush described how “we're witnessing a dramatic shift of history, as the centre of the world economic stage moves from west to east, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

¹¹⁸⁸ George W. Bush: "Remarks on American Competitiveness in Highland Heights, Kentucky," May 19, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=49>.

¹¹⁸⁹ George W. Bush: "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," May 27, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=83>.

¹¹⁹⁰ George W. Bush: "Interview With Foreign Print Media," August 30, 2007. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=75700>.

Some view the rise of Asia-Pacific with suspicion and fear; America doesn't".¹¹⁹¹ As Bush had made clear he viewed this as an opportunity, yet the events Bush was describing, the ongoing aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, were to constitute more of an acute anxiety with regards to potential US decline and its place in the world specifically in relation to China. If Bush appeared slightly ambivalent about this future, Obama, as the next chapter will demonstrate, was much more concerned.

8.5 Conclusion

US presidential discourses have as this and the previous chapters have shown about creating the material conditions for certain outcomes to become more likely, especially with regards to China. From this strand of reasoning, the logic of identity was infused with teleological rendering of political order. This aspect of the logic of identity became increasingly apparent after the end of the Cold War and especially effervescent during the George W. Bush presidency. China and the discourses of China in US presidential statements were beginning to fill the void that Arbatov described would emerge with the dissolution of the USSR. This was not in the same sense of enmity, a distinct kind of relationship. Clinton clearly wanted China to become a joint administrator of the international system, at least regionally, and Zoellick's comments during the George W. Bush presidency made this explicit. Despite the consistent emphasis of the logic of identity in US presidential discourses of China it was regularly superseded by the logic of capital or geopolitics.

This thesis now moves to the final period of its genealogical analysis, the Obama presidency exemplified by his 'pivot' to the Asia-Pacific.

¹¹⁹¹ George W. Bush: "Remarks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Summit in Lima," November 22, 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84993>.

Chapter 9 – 2008-2016: Obama’s China

“We are in a competition for influence with China; let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in, and let’s just talk straight realpolitik”

- *Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 2nd 2011*¹¹⁹²

“US engagement in the Asia-Pacific is in America’s interests...America’s commitment to the region – and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in particular- is not transient. It is enduring. And that’s because *the logic of*, and the need for, and the value of American engagement in the Asia Pacific is irrefutable. And it is proven over decades.”

-*Ash Carter, US Secretary of Defence, Singapore, June 4th, 2016*¹¹⁹³

Eric Bates (Interviewer): So why does President Obama think it’s a good idea?

Bernie Sanders: He sees it as a geopolitical issue. He does not pretend, as previous presidents have, that this is going to create all kinds of jobs in America. His argument is that if you abandon the TPP, you’re gonna leave Asia open to Chinese influence.

- *Interview in the New Republic October 17th 2016*¹¹⁹⁴

9.1 Introduction

My aim in this thesis has been to understand how China has been rendered in US presidential discourses and offer an analytical framework for why. I present my argument through the analytical concepts of the three logics, of identity, capital and geopolitics. This concluding chapter of the genealogy explores how the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics are apparent in Obama’s discourses of China.¹¹⁹⁵ Obama would most prominently invoke the

¹¹⁹² Daniel Dombey, “US struggling to hold role as global leader, Clinton says”, *Financial Times* (<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5ff5669c-4508-11e0-80e7-00144feab49a.html>), March 4 2015).

¹¹⁹³ Emphasis added. “Remarks on ‘Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security Network’ at 2016 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue and Delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Singapore, June 4, 2016”, *US Defense Department* (<https://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS.Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=2575&Article=791213>), 19 January 2017).

¹¹⁹⁴ Eric Bates, “Bernie Looks Ahead”, *The New Republic* (<https://newrepublic.com/article/137103/bernie-looks-ahead>), October 26 2016).

¹¹⁹⁵ Much of the relevant literature has, as with the previous chapter been incorporated into chapters 1 and 2. David Lampton, ‘The United States and China in the Age of Obama: looking each other straight in the eyes’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 18 (2009): 703-727; Suisheng Zhao, ‘Shaping the Regional context of China’s Rise: how the Obama administration brought back hedge in its engagement with China’, *Journal of Contemporary China* 21 (2012): 369-389; William Tow and Beverley Loke, ‘Rules of engagement: America’s Asia Pacific security policy under an Obama administration’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63 (2009): 443-457; Peter Chow (ed.), *The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations* (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Geoffrey Till and Patrick Bratton (eds), *Sea Power and the Asia-Pacific* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012); Aaron Friedberg, *Beyond Air-Sea Battle The Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014); Derek Chollet, *The Long Game: How Obama Defied Washington and Redefined America’s Role in the*

logic of capital in his approach to China even as his signature ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ was rendered through the logic of geopolitics. His attempts to pass the multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership constituted the major expression of the logic of capital as the Obama would eventually indicate this was designed to pressure China to adopt certain economic reforms.

The shift in US priorities that is now referred to as the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ took on its initial shape in an article by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton published in *Foreign Policy* in October 2011.¹¹⁹⁶ The declarative by-line, “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the centre of the action”, makes the Obama administration’s priorities clear. Clinton expressed this sense of the future through the logic of capital when she described how “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama”.¹¹⁹⁷ In a tone more congenial than in the above epigraph, Clinton described a more mutually beneficial approach to the logic of capital in US discourses of China claim, a “thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America”.¹¹⁹⁸ Clinton’s essay is worth including here for the manner in which it sets the scene for Obama’s discourses of China as the first statement by a US official publically describing the shift in US priorities.

9.2 Obama, China and Anxiety in the US Imagination

During the First Presidential debate of the 2008 US election, taking place at the University of Mississippi on September 26th 2008, Obama invoked a sense of anxiety at the US’s relative position to China declaring that “we’ve got to make sure that we’re competing in education. We’ve got to invest in science and technology. China had a space launch and a space walk. We’ve got to make sure that our children are keeping pace in math and in science”.¹¹⁹⁹ The underlying premise of competition as a driver of economic development is not necessarily my concern here, but contributes to the US perception of relative insecurity in comparison to China. The US’s ability to compete economically with China was becoming a concern through the logic of capital. The debate was taking place in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, and this was creating conditions where the US sense of itself was being put into

World (New York: Public Affairs, 2016); Chi Wang, *Obama’s Challenge to China: The Pivot to Asia* (Oxon: Routledge, 2015); Bentley and Holland (eds), *The Obama Doctrine*.

¹¹⁹⁶ Hilary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, *Foreign Policy* (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 20 May 2014).

¹¹⁹⁷ Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’.

¹¹⁹⁸ Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’.

¹¹⁹⁹ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate at the University of Mississippi in Oxford," September 26, 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78691>.

question as evident in Obama's remarks.¹²⁰⁰ The logic of capital and its manifestations in Obama's concerns about the US economy stimulated a crisis in the US's sense of identity.

These concern about China also spilled into the possibility that it was upstaging the US in geopolitical terms. As Obama described how "with China, where we are borrowing billions of dollars. They now hold a trillion dollars' worth of our debt. And they are active in countries like in regions like Latin America, and Asia, and Africa...the conspicuousness of their presence is only matched by our absence, because we've been focused on Iraq".¹²⁰¹ This was an early signal of Obama attempting to distance himself from the major foreign policy concerns of the Bush administration in the Middle East. Obama also inferred that geopolitical concerns about China were no longer confined to East Asia, but that this filtered into more global geopolitical concerns, a predominant feature of US China discussions after 1945. This also preconfigured how the logics of capital and geopolitics in US foreign policy towards China were becoming increasingly hard to disentangle in a way that has been marginally more straightforward over the course of this analysis.

In July 2009 at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Obama touched upon many of the ambiguities that underpin the US imagination of China. In what has become a modern axiom, Obama outlined how "the relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century...that really must underpin our partnership. That is the responsibility together we bear".¹²⁰² Alluding to the substantial trade imbalance between the two states he channelled the logic of capital when he remarked, "just as China has benefitted from substantial investment and profitable exports, China can also be an enormous market for American goods".¹²⁰³ Reflecting on the context of US foreign policy in Asia during the Nixon Presidency, Obama described how "America had fought three wars in East Asia in just 30 years, and the Cold War was in a stalemate. China's economy was cut off from the world, and a huge percentage of the Chinese people lived in extreme poverty. Back then, our dialogue

¹²⁰⁰ Jonathan Kirshner, *American Power After the Financial Crisis* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2014).

