THE JIHADIST DISCOURSE OF AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (2003–2005):

REPRESENTATIONAL, INTERTEXTUAL AND ARGUMENTATIVE ANALYSIS

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Abstract

This thesis conducts a critical analysis of jihadist discourse. This is achieved by qualitatively analysing the content of *Sawt al-jihad,* a propagandistic e-magazine published by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) between 2003 and 2005. The aim of the research is to establish how the jihadist worldview is discursively constructed and legitimised. The investigation is in accordance with the research programme of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) and draws on an interdisciplinary model to examine the discursive features of jihadist discourse. This model includes Bourdieu's 'capital theory' and 'symbolic power', Islamic religious epistemology, the literature on intertextuality and theories connected to Aristotelian topoi. The thesis undertakes a three-pronged analysis. The first is a representational analysis concerned with the discourse topics preferred within AQAP discourse and how the relevant social actors/actions are constructed, focusing on representation of the Self and the Other. The second analysis explores the intertextual connections via which AQAP discourse appeals to, and overlaps with, prior (sacred) texts and hearers' repertoires of 'old knowledge'. In this discussion, I attempt to develop a novel and systematic analytic approach to intertextuality for analysing (politico)-religious discourses and to use this approach to analyse the structurings and restructurings of AQAP discourse, which might then be applied to other texts in the same genre. Finally, the third analysis is specifically concerned with the persuasive dimension and attempts to critically identify the topoi AQAP utilises to legitimise the Self and delegitimise the Other. The ultimate aim of this project is thus not only to contribute to the body of knowledge about radical jihadism from a CDA perspective, but also to make a substantial contribution to the study of the discursive construction and reproduction of such ideologies from a wider perspective, too.

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AQ	Al Qaeda
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CA	Classical Arabic
DHA	The Discourse-Historical Approach
EIG	Egypt's Islamic Group
EOKA	*Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agoniston*, (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, Cyprus)
IJ	Islamic Jihad (an Egyptian jihadist group)
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IZL	*Irgun Zvai Leumi*, 'National Military Organisation', Palestine.
US(A)	United States (of America)
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Glossing Abbreviations

SING	Singular
PL	plural
F	Female
M	Male
NOM	Nominative
ACC	Accusative
1st	First (person)
2nd	Second (person)
3rd	Third (person)

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. Overview

In this study, I carry out a critical analysis of the discourse and ideology of a radical jihadist group: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (henceforth, AQAP). This analysis is based on the premise that macro-ideologies are localised in micro-discursive practices. It is achieved by conducting a textual analysis of a propagandistic e-magazine published by Al Qaeda's wing – AQAP – that operated in Saudi Arabia between 2003 and 2005: *Sawt al-jihad*. The contents and forms of the propagandistic magazine *Sawt al-jihad* are a rich repository where everyday jihadist performances and rhetorical patterns can be traced and identified. The purpose of this analysis is to establish a greater understanding of the deep ideological structures of AQAP, in particular, the construction and (de)legitimisation of the Self and the Other. Ultimately, my interest centres on how Al Qaeda groups – and the broader jihadist movement – succeed (or fail) in presenting a coherent and cohesive politico-religious worldview. The fundamental aim of my research is to contribute to the body of knowledge about radical jihadism as an ongoing global problem. Moreover, it will contribute to the growing body of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) tied to the investigation of the discourse of jihadist movements.

Despite recent developments, including the transformation of Al Qaeda into a global jihadist movement and the appearance of the so-called "Islamic State", the phenomenon remains that of the *mujahedeen*, which dates to the 1960s, encompassing the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War, which marked a key breakthrough for jihadism. Given the ongoing turmoil in Middle-Eastern geo-politics that has created political lacunae and an obvious space for the onset and progression of jihadist groups, critical analysis of the discursive practices of radical groups is a very topical research area that can best be approached via a multidisciplinary research agenda within the critical social sciences. For reasons of familiarity with the context, my research project focuses on AQAP between 2003 and 3005, which saw the decentralised expansion of Al Qaeda and the formation of different jihadist groups that pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda's leadership and followed its strategies. However, AQAP's discursive practices are by no means fundamentally different in form or content to other jihadist groups.

This study draws on several theoretical traditions to tackle jihadist discourse. Although, in principle, it subscribes theoretically and methodologically to the tradition of CDA in accordance with the research programme of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), I also

draw on Bourdieu's social constructivist theories of 'capital' and 'symbolic power' (Bourdieu 1986; 1991); Islamic religious epistemology (al-Jabiri 2008; 2011); the literature on intertextuality within and beyond CDA (Fairclough 1992; Genette 1997) and theories connected to Aristotelian topoi (Slomkowski 1997; Aristotle 2006). Such an approach, drawing as it does on several frameworks, is dictated by the research questions and data analysis requirements.

The remainder of this introductory chapter reviews approaches to the study of jihadism, sets the research questions and sheds some light on the rationale of the current study and my position as an analyst. Finally, I conclude by outlining the thesis structure.

1.2. Approaches to terrorism and jihadism

Terrorist rebellions attract a great deal of scholarly attention. Across various disciplines, vast tomes and journal articles have been written, constituting a huge body of research in what can be called terrorism and counter-terrorism studies. There are several textbooks studying terrorism: on the history and the varying and often conflicting definitions of the phenomenon (e.g. Martin 2006; Harmon 2013), and terrorist groups around the world and how to counter them (e.g. Forest's (2007) three-volume seminal work, which contains chapters by experts discussing terrorist groups' strategies, sources and facilitators). Furthermore, much work has been done in the social sciences, especially that investigating terrorists' social and psychological root causes (e.g. Bjørgo 2005; Horgan 2005) as well as these groups' cooperative coalitions and organisational structuring and functioning (e.g. Karmon 2005). Some media studies have been concerned with the distinct advantages that are offered online, where terror groups can reach out to wider audiences and radicalise individuals, thus publicising their causes well beyond local domains (e.g. Weimann 2006; Ganor et al. 2007).

Al Qaeda and its clusters have received considerable scholarly attention. There are many cross-sectional studies exploring Al Qaeda's structure, history, strategic thinking and media policies, particularly after 9/11. This event prompted several studies on the revival of *jihad* by militant Islamist groups (e.g. Bonney 2004; Kepel 2006; Bonner 2008; Cook 2015). There have been numerous studies exploring Al Qaeda's history and structure (e.g. Burke 2004; Gerges 2009; 2017; Byman 2015). Gurr and Cole (2002) have examined the threat of terrorist organisations potential acquiring WMD. Other studies have looked at regional offshoots of Al Qaeda in different parts of the world, e.g. Al Qaeda in Europe (Vidino 2006) and Al Qaeda in Yemen (Harris 2010; Page et al. 2011). With the recent threat of various jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria and the establishment of the so-called "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" (ISIS), many

studies have attempted to investigate ISIS and its likes. AQAP – in its Saudi phase prior to merging with the Yemeni counterpart – has received scholarly attention too (e.g. Obaid and Cordesman 2005). The most comprehensive account of AQAP's mission in Saudi Arabia is Hegghammer's (2010a) *Jihad in Saudi Arabia.*

The research literature, however, contains relatively few in-depth discourse/ideology analyses of jihadist ideological texts. In his historical analysis, Hegghammer (2010a) considers some Al Qaeda statements but his methodological approach is based on the analysis of mujahedeen biographies, not jihadist texts. While texts in AQAP's propagandist magazine *Sawt al-jihad* have been referred to in several studies (Harris 2010; Hegghammer 2010a; Page et al. 2011), no study has conducted a systematic analysis of the magazine's content. It is the aim of my thesis to carry out a systematic analysis of AQAP's ideological message. The representational, intertextual and argumentative analyses are intended to contribute to the growing literature on jihadism and to provide a data-driven discourse/ideology analysis. Following Alexander's (2006) symbolic dimension, doing politics can be taken to include all efforts of political performance, not least, discursive practices in the media. Therefore, the current work aims to analyse politics at this micro-level.

1.3. Research Questions

I seek to conduct a historical and evaluative piece of research that addresses a complex sociopolitical issue. My aim is to go beyond linguistic analysis and attempt to make sense of the social, political, cultural and epistemological contextual elements involved. The key question underpinning the research is why extremist jihadist rhetoric has succeeded historically in gaining sympathy and promoting jihadist ideology to the point of recruiting significant numbers of sympathisers. Working within the guidelines of the discipline of CDA and drawing on allied frameworks, this research focuses on three specific research questions. These have been formulated to diagnose AQAP discourse and are answered in Chapters 5–7, respectively:

1. What is AQAP's worldview? That is, how are *jihad*, the Self and the Other represented in AQAP discourse?

2. What are the intertextual charatceristics of AQAP discourse? And what meanings do these AQAP intertextual characteristics bring about?

3. How does AQAP discursively (de)legitimise the Self and the Other in its discourse? What (de)legitimatory topoi are utlised in AQAP discourse?

These questions are not mutually exclusive; rather, combined, they seek to explicate and explain the nature of jihadist discourse. Moreover, they are intended to illustrate the systematic mechanisms of argumentation and (de)legitimisation by analysing textual patterns in the data against the background of other discourses by drawing on the general sociopolitical context in which they were written.

1.4. Rationale of the study

A potential question could be raised regarding the novelty of analysing jihadist discourse as to what explanations could actually be added to insights already known about this complex phenomenon. This question is cogent and I should provide a brief answer to it. First, and most importantly, the jihadist movement conveys diverse but coherent narratives in terms of both the forms of rhetoric and specific contents. These contents are intertextually complex and appeal to the common knowledge and identity narratives of an audience belonging to the same epistemic community. Therefore, the theoretical-methodological approach to this complex phenomenon should proceed along the sociopolitical and epistemological dimensions upon which the rationality of the argumentative structures of the discourse at hand is built. That is, for an appropriate look at the front stage performance – the *text*, one has to look into the collective background culture, symbols narrative and myths that resonate with the audience (Alexander 2006). The theoretical/methodological approach to jihadism I would like to adopt is a multidisciplinary one that is richly informed by the sociological and epistemological aspects of language and religion. I have reason to hope that such an integration will provide a fruitful point of departure for such an intricate enterprise. One way of embarking on this enterprise is by recourse to actual jihadist texts as repositories of their sociocultural practices.

Another question concerns the obscurity of terrorist groups' intentions, in other words, how can one differentiate between the *secret* and *declared aims* of a clandestine jihadist group such as AQAP? I have no recourse to the group's secret aims, as top leaders only have them, and they are beyond the scope of this thesis. For me, what is at issue are their declared aims. I will investigate what aims emerge in AQAP's discourse and how they are textually encoded and justified. However, my objective is not to make conclusive claims but rather to put forward – in Max Weber's (1949: 184) terms – "causally adequate" explanations, as far as the analysis of discourse can allow. Although access to the social practices of the jihadists, which gives discourse analysis explanatory power, is more or less limited (particularly the actual processes of production and consumption of discourse), a CDA perspective has a lot to offer to the investigation of jihadist discourse/ideology. The framework has sufficiently robust tools to turn

jihadist texts into useful resources for historical discursive analysis. It can offer a consistent and data-driven approach, via which one can analyse the discursive construction of violence in the field of religio-politics. Thus, my perspective is geared towards the analysis of a productive discourse type containing a range of specific and significant semiotic features that have thus far not been sufficiently attended to in the social science literature.

So, where do I stand and from what standpoint do I observe and analyse? However much a researcher prides themself on being an objective social scientist, or pretends to be merely an observer, everyone is after all positioned inside their social system with only a limited range of viewpoints during their lifetime. I have no access to how jihadists produce texts and how recipients interpret them. Instead, as Fairclough (2001: 183) suggests, I have to engage in the discourse process under investigation and draw upon my own memory and experience as an 'insider' in order to explain how participants draw upon theirs. Being a researcher from the wider socioculture to which jihadist groups belong, I do therefore have preferential access as an analyst to interpret, rather than describe, the texts under investigation.

However, at this early stage, it is worth underlining both what this thesis is and is not about. I am not concerned with assessing the truth of the statements underlying AQAP's narrative. More importantly, I shall not get involved in questioning the accuracy of their interpretations of sacred texts, for I have neither the capacity nor the qualifications to do so. Instead, my focus is on the way AQAP discourse effectively brings into existence *a* 'truth', or a representation of it, with particular consequences in the real world. If a significant number of people accept the jihadists' worldview and believe their interpretations to be true, real consequences result, whether or not these interpretations are theologically or juristically valid in the first place.

1.5. Thesis design

In accordance with the research programme of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA),[1] this introductory chapter provides a general background to the project and sets out the research questions. Chapter 2 outlines the historical background of radical jihadism in the Arab/Islamic world, focusing particularly on the period following the anti-Soviet Afghan War up until 2003-2005, the time period in which AQAP operated. It also reviews existing scholarly work on jihadism and outlines a rationale for tackling this research topic from a critical perspective. Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical frameworks for this study, while Chapter 4 sketches out the

[1] A detailed account of the DHA and its analytic categories will be given in section 4.2.2.

methodologies of data selection and data sampling, the problematisation and operationalisation of the research questions, and the analytic tools to be employed. The three chapters that follow conduct a three-pronged analysis. First, Chapter 5 provides a representational analysis concerned with AQAP discourse topics and how relevant social actors/actions are discursively constructed, focusing on the presentation of the Self and the Other. Second, Chapter 6 explores the intertextual connections of AQAP discourse. Third, Chapter 7 is specifically concerned with the persuasive dimension and attempts to critically identify the argumentation schemes and themes of AQAP discourse. Finally, the thesis concludes with a chapter summarising the findings, formulating a prospective critique and referring to this study's limitations and the potential for future research in this area.

Chapter 2 THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

2.1. Introduction

For discourse to be analysed and meanings to be constructed, understood and explained, one has to consider many layers of contextual knowledge, including: from the macro sociopolitical context to the micro intertextual/interdiscursive one. The latter can only be done along with localised micro-analyses, but at this stage, it is wise to start off by shedding some light on the former: the wider historical and sociopolitical contexts. Therefore, this chapter provides a brief historical overview of the development of jihadism. A definition of 'jihadism' is given in section 2.2. Section 2.3, which follows, then briefly reviews the jihadist movement from the 1960s to the emergence of global jihadism in the 1990s, via the Afghan anti-Soviet War of the 1980s. Section 2.4 describes Al Qaeda before and after 9/11. The next section, 2.5, offers an account Al Qaeda's wing in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In section 2.6, a categorisation of Al Qaeda members is provided, while section 2.7 briefly compares Al Qaeda's military activism to guerrilla warfare in history. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter by outlining AQ(AP)'s use of the media and the rationale for selecting online magazines as an object of investigation.

2.2. What is jihadism?

The term 'jihadism' is derived from the Arabic word *jihad,* which literally means 'striving' or 'exerting oneself' (Cook 2015). Classical and contemporary Muslim scholars provide definitions of *jihad* based on exerting the self for the sake of God and list different rankings of *jihad,* ranging from a spiritual rank anchored to the individual's inner spiritual struggle to be virtuous to the religious duty of "justified war" or "fighting for the sake of God" (al-Luhaidan 1978; al-Bouti 1993; al-Qaradawi 2010; Ahmed 2015). Cook (2015) rightfully argues that the definition of *jihad* has been – and is still – subject to debate between scholars providing apologetic definitions and others emphasising its destructive nature – particularly post-9/11 – as an inherent element of Islam. But the term comes from a religious context and is charged with a complex set of meanings throughout Islamic history. It should, therefore, be studied from a historiographic perspective. Cook (2015) conducted a compelling account of the historical usage of the term in Islamic history. He concludes that *jihad* – in its military form – is intertwined between historical events and religious beliefs and closely linked to the expansion of early Islam. He argues that military *jihad* is dominant while the spiritual is negligible. Ahmed (2015) undertook a similar and more comprehensive historiographic study and provided a sketch of the redefinitions of *jihad* by grounding the term in Islamic history. For him, *jihad* in

the Quran is geared towards steadfastness on the word of Islam, including fighting. The prophetic tradition features the military sense of *jihad* in defending Islam, while the canon of classical jurists reduces *jihad* to the military confrontation between *dār al-ʾislām* 'the sphere of Islam' and *dār al-hufr/al-ħarb* 'the sphere of disbelief/war'. According to Ahmed, *al-mutaṣawwifah,* 'the mystistic sect', gave primacy to the spiritual sense of *jihad* over the military, although a considerable number of both classical and modern mystics took part in justified wars.[1]

Apart from the different definitions of *jihad,* I shall make a clear distinction between *jihad* as a historically loaded religious term and *jihadism* as a modern violent politico-religious ideology. In modern history, *jihad* as an Islamic concept has served as a resource base for anti-colonial liberation movements in different Islamic countries since the early nineteenth century, e.g. in Sudan, Algeria and India (Ray 1993). It has been adopted as a righteous and rightful defensive activity against external aggression, but not as political activism striving towards the establishment of Islamic rule in any form (Tarabishi 2008b). In its broadest sense, jihadism is a violent form of *Islamism*, a term denoting "a wide range of associations and individuals that call for establishing an Islamic system and Islamising state and society" (Kramer 2004: 536). There have been other terms used to describe this trend, such as 'political Islam', 'Islamic revivalism', 'resurgence', 'Islamic fundamentalism' and 'new religious politics', to name but a few. I prefer to use the terms *Islamism* and *Islamic revivalism.* The term fundamentalism, though widely used, is problematic. It was originally used to refer to a Christian movement working against liberal or modernist theology that questioned literal interpretation of the scriptures (Ruthven 2012). However, the case in the Muslim world is not symmetric because a considerable number of Islamists have adopted modernistic interpretations of the Quran. I use the term revivalist instead, for reviving an Islamic polity is the defining feature of this trend of political actors (al-Sayyid 2015).

Islamism emerged in the 1920s in the wake of the abolition of the Ottoman Empire, of which Caliphate status was emphasised by a broad sector of Islamists as a pan-Islamist political order that is all-encompassing across Muslim communities. Although the status of the Caliphate has not been constant throughout Islamic history, the concept of the Caliphate has, indeed, accrued significance in the post-Ottoman world (al-Sayyid 2015). In other words, the concept has been

[1] The Mahdist revolution in Sudan (1881–1899) and that of the Emir Abdul-Qadir of Algeria (1832–1837) are both liberation movements under *Sufi* leadership.

re-articulated and re-constructed in the discourse of early Islamist movements (Sayyid 2003).[2] To date, the restoration of the Caliphate manifests, to varying degrees, in the discourses of the different Islamist movements as their direct or ultimate political aim (al-Sayyid and Balqriz 2013).[3] In the post-Ottoman universe, the reconstructed Caliphate represents not only a sought-after legitimate Islamic government, but also the great Islamic power that guarantees the independent and sovereign presence of Islam in the world (ibid.). That is, what is at issue is not only a legitimate contract between the ruler and the ruled but, more importantly, the political representation of the Muslim *ummah,* 'the whole community of Muslim believers'.[4] The establishment of the Islamist movement the Muslim Brotherhood[5] in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1928 is considered to be one of the first forms of Islamism.

The reader should note that, firstly, I shall make a clear distinction between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a political ideology, subsuming a heterogeneous trend of political actors who use Islam as a rubric for identity politics and political mobilisation, both in Sunni and Shiite Islam. Second, it is worth mentioning that I am concerned only with Islamism/jihadism in the Sunni context, although the Khomeini's concept of *wilāyat al-faqīh* (Rule of the Jurist) is an articulation of a form of Caliphate that is more or less acceptable to Shiite persuasions as well (Mavani 2013). However, Shiite Islamism and its radical movements are beyond the scope of this thesis. Third, Islamism is essentially understood as "Islamic activism", which subsumes a wide range of political movements: progressive and atavistic, non-violent and violent (Hegghammer 2006: 12). To avoid the misconception of equating jihadism with Islamism, it is worth stressing that violent jihadist groups constitute a marginal part of the Islamist movements partaking in politics across the Islamic world. Hegghammer (2006) rightly maintains that their relation to Islamism is reminiscent of that of extremist Marxist guerrilla groups to socialism.

[2] Indeed, the fall of the Ottoman Empire was a moment of symbolic collapse for the Arab/Islamic conservative elites at that time. This can be seen in the body of literary and poetic works of prominent Arabs and Muslims (Shawqi, al-Rafiei, Hafez Ibrahim etc.), who expressed extreme sorrow at the loss of the Caliphate (Tarabishi 2008b). This can also be seen in Rashid Rida's (1923) *The Caliphate and the Supreme Leadership,* in which he promotes the restoration of the Caliphate as the only model for establishing a state for Muslims. There was, however, an opposite strand in Arab political thought that was in favour of a nation-state system (Abdel Razeq 1924). A compelling account of this can be seen in al-Sayyid (2015: 89–99).

[3] It is still the declared aim of *ħizb al-taħrīr,* 'The Liberation Party', founded in 1953, which prohibits democracy and capitalism and calls for the resurrection of Islamic rule (al-Sayyid 2015).

[4] The word *ummah* literally means 'nation', but it is used to refer to 'the whole community of Muslim believers'. It is the equivalent of citizens in a modern Western nation state.

[5] The Muslim Brotherhood is a religio-political movement that was founded in Egypt in 1928. It is regarded as the most organised Islamist movement in the Islamic world, with local offshoots and affiliate groups in the Arab Middle East and Central, South and South-East Asia. Between the 1940s and 1960s, the Muslim Brothers' military wing, *al-jihāz al-sirrī,* engaged in violence. However, since the 1970s, the group has embraced modern political rules and moved more towards the political mainstream, despite scepticism from some observers.

Militant groups have existed in the Islamic political scenery throughout history.[6] Currently, jihadism can be regarded as a distinct political and intellectual movement or ideology. It is a heterogeneous phenomenon characterised by the strict embracing of *takfiir* – 'excommunication', or more precisely 'declaring a Muslim as non-Muslim' – of Muslim rulers and/or Muslim societies. Far from being exclusively based on traditional Islam, the concept of *takfir*, among others, is a hybrid mixing of Islamic notions with revolutionary twentieth-century ideas (al-Sayyid 2015). The concept of *jihad* itself is revolutionised – as we will see in the analysis – through references to narrow interpretations of this Islamic concept. As far as Sunni Islam is concerned, it is worth mentioning, though, that jihadist ideologues and thinkers have been freelancers or religious autodidacts who have worked in their own capacity, not as members of any religious establishment in the realm of Sunni Islam (Ruthven 2012).

2.3. Jihadism in modern politics

Jihadism gained momentum with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (the Afghan War). This war, which lasted for ten years, from December 1979 to February 1989, represents an important and a decisive chapter in the story of jihadism. Therefore, I use it as a benchmark against which the history of the jihadist movement is considered.

2.3.1. *Pre-Afghan War (socio-revolutionary jihadism)*

Although Afghanistan in the 1980s represented the cradle of the jihadist movement, several jihadist groups operated independently across the Islamic world before the 1980s. In the 1960s, the first groups of violent Islamists appeared in the Middle East, in particular in Egypt. Their mission focused on state power and their fight was against local political regimes (Hegghammer 2006; al-Sayyid 2015). At this stage, the scope of enmity was geared towards the enemy within, i.e. apostate regimes. Yet, this mission had to be justified. To radically establish an Islamic state and reshape society, jihadist theorists had to develop justifications for the anti-governmental *jihad* movement that might lead to the indiscriminate killing of apparent Muslims (Cook 2015). Influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Quṭb,[7] the Egyptian jihadist groups, which were fighting the Egyptian regime, were the most active groups in this period. Quṭb's ideas proved influential on the Islamic movements during the 1960s. He

[6] Such as the early radical politico-religious movements of *Kharijites*, 'dissidents', who emerged from the controversy surrounding the fourth caliph, Ali. They regarded people who disagreed with them as non-believers and, thereby, targets of their violent activism.

[7] Sayyid Quṭb is an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue whose writings in the 1950s remain influential. He was executed in 1966 for his alleged plotting against the nationalist regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser (Gerges 2009).

introduced two revolutionary concepts that influenced radical groups (including Al Qaeda later on): *ħākimiyah* and *jāhiliyah.* Indeed, Quṭb himself was influenced by al-Mawdudi's writings, which started to appear in the late 1940s (Rahman and Ali 2012; Toth 2013).[8] Quṭb emphasised the notion of *ħākimiyah* (الحاكمية), 'God's sovereignty' or the 'implementation of divine authority' or 'ruling in accordance with what God revealed'. He used the concept of *jāhiliyah* (الجاهلية), 'age of ignorance' or 'not knowing the Truth', to describe the Muslim society (Byman 2015).[9] Quṭb's (2006)[10] influential book, *Milestones*, calls for legitimate governance that applies the teachings of Islam. It posits that modern societies, including supposedly modern Muslim societies (especially his home nation of Egypt), are in a state of *jāhiliyah*, straying away from Islam to materialism (Quṭb 2006).[11] The two concepts are closely related, as illustrated in Quṭb's (2006: 37–38) words:

> If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in *jāhiliyah*, and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This *jāhiliyah* is based on rebellion against Allah's sovereignty [*ħākimiyah*] on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of Allah, namely sovereignty [*ħākimiyah*], and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient *jāhiliyah*, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what Allah Almighty has prescribed.

Quṭb declared that faithful Muslims must form a vanguard to perform *jihad* in order to remedy the state of *jāhiliyah* by implementing God's rules. His concept of *jihad* is an eternal fight against all obstacles that get in the way of worshipping Allah and upholding his divine authority on earth (Gerges 2009). He urged the jihadi vanguard to fight in order to bring to a close the entire *jāhili* political system before establishing a true, legitimate Islamic order. However, Quṭb's influence on the Egyptian jihadist movement – which would later form a vital wing

[8] Abu A'ala al-Mawdudi is an Indian/Pakistani Islamist, he was the founder of *Jamaat-e-islami* 'The Islamic Community', the largest Islamic organisation in Asia. In his struggle to establish an Islamic state/society on the Indian sub-continent, his ideas were influential in Islamic circles, particularly his views on establishing a Muslim state based on Islamic law, as opposed to secularism, by which he was extremely alarmed. After being translated into Arabic, his writings influenced Quṭb, particularly the two concepts of *ħākimiyah* and *jāhiliyah* (Toth 2013: 70).

[9] As a term, *jāhiliyah* refers to the state of ignorance and polytheistic religious practices before the advent of Islam.

[10] This book was first published in 1954, while Quṭb was in prison. It was translated into various languages and I am quoting from a translated edition published in English in 2006.

[11] In this regard, Quṭb seems to take the concept of *jāhiliyah* a step further. Al-Mawdudi's definition of *jāhiliyah* mainly refers to the ruler's thoughts and way of life. Quṭb, on the other hand, claimed that the whole world lives in a state of *jāhiliyah*.

within Al Qaeda – was not only ideological but also personal. For example, Mahfouz Azzam, al-Zawahiri's uncle, represented Quṭb during his trial. Sayyid Quṭb's brother, Muhammed Quṭb, was an associate of Abdullah Azzam and a teacher of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, Quṭb's trial and execution influenced Islamist circles both in Egypt and worldwide. His *Milestones,* which he wrote in a prison cell before his execution, became his final 'will' and provided religious justification for jihadi groups in Egypt and Algeria in the 1970s (ibid.). It is worth noting that the formation of jihadist groups is not imputed deterministically to Quṭb's views, only it was then that jihadist activists sought revolutionary notions that went against the established interpretations of the Islamic canon. What the jihadist vanguard did, then, was that it took jihadism from intellectual discourse into a lived experience.

Islamist revivalism gained further momentum in the 1970/80s, following the dramatic defeat of the Nasserist pan-Arab doctrine in 1967. This period saw an episode of political and social/cultural activism within Islamist movements, now known as the period of *al-saħwa al-islāmiyyah* (henceforth, Sahwa), 'awakening Islam' (Lacroix 2011). Moreover, the period witnessed the Islamic Iranian revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Monarch of Iran and established an Islamic Republic. Jihadist activism flourished once more in this period. The key thinker of this time was Muhammed Abdel-Salam Farraj. Farraj was a key jihadist ideologue in Egypt in the 1970s, up until his execution shortly after the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 at the hands of his followers in Egypt's Islamic Group (EIG). He authored a pamphlet entitled *al-farīḍah al-ghāʾibah,* 'The Neglected Religious Duty', which refers to *jihad.* Farraj called for a dramatic act that, he believed, would trigger a popular revolution (Gerges 2017). The dramatic act was the assassination of Sadat, to which the regime's reaction was extremely harsh and pushed his group and al-Zawahiri's Islamic Jihad (IJ) to flee Egypt for Afghanistan.

'The Neglected Religious Duty' is a key development of the jihadist doctrine and its revolutionisation of tradition. This book breaks away from the canons of tradition in two respects. First, it promotes the obligatory nature of *jihad* by nominating it an *obligatory duty*, dissenting from the established consensus that *jihad* is a collective duty. Second, it transgresses the unanimous received opinion that *jihad* is only waged against an external threat, not against people within the Muslim community. Farraj's novel juristic opinions reiterate Quṭb's ideas of *hākimiyah* and *jāhiliyah* and cite the *fatwas*, 'religious rulings', of the 13th/14th century theologian Ibn Taymiya in his opinions regarding the Mongol attack on Baghdad.[12] He

[12] Ibn Taymiya was a 13th/14th century theologian, whose ideas are highly influential in the Salafist School.

specifically draws on Ibn Taymiya's *fatwa*, stating that a Muslim's faith is nullified if it is not accompanied by practising the duties of Islam – including *jihad* and defending the Islamic community. Al-Sayyid (2015) argues that Farraj's instrumentalisation of traditional texts clearly violates the analogical principles between two contexts, as these texts were contextualised in conflicts where an external enemy was involved, not in conflicts with an enemy within the sphere of Islam. Farraj emphasised the illegitimacy of the Egyptian regime and theorised the revival of jihadist activism (Byman 2015). Again, Farraj justified his declaration of war on the Egyptian government by referring to its Western-derived laws and repression, which rendered it *jāhili* and un-Islamic (Farraj 1980). Farraj's theorisation and strategic thinking highlighted the value of dramatic acts of violence and the role of propaganda in the jihadist mission. His strategy was effectively implemented by subsequent jihadist movements, in particular Al Qaeda (Byman 2015).

On the whole, the priorities of the jihadist groups in this period primarily revolved around internal socio-revolutionary goals and concerns, not regional or international ones. Several factors contributed to the emergence of jihadism in this period; for example, the relative failure of the modern state in the Arab/Islamic world (Tarabishi 2008a), the Israeli occupation of Palestine (al-Sayyid 2015) and the state of stagnation and shock of modernity that gave rise to the question of identity and notions around the return to the Self (Shayegan 1997; 2004), or in the words of Habermas, 'the melancholic longing for [an] irretrievable past' (as cited in Ray 1993: 131). Revivalism, or a return to the 'Self' in jihadist ideology, is manifested in its rejectionist view of the nation-state system, subsequent to the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate. For dissident jihadist groups, a return means taking up arms in order to seize power and Islamise society via a top-down autocratic fiat. Modern democracy, other positivist legislation and the nation-state system are all symptoms of Westernisation that are fundamentally rejected by radical Islamists and jihadist ideologues. Al-Sayyid (2015) rightly observes that radical groups are fuelled by and preoccupied with fears about religion and religious identity being eroded by the dominant *Western* cultural and political manners. In this vein, establishing Islamic rule is the ultimate articulation of religious identity, and of opposing the growing Westernisation of Muslims.[13]

[13] Similar concerns about the Self are found in the Iranian context, e.g. Al-e Ahmed's neologistic coinage of *Westoxication*, referring to the pervasive social preoccupation of manners and matters that are 'Western' in origin (Dabashi 1993: 73–78). Al-e Ahmed's ideas later proved crucial in constructing an Islamic revolutionary ideology in Iran.

2.3.2. *The Afghan War (classical jihadism)*

> America wanted it to be a proxy war against the Russians, but the Arab mujahedeen – thanks to Allah – turned it into a call for reviving the neglected religious duty. (al-Zawahiri 2005a: 59)

Prior to the 1980s, virtually all militant Islamist groups' battles were to change political regimes (Hegghammer 2010b). As we have seen, Islamists such as Sayyid Quṭb and Muhammad Farraj were local socio-revolutionaries. Their *jihad* was first and foremost about removing corrupt, illegitimate and impious rulers, who had abandoned religion. External military aggression was not evident. However, a new cause for the jihadist movement emerged with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, whereby a non-Muslim enemy performed an aggressive act on a Muslim land. With the purpose of propping up the Communist regime, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan unleashed a broad armed revolt by local opposition, joined by Islamist and tribal groups, collectively referred to as the *mujahedeen*, 'Muslims fighting in the name of Islam'. Alongside local Afghans, mujahedeen from across the Islamic world were engaged in a model of 'justified war', similar to the traditional concept of *jihad*. The aim of this *jihad* was the liberation of an Islamic land from an infidel invader. During this period, foreign fighters were summoned and mobilised from different parts of the Islamic world and new jihadist wings were born in Afghanistan.[14] It was during the Afghan War that multinational groups of jihadists could establish personal connections and develop organisational structures (Hegghammer 2010a). Nevertheless, due to the novelty of the situation, the response to the invasion was not automatic. Rather, the early years witnessed a relatively limited number of *mujahedeen*, many of whom started out as aid workers, and it took some time for a jihadist mission to actually evolve (Hegghammer 2010b).

Pan-Islamism, which flourished from the 1970s onwards in the wake of the fading Nasserist pan-Arabism, and the Cold War between America and the Soviet Union set the stage for the gradual formation of a foreign fighter movement during the Afghan War (Hegghammer 2010a; Byman 2015). The pan-Islamist rise facilitated the emergence and evolution of a jihadist movement, i.e. pan-Islamism set the stage for jihadism to draw its key leaders, ideologues and recruits for subsequent struggles. The ideological and organisational father of this movement was the Jordanian-Palestinian Abdullah Azzam.[15] Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood's envoy

[14] Indeed, Al Qaeda's core was born in Afghanistan, as discussed below in section 2.3.

[15] Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Arab, was the leading ideologue of the jihadist movement in the Afghan War, he played a key role in mobilising Arab fighters (Hegghammer 2010a). He issued a *fatwa* entitled "Defence of Muslim Lands" in 1984 to rally the mujahedeen, arguing that fighting the Soviets was a religious duty not only for the Afghans, but also Muslims around the world.

in Pakistan, Kamal al-Sananiri,[16] pan-Islamist Azzam believed that all Muslims are one people, with a religious duty to defend any Muslim land occupied by non-Muslim forces (Byman 2015). In 1981, he relocated to Peshawar, where he took a job at the International Islamic University. There, he founded *maktab alkhadamāt,* 'Services Office', and embarked on his ideological role by preaching and writing numerous magazines and pamphlets (including *join the caravan* pamphlet and *al-jihad* magazine, the mouthpiece of Afghan Arabs)[17] with the aim of inspiring and motivating Muslims to go and fight in Afghanistan (Gerges 2009). Furthermore, his Services Office coordinated organisational efforts to fundraise and facilitate the flow of mujahedeen to and from Afghanistan (ibid.). The significance of Azzam's early initiatives manifests in the fact that the majority of the fighters who travelled to Peshawar prior to 1986 (including Osama Bin Laden) appear to have been influenced and encouraged by his writings, and/or assisted by his Services Office (Hegghammer 2010b).

American aid to the anti-Communist forces began to flow before the Soviet invasion, growing steadily during the 1980s (Hegghammer 2006). By the mid-1980s, the Afghan mujahedeen received billions of U.S. dollars and relatively advanced arms. In addition, the flow of foreign fighters increased at this time. However, Byman (2015) and Hegghammer (2010b) dismiss the view that this influx of foreign fighters, known as Afghan Arabs, were supported by the United States and Gulf countries. They argue that there is no evidence that the Afghan Arabs received direct and systematic state support. Western and Arab Gulf states acquiesced to foreign fighter recruitment, but they neither organised nor paid for it. Instead, private donors and non-governmental Islamic charitable sectors funded them. Hegghammer states:

> The view of the 1980s Arab Afghans as actively state supported is a widespread misconception that has given rise to the popular "blowback theory," according to which the Arab Afghans (and by extension al-Qaida) were a U.S.-Saudi creation that later turned against its patrons. The misunderstanding stems from a conflation of Afghan mujahedeen, on the one hand, and foreign fighters, on the other; it is assumed that because states armed the Afghans, they also armed the Arabs. (2010b: 62)

Regardless of this historical/political debate, the modern jihadist movement crystallised in Afghanistan as networks comprising fighters of many nationalities due to Azzam's mobilisation and tours around the Arab world. This was the first occasion in modern history when such a

[16] Al-Sananiri, a brother-in-law of Sayyid Quṭb, was sent as an envoy to Pakistan by the then Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. He took a 40-day trip to Pakistan to assess the Afghan *jihad* and consider the scope of their involvement (Hegghammer 2010a). On his way back, al-Sananiri met Azzam and encouraged him to relocate to Pakistan.

[17] Arab foreign fighters in the Afghan War came to be known as *al-ʿarab al-ʾfghān,* 'Afghan Arabs'.

multinational group of mujahedeen embraced the fight against an infidel invader, culminating in the defeat and withdrawal of the non-Muslim aggressor. However, Azzam's jihadist doctrine differs from the pre-Afghan war *jihad.* As a Palestinian hoping for the liberation of his homeland, his doctrine did not consider other Muslim governments to be illegitimate and shifted the scope of *jihad* from apostate regimes to foreign invaders. Moreover, unlike former and subsequent models of *jihad*, he emphasised conventional military tactics, rather than terrorism (Byman 2015). His doctrine dominated the scene during the Afghan War, the end of which coincided with his assassination in Pakistan in 1989.

The launch of *jihad* in Afghanistan was a timely advantage for the Egyptian jihadist movement, which faced a harsh crackdown in the wake of the assassination of Sadat. In his memoir *Knights under the Prophet's Banner*, al-Zawahiri (2005a: 60) recounts that Egyptian *jihad* stumbled in Egypt due to the regime's iron fist and Egyptian geography [sic], which was not suitable for guerrilla wars. He states that his group found on the Afghanistan battlefront a safe haven to pursue the mission that failed in Egypt. Nonetheless, al-Zawahiri seems not to have discarded the pre-Afghan War socio-revolutionary doctrine as he states that their *jihad* in Afghanistan was against both non-Muslim invaders and the "apostate regime complicit with the enemies of Allah" (2005a: 65). Gerges (2009) remarks that the multi-national vanguard of foreign fighters (including the Al Qaeda core) that formed in Afghanistan did not play quite as significant a role in the liberation of Afghanistan, but nevertheless they represented an unprecedented phenomenon, i.e. the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Hegghammer (2010b: 57–58) gives a compelling account, categorising foreign fighters as agents who:

1. have joined, and operate within the confines of, an insurgency;
2. lack citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions;
3. lack affiliation to an official military organisation; and
4. are unpaid.

The majority of foreign fighters in Afghanistan hailed from Arab countries, while the remainder were native to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, the USA and Europe. The number of foreign fighters involved in the Afghan War is estimated to have been several thousand, a considerable number of whom subsequently embraced the concept of global *jihad*, as will be discussed in ensuing sections. Amongst the early adopters of Azzam's Services Office were Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the founders of Al Qaeda, the would-be leading jihadist front.

2.3.3. *Post-Afghan War (global jihadism)*

During the early years of the forming of jihadism in Afghanistan, the movement began to witness a split into two doctrines that differed both politically and ideologically. The pre-Afghan War era is marked by socio-revolutionary jihadism associated with the ideas of Quṭb and Farraj, who focused on overthrowing local governments. A form of pan-Islamist jihadism dominated the Afghan battlefield. After the end of the war in 1989, the jihadist movement gradually began to diverge into two jihadist doctrines: classical and global jihadism. Although the boundaries at the level of grassroots jihadists seem to be blurred, Hegghammer (2010a) notes that classical jihadism is the more orthodox form of militant activism, closer to the traditional concept of *jihad.* This doctrine was led by Azzam, who argued for the immediate military involvement of all Muslim men to defend Muslim territories occupied by non-Muslim forces (as theorised in his book '*Defence of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Faith*'). The immediate involvement of Muslims has its ideological basis in the traditionalist conceptions of *jihad*, whereby it is the religious duty of all Muslims if an act of aggression is committed against a Muslim territory, regardless of its location. Azzam sought to pursue not a struggle against governments, but the liberation of occupied territories. This conceptualisation of *jihad* has similarities to that of mainstream *ulema*; however, Azzam differed in his emphasis, in that the religious duty falls on all Muslims, rather than on solely the local population of the land under attack.

Conversely, the global jihadist doctrine was developed by Osama Bin Laden in the mid-1990s. This doctrine postulates that *jihad* is not limited to opposing the forces of non-Muslim aggressors in conflict zones, but expands to include all non-Muslim powers involved in oppressing Muslims and backing corrupt governments. Both classical and global jihadists prioritised the fight against a far enemy (the USA and its Western allies), rather than the near enemy (local rulers). The rhetoric of both doctrines sought to justify their fight against the non-Muslim powers involved in the humiliation of Muslims. However, their methods and priorities were different. In the 1990s, a considerable number of Afghan Arabs retained their classical doctrine and joined subsequent conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya, which involved a fight against an external enemy invading Muslim territories. However, following the failure of the classical jihadists in Bosnia and Chechnya and the unsuccessful 1990s attempts of Egyptian groups (in particular EIG and IJ) to revive socio-revolutionary tactics (Brooke 2008), Al Qaeda's doctrine of global jihadism has been at the forefront since the mid-1990s.

2.4. Al Qaeda

Towards the Afghan war's conclusion, in 1988, Al Qaeda's core was officially founded in Peshawar by a group of Afghan Arabs. Their goal was to guarantee a military organisation that could operate after the war in Afghanistan. The group was led by Osama Bin Laden, a veteran Afghan Arab who had established his own training camp, thanks to his wealth and devotion to the cause. The group included key figures in the jihadist movement, such as Azzam and some veteran Egyptian jihadists. At that time, Azzam called for the formation of *al-Qaeda al-sulbah,*[18] a 'solid base' of Muslim jihadists, whose goal was to fight the oppressors of *ummah*. Al Qaeda began with a vague purpose. In effect, it aimed to sustain the vanguard of jihadists that formed in Afghanistan. Hegghammer (2010a: 100) argues that, in its early years, Al Qaeda remained "an alumni society … [that] did not possess significant buildings, training camps or financial resources of its own". With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the founding members pursued different political goals.

However, in the mid-1990s, a new community of jihadists, led by Osama Bin Laden, reappeared and brought about drastic changes to the organisation's tactics and scope of enmity. Bin Laden's global jihadism took shape in the first half of the 1990s. Primarily, his doctrine was fuelled by the deployment of U.S troops in Saudi Arabia during the Second Gulf War.[19] He regarded it as yet another form of invasion. Leaving Saudi Arabia for Sudan, he started to reorganise his transnational networks of militants, particularly those who could not return to their home countries. The failed classical jihadist struggles in different places[20] and the failed revolutionary Islamism in Egypt and Algeria gradually drove the classical and revolutionary jihadist communities to join Bin Laden's ever-evolving organisational structure of Al Qaeda with its untried global mission (El Fadl 2001; Hegghammer 2010a). From 1992 onwards, Bin Laden objected to the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, seeking to increasingly converge on an anti-American worldview. Bin Laden's anti-American rhetoric was further fuelled by the American efforts to deter the mujahedeen from playing a significant role in the Bosnian War. Later on, it developed into an all-out anti-American *jihad,* regarded by socio-revolutionaries as

[18] The genealogy of the word '*Al Qaeda*' can be traced back to this name, despite the fact that it was made popular after the FBI assigned it to Bin Laden's affiliated radical activist groups during its investigation of the U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa in 1998 (Burke 2004).

[19] The American-led coalition to liberate Kuwait after being invaded by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces in 1990.

[20] After the Afghan War, classical jihadists were prevented from pursuing their mission in different places. In Bosnia, they were deterred from forming a *jihad* battlefront and they played an insignificant role (Hegghammer 2010a). The Pakistani government blocked them from creating a battlefield in Kashmir to avoid escalation of their own territorial issues with India (Byman 2015).

a means of undermining local regimes, while classical jihadists considered it a logical extension to their struggle against the USA as an oppressive non-Muslim power (Hegghammer 2010a).

2.4.1. *Pre-9/11*

As stated previously, the anti-Soviet Afghan War attracted *jihad* sympathisers from around the world. Al Qaeda's core leadership was amongst those who joined the ranks of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan early for aid work and military involvement (Gerges 2009). After the war, Al Qaeda sought to sustain and inculcate its jihadist doctrine by finding safe havens in different places at different times. Thereby, Al Qaeda took the lead in the post-Afghan War era, attracting numerous classical jihadists and Muslim youths, and attuning them to its global jihadist mission. For example, the Northern Group, which fought in Tajik, eventually joined Al Qaeda in 1996. The new global jihadists were no longer performing classical *jihad* in conflict zones involving aggression against a specific Muslim territory. Although the founding fathers were a group of veteran Afghan Arabs, the term *Al Qaeda* is used widely to describe the organisation built by Osama Bin Laden following his relocation to Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 (Bergen 2006). Al Qaeda's territorial access to Afghanistan and its ability to set up training camps provided the organisation with a unique phenomenon in jihadist history (Byman 2015). Within this environment, radicalised Muslim youths from all over the world who fell under the influence of Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and an ultra-violent culture, have been schooled in the ultimate goal, namely, striking the far enemy, particularly America.[21]

By the early 1990s, Bin Laden had concluded that war with America was inevitable. Al Qaeda's global mission culminated in February 1998 when Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Refa'a Taha took pan-Islamism to its most radical conclusion and declared a *fatwa* involving killing Americans everywhere, thereby marking the formation of an alliance called *aljabhah al'islāmiyah lijihād alyahūd wa alṣalībiyīn*, 'The Islamic Front for *Jihad* against the Jews and the Crusaders'. While Azzam's classical jihadism advocated conventional (para)-military tactics and guerrilla wars against enemies in confined theatres of war, Bin Laden argued for international indiscriminate mass casualty tactics using all means in all places, as stated in this excerpt from the communiqué declaring the formation of the World Islamic Front for *Jihad* against Zionists and Crusaders (see the Appendix B for a full translation of this communiqué):[22]

[21] Al-Zawahiri officially joined Al Qaeda in 1998.

[22] This declaration was published in the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper on 23 February 1998.

> The ruling of killing Americans and their allies—whether civilians or military— is incumbent upon every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him, in order to liberate the Mosque of al-Aqsa and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and until their armies leave the lands of Islam, punished according to the law, broken and unable to threaten any Muslim.

Jihadist discourse is characterised by its long enumerations of places where Muslims are assumed to be victims of oppression occupation, but this exceptional declaration featured two new themes: (i) America's oppression of Iraq – note that was prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq – and (ii) the occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. The latter theme is based on a hyperbolic portrayal of the American presence in the region as an occupation, a recurring theme in the discursive construction of the USA, as will be shown later in the analysis. The declaration signified the launch of a campaign against Western and American targets worldwide at the hands of Bin Laden's brothers-in-arms (Hegghammer 2006). Global jihadism crystallised in the second half of the 1990s. During this period, Al Qaeda's organisational structure, operational activities and recruitment witnessed a dramatic increase (Hegghammer 2010a). Bin Laden's organisation attracted many frustrated classical jihadists, who were no longer struggling for state power in a particular country, but instead working to target U.S. interests everywhere. Table 1 presents attacks attributed to Al Qaeda between 1995 and 2001:[23]

Date		Location	Description	Number Killed
1995	November	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Truck bomb	7
1998	August	Kenya and Tanzania	U.S. embassies bombed	301
2000	October	Aden, Yemen	USS Cole bombing	17
2001	September	USA	9/11 attacks	3,000 approx.

Table 1: Attacks attributed to Al Qaeda between 1995 and 2001

[23] The table is adapted from http://npsglobal.org/eng/news/29-non-state-actors/1034-al-qaeda-attackss-death-toll-more-than-4400-lives.html.

2.4.2. *Post-9/11*

The 9/11 attacks were a turning point in the confrontation between Al Qaeda and the USA. The ensuing 2002 US-led invasion of Afghanistan stripped Al Qaeda of its territorial haven and removed the basis for its unique organisational concept – specifically, an educational hub for global terrorism and guerrilla warfare. However, this has not resulted in weakening its ideology.[24] This stage may have witnessed Al Qaeda's decentralisation, but its worldview expanded. Al Qaeda has transformed into Al Qaedism: the ideology or worldview that attracts different regional and national clusters of jihadists following shared models, precepts and methods. In more concrete terms, the pre-9/11 Al Qaeda network appears to have broken up into five regionally-defined groups, whose operational theatres are in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia (AQAP), Southeast Asia, and Europe /North Africa (Hegghammer 2006). These regional clusters have shown the ability to recruit people and sustain the AQ's new strategy. Even after decentralisation, Bin Laden acquired a symbolic status in the newly emerging local circles and was referred to as *imām almujāhidīn* 'leader of the mujahedeen' (as we will see in 5.3.1.2) and, therefore, exerted formidable ideological influence. These groups seem to have worked independently of each other. The Saudi network came to be known as 'Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula'.[25]

2.5. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

The current project examines AQAP discourse between 2003 and 2005, during which time the Al Qaeda core decentralised and concentrated its efforts in the Arabian Peninsula – particularly Saudi Arabia – attempting to mobilise people in this region.[26] As I have already noted, Al Qaeda gradually transformed from having a centralised structure, whose leadership functioned as a central hub focused on providing funding, contacts and advice to affiliated groups and individuals all over the Islamic world, to having a complex, decentralised and multipolar structure comprising different regional franchise networks. At this stage of decentralisation, Al

[24] For example, Hegghammer (2006: 16) notes that "[s]ince the autumn of 2002, Bin laden and Zawahiri started referring to the Iraqi war in twenty-two of their statements. Seventeen of these mentioned Iraq and seven featured it as the main topic."

[25] Other groups include the Somali group a*l-sabaab* and the so-called Islamic State in Iraq. Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers formed in Iraq, while in the other three places there were no identifiable organisational structures (Hegghammer 2006). Since then, the spread of Al Qaedism has taken the form of giving *bayʿah* 'pledges of allegiance' (بيعة). These pledges have been given by large radical groups around the world. This norm has continued with ISIS since its break with Al Qaeda and its proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate. Enormous radical groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS, whether online or in the real world, e.g. in Afghanistan, Nigeria, North Africa, Pakistan and the Sinai desert (Wagemakers 2015).

[26] In 2003 and 2004, Al Qaeda carried out six attacks inside Saudi Arabia, claiming the lives of 89 people.

Qaeda switched its strategy from striking the far enemy to striking both the far enemy (non-Muslim powers) and the near enemy ('apostate rulers'). AQAP is a franchise organisation following Al Qaeda's core practices in terms of structure and military tactics. A similar Al Qaeda franchise group works in Iraq in parallel with AQAP, but this is beyond the scope of this study, for the data at hand are primarily centred on legitimising *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia. From 2002 to 2006, the group became the leading Al Qaeda network (Rosler 2010). After the American invasion of Afghanistan, its sleeper cells started to establish several clandestine training camps inside Saudi Arabia.

2.5.1. *The Pre-2003 AQAP*

When Bin Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1996, he began to reconstruct his connections in Saudi Arabia and establish affiliated networks. Over the course of five years, his networks developed much more slowly than anticipated due to the arrest of many of his potential helpers following the 1995 Riyadh operation (as noted earlier in Table 1). With the declaration of *The Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders* in 1998, Al Qaeda's media profile grew significantly, in parallel with Bin Laden's popularity, which was boosted by the East Africa bombings five months after the declaration of *jihad* against the US. At that time, the would-be founder of AQAP, Yusuf al-Uyayri,[27] was released from prison. Upon his release, he reconnected with the jihadist community and took up writing propagandist material, at a time when the Internet provided a platform for reaching a much wider audience. From 1998 to 2000, he was more of a classical jihadist concerned with the conflicts raging in Kosovo and Chechnya. He posted his writings on a website for Arab fighters in Chechnya, *Sawt al-Qawqaz*, 'The Voice of the Caucasus'. Al-Uyayri was a very active user of the Internet, participating in a Web-based radio group-chat service, *Paltalk*, under the pseudonym 'Azzam' (Hegghammer 2010a). In 2000, al-Uyayri began reconnecting with Bin Laden. He made a trip to Afghanistan in July that year too, became convinced of Bin Laden's cause and started recruiting on his behalf.

The main vehicle for AQAP's recruitment efforts focused on the community of returnees from Afghanistan, who were systematically targeted for recruitment, along with their relatives and acquaintances (Hegghammer 2010a). Various cells are thought to have operated relatively independently in Saudi Arabia and Yemen between 2001 and 2003. The first was led by a Sudanese veteran called *Abu ħudayfa*, whose cell plotted to bomb the Prince Sultan Airbase in 2002, before being arrested on 18 June 2002. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri led a second cell, which

[27] Yusuf al-Uyayri, an Afghan Saudi veteran who fought in Somalia in 1993.

operated as AQ's flagship network in the Arabian Peninsula in 2002. Al-Nashiri teamed up with Bin Laden in 1997 and he is thought to have masterminded the attack on the USS *Cole* in 2000. In 2001, he fled Afghanistan for Yemen, via Pakistan. From there, his group is thought to have plotted several failed offensives inside Saudi Arabia. However, al-Nashiri was detained in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. But the most effective network was led by al-Uyayri, which launched the 2003 *jihad* campaign.

2.5.2. *Post-2003 AQAP*

The discourse of Al Qaeda's core between 2001 and 2003 castigated the Saudi government's collaboration in the so-called War on Terror. Such an escalation might underlie its strategy to launch the campaign. But the decision to launch *jihad* in the Arabian Peninsula was a strategic one resulting from a heated debate between the (AQ)AP leaderships and the broader jihadist community since the autumn of 2002 (Obaid and Cordesman 2005). The debate within AQAP primarily centred on the question of whether to fight at home or abroad, particularly in Iraq. While the attacks on targets in Iraq might be carried out by organisations other than jihadists, such as those with a nationalist or resistance agenda, attacks in Saudi Arabia are undertaken by jihadists and directed at both American and Saudi targets. The debate is the result of fear of a negative response from sympathisers inside the Arabian Peninsula and from the circles of classical jihadists. This is because the attacks and subsequent clashes with security forces may involve killing Muslims. One critic of the campaign in Saudi Arabia is a Chechnya-based classical jihadist, the influential Abu Umar al-Sayf, who argued that the campaign would have negative consequences for the more legitimate Iraqi *jihad.* However, the AQAP network responded by publishing several articles in *Sawt al-jihad* positing that the campaign is legitimate and advantageous for the Iraqi jihadist cause (Hegghammer 2006).

The backbone of the organisation is a group of jihadists cultivated and organised by Yusuf al-Uyayri, since he joined Al Qaeda in 2000. Unlike Abu Hudayfa and al-Nashiri, al-Uyayri planned to build an organisation rather than plot premature attacks. As an ideologue, he had worked slowly and patiently to cultivate a community of grassroots jihadists. He relied enormously on propaganda, given his experience of prolific writing and posting on the Internet since the Chechnya's phase of classical jihadism. Al-Uyayri himself directed 'The centre of Islamic Studies and Research' (CISR),[28] which produced its own ideological texts and strategic studies for the global jihadist community (Hegghammer 2010a). Indeed, he was a founder of

[28] Inspired by the *Sawt Al-Qawqaz* website to which he contributed, he established the CISR as a media office or a virtual publishing house for the global jihadist movement. The CISR was hosted by several jihadist websites.

strategic studies as a pragmatic genre distinct from purely ideological texts. Immediately prior to 2003, he placed great emphasis on building the military side of the organisation. As a veteran, he contributed on numerous occasions to writing about military tactics and training. He succeeded in accumulating underground material resources, such as safe houses, weapons and bomb-making factories.

AQAP launched its campaign in Saudi Arabia in May 2003, with a series of large-scale terrorist attacks. The first issue of *Sawt al-jihad* was published at the beginning of the 8th month (*shaʿabān*) 1424 of the Islamic Calendar, which coincides with September 2003. This was almost five months after AQAP's awkward start earlier in March, when a bomb went off prematurely in a Riyadh-based bomb factory. The incident, which the police contained and succeeded in collecting important intelligence from, was an early and massive setback for the organisation.[29] This incident uncovered AQAP's headquarters and exposed it to the eyes of the security forces. Consequently, the Saudi security forces took advantage of the intelligence resources discovered in this raid and undertook a massive campaign directed against the underground jihadist community in Saudi Arabia.

Leader	
Yusuf al-Uyayri:	The founder, he was killed in a car chase on 31 May 2003.
Khaled al-Hajj:	Believed to have assumed AQAP leadership after al-Uyayri, despite the lack of references to him in *Sawt al-jihad.* He was killed by the police in Riyadh on 15 March 2004.
Abdulaziz al-Muqrin:	Under his leadership, major operations, using various tactics, were executed. On 18 June 2004, the police hunted him and three of his companions near a gas station in Riyadh.
Saud al-Otaibi:	Along with a group of AQAP core militants, he was held up in a farm in al-Rass city and fought a bloody three-day gun battle with the security forces that besieged them following an alert from a local resident. The battled ended on 5 April 2005, leaving al-Otaibi and 14 militants dead, five wounded and dozens of casualties on the police side.
Saleh al-Oafi:	He was killed shortly after his predecessor on 8 August 2005.

Table 2: AQAP's leaders up until mid-2005

The continuing publication of *Sawt al-jihad*, despite AQAP's setbacks, is seen as a way of exaggerating the size and strength of the organisation. However, the magazine eventually ceased publication in October until a special issue appeared in May 2005. This cessation of publication confirms that, by then, AQAP had become quite structurally incapacitated, given

[29] In a recent officially produced three-episode documentary aired on the a*l-Arabiya* channel, the Saudi authorities revealed insightful details about this awkward start and the ensuing security response https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLEI29WvZqk&spfreload=10.

their severe losses in manpower and resources. The period between March and September saw major setbacks on the AQAP side. The campaign, in this period, resulted in the killing of at least 26 militants, including AQAP founder Yusuf al-Uyayri and several senior leaders such as Turkī al-Dandanī. Al-Uyayri and one more militant were killed on 31 May during a car chase and al-Dandanī and two companions were killed on 3 July. A great number of *Sawt al-jihad* obituaries were devoted to Al-Uyayri and al-Dandanī. Furthermore, three key jihadist clerical ideologues, Ali al-Khudair, Nasser al-Fahd and Ahmed al-Khāldi, were arrested on 28 May. These setbacks, along with the detention of dozens of AQAP militants and the loss of crucial resources and safe houses, appear to have provoked Al Qaeda's jihadist networks to establish a specialised media unit, *Sawt al-jihad*, as part of a reorganisation process and to compensate for the mid-2003 losses. Up until the publication of the first issue, AQAP executed a handful of isolated attacks that resulted in the death of some security personnel and Western foreigners. The police initiated other confrontations. Yet, by late 2003, other undiscovered AQAP clusters reorganised and increasingly escalated their violence towards mid-2004 in a series of major attacks that were discursively constructed in successive issues of *Sawt al-jihad*. By mid-2005, almost all AQAP leaders and key operatives had been eliminated. Several ideologues were either killed or detained.

2.6. Al Qaeda structure and fighter categorisations

Hegghammer (2006: 15–16) provides a compelling categorisation of Al Qaeda's personnel structure. He argues that there are five categories constituting Al Qaeda:

1. At the top of Al Qaeda presided Bin laden and al-Zawahiri. Both had symbolic status in the newly emerging local circles and, therefore, exerted formidable ideological influence.
2. The second category is *jihad scholars*, who – unlike *scholars of the palace* – issue *fatwas* clarifying what is legitimate in the struggle against infidels. This category includes Abu Qatada al-Filistini, Nassir al-Fahad, Ali al-Khudair, Umar Abdul-Rahman, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, amongst others.
3. The third is *strategic thinkers*, who write books or articles explaining the best ways of implementing *jihad.* Brooke (2008) argues that jihadist strategic debates must have existed long before and fed into *strategic studies* as an independent hihadi genre, which then fully emerged after 9/11. Amongst the popular strategist thinkers are Abu Musab al-Suri, Abu umar al-sayf and AQAP's Yusuf al-Uyayri. Other strategic thinkers are known only by their psyeudonyms (e.g. Abu Bakr Naji, author of '*The Management of Savagery*').

4. Active militant organisations, such as AQAP, which execute operations and publish their own media products that justify their operations. The online platforms of these organisations also publish statements, audio and video recordings that cascade down from Al Qaeda's central leadership.

5. At the bottom of this complicated hierarchy lie *grassroots radicals*. These are thousands of anonymous jihadists. From this category emerge the muscle fighters and suicide bombers. Grassroots radicals can be active online as participants on radical forums and social media platforms, mostly with fake identities.

An intriguing sub-category of jihadists belonging to the latter category of grassroots radicals is *devolved jihadists* or *lone wolves* (Rosler 2010; Byman 2015). Devolved jihadists are amateur individuals or small ad hoc groups, i.e. untrained, unfunded freelancers. They are radicalised, mostly online, to conduct terrorist attacks. This is a peculiar tactic of global jihadism. Several online magazines are dedicated to this goal, such as *ṣadā al-malāḥim*, 'Echo of Battle', and AQAP's recent magazine, *Inspire*. Such magazines are devoted to inciting lone wolves to launch terrorist attacks on targets, such as airliners and transport systems, wherever they are located.

2.7. Al Qaeda's activism: guerrilla warfare?

Guerrilla warfare has been conducted throughout history and has taken varying forms. Laqueur (1977: 382–385) provides an overview of guerrilla warfare in modern history. He maintains that guerrilla wars have been fought by small and weak peoples against invading armies (e.g. the 18th century Spanish and Italian guerrilla wars against the French occupation, and the 19th century national liberation movements in Italy, Ireland, Macedonia and Poland). But guerrilla tactics were not only the war of the weak against the strong; rather, they were also adopted in the 19th century colonial wars by the colonial powers against local resistance forces (e.g. the French campaigns against Abdel Kader, and the Russians against Shamyl). The 20th century saw a few instances of guerrilla insurgencies during the First World War, then a great upsurge during the Second World War, both inside Europe against Nazi forces and beyond it with the rising tide of independence movements against the European colonial powers. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare gained political momentum with the communist modes of political behaviour and organisational principles. With communist forces, the organisation and ideology played a cultural and emotional propagandistic role in mobilising the masses; but on the whole,

revolutionary guerrilla wars are fought for reasons of national patriotism. In fact, many twentieth-century guerrilla wars (such as IRA, EOKA and IZL)[30] owe little to Communism.

Guerrilla movements cannot be covered in depth in this brief account due to the very fact that there are as many guerrilla movements as there are answers to the question 'why do people rebel?': occupation by a foreign country, economic crisis, tyrannical political regime, ideological assumptions or any social or economic discrepancies. At the bottom of every guerrilla movement is a feeling of grievance, be it national, social, ideological etc. Nonetheless, the fact that Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are awkward to describe is a case in point. That is, is Al Qaeda an army and/or an ideology? Is it a terrorist organisation with an identifiable leadership and/or an amorphous loosely networked constituency? Answers to these questions are far from reaching consensus in both scholarly and official circles (Hoffman 2003). Setting aside the disagreements on these questions, Al Qaeda and likeminded jihadist groups – as outlined in 2.4 through 2.6 – are insurgencies anchored to the ideology of jihadism and fuelled by Muslim grievances and suffering. Moreover, jihadist groups share a wide range of patterns common to many guerrilla movements: being clandestine and operating in areas difficult to locate; working in areas of war, conflict and underdevelopment; the use of propaganda and terror to demoralise and demonstrate strength; an emphasis on urban terrorism etc.

Furthermore, since Al Qaeda's commencement, Bin Laden and senior fellows stressed the virtues of guerrilla tactics, given the power imbalance between the group's forces and their assumed enemies. In his 1996 declaration of *jihad* against the U.S., Bin Laden declared:

> But you are aware that this stage requires the adoption of suitable combat methods due to the lack of parity between our regular Armed Forces and the enemy's forces. Namely, through light and fast forces operating in complete secrecy. In other words, by waging guerrilla warfare in which the people's sons other than the Armed Forces take part.
>
> (FBIS 2004: 23)

Later, in 2003, the senior Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel promoted the advantages of guerrilla warfare in a statement posted online under the title "Guerrilla Warfare Is the most Powerful Weapon Muslims have, and It is The Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader

[30] EOKA, *Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agoniston,* 'National organisation of Cypriot Fighters', is a group that fought a campaign against British rule in Cyprus in the 1950s. IZL, *Irgun Zvai Leumi,* 'National Military Organisation', is a Zionist militia that operated in Palestine, prior to the establishment of Israel.

Enemy" (Cassidy 2006: 12). In this statement, al-Adel invokes lessons of history in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Palestine to extol the advantages of guerrilla tactics.

2.8. AQ(AP) and the media

> I say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our *ummah.* (al-Zawahiri 2005b)[31]

Nothing is new when it comes to radical jihadist groups' emphasis on propaganda and publicity. Historically, propaganda and terror have always been characteristic of and essential parts of guerrilla networks (Laqueur 2017). Thanks to modern technological innovations, political propaganda has become of greater importance than military operations for terrorist groups. Al Qaeda and like-minded jihadist groups recognise the valuable role of propaganda in advertising their existence and cause, attracting supporters and sympathisers and undermining enemies. In 1984, before the official birth of Al Qaeda, Bin Laden sponsored the magazine *al-jihad*, published by Azzam's Service Office (Byman 2015). After taking this early step, Al Qaeda core leaders believed that they should not only urge would-be followers to join the fight, but also reach out to people and teach them how to think. In other words, the fundamental role of the media is to spread jihadist ideology. The mobilisation of people is then the outcome of people embracing jihadist ideology, which stipulates the requirement of *jihad* being the individual duty of every Muslim. For Al Qaeda, the media have been an effective tool. Prior to 9/11, Bin Laden occassionally gave interviews[32] and addressed people through the diffusion of audio and video recordings on Arabic TV stations and online. Subsequently, videotaped operations and/or statements or "wills" of jihadist suicide bombers have been a significant and effective strategy, with the purpose of glorifying martyrdom and *jihad.* The first will of a martyr was published in 1986, by *al-jihad* magazine (Byman 2015). Similarly, the first videotaped testimony of a suicide bomber was that of the jihadist who executed the failed attempt to assassinate the Egyptian Interior Minister in 1993. These tactics have always been used to great effect by the propaganda machine of Al Qaeda and its regional clusters.

[31] This is a personal letter sent in 2005 from the then Al Qaeda deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi. Both the original letter and its English translation are available on the website of the Combating Terrorism Centre (https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2).

[32] Such as Bin Laden's interview with John Miller of ABC News in 1998. The full transcript of this interview is available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/interview.html.

From the very beginning, Al Qaeda and like-minded jihadist groups have understood that violence is the surest means of promoting their organisations and thus developed the typical terrorist strategy of '*let actions speak for themselves*'. Therefore, the basic means of communication for Al Qaeda in the early stages was through the execution of shocking terrorist acts (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014). But this strategy is discursively complex and speaks in three ways: (a) the terrorist act itself or the propaganda of the deed; (b) the narrative that justifies the attack; and (c) the messages describing the ways the organisation intends to achieve its goal (Wilkinson and Barclay 2011).

Recently, the Internet has become a place for people to explore their religion and identity (Bhui and Ibrahim 2013). Online radicalisation is not necessarily unique in its processes, but it is absolutely distinct in its consequences. Previously, recruitment to radical groups was restricted to the recruiter's personal contact and acquaintance. Radicalisation has leveraged the power of the Internet – and more recently, social media platforms – and taken great leaps towards building a global following. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda's media policy has changed and embraced more professionalised media practices, with the establishment of *Al-Sahab,* 'the clouds', as the organisation's media wing. With the appearance of Al-Jazeera as the first Arabic TV network, and after the American War on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Bin Laden and his associates started to diffuse their videos and communications through Al-Jazeera to the global media (Nacos 2010). Since then, Al Qaeda and the broader jihadist movement have also used the Internet and the many technological advances effectively to spread their propaganda on a global scale (Burke 2004). This new reality, with the unlimited free exchange of information, has facilitated the activities of radicalisation and recruitment, which have become entrenched online (Stevens and Neumann 2009).

Between 2003 and 2006, the Internet was used effectively to propagate jihadist ideology and plot several attacks. Furthermore, this period saw the flow of leaked video recordings of Bin Laden, in which he addresses and mobilises the *ummah* (Hegghammer 2006).[33] Activities and use of the Internet can be divided into three main categories: official websites (such as the one from which the data for this study were retrieved), chat fora and blogs and distributor sites, which share jihadist links and websites (Rogan 2006). Recently, a strategic shift has been observed towards the use of social media, including Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, as more interactive methods of radicalisation (Torok 2013). The 2003–2006 protracted wave of

[33] Similar to real space, loosely linked cyber groups were active in producing and montaging video and audio jihadi material online, such as *al-saḥāb Media Production* and *al-furqān Media Production*.

terrorism against targets in Saudi Arabia was characterised by exhibiting a pan-Islamist agenda for the first time as the rationale for their violent acts inside the Kingdom. Their agenda was exhibited through both actions and discourse. Before 2003, all attacks were on Western targets; but since then, Al Qaeda's pan-Islamist ideology and strategy of struggle have expanded the scope of their attacks to new targets: security forces of the Interior Ministry and other official military and civilian personnel. Since 2003, thanks to technological advances, Al Qaeda has used online platforms to disseminate its publications, which focus on both the development of the ongoing confrontation and a general jihadist ideology.

Jihadist magazines can be viewed as playing a significant role in mobilising, recruiting and publicising the jihadi cause as early as the Afghan cause in the 1980s.[34] That the publication of *Sawt al-jihad* in September 2003 served to achieve different purposes is no exception in this respect as this magazine attempts to justify launching *jihad* inside the Kingdom and provide up-to-date statements about the various confrontations with the enemy.

2.9. Chapter summary

This chapter has explained the broad historical context leading to the emergence of AQAP. I have set out to explain jihadism and put it into context as a radical form of mainstream Islamist revivalism. After that, I reviewed the development of jihadist movements in the second half of the twentieth century. I take the 1980s Afghan War as a tipping point marking the emergence of transnational jihadism, leading to the formation of Al Qaeda and the World Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders. Then, I reviewed the activities of Al Qaeda before and after 9/11 and its personnel structure, followed by an account of AQAP's formation in the years following 9/11. Finally, I have concluded by sketching out AQAP's media practices.

As this historical review reveals, the doctrine of jihadism has gone through a series of transformations since its inception in the 1960s. It started with the Egyptian socio-revolutionary activism, whose goal was to overthrow local regimes deemed un-Islamic. Then, Azzam's classical doctrine of jihadism crystallised during the Afghan war. Classical jihadism propagated the liberation of Muslim lands occupied by non-Muslim forces. The post-Afghan-War period witnessed the emergence of global jihadism at the hands of veteran Afghan Arab warlord Bin Laden, who sought to unify the community of mujahedeen that formed in Afghanistan. His aim was to consolidate the jihadist effort against the far enemy, i.e. the Christian-Jewish alliance or

[34] Azzam's three treatises (e.g. *'Join the Caravan'* and *'Signs of the Merciful in the Afghan Jihad'*) were compilations of his articles in early jihadi magazines published by the SB.

America and its allies. His movement gained territorial access in the late 1990s in Afghanistan, which hosted Al Qaeda as a centralised network of mujahedeen. From 2003 to the end of 2006, AQAP attempted to bring global jihad home to Saudi Arabia, attacking Western targets – mainly American – plus local ones, such as security and oil targets. The inception of AQAP marks the first operational transformation of Al Qaeda into a decentralised organisation comprising regional clusters, operating on a regional level and sustaining the global enterprise.

Chapter 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

This chapter offers a critical overview of the theoretical framework that fits into the overall research project: an interdisciplinary approach combining social, linguistic and discourse-analytic theories to answer questions about jihadism. First, it elaborates on the notion of interdisciplinarity and sketches out the different theoretical frameworks that will be brought to bear on subsequent analyses (section 3.2). Second, I aim to describe Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and evaluate how it can provide a theoretical/methodological platform from which I can critically investigate the hidden/explicit ideological and argumentative loading of jihadist discourse (section 3.3). Here, I review the principal concepts of CDA in light of the research problem. In section 3.4, I briefly explain Bourdieu's general social/critical theories – particularly his views on linguistic capital, discourse habits and more general concepts related in some way or other to language and symbolic power. The social theories associated with Bourdieu provide a social-theoretical approach that supports my analysis of jihadist discourse based on reflections of the Islamic/Arab world (section 3.5), i.e. the socio-linguistic system in which jihadist discourse is embedded.

3.2. Synthesis of theories

The social problem being analysed necessitates an interdisciplinary agenda that informs the theoretical and methodological approaches taken in this study. I draw on several theoretical traditions to tackle jihadist discourse. Before detailing the specific theoretical groundings, I will discuss how such theories relate to my research problem. CDA provides a framework that allows the integration of different disciplines to investigate a social problem (Wodak 2008). Fairclough and Chouliaraki (1999: 16) make the point that CDA's contribution lies in "bringing a variety of theories into dialogue, especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other, so that its theory is a shifting synthesis of other theories, though what it itself theorises, in particular, is the mediation between the social and the linguistic". As a research paradigm, CDA relates to different theory levels: social (grand and middle-range), discourse and linguistic theories (Meyer 2001: 19). As illustrated in Figure 1, grand social theories first attempt to link the social structure with social action: the macro- and micro-sociological phenomena. At this level, this study is influenced by the Bourdieusian model of 'capital theory' and 'symbolic power' (Bourdieu 1989; 1991). I argue that Bourdieu's

sociological conceptual schema seems especially appealing in terms of demystifying jihadist ideologies and investigating jihadist semiotic data. Inspired by Bourdieu's constructive structuralist approach, this study conceptualises a top-down model whereby the social structure plays a major role in determining social action. I hold the view that religious discourse has its own sociology and plays the hegemonic role of shaping social reality. There are no rules by which a society is divided into rigid groups. Rather, the existing groups in a given society are more or less the outcome of political and discursive processes. Thus, jihadist ideologues and activists use religious discourses – with all the symbolic capital invested in them – as resources for creating novel constellations of words, sentences and arguments. This significant role will be discussed at length in Chapter 6.



Figure 1: The three levels of theories (Wodak 2008)

The second level is that of middle-range theories. Meyer (2001) maintains that middle-range theories address specific social phenomena (such as conflict, cognition, social networks) or a particular social sub-system (such as economy, politics or religion). The selection of these theories is driven by the research problem in question and its sociopolitical context. Therefore, along with Bourdieu's theory, which highlights the symbolic power of language and religion (see section 3.4), my project draws on the epistemological role of sacred/religious texts in establishing the knowledge system to which jihadists belong (see section 3.5.1). Specifically, I will draw on several critical works of authors from within Islamic/Arab sociolinguistic culture who have addressed the epistemological principles of Classical Islam (Abu Zaid 1995; al-Jabiri 2011). This interdisciplinary outsourcing to discourse analysis is indeed justified in order to

gain a proper understanding of how sacred texts play a crucial role in religious discourse generally and, in particular, jihadist discourse with respect to maintaining power relations and the contextualisation of knowledge.

The third level comprises *discourse theory*, which focuses on realising discourse as a social practice and attempts to explore its genesis and structure. In this sense, discourse theory closes the gap between language study (the lowest level in Figure 1) and higher-level social-theoretical traditions (Blommaert 2005). This linkage aims to cover all levels of analysis: from the (micro-) *linguistic* to the (meso-) *institutional* and ultimately wider (macro-) *sociocultural*. That is, the analysis – particularly in Fairclough's CDA – moves from textual analysis to studying how texts are produced, consumed and distributed, and ultimately to the assessment of discourse as a sociocultural practice (Slembrouck 2001). Meyer (2001: 19–20) argues that, within CDA approaches, one may find different theories: micro-sociological theories explaining social interaction, socio-psychological theories focusing on the social conditions of emotion and cognition and a myriad of linguistic theories (e.g. theories of argumentation, grammar, rhetoric) which try to explicate patterns specific of communication and language realisations. At this level, I daw on linguistics, pragmatics and argumentation theories to investigate micro-patterns in jihadist discourse.

3.3. Critical Discourse Analysis

CDA is an academic school or scholarly movement that postulates that discourse is not only a carrier of ideology but also a socio-cognitive action in its own right (KhosraviNik 2015a). As an academic school, CDA emerged in the early 1990s as a network of scholars: the Amsterdam Group.[1] Its notions and theories can be traced back to the 1970s and Critical Linguistics of the University of East Anglia, which turned into investigating the use of language in social institutions and its relations to power and ideology (ibid.). CDA notions are also linked with the 1970s rise of closely-related disciplines in humanities and social sciences (e.g. semiotics, pragmatics, conversation analysis and discourse studies). The theoretical origins of CDA are rooted in Western Marxism, specifically the Faircloughian approach, and emphasise how cultural dimensions (language and ideology, inter alia) play a significant role in reproducing capitalist social relations (Fairclough et al. 2011). Furthermore, the foundations of CDA can

[1] Following a symposium at the University of Amsterdam in 1991, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunter Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak met and discussed theories and methods of discourse analysis. The meeting made it possible to lay the foundations of what is now a movement of scholars who share a programmatic way of framing a range of theoretical approaches (for a brief history of the group's formation, see Wodak and Meyer 2016: 4–5).

also be traced back to "rhetoric, text linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, social psychology, cognitive science, literary studies and sociolinguistics, as well as applied linguistics and pragmatics" (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 2). Despite their different disciplines and diverse methods and objects of investigation, CDA theorists and practitioners share the following dimensions, as summarised by Wodak and Meyer (2016: 2):

- *an interest in naturally occurring language used by real language users;*
- *a focus on larger units of analysis beyond the sentence (texts, discourses, conversations, speech acts or communicative events);*
- *going beyond sentence grammar to action and interaction;*
- *the extension to non-verbal aspects of interaction and communication;*
- *a focus on dynamic (socio)-cognitive or interactional moves and strategies;*
- *the study of the functions of (social, cultural, situative and cognitive) contexts of language use;*
- *analysis of vast numbers of phenomena of text grammar and language use: coherence, anaphora, topics, macro-structures, speech acts, interactions, turn-taking etc.*

CDA subsumes a variety of analytic approaches that share a deep interest in critically analysing, understanding and explaining the semiotic dimensions of complex social phenomena (Blommaert 2005; Fairclough et al. 2011). Its approaches commonly view discourse as a *social practice* and highlight the distinctive dialectical relationship between discourse and society (Fairclough et al. 2011). This dialectical relationship is a two-way association, whereby discourse is both constitutive of and constituted by society. Thus, discourse not only represents social reality, but also has its own constitutive power. This power of discourse can be highlighted in the role it plays in textualising the social reality, constituting people's knowledges and establishing identities and relationships between them (KhosraviNik 2015a). Such constitutive power of discourse has critical ideological effects and can make assumptions about any aspect of social life (Fairclough et al. 2011). The view of CDA that discourse has a dialectical role in the construction of the social world implies that some aspects of the social world function according to different logics, i.e. there may be economic logics in place (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). This view means that discourse is just one among other possible resources of social practice. This distinguishes CDA from Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) discourse theory. Following Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe view all social practices as discursive, i.e. discourse encompasses the social, and all material entities are parts of it. As a result, discourse is not dialectical but is, rather, fully constitutive of the social world.

It is worth noting that CDA is not a method of analysis to be used detached from its theoretical and methodological foundations. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 3) convincingly lay more stress on the notion that CDA is:

> … a theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package … [that] contains, first, philosophical (ontological and epistemological) premises regarding the role of language in the social construction of the world, second, theoretical models, third, methodological guidelines for how to approach a research domain, and fourth, specific techniques for analysis.

CDA aims to expose and challenge the way social domination and power abuse are discursively (re)produced. Therefore, it is marked for its tendency to focus on politically-oriented text(s) and conduct various analyses, ranging from micro-textual to macro-discursive (KhosraviNik 2015b). Based on the notion that language use is inseparable from social functions, contexts of actions and relationships (Halliday and Hasan 1989), all CDA approaches highlight this functional aspect of language (Titscher et al. 2000) and use the scope of linguistics to answer pressing social and political questions. Thus, *problem-orientedness* – previously "a taboo for linguists" (Blommaert 2005: 6) – is a characteristic specific to the CDA enterprise (Wodak and Meyer 2016). Problem-orientedness necessitates a third distinguishing characteristic of CDA: *interdisciplinarity*. In other words, the problem, rather than the discipline, is central to the universe of knowledge and all relevant disciplines are brought in as equal partners to address the problem in question (van Leeuwen 2005). CDA is, thereby, a *perspective* in the social sciences that utilises discourse/linguistic analytic tools and techniques to answer non-disciplinary social-scientific questions (Blommaert 2005). It "works from the social to the linguistic" (Kress 1990: 87) and, as Jäger and Maier (2009: 56) rightfully argue, the appropriate procedure in CDA is chosen in accordance with the research question and the types of material used. Therefore, it is not a discrete discipline with a fixed theoretical and methodological stance, but rather a research movement that starts with a politically-driven research topic: a social wrong (Jäger and Maier 2009; Fairclough et al. 2011).

Linguistic analysis has become one of many sources of evidence when researching a social problem. Informed by grand and middle-range theories, CDA studies conduct *descriptive* and *explanatory* analyses: descriptive analyses of texts and then taking such linguistic analyses to the explanatory level where they are contextualised and explained within the wider sociopolitical context. The source of evidence found in language is peculiar and substantial, due to the fact that language itself is a form of social practice that constitutes, and is constituted by, the social reality (Baxter 2010). Nonetheless, CDA has received sustained criticism for being a contentious *political* activity lacking scholarly content and systematic methodology (Widdowson 2004) and self-reflexivity (Billig 2003). Wodak (2006) provides a comprehensive response dismissing Widdowson's critique that CDA lacks systematic methodological

principles and procedures. She convincingly postulates that there is a vast array of books and articles on methodology in CDA (including Chilton 2004; Reisigl and Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen 2005; Wodak and Meyer 2001; 2009; 2016) and many articles dedicated to the systematic description of methodology. With regard to CDA's critique enterprise and self-reflexivity, CDA is political in the sense that it concerns the analysis of exercising power through language, but this political sense of CDA does not mean that it is "unscientific" (Hay 2002; KhosraviNik 2015a). Fairclough (1985) argues that being critical means that the analyst engages in unpacking ideological-discursive formations. KhosraviNik (2015a: 51) maintains that critique is linked to the notion of contextualisation and can thus "influence all levels of analysis, from the identification of a social problem and data selection to methodology and textual analysis".

Sayer (2009) advocates criticality in the social sciences, and even calls for explicit critical and normative standpoints immanent to the societies in question. He argues that critical standpoints as an explanatory level of social science should be "immanent in the society in question, arising within its system of meanings, rather than external to it" (ibid.: 773). In this respect, I endeavour to provide a critique from a native perspective; in other words, the investigation of jihadism from a native point of view. A native point of view can be argued to have a pivotal role in critique and analysis because the interpretation of a given text is contingent to the context in which it is embedded. Context is practically everything beyond the text, and emphatically the knowledge of the participants. As an 'insider' in the universe of the recipients' jihadist discourse, who is familiar with its peculiar norms, codes and conventions for interpretation and contextualisation, I endeavour, then, to uncover the diverse ideological-discursive formations underpinning jihadist discourse. Jihadism as an ideology/discourse is primarily rooted in a sociolinguistic-intertextual system which defines how texts and contexts relate to each other.

Therefore, a more locally-socialised understanding is required for the analyst to relate text to other texts and the wider historical, sociopolitical and epistemological context. The theoretical synthesising and the definitions of terminology throughout this study take into account the peculiarity of jihadist discourse to arrive at a better interpretation and analysis of jihadist texts. This can be observed in my definitions of discourse and ideology, where the emphasis is on integrating an account of the sociology of religion and epistemological outlines, apart from the wider sociopolitical historical context.

3.3.1. *Principal concepts of CDA*

Central to CDA are the notions of discourse, context, power and critique. This section provides brief conceptualisations that best match the object of this research.

3.3.1.1 *Discourse and text*

As stated above, the view of discourse as a *social practice* is key to, and distinctive of, the CDA field of scholarship. A fundamental premise underpinning CDA is the fact that there is no such thing as *non-social* use of discourse (Blommaert 2005). In its broadest sense, discourse is conceived as an analytical category describing a wide range of meaning-making resources, such as words, pictures, symbols, designs etc. (Fairclough et al. 2011). In this vein, discourse can be used interchangeably with semiosis as a process of meaning-making; every human action can be meaningful and must be considered in theories of meaning-making (Lemke 1995). This understanding of discourse emerged parallel to the 1960–70s developments in humanities and social sciences, which witnessed an increased focus on aspects of human action in language, e.g. speech act theory, theories of politeness and finally pragmatics (van Dijk 2011b). As an abstract analytic category, discourse has evolved to be viewed as a dynamic construct of form and action, rather than the traditional duality of meaning and form.

Yet, there exist a number of potentially different conceptualisations of discourse amongst CDA theorists. Different contextual elements may comprise and generate certain types of discourse. Blommaert (2005: 2) argues that the notion of discourse "has taken into account the interdisciplinary contacts between linguistics and other scholarly fields such as literary analysis, semiotics, philosophy, anthropology and sociology". Discourses occur in macro-contexts, in social institutions, at particular times and places and so on (Titscher et al. 2000). Fairclough – influenced by Foucault[2] and having a background in Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics (SFL) – adopts a conception of discourse that is concerned principally with the *discourse practices* of specific groups, institutions or societies; his main concern is the discourse of neo-liberalism. To make it operationalisable, he provides a view of discourse in which any discursive 'event' is conceived simultaneously as an instance of *text*, *discursive practice* and

[2] Fairclough is influenced specifically by Foucault in his use of *orders of discourse* and *discourse formation* (Blommaert 2005). Despite acknowledging the huge influence of Foucault on popularising the concept of 'discourse' and 'discourse analysis' as a method, Fairclough (1992, pp. 37–38) regards Foucault's approach to discourse as abstract. Fairclough argues that Foucault's focus on discursive practices go beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, which were then the dominant modes of investigation in social research. Foucault is concerned with the discourse of human sciences and the rules of formation defining 'objects', 'subjects', 'concepts' and 'strategies' of discourse.

social practice (Fairclough 1995; 2009). He advocates a three-dimensional view of discourse, based on Halliday's (1989) dimensions of meaning or language functions. Discourse is (a) *representational*, constructing social reality, (b) *relational*, constructing social relationships, and (c) *ideational*, constructing social systems of knowledge and beliefs. Summing up Fairclough's account, he regards discourse as "(a) representing some particular part of the world, and (b) representing it from a particular perspective" (Fairclough 2003: 129).

On the other hand, van Dijk emerges from a cognitive orientation and maintains that the relations between discourse and society are cognitively mediated (van Dijk 2016). Like Fairclough, he is interested in ideological discourses, which are produced strategically and understood according to cognitive processes and representations.

With a sociolinguistic/ethnographic approach towards anti-Semitism, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 36) define discourse as "a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic speech acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as texts that belong to specific types, i.e. genres". Reisigl and Wodak's definition highlights the two elements of (a) the relatedness to a macro-topic and (b) pluri-perspectivity (see Figure 2) in a way that is more or less in accordance with their choice of the respective object of investigation, e.g. the *discourse of anti-Semitism* (2001) or the *discourse on climate change* (2009; 2016). Several other studies have adopted this paradigm, e.g. the discourse on refugees and asylum seekers (Baker et al. 2008; KhosraviNik 2009; KhosraviNik 2010b) and the discourse on the Iranian nuclear programme (KhosraviNik 2015b).

The current study follows the methods articulated in Reisigl and Wodak's Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (see section 4.2). The element of 'macro-topic-relatedness' applies to my project because jihadist discourse comprises thematically interrelated texts and topics; however, a macro-perspective defines this discourse rather than a macro-topic. My definition is reminiscent of the Faircloughian single-perspective account of discourse that represents a particular social group that sees the world from a specific perspective (Fairclough 2003). Such an account is equivalent to the discourse practices/ideologies of a specific social group: jihadists. This project realises that jihadism, as either a social practice or ideology, manifests discursively and has dialectical relationships with other forms of social practice. Jihadist beliefs and opinions are (re)produced, disseminated and legitimised by means of discourse and, simultaneously, discourse is constituted and (re)shaped by extremism.

Jihadist discourse manifests itself as religious discourse – with religious normative ways of coding and arguing – and the need for its constitutive and manipulative impact should be highlighted. Therefore, while I am aligned with the DHA's hermeneutic approach to discourse, I am inclined towards a Foucauldian view of *discourse*, which emphasises the role of discourse in shaping reality and conceives of *discourse* as "an institutionalised way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and thereby exerts power" (Jäger and Maier 2009: 35). In this respect, discourse is a knowledge system that informs social life and constitutes power. In this specific conceptualisation of discourse, the relationship between discourse and social structure remains dialectic; however, greater emphasis is placed upon the major ideological effects of discourse practices in passing off assumptions and worldviews of any aspect of social life.

In summary, I consider discourse to be:

- a cluster of context-embedded semiotic activities of an epistemic community;
- a knowledge system (intersecting and overlapping wider knowledge systems);
- socially constitutive and socially constituted;
- related to a macro-perspective;
- comprising different topics that are related to a macro-theme.

This definition is based on the fact that jihadist discourse is, by all means, religious and it aims to persuade and incite the intended audiences. Jihadism, as an ideology and politico-religious movement,[3] relies existentially on recruitment, thereby intentionally influencing people – Muslims – to embrace jihadist perceptions, attitudes and views of the world and ultimately to behave and act in a specific way (Abu Haniyah and Abu Ruman 2015). Thus, for jihadist ideologues, discourse is more or less an autonomous and manipulative actor, one which is meant to steer its recipients and influence their actions. The question of power is *the* supreme political question for jihadist discourse. Power is, essentially, about the struggle over the monopoly of the religious *truth*. The religious element manifests evidently in different aspects: discourse themes; argumentation and collective knowledge and memories that have been transmitted historically through generations. Also included would be traditional narratives about the

[3] In discerning whether it is more prudent to see jihadist movements as politico-religious or religio-political, I prefer to opt for the former, principally because their motives and declared aims are in essence religious, not political. What is at stake for them is the religious role of the state, whose role in their paradigmatic view is promoting religion and maintaining God's laws. I will return to this later in the course of the actual discourse analysis.

heroism and virtues of the Mujahedeen of *salaf*.[4] Recipients who know the genesis of such propositions infer the intended content of jihadist discourse.

For CDA, the *text* has become the relevant linguistic unit, in both theory and description/analysis (Kress 1990). Every text – whether written or spoken – or discursive event is unique and dialogic, i.e. not seen as a sender-hearer model of a communication event (Titscher et al. 2000). Moreover, it can be seen as an instance of some type of discourse that recurs in a community and is, thus, recognisable as such (Lemke 1995). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 36) define *texts* as "materially durable products of linguistic actions", which can be visualised, written or oral. As Figure 2 illustrates, texts belong to genres – particular types of discursive activities – and are parts of discourses.



Figure 2: Interdiscursive and intertextual relationships (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

These intertextual and interdiscursive relations and socio-discursive habits play the role of ideological functioning and operate as 'identity kits' (Gee 1990). *Intertextuality* is a pivotal principle in the dynamics of discourse analysis (Slembrouck 2001). Thus, it should be highlighted because meaning is not elicited exclusively from texts, but from 'textual chains' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 37) or from 'text to text' (Lemke 1995: 41). The importance of intertextuality lies in the process of transforming prior texts and restructuring textual traditions. Looking beyond the boundaries of a particular communicative event, the analyst must explore from where specific utterances arise and what histories of (ab)use, interpretation and evaluation stick to them (Blommaert 2005). *Interdiscursivity* refers to the overlap between discourses, e.g. by referring to (sub)-topics from other discourses (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). In the current

[4] In Islamic tradition, the word *salaf* means 'predecessors' and refers specifically to the first three generations of Muslims. However, it is also used to refer to *ulema* and Muslim figures beyond this period.

perspective-related discourse (‘discourse of X’ rather than ‘discourse on X’), interdiscursivity is linked explicitly in a contesting way to other discourses, as will be explored in the following sections. For ‘topic-related discourses’, interdiscursivity can often be open to the extent of having hybrid discourses (Reisigl and Wodak 2001).

Jihadist discourse has its own system of intertextuality, its own set of valued texts, preferred discourse topics and, in particular, the habit of deciding which texts should be read in which contexts. The overall jihadist discourse is not only the product of the deployment of lexis and grammar, but also, and more importantly, the product of deploying different discourse topics and voices, and the way they intertext and relate to one another. In the model of the discourse on X, interdiscursivity implies an overlap of topics and subtopics (Wodak 2008). However, in perspective-related X discourse, interdiscursivity refers to the interaction between perspectives and ideologies. Jihadist discourse has its own patterns of overlapping with texts from other discourses – other perspectives in conflict – in the sense that it has its own principles and customs for interpreting these texts and opposing them.

3.3.1.2 *Context*

A defining characteristic of CDA studies is how linguistic analysis is related to *context*. This is based on the premise that language does not operate in isolation and meaning is always made in contexts where social extra-linguistic symbols and expectations and knowledges play a role (Lemke 1995). Thus, all discourses are historical and can only be analysed with reference to their respective relevant contexts (Meyer 2001). Nevertheless, context is not simply added to a text; rather, it defines the text itself, including its genesis, meanings and conditions of use (Blommaert 2005). Context is not offered solely by the speaker, it is also the product of a dialogical process in which different parties in the communication offer and generate contexts. An appropriate account of a context is not *a context for a particular text.* This account of context is partial and fails to explain much of what occurs during interaction.



Figure 3: Context levels' interactions (KhosraviNik 2010: 67).

As this figure illustrates, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 40–41) conceptualise four levels of context, which relate dialectically to the discursive event:

- the immediate *text-internal* co-text;
- the *intertextual* and *interdiscursive* relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses;
- the extra-linguistic *social/sociological* variables and institutional frames of the specific context of a situation;
- the broader *historical sociopolitical* context in which discursive practices are embedded and related.

In this case, context is the structure consisting of all the relevant categories that have a contextual effect on the production and comprehension of discourse structures. That is, contexts are concerned with conditions of relevance (see Sperber and Wilson 1995: 118 ff.) and should consequently comprise knowledge and a shared set of beliefs. This can best be accomplished if context is conceptualised in a way that allows elements of the knowledge system, which I assume is an all-encompassing level of context, particularly in the case of investigating jihadist discourse as it is intended to address people from the same socioculture: Muslims. Blommaert (2005: 41) establishes that c*ontextualisation* "comprises all activities by participants which make relevant, maintain, revise, and cancel … any aspect of context which, in turn, is responsible for the interpretation of an utterance in its particular locus of occurrence". Therefore, interpretation is the product of contextualisation. *Re-contextualisation* is a further process whereby an element of a given discourse is transferred into a new context (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Such a process entails the *de-contextualisation* of a given element and inserting

it into a new context. These two related processes – along with the concept of intertextuality – are particularly appealing to the analysis of the way certain sacred/symbolic texts are reproduced in AQAP discourse, a defining characteristic of jihadist discourse.

3.3.1.3 *Power*

As stated above, CDA approaches are united by an interest in semiotic dimensions of power, of which the deepest outcome is inequality and manipulation. Foucault (1996: 394) defines power as "a whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, that seem capable of inducing behaviours or discourses". Power may exist in different modalities: coercive physical power, symbolic power and the power to influence and manufacture consent. In all of these, language often plays a critical role that means something to everyone. This role is of an ideological nature, which ought to be "one of the major themes of modern social sciences", as rightly argued by Fairclough (2001: 2). The connection between discourse and power is twofold: power of discourse and power over discourse.

In line with the adopted Foucauldian conception of discourse, the power of a discourse is linked to its constitutive power. This can be in the flow of knowledge(s) determined by discourse that affects the way people interpret reality and organise their discursive and non-discursive practices. Power in this sense is not understood only as something which people possess and exercise over others, but rather as that which produces the social and ascribes meaning to it (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). To varying degrees, discourses (and discourse genres, too) conventionalise, negotiate, constitute and perpetuate power hierarchies, norms and assumptions (KhosraviNik 2015a). I do not hold a deterministic view of the concentrated power of discourse as necessarily guiding people and forming their consciousness. However, in the case of jihadist discourse, discourse formation is intended to be like that, given the role of religion and the epistemological weight assigned to sacred texts, which is intentionally exploited at the stage of text production in order to influence the audience, or radicalise them. With regard to power over discourse, not all people have the same access to the repertoire and the means of communication. The repertoire is the set of linguistic resources or ways of speaking (Blommaert 2005). In the case of jihadist discourse, an important element of the repertoire is the management of sacred texts and religious discourses, and how these are de-contextualised and re-contextualised in emerging contexts. With regard to the religious repertoires, people have different social positions, and thereby different opportunities for influence.

3.3.1.4 *Critique*

The critical attitude of CDA towards semiotic power relations and power abuse is another defining characteristic. Influenced by the Frankfurt School's critical approach towards the social sciences (particularly that of Jürgen Habermas), CDA seeks not only to describe the linguistic and discursive mystification of power disparity, but also to critique and change it (Wodak and Meyer 2016). The critical attitude seeks relative emancipation from and resistance of domination or, as Foucault (1996: 384) puts it, "not being governed so much". Such an emancipatory stance highlights the need for the production and dissemination of critical knowledge in order to challenge domination through self-reflection (Wodak and Meyer 2016). The critical stance of CDA manifests in its interdisciplinary work, which aims for a proper understanding of how language plays a significant role in transmitting knowledge, organising social institutions and exercising power (ibid.). A critique's impetus is fundamental to CDA at all levels of investigation: from the identification of a social problem, to the selection of data, to contextualised linguistic analysis.

The systematic description of textual/linguistic characteristics is part of CDA. However, a 'critical' discourse analysis is accentuated by demystifying the link between linguistic choices and the political/ideological stance of the text producer. Such an explanation of textual findings is one dimension of the critical impetus. Another dimension is accentuated through the contextualisation of these findings. However, the embeddedness of the analyst in the social structure should be reflected in the critique. Critique can by no means be drawn from "an outside position" (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 7). However, being 'critical' implies that the analyst should be distanced from the data in order to contextualise the linguistic analysis and make the respective political stance explicit (Wodak 2007). Therefore, self-reflection is a central element of critique that should not be overlooked. The DHA follows a model of critique that integrates three related aspects (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 25):

1. *'Text or discourse immanent critique'* aims to discover incosistencies, (self)-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in text-internal or discourse-internal structures.
2. *'Socio-diagnostic critique'* is concerned with uncovering the – particularly latent – persuasive or 'maipulative' character of discursive practices. Here, we rely on our contextual knowledge and draw on social theories and other theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret discursive events.
3. *'Prospective critique'* seeks to improve communication (e.g. by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing 'language barriers' in hospitals, schools and so forth).

Sayer (2009: 769) argues that, since the 1970s, critique in the social sciences has tended to be rather weak and reduced to mere criticising or, as he puts it, "the reduction of illusion [of power] in society". He ascribes this neither to positivist value-freedom nor to postmodern suspicion of normativity, but to the fact that social scientific critiques "rarely set out their normative standpoints [and] their conceptions of the good" (ibid.: 768). He argues that, in the context of the social sciences, critique should – indeed cannot – avoid such normative standpoints that require consideration of ethics and well-being. To avoid inconsistencies and contradictions, critique should be based on a belief in "what is true or more true than what is false or less true" (ibid.: 770). According to Sayer, critique should not only identify false beliefs and what practices such beliefs inform but also explain *why* these false beliefs exist.[5] The DHA's model holds a normative standpoint and bases its discursive critique on the discourse ethics of deliberative democracy (see, for example, the ten rules of argumentation in Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 70–71). Similarly, van Dijk (2009) asserts that CDA's research policy implies an ethical assessment; therefore, it should be based on internationally-recognised human and social rights. Based on such a normative standpoint, application of the results is aspired to. Wodak (2007: 209) maintains that for all those concerned with CDA, the application of the results is important, whether "in practical seminars for teachers, doctors and bureaucrats, in the writing of expert opinions, or devising schoolbooks".

3.4. Symbolic power and discourse habits

Marx's economic interpretation of *capital* is incomplete and unsatisfactory, as "man is not simply an economic animal" (Fukuyama 2006: xvi). Economic interpretations cannot explain jihadists' belief-related motives that may well drive individuals to martyrdom. The individual's willingness to die for a certain cause – including jihadists – cannot be explained in economic terms. It is for this reason that I turn to Bourdieu's theory of capital that makes room for non-materialist accounts. Pierre Bourdieu's capital theory goes beyond economic theory and takes the notion of resources in the social world beyond the traditional economic form. Bourdieu (1986: 241) states that:

> [C]apital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as *economic capital*, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the forms of property rights; as *cultural capital*, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of educational qualifications; and as *social capital*, made up of social obligations

[5] I will endeavour to accomplish this explanatory level by incorporating the epistemological dimension of religious texts and traditions.

> (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of a title of nobility.

Furthermore, he provides a theory of social habitus with a range of complex immediate notions capable of bridging between texts (or any semiotic events) and the larger social system in which these texts/events occur. Thus, Bourdieu highlights the dimension of struggle and interaction, and states that the resources at stake in the various social fields[6] are economic, cultural/symbolic and social capital. Yet, these forms of capital are mutually convertible in the social world, which is structured by relations of power and domination. Actors’ capital is acquired through struggle and is partly institutionalised and partly incorporated (Wodak and Meyer 2016). Every social field has its own evolving system of dispositions, *habitus*, which ensures actors perceive and think according to the rules of the field. In this vein, actors engage in discourses and follow the discursive games specific to relevant social fields, i.e. they are equipped with their own linguistic system of dispositions or habits of meaning-making (ibid.).

In line with his capital theory, Bourdieu (1991) provides a framework of power that integrates diverse concepts of power. Of greater importance here is the intriguing concept of *symbolic power*. The question of power is central to the investigation of jihadist discourse. Language is not powerful per se, it gains power from powerful people (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). Thus, we cannot ignore that jihadist discourse is essentially religious, is produced by religious strategic thinkers and is delivered by religious clerics or other speakers appealing to the authority of religion. Here, the relationship between language and the social position of the speaker is best understood in Bourdieu’s model of symbolic power, which highlights this symbolic value in the dynamics of social power relations. In fact, such symbolic power is, to a considerable degree, appealed to in jihadist discourse, given the symbolic value of religion in the cognition of the intended audience. Thus, there emerges the question of power from outside language: a type of power that comes to discourse from religion. As stated eloquently by Bourdieu (1991: 107):

> …[t]he power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the spokesperson and his speech – that is, the substance of his discourse and inseparably, his way of speaking – is no more than a testimony, and one among others, of the guarantee of delegation which is invested in him.

[6] Social fields are “dynamic systems, characterised by struggles among the actors within this field over the distribution of resources” (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 11).

Bourdieu (1991: 13) proposes that "the body is the site of incorporated history" and the symbolic capital assigned to some speaker or institution is accumulated prestige or honour. He convincingly posits that "words are loaded with unequal weights", based on "who utters them and how they are said" (ibid.: 1). It is through these specific social and political conditions of language formation and use that he criticises structural linguists for overlooking. As with other social practices, texts cannot be analysed adequately as the outcome of conscious calculation; rather, they must be regarded as "products of particular histories which endure in the habitus" (ibid.: 15).

So, text formation and interpretation are influenced by the speaker's social position in terms of accent, grammar and lexis and semantic disposition; moreover, in using particular registers and genres to deliver recognisable types of discourse in order to invoke definite meanings or viewpoints on their subjects. For Bourdieu, the immediate context is particularly important as a key element for identifying the value of an utterance in the market of linguistic exchanges. Part of the context is the different formations (codes, genres, registers etc.) which systematically define, and are defined by, the macro-social relationships in the community (such as classes, genders or any significant sociopolitical division of any kind). In this sense of economic metaphor, speakers with higher social status, and consequently higher symbolic capital, have greater argumentation capital and greater ability to persuade and influence certain actions in the real world. Bourdieu continues that those who hold the most capital need only to speak to receive linguistic profit, irrespective of what they say (ibid.).

Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power is relevant to the investigation of jihadist discourse. I argue that there is a peculiar form of symbolic power in the use of *religious* discourse and scared texts; this symbolic power relies, in part, on the symbolic value of religion for Muslims as the wider epistemic community. Bourdieu (1991: 164) argues that "symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it". Such invisibility appears to play a significant role in concealing the potential force stemming from the influence of religious discourse (Abu Zaid 1995). Within the Arab/Islamic world, there is a tendency amongst lay Muslims to regard religious discourse as mere discourse rather than having the potential to wield considerable power (ibid.). Religious discourse(s) can be exploited to (re)shape public opinion and to (re)produce social wrongs (such as discrimination, exclusion, incitement etc.) by legitimising these actions with the religious politics of truth. The Bourdieusian notion of habitus more or less resembles and goes hand-in-hand with Foucaultian discourse. They both exert power and transport context-specific knowledges and frameworks for making sense of

things, which subsequently shape individual and collective actions – reality (Jäger and Maier 2009; van Leeuwen 2009).

To conclude, Bourdieu's models of symbolic power and discourse habits consider the idiosyncrasies among sociolinguistic/cultural systems and the dynamics of social power specific to them. To adequately investigate jihadist discourse, the adoption of such a flexible social theory helps to identify the relationships between discourses and the social positions of their producers. Such discourse-imminent symbolic power seems to be of no less influence than the coercive actions of jihadism in the real world. This is because the recruitment of jihadists begins with the exposure of lay people to jihadist discourses that are heavily loaded with the symbolic capital of sacred and valued texts.

3.5. Knowledge management

Knowledge is an important category of context. Van Dijk (1995) points to the importance of knowledge management as a crucial means of contextualisation. He argues that interlocutors not only need to have knowledge about the world or the current communicative situation, but also mutual knowledge of each other's understandings. Consequently, power abuse and manipulation in communication involve specific discursive strategies of knowledge management. When we speak about the discourse of a specific social group, we should consider not only discourse structures but also the knowledge and beliefs its producers share with the assumed audience. Contexts are concerned with relevance; therefore, it is an important role of the CDA researcher to explicate the ways in which socially shared beliefs are discursively created and propagated and how certain beliefs are abused in the maintenance and legitimisation of domination.

Radicalisation is, in essence, a matter of knowledge management. Therefore, demystifying strategies of knowledge management in jihadist discourse is an integral part of the current research. This is because jihadist ideologues have, or cite people who have, preferential access to religious knowledge and/or discourse; consequently, they have the power to influence people's knowledge formation. To understand how jihadists discursively manipulate how recipients understand an event or discourse, we have to look at the reasoning universe, in which both the jihadists and their assumed audience are situated. That is, we have to look at what criteria the jihadists use to establish specific beliefs to be treated as *true*, whereas others are not. Therefore, it is wise to shed some light on the knowledge system to which Salafist jihadism, as an ideology, belongs.

3.5.1. *The epistemological background*

Islam is a religion of revelation which is deposited in the Quran. For Muslims, the latter is believed to preserve the precise words spoken by God and revealed to Muhammed throughout his mission. The Quran was codified and disseminated 30 years after the Prophet's death on the orders of the third Caliph, *Othman bin Affan* (al-Jabiri 2013). In addition to the Quran, Muslims preserved and later codified the *Sunnah* 'example practice', which includes details about the Prophet's life, instructions and explanations. In its entirety, the *Sunnah* represents the model early Muslims saw in him as the perfect human life lived in accordance with the divine will of God (Burton 1994). The *Sunnah* comprises a vast literature of reports known conventionally as *ħadith* (pl. *aħādīth*).[7] The Quran and *Sunnah* are regarded as the two main sources of knowledge in Islamic tradition; the former is the exact words of God, the latter contains the words of his messenger: who "nor does he speak from his own inclination. It is not but a revelation revealed."[8] According to classical Islamic doctrine, the distinction between Quran and *Sunnah* (often referred to as *Hadith*) is of form only, not of substance (Brown 1996). As such, it has been a received opinion amongst Muslim jurists and scholars that the *Hadith* (the Prophet's instructions by word and example) has the status of revelation and is the second source of knowledge and wisdom, after the Quran (ibid.).