¹²⁰¹ Presidential Candidates Debates: "Presidential Debate at the University of Mississippi in Oxford," September 26, 2008. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78691>.

¹²⁰² Barack Obama: "Remarks at the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," July 27, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86473>. 20 May, 2014).

¹²⁰³ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," July 27, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86473>.

was guided by a narrow focus on our shared rivalry with the Soviet Union”.¹²⁰⁴ Obama was attempting to juxtapose how US interest with China had been governed strictly by the logic of geopolitics during the Cold War whereas now the emphasis was on the logic of capital and China’s economic potential as perceived by the US, a return to themes prevalent in early 20th century presidential discourses.

In a similar vein to Bill Clinton and Nixon, Obama presented a nuanced understanding of the Chinese worldview and China’s past contribution to the making of the US. He recalled how “China has its own distinct story that shapes its own worldview. And Americans know the richness of China's history because it helped to shape the world and it helped to shape America”.¹²⁰⁵ As has been conceptualised by poststructural scholars and more recently by non-Western approaches to IR like Lily Ling’s, the other does not just function for the self to establish in opposition to, but there are traces of the other in the self.¹²⁰⁶ Obama’s allusion to how China has helped shape the US was a significant allusion to this dynamic. Obama would make explicit the notion that US cooperation with China and China itself was becoming increasingly necessary to reproducing the international order. He observed how:

“some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions; some in America think that there is something to fear in a rising China. I take a different view...I believe in a future where China is a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations, a future when our nations are partners out of necessity, but also out of opportunity”.¹²⁰⁷

By dispelling the strands of reasoning, described in chapter 2 as the China Threat genre, that the US needed to adopt the geopolitically orientated position that China was a threat, Obama emphasised the primacy of the logic of capital with regards to the “necessity” of China to the international order.

Speaking in Shanghai on November 16th 2009, Obama also, like Clinton and Nixon, managed to situate the contemporary US-China relationship in the romanticised era of expansion and trade before the official encounter in 1844. Obama narrated how “in 1784, our Founding Father, George Washington, commissioned the Empress of China, a ship that set sail for these

¹²⁰⁴ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," July 27, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86473>.

¹²⁰⁵ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," July 27, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86473>.

¹²⁰⁶ Lily Ling, *The Dao of World Politics*.

¹²⁰⁷ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the United States-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," July 27, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86473>.

shores so that it could pursue trade with the Qing Dynasty. Washington wanted to see the ship carry the flag around the globe and to forge new ties with nations like China".¹²⁰⁸ This early account reflected the historic basis of the logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China, even if in a strict sense Obama was reconstructing this narrative. Obama would make explicit one of the guiding imperatives of the logic of capital, stating, "this is a common American impulse, the desire to reach for new horizons and to forge new partnerships that are mutually beneficial".¹²⁰⁹ The logic of capital in this regard, also had implicit consequences for US geopolitical interests, indicating the relationship between the logics of capital and geopolitics. Obama would also reflect how despite the oscillations in US discourses of China concerning whether it was a threat, opportunity, enemy or ally, there were underlying tenets that informed US thinking. Obama indicated this when he observed how "over the two centuries that have followed, the currents of history have steered the relationship between our countries in many directions. And even in the midst of tumultuous winds, our people had opportunities to forge deep and even dramatic ties".¹²¹⁰ More recently, Obama outlined how the logic of geopolitics provided the foundations for US-China reconciliation in the 1970s, despite Nixon's claim otherwise. Obama stated in geopolitical terms how "in 1979, the political cooperation between the United States and China was rooted largely in our shared rivalry with the Soviet Union", reflecting an emphasis on the logic of geopolitics.¹²¹¹

Turning to the present, Obama rebutted charges of US attempts to contain China through reasoning which reflected the imperatives and consequences of the logic of capital. Obama outlined his belief that

"our world is now fundamentally interconnected. The jobs we do, the prosperity we build, the environment we protect, the security that we seek, all of these things are shared. And given that interconnection, power in the 21st century is no longer a zero-sum game; one country's success need not come at the expense of another. And that is why the United States insists we do not seek to

¹²⁰⁸ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

¹²⁰⁹ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

¹²¹⁰ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

¹²¹¹ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

contain China's rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and successful member of the community of nations".¹²¹²

Obama would also recognise the limits of the US experience for informing its foreign policy remarking, "I think it's very important for the United States not to assume that what is good for us is automatically good for somebody else. And we have to have some modesty about our attitudes towards other countries". Despite this recognition of the importance of perspective and experience in international politics, Obama maintained the belief "that there are certain fundamental principles that are common to all people, regardless of culture".¹²¹³ Effectively, the logic of identity contained the assumption of the necessity and eventually inevitability universalisation of US ideals regarding the political structures and institutions of a state. Although the US was itself exceptional, Obama here, and US presidents more generally, maintained that the political aspects of US exceptionalism were replicable elsewhere. The logic of identity in this regard, recognised difference, but also the opportunity for homogenisation.

Approaching the logic of capital in novel language with regards to China, Obama reflected on how "there's something about when people think that they can do business and make money that makes them think very clearly and not worry as much about ideology".¹²¹⁴ He was alluding here to the manner in which China had adopted economic reforms that shifted away from its Communist beliefs and towards a more market based and capitalist orientation.¹²¹⁵ These remarks reflected the case made by Bush and Clinton that economic openness would come with political openness, even if Obama portrayed the relationship in a more coincidental manner than strict causal necessity.

Turning to the issue of security for East Asian as a whole, Obama indicated his desire to have a similar relationship with China as with Japan and South Korea. Specifically, he argued, "it is in the United States interests to have a stable and prosperous China that helps to anchor a

¹²¹² Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

¹²¹³ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

¹²¹⁴ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Town Hall Meeting and a Question-and-Answer Session in Shanghai," November 16, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86909>.

¹²¹⁵ Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 120-151; Ho-fung Hung (ed.), *China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Nicholas Lardy, *Markets Over Mao* (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014).

stable and prosperous Asia in the same way that Japan's stability, South Korea's stability creates a more peaceful world and greater commercial ties with the United States. The same is true in respect to our policy towards China".¹²¹⁶ The logic of capital thus guided the logic of geopolitics and its imperatives when considering how to foster the conditions for greater commercial ties with China.

In some of his first comments regarding TPP at the APEC summit in Japan on November 13th 2010, Obama indicated that the US is "looking to expand trade and commerce throughout the Asia-Pacific... And that's why we want to pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would facilitate trade and open markets throughout the Asia-Pacific".¹²¹⁷ This was the essence of the imperatives within the logic of capital. The US under Obama was approaching Asia as an opportunity to expand markets and trade. Obama would also clarify a few months later, that there was room for economic cooperation with China in his rendering of the logic of capital. At a welcoming ceremony for Chinese President Hu Jintao on January 19th 2011, Obama commented on the growing economic interdependence between the US and China. Obama explained, "we have an enormous stake in each other's success. In an interconnected world, in a global economy, nations including our own will be more prosperous and more secure when we work together", repeating the his position that the US "welcomes China's rise as a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations".¹²¹⁸ The logic of capital in this case functioned to limit the basis for a military conflict to break out between the US and China.

Commenting more extensively on the economic relationship, Obama tried to dispel what he saw as unhelpful stereotypes of the relationship. He remarked, "I think our goal here today was to make sure that we break out of the old stereotypes that somehow China is simply taking manufacturing jobs and taking advantage of low wages; the U.S. is importing cheap goods and thereby having cheaper products, but also putting strains on our employment

¹²¹⁶ Barack Obama: "Interview With Xiang Xi of the Southern Weekly in Beijing," November 18, 2009. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86911>.

¹²¹⁷ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit in Yokohama, Japan," November 13, 2010. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88709>.

¹²¹⁸ Barack Obama: "Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony for President Hu Jintao of China," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88918>.

base”.¹²¹⁹ This was an attempt to loosen the existing tensions in the logic of capital and the consequences of US foreign policy towards China for domestic labour interests and domestic capital interests. Obama responded arguing that “the relationship is much more complex than that, and it has much more potential than that. China is one of the top markets for American exports”.¹²²⁰ The significance of the China market would again come to dominate US imaginations of China. More broadly though, Obama would also highlight how broader geopolitical concerns were fundamental in his approach to China. He reflected how, in conversations with Hu, “with regard to regional stability and security in East Asia, I stressed that the United States has a fundamental interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution of differences”.¹²²¹ Again though, the logic of capital as well as the logic of geopolitics continued to condition US policy.