The question of *al-ʿaql* 'reason' and *al-naql* 'transmitted sources of revelation' is centuries old, within the Islamic tradition. There is much to say about the epistemological aspect because it intersects with major philosophical questions that surround the debate about modernity and Islamic tradition (e.g. Haj 2008; Hallaq 2014). Here is a brief account. The tendency to intertext with sacred texts – as explored in depth in the analyses in Chapters 5 to 7 – calls for considering their contextual and epistemological weight. To make connections between what is said in the discourses in question and the knowledge systems in which they operate, I turn to what is perhaps the most influential Arab/Islamic philosophical treatise of the twentieth century, namely *A Critique of Arab Reason* by the Arab philosopher Mohammed al-Jabiri.[9] For al-Jabiri, reason "is nothing other than 'thought' (*fikr*)", not as a totality of all thoughts but rather as in Emanuel Kant's usage of the term, i.e. a knowledge system or an instrument that generates

[7] The word *ħadith* literally means 'utterance', but it is used technically in Islamic tradition to refer to narrations of Mohammed's acts, words, orders, prohibitions, recommendations, approvals or disapprovals about ritual, personal, public, political, commercial, military and administrative aspects of life.

[8] Quran, chapter 53, verses 3–4, from now on I will reference Quranic verses as follows: (Quran, 53: 3–4).

[9] Al-Jabiri is a Moroccan Professor of Arab and Islamic Philosophy, whose legacy focuses entirely on the question of "tradition and modernity" in the Arab/Islamic world. His seminal series *Critique of Arab reason* has been widely debated since the 1980s. His works were later translated into English (e.g. al-Jabiri 2008; 2010; 2011).

knowledge (Sabry 2007). Drawing on the work of André Lalande (1948), al-Jabiri (1984; 2011) distinguishes between two kinds of reason: *al-ʿaql al-mukawwin* 'constituent reason', which refers to the mental creativity that creates knowledge and constructs meaning, and *al-ʿaql al-mukawwin* 'constituted reason', which refers to reason that is already constituted.

Al-Jabiri (2011: 59–76) maintains that when considering the Arab/Islamic tradition, one must establish *ʿaṣr altadwīn* 'the Era of codification'[10] as the referential framework, which gave rise to 'constituent reason'. He argues that it is the turning point at which Arab/Islamic culture transformed from an oral culture into a 'scholastic' one, whereby *fiqh* "religious jurisprudence" forms its genesis. He justifies his argument with the fact that what we know about the epoch antecedent to the Era of Codification was indeed structured in that same period; moreover, what followed cannot be understood unless it is linked to it in some way. He argues that 'Arab/Islamic reason' formed during this period; subsequently, the diverse ideological fields and systems of knowledge in Arab/Islamic culture ensued. It is important to note that *Hadith* was codified and a vast corpus of individuals' narratives of eye-witness accounts of the Prophet's words and acts were collected (Burton 1994). For the codification of *Hadith*, an entire scholarly field of study emerged during this period to guarantee the authentication of *Hadith* by studying the *ʾisnād* 'chain of transmitters' or the series of people who narrated the *matn* 'the text' or the content of the reported *Hadith* (Burton 1994). Throughout the second century in the Islamic Calendar and the early part of the third century, a number of great collections were gathered following procedures of varying degrees of strictness for authenticating reported *Hadiths*.

In attempting to classify the knowledge systems formed during the Era of Codification based on the epistemological historiography of Arab/Islamic thought, al-Jabiri provides a ternary classification of Arab/Islamic knowledge systems. His classification takes into account the internal structures of different fields of knowledge and defines their cognitive paradigms. For him, Arab/Islamic thought is divided into the following three knowledge systems (al-Jabiri 2011: 415):

1. *al-bayān* 'explicational' knowledge system which prevailed in jurisprudence, syntax, theology and rhetoric. This knowledge system is based on a single cognitive system that depends on analogy (see the paragraph below) as a methodology of knowledge production.

[10] Al-Jabiri refers here to the period from 760 to 860 AD.

2. *al-ʿirfān* 'mystic' knowledge system that prevailed in Sufism, some Shiette thought, Isma'il philosopgy, alchemy and predictive astronomy. This epistemological system is based on the methodology of 'disclosure and communon with the divine'.
3. *al-burhān* 'demonstrational' knowledge system, including logic, mathematics, branches of the natural sciences and discussions of divine attributes, which are founded on rational thinking, either by experimental observation or reasonable deduction.

The first knowledge system is relevant to this study. The explicational knowledge system was the first to be established in the early scholastic Arab/Islamic tradition, whereby Arab thought exercised the first scientific activity before embarking on a direct dialogue with the legacy of ancient heritage – the mystic sciences. The production of knowledge in this system is based on a single cognitive method, which depends on "analogising the unseen (*in absentia*) on the basis of evidence (*in praesentia*)" (al-Jabiri 2011: 415); in other words, by explicating the religious texts (Quran and *Hadith*) codified during the Era of Codification. This methodology established knowledge of *al-bayan* 'explication', which includes religious and non-religious disciplines. The religious text has been, and is still, referred to as the *daleel* (دليل) 'evidence' in Islamic studies within this knowledge system. Epistemologically, the explicational knowledge system is based on what has come to be known as *Usool al-Fiqh* (أصول الفقه), 'the fundamentals of jurisprudence', founded by Muhammed ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (died 204 AH, 819 AD).[11] These formed the epistemological and methodological principles that have to be followed to derive valid rulings of *fiqh* and *Sharia* law, i.e. principles for rational thinking within the explicational knowledge system.

According to al-Shafi'i's principles, which have been adopted by major schools of thought in the explicational knowledge system, sources of knowledge are ordered hierarchically as follows (see al-Shafi'i 1961: 88-ff):

1. First and foremost, The book of God, the *Quran* and its exegesses, presents the foundational source of knowledge.
2. The second source is the authority of the *Sunnah*, as codified in the various treatises of *Hadith*.
3. The third epistemological source is *consensus* of the community of scholars, *ulema*, though the definition and validity of the principle of consensus is disputed amongst religious individuals themselves (Abu Zaid 2006). After the death of the Prophet's companions, no new consensus could be admitted (al-Sayyid 2015).

[11] Al-Shafi'i established the rules of the methodological science of Usool al-Fiqh in his book *al-Risalah fi Usool al-Fiqh (Treatise on the Fundamentals of Fiqh)*, which remained the general framework for the production of knowledge within the explicational knowledge system.

4. For matters of doctrine that have not been mentioned in the first two sources, nor is there a verdict known to be consensual to the Prophet's companions, one then can resort to reasoning via *analogy* to an established rule only in the absence of the above principles.

These principles established the superiority of *Hadith* as the sole legitimate source of *Sunnah* over the understanding of *Sunnah* as *accepted practice* during and after Muhammed's era (Brown 1996). Thus, al-Shafi'i established the principles of authority in favour of *ahl al-ħadīth* 'people of Hadith' at the expense of *ahl al-ra'ay* 'people of opinion' or 'legal pragmatists' (Abu Zaid 1995). Based on such a hierarchy, one can observe the crucial role that analogy to the texts of Quran and *Sunnah* can still play (as will be discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 7). It is an established rule across the schools of jurisprudence and theology that laws are constantly derived afresh from the original sources: the Quran and the *Sunnah*, whose authority cannot be overridden by political or legal systems. The employment of religious texts to prop up one's viewpoint is not restricted to theology, it is ubiquitous in all Islamic literature. Various fields of history, Quran commentary, law politics, linguistics and even literary criticism, display a constant tendency to prop up statements with external narratives, particularly Quranic and *Hadith* texts (Burton 1994). Al-Jabiri (2011) maintains that due to the potential limitations of dealing with religious texts, Islamic sciences stagnated at the epistemological level shortly after the Era of Codification, giving way to what he terms 'the constituted reason'.

Abu Zaid (1994) maintains that Islamic religious thought has ever since been revolving around religious texts, recontextualising to varying degrees religious texts to endorse the view adopted. He justifiably points out that recent religious thought seeks authority in *athar*, 'transmitted text', attributed to earlier *salaf* who are regarded as closer to the Islamic Golden Age and, consequently, as having better understanding and the ability to interpret Islamic traditions. This procedure is referred to by Abu Zaid as "transforming secondary sources into primary sources" (Ibid.: 67).[12]

In summary, in order to understand the prominent role of *sacred* texts in any discourse – particularly in the discourse under investigation – one must consider its crucial epistemological thrust in the 'politics of truth', in the words of Foucault (1996: 386), in the explication knowledge system. The symbolic value of *sacred* texts and knowledge the society has about them cannot be identified without considering their historical genesis and epistemological

[12] This is clearly seen in the AQAP discourse, as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 6, in a discussion of how these secondary sources are inserted into *Sawt al-jihad* in a manner reminiscent of primary sources.

weight. Examples abound regarding the role of *sacred* texts in the jihadists' politics of truth and legitimacy (as will be explicated in the course of the analyses in Chapters 5–7).

3.5.2. *Ideology as identity*

There are different conceptualisations of ideology, but the common denominator is how it links meaning to the enactment of power. In its broadest sense, ideology is a "coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs and values" (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 8). Conversely, Fairclough (2003: 218) defines ideologies as "representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation". Such an account of ideology conforms to the traditional Marxist definition of (capitalist) ideology as a means of hegemony in reproducing social relations. Furthermore, this definition conceives ideology as the construction of practices from a particular perspective and, consequently, conforms or equates to the Faircloughian definition of discourse provided in section 3.3.1.1. Thus, for Fairclough, ideologies equate to discourses and both are *ways of seeing the world*. This might be confusing since the two concepts originate from different theoretical traditions.[13] For the investigation of jihadism, I adopt such an account of ideology; however, in my case, jihadism is not a dominant ideology, as in the case of capitalism in the Marxist view.

Van Dijk (2011a: 382) views ideologies in a top-down fashion as "shared mental representations of social groups which in turn control the social practices of members". In other words, ideologies are worldviews constituting the social cognition of an epistemic community. In the Western context, CDA researchers are interested in hidden or latent ideologies that appear in everyday common-sense linguistic realisations (Wodak and Meyer 2016). This is a model of a general and all-pervasive ideology defining a society or system. However, there are also group-specific ideologies, e.g. class ideologies, gender ideologies, ethnic-group ideologies and so forth (Blommaert 2005). Under specific social, political and historical conditions, social groups develop their own ideologies to defend their interests and guarantee their cohesion (van Dijk 2011a). The ideology of jihadism is group-specific, i.e. it is an explicitly codified and historically contingent mission. Moreover, it has a clear origin, influenced by the ideas and writings of seminal ideologues that have a mission and work to accomplish it within the totality of a sociopolitical system. Such system functions were once operated by a number of strata of

[13] Ideology originates from the Marxist tradition, whereas discourse comes from linguistics in modern social theory.

social actors. The ideology of jihadists underpins their discourse, which is devoted to creating the identity of the Self as opposed to the Other.

Jihadist ideology is not a hidden ideological common sense that ceases to be common sense when it is uncovered. Rather, at all levels of text production and text interpretation, ideology is tantamount to faith. Following Shayegan (1997: ix), ideology – in the case of jihadism – is the "ideologisation of Tradition", whereby religious tradition and values are revived and employed for the ultimate political goal of changing the social structure and imposing a specific way of life. As for the ideologisation of tradition in the case of jihadist groups, their ideology is often expressed directly and brought out blatantly as warrants or conclusions in their argumentation. Moreover, it can be expressed in more specific social issues and domains and practices that reflect the attitudes of jihadists. In this context, discourse plays a role in the political reproduction of religious traditions. As such, what can otherwise be regarded as taboo is not coded, but is expressed linguistically as an act of faith – an absolute truth spoken by God. And in this vein, ideology "functions in such a way that it recruits subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or transforms the individuals into subjects" (Althusser 1994: 130) Therefore, in essence, an ideology is a definitive and existential condition for jihadists, as a social group. Their ideology serves as an overarching worldview explaining the relationship between the individual, on the one hand, and society and history, on the other. It is also a revolutionary one, attempting to correct the status quo that does not conform to its idealistic value system.

3.6. Chapter

In this chapter, I have run through the theoretical framework that will inform my analysis of AQAP jihadist discourse: the CDA tradition and key concepts, Bourdieu's theories of capital and symbolic power and finally an explication of the knowledge system to which jihadists adhere. The next chapter will review the methodological approach of the current study.

Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter begins with an overview of the DHA research programme 4.2, which explains how I survey the literature on jihadism. Section 4.3 provides an overview of the methodological tools employed in the three-part analysis of the data: referential and predicational strategies, intertexuality and topoi analysis. After that, section 4.4 discusses how the data were selected, and how they were sampled for analysis. A review of the translation/transliteration methods employed is also offered here. Finally, the chapter concludes in 4.5 with a discussion of the ethical challenges I have encountered.

4.2. DHA research programme

Several methods have been proposed under CDA's broad scope to analyse the distinctive (mis)representation and (de)legitmation of the Self and the Other. The discourse-analytic approaches under the umbrella of CDA provide different methods that vary in form and content according to the theoreticial orientation (KhosraviNik 2015a). In the meantime, there are two methodological approaches to CDA: deductive and inductive (Wodak and Meyer 2016: 18). Deductive approaches start with prior claims and assumptions and illustrate them with a few examples (e.g. Fairclough's Dialectical-Relational Approach and van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Approach). On the other hand, other discourse-analytic approaches with an inductive perspective remain at the meso-level and choose their reseach problems and carry out in-depth case studies on larger volumes of data (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), van Leeuwan's Social Actors Approach and the corpus linguistic approach). The present study adopts the DHA, which offers an inductive approach to the research.

In line with the methodological steps suggested by Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009; 2016) for conducting a discourse-historical research project, the current study set out in Chapter 2 to review the preceding literature on jihadism within and beyond the field of critical discourse studies. I have been pursuing and formulating the socio-theoretical grounding that consolidates the multi-disciplinary underpinnings of the research problem under analysis. A general social/epistemological theory is needed to understand how the discourse at hand is invested with resources for saying and doing things and how it manages and de/re-contextualises the repertoire of old knowledges of the epistemic community to which the speaker and hearer both belong.

4.3. Analytic tools

The DHA offers a research programme that is open to integrating the necessary theories and methods that lead to an adequate explanation of the research problem (Reisigl and Wodak 2016). To operationalise discourse analysis, the DHA proposes a three-dimensional analytic programme (ibid.: 32–33). The first dimension is identification of the overall content or topics of the discourse under analysis. Then, the discursive strategies involved are investigated. Third, context-specific linguistic realisations (types) are examined. For a more localised heuristic analysis, one should consider the following five questions (see the corresponding strategies in Table 3, below):

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?
2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?
3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?
4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated?

The DHA's five discursive strategies are illustrated below in Table 3 (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 33):

Table 3: A selection of discursive strategies

Strategy	Objective	Devices
NOMINATION	discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions	membership categorisation devices, deictics, anthroponyms etc. tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches (pars pro toto, totum pro parte) verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions etc.
PREDICATION	discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (positively or negatively)	(stereotypical) evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, oppositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctional clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns collocations comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) allusions, evocations, presuppositions/implicatures etc.
ARGUMENTATION	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	topoi (formal or content-related) fallacies
PERSPECTISATION	positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	deictics direct, indirect or free indirect speech quotation marks, discourse markers/particles metaphors animating prosody etc.
INTENSIFICATION OR MITIGATION	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic status of utterances	diminutives or argumentatives (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctives, hesitations, vague expressions etc. hyperboles, litotes indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion) verbs of saying, feeling, thinking etc.

It is worth mentioning that these strategies are not mutually exclusive. They are more or less intentionally adopted and practised to achieve a particular goal and are located at different levels of linguistic organisation and complexity (Reisigl and Wodak 2016). But for the sake of analytic categorisation, I will follow a three-part analysis, as explicated in the following subsequent sections.

4.3.1. *Representational strategies*

There is no escape from representation when it comes to exploring the jihadist worldview. Indeed, the construction of the Self and the Other plays a significant and decisive role in the discourse of a social group primarily concerned with identity politics, such as AQAP. That said, the DHA seems to provide a more elaborate formulation of referential and predicational strategies (as shown in Table 3) that exhaust the possible discursive realisations for constructing, labelling and attributing the Self and the Other. Nomination concerns the discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions. On the other hand, predication has to do with the discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions, be it positively or negatively. Both nomination and predication strategies involve the labelling of social actors. The boundary between them is blurred. The act of nomination evokes a set of connotations, which more or less bear the feature of predication (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). Likewise, the act of predication might implicitly evoke allusions to specific nominations. Furthermore, the semantics of predication might imply a tendency of naming things indirectly, e.g. via figurative and metonymic attributes. Such a grey area between nomination and predication may, in a certain sense, be a form of mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances.

Perspectivisation concerns the framing of the overall discourse and the degree to which the speaker expresses his/her point of view, while intensifying and mitigating strategies modify the force of the utterance, whether by strengthening it or toning it down. For a perspectivised discourse like the jihadist type, varying elements of the five discursive strategies sketched out in Table 2 are strategically amalgamated and deployed to constitute the desired social world, including its subjects and objects. No one strategy can work in isolation. Of the DHA's five discursive strategies, perspectivisation seems to be an all-encompassing strategic feature that can manifest in almost every macro/micro-level choice in the process of discourse production (KhosraviNik 2010a). Therefore, the analysis of perspectivisation processes and mechanisms is the desideratum of the present study that is brought in for all levels of analysis. Finally, there are mitigation strategies, on the one hand, and intensifying strategies, on the other. Both of these

work on qualifying and modifying the epistemic status of a given proposition (Reisigl and Wodak 2001). These strategies are ubiquitous and fulfilled by means of a wide range of lexical and grammatical tools. Although I do not dedicate one of the analyses in Chapters 5–7 to them, they will be integral to all aspects of the analysis and will be explicated when they are relevant.

Representational analysis looks into how social actors/actions are constructed through nomination and predication. Since my aim in Chapter 5 is to investigate the representation of social actors/actions, I choose to put more emphasis on nomination and predication. But I begin with the identification of the overall content of *Sawt al-jihad* through exploring salient discourses/discourse topics. After identifying the overall content of the data, I examine how social memberships are constructed, and how positive or negative evaluative predicates are attributed to relevant social actors/actions. I do this by categorising the linguistic realisations of both the nominational and predicational strategies employed in *Sawt al-jihad.* I have gone through the sampled data and noted the salient discourses/discourse topics about jihad and all the linguistic realisations of nominating and predicating associated with relevant social actors. Then, I categorised all these linguistic realisations according to their respective actors and divided them according to their discursive themes, as presented in Appendix C.[1] The results of the representational analysis are presented in Chapter 5.

4.3.2. *Intertextuality*

In its broadest sense, intertextuality is a notional concept stating that any text is a link in a chain of prior and subsequent texts. Emerging from literary studies, the term was initially coined by Julia Kristeva (in essays such as 'The Bounded Text'), when she introduced the Russian literary theorist M. Bakhtin and his ideas to the French-speaking world (Allen 2011). The introduction of Bakhtin's work, particularly intertextuality, occurred at a highly charged moment, when the atmosphere was significantly polarised between structuralism and post-structuralism.[2] Bakhtin criticised Saussure's view of language as a synchronic system and criticised his neglect of how prior texts shape utterances, while simultaneously anticipating subsequent ones (Fairclough 1992; Allen 2011).[3] Thus, Bakhtin paid particular attention to the communicative functions of language based on the fact that language exists in particular social situations and is ultimately

[1] There is more about translation methods in section 4.4, below.

[2] Kristeva stands beside other post-structural figures, such as Jacques Derrida, Ronald Barthes, Michael Foucault and Louis Althusser.

[3] While Bakhtin's criticism remains true, we should not ignore the fact that we can cite Saussure as the origin of ideas concerning intertextuality, at least at the abstract level, as for him a *sign* only produces its meaning through its similarity and difference from other signs (Allen 2011).

bound up with specific evaluations that are socially predicated. He convincingly argues that the actual meaning of a given utterance "is understood against the background of other utterances on the same theme, a background made up of contradictory opinions, points of view, and value judgements" (Bakhtin 1981: 281). However, the background is not an abstract one, such as Saussure's *langue.* Rather, it is "the manner in which language embodies and reflects constantly changing social values and positions" (Allen 2011: 18). Besides the profound impact of intertextuality on literary studies, the concept is extraordinarily influential in the social sciences more broadly as well as in linguistic anthropology and CDA.

Intertextuality has been incorporated as both a characteristic of and an analytic tool in CDA. The importance of intertextuality lies in the process of transforming previous texts and restructuring textual traditions. Looking beyond the boundaries of a particular communicative event, the analyst must explore from where specific utterances arise and what histories of (ab)use, interpretation and evaluation stick to them (Blommaert 2005). The concept of intertextuality – as adopted by the early poststructuralists in literary studies – appears to be less concerned with specific intertexts. Instead, it is tied to the entire cultural code of discourses. In such a holistic view, context is regarded as distinct from text and intertextuality (Allen 2011). While the entire code of discourses remains relevant in CDA, highlighting specific intertexts is inevitably crucial in discourse analysis so as to develop a more solid analytic framework. Furthermore, context plays a substantial role, in which intertextuality is integral, so that it is regarded as a constitutive element (as explicated earlier in Figure 3).

Intertextuality is a pivotal principle in the dynamics of discourse analysis. It more or less implicates 'the insertion of history into a text and of this text into history' (Kristeva 1986: 39). While a given text may be unique, it still derives from already established texts or discourses. Therefore, texts should be read in the context and against the background of other texts and discourses (Lemke 1995). The significance of intertextuality in CDA stems from the fact that every discourse is dialogical and utterances are always understood against what has been said. There are several critical accounts directed towards intertextuality within CDA that link its micro discursive workings to the macro sociopolitical context. Titscher et al. (2000) insist that intertextuality is one of the necessary formal criteria of any *communicative event* that links texts.[4] Conversely, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) regard it as a contextual notion. Gee (1990: 155) conceives of the intertextual relations of a given discourse as operating like an 'identity kit'.

[4] Other criteria include coherence, cohesion, intentionality, accessibility, informativity and situationality (Titscher et al. 2000: 22 ff.).

Indeed, my approach to intertextuality has been inferred in an abductive manner, i.e. it is inferred while going back and forth between the data and prior theoretical constructs on intertextuality, both within and beyond CDA. Therefore, my approach to intertextuality will be fully explicated with examples substantiating it in 6.2.

4.3.3. *Argumentation: topoi analysis*

The study of argumentation has a long history that can be traced back to antiquity, especially in the writings of Aristotle (van Eemeren 2015). Reisigl (2014) argues that argumentation is the art of persuading the addressees – either by convincing them with sound arguments or influencing them suggestively or manipulatively with fallacies. He views argumentation as "the linguistic and cognitive action pattern which follows the aim of justifying or questioning validity claims that have become problematic or have been questioned" (2014: 73). On the other hand, pragma-dialectics "enables the analyst of argumentative discourse to make a normative reconstruction of the discourse that results in an analytic overview of all elements that are pertinent to a critical evaluation" (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2015: 381). Argumentation has the pragmatic purpose of persuading the addressees. Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 69–70) define persuasion as "intentionally influencing a person so that she or he adopts, fixes or changes her or his ways of perception, attitudes to and views on persons, objects and ideas, and dispositions to behave or act in a specific way". Charteris-Black (2011; 2014), on the other hand, views '*being right*' as central to the interactive process of persuasion. He convincingly suggests that there is no such a thing as unsuccessful persuasion because the model of rightness, by means of which an orator can get the audience to believe that he or she is right, is not a zero-sum process.

The DHA is one of CDA's analytic approaches, which have a strong focus on argumentation, as one of its five discursive strategies. Drawing on Kienpointner's (1992; 1997) and Wengeler's (1997) argumentation approaches, and by making references to the pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion, the DHA offers an integrative argumentation framework that connects formal, functional and content-related aspects of argumentation. Its argumentation framework is based on analysing and evaluating the *topoi* used in a given discourse. Topoi analysis has been regarded as a useful approach in finding and uncovering deeper meanings in discourse and in critiquing arguments in an efficient and productive manner (e.g. Ochs 1969; Kienpointner 1997).

Topoi (τοποι) is a classical term from the Aristotelian topical tradition, it literally means 'places' (Kienpointner 1997). It has been revived by many scholars within and beyond argumentation theory (Zompetti 2006). However, this Aristotelian term has been understood and defined in different ways. Wilson and Arnold (as cited in Ochs 1969: 419) define topoi as a "system that can draw one's thoughts to the best hunting ground where ideas suitable to a particular speaking assignment can be found". Rubinelli (2009: 13) looks at *topoi* from a functional angle and therefore dismisses the definitions that construct the topos as a static concept. Rather, he views it as a dynamic and pragmatic concept, i.e. "strategies of argumentation for gaining the upper hand and producing successful speeches". For Kienpointner (1997), topoi can be either search formulas for finding argument or warrants guaranteeing the transition from argument to conclusion. Kienpointner's (1997) approach to topoi is a formal one, in which he distinguishes between nine classes of formal argumentation schemes.[5]

Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) approach to argumentation departs from the formal view of topoi as an abstract formal typology and inclines towards *material topoi*: topic-related and field-dependent *topoi*. In this approach, *topoi* are formalised as recurring content-related conclusion rules that are typical for the respective social domain and the discourse in question. Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009; 2016) have utilised topoi analysis in exploring the argumentation structures of anti-Semitic discourse and the discourse on climate change. They regard topoi as obligatory parts of argumentation, whether explicit or implicit, and define them as "the content-related warrants or conclusion rules that connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim … and justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion" (2001: 75). The goal of the DHA's argumentation framework is to identify, analyse and more importantly evaluate the topoi used, particularly in Self and Other construction.

AQAP discourse is both dialectical and rhetorical, combining the formal logic of the former with the informal and emotional potential of the latter. Aristotle's theory of *topoi* was developed for a similar purpose. Although the theory of topoi has primarily focused on dialectical argumentation as a philosophical exercise, Aristotle proposed a set of topoi as a means for persuading an audience in his *Rhetoric* (Houtlosser 2007). The theory of *topoi* provides a set of flexible schemata that can be used in a wide range of practical contexts (Rubinelli 2009). This set of schemata can be used to locate the arguments and logical relationships that exist in a certain discourse. As rightfully argued by Rubinelli (2009: 23), the selection of appropriate

[5] These nine topoi are: topos of *definition*, topos of the *species and the genus*, topos of *comparison/similarity/difference*, topos of *the part and the whole*, *causal* topos, topos of *contradiction*, topos of *authority*, topos of *example*, and topos of *analogy* (Reisigl 2014: 76).

argumentation scheme(s) is a matter of the researcher's 'understanding of the interlocutor' and his/her 'general knowledge of the subject'.

Although topoi analysis appears to be a good analytic framework for exploring the argumentative strategies of a given discourse by reconstructing the topoi underlying it, the very notion of topos is notoriously far from reaching scholarly consensus. Therefore, it seems necessary to provide a working definition as far as the data in question are concerned. From the literal meaning of *topos* – 'place', the spatial metaphor implies a location from which a speaker chooses to locate or develop (an) argument(s). That is, as (Miller 2016: 105) puts it, this metaphor "seems to require us to conceive of topoi not as propositions but as sources from which propositions (or terms, in dialectic) may be obtained". Therefore, I align myself with Slomkowski's (1997: 44–67) view of topos. Slomkowski points to the fact that Aristotle does not define the notion of topos in *Topics,* but he does refer to it in *Rhetoric* as being synonymous to an element "under which many enthymemes fall" (Aristotle 2006: 192). From this reference, Slomkowski develops an understanding of two related terms: *topos* and *enthymeme*. The *topos* can be defined as some sort of "law, or a principle … in the form of 'If P, then Q'" (1997: 45). On the other hand, enthymemes are "instances of topoi; or … arguments which are warranted by the principle expressed in the topos" (44). To illustrate this distinction, Slomkowski (1997: 44) states that the enthymeme that reads: *A man who strikes his father also strikes his neighbours* is an instance of the corresponding more/less topos that reads: *If the less likely thing is true, the more likely thing is true as well.* Aligning to Slomkowski's (1997) account facilitates a *topoi analysis* that (i) provides a way for classifying arguments based on the already established universal topoi, and (ii) gives a way for making a distinction between universal and culture-specific arguments.

Indeed, a number of scholars have called for differentiating universal and culture-specific topoi. For example, Amossy (2002), in her sociocultural approach, divides topoi into two categories: *universal topoi,* those relying on logico-discursive universal patterns, and *culture-dependent topoi,* built on cultural beliefs specific to a given ideology. This approach to argumentation or any other form of linguistic enquiry helps the analyst infer appropriate analytic categories that best explain the research problem. This is based on the fact that any political group has its language and portrays itself, the world and the past via this means (Wodak 1989). However, while Amossy's sociocultural approach seems relevant and plausible, she does not make clear how such a distinction is made technically. In this study, I attempt to make this distinction through topos/enthymeme distinction. That is, the analysis of the arguments is made on two levels:

- First is the **topos** level, which adheres to the universal classification, e.g. topoi of definition, authority etc.
- Second is the level of **enthymeme**, which is a specific rhetorical demonstration of a corresponding topos.

Sociocultural variation occurs at the second level, while the first remains universal. In this way, enthymemes are arguments that emerge from the data. And it is the task of the researcher to construct his/her own enthymemes that best finalise the analysis of the discourse in question. Universal topoi provide a systematic analytic tool for both locating and classifying actual enthymemes. The results of the argumentative analysis are presented in Chapter 7.

4.4. Data

4.4.1. *Data selection*

Several steps were taken to select the data for analysis so as to arrive ultimately at potential units of analysis. In the first instance, one must consider the context knowledge that underpins the data chosen for analysis. Despite the apparent ideological similarity of jihadist networks, a thorough macro-, meso- and micro-textual analysis is required so as to gain sufficient familiarity with the context world in which these groups operate. In that regard, I have chosen to study the AQAP network exclusively. As I noted earlier in 1.1, I am analysing the discourse of AQAP for two reasons. First, AQAP stands as a good case study for jihadist groups. The group's body of data seems to be available, sufficient, representative and rich in terms of jihadist discursive forms and contents. Second, and despite the group's secretive nature and the lack of information about text production, this choice was made because I have considerable background knowledge about the context levels of the group's discourse, discourse topics and discursive events. Contextual information about the group, i.e. its historical development and media activities, is readily accessible on account of their publication activities via the Internet which has revolutionised jihadist media. Al Qaeda media operatives have been vigorously active online since the 1990s and have adopted Web-based platforms as distribution sites for the exchange of texts as well as audio and video- recordings. Despite the frequent hackings and closures of their websites, media operatives keep moving between various Internet addresses and temporary host sites (Hegghammer 2010a).

Abundant jihadist texts (spoken and written) are available online in Arabic and other languages (such as English, French and Urdu, inter alia). The jihadist material is of various genres: books, leaflets, articles, *fatwas* by radical clerics etc. However, given my research questions, which are mainly concerned with the representation and (de)legitimation of the Self and the Other, I

focus on a specific genre within jihadist discourse whose texts are to be used for analysis: media publications that aim to address and mobilise laypeople. Media representations play a decisive role in creating and sustaining political identities (Talbot 2007). Publishing propagandist magazines is an old practice in the universe of jihadism that dates back to the 1980s *al-jihad* magazine, which was published from Azzam's Services Office in Peshawar (as noted earlier in 2.2.1). The field of action, within which these publications lie, is the formation of public attitudes, wills and opinions. Moreover, such magazines are more or less representative of other genres because they tend to include samples and quotations from, and references to, jihadist materials, books, articles, video and audio statements etc.

With respect to methodological choices, there is also the question of how material from AQAP publications is to be selected as representative in a broad sense. AQAP's remarkable textual publications in Arabic include five series:[6]

1. *Sawt al-jihad* 'the voice of *jihad',* which was published in 29 issues, ranging from 30 to 50 pages each.
2. *Muaskar al-Battar* 'Camp of the Sabre', published in 22 issues, again ranging from 30 to 50 pages each.
3. *Al-khansāʾ* 'a proper name referring to a well-known female Muslim poet at the time of Prophet Mihammed', a single issue.
4. *Al-taqrīr al-ʾikhbāri* 'the news report', 23 issues published.
5. *Al-bayān* 'the statement', around three issues.

Although AQAP has released these e-magazines and other supplementary text, audio and video statements, the group seems to have relied on *Sawt al-jihad* as its central means for online Arabic propagation at that time (Bakr 2013). For instance, *Muaskar al-Battar* 'Camp of the Sabre' is directed at those who are already radicalised and convinced of the AQAP's ideology, and therefore it provides them with practical military courses and tactics. *Sawt al-jihad*, on the other hand, aimed to establish a coherent ideological structure comprising the group's ideological messages and responses to criticisms from political and religious establishments. Therefore, while addressing multiple audiences, as far as mobilisation is concerned, it has targeted the population of Saudi Arabia in particular. It has been the longest running of the various output streams – with its 29 issues released in the period between 2003 and 2005 – and it has played a significant role as the AQAP's mouthpiece platform for mobilising the public, spreading its ideology and recruiting new members for the 2003 jihadist cause inside Saudi

[6] AQAP also published several films which provide remarkable details about their operations, e.g. *shuhadāʾ al-muwājahāt* 'Martyrs of the confrontations' – referring to confrontations with the security forces, *waṣāyā al-shuhadāʾ* 'wills of the martyrs', Badr of Riyadh etc.

Arabia. Among the five publications listed above, it is the only magazine that offers timely statements, replies, commentaries and news about the ongoing campaign. Moreover, the magazine projects a persuasive Self-presentation and provides sections authored by multiple jihadist ideologues and participants, many of whom are members of AQAP and others who write under their *noms de guerre*. Nevertheless, little is known about the process of production and magazine circulation, apart from releasing it online. In almost all the issues of *Sawt al-jihad*, specifically in epilogues, the magazine editors urge the audience to circulate the output among relatives and personal connections.

After obtaining the necessary ethical approval, I downloaded the magazine issues from the host site *minbar al-tawḥīd wa al-jihād* "The Platform of Monotheism and Jihad", which is an online public domain.[7]



Figure 4: Cover page (left) and last page (right) of the first issue of *Sawt al-jihad.*

The magazine was published in Arabic by AQAP's media centre for media production, which seems to have been in a house in Riyadh. It demonstrated a relatively basic aesthetic quality throughout its release. It is not as professional as recent jihadist magazines such as *Dabiq* of ISIS. Nonetheless, *Sawt al-jihad* adopted many of the trappings and features of a generic magazine. For example, it has a front cover page, with low quality graphics, that bears the name

[7] I downloaded the magazine from this website: http://www.hed.ws/c?i=339, which is no longer available. *Sawt al-jihad* and all the archives of *minbar al-tawḥīd wa al-jihād* were, however, available on two host sites, http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/d.html and http://www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis), at the time of submitting this thesis.

of the magazine, a logo that reads "we care about *jihad* and mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula", and a dateline showing the Hijri month and year of publishing. The front page also includes headlines with the most attention-grabbing content (Figure 4, left). *Sawt al-jihad* has back cover pages which constantly feature an epilogue and some of the next issue's highlights (Figure 4, right). Apart from the cover pages, the remainder of the content is merely textual, with almost identical sections devoid of any graphics. They include short and long articles, ranging from half a page to four pages. The precise authors are not identified and pseudonyms are preferred, though real names are often provided when the authors are declared leaders or are those who have already died. These articles are permeated with pull quotes, highlighted excerpts from symbolic and valued texts and advertisements for books, releases, articles and *fatwas* by radical clerics.



Figure 5: Monthly breakdown of material (according to total word count).[8]

None of the magazine's editorial staff seems to have had experience in journalism, so they follow amateur norms developed within jihadist media networks. The magazine's total material amounts to 549,093 words. As shown in Figure 5, the first issue appeared in the eighth month of the Islamic calendar 1425, which corresponds to September 2003, almost four months after the launch of AQAP's campaign in May of that year. Exact issue dates are not given but the magazines seem to have maintained a steady fortnightly schedule throughout 2003, up until it ceased with the publication of the 28th issue in October 2004. Three months prior to this halt, on 20 July, the Saudi police raided the house where the media centre was located (as noted earlier in 2.4.2).

[8] I convert the Hijri month, which is shown at the beginning of each issue, to the corresponding Gregorian one.



Figure 6: The volume of the issues according to word count

4.4.2. *Data sampling*

Having selected *Sawt al-jihad*, I then needed to decide how much of this selection I should qualitatively analyse. There are different ways of sampling used in social research, through which one can arrive at analysable material from selected data. These types of sampling are normally associated with quantitative social research. They are concerned first with the question of representativity, i.e. the observation of a small number of objects is taken as a means of reaching empirical conclusions generalisable to the whole class (Titscher et al. 2000). It is indeed problematic, from the perspective of conventional research, that the samples involved in discourse-analytic research are too small to permit representation and thereby generalisability. Wood and Kroger (2000: 77) provide a plausible account with respect to this methodological dilemma:

> The differences between the nature of discourse-analytic and conventional claims mean that there are also different procedures for warranting claims in discourse analysis … In conventional work, the validity of a claim depends upon the use of the appropriate statistical test, which both supports and depends upon the adequacy of sample size. In discourse analysis, warranting procedures do not depend on statistical tests. This reflects in part the discursive nature of claims; it also reflects the requirement in discourse analysis that claims must not simply apply to the sample as a whole, but must also account for every instance relevant to the claim.

As such, according to Wood and Kroger, statistical tests for the adequacy of the sample size are not needed. Thus conceived, and given that the volume of *Sawt al-jihad* – as shown in Figure 6 above – is too large to be fully assessed, the aim of my study is not to make claim statements about statistical relationships between quantified variables but rather to deductively ensure that the central categories of analysis in the selected material are represented sufficiently well to

facilitate the most detailed and precise analysis possible. One way to decide on the sufficiency of the selected sample is via the notion of *saturation*. This concept in qualitative research means that the analysis of data is carried out until no new categories are obtained (Wood and Kroger 2000). Hence, I started with the first issue of the magazine and kept on recording linguistic realisations for the categories of analysis (e.g. linguistic realisations for nominating and predicating evaluative attributions for the Self and the Other) until no new ones emerged. The endpoint does not mean that the linguistic realisations of relevant discursive strategies are comprehensively exhausted. Rather, it means that the discursive strategies are saturated and the linguistic realisations collected are sufficient to make a solid argument.

I have thoroughly read all twenty-nine issues of *Sawt al-jihad,* but for data sampling I started with the first issue and manually recorded linguistic realisations for the categories of analysis in 4.2.3: (i) discourse topics and referential and predicational strategies, (ii) intertextual connections and (iii) legitimatory topoi. The point at which I found that the categories of analysis were saturated and no new discursive themes emerged was the eleventh issue. To ensure that the first eleven issues exhausted the categories of analysis, I systematically went through every other issue until I reached the 29th, i.e. odd-numbered issues 13–29. After scrutinising these, it turned out that no further discursive themes emerged. Nevertheless, I would argue that this method means that the discursive themes scrutinised can still be considered representative of the data of *Sawt al-jihad* as a whole.

4.4.3. *Translation and transliteration of the data*

The translation of the *Sawt al-jihad* material from Arabic into English is my own. I have attempted to put this content into an equivalent readable form in English. However, maintaining equivalence when translating jihadist content that contains a wide range of classical and religious genres is not a straightforward task. So, I have had to take into consideration: (a) the classical variety of Arabic that is used in AQAP discourse (temporal variation) and (b) the variations arising from religion as field of discourse. Thus conceived, I have drawn on Cruse's (1986: 270–280) four types of utterance meanings: *propositional meaning, expressive meaning, presupposed meaning* and *evoked meaning*. Propositional and expressive meanings are primary meanings conveyed by lexical units. The propositional meaning of an utterance is determined by its truth-conditions as conceived by language speakers. The expressive meaning of an utterance has nothing to do with its truth-conditions but rather relates to the speaker's feelings or attitude (e.g. 'I felt a sudden sharp pain'). Presupposed meaning concerns semantic traits which are taken for granted in the use of an utterance. Presupposed traits are not asserted but

rather arise from semantic relations (e.g. entailment) or co-occurrence restrictions (e.g. collocation). Finally, evoked meaning is a consequence of a language having different *dialects* (e.g. geographical, temporal and social variations) and *registers* that arise from situation-specific appropriateness. While propositional and expressive meanings are the most important types of meaning and utilised by the speaker to convey the intended message, presupposed and evoked meaning – though secondary – add further meaning to the intended message and cohesiveness to the discourse (ibid.: 277).

Being aware of Cruse's categorisation of meaning helped me with translating the material for analysis. Indeed, equivalence at text level when translating jihadist discourse is difficult to achieve, given its intertextual complexity. However, to maintain the intertextual relationships between the data in question and the Quranic and Hadith traditions, I attempted to use the translations available for Quran and *Sunnah* traditions. Thus, I made use of widely circulated and more established translations that take into account equivalence at register and dialect levels and therefore use classical words and structures. For Quranic verses, there are several available translations with distinct merits to each of them. For convenience, I have used the online translation available at https://quran.com/. This website provides English translations side-by-side with the original Arabic text. The key advantage of this website is that it offers a keyword search service, in both English and Arabic. The online search service proved very helpful to me when looking for particular expressions and word usages. Apart from the translation of full or part verses, the online search enabled me to maintain equivalence when any of the types of intertextual relations are involved (explicated further in Chapter 7). Similarly, I have relied on the website at https://sunnah.com/, which provides translations for all the prophetic tradition treatises. This site also gives side-by-side English translations and has a similar keyword search service, which thus made the translation of all intertextual connections possible.

When relevant, translations are accompanied by transliterated forms. I do this for conceptual notions, proper names and linguistics realisations for respective discursive strategies in the course of the analyses. Except for anglicised words and names (e.g. *ulema, ummah, jihad* etc.), I have tried to use the transliteration system of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, with minor changes. I use *q* rather than *ḳ* for a voiceless uvular stop (see Appendix B). When necessary I put three dots '…', ellipsis, to indicate that parts of the original text have been skipped. I resort to this when translating lengthy texts, or to avoid repeated patterns. Additionally, I use square brackets [ ] in the translated texts to provide words or phrases that relate to presupposed meanings or to add further explanation of a certain word or phrase. For instance, the bracketed phrase [the

mujahedeen] in (1) relates to what the pronoun ‘those’ refers to, while [false gods] provides an explanation of the word *tawāghīt*.

> those [the mujahedeen] who disbelieve in all the *tawāghīt* [false gods] on earth

4.5. Ethical challenges

Certain challenges arose from the attempt to collect jihadist data: chief amongst those is the protection of myself as a researcher when downloading such security-sensitive material. For this, I have done two things. First, I liaised with Newcastle University Research Office before starting data collection. This was necessary to make the university aware that whatever websites I browsed and whatever material I reviewed was for the sake of genuine research. Similarly, all downloaded material has only been stored on space officially provided by the university. Second, I was rightly required to obtain the university’s full ethical approval before I embarked upon any data collection. The university’s ethics committee processed the project requirements and evaluated the risk against university-wide and sector-wide guidelines and regulations and officially confirmed that there were sufficient safeguards in place to grant ethical approval for me to be able to download the intended data from the website of *minbar al-tawḥīd wa al-jihād*, just before it was taken down, shortly after collecting data.

Chapter 5 REPRESENTATION OF THE SOCIAL WORLD, SOCIAL ACTIONS/ACTORS IN THE DISCOURSE OF AQAP

5.1. Introduction

In this and the two ensuing chapters, I analyse the ideological workings of jihadism in the discourse of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or let me call it – following Wodak (2015) – the *micro-politics* of jihadism. The analysis of ideological forms and contents in the texts involves explication of how the social world and its social actors are constituted. This chapter explores how AQAP (re)produces its ideologies and violent exclusionary agendas on two levels: through sketching out overall discourse networks and topics on *jihad* (5.2) and seeing how the Self and the Other are discursively constructed in sections 5.3–5.6.

5.2. The discourse on jihad

One of the most important characteristics unique to AQAP, among other Al Qaeda affiliate groups, is that it was the first combat group to branch out from AQ Central in the wake of the American invasion of Afghanistan. AQAP emerged at the hands of jihadist veterans, who did not lack organisational experience, whether in recruitment – through both media and personal connections – or operational capabilities. More importantly, the founding figures of AQAP had had considerable experience in the use of online publishing and media activities, particularly in support of the Chechnyan cause (as stated previously in 2.3.1). In this vein comes *Sawt al-jihad* as a flagship magazine involved in a very sophisticated media campaign aimed at delivering a coherent narrative for the AQAP cause. Among the various strands in AQAP's set of symbolic representations that serve the jihadist purpose is its name: *Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula*. AQAP has taken the prophetic *Hadith* "Expel the polytheists [disbelievers] from Arabia"[1] as a slogan to inspire its very name. Two discourse-analytic aspects are evident in this choice of reference. First, the name appeals to a Prophet's saying, which is part of the hearers' repertoires of old knowledge. The Quranic and prophetic texts comprise a closed corpus with a strong epistemological significance, upon which AQAP builds its politico-religious philosophy. Second, the name evidently reveals the group's rejectionist stance towards the existing political order. Although the name AQAP was first adopted in November 2003, in a statement that

[1] Bukhari, 3949.

appeared in the fifth issue of *Sawt al-jihad,*[2] initial statements adopted a similar name, "the mujahedeen of the Arabian Peninsula", without declaring the group's allegiance to Al Qaeda. Even after pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda, AQAP strategically practised camouflaging, through mysterious groups claiming attacks on security forces with different names, e.g. '*truth brigades*' and '*ħaramayn brigades*'.[3] Regardless of AQAP's aim to exaggerate the size of the then-mysterious group, these names are likewise not devoid of the two aforementioned characteristics: the former appeals to a form of truth politics based on Divine authority, while the latter's local orientation refers to Arabia, rather than conventional official state names.

Overall, as already noted, *Sawt al-jihad* is primarily located in the field of politico-religious advertising. It comprises a broad range of discourse genres (e.g. *fatwas* 'religious rulings', religious debates, news reports and statements about specific incidents, interviews with jihaists and supporters of *jihad,* biographies of jihadists and respected figures in jihadist circles). A systematic examination of the data in the selected analytic period reveals that there is a plethora of interdiscursively and intertextually overlapping discourses. The primary discourses include 'a discourse on *jihad*', 'a discourse on the mujahedeen', 'a discourse on *ummah*', 'a discourse on Saudi Arabia [alongside references to other states in the Islamic world]' and 'a discourse on the Crusaders', or the Christian and Jewish alliance. These discourses are not mutually exclusive as they share some topics or explicitly refer to each other's texts.

Sawt al-jihad's overall aim is to deliver AQAP's jihadist manifesto in the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, it is unsurprising that a considerable amount of its content is devoted to the construction of *jihad.* The discourse on *jihad* is replete with a war of ideas and doctrinal polemics covering almost every conceivable issue related to *jihad,* among other theologically-related propositions. These ideas range from core beliefs to the fine theological details and jihad-related juristic issues that cannot be fully exhausted in the current study. However, it is worth summarising the macro-topics as displayed in the following diagram:

[2] In a statement entitled *bayān ħawl al-tarāju'āt al-'akhīrah,* 'a statement on the recent repentances', commenting on the appearance of three clerics on TV repenting their extremist views, as noted earlier in 5.3.2.3.

[3] These names later turned out to be those adopted by certain AQAP clusters (Hegghammer 2010a).

DISCOURSE TOPICS ON JIHAD
•*the status of jihad*
•*the obligation of jihad as regards self, knowledge and wealth*
•*the rewards for jihad*
•*the sinfulness of holding back from jihad*
•*conditions permitting jihad*
•*the case for mujahedeen not seeking permission from parents*
•*self-sacrifice operations*
•*the legitimacy of killing non-combatant infdels*
•*apostacy and nullifiers of Islam*
•*the case for the kufr 'disbelief' of governments*
•*the case against alliance with disbelievers*
•*the defence for certain cases of takfir*
•*the sedition of polytheism, more than killing*
•*polytheism in non-Sharia legislation*
•*the case against Sahwa preachers*
•*the case against dialogue with rulers*
•*the expulsion of polytheists from Arabia*
•*the case for daf' alsail, 'repelling the agressor'*
•*Muslim suffering at the hands of non-Muslims*
•*American aggression against Muslims*

Figure 7: Discourse topics on *jihad*

The focus on *jihad* is obviously salient as a criterion of belonging in jihadist identity politics. Therefore, it is worth exploring how *jihad* is constructed in *Sawt al-jihad* through examining strategies[4] of nomination and predication. The data show that there are three main topological strategies for the construction of *jihad* in AQAP discourse: militarisation, religionisation and religio-politicisation.

5.2.1. *Militarisation*

Jihad as a signifier is essential in the semantics of jihadist discourse. As previously noted, the word *jihad* is a noun derived from the verb *jaahad* (جاهد), which means 'struggle'. In Islamic tradition, *jihad* is used to denote both military and inner, spiritual struggle, as explained earlier in 2.2. However, the data reveal that it is used exclusively to indicate the former. Furthermore, *jihad* is referred to in terms of classical synonymous terms, such as *qitāl* fighting, *ribāṭ* 'firm hold [in fighting]', *nafīr* and 'going forth [to fight]'. These references are of particular importance because they are known juristic terms imported from sacred texts. Their intertextual

[4] Strategy, in this context, represents social actors/actions in terms of social activities (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

relations with sacred texts are intended to give weight to the religious obligation of *jihad* and to be picked up by the assumed *Muslim* audience.

(1)
...and his [Abdullah Azzam's] books, speeches and lectures are filled with mentioning the virtues of **fighting** in the path of Allah gained by the Mujahed in this world and the hereafter.
Issue 1, September 2003[5]

(2)
...and that a day and a night in the **firm hold** are better than this world and all it contains.
Issue 21, July 2004

(3)
The call to **go forth** from shaikh Osmah bin Laden
op-ed headline, *Issue 8*, December 2003

All three references in (1–3) are particularising synecdoches substituting *jihad* with other semantically narrower terms: 'fighting [in jihad]', 'the firm hold [of jihad]' and the act of 'going forth [to jihad]'.[6] Such particularising synecdoches belong to militarisation as a shared field of reference and features in both reference to it and predication. For instance, the noun phrase *al-ʾithkhānu fī al-ʿaduw* is similarly a linguistic realisation that features in both nomination and predication, as the following two examples reveal. This noun phrase would translate as 'inflicting a massacre/slaughter upon the enemy'. This reference is frequently realised in the magazine and violently asserts the military nature of the *jihad* being propagated.

(4)
...so once anyone finds the opportunity to harm the Crusaders, he seeks Allah's help and never hesitates, and within the magazine what makes you ready for **inflicting a massacre upon the enemy**
Issue 7, December 2003

A vital category of references that Arabic morpho-syntax allows is heavily employed in *Sawt al-jihad.* In Arabic, the word *jihād* is a verbal noun from a trilateral root – *jāhada*. This may be used in Arabic as the equivalent of the English gerund or infinitive. This facilitates the formation of noun phrases used as verbal expressions comprising a gerund and its object. This construction is employed in abundance in both nomination and predication, and it utilises

[5] For reasons of space, all the original texts for the examples presented throughout the analysis are listed in Appendix A with their respective numbers.

[6] The references *qitāl*, *ribāṭ* and *nafīr* are included as synonyms for *jihad* in standard jurisprudential treatises. They are standardised based on the occurrences of these terms or their derivational forms in the following Quranic verses. For instance, *nafīr* is inspired by the Quranic verse: ('Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah'), Quran, 9: 41. The recontextualisation processes of these and other sacred texts will be elaborated in the next Chapter.

interchangeably the verbal nouns *jihād* and *qitāl*. Both verbal nouns in context mean 'fighting'. Table 4 illustrates a few samples of these constructions:

The verbal expression	Translation
jihād/qitāl al-kuffār/al-kafireen	'fighting the disbelievers'
jihād/qitāl al-mushrikīn	'fighting the polytheists'
jihād/qitāl al-murtaddīn	'fighting the apostates'
jihād/qitāl al-amrīkān	'fighting the Americans'
jihād/qitāl al-ṭughāh	'fighting the tyrants'

Table 4: A sample of verbal expressions using the verbal nouns *jihaad* and *qitaal*

In all the constructions in Table 4, the second term of the compound nominals is the object of the underlying verb. This is a significant construction through which *jihad* is nominated with reference to the ideological identity of the Other, against whom *jihad* is propagated. Conversely, the verbal noun may be part of *iḍāfa* 'compound nominals', whereby the second term is the possessor or subject of the underlying verb. This construction defines *jihad* in terms of the identity of those implementing *jihad* or the identity of the Self. This category includes: *jihādunā* 'our *jihad*', *jihād ikhwāninā* 'our brothers', *jihad*', *jihād al-muslim(īn)* 'Muslim('s) *jihad*' and *jihād al-'ummah* '*ummah's jihad*'.

Apart from references, there is a host of predications that reinforce the military sense of *jihad.* One of the predicational themes of *jihad* (see Table 8 in Appendix C) positively propagates *jihad* as an effective means for resistance. In this vein, *jihad* is predicated with an array of attributions, such as:

> a means to repel aggression and occupation
> discomposing the internal and external enemy
> a hit on Western colonisation
> the language of force that works with enemies
> the effective power to thwart the plots of infidels and hypocrites.

In tandem with the mainstream rhetoric of Al Qaeda, AQAP discourse makes it clear that the perceived struggle with America and its allies – inside and outside of Saudi Arabia – is a war against Crusaders. Following Gulf War II,[7] Al Qaeda discourse portrays Arabia – the Holy land – as being occupied by American troops. *Sawt al-jihad* speaks incessantly of the American occupation of Arabia. These predicates function as a crucial legitimatory topos, in which analogical conceptions are drawn between contemporary political realities and the Crusades.[8]

[7] The American-led coalition to liberate Kuwait after being invaded by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces in 1990.

[8] The Crusades refers to a series of European-led military campaigns over two centuries (1097–1291 AD) in the Holy Land, part of the eastern Mediterranean coastal strip. The Crusades figure heavily and have a considerable

Thus conceived, *jihad* becomes an inevitable mission assigned to the *us*-group – 'the mujahedeen' against *them*, the 'disbeliever invaders' and 'their agents', apostate rulers.

5.2.2. *Religionisation*

Most of the discourse on *jihad* goes towards presenting the idea in general and, more importantly, strives to persuade the reader that AQAP's jihadist mission is legitimate. The basic legitimatory arguments are always based on religous authority as an acceptable basis for legitimacy between the speaker and the assumed audience. Therefore, *Sawt al-jihad* reminds the audience of the Quranic and *Hadith* texts that state the obligation of *jihad* and fighting generically. Furthermore, the audience is addressed with texts of a juristic nature that discuss the debate over whether *jihad* is a *defensive, collective duty* for the community or an *offensive permanent duty* for the individual. Summing up AQAP's account on this topic, the answer is straightforward: the necessary conditions for the latter are fulfilled because Muslim lands are under the occupation of infidel forces and local apostate rulers. As for the juristic rules of current *jihad,* AQAP ideologues and jihadist theorisers of all colours contrast with both mainstream religious scholars and the very foundation of classical schools of thought in the world of Sunni Islam that conceive of *jihad* as a collective duty for the whole community. Jihadist ideologues (including Al Qaeda's) claim that old juristic rules do not apply because Muslims are under attack and they rank *jihad* second, if not equal, to faith.

The discursive practices manifested in *Sawt al-jihad* confirm a notable correlation between *jihad* and *tawħīd,* [9] 'the profession of faith', so as to express the view that *jihad* is the practical profession of faith. By ranking *jihad* equal to the profession of faith, *jihad* is then constructed as both a means to an end and, simultaneously, an end in its own right. It is a means to an important variety of goals, but the principal two are the eviction of the Crusaders from the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) and the establishment of Islamic rule. To reveal a snapshot of the juristic arguments, it is now worth looking at the op-ed article of the first issue of *Sawt al-jihad*:

relevance and resonance in AQAP's *Sawt al-jihad*, as this period is closely linked to modern European colonialist strategies, American wars and the Western presence in the Islamic world.

[9] The correlation between *jihad* and *tawħīd* can be observed in the jihadist kinetic names and slogans. An example of the former is Al Qaeda's *al-tawħīd wal jihād* 'Monotheism and *jihad*' (التوحيد والجهاد) group led by the Jordanian militant Abu *Musʿab al-Zarqāwi* that operated in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 and developed into what later came to be known as the Islamic State in Iraq.

(5)

…Allah has ordained a great command for us, it is *jihad* for the sake of God. The Almighty has said: ﴿**Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you; and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah Knows, while you know not**﴾ [10] … God has ordained *jihad* for reasons all of which are available in our time, from repelling the aggression of the unbelievers to fighting the apostates, supporting the oppressed, and freeing prisoners, let alone offensive *jihad* against the infidels until they give the *jizyah* [poll tax] willingly while they are humbled. These are either personal or collective duties, but they are **now obligatory** as the commitment of Muslims to these duties is insufficient.

Issue 1, September 2003

This op-ed article, which can be regarded as AQAP's manifesto, puts forward a Quranic verse calling for fighting, and inter-discursively relates to the classical jurisprudence of *jihad* and *fiqh al-jihad*, and lists legitimate causes for launching *jihad.* The article strategically sets out two categories of *jihad* – defensive *jihad* and offensive *jihad* – lumping them together under the rubric of defensive *jihad*, fighting both a far enemy (aggressive disbelievers) and a near enemy (the apostates). In terms of infidelity, apostates are on an equal footing with non-Muslims as they are all worthy of attack. However, while *jihad* against non-Muslims is either obligatory *jihād al-dafʿa*, 'defensive *jihad*', or collective *jihād al-ṭalab*, 'offensive *jihad*', fighting apostate rulers is regarded as being altogether mandatory. The op-ed continues:

(6)

One of the greatest places where *jihad* is obligatory is *bilād al-ħaramayn* [the land of the two Holy Mosques], wherein the occupying **Crusader enemy**, who steals its resources, determines its policies and fights the Muslims from this land. Also, therein is the **apostate puppet government** that implements the plans of colonisation, and allies to disbelievers, and governs according to laws other than those of the Almighty God.

Issue 1, September 2003

Furthermore, the above excerpts specify the two enemies of AQAP *jihad* in Saudi Arabia: the external enemy – the Other-Outwith; and the internal enemy – the Other-within. Both enemies are defined in religious terms: Crusaders and apostates, and the AQAP jihadist mission then becomes legitimate and rightful as the necessary conditions for *jihad* are fulfilled.

It is worthnoting that excerpts 5–6 stress elevating the status of *jihad* in a manner breaking, in many respects, away from both traditional and mainstream religious scholars. Hallaq (2014: 94–98) points out that all classical juristic works insist that not every war is *jihad*. Many wars fought between Muslim emirs and kings, whether in early or late Islamic history, were not regarded as *jihad*. Moreover, Hallaq argues that Muslim jurists acknowledge *jihad* as an important obligation, but they do not privilege it as equivalent to faith. More than that, he

[10] Quran, 2:216.

stresses that it is not even privileged "over mundane obligations", such as the contingency of debtors partaking in *jihad* with the permission of lenders (ibid.: 94). Even when *jihad* is deemed mandatory on all male Muslims, the obligation remains moral and "there is no prescribed earthly punishment in the Sharia for refusal to join jihad" (ibid.: 95).

In the bulk of references, the religious obligation of *jihad* is pushed to the fore. This is observed in a category of references to *jihad* that explicitly name *jihad* as a religious duty. This group of references includes *farīḍah,* which literally means 'religious duty'. Some other references highlighting the religious obligation include: *shaʿīrah* 'ritual' and *faḍīlah* 'virtue'. This category of references is usually accompanied by the word *jihad* to form *idhafa,* 'compound nominals', using *jihad* as the second term, e.g. *farīḍat al-jihād* 'the duty of *jihad*' and *shaʿīrat al-jihād* 'the ritual of *jihad*'. This category incorporates [noun+adjective phrases] that give a further explicit sense of obligation and militarisation. Such phrases include: *al-jihād* al-*wājib* and *al-mutaʿayin*, both meaning 'obligatory *jihad*' and *al-jihād* al-*ʿaskarī* 'military *jihad*'.

(7)
…my crime is that I am doing **this absent *farīḍah* [duty]**, which is *jihad* for the sake of Allah.
Issue 8, May 2004

(8)
We will not ask you to wait for the next issue, but we would like you to be busy with ***al-jihād al-wājib*** [obligatory jihad] as this is the purpose of issuing this magazine.
Epilogue of *Issue 1*, July 2004

Furthermore, *jihad* is referred to by using complex noun phrases, such as *al-daʿawah ila allah* 'a call to Allah' or 'the propagation of faith', *al-jihād fī sabīl allah* '*jihad* in the path of God', *thirwatu sanām al-islām* 'the head of the matter in Islam' etc. These expressions construct the legitimacy of the jihadist mission by alluding to specific prophetic sayings from which these terms are derived. The above references bear the feature of predication, as they all presuppose the mandatory nature of *jihad,* but predication specifies further qualities and assigns them to *jihad.* However, the degree of its religious obligation is articulated in two different ways in these predications: (i) the classical appraisal of *jihad* as a legitimate altruistic act or (ii) an obligatory religious act equivalent to the articulation of faith.

A traditional appraisal of *jihad* and the mujahedeen is common in jihadist literature and can be traced back to the 1980s. The classical themes focus on selected references to sacred texts that sanctify *jihad* and mention the rewards for mujahdeen. Among the common traditional prejudiced traits predicated explicitly to *jihad* in AQAP discourse are:

one of the rituals of Islam
obligatory when the enemy enters a Muslim land
necessary in the struggle against infidels
a duty ordained on the believers
sanctified in the sacred texts.

This religionised category of predicational themes emphasises that *jihad* is a permanent duty. In employing these mobilising themes, AQAP rhetoric is no different to classical jihadist rhetoric. On the other hand, a broad range of predicates work collectively to form a theme emphasising *jihad* as *an embodiment of faith.* This theme ranks *jihad* as equivalent to the articulation of faith. It constructs *jihad* as Holy Islamic law, and more importantly, as ordained worship in its own right that should be performed once its conditions have been met. This theme draws on an array of sacred texts and is closely linked to the important argument of *ħākimiyah* by drawing on the political and moral resources of tradition (see section 7.2.1.1). This is a sample of attributes emphasising the central ideological status of *jihad* in the discourse of *Sawt al-jihad.*

Jihad is the externalisation of *tawħīd* to God
is the head of the matter in Islam
is a worship akin to prayer and fasting
is not deserted but by hypocrites
is a struggle between what is true and what is false
is the sign of the *ummah's* return to Islam
is a creed issue determined by religious texts
is an ordained act of worship, whether won or lost

Tawħīd, 'unification' or 'making one', is key to AQAP discourse in this regard. It is technically the most central belief in the representation of Islam and is reinforced in the first of five rituals of Islam: *shahādah,* 'testimony', or the articulation that "there is no God but Allah. Muhammed is the Messenger of God."[11] This belief in Allah as an omnipotent God who has no partners is based upon the authority of the Quran and *Sunnah*. What is at issue here, though, is the notion that associating partners with Allah – particularly implementing man-made rules – is *shirk* 'polytheism' or 'associating partners with God'. Committing *shirk* – by placing rules other than God's as equal to His – is a violation of the first pillar of Islam and qualifies the perpetrator of this violation to be excommunicated. In this vein, performing *jihad* embodies the head of the matter in Islam and results in the externalisation of God's oneness. Consequently, *jihad* is

[11] *Tawħīd* is ranked first in both '*ibādāt* 'rituals' and '*īmān* 'beliefs' defining Sunni Islam. The former is recognised as five rituals (the testimony of *shahādah,* prayer, paying *zakāh*, fasting during the month of Ramadhan and pilgrimage to Makkah), while the latter is defined in terms of one's belief in God, His attributes, His prophets, His angels, the sacred books, the Last Day and predestination.

For more about *tawħīd*, see *The Encyclopedia of Islam:* a brief account of its genesis can be found under the entry 'relihous belief' pp. 583–584, and for its development as a theological discipline within the Salafi school of thought, see 'Salafiya', pp. 608–610.

constructed as a Holy Islamic law that demarcates the Self from the Other within the community of believers. Predicates pertaining to *tawḥīd* are used in argumentation. We will see in Chapter 6 how they are used functionally used as premises or antecedents for conclusive propositions mobilising the audience to 'go forth' and join *jihad* – against the Americans and their allies.

The construction of *jihad* as an embodiment of faith generates a further theme protraying *jihad* as a *perpetual endeavour*:

> **(9)**
> *Jihad* will **continue until the Day of Judgment**, as the master of mankind and the Imam of the mujahedeen – peace be upon him – told us.
>
> *Issue 4,* October 2003

The construction of *jihad* as a *perpetual* duty indispensible of faith is dispersed across the magazine in several columns discussing *tawḥīd*-related issues, whether in juristic debates or texts adapted from valued sources.

5.2.3. *Religio-politicisation*

However, the construction of *jihad* is by no means consistent. *Jihad* can be a goal in its own right, *and a means to an end,* too. The latter composes a theme for the bulk of predicates. As far as the magazine goes, AQAP's mission has a project of retrieval, namely as an all-encompassing Islamist paradigm. *Jihad* is the driving force in such a paradigm or mode of existence. That is, it is the means for both establishing and maintaining the sought-after Islamic state. In this respect, *jihad* is constructed as a means for ridding Muslims of infidel tyranny by establishing the Caliphate on earth and implementing God's laws. A considerable amount of the discourse on *jihad* is devoted to a pan-Islamist politics centred on the *ummah*: the Islamic community. The *ummah* in *Sawt al-jihad's* narrative is the supreme political structure. But *ummah* is not presented as a social or even a religious reality compatible with the existing political order, as adopted in the mainstream pan-Islamist rhetoric. Rather, it is maintained as a universal politically unified structure. It is the focus of unity, and the symbolic externalisation of the form of Islam perceived and sought to be proclaimed by AQAP. In such references, *ummah* is often collocated with predicates portraying it as a vulnerable and dismantled entity.

(10)

One must look at the **dangers** surrounding the *ummah* and the American **unjust war** on *Muslims* in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan…

Issue 1, September 2003

(11)

in this **painful reality** experienced by the *ummah*, the **forces of global infidelity gathered** against *Muslims*

Issue 3, October 2003

(12)

…at a time when the **wounds** of the *ummah* are increasing, due to the **treachery** of those rulers who were working hard, and continue to do so, to satisfy the infidel West…

Issue 10, January 2004

As far as *ummah* is concerned, references are always collectivised. They highlight either identity by means of references incorporating ideological anthroponyms (e.g. 'Islamic *ummah*', 'Muslim *ummah*', 'Muslims' etc.) or grievances by means of nationalising references featuring parts of the Islamic world where there is a struggle with non-Muslim forces (e.g. 'Afghanistan', 'Iraq', 'Palestine' etc.). In line with Al Qaeda's anti-American global *jihad,* AQAP's list of grievances is different to the list of classical jihadism, as it includes all countries that have American bases, particularly Saudi Arabia. As far as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States are concerned, AQAP's discourse on *jihad* portrays the American presence in these areas as an occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, *jihad* is portrayed as:

(13)

...and it [jihad] is a means repelling the aggression, a means of the call to God, a means to **establish the Caliphate** and **implement God's laws** in God's land

Issue 5, November 2003

5.3. AQAP's social world

The aforementioned themes constitute the predominant legitimatory arguments concerning how *jihad* is constructed in *Sawt al-jihad.* Borrowing from Laclau and Mouffi (1985: 112), *jihad*, per se, can be regarded as *the* "nodal point" in AQAP's discourse. Pragmatically, by means of the practice of articulation in AQAP's field of discursivity and system of intertextuality, *jihad* gets constituted as a privileged sign around which other signs are ordered. Therefore, *jihad* is then the fundamental leitmotif that textualises the world as a tripartite one. This overarching worldview abandons national and social divides and starkly constructs new socio-religious divides: the *Self* as the true believers implementing *jihad* in the path of Allah, the *Other-within* as the misbelievers who abstain from *jihad,* and the *Other-outwith* as the disbelievers. Identities are discursively constituted through these divides, and members of the assumed audience are to choose their camps in the presented discursive structure they are thus expected to identify with.

Based on the data, AQAP discourses can be categorised into four discourses that represent the jihadist worldview. The dominant discourse is the discourse on jihad, which appears to be the overarching *master* discourse that defines the semantics of AQAP discourse. This categorisation allows AQAP's tripartite division of the world into: (i) the Self camp, which comprises the mujahedeen and true believers, (ii) the *Other-within* camp, which comprises misbelievers, or those who are declared non-Muslims and (iii) the *Other-outwith* camp, which comprises the world of disbelievers. In fact, there is hardly a text that is devoid of this tripartite division. It is notable that the *discourse on jihad* – as the master discourse – determines the relationship between the *us*-group on the one hand and the *them*-groups on the other, both within and outwith the world of Islam. The semantic macro-structures of this discourse offer a multitude of ideologically-loaded argumentative strategies legitimising the Self and the jihadist mission and delegitimising the Other, whether it is within or outwith.



Figure 8: An overall categorisation of *Sawt al-jihad* discourses.

It is worth noting here that such a tripartite division is technically a binary one bifurcating the world into the Self and the Other. This bifurcation is defined in religious terms, as we will see below. However, the binary division of the world into *dar al-Islam* 'the sphere of Islam' and *dar al-kufr/ħarb* 'the sphere of disbelief' – which very often shows up in scholarly works on jihadism – is absent in the AQAP narrative. That is not to say that it has nothing to do with the jihadist ideology but it appears that AQAP propagandists are wary of lifting this banner for practical reasons. The use of a *dar al-kufr/ħarb* slogan entails the aporia of collective *takfīr* 'excommunication', an accusation that caused major setbacks to the reputation of the 1970s jihadists in Egypt. The alternative for AQAP is a discursive emphasis on expelling the U.S. forces and fighting apostate rulers.

The overall preliminary analysis above leads us to the core social actors/actions represented in AQAP discourse, to which the remainder of this chapter is dedicated. Therefore, the following section examines the referential and predicational construction of *jihad*, the Self, the Other-within and the Other-outwith, respectively. A full categorisation of the concrete referential and predicational examples of these social actors is provided in Appendix C. These concrete examples cannot be comprehensively reviewed in this chapter; however, the subsequent sections focus primarily on the common discursive strategies employed in the construction of the respective actors.

5.3.1. *The Self*

The micro-politics of jihadist discourse are visibly devoted to creating a jihadist vanguard as a prototypical *us-group*. The presentation of the Self in *Sawt al-jihad* is not fulfilled in isolation of the Other. Rather, it is is linked overwhelmingly to the Other throughout the magazine, be it the Other-within or the Other-outwith. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the thematic characterisation of social actors presented here is only for the sake of maintaining a rigorous analysis. To begin with, the sphere of the Self, in a broad sense, is the *ummah* as the supreme social structure. Yet, the *ummah* is employed as a 'floating signifier', i.e. it can be invested with different content by the different articulations in *Sawt al-jihad*. The considerable use of the word *ummah* (e.g. *ummat Moħammad* 'the community of Muhammed', *ummat al-islām* 'the community of Islam', *al-ummah al-islāmiyah* 'the Islamic *ummah*' etc.) denotes an *a*-historical Islamic community. Such generic and a-historical *ummah* is discursively constructed as passive and powerless and, therefore, in need of a saviour jihadist vanguard.

Although the magazine makes references to supporters of the mujahedeen as part of the in-group, AQAP militaristic jihadists systematically predominate the scene. For obvious security reasons, the former are referred to in terms of generic rather than specific references, and specifying them as identifiable individuals is always avoided. Rather, they are referred to by using definite plurals[12] (e.g. *al-mutaʿāwinūn* 'the collaborators', *muħibbī al-jihād* 'the lovers of *jihad*' and *almuħsinīn* 'the philanthropists'). This group is positively dentoted as '*ʾṣṣādiqīn* 'honest people', whose actions confirm their words and as *brave* and *altruistic* individuals who courageously provide moral and material support to the mujahedeen. However, what the magazine dwells on more is a positive representation of the mujahedeen, who are both genericised and specified. I shall first consider the generic representation.

5.3.1.1 *Genericisation*

The generic construction of the mujahedeen – including AQAP members – can be divided into three overlapping referential strategies: religionisation, association with *jihad,* and assimilation with *ummah.* First, *religionisation* constitutes an emotionally familiar basis for group identity and legitimacy. But in the case of AQAP, religionisation is indispensible of the AQAP revivalist approach that elevates the status of *jihad* and constructs it as being equivalent to faith. Therefore, the most distinguishing feature of the new jihadists is the extensive appeal to the

[12] Genericity and collectivity are expressed in two ways in Standard Arabic: definite singular or definite plural.

Divine authority to legitimise the Self. This is reflected in the systematic reference to the Self in terms of the religious qualities that are predominant across all referential categories. Religionisation, too, functions as a fundamental legitimatory tenet because AQAP's enterprise involves both the infidel and Muslim blood, and sustaining *jihad* that involves Muslim blood requires a religious legitimacy that goes beyond the classical jihadist rhetoric based solely on the right to defend Muslim lands. Therefore, the emphasis on the notion of *tawḥīd* 'God's oneness', as we have seen in the construction of *jihad*, plays a significant politico-religious role in the micro-politics of inclusion and exclusion in AQAP rhetoric.

By using a set of references associating the AQAP mujahedeen to God and His oneness, this strategy not only presents the mujahedeen as doing something divinely ordained but rather as doing *the* divinely ordained. The key reference to *the* Self in this regard is the one that relates to the concept of *tawḥīd*, 'God's oneness', i.e. the singular and plural collectives: *al-muwaḥḥid(ūn)* 'the monotheist(s)' – those who do not associate partners with Allah. The importance of referring to the Self in terms of God's oneness springs from AQAP's ranking of *jihad* as the articulation and practice of Allah's oneness as opposed to the Other, apostates or polytheists, who associate partners with Him.

(14)

...why didn't you [the *ulema*] deter them [apostate rulers], the unjust and criminal chasing and killing of the ***muwaḥḥidīn*** 'monotheists'…

Issue 17, May 2004

The dichotomy between the Self and the Other is emphasised through the juxtaposition of references such as God's worshippers vs *ṭawāghīt's worshippers*, God's soldiers vs *ṭawāghīt's* soldiers etc.[13] Such dichotomies emphasise the jihadists' stark division of Muslims into monotheists and polytheists. It follows then that being a *mujahed* is the ultimate display of being Muslim.

However, the association with God can be implicit. Consider this excerpt:

(15)

It is a great joy to be among these strangers who – God willing – are the ***al-firqah al-nājiyah*** **'the winning group'** and ***al-ṭāʾifah al-mansūrah*** **'the supported sect',** which is not harmed by those who oppose or discourage them until the Day of Judgment**.**

Issue 6, November 2003

[13] The word *ṭawāghīt* is the plural form of *ṭāghūt*.

For instance, references to the mujahedeen as *alfirqah alnājiyah* 'the winning community' or *alṭāʾifah almanṣūrah* 'the supported sect' are pragmatically intriguing for two reasons. First, these references intertextually relate to the repertoire of the old (sacred) knowledge. Several sacred texts are relevant in this respect and the following are just a small selection:

- The prophetic saying: "I swear by the One Whose Hand is the soul of Muhammad, my nation will split into **seventy-three sects**, **one of which will be in Paradise** and seventy-two in Hell";[14] and

- The prophetic saying: "**A group of people from my *ummah*** will continue to obey Allah's Command, and those who desert or oppose them shall not be able to do them any harm. They will be dominating the people until Allah's Command is executed [i.e. Resurrection is established]."[15]

Second, and more importantly, the [passive participle+noun] construction entails the existential presupposition of a set of propositions whose truth is taken for granted. These proposals include:

1. A sect [supported by God] exists among Muslims, and
2. This supported sect is the mujahedeen.

Furthermore, the intertextual allusion to the sacred texts implies the attributions included in the sacred texts above, i.e. that God supports the mujahedeen and that the mujahedeen are the people who:

- practise true Islam,
- continue to obey Allah's commands,
- desert or oppose them that shall not be able to do them any harm, and
- are promised to dominate before the Resurrection.

Closely related to the theme of God's oneness, the reference to the mujahedeen as '*the* strangers' presupposes in the game of truth politics that the mujahedeen represent *the* true Muslims at the end of the world. This is stated in the aforementioned prophetic saying: "Islam initiated as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange, so good tidings for the stranger."

(16)

I saw him sitting alone, immersing himself in silence and bemoaning the conditions of *ummah*. He said; "We **the few and the strangers** are the ones bearing the burden of returning the *ummah* to the religion of Allah."

paying tribute to a jihadist killed in Jeddah, *Issue* 4, October 2003

[14] Sunan Ibn Majah, 3992.

[15] Sahih Muslim, 1037.

In its post facto rationalisation, AQAP discourse displays an intentional way of systematically presupposing religious truths to achieve Self-legitimisation through monopoly of the Divine truth or religious authenticity. A further referential strategy is the construction of the mujahedeen in terms of their positive (religious) attributes. This category defines the Self by expressing religious qualities, e.g. 'the pious', 'the virtuous', 'the patient' and 'the pious youth'. This strategy is closely linked with predications that express the mujahedeen's sincere and legitimate intentions of helping the oppressed and working for the good of religion.

The second category of reference to the Self is made in terms of an association with *jihad* as both a doctrine and a practice. The doctrine renders a strategy of ideologisation, while practice creates militarisation. Moreover, references to the Self in terms of *jihad* appear inseparable from religious references. AQAP's rhetoric makes overwhelming references to this category. These define the Self as collectively: *al-mujāhidīn* 'the mujahedeen', *al-murābiṭīn* 'firm holders [of jihad]', *ahl al-jihād* 'people of *jihad*' etc. At this level, the demarcation between the Self and the Other is not between Muslims and non-Muslims but rather between the mujahedeen and Muslims supporting them on the one hand and the remainder on the other, regardless of whether or not they are Muslim.

Several minor referential strategies overlap the construction of the Self by association with *jihad.* Spatialisation is an important strategy, e.g. 'the mujahedeen of the Arabian Peninsula' and '*ħaramayn* Brigades'. The spatialisation strategy dwells on the sacred in these references and avoids the official names of places and states. By and large, references to the official names of the Gulf States in *Sawt al-jihad* (such as, Saudi, United Arab Emirates etc.) are kept to the minimum and are mostly intertextually related to voices other than those of *Sawt al-jihad* editors. There is also a tendency to overlap with references in terms of age, almost always with youth, e.g. 'the youth of *jihad*' and 'the Mujahed youth'. Through further positive attributes of altruism, such engaging references are closely linked to the relevant persuasive strategy of mythologising the Mujahed and the martyr. Furthermore, militarisation is heavily used in references in terms of *jihad.* For reasons of mobilisation, *Sawt al-jihad* tends to exaggerate the scale of the jihadist movement in Saudi Arabia. This is achieved through the use of plural nouns in references, e.g. '*ħaramian* brigades', 'the mujahedeen brigades', 'the mujahedeen troops', 'the mujahedeen cells' etc. These references are abundant in statements on jihadist operations and confrontations with security forces. These statements make use of military references to the Self and demonstrate a tendency to exaggerate the size and scale of AQAP and its operations.

The third category strategically assimilates to the Muslim audience, *ummah* and magazine readers. Assimilation can be by means of reference in terms of kinship relationyms. Addressing potential in-group Muslims and using second-person possessive pronouns, AQAP mujahedeen are constructed as 'your brothers' and 'your sons'. Such kinship relationyms are also affixed with the first person in references: 'our brothers' and 'our sons', presupposing a shared *we* with the audience. The alternative method of assimilating the mujahedeen and jihadist ideologues is via positive nominations in terms of socio-religious qualities valued by the socio-epistemic community, to which the audience belongs, e.g. using the metaphors 'lions' and 'beacons of dignity', the positive actionyms 'reformers' and 'preachers of', and through collective attributes such as 'the proud' and 'the honourable'. Nevertheless, such references are aimed at a positive presentation of the mujahedeen in the eyes of the *ummah*. The relationship between the mujahedeen and the *ummah* is one between saviour and victim.

Aside from the three aforementioned strategies, pronouns play a significant role in the strategic construction of the Self in relation to the wider members of the Muslim community: *ummah*. The first-person plural pronouns *naħn, -na,* 'we' and 'us', are used ubiquitously to systematically denote the innermost Self circle in the assumed Muslim community: the mujahedeen. *Sawt al-jihad* data reveal a propensity to use such pronouns in a way that could refer to either the speaker alone, the editorial team or to the entire AQAP mujahedeen. But what matters most in all instances of *naħn* 'we' and *-na* 'us' is their ideological workings. Overall, AQAP speakers perceive themselves as part of a 'shared *we*', thereby reflecting the jihadist identity using statements regularly predicated to identify and illustrate this perception. Consider the following excerpts:

(17)

...today, with the bounty of God, **we** and **our brothers** on the battlefronts that **we** have sought to liberate from the profanity of treacherous rulers and before **them** the profanity of the Crusader Americans and **their** allies**. We** ask God for victory and the empowerment of our brothers…

Issue 2, September 2003

(18)

…verily with the bounty of Allah, **our** fight with the enemies of Allah is continuous everywhere, and the mujahedeen blows frighten and intimidate the enemies of Allah worldwide. **Our** *jihad* in the Arabian Peninsula is enduring, to the delight of the *believers* and the outrage of *disbelievers*. **We** will not leave the Americans occupying the Holy Land in peace and security. **We** will not stop **our** *jihad* until **we** liberate every inch of Muslim lands.

Issue 6, November 2003

Such apparently patriotic and truthful perceptions of the Self satisfy the overall goal of the magazine providing a legitimisation narrative for the AQAP and its identity to its readership. However, an inclusive pronoun *we*, relating to magazine readers, is used rhetorically throughout

the magazine. Although stylistic characteristics will be discussed in the next chapter, it is important here that the following excerpt includes the use of *we* as inclusive of the readers. This type of pronoun is part of a phrase at the start of every rhetorical question. The repetition of *we* adds emphasis to a shared identity with the readers and intensifies the meaning at hand.

(19)

…finally, dear brother Mujahed, *until when do **we*** say and do not do? *Until when do **we*** hear the cries for help and **we** just watch? And to what extent of the war on Islam shall we wait before **we** wake from our coma? O you who have believed, why do you say what you do not do? It is most hateful to Allah that you say what you do not do...

Issue 1, September 2003

(20)

*Until when that **we*** just watch? *Until when that **our*** honour and sanctities are violated? *Until when that **we*** watch **our** clerics are caught up in prisons? *Until when that **we*** see **our** leaders are killed? *Until when that **we*** watch the Crusaders, and the Jews are promoted and honoured in **our** land? … *Until when that **we*** accept that the American aeroplanes fly over **our** heads to demolish the houses of our brothers in Iraq and Afghanistan?…

Issue 2, September 2003

Conversely, and to a lesser degree, the data reveal a tendency to use *we* to function as a floating signifier. This could refer to generic identity groups whom the speakers consider to be representative. This strategic use of the deictic expression *naḥn, -na* goes hand in hand with other collectives that can be co-referential to each other – such as 'Muslims', '*ummah*', 'the *ummah* of Muhammed/Islam', 'people of *Sunnah*'[16] and so forth. Consider this excerpt:

(21)

.. and I ask *every Muslim* reading these words [1]:
Where are **we** from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman who is in America's prisons? [2]
Where are **we** from the Mujahed Ramzi Yousef and the Mujahed Abu Hajar who are in America's prisons? [3]
Where are **we** from our prisoners in Guantanamo? [4]
Where are **we** from the captured Muslim scholars in the prisons of *ṭawāghīt* and apostates? [5]
And where **we** are from the rest of the oppressed Muslims who languish behind the walls? [6]
And today **our** dead and **our** prisoners are in hundreds and thousands, and **we** do not move a hair and do not pledge allegiance to God, an honest pledge of allegiance so that **we** have **our** sins forgiven!! [7]
Where are *those who are true to what they promised Allah*? [8]
Where are *the youth of Islam*? [9]
Where are those seeking revenge for their religion, honour, brothers and their *ummah*? [10]
Our religion has been fought, and **our** God and **our** Prophet have been insulted, and **our** lands have been taken and **we** are busy and oblivious!! [11]
And **our** money has been taken and **we** are inattentive! And **our** heroes are killed and we are still? [12]
Till when, O *ummah of Islam*? Till when? Till when? [13]

Issue 13, March 2004

[16] 'People of *Sunnah' – ahl alsunnah* – is one way of collectively referring to the Sunni sect, as opposed to other Islamic sects such as Shiism and Sufism. However, the jihadist discourse can refer to a narrower account, given the correlation between *jihad* as a crucial component of *Sunnah* in the jihadist worldview.

Initially, this emotional appeal addresses all Muslims and makes use of nouns, pronouns and the individual names of specific participants. The speaker here uses the realisations of 'we' – the subject pronoun *naħn* and its object pronominal affix *-na* – to refer to different groups representing the Self. Therefore, it is crucial to work out which identity group is implied in each context. In this excerpt, the speaker uses *'we'* to refer to a number of different groups. First, *every Muslim* is referred to in the pronoun included in the anaphora '*where are we from*', which is repeated in [2–6]. The rhythmic repetition of this rhetorical scheme is accompanied by the explicit identification of certain jihadist individual by their names (see the underlined names). This style of delivery foregrounds the names revealed (e.g. *Omar Abdel Raħman* and *Ramzi Yousif*) and their ideological anthroponyms (e.g. *Sheikh* and *Mujahed*) and associates them with the collective identity of 'all Muslims'. This anaphora leads to an anticipation involving the audience emotionally by referring to the tragic situation of the Self as 'our dead' and 'our prisoners'. The solution to this situation is *jihad,* as implicitly presupposed in seeking the audience to pledge allegiance to Allah. The speaker here uses 'our' to refer to the mujahedeen. However, the vague use of '*our*' is politically valuable as it conflates the identity of 'the mujahedeen' with that of 'all Muslims'. Similarly, another anaphoric scheme repeating the phrase *'where are'* in [8–10] involves the audience cognitively by referring to their repertoire of old knowledge when it constructs a prototypical *we* 'the youth of Islam' in terms of positive attributions mentioned in a Quranic verse, i.e. *those who are true to what they promised Allah*.[17] The use of the possessive pronoun 'our' in the repeated patterns '*our* religion', '*our* God', '*our* Prophet', '*our* lands' and '*our* money' constructs a group of individuals perceived as sharing all these things, i.e. the pronoun here refers to *ummah.* On the other hand, the pronoun in 'our heroes' refers to the mujahedeen and again conflates the identity of Islam with that of *jihad.*

5.3.1.2 *Specification*

Unlike the Other-presentation, the presentation of the Self draws extensively on the individualisation of jihadist actors. The foregrounding of identifiable jihadist individuals plays a remarkable role in the positive presentation of the jihadist Self. Indeed, a considerable amount of the magazine's content is devoted to the charismatic projection of the mujahedeen, who can be regarded as the incarnation of the archetypical Self.[18] The analysis of naming specific

[17] This reference relates intertextually to the verse "Among the believers are men true to what they promised Allah. Among them is he who has fulfilled his vow [to the death], and among them is he who awaits [his chance]. And they did not alter [the terms of their commitment] by any alteration" (Quran, 33: 23).

[18] All magazine issues include at least one column dedicated to a mujahed or martyr. For instance, there are *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* (five episodes), *The Biography of a Martyr* (eight episodes), *An Interview with one*

individuals from the in-group involves identifying the system of values underlying the choice of names given to them. The nomination is typically realised by their names and/or their teknonymics.[19] Teknonymics can function as nomination realisations or as informal honorifics preceding given names (there is more on the ideological role of teknonymics in 6.3.2). Other pre-nomination forms of honorification include titles with possessive constructions such as 'our sheikh', 'our leader' and 'our brother', which are commonly used for the honorification of fellow mujahedeen. Specific prayers (e.g. 'may Allah save him', '-protect him') are often used as post-nomination honorification. Other nominations predominantly associate them with *jihad* and entail some form of differentiation between them and others, and this reinforces the jihadist ideology. Look at the use of '*imam* of the mujahedeen' in these two examples:

(22)

The speech of our Sheikh, **Imam of the mujahedeen,** *Osama bin Laden***,** may God support him, was delivered on this stage….

Issue 8, December 2003

(23)

Jihad is permanent until the Day of Judgment according to the words of the **Imam of the mujahedeen** [*Prophet Mohammed*], peace be upon him…

Issue 4, November 2003

A noteworthy point has to be mentioned about the word *imam*. Political thought, within the paradigm of Sunni Islam, identifies *imāmah* as the supreme sovereign authority in the Islamic community. The individual who holds this office is called an *imām.* The political term *imām* – head of the Islamic community – is derived by extension from the religious domain, as it literally denotes "the man who leads prayer". Therefore, *imām* can be translated as 'leader', 'head' or 'chief', but with a politico-religious diacritic. This view conforms to AQAP's revivalist political approach, which seeks to revive the pre-modern political paradigm, in other words, Islamic rule under a sovereign head and incorporating all Muslim lands. Apart from reinforcing the elevation of the status of *jihad*, '*imam* of the mujahedeen' constructs *jihad* as the baseline for moral and political *homogeneity* among the *us*-group. The homogenous Self in AQAP is linked well with the historical Self. This is witnessed in the prophetic reference to *Osama bin Laden* as '*imam* of the mujahedeen', a reference used to denote the Prophet Mohammed, as the second example above reveals.

of the Wanted (two episodes), *An Interview with a Mujahed* (nine episodes), apart from varying statements that give detailed accounts of the various attacks and confrontations with security forces.

[19] It is a common reverential naming in the Arab world, but it is more common for jihadists especially for their pseudonyms. It is almost a norm that the choices of these teknonymics refer to some respectable historical figures.

Predication plays a significant role in Self-presentation. The full range of referential forms explored above bears the feature of predication based on whether there are explicit denotations, indirect connotations or presupposed propositions. Through linguistic predications, the Self – be it generic or specified – is assigned further evaluative positive qualities. The attributions ascribed to the mujahedeen serve to fulfil Self-legitimatory topoi, which will be explicated in detail in Chapter 7, particularly the *enthymeme of epitome*. By and large, the predicational content can be divided in the following discursive themes that present the Self as:

- rightful and committed to a Divine mission;
- altruistic and having noble pan-Islamist goals;
- brave and successful;
- organised and having goals;
- as victims;
- resistant and uncompromising;
- the true sect;
- seeking martyrdom and winning in the next world;
- caring for fellow Muslims.

5.3.2. *The* Other-*within*

This part of AQAP's social world subsumes a host of social actors explicitly or implicitly excluded from the community of believers. The juristic and theological polemics in *Sawt al-jihad* propagates a set of acts that disqualify their commissioners from being Muslim, and they are then declared non-Muslim or apostate. In contrast to the Self, *Sawt al-jihad* offers clear answers to all the perceived grievances of *ummah* by perpetually constructing an internal enemy in the Islamic community, namely, 'the Other-within'. The Other-within is constantly associated with the external infidel enemy invading Muslim lands. The construction of the Other-within is first and foremost fulfilled through generic references, e.g. '*ṭawāghīt*' as opposed to 'God', 'polytheists' as opposed to 'monotheists', 'people of false' as opposed to 'people of right' etc. Among other references, these are frequently used as empty signifiers that define the Other-within primarily in religious terms. *Sawt al-jihad* focuses on the immediate geographical context of Arabia – principally Saudi Arabia – but it by no means does so in isolation of the broader framework of the Islamic *ummah*. Throughout the magazines, references are made to other countries, but for reasons of space, I will focus on the AQAP's view of the Other-within in the Saudi context.

Whether in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, this camp of social actors in AQAP's worldview is quite complicated. As far as the magazine goes, there exist three types of foregrounded social actors:

the ruling elites, security forces and men of religion – both *ulema* and preachers. The first type is the political rival, the second is its hand in the struggle, while the third is the source of legitimacy. All these social actors are Muslim, and since AQAP's motive is religious and its referential domain is *Sharia* law, their *jihad* must abide by the rules of *Sharia*. According to *Sharia*, it is not lawful to make war with Muslims unless they abandon Islam and, when they do, they become *murtaddīn* 'apostates'.[20] However, neither rulers, nor security personnel, nor men of religion abandoned Islam and chose another faith for *jihad* against them to be legitimate. Herein lies the importance of *takfir* 'excommunication', whereby jihadist ideologues and theologians preserve the right to issue a *fatwa,* a 'religious ruling' denouncing someone as *kāfir* 'disbeliever', *murtadd,* 'apostate', or other labels implying that s/he is no longer Muslim.

Thus, charges of apostasy are of paramount importance in the jihadist global doctrinal and political approach. Discursively, a noticeable difference exists in AQAP language in the degree of excommunication between the political elite and the other two groups. *Sawt al-jihad* levels charges of apostasy against the Saudi regime/government, and to a lesser extent against the security personnel and even less against *ulema*. Therefore, I shall follow this order.

5.3.2.1 *The regime*

It is worth mentioning that *Sawt al-jihad* actually started by stating a conservative declared aim – expulsion of the American troops occupying Arabia – and avoided explicit *takfir* of the Saudi regime. There exist references to *murtaddīn* 'apostates', but they are used as generic references which only implicitly denote the Saudi regime. The apparent reason for this is to rid AQAP of the notorious label of *takfir*.[21] It was only from the third issue onwards that *Sawt al-jihad* explicitly denounces the Saudi government as *kāfir,* in the same statement in which AQAP pledges its allegiance to the Al Qaeda leadership. As far as the data show, a broad range of references are employed to represent the Saudi political regime: the more generic *ḥukūmah* 'government', *niṭḥām* 'regime' and *dawlah* 'state', and the more specified *ʾāl sʿūd* 'the house

[20] From *riddah,* 'apostasy', which has lots of definitions in the Islamic tradition but in its broadest sense it means the case when someone had been or had become a Muslim and then abandoned Islam to unbelief (Khadduri 2006: 147–153; Lewis 1988: 84–87; for an overview of classical and modern prescriptions pertaining to apostasy, see Peters and De Vries, 1976). The notion of apostasy is notoriously used to legitimise the killing of Muslim individuals or groups.

[21] The 1980s in Egypt witnessed the failed *jama'at altakfir wa alhijra* 'the community of *takfir* and *hijra*' that practised denouncing the whole of society as *kāfir* and called for the believers to migrate to the house of Islam. Relevant in this respect too is the extremist notion of *jāhiliyah* 'the age of ignorance' that I pointed to earlier in 2.2.1. Notions of *takfir* have ever since become notorious and used as a counter-argument against jihadist groups. As a result, jihadist groups have found themselves between a rock and a hard place, i.e. they have to be cautious as regards the dilemma of practising *takfir* that is too integral to any jihadist mission involving the killing of Muslim individuals or groups.

of Saud' (henceforth, Al Saud), or any combination made of these references. The use of the words *ḥukūmah* and *dawlah* in the jihadist context needs some clarification. The modern usage of the word *ḥukūmah* 'government' refers to the group of people involved in the exercise of authority, and *dawlah* means 'state'. However, the Arabic words *ḥukūmah* and *dawlah* are ancient and have a range of meanings other than those in common parlance. In the context of *Sawt al-jihad*, *hukūmah* and *dawlah* are used in the sense of 'rule' or 'regime'.[22] Thus, the expressions *ʾalḥukūmah ʾalsuʿūdiyah,* and *ʾaldawlah ʾalsuʿūdiyah,* that are literally translated into English as 'the Saudi government' and 'the Saudi state', are both understood to mean the 'regime' and the ruling members of the royal family. This distinction is particularly important in order to understand to which specific social actors the respective attributions, particularly the ones involving *takfir*, are assigned, as demonstrated below.

The data reveal a range of strategies for constructing the Saudi regime. First is the category of neutral expressions that include references in terms of the proper name *Al Saud*, or references with regard to political actionalisation *hukkām* 'rulers', or the aforementioned words denoting the regime: *niṭḥām*, *dawlah* and *hukūmah.* The other category comprises a range of references that involve *takfir.* This includes references using noun phrases that include the above nouns to which attributive adjectives such as *kāfir*, *apostate* and *ṭāghūt(i)* are assigned.

(24)

Also therein is the **apostate puppet government** that implements the plans of colonisation, allies to disbelievers, and governs according to laws other than the Almighty God's laws.

Issue 1, September 2003

(25)

...the authorities of the **apostate *ṭāghūti* regime** have arrested some of the youth returning from the land of Afghanistan...

Issue 7, December 2003

Such generic assigning of *kufr* and *apostasy* to the government and the regime is vague, in the sense that it does not state the specific individuals to whom the characteristics of *kufr* are attributed. In other words, it is not obvious whether this explicit *takfir* applies to all people involved in the exercise of authority or just the ruling members of the royal family.[23] However, the key and the most frequent *takfiri* element is the word *ṭāghūt* and its derivatives. The term

[22] This meaning is still common in contemporary Arabic in the sense that *ħukm al Saud* means the 'rule of the House of Saud'. The polysemic manipulation of words and phrases derived from the root *ħ-k-m* plays a significant argumentative role, as explained later in section 7.4.2.

[23] The demarcation of the authorities in Saudi Arabia is indeed complicated. It is a monarchy in which the king, besides his monarchical role, is the head of the government. Even those in line to the throne hold governmental posts. Other members of the royal family hold positions in the government and other bureaucratic organisations.

ṭāghūt is discursively instrumentalised in delegitimising the Other-within: the rulers, soldiers and *ulema*. It is heavily-loaded ideologically and it is often translated in the literature as 'tyrant' or 'false god'. Although it is discursively manipulated to mean the latter, I will retain the transliterated form as it is heavily instrumentalised with different derivations in the data: the plural form *ṭawāghīt*, the M/F adjective forms *ṭāghūti/yah* etc. In Islamic traditional literature, this term most commonly has the connotation of insolence towards and disrespect for God (Lewis 1991). It is used in the Quran of Pharaoh, who defied the word of God and claimed divinity. From there, the usage of this term has been applied to non-Muslim rulers and, historically and until very recently, to rulers whose legitimacy is not accepted. The usage of this term in the data is frequent and, in some cases, juxtaposed with Allah.

(26)

...the battle of al-suwaydī![24] Yes, it is a battle and let those be disgraced who do not understand, a fight wherein the two armies met: one fights for the sake of **God**, and the other for the sake of ***ṭāghūt***...

Issue 3, October 2003

Such juxtaposition depicts the rulers as false gods defying Allah. It also portrays the conflict as a struggle between God and his believers on the one hand, and the *ṭawāghīt* and their people on the other. The *ṭawāghīt,* then, assume God's right of sovereignty and divinity and extort the Muslims' right to direct their worship – the rule in accordance with God's laws in this case – to God alone (al-Sayyid and Balqriz 2013). In this sense, this term is a discursive tool integral to the *argument of ħākimiyah* (section 7.2.1.1) in which *ṭawāghīt* are constructed as false gods imposing their manmade laws instead of God's laws. This extreme use of *ṭāghūt* as a central referential tool in AQAP discourse on the Saudi regime indicates that the notion of *ħākimiyah* plays a pivotal role in the ideology of AQAP. The most intriguing aspect of this term is its framing of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled as that of a God-worshipper relationship that plays the double role of explicit *takfir* of the rulers and the ambivalent *takfir* of the *ulema* and the security forces.

The third category regarding the Saudi regime/rulers is a group of references that discursively dissimilates them through explicitly or implicitly associating them with the external enemy. This category includes: 'the traitors', 'the agents', 'the protectors of the Crusade', 'America's Sheikhs', 'slaves of the Crusaders' and so forth. The data are replete with referential items and predicational themes that associate the Other-within with the Other-outwith, using a master-

[24] Al-Suwaydī is a district in Riyadh, and this excerpt is from a statement released about a five-hour shoot-out on 12 August 2003 that led to the death of one AQAP member and the arrest of five others.

slave metaphor, e.g. 'their slaves', 'the Crusade's slaves', 'the Jews' slaves' and 'the slaves of America'. However, this category is by no means devoid of *takfir* as it is frequently explicated in *Sawt al-jihad* that helping the infidels and allying to them nullifies the faith of the committers of such crimes. It relates to a repertoire of juristic notions stressing that those allying to, or colliding with, an infidel enemy commit nullifiers of faith, *nawwāqiḍ al-islām.* A related set of references, in this respect, is two wordplays on the proper name Al Saud: *'āl yahūd* and *'āl salūl*,[25] which literally mean 'the House of Jews' and 'the House of *salūl*', respectively. The former explicitly constructs Al Saud as Jewish, and the latter alludes to this by evoking *bin salūl*, a controversial figure of Jewish origin from the time of early Islam.

(27)

...may Allah disgrace the impure [rulers] of Arabia and humiliate ***'āl yahūd***…

Issue 3, October 2003

(28)

The *ṭawāghīt* of ***'āl salūl*** resorted to their fellow apostates' methods in Algeria and Egypt by trying to tarnish the image of the mujahedeen…

Issue 6, November 2003

Adjectives derived from *salūl* are frequently used as attributive adjectives when referring to other related social actors, such as *al-hukūmah al-salūliyah* 'the salūli government', *al-iʿalām al-salūl* 'the salūli media', *al-quwāt al-salūliyah* 'the salūli forces', among others.

Apart from referentiality, the predicates assigned to the rulers correlate with a list of negative attributions. By and large, these predicates fall under one of three categories: not implementing God's laws, complicity with America or waging war against the mujahedeen. The following is a sample of the predicates ascribed to the Saudi regime:

[25] Abdullah bin *salūl* is a renowned Muslim convert of Jewish origin in the time of early Islam.

- as abandoning religion

renegades on the enjoinments of God
having averted religion
the government of disbelief, injustice, and tyranny
fighting them is first to fight infidels

- as colluding with the external enemy

allying to infidels
governing according to laws other than Almighty God's
shutting up the reformers and preachers for good
imprisoning whomever calls them to govern according to God's laws
America's key ally in the war on terror
implementing the plans of the *ummah's* enemies
aiding the war on Iraq
providing the Americans with intelligence information about mujahedeen

- waging war on jihad

chasing, imprisoning, torturing and killing mujahedeen
desperate to block the financial sources of the mujahedeen
trying to distort the image of the mujahedeen in the eyes of donors
jailing the champions and hailing the hypocrites of *ummah*
waging a crusade war on *jihad* and Islam
providing America with free oil supplies

The three themes above concern the excommunication of the Saudi state and are elaborated and discussed in many theological debates included in the magazine as nullifiers of faith. Several texts are quoted from jihadist treatises that declare the infidelity of the Saudi state.[26] Indeed, such generic *takfīrī* sentiments towards a state are incomprehensible as a state – in the modern sense – does not have faith. However, to approach an understanding of AQAP politics, two things must be understood. Frist, *al-dawlh* 'the state' and *al-ħukūmah* 'the government' – that are declared as *kafir* – are best understood as referring to the dynasty: the House of Saud. Second, the jihadist endeavour is for an Islamic state that undertakes the promotion of faith and maintains the application of *Sharia* law. Furthermore, in addressing a Muslim audience whose perception of political legitimacy is wholly based on religion, it functions as a crucial delegitimisation strategy to construct the Saudi regime not as lacking the necessary religious legitimacy but rather as having forfeited such legitimacy by no longer being Islamic.

[26] One of the classical treatises that have denounced the Saudi State is the work of the Jordanian jihadist ideologue Muhammed Al-Maqdisi, it is entitled *al-kawāshif al-jaliyah fī kufr al-dawlah al-suʿūdiyah,* "The obvious Proofs of the Saudi State's infidelity", and was published in 1989; it has been circulated ever since in jihadist circles and on websites.

Overall, the definition of identity and the focus of loyalty in the AQAP narrative are solely based on an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is assumed to govern all aspects of life, including the political. In line with the broader jihadist movement, the delegitimisation of the Saudi political elite is based on *ħākimiyah*. The argument of *ħākimiyah* implies that had the Saudi state implemented God's laws, it would be Islamic, and therefore legitimate. However, a perceived Caliphate shows up less in AQAP discourse, but this apocalyptic polity – though less discursively employed – is a fundamental notion in the jihadist doctrine that views the modern 'nation-state' political form as an illegitimate colonial legacy. The following excerpt is an illustrative one for a jihadist doctrine that constructs *waṭaniyah* 'nationalism' as *wathaniyah* – note the wordplay – 'idolatry':

(29)

...those [the mujahedeen] who disbelieve in all the *tawāghīt* [false gods] on earth, of the Arab and non-Arab governments, those who disbelieve in the UN, Arab and regional tyrannical organisations ... those who disown the polytheistic doctrines, the paths of democracy, and the ***wathaniyah* 'idolatry' of *waṭaniyah* 'national'**.

Issue 8, December 2003

5.3.2.2 *The soldiers*

The second category of social actors in the Other-within is the security forces, notably the Interior Ministry personnel, because they are involved in counter-terrorism operations.[27] The security forces are heavily foregrounded in *Sawt al-jihad* due to the significant content of statements covering AQAP confrontations with them. The range of professionyms include words such as 'soldiers', 'officers' and 'forces' that are often correlated with organisational anthroponyms, such as 'the Interior Ministry forces', *al-tawārī* 'the emergency forces', *al-mabāħith* 'the intelligence services'[28] and so forth. These references are the least common category, while references that present the security forces negatively are used in abundance.

Overall, the security forces are discursively constructed as 'belonging to' or 'possessed'. This is linguistically fulfilled via possessive constructions. There are different ways of expressing possession in Arabic. For a possessive relationship between two nouns, construct noun phrases are used. There is no overt possessive marker as in English ('s) in Arabic, instead order expresses possession. The first term is interpreted as belonging to the second. However, possessivisation overlaps with other discursive strategies. While the first term of a construct is almost always militarised, the second is constructed using ideological anthroponyms associated

[27] As part of its hard policing, the Saudi government has developed a special security apparatus and established a trained security unit, *quwāt al-ṭawāri' al-khāṣṣah,* 'the special emergency force'.

[28] The equivalent of the British MI5.

with the regime, e.g. 'apostates', '*ṭawāghīt*', 'Crusaders', 'America' etc. Thus, in the construction *junūd al-ṭawāghīt,* the first term *junūd* belongs to the second *al-ṭawāghīt,* and the whole construct is translated in English as 'the *ṭawāghīt's* soldiers'. Most of the references (as illustrated in Table 11 in Appendix C) construct the forces as 'soldiers', 'forces', 'army' or 'slaves' occupying the position of *the possessed* in a possessive structure, whereby *the possessor* is either 'the regime', 'Al Saud', 'the *ṭawāghīt*' or 'America'. The Otherness of the soldiers is further reinforced by means of deictics (*hum* 'they', *-u* 'they.NOM' and *-hum* 'they.ACC') that associate them with the apostate rulers or infidel enemy.