Obama would also imply that China could be understood as ‘catching up’ in terms of development as if all states existed on the same liberal plane of history progressing towards liberal democratic nirvana.¹²²² He described how “China's at a different stage of development than we are”, reflecting the pertinence of the liberal teleology I described in Bush’s discourses towards China. Although recognising that “China has a different political system than we do” and describing how the US and China “come from very different cultures and with very different histories”, Obama would recall how told Hu that “we have some core views as Americans about the universality of certain rights freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly that we think are very important and that transcend cultures”.¹²²³ The appreciation of cultural experiences and their impact on political perspectives only extended so far when understood through the logic of identity.

¹²¹⁹ Barack Obama: "Remarks With President Hu Jintao of China During a Roundtable Discussion With American and Chinese Business Leaders," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88919>.

¹²²⁰ Barack Obama: "Remarks With President Hu Jintao of China During a Roundtable Discussion With American and Chinese Business Leaders," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88919>.

¹²²¹ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Hu Jintao of China," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88927>.

¹²²² Ha-Joon Chang and Illene Gabel, *Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual* (London: Zed Books, 2004).

¹²²³ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Hu Jintao of China," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88927>.

The signature US discourse towards China, historically, but more explicitly since Deng's reforms, and as a result of the dominance of the logic of capital, was evident when Obama described to Hu how "China's rise offers enormous economic opportunity". In a more informal setting, during a roundtable with business leaders and Hu, Obama described the general economic interest of the US with regards to China when he expressed how "we want to sell you all kinds of stuff. We want to sell you planes. We want to sell you cars. We want to sell you software".¹²²⁴ Making explicit the link between the search for markets abroad, and in China specifically, and the subsequent domestic benefits, Obama described how as "President Hu and his Government refocuses the economy on expanding domestic demand, that offers opportunities for US businesses, which ultimately translates into US jobs".¹²²⁵ This reflected in short, the logic of capital as evident in Obama's foreign policy. Obama would nevertheless make clear, that he also adhered to the Bush administration's approach to the benefits of China's increasing involvement with the international order as coming with certain conditions. Obama would state, "China's rise is potentially good for the world. To the extent that China is functioning as a responsible actor on the world stage".¹²²⁶ The logic of capital then was complimented by the logics of geopolitics and identity, as was the case under the George W. Bush Presidency.

In his 2011 State of the Union address Obama again drew comparisons to China indicating a continuing sense of anxiety at what China's 'rise' might mean for the US. In an attempt to justify increased government spending on domestic issues like education and research, Obama described how "nations like China and India realized that with some changes of their own, they could compete in this new world. And so they started educating their children earlier and longer, with greater emphasis on math and science. They're investing in research and new technologies".¹²²⁷ Again referencing China, he remarked how "just recently, China became the home to the world's largest private solar research facility and the world's fastest

¹²²⁴ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Hu Jintao of China," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88927>.

¹²²⁵ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Hu Jintao of China," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88927>.

¹²²⁶ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Hu Jintao of China," January 19, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88927>.

¹²²⁷ Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>.

computer".¹²²⁸ This sense of anxiety extended into the domestic materiality of US identity as Obama lamented how US "infrastructure used to be the best, but our lead has slipped. South Korean homes now have greater Internet access than we do. Countries in Europe and Russia invest more in their roads and railways than we do. China is building faster trains and newer airports".¹²²⁹ When it came to green technology Obama warned how "China is making these investments. They have already captured a big chunk of the solar market partly because we fell down on the job. We weren't moving as fast as we should have. Those are jobs that could be created right here that are getting shipped overseas".¹²³⁰ This was about the US's sense of itself as being the most developed country in the world, and not only was Obama describing issues pertinent to the US being a successful economy, he was invoking a sense of anxiety present in the logic of identity.

Obama's comparisons to China were invested with these concerns about US identity and sense of self specifically with regards to its economy. He argued how "building a world class transportation system is part of what made us an economic superpower. And now we're going to sit back and watch China build newer airports and faster railroads, at a time when millions of unemployed construction workers could build them right here in America?"¹²³¹ In Obama's words, more investment was needed to restore the US's sense of self. In an uncanny foreshadowing of rhetoric that would come to dominate the 2016 Presidential election, Obama made clear that his comparisons to other countries and call for government investment was a concern with "how America can be number one again".¹²³² In this regard, the logic of capital and the logic of identity were closely intertwined as the US considered itself in relative decline in light of China's 'rise'.

¹²²⁸ Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>.

¹²²⁹ Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>.

¹²³⁰ Barack Obama: "Remarks at Orion Energy Systems, Inc., in Manitowoc, Wisconsin," January 26, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88934>.

¹²³¹ Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Job Growth," September 8, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=96661>.

¹²³² Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>.

9.3 The ‘Pivot’ and the Primacy of the Logic of Capital

Speaking at the November 2011 APEC summit in Hawaii, Obama returned to the logic of geopolitics when he took his turn to invoke the geopolitical mantra that “the United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay... whether it's on security architecture, whether it's on trade, whether it's on commerce, we are going to continue to prioritise this region”.¹²³³

Significant though, was his emphasis on prioritising the Pacific. Obama would also invoke the logic of capital when he argued that “we should be rooting for China to grow, because not only does that then present an enormous marketplace for American businesses and American exports, but to see so many millions of people, hundreds of millions of people, lifted out of poverty is a remarkable achievement... those are potential customers for us in the future”.¹²³⁴

In this light, Obama described his visit to Australia in November 2011 as “making it clear that the US is stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific”.¹²³⁵ This commitment also contained a defence of the liberal, rule based order that Clinton and Bush defended. Obama remarked how in the US:

“we welcome a rising, peaceful China... with their rise comes increased responsibilities. It's important for them to play by the rules of the road and in fact help underwrite the rules that have allowed so much remarkable economic progress to be made over the last several decades. And that's going to be true on a whole host of issues. So where China is playing by those rules, recognizing its new role, I think this is a win-win situation”.¹²³⁶

Aside from repeating the responsibilities that China’s ‘rise’ earned for it, Obama also indicted the desire for China to not just adhere to international rules and norms, but help “underwrite” them.¹²³⁷ This served to rebut the charge that the US feared China as he remarked, “I think the notion that we fear China is mistaken. The notion that we are looking to exclude China is mistaken”.¹²³⁸ Important here, is the distinction between fear and anxiety, if anxiety is a more

¹²³³ Barack Obama: "Remarks at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit Question-and-Answer Session in Honolulu," November 12, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97036>.

¹²³⁴ Barack Obama: "Remarks at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit Question-and-Answer Session in Honolulu," November 12, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97036>.

¹²³⁵ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard of Australia in Canberra, Australia," November 16, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97060>.

¹²³⁶ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard of Australia in Canberra, Australia," November 16, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97060>.

¹²³⁷ For a critique of how norms are used and understood in international politics see Charlotte Epstein (ed.), *Against International Relations Norms: Postcolonial Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

¹²³⁸ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Julia E. Gillard of Australia in Canberra, Australia," November 16, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97060>.

general uncertainty about the meaning of something, then fear is a specific sensation to something certain. This exemplifies how the logics of capital, geopolitics, and identity then do not determine specific policies or thoughts, but do frame, organise and limit the parameters of US foreign policy towards China.

In his hallmark address regarding US foreign policy in Asia, Obama spoke to the Australian Parliament in Canberra on November 17th 2011. The major content of the speech was describing what would come to be known as the ‘pivot’ to Asia, first articulated by Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State in her October *Foreign Policy* article. Obama argued that this prioritising of the Asia-Pacific, “for the United States, this reflects a broader shift. After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region”.¹²³⁹ What Obama wanted to indicate though by emphasising the logic of identity was that this was a matter of priority as “the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation”.¹²⁴⁰ The US’s sense of itself as a Pacific state implied certain geopolitical entitlements to acting in Asia. The potential Obama described was rendered through the logic of capital as he remarked how in the Asia-Pacific “we see the future. As the world’s fastest growing region, and home to more than half the global economy, the Asia-Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American people”.¹²⁴¹ US foreign policy the reflected domestic economic concerns that I describe as operating through the logic of capital.