Another theme closely related to possessivisation is the construction of the security forces as slaves and mercenaries. As we have seen above, the regime is constructed as a slave to the American master. In the same way, soldiers are portrayed as the slaves of slaves. Therefore, they are referred to as *ʿabīd ʾāl salūd,* 'Al saluul's soldiers', and *ʿabīd al-ṭaghūt* '*ṭaghūt*'s slaves'. This example illustrates this point:

> **(30)**
> **The slaves of the Crusaders' slaves**, the devil's soldiers, Satan's forces, the *taghūts'* servants chased you; they didn't like the Crusaders being harmed … **The slaves of the slaves** chased you with the actual support from the Crusaders, who participated with their slaves in their work ... O Abu Hajar, may Allah have mercy on you and those who were with you were not but men true to what they promised Allah...
>
> *Issue 20*, June 2004

It follows then that the security forces are discursively dissimilated by associating them with the infidel enemy: 'the slaves of the Crusaders' slaves'. Slavery is used metaphorically to construct soldiers as mercenaries. The slavery metaphor and frequent references to it occur as nomination and predication. They are referred to as *ʿabīd al-dirham,* 'the slaves of *dirham* [money]', as opposed to mujahedeen, 'God's slaves'. An intriguing discursive technique is the juxtaposition of soldiers and mujahedeen that is overwhelmingly instrumentalised. The following table summarises the positive/negative dichotomy between soldiers and mujahedeen based on referential and predicational realisations:

Security forces	Mujahedeen
Nomination:	
- *ṭāghūt's* Satan's/devil's soldiers	- Allah's soldiers/soldiers of the gracious
- people of the false	- people of the right
- *ṭāghūt's*/America's/money slaves	- God's slaves
- criminals/mercenaries	- mujahedeen
Predication:	
- fighting in the cause of ṭāghūt/Crusade	- fighting in the cause of ṭāghūt
- fighting for the sake of a salary	- not fighting for worldly purposes
- fighting to extinguish the light of Allah/to please America	- fighting for Allah's word to become Superior

Table 5: Juxtaposition of mujahedeen and security forces

Such juxtaposition of soldiers as fighters for worldly purposes and mujahedeen as those fighting for sublime religious purposes fulfils a dual mission: a negative presentation of soldiers to the audience, and the demoralisation of the soldiers themselves. In broad terms, possessivisation and the slave/mercenary construction mitigate against the *takfir,* 'excommunication', of the possessed/slaves/mercenaries: the soldiers. The soldiers are not constructed as *apostates* but rather as the possessions of apostates, i.e. 'the apostates' soldiers' rather than 'the apostate soldiers'. That is, they are not labelled as *kāfir,* but the attributes of *kufr* are ascribed to them. Understandably, AQAP avoids the explicit *takfir* of social actors other than rulers who implement manmade laws. This can be understood as an attempt by AQAP to rid itself of the collective *takfir* label, as it is strictly prohibited in the Salafi school of thought – to which AQAP belongs.

The metaphor of slavery bears implicit aspects of *takfir*, particularly when combined with reference to the rulers as *ṭawāghīt*. The above God-*ṭawāghīt* juxtaposition involves on the one hand the rulers' assumption of God's right of sovereignty, as explained above, and on the other hand, it frames a ruler-ruled relationship that defies the individual Muslim relationship with God. That is, it refers to soldiers as *ʿabīd ʾāl suʿūd/al-ṭaghūt*, 'Al Saud's/*ṭaghūt*'s slaves', fighting in the cause of the *ṭaghūt*, as opposed to mujahedeen, who are referred to as God's worshippers/slaves fighting for His cause. The *takfir* of the security forces does not appear to be put forward in explicit terms but is, rather, left to the hearer to decode it from a relationship metaphorically constructed as one between a slave and a false god. The task of decoding operates on two aspects: (a) the juxtaposition of mujahedeen and soldiers in *Sawt l-jihad*, and (b) the restrictions placed on the use of the linguistic item *ʿabīd* in Arabic. In Arabic, *ʿabd* 'slave' is generally used as a metaphor of man's relation to God. Furthermore, the verb *ʿabada',*

which translates into English as 'worship', is derived from the same trilateral root (ʿa-b-d). The metaphor of slavery is seldom, if ever, used for the relation of the ruled to the ruler.

The ambivalent *takfir* of the security forces falls short of legitimising AQAP militants killing soldiers, as their blood cannot be forfeited unless they are denounced in explicit terms as *kafir*. A way to escape this dilemma is via a juristic rule known as *dafʿ al-ṣāʾil,* 'repelling the attacker'.[29] The word *al-ṣāʾil,* which roughly translates as 'the attacker', is a designated term referring to an attacker whether it be Muslim or non-Muslim. *Sawt al-jihad* statements on the confrontations between AQAP militants and the security forces refer to soldiers as *al-ʿaduw al-ṣāʾil.*

(31)
...but we will not be up for grabs for the *ṭawāghīt* and their soldiers. We will defend ourselves, we will not hesitate to repel ***al-ṣāʾil* 'the attacker' soldiers**, and we shall show them what they hate. Allah is predominant over His affair, but most of the people do not know…

Issue 3, October 2003

Furthermore, several predications present soldiers as cowardly, turning their backs on battles with mujahedeen. A wide range of such hyperbolic statements on this theme is frequently used in *Sawt al-jihad's* accounts of confrontations between AQAP militants and security forces.

(32)
…we took our positions to start shooting at them but soon afterwards they **escaped and fled** without firing a single bullet…

Issue 4, October 2003

(33)
…then the bullets hailed from **cowardly** snipers **fighting from behind walls**…

Issue 15, April 2004

[29] In November 2003, *Sawt al-jihad* published two long articles, entitled "The Jurisprudence of *Jihad:* Repelling the *Ṣāʾil*: Confronting the Regime's Soldiers". AQAP ideologue Abdullah al-Rashid wrote both articles.

5.3.2.3 *The ulema*

The *ulema* are frequently represented in *Sawt al-jihad.* The mainstream *ulema* played a significant role in the official counter-terrorism campaign. Aside from hard policing, the Saudi handling relied on an efficient soft approach[30] that included a media campaign in which the official religious sector and the mainstream *ulema* participated in denouncing AQAP members and their activities in Saudi Arabia. An important component was the broadcasting of televised interviews with three key AQAP militants[31] who appeared on TV in November 2003 repenting their extremist views and explaining in religious terms how they had been mistaken in their support of AQAP members taking up arms. As a result, a considerable amount of the content of the discourse on *jihad* is counter-arguments for the campaign against AQAP. However, the range of referential types used to construct them is less diverse than for rulers and soldiers. The referential and predicational strategies used delegitimise the *ulema* in various ways. A negative presentation of the *ulema* is generalised on the whole, with almost no indivisualised references.

The common denominator in referential and predicational strategies constructing the *ulema* is the attempt to rid them of any religious credibility in the minds of the population, and the Islamist community in particular. An essential reference involves associating the *ulema* with the rulers, e.g. *ʿulamāʾ al-ṣalāṭīn,* 'the sultans', *ulema', al-mashāʾikh al-rasmiyīn,* 'official Sheikhs', and *ʿulamāʾ al-ṭaghūt 'ṭāghūt's ulema'*. Staying away from the rulers for reasons of piety and maintaining integrity and independence are virtues revered in the Salafist literature, even for those who are not revolutionary and anti-political authority. The very reference 'the sultan's *ulema'* implies negative connotations of treason. *Ṭāghūt's ulema* is more derogatory. Such references are accompanied by predicated negative attributes that reinforce the *ulema* being seduced by worldly pleasures and neglecting to make clear to people the obligation to embrace *jihad* against the Crusaders and their apostate agents.

Another category of delegitimatory references makes use of attributive adjectives, e.g. *al-mukhathelūn* 'the discouragers', *al-murjifūn* 'who spread rumours', *al-munāfiqūn* 'the hypocrites', *al-mustaslimūn* 'surrenders' etc. Interestingly, the falsehood of the *ulema* is expressed via the active participles of verbs in a specific morphological pattern that denotes pretention. Instances of this category include references such as *al-mutafayhiq* and *al-*

[30] The soft approach includes tightening the financial system and opening communication channels for potential deserters amongst AQAP militants.

[31] These were the clerical ideologues *ʿali al-Khudair, Nasser al-Fahd* and *Ahmed al-Khāldi* who were arrested on 28 May 2003.

muta'aslimūn, which roughly translate into English as 'pseudo-jurists' and 'pseudo-Islamists', respectively.

(34)
...indulging in the mud of *ṭawāghīt* and their tale mercenaries and **pseudo-jurists**…
Issue 15, April 2004

Pronouns are used to associate the *ulema* with the rulers in references such as *shuyūkhuhum*, 'their Sheikhs'. The following is a sample of the predicates ascribed to the *ulema* corresponding to the referential strategies above:

- being negligent and accepting humiliation
who find nothing wrong in their land being occupied by American female soldiers
who don't think of liberating the land of the Crusader invaders
at the forefront of the negligent in the rights of our *ummah*
instilling in them [the people OR their followers] humiliation and debasement
irrigating them [their followers] with the water of servility
deterring Muslims from jihad
- serving the ruler
enslaved by *ṭawāghīt* and their fate is linked with his
providing gains for the Crusade
serving the Crusade
hypocrites
brainwashing the people
hired by the sultans
handkerchiefs in the hands of the sultans
- being false
pretend *ulema*
pretend religious
seduced by worldly positions
the so-called *ulema*

In addition to the *ulema*, reference is made to the *duʿāt al-ṣaḥwah,* 'preachers of Sahwa'.[32] These preachers are known Islamist figures who appeared in the 1980/90s as a generation of enthusiastic preachers, some of whom were pro-*jihad.* By and large, they share delegitimatory discursive themes similar to those ascribed to *ulema*, but references to them are largely accompanied by a set of attributes highlighting their argument's inconsistencies, e.g. 'you were pro-*jihad* during the Afghan War and are against *jihad* now'.

[32] The Sawha literally means the phenomenon of "Awakening [Islam]" (for a detailed account of this phenomenon, see Lacroix 2011).

5.3.3. *The Other-outwith*

The Other-outwith comprises a group of non-Muslim countries hostile to the Islamic world, which Al Qaeda's literature refers to as the infidel Crusader-Jewish alliance. The data clearly display two levels of discursively constructing the Other-outhwith. First, there is a set of references which are more or less floating signifiers that refer to a supposedly infidel Other. On this level, the differentiation is ideological and represents the Other by means of *religionyms* (e.g. 'Christians' and 'Jews'), *negative ideologonyms* (e.g. 'Crusaders', 'infidels' and 'polytheists') *references based on local orientation* (e.g. 'the West' and 'the Americans') and *a pre-modern ethnic reference* (*al-rūm* 'the Romans'). *Sawt al-jihad,* as early as the first issue, set forth its extremist ideological stance legitimising the indiscriminate killing of infidels. The following excerpt is taken from an article entitled 'Creed first', which was published in the first issue immediately following the op-ed.

(35)

…Verily **they** are **polytheists**, **whose blood is that of a dog**.
God Almighty has said (Indeed, the worst of living creatures in the sight of Allah are those who have disbelieved, and they will not [ever] believe) and (Those are like livestock; rather, they are more astray) … verily **the blood of the infidel is forfeited** … and verily the *muwaḥūid* [the monotheist] whose chest is filled with Godly-ordained enmity to **infidels**, who disbelieved in *ṭāghūt* and in whoever believes in *ṭāghūt,* whose alliance and enmity are in the cause of Allah, this *muwaḥūid* should verily long for the **infidel's blood**, and to **cut him into pieces**…
My brother Mujahed **...** Do you not want Paradise?! Do you not want to be safe from hellfire?! … **Kill the polytheist** … **Kill those who have dog's blood**. **Kill those by whom you are enjoined by God to kill**…

Issue 1, September 2003

In this and similar references made throughout the magazine, a plethora of negative attributes are ascribed to the ideological Other-outwith to legitimise the indiscriminate killing of Western expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Several incidents occurred from 2003 to 2005, resulting in the wounding and killing of several Westerners in isolated events other than mass bombings.[33] Several topics in the discourse on disbelievers make the case that infidel blood is forfeit simply for being *kafir* or non-Muslim. This view justifies the indiscriminate killing of non-Muslims, combatants and non-combatants alike. The dehumanising 'dogs', 'livestock' in the excerpt above reinforce such propositions.

Second, there are references denoting specific Western countries. Although the common Otherness in this camp is based on being non-Muslim or infidel, the struggle is simply focused

[33] In these isolated incidents, nine Westerners were killed and five injured from 2003 to 2005.

on a universe of Crusade worshippers, *abadat al saleeb*. The pole of this universe, on which the magazine is fixated, is the USA. This is witnessed in the context of the standoff between America and Al Qaeda since the latter's inception and more particularly in the context of the post-9/11 "War on Terror". The case made against the USA throughout the magazine is very detailed and propagates the history of what AQAP regards as hostilities and conspiracies against the Islamic world. However, the list of old grievances does not justify AQAP's jihadist campaign inside Saudi Arabia. Therefore, *Sawt al-jihad* adopts a hyperbolic narrative depicting the USA as occupying Saudi Arabia. This theme is constructed and reproduced throughout the magazine, consider this example that refers to the USA as 'the occupying Crusader enemy':

> **(36)**
> Of the greatest places where *jihad* is obligatory: *bilād al-ħaramiayn* [the land of the two Holy Mosques], wherein the **occupying Crusader enemy**, who steals its resources, determines its policies, and drives the Muslims from this land. Also therein is the apostate puppet government that implements the plans of colonisation, and allies to disbelievers, governing according to laws other than those of Almighty God.
>
> *Issue 1*, September 2003

This narrative serves to justify the declared aim of AQAP, which is the expulsion of the Crusaders from Arabia. Nonetheless, AQAP's ideological stance – in line with AQ's stance – states that all Americans/Westerners are legitimate targets – civilian and military alike.

As seen in Table 12 (Appendix C), a key referential tool used to represent America is the use of the Crusades as a religious icon symbolising the historical rivalry between the world of Islam and Christendom. This category combines several linguistic types incorporating the word *al-ṣalīb* 'Crusade', or *al-ṣalībiyy(a),* that can be used as both an adjective and a noun derived from it.[34] This category is conflated with various referential tools, e.g. *al-ṣalībiyy(īn)* 'the Crusaders', *ʿubbād al-ṣalīb* 'worshippers of the Crusade', *al-ʿduw al-ṣalībiy* 'the Crusader enemy', *sadanat al-ṣalīb* 'servants of the Crusade' etc. References to the Crusades are used throughout the magazine for a variety of actors/actions. This includes, among others, *al-gharb al-ṣalībiy,* 'the Crusader West' *al-ħarb al- ṣalībiyya* 'the Crusade war'. Such references frame the relationship of the Islamic world with the West as one of hostility evoking the listener's repertoire of old knowledge about the Crusades. AQAP's worldview has its own perception of history that considers the American post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan to be the Tenth Crusade, as phrased explicitly in this excerpt:

[34] One way of structuring the adjective from a lexical root in Arabic is through attaching the *nisba,* a 'relative' suffix, *-iyy* (M) or *-iyya* (F).

(37)

…but the **Tenth Crusade** is now marching towards Afghanistan…

Issue 4, October 2003

Since the declared aim of AQAP is the expulsion of the Crusaders from Arabia, the confrontation is between Us ('the worshippers of Allah') and Them ('the Worshippers of the Crusade'). As we have seen in the Other-within, some references and predicational themes associate the regime and the security forces with the Crusade. In this vein, the *ṣalībiy* attributions are primarily made to the Other-outwith and secondarily to the Other-within. References in terms of the Crusade are thus ideologically evaluative and are used in close proximity to predications reinforcing the Crusade narrative in the form of assumed shared knowledge. Moreover, the Crusade narrative involves two discursive strategies, *religionisation* and *militarisation*, and these are strongly related to historical analogical representations (as will be discussed in Chapter 7). The discursive construction of America dwells almost exclusively on invoking the historical narrative of the Crusades, along with a mutual association between America and the Saudi regime.

It is emphasised by a *Sawt al-jihad* editorial that the number one enemy is the Crusaders occupying the Arabian Peninsula, *bilād al-ħaramain*, and that they will not target security forces provided the latter do not interfere to protect the Crusaders. This can be interpreted as a means of avoiding any blame for staining this hand with Muslim blood. Therefore, the range of attributions ascribed to America through predication are quantitatively abundant but limited in terms of their thematic content. As presented in Table 12 (Appendix C), the predications solely present America in religious and military terms as the "aggressive State of the Crusade". The predications highlight the American invasion of Muslim lands. More importantly, hyperbolic statements are made about the American presence in Arabia, portraying it as an occupation of the heartland of Islam.

(38)

…here is *jihad* in your land, these are the Americans among you, **building their churches in Mohammed's land**, look at them conquering your land with their troops and weapons…

Issue 8, December 2003

(39)

…have you not seen this who curses your religion … who occupies Muslim lands and **colonises Makkah and Madinah**…

Issue 10, January 2004

Such statements are made in abundance throughout the magazine. The mechanism of constant repetition in these statements aims to legitimise AQAP's mission, given the several mass bombings that targeted compounds and facilities hosting American citizens. On the other hand, the enemy – America – is also presented as a losing enemy in the long run because it has been drawn into an ambush set by the mujahedeen. Several predications reinforce this narrative, featuring economic losses from the costly war launched in the Islamic world. Therefore, other predications assert that America's defeat is a matter of time as it is trapped in the minefield of its war on Islam.

5.4. Recap and conclusion

This chapter has explored the topics of AQAP discourse on *jihad* and how *jihad* is constructed in its ideology. The analysis has shown that *Sawt al-jihad* stresses a messianic revivalist mission whereby *jihad* is, on the one hand, a goal in its own right – an incarnation of God's oneness or the pure form of Islam and – and, on the other hand, a means for repelling a constructed U.S. invasion and fighting the illegitimate Saudi government. The chapter has explained how the AQAP narrative steers away from the classical Islamic conception of *jihad* as a collective duty and elevates its status to a personal duty equivalent to the articulation of faith. Therefore, the construction of *jihad* is interwoven with a plethora of juristic and theological topics, which are based on selective recontextualisation of sacred texts and prior juristic opinions. These topics promote polemics and ideas ranging from the legitimate killing of non-combatant infidels, the case of *kufr* or *apostasy* 'disbelief' of the Saudi government, to the polytheism in allying to disbelievers and implementing non-*Sharia* legislation, among others.

Then, this chapter provided an account of how AQAP discourse textualises the social world. *Sawt al-jihad* conveys an extreme tripartite division of the world: believer Self, misbeliever Other-within and disbeliever Other-outwith. This extreme worldview is dictated by the urgent need to legitimise the novel *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia, which involves killing Muslims. Thus, the prototypical Self in the AQAP politics derive its merits from a commitment to *jihad* as a Godly-ordained duty. *Sawt al-jihad*, therefore, constucts the mujahed as *the* true Muslim, who is altruistic to the *ummah* and is willing to sacrifice his soul on this path. The notion of the *ummah* can be deemed to be the typical social structure in the AQAP's body politic. The Other in *Sawt al-jihad* is divided into the Other-within and the Other-outwith. AQAP's declared aim is fighting the invading American Crusaders and expelling them from Arabia. Three prominent camps of social actors are manifest in *Sawt al-jihad:* the political regime, the security forces and the *ulema*, 'religious scholars'. All these groups of social actors are presented with similar

negative attributions, though with varying religious/theological implications. The political regime/rulers are generically presented as either 'false gods', imposing their manmade laws instead of God's laws, or with a wide range of attributions that involved declaring them as *kuffār*, 'disbelievers/non-Muslim'. On the other hand, the security forces are constructed by means of linguistic realisations implying their implicit excommunication, while the *ulema* are generally associated with the government as 'official sheikhs' or 'sultans' ulema'. The Other-Outwith is strictly defined in religious terms as a constructed Christian-Jewish alliance. In a narrative that goes hand in hand with the AQ's anti-Americanism, the prominent actor in this universe of disbelief is the USA. *Sawt al-jihad* puts forth an extreme ideological stance legitimising the indiscriminate killing of disbelievers.

Overall, such a representation of the social world is of a simplistic nature. It draws analogic historical representations with an imagined past in the jihadist narrative. Thus, all identities are reduced to traditional or pre-modern categories that, despite their simplistic nature, exert pervasive emotive and epistemological influence on the audience. Now, having reviewed the AQAP's social world, the next chapter will explore the intertextual fabric of AQAP discourse.

Chapter 6 ANALYSIS OF INTERTEXTUAL RELATIONS IN AQAP DISCOURSE

6.1. Introduction

Having reviewed the content of AQAP discourse topics along with the referential and predicational strategies that underpin them, this chapter considers the fabric of AQAP discourse. The previous chapter addressed what is said, while this one attempts to discuss the manner of articulation. Equipped with the analytic tool of intertextuality, alongside the concomitant tools of presupposition and de/re-contextualisation, I aim to explore the ways in which AQAP discourse appeals to, and overlaps with, prior (sacred) texts and the hearer's repertoires of old knowledge. The goal of this chapter is twofold: (i) to develop a systematic analytic approach to intertextuality that is operationalisable in analysing (politico)-religious discourses – particularly perspectivised AQAP ideological discourses and (ii) to use this framework to analyse the structuring and restructuring of AQAP discourse. With respect to the former, I draw on Genette's approach to intertextuality (1997) and Fairclough's (1992) notions about modes of intertextuality and discourse representation.

6.2. Appropriating an approach to AQAP intertextual connections

This thesis proposes a fairly simple argument: the most important discursive vehicle for jihadist ideology is not the content of jihadist texts, but rather the underpinning intertextual relations between what is said and prior texts that carry symbplic and epistemilogical capital. AQAP's discourse, and the various types of jihadist discourses, are, in essence, revivalist. They seek to resurrect a paradigmatic societal form: *khilāfah ʾalā minhāj alnubuwah,* a Caliphate according to the prophetic method. For such an ideological group, the authority lies somewhere in the river of Islamic tradition flowing from the constitutive texts of the Quran and the *Sunnah* through the amplifying corpora of religious and juristic texts, along with Islamic history. My argument, therefore, focuses on the way in which previous *valued* texts and their generic features are selected and put together in the discourse in question. The producers of AQAP discourse select elements from enclosed religious and ideological systems and arrange them in *Sawt al-jihad.* The aim of this task is to locate, describe and stabilise the significance of the intertextual relations between a specific text and others. For the respective sacred and religious texts involved, this study distances itself from becoming involved in any theological debate regarding the authenticity of relevant texts or the truthfulness of their interpretations. My role

is to explicate the intended meaning by the speaker and reveal relevant underlying texts. Such a peculiar relation between previous *valued* texts and new ones needs to be captured in the approach taken to intertextuality.

Significant attention has been paid to the concept of intertextuality in sociocultural linguistics and discourse studies. Studies have examined the intertextual language in everyday use (e.g. Gordon 2003; Tannen 2006), in reported speech (e.g. Fairclough 1992; Matoesian 2000) and the intertextual connections involved in political discourse (e.g. Hodges 2008). Within CDA, the DHA gives primacy to intra- and intertextual relations and regards them as a constative element of context. It emphasises the role of intertextuality in transforming prior texts and restructuring new conventions to generate novel materials, but it does not provide a clear and systematic analytic framework. Fairclough (1992: 117–118) offers a rather detailed account of intertextuality that pays particular attention to reported speech. His approach accords with his focus on discourse and social change and only relies on intertextuality as a micro-analysis tool. He distinguishes three modes of manifest intertextual relations: (1) *sequential intertextuality*, where different texts or types alternate within a text; (2) *embedded intertextuality*, where one text or discourse type is clearly contained within the matrix of another; and (3) *mixed intertextuality*, where texts or discourse types are merged in a more complex and less easily separable manner.

The data of *Sawt al-jihad* comprise an intertextual phenomenon in the first place and are saturated with dialogic references to prior texts. However, within CDA, intertextuality does not appear to have been sufficiently operationalised to do discourse analysis in a scope broader than text-to-text connections. Such limitedness strips the analysis of its ability to capture the omnipresent and dialogic nature of intertextuality beyond the word level in the data of *Sawt al-jihad*. Consequently, I have attempted to proceed eclectically and move to formulate an analytic framework for intertextual relations, drawing for the most part on the structural approach presented by Genette (1997). Simultaneously, I adopt Fairclough's (1992) notions regarding modes of intertextuality and discourse representation.

6.2.1. *Genette's hypertextuality*

Genette (1997) provides a broader account of intertextuality that can be developed and operationalised in CDA. Rather than looking at micro-modes of intertextuality, as is the case in Fairclough's account, Genette presents a compelling account that studies the totality of the textual transcendence of a literary text, i.e. "all that sets the text in relationship, whether obvious or concealed, with other texts" (1997: 1). His model of transtextuality[1] is subdivided into five categories. First, he styles the mere co-presence of two or more texts in one text as *intertextuality*. For Genette, this category subsumes instances ranging from explicit quotations to less explicit allusions up to more concealed acts of plagiarism, allusion etc. He drives away from Kristeva's semiotic processes of cultural and textual signification and offers a revised description of *intertextuality* that is concerned in a more restrictive sense with the relationship between specific textual elements. The second category is *paratextuality*, whereby the *paratexts* – texts accompanying a primary literary text, e.g. titles, subtitles, prefaces, postfaces etc. – provide the text with a variable setting and bind it within the totality of literary works.[2] Paratexts are subdivided into two further categories: (a) *peritext*s (elements such as titles, chapter titles, prefaces, notes etc.) and (b) *epitexts* (features including interviews, announcements, reviews, private letters and other authorial and editorial discussions). The third category is that of *metatextuality*, where a text takes up a relation of commentary on another previous text, whether or not this is cited. Such a critical relationship of metatextuality is recursive, whereby we can identify meta-metatexts. Fourth, Genette introduces the category of *archetextuality*, which comprises the reader's expectations pertaining to genre-specific matters.

Of primary importance among all five categories of Genette's transtextual relations is *hypertextuality*. Hypertextuality involves a relationship between a *hypertext* and an earlier *hypotext*, in which the hypotext is definitely located as a major source of signification for the hypertext, such as Homer's *Odyssey* that can be said to be a major hypotext for other literary works, e.g. Joyce's *Ulysses* (Allen 2001: 108). Conversely, the hypertext is grafted through transforming the generic and textual features of a hypotext or a corpus of hypotexts. Similarly, the hypertext is unable to exist without the hypotext, from which it originates through the process of transformation, though without necessarily citing it. Genette (1997: 5) emphasises

[1] Confusingly, the term *intertextuality* is not the concept employed in the sense introduced by Kristeva nor that which is common in CDA but is reduced to the concrete co-presence of two texts, the first type in the transtextuality model.

[2] Genette (1997: 429) states that the prefix para- in *paratext* is used in the sense of operating with similar adjectives such as *parafiscal* and *paramilitary*.

that, for a hypertext, the hypotext "is more frequently considered a 'properly literary' work than is the metatext". Figure 9 below illustrates the distinction Genette makes between intertextuality and hypertextuality.



Figure 9: Intertextual vs hypertextual relations

The main point here is to argue that the differential elevational values of texts should be worked into the formulation of intertextual links made in politico-religious discourses such as jihadist texts. The notion of *hypotext* is particularly relevant to jihadist data and similar discourses. I am primarily concerned with the significance of the prior text to the new intertext; and to avoid terminological confusion, I prefer the term hypotextuality to Genette's hypertextuality. For Genette's literary approach, the source of signification is literariness, but for my approach it is the authoritative, context-sensitive symbolic value of the hypotext which is featured in the intertext in question. The relation, then, between the hypotext and the intertext is a relation between an *imitated* text and an *imitative* one, with varying degrees of imitation or transformation. Of course, I am not assuming, when intertextually occurs (on the left in Figure 9), that the prior text has no value. There must be a pragmatic value in representing a specific prior text among other possible prior texts, but the issue is that in the case of hypertextuality (as diagrammatically displayed on the right), the prior text adds significant value, authority and legitimacy to the intertext, due to the higher symbolic value assigned to the prior text.

6.2.2. *Hypotextuality and the analysis of AQAP discourse*

Fairclough (2001: 71) argues convincingly that "[i]deology is most effective when its workings are least visible". That remains undoubtedly true, but the effectiveness of jihadist discourse in recruiting new members cannot be perceived as hidden ideological workings. Indeed, it is too explicit, as already argued in Chapter 5. Effectiveness here can be ascribed to something else. Paraphrasing Fairclough, I would argue that ideology is most effective when it takes on the guise of religion, or in the words of Shayegan (1997: ix): the "ideologisation of tradition". The ideologue in the Islamic world, as quite eloquently put by Shayegan (1997: 141),

> …has the advantage of possessing unshakable certainties forged out of incisive *a priori* notions … He has the faith of one who believes … He has the faith of one who believes he possesses the truth and is intolerant of anyone opposing him or disputing his monopoly of truth.

He continues (142):

> The ideologue does not live in time but in space. He cannot feel comfortable until he has converted the movement of time into a frozen space where everything is in its correct place: where, say, the wicked are on the left, the good on the right, the discarded forms of the past behind, and in front a transparent future … marking out the roads to utopia.

Shayegan's characterisation of the ideologue seems appropriate for *Sawt al-jihad* ideologues. Their semantic macro-structures are presented as unshakeable certainties forged out of incisive *a priori* notions, protected on the grounds of: "God said it". Therefore, for AQAP's jihadist ideology, epistemology is intertextual and concerns a repertoire of old knowledge or, more precisely, a repertoire of old texts. Therefore, this study emphasises the systematic and relational nature of (jihadist) texts with earlier/historical discourses and assumes it is possible for the analyst to explicate and describe recurrent systematic relations.

One might convincingly, though, suggest that the relationship between *Sawt al-jihad's* texts and prior texts is a case of interdiscursivity. This remains true to a degree but what really matters is not the two overlapping discourses, but rather the overlap between the intertextual text and certain 'hypotexts', which supposedly possess a symbolic value, irrespective of the type of discourses to which they belong. The common denominator among the corpus of hypotexts is the fact that they belong to an epistemologically and emotionally archetypical Self. Thus, the hypotextual reference functions as a paradigmatic link, not only between two texts, but also between speaker and archetypical Self denoted in the hypotext. For instance, the hypotextual

connections drawn at the level of onymity and pseudonymity (in 6.3.2 below) do indeed form a relation between the current jihadist individual and a perceived archetypical Self from the past.



Figure 10: Hypotextual relations in *Sawt al-jihad*

It is noteworthy that the structure of the hypotext follows the same hierarchical pattern explicated in 3.5.1. As Figure 10 illustrates, the corpus imbues the jihadist text with – in the words of Irvine (1989: 258) – *a chain of authentication*, ranging from Quranic verses and prophet's sayings to texts attributed to *salaf* or jihadist figures. It is the Salafist mindset, in which the standard of *truth* lies in the practice of *salaf*, stretching from the time of the Prophet Mohammad up to the mujahedeen of modern times. In Bourdieu's (1991) terms, each incorporated hypotext contains its own *symbolic capital* stemming from a belief in the legitimacy of its words, and of those who uttered them. The purpose of examining iterative hypotextual processes is to uncover how such a regime of truth reveals itself intertextually. While the jihadists' use of language is implicated in a wider chain of both preceding and subsequent utterances, I am exclusively concerned with the former because the current study is focused on the way *Sawt al-jihad* cultivates prior linguistic resources. AQAP discourse inevitably anticipates potential responses from different social actors, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis. Hypotextuality, with the sum of all existing hypotexts, promotes the discourse in question by appealing to its infinite power, which is superior to that of everyday discourse. It is characteristic of AQAP intertextual references that they maintain a degree of

juristic analogy, in the sense that the meaning brought forward by intertextuality centralises a representation, a story, a set of ideas without there being a need to state them explicitly. The hypotext is there, potentially present and bearing all of its meaning and symbolic as well as epistemic power, without necessarily uttering the analogous representation between the speakers of both text and hypotext. Thus, an exceptional richness and credibility are conferred upon *Sawt al-jihad's* intertexts.

AQAP's voice in *Sawt al-jihad* is not uniquely homogeneous. Rather, it incorporates a mass of the *already said/written/read* into a discourse composed of texts drawn from innumerable stages in past histories. The intertextual profile of the jihadist discourse is too rich and historically loaded and reaches out beyond the immediate here-and-now encounter between the producers and consumers of discourse. For argumentative purposes (as will be explicated in the ensuing chapter), *Sawt al-jihad* is punctuated by references to significant epistemological texts and historical narratives. This involves a relatively constant flow of history into texts. Furthermore, hypotextuality plays a major role in rhetorical and emotional acts and can have an elocutionary effect on the audience by triggering certain behavioural patterns.

In the case of religious revivalists and jihadists, the hypotext is the source of epistemological signification. That said, I attempt not to lose sight of the literariness of the corpora of hypotexts, for they do indeed bear elements of literary worth or eloquence. It has been established in Islamic tradition that the rhetorical superiority of Quran is inimitable. An entire branch of a theological discipline known as *iʿjāz* 'inimitability' is devoted solely to this purpose (Achrati 2008). The fundamental premise for this discipline is that the Quran's miraculous and inimitable nature springs from its challenge to pre-Islam Arabs, whose cultural community was best known for its cultivation of language and poetry. The densely structured chapters of the Quran reflect linguistic patterns known in Ancient Arabia, such as *sajʿ*, a prose style composed of remarkably concise sentences with changing expressive rhymes. The notion of *inimitability* is iterated in several Quranic verses (Graham and Kermani 2006; Neuwirth 2006).[3] Furthermore, the corpus of *Sunnah* contains bespoke stylistic features, and it is widely established in Arab-Islamic culture that quoting lines and fragments from the Quran and *Sunnah* or other traditional

[3] An example of such verses is: Or do they say [about the Prophet], "He invented it?" Say, Then bring forth a surah like it and call upon [for assistance] whomever you can besides Allah, if you should be truthful (Quran, 10: 38). This and similar verses affirm the divine authorship of the Quran. Several modern Muslim authors have emphasised the literary supremacy of the Quranic text, such as Abu Zahra (1974), al-Rafi (1937) and Rida (1935), and for aesthetic reception of the Quran see Graham and Kermani (2006).

sources has oratory and rhetorical value. Moreover, it is a common practice, even in modern-day religious discourse across different Islamic schools of thought.

The appeal to religious authority is salient in AQAP discourse. Since religious symbolic power lies in a closed corpus of texts, it follows as a matter of necessity that the vehicle for the appeal to religious authority is an intertextual one. Therefore, *hypotextuality* –deliberate intertextual transpositions consisting of specific pre-existing hypotexts – is of direct concern to the analysis of AQAP discourse. As illustrated in Figure 11, I am inclined to recognise Genette's five types of transtextual relations in a rather specific model within which *hypotextuality* – rather than *hypertextuality* – is the overarching mode manifesting in and overlapping with other types of intertextuality. For the purposes of my analysis, I define hypotexts as a corpus of texts, textual fragments or segments of sociolects that share formal, grammatical and lexical elements with the intertext. Their producers regard this corpus or its authors as a source of signification. Hypotexts can be transformed using processes such as amplification, repetition, excision, reduction etc.

As shown in Figure 11, hypotextual transformation processes can mainfest at the levels of:

- *archetextuality*, where hypotextual processes occur as a structural whole, e.g. in the choice of genre-specific features, register, stylistic elements etc.
- *paratextuality*, where hypotexuality shows at the level of the paratext, e.g. titles, slogans, pull qoutes, (pseud)onymity etc.
- *meta-textuality*, when selected hypotexts are being topicalised, and
- *micro-hypotextuality*, whereby the intertextual relation is a text-to-text one, e.g. embedded hypotexts, allusions etc.



Figure 11: Model of hypotextuality in AQAP discourse

Before proceeding to the analysis, I wish to highlight two notions in concomitance with hypo/inter-textuality, namely, recontextualisation and presupposition. Recontextualisation is the outcome of the process of transforming previous texts or just inserting them into a new intertext (Linell 1998). However, in the case of AQAP discourse, recontextualisation practices are not arbitrary, they more or less follow a practice of seeking authenticity by establishing links with sacred texts. This method follows the religious discourse tradition that has its own canons of intertextuality, principles of regarding which texts are most relevant to the interpretation of any text and, more importantly, principles of knowledge production norms that are mainly based on the concept of analogy. Indeed, citing sacred texts is, to varying degrees, a common intertextual pattern in the discourses of different Islamic schools of thought.

Conversely, presupposition is traditionally defined as "a piece of information or a proposition whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a sentence" (Huang 2014: 85). Along with other accounts of presuppositions (e.g. Levinson 1983; Yule 1996), this definition provides a non-intertextual account of presupposition confined to the domain of the sentence.[4] In contrast, Fairclough (1992: 120–121) provides a compelling intertextual view of presupposition, which assumes that "presupposed propositions are a way of incorporating the texts of others". He argues convincingly that:

> …there are problems with this [intertextual] account: it would entail, for example, that the sentence 'the Soviet threat is a myth' is semantically contradictory, because the text producer would be simultaneously taking it for granted that there was a Soviet threat; and asserting that there was no such threat … [with the intertextual view] the expression 'the Soviet threat' and the presupposition it cues come from another ('alien', as Bakhtin puts it) text which is here contested.

He then concludes that:

> … [w]ithin an intertextual account of presupposition, the case where the presupposed proposition does constitute something taken for granted by the text producer can be interpreted in terms of intertextual relations with previous texts of the text producer.

Polyzou (2015) makes an interesting point in this regard. She presents a compelling socio-cognitive account of presupposition starting from the lexical level, then proceeding to the level of the clause, followed by the discourse level and then, finally, the interaction of pragmatic knowledge with real world knowledge. The latter gives room for both universal and culture-specific assumptions shared by competent members of the epistemic community. This level of pragmatic presupposition bears links to intertextuality that are context-sensitive. I will return to this level of presupposition in Chapter 7.

The remainder of this chapter illustrates how hypotextuality is substantiated in AQAP discourse at the four levels depicted in Figure 10.

[4] Within the sentence-domain account, some conceive of presupposition as an attribute of the speaker (e.g. Yule 1996), while others regard it as an attribute of the utterance (Frege 1982). However, both approaches neglect the intertextual aspect of presupposition.

6.3. Analysing *Sawt al-jihad's* hypotextual profile

The notion of hypotextuality must be examined in light of the symbolic power and epistemological weight of the cited hypotexts. The production and interpretation of jihadist texts are influenced by the speaker's social value besides the linguistic features deployed in the text, such as grammar and lexis, semantic dispositions and the use of particular registers and genres to produce recognisable types of discourse that yield certain perspectives from their subjects.



Figure 12: The hypotextual connections realised in the content of *Sawt al-jihad*

I should point out an important fact before commencing on the substantiation of the categories displayed in this diagram. It is important to bear in mind that I am analysing examples translated from Arabic into English. The translation of texts involving hypotextual relations is never neutral because it erodes the significance of the transformation processes and conceals the ways in which previous formal structures are produced within the respective hypotexts. Nonetheless, I have done my best to give particular examples for each category. Whenever necessary, notes are added in the course of the analysis.

6.3.1. *Architextual hypotextuality*

Architextual relationships, where hypotextual processes occur as a structural whole, e.g. in the choice of genre-specific features, registers, stylistic elements, are the most abstract and implicit of all the hypotextual categories. At this level, the process of assimilating texts and pre-texts through hypotextual references operate not only at the word level but also at a structural whole; in other words, how a text relates to the entire religious discourse/rhetoric as a semi-autonomous field. There is a matrix of formal, grammatical and lexical elements that help the reader recognise the semiotic unity of *Sawt al-jihad's* texts as a unique architext. Indeed, we can speak of a jihadist *idiolect*, a transformed version of a religious sociolect associated with jihadist groups. At this macro-level, the relationship is not necessarily a text-to-text one. Rather, the relationship involves a whole tradition or sociolect. For the autographic texts of *Sawt al-jihad*, texts produce their significance out of hypotextual relationships with the religious *sociolect* as socially normative discourse. Discourse, in this regard, is the type of language used in religious sermons and rituals and is recognisable by the audience. It is the source from which *texts* and '*orders of discourse'* are borrowed.[5]

One way of maintaining hypotextual relationships at the level of the architext in *Sawt al-jihad* is through *enregisterment*. In its broadest sense, register is "a variety of language defined according to its use in social situations" (Crystal 1990: 327). Enregisterment is a set of processes "through which a linguistic repertoire becomes differentiable within a language as a socially recognised register of forms" (Agha 2003: 231). The social position is cast in the linguistic elements typical of religious discourses, such as lexis, style and semantic dispositions recognisable to the listener. Hymes (1996: 33) states that "A repertoire comprises a set of ways of speaking. Ways of speaking, in turn, comprise *speech styles*, on the one hand, and contexts of discourse, on the other, together with relations of appropriateness obtaining styles and contexts." Religionisation – as a discursive strategy – is not infused in AQAP discourse only via specific linguistic realisations (e.g. nomination or predication), it can also be identifiable in terms of architextual elements. Overall, *Sawt al-jihad* maintains *a religious register*, a variety of linguistic repertoires associated with religious situations is effectively infused in AQAP discourse through intertextual connections. Equipped with metapragmatic abilities, the consumers of AQAP discourse differentiate the religious register, among other registers, and assign pragmatic values to it. Enregisterment can be observed in the fact that AQAP discourse distances itself from the mainstream Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) by adhering to the more

[5] Orders of discourse are the implicit conventions determining what counts as *appropriate* talk (Fairclough 1992).

classical variety associated with its valued hypotexts, i.e. the Quran, *Sunnah* and the language spoken by the Salaf. As the excerpts presented so far illustrate, the language of *Sawt al-jihad* draws hypotextual relations not with people's everyday language but rather with Classical Arabic. To render the analysis tangible, I will look at two variant forms assigned to the religious register: (1) genre and (2) classical stylistic choices.

Fairclough defines *genre* as 'a relatively stable set of conventions that is associated with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity, such as informal chat, buying goods in a shop, a job interview, a television documentary, a poem, or a scientific article' (1992: 126). Indeed, every issue maintains architextual relationships with religious discourse as a semi-autonomous field. Every issue bears the elements of a *khuṭbah*, a 'religious sermon'. The structure of every issue of *Sawt al-jihad* begins with an op-ed, followed by various magazine sections, and ends with an epilogue and intertext with structuring of the *khuṭbah.* This corresponds to the *khuṭbah's* opening, body text and closing, respectively. The correspondence is with both the structuring and the semantic content of these sections. The magazine texts, particularly autographic texts, share the defining generic features of religious sermons. The excerpt below is a translation of the op-ed of *Sawt al-jihad's* fourth issue:

(1)

TITLE **The op-ed: on the way ahead**

OPENING Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, the ally of the Righteous, and the helper of his followers, the mujahedeen [1]. His prayers and peace be upon the most honourable of the messengers, our Prophet Muhammad, and upon his family and companions [2].

BODY TEXT We are now in the last ten days [of Ramadhan] in which the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, used to strive harder than other days, reviving the night with prayers and awaking his family [to pray] [3].

… During these ten days, a group of blessed youths of Islam raided a complex of settlements of the Crusaders in the Arabian Peninsula. They brought to God a jihadist operation against his enemies, an operation delighting the believers and enraging the disbelievers and their allies ﴿**and among you are avid listeners to them**﴾ [4].

Jihad will continue until the Day of Judgment, as the master of mankind and the Imam of the mujahedeen – peace be upon him – told us. One of the greatest times of *jihad* in Islam is the month of Ramadan, which has seen a number of battles, the first of which was the great battle of Badr [5].

The mujahedeen fight the enemies of Allah everywhere, as Allah has commanded them [6]. They have gone forth to defend the sanctuaries of the Muslims. They do not target Muslims and do not intend to harm them [7]. How do the mujahedeen do so while they come out only in defence of the sanctity of Muslims and in obedience to Allah? [8]

And he whoever knows that this is the purpose of *jihad* and its supreme goal will not listen to the calls of the hinderers and those hypocrites who say 'come to us', and those who do not go to battle, with the exception of a few [9].

Neither the mujahedeen nor the non-mujahedeen are entitled to make the fundamental tenets and rules of religion a matter for debate or negotiation. ﴿**It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should [thereafter] have any choice about their affair.**﴾ [10]. Those who

bow to and abide by the rule of *Sharia*, who submit their faces to Allah, rule by His law and lift man-made laws, and disown the enemies of Allah and do not ally to them, they are then our brothers and we are with them on the road [of jihad]. So, on what do we negotiate? [11]

There is no negotiation between those who reject Allah's law and choose the religion of America, or want to believe in some laws and disbelieve in others [12].

The dialogue between us and those occupying the lands of Muslims, killing their sons and keeping their women alive, is fighting in the path of Allah until God stops their military might and defeats them [13]. ﴿**So fight, [O Muhammad], in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] might of those who disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment**﴾ [14].

We call on the *ummah* to target Americans everywhere, for this is the language of dialogue that the enemy understands ... and the mujahedeen with Allah's will and strength will continue on this path ... and are unafraid to take the blame [15].

CLOSING We ask Allah to support the mujahedeen everywhere, and to hold the banner of religion high. O Allah, grant peace and blessings unto our Prophet Mohammed and upon his family and companions [16].

Issue 3, October 2003

The structure of this op-ed intertexts with the structure of a religious sermon that begins with an exordium reciting praise and gratitude to God, and invocating peace and blessings on the Prophet Mohammed. This is followed by a body of text commenting largely on the respective events and delivering a manifesto outlining AQAP's overall policy. The op-ed ends by reciting blessings on the Prophet Mohammed and a selection of prayers for the good of the Islamic community and the mujahedeen. Indeed, although this short except illustrates several forms of hypotextuality, my focus is confined to its structure. At this level, the social identity of the speakers is constituted through the *genre* of what they say. Such a genre is associated with a socially ratified activity type, namely, the religious register. AQAP's media practices – along with those of other jihadist groups – demonstrate that its speakers distance themselves from mainstream media and their daily language.[6] For the jihadist groups, the use of the media is a matter of access to the public: a non-religious product used for the construction of religious discourses and identities.

Regarding generic features, *Sawt al-jihad* is committed to maintaining hypotextual relations in the architextual fabric of the magazine with a religious register. This is uniquely achieved through *khuṭbah*, as a genre-specific performable sign belonging to the religious register. The use of *khuṭbah* features is a meaningful act and is semiotically linked with culturally-relevant ways of being religious. For instance, the opening of the op-ed even maintains matching the

[6] Media, as portrayed in *Sawt al-jihad*, are starkly negative. This is observed in the negative collocates occurring with the word media, such as *salūli* – an adjective evoking the hypocrisy of Ibn Salul, as pointed out earlier in Chapter 5 – alongside other collocates such as *fraud, lying* etc.

style of praising with the body text. This is observed in the matching between the attribute of God as 'helper of the mujahedeen' to the news of 'raiding Riyadh's residential complex', reported in the body of text. This too is an established practice in the delivery of religious sermons. The op-ed's incorporation of the *khuṭbah's* structural elements is entirely silent. Nonetheless, its generic quality of *religiosity/religionisation* is communicated to the listener. It is unarticulated but easily recognisable by a Muslim layperson, specifically, the intended Salafi audience. It follows, then, that the audience is involved in the business of determining the generic status of the text, which in turn influences the way they consume and understand the content of the message conveyed by the speaker.

Enregisterment through genre choice can be said to be a form of contextualisation that builds further on notions of the reflexive nature of language usage, in the sense that utterances do not only say something *in* themselves, but they also say something *about* themselves. In the meaning-making process, the use of religious *genre* is a structuring device that draws on the role of religious discourse in particular social contexts. Religious *khutbah* implies not only particular text types, but also specific processes of consuming these texts. More importantly, it involves two designated subject types, where the speaker is an 'imam' and the addressees are 'layperson believers'. Therefore, the layperson recipient takes the propositions delivered in religious discourse as authoritative actions. In other words, if the speaker performs a religious speech act (preaching, making a *fatwa*, for example), then the speaker can be assumed to have the power/authority to do so; and consequently, his propositions rest on religious authority within the immediate cultural context. A significant element in this regard concerns the sensitivity of the audience to the repeated use of such architextual elements that intertext with the corpora of hypotexts. Evidently, their sensitivity underpins the formal concerns of the text producers who stick to the dogma of imitating the classical hypotextual model. The sermon's properties strengthen the epistemological and rhetorical effectiveness of the political aims and propositions expressed in AQAP discourse. Such generic elements concern the 'outward' surface structures. Nonetheless, the audience's perceptions help guide and determine to a considerable extent their expectations and reception of AQAP discourse.

Genre is one aspect of architext. Style, though interconnected with genre, is another. Style is a complex interaction between the speaker's choice of linguistic features and their social meaning (Charteris-Black 2014). The jihadist texts in question are characterised by the adoption of classical rhetoric and an oratory style that combines a multitude of classical linguistic choices. Of utmost importance in these choices are their social meaning and semiotic effect (ibid.). The

following excerpt is taken from an article entitled *Encourage the believers, in Sawt al-jihad's* first issue:[7]

(2)

O you the Mujahedeen in the path of Allah [1]
To you, O you who hold firm in Tora Bora, Gaza, Grozny and the land of the two holy mosques [2]
To you, O you who made heavens home for your high souls [3]
To you, O you the lights of dignity and the suns of championship [4]
To you, O you the people of firm hold, I say [5]
Rejoice, by one in whose hands is my life [6]
(Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties, [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So rejoice in the transaction you have contracted. And it is that which is the great attainment) [7]
Yes, rejoice and don't say that the martyr has died [8]
Don't say we lost the martyr [9]
Since buried under the soil alone [10]
I never died, for the angels are around me [11]
With my Lord, resurrected as a new creation [12]
O you, the lions, fight the leaders of disbelief. For indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them; [fight them that] they might cease [13].
O people of the believers, be patient, fight with your Lord's insight. When you meet the servants of the Cross, those are the ones who have exchanged guidance for error and forgiveness for punishment. How patient they are in pursuit of the Fire! [14]
Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest, Allah is the greatest [15]
Disregard the rumours of rumour-spreaders, the discouragement of the secularists and the amusing stories of hypocrites [16]
O slaves of Allah ... let the sword hit the necks of the enemies of God, and defend your *ummah* with your pure blood in the arena of *jihad* [17]

Issue 1, September 2003

This piece is replete with enregistering individual features associated with the classical style. For instance, the way the audience is addressed using the word *ʾāyyuhā* or *yā āyyuhā*, which approximately translates as 'O you', can be regarded as an institutionalised way of talking maintaining a stylistic hypotextuality with religious discursive formations. In fact, this style is commonly used in religious discourse and originates from Quranic texts. In this excerpt and elsewhere, this linguistic realisation is frequently used, particularly in stylistic schemes encouraging the audience to join *jihad.* In this excerpt, it is used at the beginning in an anaphora engaging the audience emotionally and cognitively. Furthermore, the texts of *Sawt al-jihad* make extensive use of classical figures of speech (both schemes and tropes)[8] that are standard

[7] The analysis of stylistic elements is an interesting and illuminating one with respect to enregisterment. However, translating these elements, no matter how good the translation is, entails the aporia losing the cultural values assigned to these elements in the target language, not to mention the impossibility of achieving equivalence when translating these texts.

[8] A scheme is a figure of speech involving grammatical choices in which there is some modification to the normal and expected sequence of words (e.g. anaphora, antithesis, epiphora etc.). Tropes, on the other hand, involve a choice of lexis whereby words are used with a sense that differs from their literal sense (allusions, hyperboles,

in religious discourse. This excerpt exhibits some examples of figurative schemes, such as the anaphora *ʾilaykum yā man* 'To you, O you who' in [2] through to [5], and repetition of the phrase *ʾallāhu ʾakbar* 'Allah is the greatest' in [15]. These are stylistic features associated with the discourse of the *Salaf*. Examples of tropes include *metaphors* (e.g. the light and sun metaphors in [4] that refer to the mujahedeen, and use of the *sword* metaphor in [17] for jihad), and *periphrasis,* such as the one in line [16], whereby more than necessary words are used to express the meaning of disregarding encouragers. Periphrases are common parlance in AQAP discourse, which is characterised by displaying rhetorical and oratorical skills. Another important trope is allusion, which involves the evocation of well-known textual or cultural references, such as the phrase *'by one in Whose Hands my soul is'* that evokes the well-known way of swearing common in prophetic sayings: *'by the one in whose hands Mohammed's soul is'*.[9] The consistent adoption of these classical choices bears a hypotextual element at the macro-structural level and refers to a shared identity, the glorious past, to which the *ummah* should return to regain glory and supremacy. The stylistic resemblance can be used to prove authenticity and reinforce the return to the Self because it has a metalinguistic tinge that can be easily detected by the audience.

As opposed to literary works where authors suffer from "anxiety of influence [of previous texts]" (Bloom 1997), the authors of *Sawt al-jihad* texts enjoy the *keenness* of producing texts *reminiscent* of earlier hypotexts. The stylistic resemblance can be observed in the myriad of linguistic realisations expressing modality. By and large, AQAP's jihadist content is expressed in a manifest way and is put forward as unmitigated and apodictic assertions. These assertions are made by deploying an array of semantic and formal devices. Examples of semantic devices include swearing phrases, such as *tallāhi* '[I swear] by Allah', *wallathi nafsī biyadihi* 'by Him in whose hand is my soul' etc. Assertive grammatical elements associated with prior hypotexts are also used. An example of this is the assertive affixes attached to verbs. For instance, the word *la-nuqatilu-nna,* has two assertive affixes attached to the verb *nuqātil* '1st.PL-fight': the prefix *la-* and the suffix *–nna.* Both affixes exert more assertion on the expressed proposition. Thus, the word *la-nuqatilu-nna* can be roughly translated as 'verily, we are fighting'.

To conclude, the architextual elements reviewed above enter AQAP narrative and effectively remind the audience of the value-laden hypotextual corpora to which they are related. When

irony, metaphors etc.). Schemes and tropes alike influence meaning and exert a degree of persuasive effect (see Charteris-Black 2014: 39-40).

[9] I will return to allusion in section 6.3.4.2.

these architextual elements are reiterated across *Sawt al-jihad*, one effect is to solidify AQAP narrative as a macro-level discourse. The appeal to the historical Self is constituted through reinforcing religiosity in the text and maintaining hypotextual relations to institutionalised ways of religious talk (such as exordiums, rhetorical formulae, prayers etc.) that play a significant role in expressly regulating and reinforcing the messages delivered and exerting power upon them. The constant hypotextual element invoked, whether explicitly or implicitly, brings power and authority to the intertext. Such a sociolinguistic differentiation can be considered a type of sanctification obtained via language, drawing on the shared beliefs of the epistemic community.

6.3.2. *Paratextual hypotextuality*

The paratextual profile of *Sawt al-jihad* is not complicated. Two paratexual components are salient: *titles* and *pull quotes*. First, titles, which are a necessary part of AQAP rhetoric, summarise the gist of the jihadist ideology through *key* words that signify the tenets of jihadism. The magazine name is uniquely relevant in this regard. This can be observed in the subtitle accompanying the magazine's title on the front page: *Sawt al-jihad: tawḥīdun wa jihād* ('the voice of *jihad*: unicity and *jihad*'). The subtitle refers to the discursive theme portraying *jihad* as equivalent to or an externalisation of faith or the oneness of God. The table below presents a list of the titles featured in the first three *Sawt al-jihad* issues:

Issue 1	Issue 2	Issue 3
The op-ed	The op-ed	The op-ed
Creed first	Creed first	Creed first: how the *assiddiiq* 'the truthful' fought them
Encourage the believers: said so while fire was burning him	Encourage the believers: said so while fighting back his tears	Encourage the believers: hasten to Paradise as wide as the heavens and earth
The *ulema* said: Abu Umar Mohammed al-saif, may Allah protect him	The monotheists freeing themselves from the pledges of the apostate *ṭawāghīt*	Knights under the Prophet's banner: al-Suwaydi battle, the facts as they are
a message to the martyr of duty	Knights under the Prophet's banner**:** the caravan of female martyrs in Qandahar	Removal of contemporary doubts about *jihad*: restrain your hands
Our enemy within: Saudi Arabia as America sees it	Tears of sorrow on the loss of a martyr	Light on the path of *jihad*, by Sheikh Abu Qatadah, may Allah free him
Said the Sheikh: Nasser al-Fahad, may Allah free him	Removal of contemporary doubts about *jihad*: the words of unification before the unification of words	An interview with Sheikh Abdullah al-Rishud, may Allah protect him
Pleasing the slaves with the virtues of *jihad*, Abdullah Azzam, may Allah have mercy on him	Light on the path of jihad	The jurisprudence of *jihad*: Shall there be a death ritual prayer for the martyr Ahmed al-Dakheel?
Knights under the Prophet's banner: Issam Algumri and Aljammaliyah do battle	An interview with one of the wanted 19: The Mujahed Abu Hajar Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, may Allah protect him	A statement from the mujahedeen to the Islamic *ummah*
Removal of contemporary doubts about *jihad*: bombing is not a means of reform	Said the Imams	Our enemy within: the Saudi-American exchange, plans for fighting *jihad* and the mujahedeen
An interview with one of the wanted 19: Mujahed Abu Hajar Abdulaziz al-Muqrin, may Allah protect him	Black magic and the Mujahedeen	A message from Sheikh Mohammed to the mujahedeen of the Arabian Peninsula
Black magic and the Mujahedeen	The jurisprudence of *jihad*: does the martyr have to be washed?	Said the people of the frontiers
Is it permissible to say the Turki al-Dandani is a martyr?	Said the people of the frontiers	Compliance and obedience
Our banner	The mujahedeen's statement about the Interior Ministry's declaration	But they plan, and Allah plans. And Allah is the best of planners: the story of Thafer al-Ajmi escaping Medina Prison
epilogue	epilogue	epilogue

Table 6: List of the titles in the first three issues of *Sawt al-jihad*

The titles in the table above reach out to the audience not with pieces of news but with perspectives and creedal formulae. The first title immediately following the op-ed is constantly *creed first.* The theme of this column is the notion of a tripartite world divided along creedal lines: believers, misbelievers and disbelievers. The next title is *encourage the believers*, which is hypotextual with the Quranic verse:

> So fight, [O Muhammad], for the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And **encourage the believers** [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] might of those who disbelieve.[10]

The original title *Encourage the believers* is supplemented by varying subtitles across the magazine. This hypotextual link functions as a slogan or sound bite that resonates with the listener. The recontextualisation of this phrase from a Quranic verse into new discursive encounters figures prominently on the paratextual site and engages the audience in an interpretation of this Quranic verse, and in the debate on whose reading will be accepted as valid and truthful. However, the relation between the prior (con)text and the new (con)text is presupposed as syllogistic. This conforms to *qiyas* 'analogy', the long-established root of Islamic law, which is used to determine the implications of God's commands in particular instances. In other words, such a recontextualisation is effectively a *fatwa*.

The titular profile makes hypotextual connections with well-known figures among the predecessors, e.g. a column dedicated to rebuffing arguments against AQAP. One of the key strategies to defeat AQAP was the religious establishment campaigning through the media. Therefore, this column's main title is *kashf al-shubuhāt,* 'the removal of doubts', which intertexts with a creedal treatise for Muhammed bin Abdul-Wahhab, to which the religious establishment in Saudi Arabia is ascribed. On the other hand, a column dedicated to narrating biographies of the mujahedeen makes hypotextual connections with Ayman al-Zawahiri's (2005) *fursān taḥt rāyati al-nabiy* 'knights under the Prophet's banner'. Jihadist leaders are revered hypotextually as *the* archetypical Muslims.

The second paratextual element is a wide range of pull quotes featured throughout the magazine. These quotes are clearly highlighted on the cover of the magazine by using a large, eye-catching font size. One of the frequent quotes is a text attributed to the thirteenth/fourteenth Muslim theologian, Ibn Taymiya:

[10] Quran, 4: 84.

> The religion does not rise unless there is a book that guides and sword that aids (but sufficient is your Lord as a guide and a helper).

This frequent slogan is positioned next to the magazine's name on the second page of every issue. The quotation carries hypotextual relations with two valued texts, the renowned figure of ibn Taymiya and a Quranic verse embedded in his quotation. Encapsulated in this slogan are the discursive strategies of religionisation (reference to the Quran) and militarisation (reference to the sword), which we have observed in the representation of *jihad.*

There a number of Quranic verses which are on the surface of the magazine as pull quotes. Here are some examples:

> O you who have believed, what is [the matter] with you that, when you are told to go forth in the cause of Allah, you adhere heavily to the earth? Are you satisfied with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter? But what is the enjoyment of worldly life compared to the Hereafter except a [very] little.[11]

> O you who have believed, if you support Allah, He will support you and plant firmly your feet.[12]

The words of Al Qaeda's leaders are similarly reverred and foregounded on the cover of the magazine. Consider this excerpt:

> **(3)**
> While the sons of the Two Holy Lands have a belief in the necessity of *jihad* against disbelief everywhere, they are the most powerful and enthusiastic in their land where they were born to defend their greatest sanctities – the Kaaba, the *qibla*[13] of all Muslims – and know that Muslims all over the world will help and support them in their great cause, the cause of all Muslims, namely, the liberation of their sanctities, and that is the duty of every Muslim in the world.
> *Sheikh Osama bin Ladin, May Allah support him*
>
> *Issue 3*, October 2003

An intriguing element, notable alongside the titles and pull quotes, is the name of the author or speaker. Names occupy a significant portion of the paratextual site and play a meaningful role in the ideological workings of the Self. AQAP practice throughout the magazine is not aimed at acknowledging a particular author with a credit but rather at highlighting the archetypical jihadist character. The expression of jihadist ideas is deemed in the jihadist literature to be a form of *jihad*, *aljihād bil ʕlm* '*jihad* with knowledge'. The name of the author appears in one of two conditions: onymity and pseudonymity, not to mention some mixed cases. Onymity is no longer a statement of identity (the author's name is X or Y), and pseudonymity is not just for

[11] Quran, 9: 38.

[12] Quran, 47: 7.

[13] The direction Muslims face when they pray.

the sake of incognito, nor for the desire of giving oneself a pseudonym. Instead, the discursive practices of both onymity and pseudonymity are a way of constructing a character and putting this character in the service of the ideology. So, what is at stake is not the question of authorship – as commonly practised. Rather, the identity of the jihadist is constructed through paratextuality.

Whether in the paratext or elsewhere, onymity and pseudonymity are a rich source of hypotextual relations. The revivalist ideology manifests in drawing hypotextual relations with early Muslims' cultural code of personal names. The range of the mujahedeen's given names revive old naming structures that consist of *kunyah* and a surname. First, the *kunyah* has three forms: (a) *teknonymics*, male names derived from the child's name [father of X], (b) *matronymics,* female names derived from the child's name [mother of X], and (c) *patronymics*, names derived from the father's given name [son/daughter of X] (e.g.). The surname may include references to family information – family names are replaced with tribal names belonging to the era of early Muslims (e.g. *al-Azdi*, in the second example below) – or place of origin. Some examples are listed below:

1. Abu Qātāda al-Filisṭīnī	The father of Qatada, the Palestinian
2. Abu Jandal al-Azdī	The father of Jandal, the Azdi
3. Abu Ali al-ħijāzī	The father of Ali, the Hejazi
4. Abu ħafṣ al-Misri	The father of Hafs, the Egyptian
5. Umm Azzam	The mother of Azzam

These are common naming structures among jihadist actors, particularly in the case of pseudonymity. Consequently, naming practices are a rich source where references to identity and the Self are made.[14] This practice is closely linked to the charismatic projection of the mujahedeen throughout the magazine (see 7.4), whereby presentation strategies – through the constant drawing of hypotextual relations – reinforce the analogy between the mujahedeen and the archetypical Self: the *salaf* or 'pious predecessors'. Such paratextual elements, which highlight the identity of the Self, function to control how the intended audience receives *jihadist* texts.

The texts within the magazine are objects to be read; paratextual elements, such as titles and subtitles, pull quotes, slogans and jihadists' names, are objects to be circulated and talked about

[14] Linking the Self to the *salaf* is fulfilled through such naming practices and names are consolidated with other attributive adjectives, e.g. *ahlu al-thughūr* 'people of the frontiers' etc.

and, more importantly, to be purposefully made resonant by drawing relations with a broad range of hypotexts.

6.3.3. *Meta-textual hypotextuality*

This category of hypotextuality topicalises prior texts and, as the list of *Sawt al-jihad* titles above reveals, a considerable amount of space in the magazine is dedicated either to challenging the Other's narratives or highlighting texts regarded as valued within the jihadist ideology. The meta-textual profile can be usefully examined in terms of two categories: *dialogic metatextuality* and *hypotextual metatextuality*. Most of dialogic metatextuality goes to the Other-within and, in particular, the religious establishment (the *ulema* 'religious scholars' and *duʿāh* 'preachers') and Interior Ministry statements. The magazine section entitled '*The removal of doubts'* is dedicated primarily to resisting and rebutting the arguments proposed by the *ulema* and preachers' anti-AQAP campaign. For instance, in the first issue, this section counters the argument: 'bombing is not a means to reform'. With regard to the Interior Ministry, AQAP frequently issues statements challenging the official narrative. As for Western media, the magazine only values news about the Saudi government that portrays the fragility of the Saudi state. The section entitled *'Our enemy within: Saudi Arabia as America sees it'* is dedicated to this purpose.

With regard to *hypotextual metatextuality*, the magazine frequently uses prior texts, which are presented with the aim of legitimising the Self or delegitimising the Other. The objective is to recommend such readings to the magazine's audience. Several jihadist treatises have been highlighted. These works argue in religious terms for the worldview adopted by AQAP vis-à-vis *jihad* and other contentious issues. For instance, the first issue features a commentary on a book by the classical jihadist ideologue Abdullah Azzam, entitled *ʿitħāf ʿal-ʾibād bifaḍāʿil al-jihād* 'blessing the slaves with the virtues of *jihad*'. Both the title and the author of the book feature in the title of this section, with the prayer 'may Allah have mercy on him' following the author's name. The way this text represents the book and its author is significant. The relation of the commentary does not involve embedding or merging of voices, as witnessed in micro-hypotextuality. Rather, the book is revered as a valuable reference for the virtues of *jihad*.

(4)

Title: Blessing the slaves with the virtues of *jihad*',
by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam – may Allah have mercy on him.

It is no coincidence that this book has this title, for the martyr Imam Abdullah Azzam was guided in choosing the titles for the books he wrote…

The book that reviews indeed blesses the reader with the virtues of *jihad*. It includes speeches, raging hearts and passion. Once you finish the book, you will wish to be in the arena of *jihad,* fighting on the path of Allah, so you find great attainment.

Sheikh Abdullah Azzam touched upon important aspects of *jihad* and commented on them in a way that is beneficial. Some of these aspects are: the continuity of emigration [from the sphere of disbelief to the sphere of Islam, women's *jihad*, pledging allegiance in war, inter-Muslim fighting, types of *jihad*…]

The virtues of *jihad* about which the sheikh talked cannot be limited to this book. His books, lectures and speeches are full of the virtues of fighting on the path of Allah, which can be attained by the mujahed in this world and in the hereafter…

Issue 1, September 2003

This excerpt refers to a classical jihadist book, written after the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. The aim of such metatextuality is to refer the readership to such radicalising works. Another example is a work entitled *al-kawāshif al-jaliyah fī kufr al-dawlah al-suʿūdiyah* "The obvious Proofs of the Saudi State's infidelity", by the jihadist ideologue Muhammed al-Maqdisi. Likewise, the book is reviewed and presented positively to the audience.

6.3.4. *Hypotextual micro-structures*

At this micro-level of hypotextuality, the relation is text-to-text. The workings of hypotextuality here are elaborate, and insertion of the hypotext takes many forms. Indeed, AQAP discourse is constituted through the novel configuration of these already-existing hypotexts, whereby the hypotextual relationship involves the investment of hypotexts' symbolic value. This investment highlights the dimension of struggle over religious texts as a *symbolic recourse* at stake, in the words of Bourdieu. The jihadists' worldview has its own system of dispositions, which introduces rules for how producers and consumers of discourse perceive the respective arguments. Therefore, the symbolic resource of religious texts is a source of symbolic power, *'power in discourse'* in particular. Bearing in mind the epistemological hierarchy of the Quran, the *Sunnah* and the traditions of the *salaf* in the knowledge system, to which AQAP jihadists adhere, the power of the cited words from these traditions is nothing more than the delegated power of the respective speaker.

Based on the degree of marking the contained hypotext, I shall make a distinction between three forms of micro-hypotextuality: (1) explicitly marked hypotexts, (2) unmarked hypotexts and (3) hypotextual allusions. Below is an account of these three forms. All these variations of hypotextual connections involve two interconnected processes: (a) *decontextualisation*,

whereby (one or more fragments of) the hypotext is lifted from its original setting; and (b) *recontextualisation*, which involves the insertion of the hypotextual element(s) into the new setting(s).

6.3.4.1 *Marked hypotexts*

Explicitly marked hypotextuality is the case when the hypotext is contained within the matrix of a jihadist text. Marked hypotexts that may show up as hypotexts are overtly marked as separate texts. This technique is used extensively where valued hypotexts are clearly contained within the matrix of the magazine, either as slogans, pull quotes, titles or magazine sections. This category of hypotextuality is closely linked to metatextuality, in other words, valued texts that are put forward as inspirational fragment texts representing the Self. No topicalisation is involved but texts and excerpts are explicitly foregrounded on the surface of the magazine. Featured texts of this sort are divided into four categories: Quranic texts, *Hadiths*, texts of the *salaf* and jihadist literature. However, explicitly marked hypotexts are also prevalently deployed within jihadist texts. In this excerpt – and in *Sawt al-jihad* as a whole – we find a mosaic of quotations drawn from innumerable previous contexts, including jihadist ones. Sentences (4), (10) and (14) in the op-ed above are typical examples of explicitly marked hypotexts. All these hypotexts are Quranic verses cued in the text and manifestly marked on the surface of the text using bold font and verse symbols ﴿ … ﴾.[15] The magazine is replete with a broad range of explicitly marked Quranic verses and prophetic sayings. The following is an example of an explicitly marked embedded prophetic *Hadith*:

> **(5)**
> Do you feel solitude for the walkers are few? [1] Do you feel going slow for the road is so long? [2] Then remember his saying – peace be upon him: (By Him in Whose Hand Muhammad's soul is, I love to fight in the way of Allah and get killed, to fight again and get killed and to fight again and get killed) [3]. O you, the mujahedeen on the path of Allah…
>
> *Issue 6,* November 2003

This hypotextual *Hadith* in sentence [3] appeared in the op-ed of the sixth issue. It is also marked explicitly on the surface of the text using parentheses. These symbols are used conventionally to mark Quranic verses and *Hadith*. However, aside from punctual markers, hypotexts are marked using discourse representation or speech reportage. There are conventional methods of reporting Quran and *Hadith* quotations. The excerpt above represents an embedded hypotextual *Hadith* by means of the phrase (قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم), which can be

[15] Occasionally, the ampersand symbol is used to mark the end of a verse when more than one verse is involved.

roughly translated as 'his saying peace be upon him'. However, discourse reorientation can play the ideological role of determining the functions of the represented hypotext. Below is the excerpt that first featured in section 5.3.1:

> **(6)**
> …Allah has ordained a great command on us; it is *jihad* for the sake of God, the Almighty has said [1]: ﴿**Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you. But perhaps you hate a thing and it is good for you, and perhaps you love a thing and it is bad for you. And Allah Knows, while you know not**﴾ [2] … God has ordained *jihad* for reasons, all of which are available in our time. From repelling the aggression of the unbelievers to fighting the apostates, supporting the oppressed, and freeing prisoners, let alone offensive *jihad* against the infidels until they give the *jizyah* [poll tax] willingly while they are humbled [3]…
>
> *Issue 1*, September 2003

The representation above concerns the ideational content of what is quoted. It frames the hypotext message by merging the voice of a sacred hypotext with that of an AQAP speaker. The message that is contained in the hypotext – ordaining *jihad* upon the believers – is contextualised in the immediate context of the AQAP mission. The pronoun *us* in the representing discourse in (1) externalises the pronoun *you* in the represented sacred text. Subsequently, the sacred text – with its epistemological and religious weight towards both the addresser and addressee – is translated into the speaker's own language. The notion that the sacred text is *a*-historical is deeply rooted in religious discursive practices. Considering the other hypotextual characteristics of AQAP discourse that consolidate the religionisation of the jihadist narrative – jihadist deeds – these are justified in religious terms by portraying them as embodying the divine message of the sacred text. In other words, the magazine plays the role of interpreting the hypotext for its audience.

The aim of marking the quoted sacred hypotexts is by no means a matter of establishing them as belonging to an outside voice. Quite the contrary, marking the embedded hypotexts serves to highlight their Divinity. The outcome of this process is a linguistic form that establishes an authoritor-authoritee relationship between text producer and consumer, whereby the jihadist interpretation of the sacred text is *the* true one. The meaning of the hypotext, therefore, cannot be determined without referring to how it functions and is recontextualised in the new intertext. The jihadist identification with hypotexts and the abolition of their socio-historical context are trends that characterise the radical rhetoric. Currently, this trend is experienced in the discourse of a wide range of violent extremist groups, known as Salafist jihadism. Such a phenomenon taps into the old dichotomy of literalist vs intentionalist interpretations of religious texts, and the question of the *a*-historicity of a religious text.

6.3.4.2 *Unmarked hypotexts*

The second type of hypotextual micro-structures is *unmarked embedded hypotexts*. In this type, there is no explicit boundary between the intertext and the contained hypotext. Devices marking hypotexts – such as Quranic markers, quotation marks and reporting clauses – disappear. The exact words of the hypotext or sequences of hypotexts are used. Occasionally, tense and deictics of the hypotext are shifted to incorporate the voice and perspective of the new intertext. Consider the fragment below, which appeared in September 2003 in an AQAP statement pertaining to a previous report produced by the Saudi Interior Ministry:

> **(7)**
> The Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula – in the bounty of Allah – are **preparing all that they could**, and summoning **whatever they are able of power**, in addition to the fighting experiences they have gained in various fields of jihad [1]. They did not prepare all that, nor did they carry the banner of jihad, but for **the word of God to be the highest**, so that **there shall be no more fitnah [tribulation] and worship shall be for Allah** [2]. They have vowed to fight America everywhere, especially in the land of the two holy mosques, taken by the Crusaders as a base to launch the Crusade wars … and Afghanistan and Iraq have been invaded from its different bases [3].
>
> *Issue 2*, September 2003

The italicised bold portions of the passage above are fragments of Quranic verses blended into the text. The voices of the hypotext and the intertext are not demarcated. However, such pieces are used to represent the speaker's discourse and are easily recognised and understood by the intended audience, which thus finds it easy to go along with their meanings. The degree of *boundary maintenance* (Fairclough 1992: 119) between the hypotext and the intertext is a matter of deliberate and conscious choice. The two hypotextual fragments in [1] are incorporated from the following Quranic verse:

> And **prepare against them whatever you are able of power** and of steeds of war, by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides whom you do not know, [but] whom Allah knows. (Q, 8: 60)

Recontextualisation here involves reshaping the hypotext to some degree. As sentence [1] illustrates, the aspect of the hypotextual verb 'prepare' in the Quranic verse has been transformed into the present 'are preparing'. Meanwhile, the second person *you* is transformed into the third person plural *them,* which is co-referential to the subject of the sentence, *the Mujahedeen in the Arabian Peninsula.* The level of blending of the voices involved in this micro-structure is remarkably more than that in the explicitly marked ones. The key hypotextual phrase acts as an anchor to the context of jihadism that helps maintain a linkage between the old context of the Quranic verse and the subsequent recontextualisation, in which the phrase is

incorporated as a positive attribution predicated to the *mujahedeen*. This manoeuvre is widely used in *Sawt al-jihad* and has close ties with the authoritative appeal to sacred texts. This accords with a long-established epistemological pattern, whereby sacred texts are eternal and open to *a*-historical readings. Similarly, sentence [2] draws hypotextual relations with two other Quranic verses. The two clauses *'the word of God to be the highest'*[16] and *'there shall be no more fitnah [tribulation] and worship shall be for Allah'*[17] are two hypotextual clauses grammatically subordinated to a main clause, of the speaker's words, in a relationship marked by the conjunction *for*. The aim is to use the authority of the hypotext to support the speaker's position.

Embedding Quranic verses and other types of hypotexts in AQAP texts works to re-inscribe them into the subsequent AQAP context. The constant incorporation of hypotextual series – marked or otherwise – and the fidelity to maintaining a manner of convergence to the hypotext and its established meanings work to bolster the speaker's merits and truthfulness.

6.3.4.3 *Allusions to hypotexts*

The third type is allusions. AQAP discourse is replete with words (or phrases) that evoke assumed/shared knowledge between speaker and hearer, e.g. historical texts, stories and personalities. These allusions acquire their meanings from the shared collective memories of an epistemic community. In its entirety, the collective memory – imaginary or real – represents a type of hypotextual domain that can be mined as a source of meanings, and stories for making sense of the present-day setting. Such cross-domain mappings are integral to every hypotextual reference. However, in the case of allusions, mapping processes draw freely on other semiotic elements. Elements can be events (e.g. nominating the attack on one of the residential complexes in Eastern Riyadh in 2009 as *Badr al-Riyad*, referring to the battle of *Badr*[18] in early Islam). Nevertheless, allusions are inevitably accompanied by two processes that work to strengthen the plausibility of the analogy: *erasure* and *focalisation* (Hodges 2011). Erasure involves excluding facts inconsistent with the narrative, while focalisation highlights the similarities between the two domains of the analogy that the speaker wishes to make

[16] 'And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds (is this not seeds?). You said seed in the text of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows.' Quran, 8: 60.

[17] 'Fight them until there is no [more] *fitnah* 'tribulation' and [until] worship is [acknowledged to be] for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors.' Quran, 2: 193.

[18] This was the first battle fought by Prophet Mohammed and his followers against the Polytheists of Makkah. It was in 17 Ramadhan 2 AH – Islamic calendar. It was for the timing – 17 Ramadhan 1424 AH – that the operation in Riyadh was named *Badr al-Riyadh.* Again, hypotextual connections are maintained on the operational level.

conspicuous. For instance, alluding to the battle of *badr* and the operation of *badr alriyad* focuses on similarities, such as the timing (both events occurred during Ramadan) and the small numbers of fighters on the Muslim side. On the other hand, facts pertaining to Muslim casualties are overlooked. In fact, allusions of this sort are strategically used to fulfil several functions: an association with the exemplary time of the Prophet. Above all, they serve as easily repeatable, catchy phrases or slogans that are reiterated across AQAP texts to consolidate the overall narrative.

Semiotic elements can be ready-made labels for social actors. This category is a rich source for the division of social actors in the jihadist worldview, and it can be best observed in the different labels used to construct a tripartite image of the world. The Self camp is designated as *Muslims, believers, mujahedeen* etc. Labels such as *apostates, hypocrites* and *discouragers*, among others, are recalled nominating the Other-within. For the Other-outwith, a myriad of labels is used, including *infidels, Crusaders, the Romans* etc. The religionised narrative evokes the vast histories of meanings inscribed in these labels. As a whole, the intra-textual combination of these labels, which have hypotextual references to the past, provides a coherent narrative of the current world by drawing analogies to past worlds. This narrative and the histories inscribed therein belong to an historical series and, therefore, engage the listener in the interpretation of intertextual context. For every text, the listener is engaged in deciding to which series a text belongs and, subsequently, what can be presupposed as common ground for the participants.

Allusions cut across other forms of textuality, such as paratextuality and metatextuality. In these allusions, an analogy is always made between the collective memories of "the time of the Prophet" and "the present context". These are strengthened by drawing comparisons between the two contexts. These similarities are accentuated through the process of repetition. Each reiteration of the hypotextual phrases reinforces AQAP's association with a larger narrative of a commitment to Divine will. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide an exhaustive account of either the allusions occurring in *Sawt al-jihad,* or the hypotexts standing behind them. Therefore, I will just give one more example, whereby allusion involves a rather complex transformation. Consider the reference to AQAP mujahedeen as *strangers* in the following excerpt:

(8)

At a time when the demoralisers are many, hypocrisy and hypocrites have peered, the mujahedeen have become **strangers** amongst their relatives, loved ones, and friends. They rarely find aides for the good, and supporters on its road.

Issue 1, September 2003

This emotional excerpt alludes to a prediction of the Prophet that is widely circulated in the Salafi tradition. It is the apocalyptic view that, at the end of time, few believers will uphold their religion, also known as *strangers*, similar to early Muslims. In other words, deeming the mujahedeen as *strangers* hypotextually relates to the Prophet's statement that: "Islam initiated as something strange, and it would revert to its (old position) of being strange, so good tidings for the stranger."[19] This type of allusive nomination encapsulates a complex story and, more importantly, efficiently entails the *argument of commitment*. The essential meaning here is that the estranged mujahedeen are those who are committed to the principles of Islam based on the accepted epistemological hierarchy outlined in 3.5. The allusions deployed throughout the magazine utilise ready-made cultural frameworks in the hypotextual context as generic precedents.

Allusions are employed abundantly in predication, too. The attributes are selected strategically to ensure the *Muslim* audience picks up on two concepts. For instance, when speaking of the alliance between Saudi Arabia and non-Muslim countires, the word *tatawalla* 'take as an ally' is predicated to the Other-within. Here, there is a hypotextual allusion to well-known concept of 'allying the infidels', that is closely linked to the enthymeme of alliance and disavowal in 7.3.3 below. Allying the infidel is regarded as a nullifier of belief, i.e. a pretext to excommunicate rulers. Indeed, issues of *Sawt al-jihad* extensively elaborate on this and other nullifiers in a series of episodes entitled *nawāqiḍu al-islam,*'nullifiers of Islam'. The choice of this classical word rather than that associated with common parlance, namely, *taħālaf,* which has the same meaning, hpotextually alludes to a Quranic verse.[20] This indicates that linguistic choice goes beyond the political to the ideological, presupposing thereby the conclusion included in the verse: "*And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed, he is [one] of them.*"

The hypotextual tendencies noted above can be interpreted as one realisation of a wider tendency of AQAP speakers to market their worldviews in ways that link consistently to the sacred texts and history. The hypotextual series connect – either through presupposed or entailed indexicality – with a particular context and other valued contexts. Such linkage with sacred and valued texts bears both an epistemological and a rhetorical significance. These hypotextual tendencies sustain for the AQAP narrative what can be called a *regime of truth,* in

[19] Muslim, 270.

[20] "O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you – then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people", Quran, 2: 51.

Foucault's terms (Hodges 2011). Every discourse producer – particularly a perspectivised discourse of the AQAP sort – speaks from within a certain regime of truth (Blommaert 2005). The system of truth in the AQAP case is religious in nature and revolves around a corpus of sacred texts and a collection of sayings that belong to a religious imaginary about the past. In doing so, the cited hypotexts must give up their transitivity: they no longer speak, they are spoken; they no longer denote, they connote; they no longer mean something on their own, they acquire the status of material. The role of such hypotextuality introduces a novel way of reading or consuming the jihadist discourse, whereby every hypotextual reference is an invitation to a continued process of reading the hypotext, integrating the hypotext and the intertext in a unified syntagmatic structure.

6.4. Recap and conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the different intertextual formations exhibited in *Sawt al-jihad.* The intertextual formations seem to play a significant role in delivering a coherent narrative drawing on religion as historical analogies. In effect, they seem to position the recipients as social subjects and instil a degree of credibility and truthfulness of the AQAP message within them. The social world constructed in this narrative is the outcome of the discursive process "world-making" (Bourdieu 1989: 22). I have argued in this chapter that intertextuality is an identity kit, creating and promoting views of the Self and the Other, and assigning every social actor an identity, by drawing analogical representations between an assumed past and the current political reality. The jihadists' system of intertextuality system revolves around the possession of religious truth through investment in prior sacred and valued texts' symbolic capital.

I have developed an approach to intertextuality, drawing on Genette (1997), which concerns deliberate intertextual transpositions being drawn with hypotexts – pre-existing texts located as major sources of epistemological and symbolic value. I have termed this intertextual phenomenon *hypotextuality.* In section 6.2, my approach to hypotextuality is detailed, differentiating various levels of hypotextual transformations: *archetextuality*, where hypotextual processes occur as a structural whole; *paratextuality*, where hypotexuality shows up at the level of the paratext; *meta-textuality,* when selcted hypotexts are being topicalised; and *micro-hypotextuality,* whereby the intertextual relation is a text-to-text one, e.g. embedded hypotexts, allusions etc. Section 6.3 has provided an account of *Sawt al-jihad's* intertextual profile in light of the proposed framework.

Chapter 7 ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTATION STRATEGIES IN AQAP DISCOURSE

7.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to answer the third research question: what are the argumentation strategies and the macro-/micro-legitimatory topoi utilised in AQAP discourse to (de)legitimise the Self and the Other? I answer this question through the methodology of topoi analysis, which has already been described in previous chapters. First, in 7.2, I will provide a brief overview of enthymemes evidenced in *Sawt al-jihad*, classified into their respective topoi. Subsequent sections, 7.3–7.6, explore the argumentative nature of *Sawt al-jihad* by locating legitimatory topoi and the ways they are rhetorically demonstrated.

7.2. The dynamics of topoi and enthymemes

Argumentation is an essential hallmark of any specific perspectivised discourse. The research data are overwhelmingly imbued with an enormous set of topoi that cannot all be sufficiently analysed within the limitations of this chapter. Rather, this chapter explores *Sawt al-jihad*'s argumentation profile through: (i) exploring the *topoi* or places that are the sources of arguments, and (ii) sketching the macro-arguments or enthymemes stemming from these sources. For reasons of space, the analysis is restricted to the arguments pertaining to *jihad*, the Self and the Other. It leaves aside the enormous arguments and counter-arguments on other issues like juristic and theological polemics, the representation of the media, among others. The data reveal that the macro-structure of *Sawt al-jihad* promotes a set of argumentative themes for the legitimation of the Self and the AQAP jihadist mission as well as the delegitimisation of Other social actors. The salient macro-argumentative enthymemes are presented in Figure 13, which roughly presents them alongside their respective scale. These enthymemes are arguments emerging from AQAP discourse and each enthymeme is constructed as an 'if …, then' argument that guarantees the transition from premise to conclusion.



Figure 13: Macro-augmentative themes in *Sawt al-jihad*

As noted earlier in 4.3.3, topoi are sources, from which propositions or arguments that have logico-discursive universal patterns, are derived. Based on this approach to topoi, the legitimatory enthymemes shown above can be classified into four macro topoi: topos of authority, commitment, consequence and defence, as illustrated in the diagram below:



Figure 14: The set of topoi and their enthymemes in *Sawt al-jihad*

The analysis presented in the two previous chapters has shown that AQAP language, in the pursuit of its political goals, is religious in substance. The religious identity forms the core of AQAP jihadist politics, whereby non-compromising views of the past and the Self legitimise

reviving a *polity* defined and legitimised in religious terms. As a religious group, AQAP constitutes its speech repertoire based solely on historical analogical reasoning, whereby the topos of religious authority is *the* key topos. The historical analogical reasoning underpinning AQAP discourse stems from the fact that a Muslim's life – including their politics – must be modelled after that of the Prophet Mohammed and his followers. As pointed out earlier, *salafiyah* 'Salafism' is a puritanical religious mindset centring on the view that the era of the Prophet, *saħāba* 'the first generation', and *tābiʾīn* 'their followers' is purer than later eras, including the present. This view of history underpins the notion of revivalism or a return to a pure past.

Therefore, there is meaning in this choice of topoi displayed in Figure 14. The selection of these topoi reflects how the producers of *Sawt al-jihad's* texts tailor their arguments according to the assumed audience: a Salafist audience. As the diagram highlights, the key topos under which the macro doctrinal enthymemes fall is that of religious authority. The deliberate choice of an appeal to religious authority as the central topos in AQAP discourse impacts on the audience's reception of the expressed arguments. The topos of religious authority and its macro-enthymemes, along with other rhetorical demonstrations of this topos, are not just mental *topoi* – 'places' that the speakers go to. Rather, they are locations to which the audience is led in order to achieve complete reasoning. That is, based on the visual metaphor of *topoi* as sources of arguments, the recipient will be circumscribed in a reasoning space, where s/he is trapped with these enthymemes: whose rules shall be implemented? Is *jihad* divinely ordained? Should the Muslims ally to each other and disavow the disbelievers? etc. This reasoning narrows the recipient's focus on seeking the sanctioning of jihadist deeds through their literal interpretations of specific texts. Moreover, it takes into consideration the accepted epistemological hierarchy and comprises recontextulaised texts from the Quran, *Sunnah* and opinions of respected figures from across the full spectrum of the Islamic tradition. This topos aims to test the lay believer's commitment, wherein joining *jihad* becomes either an act of obedience or disobedience to Allah. A wide range of arguments also constructs *jihad* as obligatory.

It is worth mentioning that these topoi are charged with a wide range of emotional appeals that may matter more than the argumentative rational content, as suggested by prominent scholars (e.g. Lynch 2006; Hafez 2007b; Hafez 2007a; Sageman 2011). The emotional presentation of these topoi and corresponding enthymemes is achieved using a host of stylistic schemes, e.g. anaphora, repetition, rhetorical questions etc. However, the stylistic representations of topoi are an interesting topic that may be addressed elsewhere. Before, proceeding to the analysis of topoi and enthymemes, I should highlight an important issue. The premises underlying both

enthymemes and the underlying topoi are not always manifest. Indeed, they are more often latent or presupposed either as shared knowledge or meanings invoked by intertextual connections.

7.3. Topos of religous authority

Religious authority forms the main thrust of AQAP discourse, for both macro ideological ideas and specific nuances concerning minor religious or *jihad*-related juristic issues. In this regard, *Sawt al-jihad* draws on a received belief in the realm of the *Salafist* epistemic community that revelation is the source of truth. Consequently, role of *ʿaql* 'intellect' is subservient to *waħy* 'revelation' and subsequent traditions, (see examples 1–2, below):

> **(1)**
> At this time comes *Sawt al-jihad* to be of help to the mujahed, lighting his way and guiding him to the path, its inexhaustible fount is the **texts of the two revelations, Quran and Sunnah, and the biographies of the Prophet's companions, their followers** and those who follow them until the Day of Judgment.
>
> *Issue 1*, September 2003

> **(2)**
> One of the characteristics of religious duties is the fact that the person submits to Allah and performs them, and does not subject them to **reason nor the experiences of others**, but performs as ordained by Allah and seeks reward from Him.
>
> *Issue 1*, September 2003

As the bold portion in example (1) shows, AQAP's editorials explicitly state these epistemological principles. Regardless of the question of whose words the *Sunnah* is, this excerpt makes no distinction between the Quran and the *Sunnah*, and thereby they are strategically given the same status regarding authority. Furthermore, it is notable that the religious authority is more than that of revelation. The excerpt also establishes the authority of the practice of the Prophet's companions and the succeeding generations, respectively. This received opinion among scholars of Sunni Islam is based on a renowned *Hadith*, stating that "[t]he best of my followers are those living in my generation (i.e. my contemporaries) and then those who will follow the latter".[1] The aim of these pronouncements, made as early as the first issue of *Sawt al-jihad*, is to object to any potential anti-textualistic argumentation. This objection has important implications. Chief among them is to undermine non-literal interpretations of Quran and *Sunnah* that would be at odds with AQAP's coherent narrative, which is based on *a*-historic, revolutionised readings of specific sacred texts, as will be shown

[1] Bukhari, 2.

in the enthymemes below. Thus, any deviation from this normative system is explicitly condemned in *Sawt al-jihad's* editorials:

> **(3)**
> Their pursuit reminds us of what the **outlier rationalist group** (Muhammad Abdu and Jamal al-Afghani and who is their ilk) did with British colonial rule in Egypt, where they deterred the *ummah* from fighting with their **rationalistic sophistries**, and their submissive opinions of co-existence, that abolish tenets of religion such as 'alliance [to the believers] and disavowal [of the non-believers][2] and *jihad* on God's path.
>
> *Issue 1*, September 2003

> **(4)**
> *Jihad* in the path of the Almighty Allah is an obligation imposed by Allah on his worshippers; it is not a human ideology, approach or opinion that can be tested or experimented. A Muslim has no choice but to accept or reject it. Moreover, ***jihad* should not be based on rationally considering its pros and cons**, the pros and cons are considered in light of what religion says and the worshipping aspect of *jihad* ought not to be overlooked.
>
> *Issue 1*, September 2003

Technically, examples 1–4 set forth the normative epistemological system that governs the jihadist worldview vis-à-vis truth, history and the common good. This system makes a clear distinction between two approaches to the divine texts within the epistemic community of Sunni Islam. A distinction is made between scriptural interpretations of sacred texts and more rationalistic intentional interpretations, *alfiqh almaqāṣidī*. Reducing Islam to religious scripts, and presupposing its universal message regardless of time and place, the commitment to a literal interpretation then becomes the ultimate means of expressing authenticity. Thus, it follows that *al-ʿaqlāniyah* 'rationalism' is constructed discursively as a rival to supposedly authentic literal interpretations. The rationalist Other is then presented negatively as outliers who mean mischief to *ummah* by adopting so-called sophistries that call for submission to the enemy by abolishing *jihad*.[3] Therefore, the consistent appeal to religious authority throughout the magazine by the recontextualisation of sacred texts affords the jihadist worldview significant epistemological credibility. There are socio-cognitive dimensions of the production and interpretation of the sacred texts that operate according to specific ontological and epistemological norms within the community of believers.

[2] I will return to 'alliance and disavowal' in section 7.3.1.3.

[3] *Sawt al-jihad* makes frequent references or allusions to history. In Example 5, while the two prominent Islamic scholars Mohammed Abdu and his mentor Jamal al-Afghani are both deemed Islamic reformists in the early post-colonial period – particularly the late 19th century – in mainstream modern thought, they are presented as examples of heretic rationalists. Rationalism in this context is nothing but a modern hermeneutic interpretation of religious texts as both scholars remained loyal to their call for a return to the original teachings of Islam and application of the Islamic system.

Thus, these excerpts explicate a reasoning system based on historical analogical representations, according to which the AQAP mindset works. Thus, reasoning can be:

a. *scriptural,* in which contemporary political realities are mapped against the background of certain sacred texts;
b. *historical,* in which analogical conceptions are drawn between contemporary political realities and *a* sacred history as constructed in the AQAP narrative; or
c. a combination of the two.

Scriptural representations manifest themselves as Quranic verses, *Hadith* narrations or the sayings of respectable historical figures deemed *salaf* 'pious predecessors'. AQAP borrows heavily, albeit selectively, from these categories and imposes past notions on the present political realities. Historical representations include a wide range of historical accounts that comprise what can be said to be the jihadists' version of *sacred history.* Given the jihadist's revivalist approach that seeks to revive a lost past, it is indeed not only the case that specific incidents from history are evoked, but also that the wider historical narratives are mapped onto the present. AQAP – among other jihadist groups – reimagines and reconstructs *a* history of the *ummah,* or *a* 'religious imaginary' in the words of Arkoun (2006). Examples of analogical historical representations that abound in AQAP discourse would include: mapping the narrative of the Prophet's struggle in the Battle of Badr onto the present AQAP's members' offensive in Riyadh; mapping the eleventh-/twelfth-century Crusaders onto contemporary America and its coalition etc. Thus, centuries of Islamic interpretations and counter-representations are overlooked and a rather strict, uncompromising textual reading is put forward as unmitigated articles of faith.

The appeal to religous authority is in a sense a topos that can be formalised as follows (Reisigl 2014: 76):

Conclusion Rule:	If authority X says that A is true/that A has to be done, A is true/that A has to be done.
A:	X says that A is true/that A has to be done.
C:	Thus, A is true/A has to be done.

The topos of religous authority underpins AQAP's ideological starting points. These starting points comprise the macro-enthymemes displayed in Figure 14: namely, the enthymemes of *ħākimiyah*, divinely ordained *jihad*, and alliance and disavowal. These three enthymemes are manifestations of the process of revolutionising specific sacred texts. In a sense, each enthymeme is propped up by a formal argument: 'God said it.' Thus, it engages in employing religious 'meaning in the service of power', in a perceived social world in which the difference

marker is religion (Hjelm 2014: 866). From a critical perspective, these enthymemes are a struggle for argumentation and hegemony. *Ħākimiyah*, divine ordainment, and alliance and disavowal are creedal enthymemes, fetched from tradition, but strategically recontextualised to serve the jihadist cause. These three enthymemes have nothing to do with the *Other*-outwith. Rather, despite the declared enemy in AQAP's campaign being the *Other*-outwith, all these macro-enthymemes are concerned with delegitimising the *Other*-within, and legitimising the Self.

7.3.1. *Enthymeme of ħākimiyah*

The concept of *ħākimiyah* is the most prominent revolutionised concept that can be regarded as the spearhead enthymeme in AQAP discourse for delegitimising the Other-within. The term *ħākimiyah* means that ultimate sovereignty and authority belong to God. That is, all walks of life, and foremost the political, must be governed by *Sharia* law for society to be Islamic. The term *ħākimiyah* is derived from instances of the verb *yaħkum,* and its verbal noun *ħukm,* in the sacred texts. An example is this Quranic verse, which is circulated widely in *Sawt al-jihad:* (And whoever does not – *yaħkum* – 'judge' by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers).[4] I should note though the fact that the Arabic verb *yaħkum*, contained in the Quranic verse, is actually polysemic. In other words, it has multiple senses, such as 'rule', 'govern', 'judge' and 'adjudicate conflicts', inter alia (Mujamma 2004). The polysemy of *yaħkum* involves both a political and a judiciary sense, i.e. the judiciary sense of adjudicating according to *Sharia* law and the exercise of politics according to God's law. Although all Islamic exegetic treatises unanimously interpret this verse according to the judiciary context (Tarabishi 2008a; 2008b), *Sawt al-jihad* goes along with the mainstream jihadist literature and ideologises the Quranic verse and charges it with a political sense.

With regard to the political aspect, the formative texts of Islam do not dictate a particular from of governance. It is noteworthy that Quran and *Sunnah* traditions narrate with elaboration the basic principles and characteristics setting the governance standards for the rulers and the ruled (Choudari and Ahmed 2013). These principles include *ʿadl* 'justice', accountability, honesty, equality and freedom. The Islamic theorisation of politics appeared later. Based on readings of the political practices of the Prophet and the historical experience of the Prophet's early Caliphs, political theories were formulated later, beginning with Mawardi's (d. 1058) theories and later those of Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328). The early theories perceived *ummah* as a basic collective

[4] Quran, 5: 44.

religio-political unit, and the *Sharia* as the basis for the legal system. Due to the political decline of the Islamic Caliphate at the time eleventh to the fourteenth centuries, the notion of the Caliphate is not as central as that of *ummah* and *Sharia*. Consequently, it is fair to say that the concept of *ħākimiyah* is a recent one (al-Sayyid 2015; Tarabishi 2008a; 2008b). The notional concept of *ħākimiyah* crystallised in the context of anti-colonial liberation movements (Rahman and Ali 2012). Although the concept is invoked broadly in the discourse of Islamists, the term is ambiguous and remains far from achieving consensus, even among Islamists. Al-Sayyid (2015) argues that *ħākimiyah* characterises any rival political order, be it democracy or any other political form, as un-Islamic and tantamount to apostasy.

In the post-Ottoman era, there have been two dominant forms of political Islam: the calls for restoration of the Caliphate as a symbol for one *ummah* and the calls for applying *Sharia* as a moral and legal system. As far as *Sawt al-jihad* goes, the AQAP approach combines both forms, combining an argumentative theme that can be labelled the enthymeme of *ħākimiyah*. This enthymeme is central to both legitimising the Self and delegitimising the Other. The nominalisation of this concept through the constant rhetorical recycling of *ħākimiyah* throughout *Sawt al-jihad* goes along with the use of the enthymeme of *ħākimiyah* by other jihadist groups. This enthymeme schematises the Quranic verse cited above – along with other sacred texts of similar themes – so that when speaking of the legitimacy of a certain ruler or government, this enthymeme then creates the following syllogism:

(I) God says that His laws must be implemented.
(II) Ruler X does not implement God's laws.

Ruler X is a disbeliever and therefore illegitimate.

The major premise I is admitted as an acceptable proposition or a shared belief with the assumed audience. More importantly, this premise is an applicable rule drawing on the aforementioned Quranic verse. The ideologisation of religious tradition occurs at the level of such discursive schematisation of a well-known Quranic verse, giving way to an extremist argumentation tool that is at odds with the mainstream and classical canon of religious scholars. Consider these excerpts:

(5)

The disbelief of these *ṭawāghīt* [the Saudi rulers] sanctified the juristic principles of the people of *Sunnah* [the Sunni community of believers], stipulating the excommunication of apostates **who rule/judge by laws other than what Allah has revealed**, **change his religion**, **make what is *ħalāl* [permissible] into what is *ħarām* [forbidden], and what is *ħarām* [forbidden] into what is *ħalāl* [permissible]**…

Issue 3, October 2003

(6)

Also, therein is the **apostate puppet government** that … governs according to laws other than those of Almighty God, and jails those who **call them to implement Allah's *Sharia*** [the mujahedeen and the jihadist ideologues]...

Issue 1, September 2003

This enthymeme of *ħākimiyah* has become a ready-made argument for the legitimisation of the mujahedeen and the delegitimisation of their rivals, political rulers. It has been established in the discourse of Al Qaeda leaders that democracies, constitutional governments and insufficiently Islamic monarchies are viewed as equally illegitimate forms of governance for Muslim communities because these forms favour human rulers and legal systems over the "the law of God", *Sharia* (Blanchard 2007).[5] In this regard, the application of *Sharia* law is not only a legal system, but also an all-encompassing paradigmatic political system – the Islamic state – that governs all aspects of social and economic life, as opposed to *al-aħkām al-waḍ'iyah* 'positivistic, man-made laws' and *al-dīmuqrāṭiyah al-kāfirah* 'infidel democracy'. As far as *Sawt al-jihad* goes, *ħākimiyah* is used strategically to mean both implementing a *Sharia-based* judiciary and governing/regulating society from the top in accordance with God's law, *Sharia.* However, *Sawt al-jihad* avoids the Saudi monarchy being illegitimate per se because if *ħākimiyah* refers to governance, the Saudi dynasty is no different from any earlier ruling dynasty in Islamic history. Moreover, in this instance, both the canon of tradition and the authority of exemplary *salaf* are counterproductive, for it is an established rule in Salafism that dissidence to the ruler is strictly forbidden.[6]

Instead, *Sawt al-jihad* opts for delegitimising it on account of the institution's failure to commit to *Sharia* and other reasons that I will offer below. However, little is said throughout the magazine about the second premise of the enthymeme, i.e. that 'the Saudi government/rulers do not implement *Sharia* 'God's law'. Indeed, the judiciary system in Saudi Arabia is based on the provisions of Islamic law. An instantiation of this premise only appears in an interview with

[5] *Sharia* or (God's law) is rather a problematic term that deserves further explication in its own right. I cannot do justice to it in this space but I will present Hallaq's (2013) viewpoint that I see as relevant here. Hallaq distinguishes between two forms of *Sharia*: *Sharia* prior to the emergence of the modern state and *Sharia* after. To him, the former was then the supreme moral and legal force, which was the accepted system of norms for regulating both society and government across the dynastic powers that ruled the world of Islam. This form was paradigmatic but, conversely, with the appearance of the modern state it was reduced to providing no more than the raw material for legislation of the personal status.

[6] The received opinion in the Salafi political literature, particularly *atharī Salafism* 'traditional Salafism', is against political dissent. This view is inspired by many narrations that correlate political dissent with *fitnah,* 'internal strife'. One of these narrations is this Hadith: 'When you are holding to one single man as your leader, you should kill who seeks to undermine your solidarity or disrupt your unity' (Muslim: 1852).

a jihadist, whose nom de guerre is Abdul-Rahman al-Athari, in his answer to a question about the most prominent aspects of faith shortcomings on the side of the Saudi government:

> **(7)**
> The adjudication according to laws other than those of the Almighty God (Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to *ṭāghūt*, while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray).[7] An example of this in our reality is the adjudication according to [the Saudi] **labour law** and the arbitration in the [Saudi] **Chambers of commerce**, and other [legal] systems that violate the law of God.
>
> *Issue 5*, November 2003

This excerpt reveals the extreme vision adopted by AQAP ideologues. This view that condemns the provisions of Saudi labour and commercial laws is propped up by an extreme conception of *ħākimiyah*, in the sense that divine sovereignty and God's law are so comprehensive that they preclude all human laws and authority. This idea is in parallel with the established concept of *ħākimiyah* and known in other radical groups since the 1970s. The fundamental aim is to delegitimise the Saudi state and declare its rulers as *kuffār,* disbelievers. Otherwise, waging a jihadist campaign would not adhere to the principles of legitimate *jihad*.

The enthymeme of *ħākimiyah* refers to the corresponding claim that Muslim leaders submit to the West, do not adhere to the *Sharia* and engage in international institutions that are not based on God's law. This has close ties to the jihadist's anti-nation-state and anti-democracy sentiments. The nation-state is constructed as being in defiance to the assumed supreme Islamic polity and democracy – as the rule of the demos – in defiance of God's sovereignty and authority. With regard to the former, jihadists are not alone in despising the nation-state system as pan-Arabists hold a similar view of the modern state as a colonial legacy. While pan-Arabists called for the unity of Arabs, the jihadists' armed struggle is basically for restoring a single Islamic polity: one state under one ruler as a symbol of Muslim unity and identity.

> **(8)**
> …those [the mujahedeen] who disbelieve in all the *ṭawāghīt* on earth, of the Arab and non-Arab governments, those who disbelieve in **the UN**, Arab and regional tyrannical organisations, those who disown the polytheistic doctrines, the paths of democracy, and the ***wathaniyah* 'idolatry' of *waṭaniyah* 'national'**.
>
> *Issue 8*, December 2003

The call for applying *Sharia* in the jihadist sense is different from that of the mainstream Islamists. For the latter, implementing the *Sharia* more or less means to have *Sharia*-based judiciary systems in which their set of laws is compatible with the traditional *Sharia* system.

[7] Quran, 4:60.

They embrace this view within their respective nation-state systems. For the jihadists, *Sharia* is, conversely, more than a set of codified laws, i.e. *Sharia* here is used in the political sense as the ultimate framework for political legitimacy. Particularly in countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Syria, mainstream Islamists' call for implementing *Sharia* is a reaction to the replacement of the traditional *Sharia* with modernised laws emanating solely from the secular nationalist political authority (Fukuyama 2011). As rightfully argued by (Feldman 2012: 111–117), these demands for a return to *Sharia* reflect a grave dissatisfaction with lawless authoritarianism, in which powerful executives are neither limited by modern courts and legislatures nor by a class of *ulema*.

7.3.2. *Enthymeme of obligatory/eternal jihad*

The thrust of the magazine's discourse on *jihad* comes from a religious authority that is brought to confirm the theological authenticity of the jihadist ideology in general and in particular AQAP's mission for *jihad* in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. As observed previously in 5.2.2, *Sawt al-jihad* elevates the status of *jihad* and constructs it as a divinely ordained 'ritual', or 'an act of worship', in its own right. Throughout the magazine, this enthymeme overlaps with a wide range of juristic topics and polemics concerning the legitimacy of *jihad* itself. A recurrent theme about divine ordainment concerns the debate over whether *jihad* is *farḍ kifāyah* 'a collective duty' or *farḍ ʾayn* 'personal/permanent duty'. AQAP's stance is in favour of the latter, breaking away from classical and mainstream *ulema* 'religious scholars'. The underlying topos for this stance is the topos of divine authority. After all, *jihad* is a religious notion, the legitimisation of which must be observed according to juristic norms. *Sawt al-jihad* depicts *jihad* as a permanent obligatory duty for Muslims individually, similar to the five pillars of Islam: prayer, fasting etc. The performer of the *farḍ ʾayn jihad* is rewarded, but unlike collective *jihad*, failing to perform it leads to punishment.

Such a view is constantly repeated throughout *Sawt al-jihad.* Consider this excerpt quoting Abdul-Qadir Abdul-Aziz[8], a pseudonym for a well-known jihadist ideologue:

[8] His real name is Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (aka Abdul-Qadir Abdul-Aziz or Dr. Fadl). He has written central texts on the theological and practical meaning of *jihad*. Some of his writings (e.g. *alʾumdah fī iʾdād alʾuddah* 'The essentials for making ready for *jihad*') were used as manuals in training camps in the 1980s, and later on his pro-*jihad* opinions proved influential in wider jihadist offline and online publications.

(9)

Sheikh Abdul-Qadir Abdul-Aziz, may God preserve him, said:
The fact that the *jihad* of these ***ṭawāghīt*** is **a permanent duty** is the knowledge that must be spread throughout the Muslim world. Every Muslim should know that **he is personally commanded** by his God to fight these ***ṭawāghīt***…

Issue 2, September 2003

Apart from the debate over whether *jihad* is a collective vs a personal duty, there are a number of arguments that are distinctive to the ideology of modern jihadism, i.e. *jihad* as a permanent revolution. Closely linked to the notion of *ħākimiyah*, AQAP intriguingly charges the old concept of *jihad* with new revolutionised meanings – simply *jihad* as the embodiment or externalisation of faith or God's oneness.