The ‘pivot’, being conditioned by the logic of capital, was consequentially organised through the logic of geopolitics and the US’s network of regional allies. Obama stated, “I have therefore made a deliberate and strategic decision: As a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long term role in shaping this region and its future by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends”.¹²⁴² In terms of the logic of geopolitics this meant, as Obama put it, that the US would “preserve our unique ability to

¹²³⁹ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

¹²⁴⁰ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

¹²⁴¹ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

¹²⁴² Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

project power and deter threats to peace".¹²⁴³ The projection of power in this sense was to occur spatially as well as discursively as the US attempted to order East Asian relations.

Turning to China in an attempt to argue that the 'pivot' was not about containing China, Obama stated, "the United States will continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with China. All of our nations have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China. That's why the United States welcomes it". Geopolitically for the US, Obama described how "we've seen that China can be a partner, from reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula to preventing proliferation".¹²⁴⁴ Obama would also repeat the US axiom regarding the link between economic and political freedom. He described how "history teaches us, the greatest force the world has ever known for creating wealth and opportunity is free markets. So we seek economies that are open and transparent. We seek trade that is free and fair. And we seek an open international economic system, where rules are clear and every nation plays by them".¹²⁴⁵ This statement briefly encapsulates the contemporary articulation of the logic of capital as understood in US presidential discourses regarding China and foreign policy more generally.

Fundamentally, Obama would make clear how these interests and imperatives, embedded in the logics of capital and geopolitics, were conditioned by the logic of identity. In the passage, which served as the initial provocation this thesis began with, Obama declared:

"This is the future we seek in the Asia-Pacific: security, prosperity, and dignity for all. *That's what we stand for. That's who we are.* That's the future we will pursue in partnership with allies and friends and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in".¹²⁴⁶

Obama makes explicit the constitutive link between how the US conceptualises its identity and how it acts. This is the definitive imperative in the logic of identity where the US's imagining of its own identity compels specific foreign policy practices, exemplified by how it conceives of itself as a Pacific power, which obliges and entitles engagement in the region. This is not to say that the logic of identity is the primary influence in US foreign policy

¹²⁴³ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

¹²⁴⁴ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

¹²⁴⁵ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

¹²⁴⁶ (Emphasis added) Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Parliament in Canberra," November 17, 2011. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97064>.

towards China, but that it shapes and limits how the logics of capital and geopolitics can be rendered in practice.

Prior to a meeting with then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in February 2012, Obama recalled how the US had “tried to emphasise that because of China's extraordinarily—extraordinary development over the last two decades, that with expanding power and prosperity also comes increased responsibilities”.¹²⁴⁷ His concern here was presented through the logic of capital as he outlined how his administration “want to work with China to make sure that everybody is working by the same rules of the road when it comes to the world economic system”.¹²⁴⁸ China, in Obama’s terms, now that it was becoming increasingly economically developed and consequentially had to meet certain standards if it wanted to fully participate in the international order.

During the 2012 Presidential debate in Florida where Republican nominee Mitt Romney regularly raised the issue of China, Obama conceded stated that “China is both an adversary but also a potential partner in the international community if it's following the rules”.¹²⁴⁹ How the US conceptualised China then, was contingent on how rigorously China adhered to the standards of international behaviour as understood by the US. The debate was also significant, as Obama would make explicit the geopolitical role of TPP. He declared that “we believe China can be a partner, but we're also sending a very clear signal that America is a Pacific power, that we are going to have a presence there...And we're organising trade relations with countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure about meeting basic international standards”.¹²⁵⁰ Obama was essentially deploying a contemporary form of Taft’s dollar diplomacy where US economic power could be deployed to shape the behaviour and nature of other states, not just for economic gain in its own right but for more explicit and broader geopolitical interests.

US economic power was becoming orientated towards making China behave in a specific manner and conduct particular reforms regarding the liberalisation of its economy, with the

¹²⁴⁷ Barack Obama: "Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Vice President Xi Jinping of China," February 14, 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99401>.

¹²⁴⁸ Barack Obama: "Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Vice President Xi Jinping of China," February 14, 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99401>.

¹²⁴⁹ Barack Obama: "Presidential Debate in Boca Raton, Florida," October 22, 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=102344>.

¹²⁵⁰ Barack Obama: "Presidential Debate in Boca Raton, Florida," October 22, 2012. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=102344>.

aim of the US accruing certain economic benefits from this. US foreign policy was not so much about containing China, as had been the case during the 1950s, but about fostering the conditions to produce a certain kind of China. This reflected the convergence of the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity as the US desired a China who while helping to underwrite the rules of the international order essentially functioning as a joint administrator of that order. The issue with the greatest need for cooperation in terms of the international order was climate change as Obama made clear arguing that “neither country by itself can deal with the challenge of climate change. That's an issue that we'll have to deal with together”.¹²⁵¹ Again, China had a necessary role to play.

In an interview on CBS in June 2013, Obama reflected on how China's recent, rapid pace of economic development was affecting how it perceived its role in the world. He repeated the need for China to take on increased responsibility in the international order remarking, “we've got to get this relationship right and China does need to be a stakeholder”.¹²⁵² Obama also considered from the Chinese perspective, “they recognize...they have achieved such rapid growth and they have grown so fast almost on steroids that there's a part of them that still thinks of themselves as this poor country that's got all these problems”.¹²⁵³ The consequences of this were in Obama's words:

“I think what you're seeing inside of Chinese leadership is the desire to maybe continue not to be responsible, not to be a full stakeholder, work the international system on something like trade or intellectual property rights; get as much as they can and be free riders and let the United States worry about the big hassles and the big problems”.¹²⁵⁴

What these thoughts reveal, is the manner in which the US no longer had the desire, and potentially the capacity to address global issues on its own. In terms of the logic of identity, the Obama exemplified how the US considered that occupying a certain economic status globally, came with certain responsibilities of being a modern state. More precisely Obama described how “what we're saying to them is you can't pick and choose. You know, you can't

¹²⁵¹ Barack Obama: "Remarks Following a Meeting With President Xi Jinping of China and an Exchange With Reporters in Rancho Mirage, California," June 7, 2013. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=103760>.

¹²⁵² Barack Obama: "Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS "Charlie Rose"," June 17, 2013. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=109740>.

¹²⁵³ Barack Obama: "Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS "Charlie Rose"," June 17, 2013. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=109740>.

¹²⁵⁴ Barack Obama: "Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS "Charlie Rose"," June 17, 2013. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=109740>.

have all the rights of a major world power, but none of the responsibilities".¹²⁵⁵ Following this line of argument, the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity were inseparable in Obama's discourse. Each limited and shaped how the others could be rendered discursively and the subsequent actions they compelled.

In his 2014 commencement speech at West Point military academy Obama considered the major decision facing the US was "not whether America will lead, but how we will lead, not just to secure our peace and prosperity, but also extend peace and prosperity around the globe".¹²⁵⁶ He would try to position his foreign policy somewhere between adopting some form isolation and extensive intervention in global crises. Definitively, Obama declared, "America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will. The military... is and always will be the backbone of that leadership."¹²⁵⁷ This leadership was framed within the need to secure the perpetuation and extension of the conditions for the imperatives of the logics of capital and geopolitics.

On November 14th 2014, Obama commented on the Chinese plans to set up what would become the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. He remarked how US concerns "on something like a infrastructure bank in this region [was] making sure that there's transparency and accountability, and that if it's in fact a multilateral institution, that there are rules that all countries are abiding by in the operations of the institution".¹²⁵⁸ Obama made it clear that as long as China acted within existing international rules then the US did was not especially concerned. Conceding the limitations to the logic identity when it came to China Obama remarked, "we don't expect China to follow an American model in every instance, but we're going to continue to have concerns about human rights".¹²⁵⁹

¹²⁵⁵ Barack Obama: "Interview with Charlie Rose on PBS "Charlie Rose"," June 17, 2013. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=109740>.

¹²⁵⁶ Barack Obama: "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," May 28, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105220>.

¹²⁵⁷ Barack Obama: "Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York," May 28, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105220>.

¹²⁵⁸ Barack Obama: "Remarks Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Anthony J. Abbott of Australia and an Exchange With Reporters in Beijing, China," November 10, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107901>.

¹²⁵⁹ Barack Obama: "Remarks Following a Meeting With Prime Minister Anthony J. Abbott of Australia and an Exchange With Reporters in Beijing, China," November 10, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107901>.