(10)

…we must make it clear to people that *jihad* is nothing but an **embodiment of the Oneness of God** and **an implementation of the testimony that there is no God but Allah** and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and we connect people to this matter to know the importance of jihad.

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The data reveal greater emphasis on the enthymeme of the eternality of *jihad*, whether as an abstract religious concept or as contextualised action against the internal and the external enemies in the AQAP campaign. Similarly, this enthymeme is based on the schematisation of specific texts that denote the eternality of *jihad.* Consider this excerpt:

(11)

This worship is going on to the Day of Resurrection; the Prophet peace be upon him said: "This religion will continue to exist, and a group of people from the Muslims will **continue to fight for its protection until the Hour** [End of the world] is established."

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The discursive themes constructing *jihad* as 'perpetual', 'global' and 'boundless' war against disbelief and *ṭāghūt* are abundant in *Sawt al-jihad.* The aim is to establish *jihad* as the identity marker dividing the community into *ʿal-mujāmilūn* 'the mujahedeen' and *ʿal-qāʿidūn* 'those holding back'. Thus, the construction of *jihad* as commanded by God and therefore legitimate serves two goals. First, it secures the religious credibility of their tripartite framework for social identity. By projecting *jihad* as the truth and the right path to follow, the jihadist Self is projected as committed to truth, while those Muslims abandoning *jihad* are delegitimised and constructed as the Other-within. Second, this enthymeme is a significant mobilising factor. The bulk of arguments under this enthymeme aim to establish *jihad* as a personal duty for every Muslim capable of going to war and then count on the lay believer's religiosity in deciding to join the *jihad*.

7.3.3. *Enthymeme of alliance and disavowal*

The third enthymeme falling under the topos of authority is *ʿalwalāʿu wa ʿalbarāʿ* 'alliance and disavowal'.[9] This enthymeme is dedicated to the binary division of the world into a community of believers and communities of non-believers. *ʿAlwalāʿu* means the manifestation of loyalty and alliance to the former, while on the other hand *ʿalbarāʿ* means disavowing the latter (al-Qahtani 1992). It should be noted that this creedal enthymeme is not a principal core belief in Islam; rather, it was developed as a theological concept later. It is attributed to Ibn Tamiya (d. 1328), a religious scholar whose teachings are influential in the Salafi school of thought. The concept emerged after the Mongol invasion of the Islamic world that reduced the Islamic state to smaller sectarian constituencies (al-Sayyid 2015).

Similar to the first two enthymemes, this enthymeme schematises sacred texts calling for the solidarity of believers and the disavowal of disbelievers. Consider this example:

> **(12)**
> God praised the Mujahedeen in His threat to the apostates, He said: (O you who have believed, whoever of you should revert from his religion – Allah will bring forth [in place of them] a people He will love and who will love Him [who are] humble towards the believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they strive in the cause of Allah and do not fear the blame of a critic.) **Allah praised the people whom He will bring forth by *jihad* and alliance and disavowal for being not to fear the blame of blamers for they knew the true path and took it under the guidance of God**…
>
> *Issue 2*, September 2003

Therefore, this enthymeme highlights the Saudi-American alliance as a sign of illegitimacy that is always listed as a macro-argument against the state, as we have seen in an earlier example that calls for *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia, because "therein is the apostate state that … allies to disbelievers". Under this enthymeme, a wide range of propositions are propagated. For example, the USA is constructed as a state warring against Islam and Muslims. Therefore, the mere agreements and treaties with the USA are portrayed as a breach of the principle of 'alliance and disavowal', deemed as *ʾaṣlun min ʾuṣūl ʾaddīn* 'one of the tenets of Islam'. Consider these two examples:

[9] Some sources (e.g. Harris 2010; Ulph 2006) translate *ʿalwalāʿu wal barāʿ* as 'alliance or support to the believers and enmity to the nonbelievers'. A rather precise literal translation is '*alliance and disavowal*', though such doctrinal concepts have been revolutionised in the discursive practices of the jihadists to mean 'alliance and enmity'.

(13)

Also, therein is the **apostate puppet government** that … **allies to disbelievers**.

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(14)

…it is a warring state [USA] assaulting Muslims and partaking and aiding against them across the world, and this necessitates that it in principle has no binding agreements [with Muslims] because **they were signed by *ṭawāghīt*** and apostates…

Issue 2, September 2003

Some argue that this enthymeme articulates the jihadists' core belief pertaining to the regulation of foreign affairs in the perceived Islamic state. In other words, "where prioritisation is given to the Islamic or pro-Muslim credentials of the external state, over or against other considerations (moral or financial obligation, economic interest, international treaties etc.)" (Ulph 2006: 11). Indeed, the elevation of the status of the doctrine of 'alliance and disavowal' is first and foremost geared towards the Other-within not outwith. That is, it is a legitimatory enthymeme aimed at pronouncing *takfir* 'excommunication' of the Other-within, rival political rulers. It serves to construct the Saudi state's conclusion of agreements and alliances with the USA as a nullifier of faith. Strenuous in its denunciation of national identities, *Sawt al-jihad* portrays this act from the side of the Saudi government as a betrayal of *ummah,* the Muslim community. More importantly, based on the principles of alliance and disavowal, all acts of Saudi coordination with the USA are constructed as qualifying the Saudi state for being excommunicated. Subsequently, resisting and overthrowing the Saudi state is religiously sanctified based on the principle of *ʿalwalāʿu wa ʿalbarāʿ*.

7.4. Topos of defence

Closely related to and overlapping with the topos of *ħākimiyah* is the topos of defence. It is a short-cut strategy for legitimising the Self against the perceived American occupation of Saudi Arabia – in the context of the wider classical list of Muslim suffering at the hands of infidel forces – and against the perceived Other-within's aggressions towards the mujahedeen.

7.4.1. *Enthymeme of defying the occupiers*

'we are legitimate because we are defending Muslim lands'

This enthymeme recycles a persistent theme in the jihadist movement's revolutionary rhetoric on Muslims suffering at the hands of non-Muslim aggressors that has ever since the 1960s been repeated and recontextualised in a wide range of domains and genres, both within jihadist literature and within wider pan-Islamist rhetoric. In accordance with AQ's post-1990 anti-American rhetoric, this enthymeme focuses on the USA as the key actor in the universe of the infidel Other and reinforces AQAP's declared aim: the expulsion of the occupying American forces from the Arabian Peninsula. The overlap with the topos of *ħākimiyah* occurs at the level of constructing the expulsion mission as a fulfilment of the frequently repeated *Hadith* 'Expel the polytheists from Arabia.'[10] Nonetheless, the appeal in this enthymeme to divine authority plays a rather secondary role, i.e. it does not mount to the revolutionary schematisation of the sacred texts as evidenced in the enthymemes falling under the topos of divine authority. Nevertheless, the dominant theme is the Muslims' universal right to defend their lands and liberate them from the occupying Americans, i.e. 'we are right because we are defending the Muslim lands'.

For *Sawt al-jihad*, there is a crystal-clear tendency in this enthymeme to correlate the perceived American occupation of Saudi Arabia with the Other's perceived Muslim suffering at the hands of Americans. In this regard, AQAP draws on Bin Laden's sentiments against the Saudi government's invitation of foreign troops after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. He portrayed this as an affront to the sanctity of the Holy Land of Islam. The same rhetoric emerges as early as the op-ed of the first issue, as seen previously:

> **(15)**
> One of the greatest places where *jihad* is obligatory: *bilād al-ħaramayn* [the land of the two Holy Mosques], wherein the **occupying Crusader enemy**, who steals its resources, determines its policies…
>
> *Issue 4*, October 2003

[10] Sunan Abi Dawud 3029.

Another relevant *Hadith* in this vein is the less repeated *Hadith:* 'Let there not be two religions in Arabia.' The incorporation of this *Hadith* is based on the hyperbolic portrayal of the American military presence as another religion in the Arabian Peninsula.

This same rhetoric is employed as a legitimatory argument for sanctifying and legitimising AQAP's operations inside Saudi Arabia. Consider this excerpt from the fourth issue's op-ed, commenting on the operation that was executed on the al-Muhayya compound in Riyadh:[11]

(16)

…a group of blessed youths of Islam raided a complex of settlements of the Crusaders in the Arabian Peninsula. They brought God a jihadist operation against his enemies, an operation delighting the believers and enraging the disbelievers and their allies … They have gone forth to **defend the sanctuaries of the Muslims**. They do not target Muslims and do not intend to harm them…

Issue 4, October 2003

AQAP's focus on the narrative of expelling the American troops on Arabian soil fits well onto the AQ's internationalist agenda of striking the non-Muslim aggressor forces in all Muslim lands. And, more importantly, this rhetoric of resistance appears historically to gain audience acceptance and, therefore, is heavily invested in the *Sawt al-jihad's* narrative. To put the local *jihad* in the context of pan-Islamist global *jihad*, the magazine characterises the presence of the U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia not only as an 'invading army' but also as 'another religion in Arabia'. This hyperbole helps promote the commitment to defensive *jihad* and to justify the jihadist operations against American targets insider Saudi Arabia, combatants and non-combatants alike.

A micro-topos related to this enthymeme is the more/less topos used frequently to legitimise AQAP's controversial mission in Saudi Arabia. If *jihad* is legitimate against the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, why is it then illegitimate against the bases from which the operations against Afghanistan and Iraq are launched? Consider this example:

(17)

It is strange that many young of the youth of *jihad* go to other fields of *jihad* and leave this great field [*jihad* inside Saudi Arabia].

Issue 2, September 2003

Such propositions are directed towards laypeople who consider themselves pious but are not convinced of the legitimacy of *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia.

[11] This explosion targeted a residential complex in al-Muhayya district in Riyadh and left 17 people dead and 120 injured. This operation was counter-productive as far as public opinion was concerned for it turned out that most of the casualties were Arab and Muslim expatriates, contrary to AQAP's declared aim.

7.4.2. *Enthymeme of resisting the regime/security forces*

'we are legitimate because we defend ourselves/mujahedeen'

Sawt al-jihad equally uses the topos of defence to legitimise the involvement of Muslim blood. The AQAP campaign has always been presented as a mission for the expulsion of American troops from Arabia, not intending to spill Muslim blood, as revealed in example (16). Again, although the security forces are implicitly excommunicated and pronounced *kāfir,* AQAP editorials seem to be fearful of outraging the public by the direct targeting of Saudi soldiers. It justifies the casualties among them as a matter of resistance, i.e. 'we have the right to defend ourselves/the mujahedeen'.

(18)

We will defend ourselves, we will not hesitate to repel ***al-ṣā'il*** **'the attacker' soldiers**, and we shall show them what they hate.

Issue 3, October 2003

This enthymeme focuses on the right to defend the Self but is by no means devoid of allusions to authority. The concept of *al-ṣā'il* 'a juristic term denoting the attacker be it Muslim or otherwise' is the key element from the topos of authority that overlaps with this enthymeme. However, the enthymeme of resisting the security forces was dramatically recycled towards the end of 2004, when AQAP targeted two security headquarters and checkpoints (see Appendix A). Later issues tended to employ this enthymeme and link it with the (re)production of the mujahedeen's victimhood through the incessant narration of stories about their imprisonment and alleged torture. Victimhood is reinforced with stories about the harsh lives of mujahedeen caused by being in the run, chased by security forces. The victimisation of the mujahedeen aims to gain more sympathisers and ultimately legitimise the operations against security forces as merely retaliation against mujahedeen sufferings at the hands of the security forces.

Contrary to the assertions made on the legitimacy of targeting foreign troops and the excommunication of political leaders, *Sawt al-jihad* editorials mainly use the enthymeme of repelling the security forces, given their strategy of avoiding an explicit pronouncement of Saudi soldiers being *kuffār.* However, the killing of Muslim security forces has proved to be a setback for the AQAP. The fact that some AQAP operations resulted in deaths among Muslim and Arab residents and passers-by was an embarrassing issue weaponised in the official anti-AQAP media campaign. Therefore, this issue received a considerable number of polemic replies, primarily based on accusations of fabrication on the side of the government.

7.5. Topos of commitment

Like the topos of authority, the topos of commitment is concerned with the legitimisation of the Self and the deligitimisation of the internal Other, not the external. The topos of commitment claims that Muslims should be committed to a set of ideological positions. The list of propositions goes on and touches upon a wide range of themes constructed as identity markers. Chief among these issues are the commitment to jihad, the commitment to defending Muslims, the commitment to promoting virtues and preventing vice, and so forth. Based on the commitment to these propositions, two camps of social actors arise. There are those with consistent commitment and others with inconsistent or no commitment. *Sawt al-jihad* data show that this topos is such an extraordinarily powerful tactic used in AQAP discourse, not because of factual commitment or non-commitment, but also because of the AQAP narrative and the emotional appeals infused in it. Therefore, two camps or enthymemes are instantiated in *Sawt al-jihad* in accordance with AQAP's persistent theme of the Self and the Other-within: (1) the jihadist as the epitome of Muslim, and (2) non-committed others.

Before proceeding to the two enthymemes falling under this topos, I should shed light on a point that applies equally to both enthymemes. Indeed, an important means for presupposing the topos of commitment is the tendency to infuse the narrative with hypotextual references, whether in the projection of the mujahedeen or the construction of the internal Other, as will be explained in the following section. Furthermore, regarding the audience targeted, this line of argumentation addresses lay Muslims or the population of Saudi Arabia rather than the *ulema* or the political elite. It is, as it were, a comparison drawn between two camps, and it is the task of the audience to choose from these binaries: the mujahedeen or *ʾal-qāʿidūn* 'holding back', the honest *ulema* or the dishonest *ulema*, God's soldiers or the *ṭāghūt's* soldiers.

7.5.1. *Mujahedeen as the epitome of Muslims*

'we are legitimate because we are committed and consistent'

Sawt al-*jihad* data have shown a constant tendency to iconicise the mujahed as a person who is, against all the odds, steadfast and committed to the path of Islam. The propositions demonstrating this tendency can be said to form one enthymeme: the enthymeme of epitome. This enthymeme maintains a positive self-presentation of the jihadist as *alfirqah al-nājiyah/al-manṣūrah* 'the chosen/supported community', committing themselves to what *Sawt al-jihad* constructs as the core principles of Islam. A key principle in this vein is *jihad*, the status of which has been elevated to be an embodiment of faith and monotheism in actual politics.

(19)

And then we have walked this way based on this vision [the vision that *jihad* is divinely ordained], and knew the truth and committed ourselves to it, and we ask God to be **steadfast to the truth**. *Jihad* is religious and the *ummah* has been promised that *jihad* will continue, he said peace be upon him. "This religion will continue to exist, and a group of people from the Muslims will continue to fight for its protection until the Hour is established." We hope that **we are part of this supported community, which upholds the command of God and *jihad* in the path and fights His enemies.**

Issue 3, October 2003

The enthymemes of commitment are substantiated in the wide range of nominational and predicational realisations referring to the mujahedeen. For instance, as previously noted in 5.3.1, the key reference to the mujahedeen as *ghurabāʾ* 'strangers', which draws a historical analogy between the few mujahedeen and the few early Muslims, is charged with the legitimatory topos of commitment. Since AQAP is principally participating in a war based on making claims to truth, references to social actors within the Self camp reflect a presupposed topos of commitment. For instance, Osama Bin Laden is referred to as 'the imam of the mujahedeen', a reference used to denote the Prophet.

In line with previous and subsequent jihadist groups, AQAP's performance pertaining to this enthymeme works significantly to iconicise the character of the mujahed. Therefore, this enthymeme is a mix of cognition and emotion that offers inspiration and motivation for would-be jihadists. The iconicisation of the mujahed character is an old practice in the literature of jihadist ideologues. This dates back to the writings of Abdullah Azzam, namely his book *Signs of the Merciful in the Afghan Jihad.* Iconicisation concerns incarnating ideas in personalities and this strategy plays a significant radicalising role, as noted by Gerges (2017: 33):

> In my conversations with former jihadis, one of the critical lessons I have learned is that personalities, not ideas or organisations, are the drivers behind the movement. It is a personality-driven animal that devours idealistic and alienated young Muslims.

Thanks to technological advances, the ascendance of ISIS and other jihadist groups gave rise to several publications that included multimodal projection of the charismatic jihadist. However, the charismatic projection of the mujahed in *Sawt al-jihad* was merely textual. All 29 issues include sections iconicising and memorialising significant jihadist figures, dead and

alive, within and beyond AQAP. A key theme iconicising the jihadist personality is steadfastness, i.e. commitment.[12]

7.5.2. *Enthymeme of inconsistency*

'they are illegitimate because they are inconsistent/not committed'

As opposed to the commitment and consistency of the Self, *Sawt al-jihad* strongly propagates a set of arguments about the inconsistency of the Saudi government and the *ulema* and preachers concerning *jihad.* On the one hand, the inconsistency of the political regime is a temporal one. A considerable number of propositions make references to the contradiction in supporting the mujahedeen by the government in the 1980s Afghan war and fighting the mujahedeen later on. This enthymeme is extensively recycled to delegitimise the Saudi state and construct it as a renegade. Conversely, the *ulema* and the preachers played a significant role in campaigning against AQAP as early as the campaign started, and to them alone, six episodes entitled 'Years of Deception: Studying the Reality of Sahwa Preachers' were dedicated from the fifth to the tenth issues. Their inconsistency is both temporal and spatial. The former is no different to the inconsistency of the Saudi government. The latter signals a contradiction regarding resistance to the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as legitimate *jihad* while targeting Americans inside Saudi Arabia as illegitimate. It also makes references to the contradiction in the *ulema's* and preachers' support for previous *jihads* and the objection to the current AQAP campaign.

(20)

These *ulema* were the references of the people … Many of this *ulema* were sending the youth to the battlefields and were mobilising them with their writings, cassettes and their ideas that were based on a rejection of the ruling according to laws other than God's and on waging *jihad* against the *ṭawāghīt*…

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More often, this enthymeme speaks of the generic *ulema* and preachers and occasionally specifies certain individuals.

[12] In a recent study, Lahoud (2017: 54–60) found that the common themes of *anāshīd* 'Capella songs', posted online on the jihadi website *shabakat al-mujahedeen al-iliktūniyah* 'the mujahedeen's electronic network', go for topics involving the topos of commitment, such as steadfastness, martyrdom, eulogising jihadists etc.

7.6. Topos of consequence

7.6.1. *Enthymeme of jihad usefulness*

This enthymeme legitimises *jihad* by propagating a constructed set of useful consequences. This is a complex enthymeme, as salvation is twofold: *salvation now* and *salvation then.* Regarding the former, *jihad* is salvation for the whole community, the *ummah*. It concerns legitimisation of *jihad* as 'a means of establishing the Islamic state'. Salvation now concerns rescuing the powerless Muslim believers invaded by non-Muslim forces, and ruled by treacherous apostates. It is interesting to note that the salvation narrative has nothing to do with worldly needs. While this view is in line with sublime and puritanical intentions, with which the jihadist character is correlated, it also entails a dilemma: what Gerges (2017: 279) styles a 'vacuum of ideas'. AQAP offers extreme religious interpretations and aspirations for an imagined *populous* – the *ummah* – but for real people in the real world, it offers an oblique and apocalyptic future. This future has no positive vision of governance and does not address the basic needs of the people. Their Islamic utopia is obscure, and defined, if any, in oratory terms as a place where there are no borders, and in which Muslims behave as they should do.

Conversely, *salvation then* focuses on the useful consequences ascribed to the *mujahed* in the afterlife. For AQAP to survive, it must appeal to fresh recruits. So, this enthymeme is geared towards the pool of potential recruits, particularly young males, and appeals to the salvation of the recruit as an individual. *Salvation then,* in the next world, seems to be a key mobilising factor in *Sawt al-jihad*. It draws on a set of rewards accorded to martyrdom. The data abundantly draw on a doctrine of narrations in a tradition that lists the posthumous rewards for the martyr in the cause of God. Martyrdom, therefore, lies at the core of emotionally radicalising themes in the discourse of AQAP and other jihadist groups. This thematic category is not devoid of intertextually embedding or alluding to sacred texts encouraging the believers to join *jihad* or promising them rewards in the hereafter.

> **(21)**
> …but the worship that qualifies you to receive **God's pardon and the forgiveness of sins** is verily *jihad* in the path of God. The amplified texts of the Quran and *Sunnah* confirm God's pardon and forgiveness for those perfuming *jihad.* The Almighty said: (O you who have believed, shall I guide you to a transaction that will save you from a painful punishment. [It is that] you believe in Allah and His Messenger and strive in the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is best for you, if you should know.)[13]
>
> *Issue* 21, February 2004

[13] Quran, 61: 10–11.

Martyrdom is constructed as *ʾizz alduniā wa saʾādat alʿākhira* 'glory in this life and happiness in the hereafter'[14] and thus represents both the zenith of the jihadist trajectory and an expression for altruistically sacrificing a worldly lifetime for an eternal afterlife. Thus, salvation addresses the individual and functions on two levels: the salvation won from the sins of quitting *jihad* and the salvation achieved by reaping the rewards promised for the mujahedeen. The theme of martyrdom is deployed throughout the magazine as the ultimate goal sought by mujahedeen:

(22)

May Allah have mercy on you, may Allah have mercy on you, Yousif, you **sought martyrdom in Afghanistan**, and you sought it in Somalia, and here it is coming to you in the land of the Arabia Peninsula…

Issue 2, September 2003

I **ask God to grant me martyrdom** in His path.

Issue 2, September 2003

Martyrdom is presupposed for the group's dead members in a discursive strategy used frequently throughout the magazine, in particular within genres focused on the Self-fashioning of fellow dead *mujahedeen* as martyrs. Consider this excerpt from a text lamenting an AQAP leader:

(23)

The martyr Turki al-Dandani was killed in al-Jawf at the hands of *ṭawāghīt's* soldiers, may Allah have mercy and him and accept him among martyrs…

Issue 2, September 2003

This type of contractual preaching of *jihad*, in which recruits are urged to sacrifice their lives for the sake of reaping martyrdom rewards, appeals to young recruits who provide a constant supply of people willing to commit suicide. The intensified focus on martyrdom and its perceived posthumous rewards aims to secure fresh recruits, particularly with a willingness for self-sacrifice.

7.6.2. *Enthymeme of threat*

Another macro-argumentation strategy for waging *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia is based on future threats. The enthymeme of threat comprises a set of argumentative themes about the invasion of the Arabian Peninsula by non-Muslim forces. Furthermore, *Sawt al-jihad* dwells more on ideological threats, whereby un-Islamic doctrines are forced on the Muslim population of Saudi Arabia. To tap into the local population, AQAP discourse partly relates to some local regulatory decisions and links them to this enthymeme. For example, some propositions construct a

[14] Issue 4, an interview with the wanted sheikh Abdullah al-Rishudi.

hypothetical threat with regard to some regulatory changes in Saudi Arabia pertaining to education at the time of publishing *Sawt al-jihad*: notably, changes in some religious curricula and the decision to unite the administrative bodies of boys' and girls' education.

(24)

Consider the dangers surrounding the *ummah*. The unjust American war on Muslims in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, and the aftermath of the Iraq war, a change in the map of the region and changes in society and education, and the imposition of **infidel democracy** on the region

Issue 2, September 2003

7.7. Recap and conclusion

This chapter has analysed (de)legitimatory topoi and their respective enthymemes evidenced in *Sawt al-jihad*. I set out with a brief overview of *Sawt al-jihad's* enthymemes and classified them into their respective topoi. Many enthymemes have been weaponised to promote the AQAP worldview. They fall under four legitimatory topoi: authority, commitment, defence and consequence. All these topoi and their respective enthymemes are ideologically-driven. That is, the macro-arguments define the AQAP struggle through the framework of identity politics rather than modern-day social demands. The key overarching topos is that of authority, which underpins AQAP's reasoning system. Religious authority forms the main thrust of AQAP discourse, and the topos of authority overlaps with all other topoi. The topos of authority is a complex one that can be both scriptural, propped up concerning sacred texts, or historical, drawing analogical conceptions between contemporary political realities and a sacred history. It subsumes the key belief enthymemes of *ħākimiyah*, divine ordainment, and alliance and disavowal. All these enthymemes are modern ideas fetched from tradition and are revolutionarily schematised to serve the jihadist cause. They are all concerned with delegitimising the Other-within. The other topoi are consistent with classical arguments for *jihad*. The topos of defence has been employed as a short-cut strategy for legitimising AQAP's jihadist cause inside Saudi Arabia. It legitimises the Self against the perceived American occupation of Saudi Arabia – in the context of the wider classical list of Muslim suffering at the hand of infidel forces – and against the perceived Other-within's aggression against the mujahedeen. Similarly, the topos of consequence and topos of commitment recycle classical jihadist notions arguing for and mobilising people to AQAP's *jihad*.

Chapter 8 CONCLUSION

8.1. Overview

The first section of this concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings and an overall critique. The chapter concludes by outlining the limitations of the present study and presenting suggestions for future research.

8.2. Summary and discussion

Under CDA as a theoretical and methodological package, the present study has investigated the discursive micro-politics of AQAP between 2003 and 2005. It has looked at data from the texts of the e-magazine *Sawt al-jihad,* which can be regarded as front stage political practices. By drawing on Bourdieu's 'capital theory', Islamic religious epistemology and the literature on intertextuality, this thesis has attempted to explore *Sawt al-jihad's* texts and make sense of the sociopolitical, cultural and epistemological contextual elements involved. The study has focused on exploring how the Self and Other are constructed, prominent intertextual connections and their values and, finally, the legitimisation of the jihadist worldview. *Text* has been regarded as a resource wherein the collective background culture, symbols narrative and myths that resonate with the audience are looked into. The findings are summarised as follows:

8.2.1. *Representational analysis*

As AQAP's media outlet in the 2003 campaign, *Sawt al-jihad* stressed a messianic revivalist mission whereby *jihad* is, on the one hand, a goal in its own right – as an incarnation of God's oneness or the pure form of Islam and – and conversely, a means for repelling a constructed U.S. invasion and fighting an illegitimate Saudi government. The AQAP narrative broke away from the classical Islamic conception of *jihad* as a collective duty and elevated its status to be a personal duty equivalent to an articulation of faith. *Sawt al-jihad* propagated an extreme tripartite division of the world, dictated by an urgent need for the legitimacy of the novel *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia, which involves killing Muslims. The sort of *jihad* promoted throughout the data of *Sawt al-jihad* is exclusively a military one. Therefore, the construction of *jihad* is interwoven with a plethora of juristic and theological topics, which are based on a selective revolutionisation of sacred texts and prior juristic opinions. These topics promote polemics and ideas ranging from the legitimate killing of non-combatant infidels, the case of *kufr* or *apostasy*

'disbelief' of the Saudi government, the polytheism in allying to disbelievers and implementing non-*Sharia* legislation, among others (as noted earlier in Figure 7).

Thus, the prototypical Self in AQAP's body politic derives its merits from the commitment to *jihad* as a Godly-ordained duty. *Sawt al-jihad,* therefore, mythologises the mujahed as *the* true Muslim, who is altruistic to the *ummah* and willing to sacrifice his soul on this path. The notion of the *ummah* can be deemed to be the typical social structure in AQAP's body politic, into which the discourse topics and discursive strategies of the jihadist cause and discourse are woven. However, the ideological trappings of the topics on and representations of the *ummah* are quite complex. AQAP propagates a pan-Islamist ideology that transcends nationality, ethnicity and borders and puts the local *jihad* inside Saudi Arabia within Al Qaeda's global *jihad.* AQAP's narrative – and that of other groups of its ilk – trades on the sufferings of Muslims and presents the mujahedeen as a saviour to the community of Muslims. For good or for ill, the notion of the *ummah* remains part and parcel of the discourse of mainstream Islamism, and consequently part of the cognition of lay Muslims. People's knowledge and thoughts regarding *ummah* are derived in large measure from religious discourse, be it traditional or contemporary. In the discourse on *ummah,* AQAP discourse cuts across tradition and other (politico)-religious discourses, whereby notions of the Self are associated with the whole community of believers.

The Other in AQAP's narrative is split into the Other-within and the Other-outwith. AQAP's declared aim is fighting the invading American Crusaders and expelling them from Arabia. Regarding scale and diversity, the delegitimatory discursive strategies for the Other-within are far greater than those on the Other-outwith. This indicates that the discursive practices in *Sawt al-jihad* are more or less locally oriented and focused on delegitimising the Saudi regime. Nonetheless, *Sawt al-jihad* continues to declare that it is anti-American and aims to expel the foreign non-Muslim troops from Arabia. This might be because recruits desire to fight the Americans rather than the regime and the security forces. It may also be due to the contentious legitimacy of waging *jihad* against fellow Muslims. The list of grievances attributed to the regime is not socio-economic but instead religious, in which the alliance with the USA and non-Muslims states is a key delegitimising argument.

The findings of the representational analysis endorse al-Sayyid's (2015) diagnosis of the jihadist phenomenon as a sect driven by panic as regards the Islamic identity, fuelled by social imaginaries of the past and apocalyptic prophecies about the future. At the core of *Sawt al-jihad's* identity politics, *takfir* seems to be the key weapon in AQAP's War of Truth. AQAP

has used this weapon carefully, for it is a serious undertaking with lethal consequences. The explicit *takfir* was clearly levelled against rulers and governments for violating the principles of *ħākimiyah* and alliance and disavowal. Although the *ulema* and the security forces were constructed with a wide range of delegitimising and even derogatory terms, specific explicit *takfir* of them was by and large avoided. However, the way they were nominated and predicated involves an implicit *takfir*. *Takfir* seems to have been a key weapon in the struggle for the hearts of believers, so as to distinguish the level of commitment to AQAP's radical's cause and to delineate the lines of identities between the *us*-group and the *them*-group. Nonetheless, it caused two major setbacks for AQAP. First, it has an inherently fragmenting influence on the community whom the jihadists are attempting to win over. Second, the fragmenting *takfiri* ideology has exposed AQAP to criticism from among Sunni scholars and cost the group its reputation among the population of Saudi Arabia.

The overall representational profile of AQAP seems to be consistent with AQ central's calculated variations in both tone and content. AQAP rhetoric has remained committed to AQ's focus on the American presence in Saudi Arabia. AQAP appeals to various target audiences, but this strategic manoeuvre concerning the declared aim directly addresses the population of Saudi Arabia, the pool of potential recruits whose support was the lifeline for the then AQAP's awkwardly-run offensive. This presence in the birthplace of Islam is constructed as the cause triggering the AQAP offensive. Although this can be seen as a calculated rhetorical tool, which intermingles pseudo-nationalist with pan-Islamist ideological content, this macro-legitimatory argument seems not to tap into the social base inside Saudi Arabia. The AQ's treatment of the U.S. military presence was understandable during the 1990s, but the same treatment after the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia in 2003 is questionable.[1] Indeed, it is even inconsistent with Bin Laden's September 1996 declaration of *jihad* against the United States when he stated that "[t]he solution to this crisis is the withdrawal of American troops ... their military presence is an insult to the Saudi people" (FBIS 2004: 13). From my viewpoint, the anti-American sentiment is a rhetorical tool concealing AQ(AP)'s anti-Saudi regime policy. This is evidenced in both the operational and discursive practices. Operationally, AQAP's offensive waged a violent campaign against U.S. and non-U.S. targets in numerous attacks inside Saudi Arabia. Small- and large-scale attacks were executed against military and civilian, U.S. and Saudi personnel. Conversely, AQAP discursive practices have remained consistent

[1] The U.S. Defence Secretary announced on 29/04/2003 that its 5,000 troops in Saudi Arabia would be pulled out in summer that year leaving 400 troops to train Saudi soldiers, see: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/30/usa.iraq.

with the pan-Islamist narrative: *ʿahl ʿal-jazīrah* 'people of Arabia' should view themselves as part of a larger single nation and unite in an obligatory defensive *jihad* to resist U.S. aggression.

8.2.2. *Intertextual analysis*

The tripartite division of the social world is a substantiation of the power of "world-making" (Bourdieu 1989: 22). Indeed, this power of world-making is in its turn the outcome of conflicts between different symbolic powers, each of which aims to impose its vision of which divisions are legitimate and which are not. AQAP's world-making is fulfilled through a system of intertextuality that draws analogical representations between an assumed past and the current political reality and, in turn, assigns every social actor an identity based on these analogies. This system revolves around the possession of religious truth through investment in prior sacred and valued texts' symbolic capital. I have termed this practice *hypotextuality,* whereby deliberate intertextual transpositions are drawn with hypotexts – pre-existing texts located as major sources of epistemological and symbolic value. Thus, it is worth noting that the notion of intertextuality has a lot to offer as an analytic tool to the analysis of politico-religious discourses. Intertextuality should not then be reduced to form (Titscher et al. 2000), nor should it serve as a contextual notion (Reisigl & Wodak 2001). Rather, intertextuality serves as an *identity kit* (Gee 1990), where it is necessary to look beyond the boundaries of jihadist texts and explore from where specific utterances emerge and what histories and values adhere to them, as discussed at length in Chapter 6.

I have demonstrated how hypotextuality served as AQAP's identity kit and examined hypotextual connections at the levels of architextuality, paratextuality, meta-textuality and micro-hypotextuality. In (politico-)religious discourses, the 'sacred texts' and the 'already uttered' texts of respectable figures frequently enter into new discussions – primarily in the contest over how best to represent the 'already uttered' sacred and symbolic texts. Thus, prior texts are recontextualised in new discursive encounters with varying degrees of fidelity. The process of recontextualisation is, indeed, "a political act" that links to larger sociopolitical concerns. Therefore, the significance of the hypotextual practices in AQAP's discourse lies in its power to impose upon the listener's mind a specific vision of social division, a sense of history and a diagnosis of the existing world order. Religion is the exclusive means for relating socially-defined realities with the ultimate reality (Berger 1969: 41). Historically, the primary sources of religion have been the most widespread and effective instrument of legitimisation in the exercise of politics in the Islamic world. Therefore, the religious symbolic capital is a credit or power granted to specific social actors possessing the status of being in a position to impose

recognition, whose utterances are brought together to form a mosaic of quotations and intertextual relations. Similarly, hypotextual connections with secondary valued texts of respected figures feature prominently in AQAP's discourse and, in effect, engage these discourses in the long-contested struggle over the interpretation of sacred texts. It is a fight over whose contextualisation – or reading – of the religious corpus will be the valid one. Such a viewpoint reinforces the old critiques about the *a*-historicity of sacred texts – primary and secondary alike – in the sense that what is at stake is not literal scripture but rather its sublime value and intention.

8.2.3. *Argumentative analysis*

Many enthymemes have been weaponised to promote AQAP's worldview. They fall under four legitimatory topoi: authority, commitment, defence and consequence. All these topoi and their respective enthymemes are ideologically-driven. That is, macro-arguments define AQAP's struggle through a framework of identity politics rather than modern-day social demands. The key overarching topos is that of authority, which underpins AQAP's reasoning system. Religious authority forms the main thrust of AQAP discourse, and the topos of authority overlaps with all other topoi. The topos of authority is a complex one that can be both scriptural, propped up concerning sacred texts, or historical, drawing analogical conceptions between contemporary political realities and a sacred history. It subsumes the key belief enthymemes of *ħākimiyah*, divine ordainment, and alliance and disavowal. All these enthymemes are modern ideas fetched from tradition and are revolutionarily schematised to serve the jihadist cause. They are all concerned with delegitimising the Other-within.

The other topoi are consistent with classical arguments for *jihad*. The topos of defence has been employed as a short-cut strategy for legitimising AQAP's jihadist cause inside Saudi Arabia. It legitimises the Self against the perceived American occupation of Saudi Arabia – in the context of the wider classical list of Muslim suffering at the hand of infidel forces – and against the perceived Other-within's aggression against the mujahedeen. Similarly, the topos of consequence and topos of commitment recycle classical jihadist notions arguing for and mobilising people to AQAP's *jihad*.

As noted in the representational analysis, the analysis of (de)legitimatory topoi has found that the Other-outwith is not the sole or the primary actor to be delegitimised in AQAP's discourse world. Rather, the Other-within is the primary target of delegitimisation. That is not to say that AQAP does not target the USA/West nor that the USA/West is not repugnant. The issue is that

defying the USA/West is just one argument against the Other-within within a larger view of the world. The question is not that of *Dar al-Islam* 'the sphere of Islam' vs *Dar al-Kufr* 'the sphere of disbelief'. Rather, AQAP's goal is to create a chasm between the apostate/hypocrite state and Muslim society.

Topoi analysis provides an approach to argumentation that appears to be compatible with the task of locating the arguments in a given discourse. Topoi – as formal devices – seem to be an effective search formula for both developing and locating arguments. Drawing on Slomkowski (1997), I have employed an understanding of the topos as an argumentation scheme that can be said to underlie enthymemes. Enthymemes are, therefore, culture-specific, context-dependent instances or rhetorical demonstrations of their respective topoi. The incorporation of a topos/enthymeme distinction solves the persistent debate over whether topoi are form-related or content-related conclusion rules. For the distinction of culture-specific "topoi" – i.e. enthymemes, references are made to the Aristotlean distinction between general and specific topoi.

8.3. Evaluation of the theoretical/methodological approach

The analysis of nturally occurring language used by jihadists seems to have been a research programme, with potential insights for the research problems in questions, and for CDA theories and methods. This approach has allowed me to examine the discursive practices of AQAP and to demonstrate how *jihad*, the Self and the Other are constructed and (de)legitimised. In this study, I have sought to develop an intertextual approach to explore the manner in which jihadist transpositions are made from specific hypotexts. Indeed, there is still a potential opportunity to pursue in-depth studies as to how religious authority is exploited by AQAP and its ilk, by conducting studies, in Arabic, investigating jihadist discourse and other (politico)-religious discourses. However, while I have attempted to answer a few questions about the jihadist phenomenon, many questions remain unanswered and CDA has a lot to offer in this regard.

This study has its own limitations in scope, largely because of space and time restrictions. First, the analysis of the jihadist discourse leads to opening a wide range of context-specific notions and historical accounts, to which I could not do justice within the space of an IPhD thesis. Second, the translation of texts involving hypotextual relations is never neutral. Translation erodes the significance of the transformation process and conceals the way in which previous formal structures are produced within respective hypotexts. A proper intertextual analysis can

only be conducted in Arabic studies whereby different intertextual connections at all levels of analysis can be fully attended to.

8.4. Overall conclusion

While the principal goal of mainstream Islamist groups has been a theocratic agenda – establishing an Islamic Caliphate – in the first half of the twentieth century, it turned into a nomocratic one in the second half of the century, calling for the rule of *Sharia* (al-Sayyid 2015). This thesis has found that the discursive practices of AQAP employ both goals, but with more frequent instrumentalisation of the latter. Before the 2003 campaign, Al Qaeda central was cautious with respect to the notion of an Islamic state, and so was AQAP. References to the Caliphate exist in the AQAP narrative, not as a macro-legitimatory argument but rather as a long-run consequence. The focus on the rule of *Sharia* that is constructed to forbid alliances with disbelievers is a strategy calculated to delegitimise the Saudi regime. This is understood against the background that it is a received opinion that the existing Saudi state is Islamic, or at least by the guidelines of the classical Salafist School. The supreme Islamic polity – the Caliphate - seems not to have tapped into the social base. Therefore, AQAP has focused on the instrumentalisation of the *ħākimiyah,* in the sense of the implementation of God's law.

The delegitimisation of the Saudi government seems to be motivated by an extremist Islamist ideology rather than by socio-revolutionary activism. AQAP members continue to have the same 1990s hostile and retaliatory sentiments against the Saudi regime, particularly the grievances known in the statements of veteran mujahedeen who were detained during the 1990s, who see the change in the official Saudi policy regarding the participation of mujahedeen in foreign areas of conflict. Therefore, the discord is fundamentally ideological, not social. Similarly, I argue that a defining feature of AQAP jihadist ideology is the rejection of the existing world order and the pursuit of a polity purely defined in religious terms. Their struggle stems from the huge dissonance between this order and their religiously-motivated aspirations, be they political, moral or cultural. The discursive contents and forms sit uncomfortably in a modern world that has been created by the Other. This modern world comes in-between a lamented mighty past and an apocalyptic promised future that is believed will bring back dignity, might and grace to what jihadists perceive as God's chosen sect. The jihadists' perceived aspirations can only be externalised in, and only in, an Islamic state, though the Caliphate seems to have been employed to the minimum in AQAP discourse.

For the moment, AQAP – as an organisation – has been dead for a decade in Saudi Arabia. But in this decade, jihadist groups and emirates have emerged and ascended across the region. The seeds of jihadism, as this thesis has argued, are politico-religious. The religious affords ideological nourishment in the form of macro-legitimatory arguments, for a perceived exercise of politics, whose polity and focus of loyalty are defined in religious terms. These macro-legitimatory arguments are predominantly notions fetched from sacred texts or religious traditions, discursively ideologised to serve the jihadist worldview. Regardless of the veracity of jihadist propositions, jihadist discourse delivers a coherent narrative. No one strategy is likely to be decisive in countering Al Qaeda and its jihadist agenda and worldview. A complex mixture of instruments is needed for this encounter – military, intelligence, financial and even social. However, a long-term war of ideas must be in place. As the data have revealed, there is a pressing amalgam of ideological issues that need to be addressed. Chief among these issues are Islamic political theory, the tension between *Sharia* law and innovative modern-day legislation and the problematic notion of 'alliance with Muslims and the enmity with non-Muslims'. This war of ideas should extend to the extremist and revolutionary ideologisation of tradition and sacred texts. Examples of such ideologisation of tradition have been identified in the contextualisation of sacred texts specific to the jihadist narrative (as explained in depth in Chapter 6) and the schematisation of some Quranic verses (e.g. topoi of *ħākimiyah* and 'alliance and disavowal', in Chapter 7).

It is easy for the jihadist movement to replace combatants, but it is harder to replace its key notions and arguments. Therefore, based on the analyses carried out in this thesis, I argue that more enlightening and critical work is needed to revise a wide range of grand narratives, such as the notions of 'Islamic Caliphate' and '*Sharia*'. Throughout Islamic history, there has always been a gap between the de facto exercise of power and the theoretical formulations of the jurists. The analysis of AQAP discourse has revealed that this gap is concealed and there is, rather, a narrative – or to use Arkoun's (2006) term, a *'religious imaginary'* – in other words, based on *a*-historical visions of the past. For instance, regarding *Sharia,* AQAP discourse speaks of an idealistic paradigmatic form for applying revealed holy law and ignores the fact that *Sharia* has never been an overriding reality and Islamic law has always been supplemented by local customary laws, given the enormous cultural and geographical differences between Muslim societies.

Furthermore, I would like to highlight a problem inherent in the topos of religious authority. As observed in Chapters 6 and 7, the producers of *Sawt al-jihad's* texts desire to identify with the earliest Muslims – the Prophet, his companions and their successors, whose example is still

alive in the hearts of people living in Islamic culture – manifest in the hypotextual connection. There is a commonly accepted principle underlying this system of reasoning: that sacred texts are *a*-historical and universal. However, this principle is problematic for two reasons. First, it is easy to assemble convergent texts to support a violent narrative. It is true that this principle equally allows counterarguments to the violent theory, but this creates a level of reasoning where bad ideas can battle it out with good ideas on an equal footing. That is, the cultivation of prior hypotexts can be used strategically for credibility-building purposes for good and bad ideas. Second, the *a*-historical view disregards the huge differences between pre-modern and modern world orders.

8.5. Recommendations for future research

Hypotextuality has more to offer in terms of highlighting the appeal to authority at the stylistic level. The approach I have developed to hypotextuality, along with polyphony and double voicing, has a lot to offer such studies. More case studies are needed to explore the epistemological and argumentative force of historical analogic reasoning. Moreover, this, in turn, takes us to an old question asked anew: *truth politics* and the basis of 'God said it.' From my perspective, this type of reasoning is too powerful if we regard sacred texts as *a*-historical. Having observed the debate between *mainstream ulema* and *jihadist ideologues*, for every argument put forward by one side, another counter-argument is proposed. A potential study in this regard is a comparative study evaluating the employment of the topos of authority by proponents and opponents of jihadism, to assess whether or not such a dialogue has circular reasoning.

Other potential research on jihadism could investigate the stylistic presentation of argumentation. AQAP is replete with metaphors associated with the Quran, the prophetic tradition and codes of heroism and chivalry corresponding to the time of early Muslims (e.g. path concept, slavery etc.) which, in turn, can have decisive entailments regarding the performance of authenticity. We have seen in 5 that metaphor can be used for masking *takfir* 'declaring a Muslim to be out of creed'. I argue that an interesting ingredient in jihadist texts is metaphorical mappings, and I would recommend examining the jihadists' use of them. Therefore, critical metaphor analysis and topoi analysis can both be devised to deal with jihadist rhetoric. The iconicisation of the jihadist personality is yet another line of enquiry that is worth pursuing. This study has shown that the jihadist discourse often uses the charismatic projection of mujahedeen as a means of mobilising supporters and enhancing Self-credibility and legitimacy. A host of symbols and imageries are used to project the jihadists – leaders and

grassroots – as the inspirational archetypical Self actors. Gerges (2017: 33) rightfully argues that the prime driver in radicalising jihadists is personality, not ideas. The cultivation of the jihadist personality in *Sawt al-jihad* indicates that AQAP's ideologues and propagators are aware of the fact that potential recruits, particularly alienated young Muslims, are personality-driven. Therefore, it is wise to pursue how jihadist ideas are anchored discursively in real jihadist performers.

Another important line of research concerns the consumption of jihadist discourses. The current study has explored the space between the text producer and the text. However, the question of how jihadist texts are consumed is a potential field of inquiry, where the findings of discourse analysis can relate to culture and communication studies.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Transliterating symbols

	Transliterating symbol	Arabic letter	Phonetic description
Consonants	ʾa	ء	glottal stop
	b	ب	bilabial voiced stop
	t	ت	voiceless alveolar stop
	th	ث	voiceless dental fricative
	j	ج	voiceless alveolar affricate
	ħ	ح	voiceless pharyngeal fricative
	kh	خ	voiceless velar fricative
	d	د	voiced alveolar stop
	dh	ذ	voiced dental fricative
	r	ر	alveolar trill
	z	ز	voiced alveolar fricative
	s	س	voiceless alveolar fricative
	sh	ش	voiceless post-alveolar fricative
	ṣ	ص	velarised voiceless alveolar fricative
	ḍ	ض	velarised voiced alveolar stop
	ṭ	ط	velarised voiceless alveolar stop
	ḍẖ	ظ	velarised voiced dental fricative
	ʿa	ع	voiced pharyngeal fricative
	gh	غ	voiced uvular fricative
	f	ف	voiceless labiodental fricative
	q	ق	voiceless uvular stop
	k	ك	voiceless velar stop
	l	ل	alveolar lateral
	m	م	bilabial nasal
	n	ن	alveolar nasal
	h	هـ	voiceless glottal fricative
	w	و	voiced labial-velar approximant
	y	ي	palatal fricative
Vowels	a	◌َ	short a
	u	◌ُ	short u
	i	◌ِ	short i
	ā	ـا	long a
	ū	ـو	long u
	ī	ـي	long i

Table 7. The full tramscription of the Arabic phonemic inventory

Appendix B: The chronology of the milestones in AQAP's 2003 campaign

18 March 2003	A bomb going off prematurely in a Riyadh-based bomb factory
25 March 2003	Killing a policeman and wounding another in Skaka
12 April 2003	Killing a police chief in his car in Jawf
1 May 2003	An American shot dead in a marine base in Jubail
6 May 2003	A battle in Riyadh, then authorities issued 19 militants wanted
12 May 2003	A 3-car-bomd targeting Western expatriate compound, 35 killed
September 2003	The first issue of AQAP's *Sawt al-jihad* published
8 November 2003	Suicide bomb on Muhayya compound, 17 killed, 120 wounded
4 December 2003	A Major General security officer attacked and wounded
6 December 2003	Authorities issued a wanted list of 19 militants
15 March 2004	AQAP's Khaled alHajj and 2 militants killed by police
21 April 2004	Car bomb on security building in Riyadh, 6 killed, 145 wounded
29 May 2004	Militants shooting at several places in Khobar, many wounded
6 June 2004	BBC correspondent wounded and cameraman killed in Riyadh
8 June 2004	US citizen Robert Jacobs killed in Riyadh
12 June 2004	US citizen Kenneth Scroggs killed in Riyadh
12 June 2004	US citizen Paul Johnson kidnapped from Riyadh and killed later
18 June 2004	AQAP's leader al-Mugrin and 3 militants killed in a police raid
23 June 2004	One-month amnesty for surrenders declared by authorities
20 July 2004	Killing 2, wounding and arresting 3 militants in a police raid
3 August 2004	Shooting dead an Irish citizen in a militants gun firing in Riyadh
11 September 2004	Car explosion near Samba Bank in Jeddah, the attacker wounded
November 2004	*Sawt al-jihad* temporarily discontinued, reappearing later
6 December 2004	Storming the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, 4 attackers were killed
29 December 2004	Suicide car bomb attacks on the interior Ministry and National Guard training facility, 10 militants killed and 1 bystander dead
3-5 April 2005	A 3-day gun battle leaving 14 militants dead and several wounded in Al-Rass
19 June 2005	Police interrogator shot dead by militants at his house
19 June 2005	Authorities issued a wanted list of 36 militants
24 February 2006	A failed attack with 2 explosives cars on Abgaig oil facility
2 December 2006	Authorities announce the arrest of 136 militants in several cities
7 December 2006	Militants shooting dead 2 security guards near a prison in Jeddah
26 February 2006	4 French tourists killed in an archaeological site north of Medina
27 April 2007	Authorities announced the arrest of 172 suspected militants
9 august 2007	Authorities announced the arrest of 135 suspected militants
28 November 2007	Authorities announced the arrest of 208 suspected militants
3 march 2008	Authorities announced the arrest of 56 suspected militants
25 June 2008	Authorities announced the arrest of 701 suspected militants
19 January 2009	Saudi AQAP and Yemeni AQAP merged (Danadani)

Appendix C: Nominational and predicational realisations

Table 8: The construction of *jihad*

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
JIHAD: *jihād* 'jihad' *qitāl* fighting *ribāṭ* 'firm hold' *nafīr* 'going forth' *shaʾīrah* 'ritual' *faḍīlah* 'virtue' *jihādunā* 'our jihad' *jihād ikhwāninā* 'our brothers' jihad' *jihād al-muslim(īn)* 'Muslim('s) jihad' *jihād al-muʿmin(īn)* 'believer('s) jihad' *jihād al-mujāhid(īn)* 'Mujahed('s) jihad' *jihād al-ummah* '*ummah's* jihad' *al-fareedhah algha'ibah* 'the absent duty' *al-jihād al-askari* 'the military jihad' *al-jihād al-wājib (al-mutaʿayin)* 'the obligatory jihad' *farīḍat al-jihād* 'the duty of jihad' *sha'eerat al-jihad* 'the ritual of jihad' *al-jihādu fī sabīl allah* '*jihad* in the path of God' *al-qitāl fī sabīl allah* 'fighting in the path of God' *al-ʾithkhānu fī al-ʿaduw* 'inflicting a massacre in the enemy' *jihād al-kuffār/al-kāfirīn/al-mushrikīn/al-murtaddīn/al-ʾamrīkān/al-ṭughāh/aʿadāʾī allah* '*jihad* against the infidels (polytheists) (apostates) (Americans) (*ṭawāghīt*) (God's enemies)'	- ***military*** is fighting is the military struggle fighting the apostates is defensive jihad all about defensive *jihad* nowadays - ***as tawḥīd externalised*** the externalisation of *twheed* to God embodiment of *tawḥīd* the head of the matter in Islam a worship akin to prayer and fasting not deserted but by hypocrites increases imaan 'belief' and pushing away disbelief and hypocrisy the sincerity of intentions to God is an act of worship one of the Islamic laws a struggle between what is true and what is false of the most loved acts of worship to God the sign of the *ummah's* return to Islam a creed issue decided by the religious texts an ordained act of worship, whether won or lost the ultimate purpose for people the banner of which is lifted by the winning sect

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
al-da'awah ila allah 'the call to Allah'	among the reasons for uprightness - ***perpetual*** impossible to eliminate universal fate a continuous fierce war against the Crusade and its followers global and boundless valid at all times in all places not just a single battle continuing until the day of judgement - ***a test for the believers*** a great test [for the believers] may not immediately lead to triumph based on withstanding hardships its dereliction is disobedience to Allah abandoning it is one of the greatest sins abandoning it leads to the descent of Allah's punishment on the *ummah* lifting its banner is a God-given bounty - ***a means to an end*** a means of establishing the Caliphate on earth a means of implementing God's laws a means of calling to Allah the road to victory, pride, and dignity a noble means its aim is the demise of the affliction that befell Muslims one of the financial resources of the state of Islam

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	- ***Obligatory and legitimate***
	is one of the rituals of Islam
	mandatory when the enemy enters a Muslim land
	mentioned and legitimated by many Quranic and *Sunnah* texts
	permanent duty on *ummah*
	a statement made by the Prophet Mohammed
	an obligatory duty that doesn't require parents' permission
	a duty ordained on the believers
	permeant ordinance
	there are numerous reasons for it in the Arabian Peninsula
	referred to in the [Quran and *Sunnah*] texts as necessary in the struggle against infidels
	- ***salvation then***
	for which the reward is the forgiveness of all sins
	has great rewards
	leading to paradise in the next world
	profitable even if mujahedeen are killed
	the ultimate purpose of which is God's rewards
	- ***a means for defiance***
	the effective power to thwart the plots of infidels and hypocrites
	the language of force that works with enemies
	a means of taking revenge on behalf of Muslims
	a blow to Western colonisation and the world order
	a means of destructing infidels and the victory of believers
	a means of repelling aggression
	defiance to the enemy

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	- ***effective*** having discomposed the internal and the external enemy dramatically influential liberated some of the Arabian's Peninsula's people from slavery could have established states