At an APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014, Obama reiterated a common theme within in US discourses on China's 'rise'. He described how "we welcome the rise of a prosperous, peaceful, and stable China".¹²⁶⁰ Elaborating on this theme, Obama recounted how "over recent decades the United States has worked to help integrate China into the global economy, not only because it's in China's best interests, but because it's in America's best interests and the world's best interests. We want China to do well".¹²⁶¹ This integration into the global economy and international order extended to cooperation over climate change, as Obama announced an agreement between the US and China in with regards to reducing their carbon emissions. Obama invoked the sense of responsibility both states had when he argued, "as the world's two largest economies, energy consumers, and emitters of greenhouse gases, we have a special responsibility to lead the global effort against climate change".¹²⁶² The issue of climate change appeared in this light to transcend the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity, as it cannot be confined to any particular one even if responses to it could be seen within one or more of them.

Without exploring this notion in great detail here it is worth considering that the potential consequences of climate change have started to induce a more specific logic, present in some of the remarks made by Clinton that I discuss on page 247, about to comprehend and respond to it. A logic that is more attuned to the existential and transnational implications of the more extreme scenarios.¹²⁶³ To return to the focus here, Obama would outline the importance of the agreement in the following manner, "That's why today I am proud that we can announce a historic agreement. I commend President Xi, his team, and the Chinese Government for the commitment they are making to slow, peak, and then reverse the course of China's carbon emissions".¹²⁶⁴ This raises the potential for climate change, as the definitive transnational or

¹²⁶⁰ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit in Beijing, China," November 10, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107915>.

¹²⁶¹ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit in Beijing, China," November 10, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107915>.

¹²⁶² Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing, China," November 12, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107903>.

¹²⁶³ Simon Dalby, *Security and Environmental Change* (London: Polity Press, 2009); Naomi Klein, *This Changes Everything: Capitalism Vs. The Climate* (London: Penguin, 2015); Nicholas Stern, *Why are We Waiting?: The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change* (USA: MIT Press, 2015); Amitav Ghosh, *The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

¹²⁶⁴ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing, China," November 12, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107903>.

global issue, as collapsing the relationship between the three logics I describe in US presidential discourses of China.

Returning to the logic of geopolitics, Obama outlined how “for decades, America's engagement in the Asia-Pacific, including our alliances and our stabilizing presence, have been a foundation for the region's progress, including contributing to China's remarkable economic growth”.¹²⁶⁵ In this strand of reasoning, it was the due to the consequences of US policy in the region that had guaranteed the requisite geopolitical stability necessary for the conditions of economic development. The logic of geopolitics, as deployed by the US concerning its presence in the Asia-Pacific, operated in lieu of the imperatives of the logic of capital. The US, had in Obama’s reasoning, been historically engaged in Asia in order to create the conditions where it too could benefit economically. This revealed the US’s primary concern with geopolitical stability, where the imperatives of the logic of identity as the requirement to foster democracies, were secondary unless they contributed to the concerns within the logic of capital. This explains why the US can take the following position on the territorial disputes over various islands between China and other Asian countries. Obama stated the US in the following terms where:

“While the United States does not take a position on competing claims in the East and South China Seas, I made it clear that we do have a fundamental interest in freedom of navigation and that territorial disputes in the region should be resolved peacefully, in accordance with international law”.¹²⁶⁶

Publically then, the US prioritised the logic of capital where it was concerned with limiting the effects of these disputes on trade and other economic activities.

Speaking in December 2014, Obama recognised the domestic tensions contributing to China’s foreign policy. Obama observed how Xi “has consolidated power faster and more comprehensively than probably anybody since, I think, Deng Xiaoping”, significantly Obama recognised the “dangers in that: on issues of human rights, on issues of clamping down on dissent. He taps into a nationalism that worries his neighbours and that we've seen manifest in

¹²⁶⁵ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing, China," November 12, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107903>.

¹²⁶⁶ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing, China," November 12, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107903>.

these maritime disputes in the South China Sea and as well as on the Senkaku Islands”.¹²⁶⁷ Obama was more concerned with acting on the imperatives of the logic of capital. He described how “one of the ancillary benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is to create high standards in the region that then China has to adapt to, as opposed to a race to the bottom where there's no IP protection, for example, and China is really setting the terms for how trade and investment should operate”.¹²⁶⁸ It was becoming more explicit that TPP was about constraining China rather than containing China. The Trade agreement was an attempt to regulate and Chinese behaviour to produce a certain kind of China rather than limit its behaviour outright.

During a question and answer session with the Business Roundtable in December 2014, Obama reflected on his anxiety over China’s economic impact on the US. He responded to a question on China, in an answer worth recollecting in full:

“I do not take potential competition from China lightly, but I am absolutely confident we've got better cars than China does. And I'd much rather have our problems than China's problems. That I'm confident about. On the other hand, the one thing I will say is that if they need to build some stuff, they can build it. And over time, that wears away our advantage competitively. It's embarrassing: You drive down their roads, and you look at what they're able to do”.¹²⁶⁹

Implicit in this answer was that although Obama still felt the US more developed than China, in manufacturing and economic terms there appeared a sense of envy at China’s economic capacity. Whether this was due to Republican obstruction in Congress or merely China’s perceived capable economic ability, is for my purposes besides the point, what the remarks do reflect though, is further evidence of the logic of capital was giving rise to a sense of US anxiety and uncertainty about what China’s ‘rise’ means for itself.

During his 2015 State of the Union address Obama would again allude to the sense of anxiety in US foreign policy about China’s ‘rise’ and its consequences. He argued, “China wants to write the rules for the world's fastest growing region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those

¹²⁶⁷ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Business Roundtable and a Question-and-Answer Session," December 3, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107998>.

¹²⁶⁸ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Business Roundtable and a Question-and-Answer Session," December 3, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107998>.

¹²⁶⁹ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Business Roundtable and a Question-and-Answer Session," December 3, 2014. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=107998>.

rules".¹²⁷⁰ This line of reasoning reflected primarily the logic of capital but also expressed geopolitical concerns about the Asia-Pacific and the sense that the US was the world's arbiter of economic rules. Although Obama regularly emphasised US cooperation with China, compelled by the logic of capital he did maintain that this did not allay US geopolitical concerns about China's increasingly forthright behaviour in Asia. Obama stated how "the scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to China's military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial disputes".¹²⁷¹ The logic of geopolitics and with it, the US's concerns for its allies in Asia, did retain a certain degree of autonomy from the logic of capital, whereby the US understood its interests as not purely economic. In this regard, the logic of geopolitics compelled the US to behave in a certain way concerning what to do about an increasingly powerful state in a region where it had maintained relative hegemony for a sustained period of time.

Speaking at the Nike headquarters in Oregon on May 8th 2015, Obama outlined the potential benefits to the Chinese if Congress did not approve TPP. He argued:

"we have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy. And we should do it today, while our economy is in the position of global strength. Because if we don't write the rules for trade around the world, guess what? China will. And they'll write those rules in a way that gives Chinese workers and Chinese businesses the upper hand and locks American made goods out".¹²⁷²

As mentioned above it was becoming increasingly clear how TPP exemplified the logic of capital and was about responding to China's 'rise' in a way that would benefit the US while pressuring China to adopt particular economic reforms and practices.

During another Business Roundtable question and answer session in September 2015 Obama reflected on the comparisons being drawn between US anxiety about Japan in the 1980s and China in the 2010s. He argued that the US should "not fall into the same trap that we fell into around Japan in the 1980s, which is, somehow, China is taking over just like Japan was taking

¹²⁷⁰ Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=108031>.

¹²⁷¹ Barack Obama: "Statement on the 2015 National Security Strategy," February 6, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=109365>.

¹²⁷² Barack Obama: "Remarks at Nike World Headquarters in Beaverton, Oregon," May 8, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110156>.

over, and we're in inevitable decline".¹²⁷³ In a minor sense, Obama was contradicting some of his earlier statements comparing US unfavourably to China but here he maintained that "this whole argument...that somehow we're getting outcompeted, out-dealt, out-this, out-that, we're losing, we're in—nobody outside the United States understands what we're talking about".¹²⁷⁴ What he was defending though, was US engagement with China in the face of calls for a more confrontational strategy.

In a joint news conference with Xi on September 23rd 2015, Obama outlined how the US understanding of China influenced how it acted towards China. He described how "given China's size, we recognize there's still a lot of development to be done and a lot of poverty inside of China".¹²⁷⁵ Despite this recognition, Obama maintained that the US "can't treat China as if it's still a very poor, developing country, as it might have been 50 years ago. It is now a powerhouse. And that means it's got responsibilities and expectations in terms of helping to uphold international rules that might not have existed before".¹²⁷⁶ China's economic development had lead the US to view it in a more equal manner, which essentially meant a new set of expectations regarding international responsibility and an adjustment in the framing of the logic of identity.

In outlining his concern over not completing TPP and the benefits this failure would offer China, Obama again argued that "if we fail to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership done, if we do not create the architecture for high standards trade and commerce in this region, then that void will be filled by China, it will be filled by our economic competitors. They will make the rules, and those rules will not be to our advantage".¹²⁷⁷ This anxiety about not being able to determine the terms of international trade in Asia exemplified the sense of anxiety that Obama acknowledged permeated US domestic politics after the 2008 financial crisis. He speculated that "the reason that a lot of Americans feel anxious—is that the economy has been changing

¹²⁷³ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Business Roundtable and a Question-and-Answer Session," September 16, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110816>.

¹²⁷⁴ Barack Obama: "Remarks to the Business Roundtable and a Question-and-Answer Session," September 16, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110816>.

¹²⁷⁵ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China," September 25, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110838>.

¹²⁷⁶ Barack Obama: "The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China," September 25, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110838>.

¹²⁷⁷ Barack Obama: "Remarks During a Meeting With National Security Leaders on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement," November 13, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111134>.

in profound ways, changes that started long before the great recession hit, changes that have not let up”.¹²⁷⁸ The financial crisis of 2008 then created the conditions for US anxiety both domestically amongst its population, but also internationally regarding its relationship to China.

In a statement directed at China during his visit to Vietnam in May 2016, Obama outlined how the US would act to preserve geopolitical norms that facilitate economic trade. Obama again restated how “in the South China Sea, the United States is not a claimant in current disputes. But we will stand with partners in upholding core principles, like freedom of navigation and over-flight and lawful commerce that is not impeded and the peaceful resolution of disputes, through legal means, in accordance with international law”.¹²⁷⁹

Describing the geopolitical performances available to the US Obama described how “the United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and we will support the right of all countries to do the same”.¹²⁸⁰ The logic of geopolitics in this case, was prioritised by Obama as unquestionable US foreign policy in the region.

The significance of passing TPP to counter China and its attempts to reduce US influence in Asia were prominent in some of Obama’s final comments on international politics in September 2016. He released a statement describing how “as our global economy evolves, we have to ensure America plays a leading role in setting the highest standards for the rest of the world to follow. That’s what the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, is all about: putting American workers, farmers, and businesses first”.¹²⁸¹ Obama summarised the need for TPP warning that “China is negotiating a trade deal of its own, one that would carve up the growing Asia-Pacific markets at our expense, risking American jobs, businesses, and goods. Unless we act now to set our own high standards, the fast growing Asia-Pacific will be forced to play by lower standard rules that we didn’t set”.¹²⁸² The major issues at stake in Asia then

¹²⁷⁸ Barack Obama: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 12, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111174>.

¹²⁷⁹ Barack Obama: "Remarks in Hanoi, Vietnam," May 24, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117720>.

¹²⁸⁰ Barack Obama: "Remarks in Hanoi, Vietnam," May 24, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117720>.

¹²⁸¹ Barack Obama: "Statement on the United States Trade Enforcement Action Against China," September 13, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=118960>.

¹²⁸² Barack Obama: "Statement on the United States Trade Enforcement Action Against China," September 13, 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=118960>.

were rendered through the logic of capital where the US stood to lose out economically to the benefit of China.

9.4 Conclusion

In April 2016, *The Atlantic* magazine published an extensive article based on a number of interviews with Obama conducted by Jeffrey Goldberg.¹²⁸³ Although not Obama's final statement on foreign policy, the article tried to capture what the 'Obama Doctrine' consisted of and offers useful insight into the Obama's foreign policy motivations. These merit consideration here before I offer some concluding thoughts overall for the manner in which the further illuminate Obama's foreign policy thinking. Obama reflected how "in terms of traditional great-state relations, I do believe that the relationship between the United States and China is going to be the most critical".¹²⁸⁴ More precisely, Obama considered, through the logics of capital and geopolitics what the possibilities of China's successful 'rise' or collapse might mean for the US. He outlined how if "China continues on a peaceful rise, then we have a partner that is growing in capability and sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an international order".¹²⁸⁵ What this reveals, as mentioned above is the manner in which Obama acknowledged the limits of US capability within international politics as rendered through the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics.

Conversely, Obama considered the challenges facing China where "if [it] fails; if it is not able to maintain a trajectory that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an organising principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a country its size in maintaining the international order; if it views the world only in terms of regional spheres of influence—then not only do we see the potential for conflict with China, but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges that are going to come".¹²⁸⁶ Succinctly Obama affirmed that he had "been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China".¹²⁸⁷ What this signifies is Obama's understanding that to see China as a threat or opportunity as is the traditional way for debating China's rise, misses out the significance of China's apparent necessity to US interests, regionally, globally and economic as well as political. In geopolitical terms, Obama was more expressive regarding US pushback to some of China's

¹²⁸³ Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine", *The Atlantic* (<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>, April 24 2016).

¹²⁸⁴ Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine".

¹²⁸⁵ Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine".

¹²⁸⁶ Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine".

¹²⁸⁷ Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine".

actions in the region. He argued, “I think we have to be firm where China’s actions are undermining international interests, and if you look at how we’ve operated in the South China Sea, we have been able to mobilise most of Asia to isolate China in ways that have surprised China, frankly, and have very much served our interest in strengthening our alliances”.¹²⁸⁸

In this line of reasoning, the US requires China to participate in the international order in a manner concordant with US ideals to help preserve and reproduce that very order. There was nothing inherently threatening about China’s ‘rise’, but the US was concerned, as it has been since Franklin Roosevelt’s hopes for a democratic China, in producing a China that behaved in a way beneficial to the US and the preservation of the international order. Describing Obama’s foreign policy towards China as either containment or attempting to constrain China essentially misses the major point that US foreign policy towards China has been about producing a China that would assist in the administration of the international order, as the US understood it. What this revealed was a sense of anxiety present in US discourses about China with regards to the US’s relative position and domestic way of life, but less overtly, a sense of anxiety about international politics more broadly. This is best exhibited by the admittedly few remarks on climate change I have engaged with in this chapter and the previous one. What climate change appears to do based on the difficulty with locating it in any of the three logics I have described and analysed, is collapse their distinctions and imperatives. Climate change might in this regard induce its own logic within US political discourses that conditions not just US discourse of China, but US discourses of politics more generally. Whether this is the case, and what this might mean though are matters for another day.

¹²⁸⁸ Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine”

Chapter 10 - Beginnings

10.1 Beginnings

This thesis has demonstrated that three logics, of identity, capital, and geopolitics, emerge over time and are predominant in US presidential discourses of China. These were not pre-existing assumptions derived as analytical concepts from the genealogy I have presented. These logics function to frame, organise and limit what is politically possible and subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China. The logic of capital addresses the need for US capital to reproduce itself by expanding internationally. The logic of geopolitics predominantly functions as the organising principles for the logic of capital and US foreign relations specifically in relation to China, though it at times invoked independently of the other two. The logic of identity functions as a conditioning limit on the logics of capital and geopolitics. By this I mean that the logic of identity both enables and limits certain understandings and application of the other two logics. The logics of US foreign policy towards China within US presidential discourses operate in a nexus of converging and diverging tension. This is not the same as some kind of dialectical synthesis, but to describe US foreign policy as conditioned through only one of the logic of identity, capital or geopolitics would ignore the evidence presented here.

In the 19th century US presidential discourses of China, exemplified by Polk, Grant and Cleveland predominantly invoked the logic of capital where China was a potential economic ‘solution’ to domestic economic crises. It was not until the Presidency of William McKinley that the other two logics of geopolitics and identity became visibly more significant. Taft established a lasting legacy through his rendering of the logic of capital towards China as a means to transform China. Franklin Roosevelt became the first to gradually combine the logics in a way that did not overly prioritise one or the other. Under Truman there was a clear increase in China’s significance. He was also significant for being the first to articulate a preference for China to assist in the management of the international system, at least locally in Asia. Eisenhower rendered China explicitly as “a bleak problem that must be solved”.¹²⁸⁹ Johnson and Nixon acknowledged that allowing space for understanding China’s perspective on the world would benefit US policy and both invoked the logic of capital to varying degrees when justifying reconciliation. Although Clinton regularly invoked all three logics, he more

¹²⁸⁹ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Remarks and Discussion at the National Press Club.," January 14, 1959. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11696>.

regularly imagined China through the logic of capital. Significantly, Obama not only recognised an uncertainty about what China's economic development meant for the US but he started to reflect the limits of those logics in regards to China when it came to addressing the issue of climate change.

From this genealogy it becomes possible to reflect on how the problem of China emerged historically as a perceived solution to the economic problems of the US before it became rendered as a geopolitical problem outright during Eisenhower's presidency. Increasingly apparent though, especially under Clinton, Bush and Obama is the US intention that China become, at the least, a regional custodian of the international order, if not a more 'responsible' member more globally. Under Obama, China was now perceived as necessary actor in the maintenance of the global economy and political system not just an opportunity or a threat.

What I can establish more generally from this analysis is that US anxiety over the 'rise of China' is a manifestation of historic US conceptions of its identity as a 'Pacific power', its geopolitical imagining of the Asia-Pacific, and the perceived imperatives of contemporary capitalism in the US. Fundamentally the logics I articulate not only capture how the US thinks about and how its foreign policy is conditioned towards China, but they function to produce China as the very problem they attempt to resolve. And it is in this manner that I expand on Foucault's comments on critique as setting out the assumptions of a particular practice with the impetuosity of critical theory as outlined by Cox to imply that it is on the terrain of these logics that US foreign policy should be challenged if one has in mind reducing the geopolitical and economic tension between the US and China today.

As Chapter 2 indicated, there is an extensive body of literature on US foreign policy towards China though none of which provide a genealogical analysis of US presidential discourse over this time frame. My argument should hopefully speak to and contribute to the conclusions drawn by Pan, Barr, Turner and Ling, regarding the significance and limitations of how China has featured in the US imagination. Following Koopman's framing of Foucault's genealogy I have been able to derive three analytical concepts which will hopefully be useful to further analysis of either US foreign policy towards China in more detail, or at least potentially a starting point for engaging with US foreign policy more broadly. I remained mindful though of Angharad Stephens' observation that many critical responses to the prevailing US imaginative geographies "tend to keep them firmly in place and entrench them further",

though I would contend that this should not preclude the analysis here.¹²⁹⁰ There must also be some acceptance that even if we produce certain ideas we wish to disrupt, this should be considered the price of critique and analysis.

In many ways, this research has produced more questions than it has answer. This is perhaps always the case, but remains a strange sensation. There are a number of potential areas of further research that exist latently in the manner in which I have selected the source material and focus that I use. Time and practicality necessarily lead to certain methodological choices that always imply certain a set of limitation to one's argument. For instance, in light of the genealogy it would seem to make sense to structure the argument thematically through the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics, although a chronological structure was necessary to demonstrate how I derived the logics even if a thematic structure lends itself to a more overt analytical position.

My focus on presidential sources alone, with a few complimentary additions from government officials raises the question of whether these logics feature in other sources of discourses. One might consider how the US public consider the importance of relations with China, especially in the current moment defined by Donald Trump's presidency, more on this below. One issue that became apparent is the absence of an explicitly racial discourse in the sources I analysed. What I noticed early in my research is that although Cleveland and McKinley made explicit references to race in their statements about the Chinese, racial discourses were much more overt and explicit in other sources, especially during the 19th century in congressional and everyday discourses. For instance, one popular pamphlet circulating in the early 19th century during debates over Chinese exclusion was entitled '*Meat Vs. Rice. American Manhood Against Asiatic Coolieism. Which Shall Survive?*' and Chinese were racially inferior due to their diet of rice.¹²⁹¹ Worth considering as well might be the relationship between popular, congressional and presidential discourses of China.

It might also be analytical fruitful to engage with the broader set of foreign policy documents contained in the published *Foreign Relations of the United States* collections to see whether the logics discernable in presidential discourses are present in the more private spaces of

¹²⁹⁰ Angharad Stephens, 'Beyond imaginative geographies? Critique, co-optation, and imagination in the aftermath of the war on terror?', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* (2011): 254.

¹²⁹¹ American Federation of Labor, 'Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion. Meat Vs. Rice. American Manhood Against Asiatic Coolieism. Which Shall Survive?', *Internet Archive* (<https://archive.org/details/somereasonsforc00labogooq> 20 October 2014).

foreign policy decision making.¹²⁹² This might also help with exploring the relatively under researched period of US-China relations during the 1920s.¹²⁹³ Or it would be worth examining the relationship between the broader milieu of geopolitical ideas and US foreign policy with regards to China. This could be done for instance, bearing in mind the close relationship between Alfred Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, by examining the relationship between the arguments of Mahan's *the Problem of Asia* and Brooks Adams' *The New Empire* and Roosevelt's foreign policy.¹²⁹⁴ One could do this through a more contemporary focus and consider whether and how these logics are circulated in modern media discourses, contemporary secondary literature on US foreign policy or in academic.

I also do not engage at all with how the Chinese responded to these discourses or indeed through what logics they understand the US. It might also have been beneficial to consider US discourses of China and Japan over the period as much of their concern about one was to do with how they understood the other, apparent in the discourses of Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt or Obama. There were also significant periods of debate in the US about how exactly they should understand China, most notable were during WWII up until the success of the Communist revolution in China.¹²⁹⁵ This would reflect more the more 'traditional' concerns of a genealogy as needing to focus on debates and subjugated knowledge, rather than say, presidential discourses. In a broader sense, it would be worth investigating the consequences of the US imagining of China for the rest of Asia or more specifically South-East Asia, especially during the second half of the 20th century.

There is a necessary question that follows from this genealogy, either a continuation of the genealogy if you will or what other analysis can now be done with the conceptual frameworks developed from the genealogy. One might address why a particular logic was more dominant at a particular time, or indeed how the different logics relate to each other. An inquiry of this

¹²⁹² US Department of State, 'Historical Documents, *Foreign Relations of the United States*', *Office of the Historian* (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments> 15 February 2017). I had initially considered including source material from these collections but eventually decided to focus on solely public presidential documents. The task though worthwhile as it may be, would also be extensive.

¹²⁹³ There was an absence of useful analytical material in presidential source material during this period even if a number of important events like the growing Nationalist movement and their split from the Chinese Communists in 1927. For some discussion of this period see Errol MacGregor Clauss, "Pink in Appearance, but Red at Heart": The United States and the Far Eastern Republic, 1920-1922', *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1 (1992): 327- 356 and Wei Liang-tsai, 'U.S. China Policy in the Late 1920s: An American Response to Chinese Nationalism', *American Studies* 8 (1978): 125-150.

¹²⁹⁴ Alfred Mahan, *The Problem of Asia* (USA: Transaction Publishers, 1900); Brooks Adams, *The New Empire* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903); Richard Turk, *The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan* (USA: Praeger, 1987).

¹²⁹⁵ Kenneth Chern, *Dilemma in China: America's Policy Debate, 1945* (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1980).

kind would necessitate the application of a different set of theoretical and methodological tools, but nonetheless requires an initial genealogy as I present here, to be meaningful. A number of questions arise concerning where and how does change occur in US foreign policy? Why at some times does one logic appear more evident than the other two? What are the specific conditions that affect this? A more theoretical analysis of how the logics relate to each other would also be worthwhile. I remained essentially ambivalent about US political party structures but it would be worth considering the function of these logics in the broader political context of US politics concerning class antagonisms and other personal interests of political actors involved in the foreign policy process. This concern has been noted astutely explored by Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton when looking at the competing class interests in US foreign policy in relation to Iraq during the run up to the 2003 US invasion. While I have refrained from explicit engagement with their ideas, the issues they raised have haunted this thesis for a substantial period of time.¹²⁹⁶

Where possible I have referred to the domestic and broader socio-political factors that might have influenced US foreign policy towards China though this was never intended to be a major focus of this thesis. For instance, it was apparent that domestic financial problems in the US often spurred an increased interest in China, either in the 1890s, the 1930s or post 2008. I was more concerned with articulating the logics which condition how the US came to think and acts towards China. Further research might benefit from a historical sociological approach along the lines of the extraordinary work done by Alexander Anievas and others who make use of theories of uneven and combined development.¹²⁹⁷ This would go some way to deepening our understanding of the logics I have described and their functioning within various domestic and transnational social relations. This would also reflect a more concerted attempt to account for capitalism in US foreign policy and policy towards China more broadly. The logic of capital I describe, mildly reflects this concern but for the most part only recognises that empirically, it is vital to understanding how the US thinks about and acts towards China. A more specific analysis of the role of private corporations and individuals in this light would also add to our understanding and analysis.

¹²⁹⁶ Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, 'The Deficits of Discourse in IPE: Turning Base Metal into Gold', *International Studies Quarterly* 52 (2008): 103-128; Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, 'Axis of Evil or Access to Diesel? Spaces of New Imperialism and the Iraq War', *Historical Materialism* 23 (2015): 94-130.

¹²⁹⁷ Alexander Anievas, *Capital, The State, and War: Class Conflict and Geopolitics in the Thirty Years' Crisis, 1914-1945* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2014); Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, *How The West Came to Rule The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism* (London: Pluto Press, 2015); Alexander Anievas and Kamran Martin (eds), *Historical Sociology and World History* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016).

The final two chapters of this thesis also reflect the growing concern with climate change in US presidential discourses regarding China. The significance was noted by Obama's Secretary of State John Kerry reflecting on the failed 2009 Copenhagen when he described how the US's relationship with China "changed the paradigm of what happened in Copenhagen...It was a sea change".¹²⁹⁸ More specific research might focus on how the issue of climate change and related security effects was affecting how the US understood its relationship to China and how it should orientate its foreign policy.¹²⁹⁹ What can be drawn from my brief analysis of Obama's comments, centred on a secretly negotiated deal with China, is how the existential nature of climate change does not fit into any of the logics I describe.¹³⁰⁰

This though, brings into focus the Donald Trump presidency.

10.2 2016 and Beyond: The Trump Future.

The 2016 election of Donald Trump raises, amongst other things, a number of important questions that the research I have presented here might be able to address. I present a few brief suggestions on how my research would approach his presidency through the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics I have outlined in this thesis.

The ascension to the US Presidency of Donald Trump has provoked a heightening of tensions between the US and China as he has adopted a more aggressive stance towards China throughout his presidential campaign. Although criticism of China during US elections is a now common theme¹³⁰¹, Trump has advocated a contemporary form of unilateral mercantilism towards China on the perception that China has actively undermined the US economy. This is best, but unfortunately, exhibited by his declaration that "we can't continue to allow China to rape our country".¹³⁰² Trump's rhetoric can be understood as exhibiting a more bellicose rendering of the three logics I have developed in this thesis, and a particular understanding of the logic of capital and identity. This is despite the fact that Xi Jinping's

¹²⁹⁸ Suzanne Goldenberg, 'How US negotiators ensured landmark Paris climate deal was Republican-proof', *The Guardian* (<http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/climate-change-paris-deal-cop21-obama-administration-congress-republicans-environment> 25 January 2016).

¹²⁹⁹ Simon Dalby, *Security and Environmental Change* (London: Polity Press, 2009).

¹³⁰⁰ Tania Branigan and Lenore Taylor, 'US and China strike deal on carbon cuts in push for global climate change pact', *The Guardian* (<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge>, 25 January 2016).

¹³⁰¹ Chen, 'China Emerges as a Scapegoat in Campaign Ads'.

¹³⁰² Diamond, Jeremy, 'Trump: 'We can't continue to allow China to rape our country'', *CNN* (<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trump-china-rape/>, 24 October 2016).

January 2017 speech in Davos¹³⁰³ appeared to represent a position that US foreign policy had been pressuring China to adopt since at least Clinton's era, that of a "responsible stakeholder" and cooperative administrator of regional and global capitalism.

In his brief time as president, Trump has already reduced his statements on China to more palatable variations on the US having lost jobs since China's entry into the WTO. On February 23rd 2017 Trump would set out his position on US foreign economic policy, revealing the intimate relationship between 'domestic' and 'foreign' concerns when he stated, "my administration's policies and regulatory reform, tax reform, trade policies will return significant manufacturing jobs to our country".¹³⁰⁴

In an address to Congress on February 28th contextualised that claim when he remarked, "we've lost more than one-fourth of our manufacturing jobs since NAFTA was approved, and we've lost 60,000 factories since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001".¹³⁰⁵ A few weeks later at a 'Make America Great Again' rally in Kentucky on March 20th Trump would remark, "since China joined -- and it's another beauty -- the World Trade Organization in 2001, the United States has lost many more than 60,000 factories. We sacrificed our own middle class to finance the growth of foreign countries".¹³⁰⁶ It is comparatively early days but what is clear from these remarks is the manner in which Trump is approaching China through the logic of capital.

Trump did make some reference to China during his February 10th meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In relation to Japan he stated, "working together, our two countries have the ability to bring greater harmony, stability, and prosperity to the Pacific region and beyond, improving countless lives in the process".¹³⁰⁷ His comments reveal a distinct difference in tone from his campaign rhetoric as evidence by the relatively oblique

¹³⁰³ 'Full Text of Xi Jinping keynote at the World Economic Forum', *CGTN* (<https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/17/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum> , 25 January 2017).

¹³⁰⁴ Donald J. Trump: "Remarks in a Meeting with Manufacturing CEOs," February 23, 2017. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123407>.

¹³⁰⁵ Donald J. Trump: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress," February 28, 2017. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123408>.

¹³⁰⁶ Donald J. Trump: "Remarks at a "Make America Great Again" Rally in Louisville, Kentucky," March 20, 2017. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123589>.

¹³⁰⁷ Donald J. Trump: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan," February 10, 2017. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123196>.

statement, “we have conversations with various representatives of China. I believe that that will all work out very well for everybody: China, Japan, the United States, and everybody in the region”.¹³⁰⁸ This statement makes some inference to a Trumpian logic of geopolitics though in repudiation of the Obama administration’s discourse his Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton has declared that:

“On the issue of pivot, rebalance, et cetera, that was a word that was used to describe the Asia policy in the last administration. I think you can probably expect that this administration will have its own formulation and it hasn’t actually, we haven’t seen in detail what the formulation will be or if there even will be a formulation”.¹³⁰⁹

Now it seems apparent that the Trump administration will not be a continuation of Obama era policies towards China, but the logics of capital and geopolitics remain key features in Trump’s discourse of China so far.

Examining the Trump presidency’s foreign policy towards China would benefit from combining the three logics presented here with an approach outlined by Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graff. They study “corporate elite networks”, using social network analysis and detailed biographical data, to explore the social sources of grand strategy making to see how public state power relates to social private power.¹³¹⁰ They elaborate on a nexus that exists between individuals based in transnational capital and the US government to demonstrate the close relationship between corporate and state interests in US foreign policy.¹³¹¹ What this might entail is examining the thought of one of Trump’s economic advisor Peter Navarro who has published numerous tracts on US-China relations including *Death by China* and *The Coming Wars*, and the marginally more refined *Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism means for the World*.¹³¹² Evident in Navarro’s work is an inversion of the principal US understanding of the logic of capital where the incorporation of China into

¹³⁰⁸ Donald J. Trump: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan," February 10, 2017. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123196>.

¹³⁰⁹ Ankit Panda, ‘Straight From the US State Department: The 'Pivot' to Asia Is Over’, *The Diplomat* (<http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/straight-from-the-us-state-department-the-pivot-to-asia-is-over/>, 20 March 2017).

¹³¹⁰ Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graff, *American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks* (Oxon: Routledge, 2016).

¹³¹¹ Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graff, ‘The Limits of Open Door Imperialism and the US State-Capital Nexus’, *Globalization* 9 (2012): 593-608.

¹³¹² Adam Davidson, ‘Trump’s Muse on U.S. Trade with China, October 12 2016’, *The New Yorker* (<http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/trumps-muse-on-u-s-trade-with-china>, 15 December 2016); Peter Navarro and Greg Autry, *Death by China Confronting the Dragon- A Global Call to Action* (New Jersey: Pearson Publication, 2011); Peter Navarro, *The Coming China Wars* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2008); Peter Navarro, *Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2015).

the global economic system beginning in the 1980s has undermined the US manufacturing sector. This is in stark contrast to Obama's argument that China is now fundamental to the maintenance of the global economic system.

The most important part of this research though, is how it should ideally serve as the beginning of a broader engagement with US foreign policy and China and not some kind of absolute conclusion that captures the entirety complexity of the relationship. Whatever might occur during the Trump presidency, it is unlikely that the US-China relationship will become of any lesser importance in the near future and so maintaining a critical attitude to US discourses of China in the present by way of engaging with the history invoked by those contemporary discourses will remain a necessary exercise.

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