Table 9: The construction of the *ummah*

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
***ummah*:** *al-ummah* 'the Islamic community' *al-muslimūn* 'the Muslims' *al-mustaḍʿafūn* 'the oppressed' *ahl al-islām* 'people of Islam' *ahl al-sunnah* 'people of *Sunnah'* *ummat al-islām* 'the community of Islam'	the most humiliated nation in need for the substantiation of *tawḥīd* chosen by God to be the best nation among all humanity humiliated by the Crusaders, the Jews and the apostates living the life of religious dereliction and the indulgence in sins having no other solution but the return to the Book and *Sunnah* humiliated by Allah due to abandoning jihad turned away from jihad will be guided if practised jihad

Table 10: The construction of the Self

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
THE MUJAHEDEEN:	
	rightful and committed to a Divine mission
naḥn 'we'	the true
-nā 'our/us'	having a mission and a message
mujāhid(īn) 'Mujahed(een)'	defending the sacred lands of Muslims
murāabiṭ(īn) 'firm holder(s)'	fighting for Allah's word to become Superior
al-muwaḥid(īn) 'maonotheost(s)'	dedicated to God's enjoinments
abṭāl 'champions'	having a just cause
al-ghurabā' 'the strangers'	hailed and lauded by God
al-shahīd 'the martyr(s)'	fighting God's enemies as enjoined by God
al-ṣāabir(īn) 'the patient'	permitted by God to kill infidels
al-akhyār 'the pious'	people of truth and patience
al-ṭalīʿah 'the vanguard'	supporting and protecting God's religion
sarāyā al-mujāhīd(īn) 'troops of mujahedeen'	their *jihad* is legitimate
katāʾib al-ḥaq 'the brigades of the right'	seeking refuge in strong support [God presupposed]
katāʾib al-mujāhidīn 'brigades of mujahedeen'	making their lives in the path of God
khalāyā al-mujāhidīn 'cells of muhjahedeen'	not a mafia gang killing each other for dollars
shabāb al-jihād 'youth of jihad'	guided by the light of the Quran and *Sunnah*
ahl al-jihād 'people of jihad'	disbelieved in *ṭāgihūt* and whoever worships them
ahl al-ribāṭ 'people of *ribat*'	following the Prophet's *Sunnah*
maṣābīḥ al-ʿizzah 'the lights if dignity'	grateful to Allah for the bounty of jihad
ahl al-sunnah 'people of *Sunnah'*	avoiding the seduction of abandoning jihad
abnāʾal-jazīrah 'sons of the peninsula'	***altruistic and having noble pan-Islamist goals:***
ahl al-thughūr 'people of the frontiers'	seeking to free Muslim prisoners
ikhwānuk(um) 'your [PL/SING.] brothers'	wishing to promote virtue and prevent vice
ikhwānunā 'our brothers'	
abnāʾukum 'your sons'	
ikhwānī 'my brothers'	
ʿibād allah 'God's slaves/worshippers'	

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
awliyāʾallah ‘Allah’s allies’ *jund allah* ‘God’s soldiers’ *altāʾifah al-mujāhidah* ‘the striving sect’ *al-shabāb al-mujāhid* ‘the striving youth’ *al-mujāhidūn al-muʾminūn* ‘the striving believers’ *al-shabāb al-ṣāliḥīn* ‘the pious youth’ *al-ḥarakah al-jihādiyah* ‘the jihadist movement’ *mujāhidū arḍ al-jazīrah* ‘the mujahedeen of the Peninsula’ *fursān taḥta rāyat al-nabiy* ‘knights under the Prophet’s banner’ *fiʾatun tuqātilu fī sabīl allah* ‘an army fighting in the cause of Allah’	in constant striving and sacrifices all over the world not fighting for worldly purposes flocking to Arabia to liberate it from Crusaders and their agents selling this world in the name of obeying God’s commands and supporting the vulnerable the *ummah* rises with them men who sacrificed their lives for their religion reforming what people have spoiled known for their good will and intentions [referring to the mujahedeen] the supply for the coming Islamic Caliphate ***brave and successful:*** brave heroes the men of *ummah* the knights of *ummah* managing to kill Americans managing to kill dozens of the National Guard troops storming the Crusaders’ settlements (with reference to expatriate compounds in Riyadh) seeing *jihad* as fighting killing infidel hostages repelling government forces and incurring losses pounding the Crusaders’ strongholds not naïve that they expose themselves to the regime lighting fires beneath the Crusaders lifting the banners, chanting *allahu akbar* ‘Allah is great’ feared by *ṭawāghīt*

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	able to escape confrontations with minimal losses
	triumphing intellectually
	whose operations are increasing
	not stupid
	organised and having goals:
	having clear goals and adopting distinct methods
	seeking to evict the Crusaders from Arabia
	determined to establish the Islamic State
	not waging *jihad* without a purpose
	having a central leadership
	waging a war of attrition with the Crusade's states
	managed to neutralise America
	fighting under the banner of the global front of fighting the Crusaders and the Jews
	hoping for establishing the Islamic state
	coming to kill Christians in Arabia
	as victims:
	being misshaped by *ulema* and the media
	tortured in prison
	being abducted by infidels
	seldom finding aids for the good, and supporters on its road
	resistant and uncompromising:
	refusing a life of humiliation
	disregarding the rumours and the discouraging campaigns by the media and evil *ulema*
	standing for the truth and being unafraid to take the blame

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	determined to keep on their way despite their experiences
	the first threat to the Jews and the Christians
	having high morale
	a thorn in the enemy's side
	disbelieve in the Arab and non-Arab governments
	distancing themselves from international and regional associations
	disavow the polytheistic doctrines
	disavow the democratic approaches
	repudiate the pagan nationalism
	could have resisted despite the obstacles
	not harmed by those who disbelieve or stand against them
	expecting one of the two best things: victory or martyrdom
	men who vowed not enjoy life before liberation Muhammed's land from the Crusaders
	whose hearts are filled with enmity to infidels
	taking allies and enemies for the cause of God
	triumphing over discouragers by joining the jihad
	vowing to defeat the fight who fights Allah
	will not abandon *jihad* regardless of how bad the conditions become
	continuing to fight America and all invaders
	aiming to convert people to Islam
	upset America and its allies
	will disregard the rumours' claims that *jihad* deforms the image of Islam
	will dismiss the claims that beheading Americans is cruel and brutal
	the true sect:
	putting faith in God's hands

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	fasting during the day and praying at night
	upholders and protectors of religion
	the victorious sect of Islam
	men who are true to what they promised Allah
	among them honest *ulema*
	strangers among families, relatives and loved ones
	the best of people
	lifting the banner of *jihad* in the path of Allah
	worshipping the God of *jihad*, rather than the leaders of jihad
	asking Allah to keep us form on the *jihad* and the straight path
	the army, to which the grace of Allah is promised
	seeking martyrdom and winning in the next world
	martyrs in death
	seeking martyrdom in the path of Allah
	triumphing even if get killed
	believing the promise of Allah
	will marry fair wives in the Paradise
	trade with Allah
	martyrs will achieve eternal life in the Paradise
	granted forgiveness by Allah's upon their death
	pay their lives as dowries for fair wives in the Paradise
	fearing punishment in the next world
	caring of Muslims
	avoiding Muslim blood
	caring of their injured fellows
	not initiating fighting with the regime's soldiers

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	don't target Muslims not seeking to take arms against Muslims **with referring to the honest people who support mujahedeen:** their actions confirm their words they courageously provided moral and material support to mujahedeen provide weapons and shelter to the mujahedeen they defended the jihadist approach despite the *ṭawāghīt*'s threats
REFERENCE TO OSAMA BIN LADEN: Osāmah**,** Osāmah bin Lādin *abū abdullah* 'father of Abdullah' *al-shaykh* 'the chief' *al-qāʾid* 'the leader' *al-mujāhid* 'the Mujahed' *al-ʾimām* 'the (religous) leader' *shaykhunā* 'our chief' *imāmunā* 'our leader' *(imām) (shaikh) (qāʾid) alhujahedeen* '(chief) (leader) of the mujahedeen' *Al-shaykh al-mujāhid* 'the Mujahed chief' *al-ʿabd al-ṣāliḥ* 'the pious slave [of God]' *qāʾid fusṭāṭi al-ʾīman* 'the leader of the believers' assembly'	honest person speaking on behalf the mujahedeen who fight the West under his leadership, the Muslims have succeeded offering a truce to the Europeans seeking to liberate the Arab and Islamic world from American influence renovator of the time and compeller of Americans gave a Saudi colour to the 9/11 attacks speaking in the name of the *ummah's* nobles sobbing when he remembers Iraq able to fight the world's apostates and infidels rendered the *ummah* great projects

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
REFERENCE TO AQAP FOUNDER YUSUF AL-UYAYRI:	
Yusuf Al-Uyayri *al-shaykh* 'the chief' *al-qāʾid* 'the leader' *al-mujāhid* 'the Mujahed' *al-shahīd* 'the martyr' *al-ʾimām* 'the leader' *akhūnā* 'our brother' *al-baṭal* 'the hero'	imam 'leader' long-sighted strategic thinking a martyr honest person highness in the time of disgrace a prudent mind an outweighing opinion one of the trainers in the Faruq camp during the Afghan *jihad* sought martyrdom in the battles of Somalia against the American forces sought martyrdom in Afghanistan bravely obtained martyrdom in the Arabian Peninsula went on a hunger strike to be transferred into solitary confinement to devote his time to Allah aided the *jihad* in Chechnya by writing religious studies for *the voice of Caucasus* website having a jihadist career full of sacrifice and hard work following Prophet Mohammed's approach being the bodyguard of Sheikh Osama bin Laden having shown his genius to Sheikh Osama bin Laden contributing to the fundraising for Kosovo imprisoned and severely tortured in Dammam has relations with the leader Khattab blessed with an incredible military intellect met with some Taliban ministers who came to perform hajj

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	hurt by how the *ulema's* let down
	whose virtue is recognised by the *ulema*
	whose writings increased the number of *ulema* supporting 9/11
	patient on calamities
	soft-hearted on mujahedeen and easily shedding tears when reminded of the sacrifices of the mujahedeen
	modest
	a martyr in the cause of his religion
	fought until being killed on the soil of the Arabian Peninsula

Table 11: The construction of the Other-within

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
A SET OF FREQUENTLY-USED EMPTY SIGNIFIERS REFERRING TO THE OTHER WITHIN: (*hum, -u* 'they', *-hum* 'them', *antum* 'you.PL.NOM', *-tum* ''you.PL.ACC' *al-mushrikīn* 'polytheists', *al-ṭawāghīt* ', *ʿabadat al-ṭawāghīt* '*ṭawāghīt*'s worshippers', *al-murtaddīn* 'apostates', *ʿaduwunā min al-dākhil* 'the enemy within', *al-ʾanthimah al-ṭawāghītiyah* 'the *ṭāghūti* regimes', *salāṭīn* 'sultans', *ahl al-bāṭil* 'people of the false = those who followed what is false', *jund al-shayṭān* 'devil's soldiers')	
REFERENCE TO THE HOUSE OF SAUD, THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT: *antum* 'you.PL.NOM' *-tum* ''you.PL.ACC' *hum* 'they' *-u* 'they.NOM' *-hum* 'them.ACC' *ʾāl suʿūd* 'the house of Saud' *ʾāl salūl* 'the house of Saluul' *ʾāl yahūd* 'the House of Jews' *al-ṭawāghīt* *ṭawāghīt al-jazīrah* 'the *ṭawāghīt* of the Peninsula' *ṭawāghīt ʾāl salūl* 'the house of Saluul's *ṭawāghīt*' *ṭawāghīt suʿūd* 'the house of Saud's *ṭawāghīt*' *ṭawāghīt al-ħaramayn* 'the tyants of the Holy land' *ṭawāghīt al-riddah* 'the *ṭawāghīt* of apostacy' *al-nāʿib* 'the agent'	*ṭawāghīt* apostates renegades renegades on the enjoinments of God having averted religion the government of disbelief, injustice, and tyranny fighting them is first to fight infidels implement the plans of colonisation allying to infidels governing according to laws other than those of the Almighty God shutting up the reformers and the preachers for the good imprisoning whoever calls them to govern according to God's laws America's key ally in the War on Terror supporting the global war on terrorism with the available resources

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
al-khawanah 'the traitors' *al-ʿaduw* 'the enemy' *aʿadāʾuna* 'our enemies', *ʿbīd ʾāl yahūd* 'the Jews' slaves' *ʿbīd ʿamrīka* 'America's slaves' *ʿbīduhum* 'their slaves' *athnābuhum* 'their tails' *hulafāʾuhum* 'their allies' *humāt al-ṣalīb* 'the protectors of the Crusade', *aʿadāʾ allah* 'God's enemies' *al-ħukūmah al-ʿamīla* 'the agent government', *al-ħukūmah al-ṣalībiyah* 'the Crusader government', *al-ħukūmah al-murtaddah* 'the apostate government', *ʿaduwunā min al-dākhil* 'the enemy within', *al-ħukkām al-khawanah* '' *shuyūkh ʿamrīka* 'America's Sheikhs' *ʿukhrā tuqātilu fī sabīl al-ṭaghūt* 'another [army] fighting in the cause of *ṭaghūt'*	aiding the war in Iraq providing the Americans with intelligence information about mujahedeen chasing, imprisoning, torturing and killing the mujahedeen providing space for polytheists, rafidhah [Shiite] and secularists entering into a treaty and alliance with the Crusaders who fight Islam and the Muslims desperate to drain financial sources trying to distort the image of mujahedeen in the eyes of donors the most agent state to America protecting the American interests jailing the champions and hailing the hypocrites of *ummah* not qualified to establish the religion and defend Muslims implementing the plans of the *ummah's* enemies resorting to *ṭāghūti* laws, such as the Labour Law, commercial courts, Customs Law, etc. claiming to have eliminated *jihad* implements America's instructions declaring war on *jihad* waging a frenzied attack on *jihad* waging a crusade against *jihad* and Islam providing America with free oil supplies gave aid to the Iraq War don't allow prejudice to America its presence depends on the existence of America having deservedly proven that it is the most agent state to America loyal to protecting America's interests

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
REFERENCE TO *ULEMA*:	
hum ‘they’ *-u* ‘they.NOM’ *-hum* ‘they.ACC’ *ʾal-ʿulamāʾ* ‘the *ulema’* *al-murjifūn* ‘the who spread rumours’ *al-mukhathelūn* ‘the discouragers’ *al-munāfiqūn* ‘the hypocrites’ *al-mustaslimūn* ‘surrenders’ *ʿulamāʾ al-sūʾ* ‘the evil *ulema’* *ʿulamāʾ al-ṣalāṭīn* ‘the sultans’ *ulema’* *shuyūkhuhum* ‘their Sheikhs’ *ʿulamāʾ al-ṭaghūt* ‘*ṭāghūt*’s *ulema’* *al-mashāʾikh al-rasmiyīn* ‘official Sheikhs’	who find nothing wrong in their land being occupied by the American female soldiers who don’t consider liberating the land of the Crusader invaders instilling in them [the people OR their followers] humiliation and debasement irrigating them [their followers] with the water of servility enslaved by a *ṭāghīt* and their fate is linked with his at the forefront of the negligence regarding the rights of our *ummah* pretending to be religious renegades deterring Muslims from *jihad* serving the Crusade providing gains for the Crusade pretended *ulema* seduced by worldly positions hypocrites brainwashing the people hired by the sultans handkerchiefs in the hands of the sultans the so-called *ulema* trying to deceive people by claiming that the mujahedeen are targeting Muslims

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
SOLDIERS AND SECURITY FORCES:	
hum 'they', *-u* 'they.NOM', *-hum* 'they.ACC'	*are traitors:*
al-junūd 'the soldiers'	cowardly
al-quwāt 'the forces'	traitors
almuḥaqqiqūn 'the interrogators'	fighting for the sake of salary
al-ḍābiṭ, al-ḍubbāṭ 'the officer(s)'	fighting in the cause of *ṭāghūt*
wazārat al-dākhiliyah 'the Interior Ministry'	fighting in the cause of the Crusade
wazārat al-dākhiliyah al-ṣalībiyah 'the Crusader Interior Ministry'	aides of the Crusaders
ʿskar al-kufr 'the soldiers of disbelief'	sacrifice their souls for the sake of the Crusade's worshippers
ʿskar al-ṭawāghīt	go to Hellfire if killed in the ranks of *ṭāghūt*
junūd al-ṭawāghīt '*ṭawāghīt's* soldiers'	the protectors of the Crusade
junūd al-nāʾib 'the agent's soldiers'	fighting under the devil's banner
junūd ʾāl suʿūd 'Al Saud's soldiers'	fighting the mujahedeen
junūd firʿawn 'Pharaoh's soldiers'	working to extinguish Allah's light
junūd ʾiblīs 'devil's soldiers'	pay their religion in exchange for a salary
junūd al-ḥukūmah (al-salūliyah) 'the (*salūli*) government soldiers'	unable to eliminate the mujahedeen
junūd al-nithām 'the regime's socldiers'	push themselves in a losing battle with the mujahedeen
quwāt al-ṭawāri' 'the emergency force'.	sell themselves for worldly advantage
quwāt al-nithām 'the regime's forces'	protecting polytheism
quwāt al-nithām 'the security forces'	accept being at the forefront of the Crusader soldiers
quwāt al-murtaddīn 'the apostates' forces'	accept being at the hands of the *ṭawāghīt*
quwāt ʾamrīka 'America' forces'	protecting the Crusaders
al- quwāt al-salūliyah 'the *salūli* forces'	engaged in constant war with the mujahedeen
kilāb al-mabāḥith 'dogs of secret police'	America's slaves
al-ʿabīd 'the slaves'	turning their backs [in flight]
ʿabīd al-ʿbīd 'the slaves of the slaves'	leave their vehicles and weaponry
ʿabīd ʾāl salūd 'Al saluul's soldiers'	
ʿabīd al-ṭaghūt '*ṭawāghīt's* slaves'	
ʿabīd ʾamrīka 'America's slaves'	
ʿbīd al-dirham 'the slaves of *dirham* [money]'	

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
Al-murtazaqah ‘the mercenaries’	fight from behind walls killed in their dozens frightened and panicked

Table 12: The construction of the Other-outwith

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
A SET OF FREQUENTLY-USED EMPTY SIGNIFIERS REFERRING TO THE OTHER-OUTWITH: (*hum* 'they', *-u* 'they.NOM', *-hum* 'they.ACC', *al-rūm* 'the Romans', *al-kuffār, al-kāfirīn* 'infidels', *al-ṣalībiyīn* 'Crusaders', *al-naṣārā, al-masīħiyīn* 'Christians', *al-yahūd* 'the Jews', *al-gharb* 'the West')	
AMERICA, THE AMERICANS:	
hum 'they', *-u* 'they.NOM', *-hum* 'they.ACC' *al-kuffār, al-kāfirīn* 'infidels', *al-ṣalībiyīn* 'Crisaders', *al-naṣārā, al-masīħiyīn* 'Christians', *al-ʾamrīkiyīn* 'the Americans', *al-aʿadāʿ* 'the enemeies', *al-mulħidūn,* 'athiests', *asyāduhum* 'their [Al Saud] masters', *ahl al-kufr* 'people of disbelief' *ʿubbād, ʿabadat al-ṣalīb* 'the Crusade's worshippers', *sadanat al-ṣalīb* 'the Crusade's servants', *al-ʿaduw al-ṣalībī* 'the Crusader enemy', *al-mujannadāt al-ʾamrīkaiyāt* 'the American female soldiers', *al-duwal al- ṣalībīyah* 'the Crusader states' *ʾulāʾika allathīna kafarū* 'those who disbelieved',	the masters their [the apostate regimes] masters stealing its resources [the Arabia] determining its policies fighting the Muslims of this land colonising Makkah and Madinah the biggest obstacle in the way of establishing the Islamic state desecrating the sacred land the protector of the Crusade implementing whatever possible in the war against Islam and Muslims the most hostile enemy ever will not experience security before leaving Arabia, Palestine, and all Muslim lands colonising Arabia using military bases in the sacred land to bomb Muslims waging a global war on Islam and Muslims

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
juyūsh alyahūd wa alsalībiyīn 'the armies of the Jews and the Crusaders',	an aggressive state waging the tenth Crusade war took advantage of the Kuwait War to achieve its interests the stronghold of atheism invading the Islamic world tightens its grip on jihadist and Islamic movements in the Islamic world frightened and panicked after destroying the Crusade residential compound the leader of disbelief killing them pleases Muslims will know how Allah aids his supporters an empire held together by materialistic strength whose end is imminent drawn into a war of attrition by Al Qaeda swallowed the bait [laid by Al Qaeda], and expanded and deployed want to misshape our identity and strip us of religion being defeated requesting the apostate regime to arrest and interrogate the mujahedeen placing their churches in Mohammed's land searching for the mujahedeen will receive painful blows from the mujahedeen head of infidelity killing Muslims in Palestine at the hands of Israel whose crimes in Afghanistan are indescribable are in a predicament in Afghanistan aim to make the mujahedeen busy fighting the Saudi regime

NOMINATIONAL STRATEGIES (**SOCIAL ACTOR:** linguistic realisations)	**PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES** (*Predicational themes*: linguistic realisations)
	in a severe and critical situation in Iraq
	came with its soldiers to the land of Muhammed
	marketing the deception of reform in the Islamic world
	raping Muslim women in abu ghraib [an American prison in Iraq]
	appreciating Saudi efforts in the war on terrorism
	supporting Israel
	wronged our brothers in Guantanamo Bay prison
	mistreated and killed Muslims in Somalia
	caused the death of more than half a million Iraqi children
	defeat is just a matter of time
	cannot eliminate terrorism
	facing a guerrilla war
	militarily lurching
	politically wandering
	economically bleeding
	spend billions in maintaining the security of its facilities and its economic interests around the world
	trapped in a minefield in its war on Islam
	fake civilisation

Appendix D: Bin Laden's Declaration

World Islamic front for *jihad* against Zionists and crusaders: declaration of war[1]

From al-Quds al-_Arabi, February 23, 1998

Praise be to Allah, mover of the clouds, defeater of the Confederates, and who stated in his law-giving Book: "Then, when the sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, take them [as captives], besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every point of observation" [9:5], and prayers and peace upon His Prophet Muhammad b. _Abdallah, who stated: "I was sent with a sword just before the Hour [of Judgment], so that they would worship Allah alone, and my daily sustenance was placed beneath the shadow of my spear, and humiliation and contempt were placed upon those who resist my message."

Since the time when Allah spread the Arabian Peninsula [see 79:30], created within it its deserts and surrounded it with its seas, it has never been crushed and overcome [see 12:7] as by these Crusader hordes that have spread over it like locusts, pressing upon its land, devouring its wealth, and annihilating its greenery. All of this is happening at the same time as "the nations are quarreling with each other over the Muslims, just as starving people quarrel over a bowl [of food]."[8] The seriousness of the times and the minimum [number] of helpers compel us, and also you, to make a stand concerning current concealed events, just as it obligates us to agree on a course of action.

No one today will argue concerning three truths that are backed up by abundant proofs concerning which all fair-minded people will agree. We will list them to remind those who can be reminded, to destroy those who will be destroyed by clarity, and to embarrass those who are embarrassed by clarity, and they are:

1. For [a period of time] going on seven years, America has been occupying the lands of Islam, the holiest of its places, the Arabian Peninsula, stealing its produce, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, and frightening its neighbors. It has turned its bases on the peninsula into a spearhead with which to fight the adjoining Islamic peoples. Possibly in the past there were some who would argue the fact of the occupation, but now all of the people of the peninsula would acknowledge it. I will not even note the continual American aggression against the Iraqi people, using the peninsula, despite the refusal of the rulers to permit this, since they are overpowered.
2. Despite the great destruction which has occurred among the Iraqi people at the hands of the Crusader-Zionist alliance, and despite the frightening number of killed—close to a million— despite all of this, the Americans are trying once again to return to these terrible slaughters, as if they were not satisfied with the long siege after the violent war, and not even with ripping apart or destruction. Now they come once again to annihilate what is left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbors.
3. Since the motivations of the Americans behind these wars is religious and economic, and also to serve the interests of the minuscule Jewish state in order to remove eyes from its occupation of Jerusalem and its killing of Muslims there [so, too, the Muslims should respond with a religious and economic war]. The best demonstration of this is their desire to destroy Iraq, the strongest of the adjoining Arab nations, and their aspiration to dissolve the states of the region into paper statelets, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Sudan. Through their fragmentation and weakness the

[1] The translation of this communiqué is adopted from (Cook 2005: 173-175).

continuation of Israel will be ensured, as well as the continual brutal Crusader occupation of the peninsula.

All of these crimes and calamities from the Americans are an open declaration of war upon Allah and His Messenger, and upon the Muslims. All the religious leadership—past and present—has had through the Islamic age a consensus that *jihad* is an individual obligation if an enemy destroys the lands of the Muslims. Among those who have related this are the Imam Ibn Qudama [d. 1223] in his *Mughni,* the Imam al-Kasani [d. 1191] in his *Bada_i_,* al-Qurtubi [d. 1273] in his *Tafsir,* Shaykh al- Islam [Ibn Taymiyya] [d. 1348] in his *Ikhtiyarat,* where he stated: "As for defensive fighting, the most important of the types [of fighting] is to repel an invader from the sanctity and the religion is an obligation according to consensus. There is nothing more obligatory—other than actually believing [in Islam]—than repelling an attacking invader who corrupts the religion and this world."

So, building upon all of this, and taking the command of Allah as our example, we give the following opinion to all Muslims:

The ruling of killing Americans and their allies—whether civilians or military— is incumbent upon every Muslim who is able and in whichever country is easiest for him, in order to liberate the Mosque of al-Aqsa and the Holy Mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and until their armies leave the lands of Islam, punished according to the law, broken and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the Word of Allah: "Fight them until there is no sedition [temptation] and the religion becomes that of Allah" [2:193]; and His Word: "And why don't you fight for the cause of Allah and for the down-trodden, men, women and children, who say: 'Lord, bring us out of this city whose inhabitants are unjust and grant us, from You, a protector, and grant us, from You, a supporter'" [4:75].

So, with Allah's permission, we call every Muslim who believes in Allah and desires a reward to take as his example the order of Allah to kill Americans and to steal their possessions in everyplace they are to be found, and during every time possible. We also call upon the religious leadership of the Muslims, their leaders, their youth, and their armies to initiate attacks upon the American devil, and upon those allies of Satan who have allied themselves with them, in order to frighten them away from behind them [the Americans], so that they may [re]consider. "O believers, respond to Allah and to the Apostle if He calls you to that which will give you life; and know that Allah stands between a man and his heart, and that unto Him you shall be gathered" [8:24]; and His Word: "O believers, what is the matter with you? If you are told: 'March forth in the way of Allah,' you simply cling heavily to the ground. Are you satisfied with the present life rather than the Hereafter? Yet the pleasures of the present life are very small compared with those of the Hereafter. If you do not march forth, He will inflict a very painful punishment on you and replace you by another people, and you will not harm Him in the least; for Allah has power over everything" [9:38–39]; and also "Do not be faint-hearted and do not grieve; you will have the upper hand, if you are believers" [3:139].

Shaykh Osama b. Muhammad b. Ladin
Ayman al-Zawahiri, amir of the Gama_at al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
Rifa_i Ahmad Taha, of the Gama_at al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
Mir Hamza, Jami_at al-_ulema_-i Pakistan (Pakistan)
Fazlur Rahman, amir of the Haraka al-Jihadiyya (Bangladesh)

Appendix E: The original version of data excerpts examples by Chapter

CHAPTER 5

(1)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 12 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: إتحاف العباد بفضائل الجهاد للشيخ عبدالله عزام ـ رحمه الله
... فكتبه وخطبه ومحاضراته مليئة بذكر فضائل القتال في سبيل الله التي يجنيها المجاهد في الدنيا والآخرة

(2)
ISSUE: 21 PAGE: 40 DATE: July 2004
TITLE: ذروة سنام الإسلام
وأن رباط يوم خير من الدنيا وما فيها

(3)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 2 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: نداء النفير من الشيخ أسامة بن لادن
بقلم / أبي هاجر عبد العزيز المقرن
نداء النفير من الشيخ أسامة بن لادن

(4)
ISSUE: 7 PAGE: 42 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: وختاماً
حتى إذا ما سنحت الفرصة ، ووجد المرء هدفاً أو فرصة للنيل من الصليبيين فإنه يستعين بالله ، ولا يتردد ، وفي ثنايا الملحق تجد ما يجعلك قادراً على الإثخان في العدو

(5)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 2 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
فقد أوجب الله علينا أمرًا عظيمًا ، وهو الجهاد في سبيل الله ، وقال سبحانه: (كُتب عليكم القتال وهو كره لكم وعسى أن كرهوا شيئًا وهو خيرٌ لكم وعسى أن تحبوا شيئًا وهو شرٌّ لكم والله يعلم وأنتم لا تعلمون)
وقد أوجب الله الجهاد لأسباب جميعها متوفر في عصرنا هذا ، من دفع عدوان الكافرين ، وقتال المرتدين ، ونصرة المستضعفين ، وفكاك الأسرى والمسجونين ، فضلاً عن جهاد الطلب بقتال الكفار حتى يُعطوا الجزية عن يدٍ وهم صاغرون ، وكل من هذه إما فروض أعيانٍ ، وإما فروض كفايةٍ لكنْ لم يقُم بها من تحصل بهِ الكفايةُ من المسلمين فهي فروضُ أعيانٍ إلى حينِ حصول الكفايةِ.

(6)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ومن أعظم الأماكن الّتي تعيَّن فيها الجهاد ووجب: بلاد الحرمين ، ففيها العدوُّ الصليبيُّ المحتلُّ الّذي يسرق خيراتها ، ويرسم سياساتها ، ويحارب المسلمين انطلاقًا منها ، كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلةَ المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.

(7)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 10 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: بيانات .. ومتابعات ..
من سلطان بن بجاد العتيبي إلى من يراه من المسلمين
... فجريمتي أني أعمل بهذه الفريضة الغائبة وهي الجهاد في سبيل الله ...

(8)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 32 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الأخيرة
لن نطلب منك أن تنتظر عددنا القادم ، بل نود أن تكون مشغولاً بالجهاد الواجب ، فإنه هو المقصود من إصدار هذه المجلة

(9)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 3 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية ...
على الدرب سائرون
والجهاد ماض إلى قيام الساعة كما أخبر سيد البشر وإمام المجاهدين صلى الله عليه وسلم تسليما كثيرا

(10)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 8 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: قال العلماء
قال الشيخ: أبوعمر محمد بن عبدالله السيف حفظه الله
بل عليه أن ينظر إلى الأخطار المحيطة بالأمة. والحرب الأمريكية الظالمة على المسلمين في العراق وفي فلسطين وفي أفغانستان

(11)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 29 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: **بيانات وفتاوى ... بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية**
وفي هذا الواقع الأليم الذي تعيشه الأمة ، تكالبت قوى الكفر العالمي على المسلمين

(12)
ISSUE: 10 PAGE: 9 DATE: January 2004
TITLE: مع الحدث: " مؤتمر الحوار الوطني " تفرق في الدين ، و اجتماع على الباطل
في وقت تزداد فيه جراح الأمة ، بسبب خيانات هؤلاء الحكام العملاء الذين كانوا وما زالوا في عمل دؤوب لإرضاء الغرب الكافر

(13)
ISSUE: 10 PAGE: 9 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: مقاصِدُ الجِهاد: (دفعُ الصَّائل)
فهو وسيلةُ دفعِ العُدوانِ ، ووسيلةُ الدَّعوةِ إلى الله ، ووسيلةُ إقامةِ الخِلافةِ في الأرض وتحكيم شرع الله في أرضِ الله

(14)
ISSUE: 18 PAGE: 43 DATE: January 2004
TITLE: محبة الله يا أهل الجهاد
لماذا لم تردعوهم عن الظلم والإجرام من قتل الموحدين ومطاردتهم

(15)
ISSUE: 6 PAGE: 41 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: أجل النعم وأكبر الشرف
وإنها لسعادة لنا وأيُّ سعادةٍ أن نكون بإذن الله من ضمن هؤلاء الغرباء الذين هم - إن شاء الله - الفرقة الناجية والطائفة المنصورة التي لا يضرها من خالفها ولا من خذلها إلى قيام الساعة ..

(16)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 37 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: متعب المحيّاني ... غربة الشهداء
لقد رأيته عندما خلا بنفسه يديم الوجوم والتحسر على واقع الأمة ، ويقول: ((نحن الغرباء القلائل الذين يقع علينا عبء إعادة الأمة إلى دين الله

(17)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 24 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: لقاء مع أحد المطلوبين الـ 19
المجاهد / أبو هاجر عبد العزيز بن عيسى المقرن حفظه الله
واليوم بحمد الله نحن والإخوة في الجبهة التي كنا نسعى لها ولتطهيرها وتحريرها من رجس الحكام الخونة وقبلهم من رجس الصليبيين من الأمريكان وحلفائهم ، نسأل الله لنا وللإخوة النصر والتمكين.

(18)
ISSUE: 2 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
فإن حربنا مع أعداء الله مستمرة بفضل الله في كل مكان ، وضربات المجاهدين في أنحاء الأرض ترعب أعداء الله وترهبهم ، وجهادنا في جزيرة العرب مستمر بإذن الله قائم على سوقه ، يعجب المؤمنين ويغيظ الكفار ، ولن نترك الأمريكان يحتلون بلاد الحرمين بأمن وسلام ، ولن نقف عن جهادنا حتى نحرر كل شبر من بلاد المسلمين.

(19)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 32 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الأخيرة
أخي المجاهد .. حتى متى نتكلم ولا نعمل؟! وإلى متى نسمع صرخات الاستغاثة ونحن ننظر؟! وإلى أي حدٍّ ننتظر أن تصل الحرب على الإسلام حتى نتحرك من سباتنا؟! يا أيها الذين آمنوا: لم تقولون ما لا تفعلون؟! كبر مقتًا عند الله أن تقولوا ما لا تفعلون ..

(20)
ISSUE: 2 PAGE: 26 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: لقاء مع أحد المطلوبين الـ 19
المجاهد / أبو هاجر عبد العزيز بن عيسى المقرن حفظه الله
إلى متى ونحن ننظر ؟ إلى متى ونحن تستباح حرماتنا وتنتهك أعراضنا ؟ إلى متى ونحن ننظر إلى مشايخنا وهم يزج بهم في السجون ؟ إلى متى ونحن ننظر إلى قادتنا وكوادرنا وهم يقتلون ؟ إلى متى ونحن ننظر إلى الصليبي واليهودي يكرم ويعزز في أرضنا ؟ إلى متى يُسب الله تعالى ونسكت ؟ إلى متى نرضى بالطائرات الأمريكية تحلق من فوق رؤوسنا لتهدم بيوت إخواننا في العراق وأفغانستان ؟

(21)
ISSUE: 13 PAGE: 18 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: فبايعهم على الموت
بقلم الشيخ: فارس بن أحمد آل شويل الزهراني
وإنني أسأل كلَّ مُسلمٍ يقرأ هذا الكلام فأقول:
أين نحن من الشيخ عمر عبد الرحمن في سجون أمريكا؟
وأين نحن من المجاهد رمزي يوسف والمجاهد أبي هاجر العراقي في سجون أمريكا؟
وأين نحن من أسرانا في غوانتانامو؟ وأين نحن من علماء المسلمين المأسورين في سجون الطواغيت والمرتدين؟
وأين نحن من بقية المستضعفين من المسلمين الذين يقبعون خلف الأسوار؟
ياالله بيعةٌ على الموت وعلى عدم الفرار من أجل رجل واحد - عثمان بن عفان - من رسول الله ε!!
وقتلانا اليوم وأسرانا بالمئات والآلاف ولا تتحرك فينا شعرةٌ ولا نبايع لله بيعة صادقة نكفر بها خطايانا!!
أين الذين صدقوا ما عاهدوا الله عليه ؟ أين شباب الإسلام؟
أين الذين يثأرون لدينهم ولعرضهم ولإخوانهم ولأمتهم؟
حُورب ديننا وسُبَّ ربُنا Ψ ونبينا ε وأُخذت ديارنا ونحن سادرون غافلون مشغولون!!
وأُخذت أموالنا ونحن لاهون!! وقُتل أبطالنا وأخيارنا ونحن ساكتون!!
فإلى متى يا أمة الإسلام؟ إلى متى؟ إلى متى؟!!.

(22)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 2 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية ...
على الدرب سائرون
جاءت كلمة شيخنا إمام المجاهدين أسامة بن لادن نصره الله في هذه المرحلة ...

(23)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
والجهاد ماضٍ إلى قيام الساعة كما أخبر سيد البشر وإمام المجاهدين صلى الله عليه وسلم تسليمًا كثيرًا

(24)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلةَ المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.

(25)
ISSUE: 7 PAGE: 33 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: سيرة شهيد: تركي الدندني ... عزيمة وشجاعة
قبضت سلطات النظام الطاغوتي المرتد على بعض الشباب العائدين من أرض أفغانستان

(26)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 9 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: معركة السويدي الوقائع كما هي ..!!
يرويها أحد المجاهدين المشاركين في المعركة حفظه الله
معركة السويدي ! نعم ، معركة وإن رغمت أنوف الذين لا يفقهون ..
تقابل فيها الصفان ، والتقى الجمعان: فئة تقاتل في سبيل الله ، وأخرى تقاتل في سبيل الطاغوت ...

(27)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 6 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: وحرض المؤمنين
قوموا إلى جنة عرضها السماوات والأرض
أسعدَ جَدَّ المجاهدين فما زال في صعود ، وأخزى أنجاس الجزيرة وأذلهم من آل يهود.

(28)
ISSUE: 6 PAGE: 15 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: لقاء مع الأستاذ: " لويس عطية الله " حفظه الله
لجأ الطواغيت من آل سلول إلى تجارب إخوانهم المرتدين في الجزائر ومصر ، بمحاولة تشويه صورة المجاهدين

(29)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 22 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: كُنّا مستضعفين في الأرض
أولئك الذين يكفرون بطواغيت الأرض كلها من الحكومات العربية والعجمية ، ومن الهيئات الطاغوتية الأممية والعربية والإقليمية .. الذين يتبرؤون من المذاهب الشركية ومسالك الديمقراطية ، ووثنية الوطنية..

(30)
ISSUE: 21 PAGE: 26 DATE: July 2004
TITLE: عبد العزيز المقرن رضي الله عنه
طاردك عبيد عبيد الصليبيين, جنود إبليس وعسكر الشياطين, خدم الطواغيت وأحذية المرتدين, ولم تطب خواطرهم أن يروا من يؤذي الصليبيين ... طاردك عبيد العبيد بمساندة فعلية من الصليبيين الذين شاركوا عبيدهم في تلك المطاردات ... رحمك الله - أبا هاجر - أنت ومن معك ... وما كنتم والله إلاّ رجالاً صدقوا ما عاهدوا الله عليه

(31)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 30 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية
فإننا لن نكون لقمةً سائغةً للطواغيت وجنودهم ، بل سندافع عن أنفسنا ولن نتردد في دفع الصائل من جنودهم ، وسنريهم مِنَّا ما يكرهون والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون

(32)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 14 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: مواجهات رياض الخبراء: صور من البطولة والصمود
فما أخذنا مواقعنا إلا وهربوا جميعاً دون أن نطلق عليهم طلقةً واحدة

(33)
ISSUE: 17 PAGE: 13 DATE: March 2004
TITLE: خالد السبيت ...
أتواصوا به .. بل هم قومٌ طاغون
انهالت الطلقات من القناصة الجبناء المستترين الذين يقاتلون من وراء جدر

(34)
ISSUE: 20 PAGE: 27 DATE: June 2004
TITLE: أيها العلماء: أيُّ الوعيدين أشدّ ؟!
عن الولوغ في وحل الطواغيت وأذنابهم من المرتزقة والمتفيهقين

(35)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 4-5 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: إنّما همُ المُشركُونَ ، وإنّما دمُ أحدِهِم دمُ كلبٍ !
إنَّما همُ المُشركُونَ ، وإنَّما دمُ أحدِهِم دمُ كلبٍ ! ... وقد قال الله تعالى: (إنَّ شرَّ الدَّوابِّ عند الله الّذين كفروا فهم لا يؤمنون) ، وقال (أولئك كالأنعام بل هم أضلُّ)... إنَّ المُكتفي بما سبَقَ يخرجُ بأنَّ كفر هذا الكافر ، وخروجه عن دين الله ، اقتضى هدر دمِهِ ... إنَّ الموحِّد الَّذي يمتلئ صدرُهُ بما أمره الله به من عداوةِ الكُفَّارِ ، الَّذي كفر بالطَّاغوتِ ومن عبدَ الطَّاغوتَ ، والَّذي والى في الله وعادى فيه ، إنَّ هذا الموحِّدَ حقًّا لَيَكفيهِ ما سَبَقَ ، ليتحرَّق شوقًا إلى دم الكافر ، إلى نحر عدوِّ الله وتقطيعه ...
أخي المجاهد .. ألا تريد الجنَّة؟!
ألا تريد أن تأمن النار بإذن الله؟!
اقتل المشرك .. اقتل من دمه دم كلبٍ .. اقتل هذا الَّذي أمرك الله العظيم بقتله

(36)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ومن أعظم الأماكن الّتي تعيَّن فيها الجهاد ووجب: بلاد الحرمين ، ففيها العدوُّ الصليبيُّ المحتلُّ الّذي يسرق خيراتها ، ويرسم سياساتها ، ويحارب المسلمين انطلاقًا منها ، كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلةَ المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.

(37)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 35 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: شهيد الحرم: متعب المحيّاني ... غربة الشهداء
غير أن الحملة الصليبية العاشرة بدأت جحافلها تتجه نحو مقبرة الأقوياء ، نحو أفغانستان

(38)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 11 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: بيانات .. ومتابعات ..
من سلطان بن بجاد العتيبي إلى من يراه من المسلمين
هاهو الجهاد اليوم جاء في بلدكم ..هاهم الأمريكان بين أظهركم ..هاهم يضعون الكنائس في أرض محمد ع هاهم دخلوا أرضكم بقواتهم وأسلحتهم

(39)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 5 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: إنّما همُ المُشركُونَ ، وإنّما دمُ أحدِهِم دمُ كلبٍ !
ألم تر هذا .. الّذي .. يسب دينك ... ويحتل أرض المسلمين .. ويستعمر مكة والمدينة

CHAPTER 6

(1)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية ... على الدرب سائرون

الحمد لله رب العالمين ، ولي الصالحين ، وناصر عباده المجاهدين ، والصلاة والسلام على أشرف المرسلين نبيّنا محمد وعلى آله وصحابته أجمعين ، أما بعد:

فقد دخلت العشر الأواخر التي كان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يجتهد فيها ما لا يجتهد في غيرها ويحيي ليله ويوقظ أهله ، وهي موسم من أعظم مواسم الطاعات ، وسوق رابحٌ لمن أسهم فيه بتجارةٍ تنجي من عذابٍ أليم.

وقد أغارت ثلّة مباركةٌ من شباب الإسلام المبارك بين يدي هذه العشر على مجمّع من مستوطنات الصليبيين في جزيرة العرب ، وتقرّبوا إلى الله بعملية جهاديَّةٍ في أعدائِهِ ، تعجب المؤمنين وتغيظُ الكفّار وأولياءهم (وفيكُم سمَّاعُون لهم).

والجهاد ماضٍ إلى قيام الساعة كما أخبر سيد البشر وإمام المجاهدين صلى الله عليه وسلم تسليمًا كثيرًا ، ومن أعظم أزمنة الجهاد في الإسلام شهر رمضان الّذي كان فيه عددٌ من المعارك ، كانت أولاها غزوةُ بدرٍ الكبرى.

والمجاهدون يُقاتلون أعداء الله في كل مكان كما أمرهم الله ، ولا يستهدفون المسلمين ولا يقصدون النيل منهم ، كيف ولم يخرجوا إلا دفاعًا عن حرمات المسلمين وذبًّا عن أعراضهم وامتثالاً لأمر الله بالجهاد في سبيله.

ومن علم أنّ هذا مقصد الجهاد وهدفه الأسمى لم يكن واردًا عنده دعوات المعوّقين والقائلين هلمّ إلينا ولا يأتون البأس إلاّ قليلاً ، وليس للمجاهدين ولا لغير المجاهدين أن يجعلوا ثوابتَ الدين وقواعده مادّةً يُتحاور فيها ويُتفاوض (وما كان لمُؤمنٍ ولا مُؤمنةٍ إذا قضى الله ورسولُهُ أمرًا أن يكون لهمُ الخيرةُ من أمرِهِم) فمن رضخ لحكم الشريعة ونزل عندها وأسلم وجهه لله ، وحكّم شرعه ورفع القوانين الوضعيَّة ، وتبرّأ من أعداء الله ولم يتولَّهم فهو أخونا ونحن معه على الطريق ففيم التفاوض؟ ومن رفض شرع الله وشاء أن يدين بدين أمريكا ، أو أراد أن يُؤمن ببعضٍ ويكفر ببعضٍ فليس بيننا وبينه حوارٌ ، ومن أراد أن يحتلّ بلاد المسلمين ، ويقتل أبناءهم ويستحيي نساءهم فحوارنا معه بالقتال في سبيل الله حتّى يكفّ الله بأسه ويكسر شوكته (فقاتل في سبيل الله لا تكلَّفُ إلاّ نفسك وحرّض المُؤمنين عسى الله أن يكفّ بأس الذين كفروا والله أشدُّ بأسًا وأشدُّ تنكيلاً)

ونحن ندعو الأمَّة إلى استهداف الأمريكان في كلّ مكان فهذه هي لغةُ الحوار الّتي يفهمُها العدوّ ، ويستجيب للمطالب إذا سمعها.

والمجاهدون بحول الله وقوّته ماضون على هذا الطريقِ ، ثابتون على هذا الدربِ ، لن تأخذهم في الله لومةُ لائمٍ ، ولن يثنيهم عن الجهاد المخذلون والمعوقون.

نسأل الله أن ينصر المجاهدين في كل مكان ، وأن يعلي راية الدين ، وصلى الله وسلم على نبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحابته أجمعين.

(2)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله

أيها المجاهدون في سبيل الله ....
إليكم يا من ترابطون على ذرا الهندكوش ، وتورا بورا .....وجنين .....وغزة ..... وقروزني ....وبلاد الحرمين
إليكم يا من رضيتم السماء نزلاً لنفوسكم العالية ....وأبيتم السماوة .....
إليكم يا مصابيح العزة وشموس البطولة ....
إليكم يا أهل الرباط ...أقول ...
أبشروا والذي نفسي بيده الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....
(إن الله اشترى من المؤمنين أنفسهم وأموالهم بأن لهم الجنة يقاتلون في سبيل الله فيَقتلون ويُقتلون وعداً عليه حقاً في التوراة والإنجيل والقرآن ومن أوفى بعهده من الله فاستبشروا ببيعكم الذي بايعتم به ....)
نعم استبشروا ...ولا تقولوا مات فلان وفلان ...
لا تقولوا قد فقدنا الشهيدا
مذ طواه الثرى وحيداً فريدا
أنا ما مت فالملائك حولي
عند ربي بُعثت خلقاً جديدا
فاصنعوا اليوم من شموخي نشيدا
أيها الأسود ....
قاتلوا أئمة الكفر إنهم لا أيمان لهم لعلهم ينتهون
صبراً معاشر المؤمنين ....قاتلوا على بصيرة من ربكم ، وثبات من دينكم ...وكأني بكم قد لقيتم سدنة الصليب وأحفاد القردة والخنازير ....
باعوا الآخرة بالدنيا ...واشتروا الضلالة بالهدى.

..فما أصبرهم على النار ....
الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....الله أكبر ....
دعوا عنكم إرجاف المبطلين .... وتخذيل العلمانيين ...وخزعبلات الأذناب المنافقين
عباد الله .. أعملوا السيف في رقاب أعداء الله ، وخذّلوا دون أمتكم واستنهضوا الهمم بعظيم فعالكم وبدمائكم الطاهرة المنهمرة في ساح الجهاد ...

(3)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 33 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: قال أهل الثغور
لئن كان أبناء الحرمين عندهم شعورٌ وإيمانٌ بضرورة الجهاد ضد الكفر في كل مكان ، فهم أكثر ما يكونون عدداً وقوةً وحماسةً على أرضهم التي ولدوا عليها للدفاع عن أعظم مقدساتهم -الكعبة المشرفة ، قبلة المسلمين أجمعين- ويعلمون أن المسلمين في العالم أجمع ، سينصرونهم ويؤازرونهم في قضيتهم الكبرى ، قضية كل المسلمين ، ألا وهي تحرير مقدساتهم ، وأن هذا هو واجبُ كل مسلم في العالم

(4)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: إتحاف العباد بفضائل الجهاد
للشيخ عبدالله عزام - رحمه الله -
ليس صدفة ولا فلتة أن يأتي هذا الكتاب (إتحاف العباد بفضائل الجهاد) بهذا العنوان ، فقد كان الإمام الشهيد عبدالله عزام موفقاً باختيار العناوين للمواضيع والكتب التي ألفها ، فكل موضوع أو كتاب ألفه وضع له عنوان صادقاً لمحتواه .
فهذا الكتاب الذي نستعرضه حقاً إنه يتحف القاريء بفضائل الجهاد ، فقد حوى على أحاديث تستجيش القلوب وتلهب العواطف ، حتى إذا انتهيت من هذا الكتاب تمنيت أن لو كنت في ساح الوغى تقاتل في سبيل الله فتفوز فوزاً عظيماً .
وفضائل الجهاد التي تحدث عنها الشيخ لم تكن مقصورة على هذا الكتاب ، فكتبه وخطبه ومحاضراته مليئة بذكر فضائل القتال في سبيل الله التي يجنيها المجاهد في الدنيا والآخر

(5)
ISSUE: 6 PAGE: 33 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية كتب عليكم القتال
هل أوحشتكم قلة السالكين ، أو بطأ بكم طول الطريق ؟ فتذكروا قوله: (والذي نفس محمد بيده لوددت أن أغزو في سبيل الله فأقتل ثم أغزو فأقتل ثم أغزو فأقتل) أيها المجاهدون في سبيل الله ...

(6)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 2 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
فقد أوجب الله علينا أمرًا عظيمًا ، وهو الجهاد في سبيل الله ، وقال سبحانه: (كُتب عليكم القتال وهو كره لكم وعسى أن كرهوا شيئًا وهو خيرٌ لكم وعسى أن تحبوا شيئًا وهو شرٌّ لكم والله يعلم وأنتم لا تعلمون).
وقد أوجب الله الجهاد لأسباب جميعها متوفر في عصرنا هذا ، من دفع عدوان الكافرين ، وقتال المرتدين ، ونصرة المستضعفين ، وفكاك الأسرى والمسجونين ، فضلاً عن جهاد الطلب بقتال الكفار حتى يُعطوا الجزية عن يدٍ وهم صاغرون

(7)
ISSUE: 2 PAGE: 35 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين في جزيرة العرب حول تصريحات وزارة الداخلية الأخيرة
المجاهدون في جزيرة العرب يعدون بفضل الله العدة ، ويجمعون ما استطاعوا من قوة ، إضافة إلى الخبرات القتالية التي اكتسبوها في شتى ميادين الجهاد ، ولم يعدوا هذه العدة ، ولا حملوا راية الجهاد إلا لتكون كلمة الله هي العليا ، وحتى لا تكون فتنة ويكون الدين لله ، وقد أخذوا على أنفسهم عهدا بمحاربة أمريكا في كل مكان ، وخاصة في بلاد الحرمين التي اتخذها الصليبيون قاعدة لانطلاق الحملة الصليبية وقيادتها وإدارتها ، وغزيت أفغانستان والعراق من قواعدها المتفرقة

(8)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 35 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين في جزيرة العرب حول تصريحات وزارة الداخلية الأخيرة

في زمن كثر فيه المخذلون ، واشرأب فيه النفاق والمنافقون ، وقلّ النّاصحون ، أصبح المجاهدون غرباء بين الأهل والأحباب ، وبين الأقارب والأصحاب ، فلا يجدون على الخير أعواناً إلا ما ندر ، ولا يجدون على الطريق أنصاراً

CHAPTER 7

(1)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 1 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: بسم الله
جاءت (صوت الجهاد) لتكون عونا للمجاهد ، منيرة له الطريق ، وهادية له إلى السبيل ، معينها الذي لا ينضب: الكتاب والسنة ، ومشربها الذي لا يتكدر: نصوص الوحيين وسيرة الصحابة والتابعين ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلى يوم الدين ..

(2)
ISSUE: 6 PAGE: 37 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: وصايا للمجاهدين: لا تتعلقوا بالنتائج
وإن من سمات الواجبات الشرعية أن العبد يؤديها وهو مسلم لله ، فلا يعرضها على العقل ولا خبرات وتجارب الآخرين بل يقوم بها كما أمر الله تعالى ويحتسب الأجر من عنده سبحانه

(3)
ISSUE: 5 PAGE: 34 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: وصايا للمجاهدين: احذروا من هؤلاء
ويذكرنا سعي هؤلاء بما قام به النفر النشاز من الفئة العقلانية (محمد عبده وجمال الدين الأفغاني وممن هو على شاكلتهم) تجاه الاستعمار البريطاني لمصر حيث خدروا الأمة عن القتال ولبس لأمة الحرب ، بسفسطاتهم العقلية ، وأطروحاتهم الانبطاحية التعايشية ، ونسفهم لأصول الدين من الولاء والبراء والجهاد في سبيل الله

(4)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 28 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية
الجهاد في سبيل الله تعالى فريضة فرضها الله على عباده ، وليس فكرا أو منهجا أو رأيا بشريا يؤخذ على سبيل التجربة والاختبار ، فلا خيرة للمسلم في قبوله أو رده.
و لا ينبغي أن يقوم من خلال النظر العقلي في المصالح والمفاسد بل لابد من اعتبار المصالح والمفاسد على ما يقتضيه الشرع . كمالا يصح إغفال الجانب التعبدي فيه

(5)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 30 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية
فإن كفر هؤلاء الطواغيت هو ما دلت عليه أصول أهل السنة والجماعة في تكفير المرتدين من الحاكمين بغير ما أنزل الله ، و المبدلين لشرعه ، والمحللين للحرام المحرمين للحلال ، والمناصرين للكفار على المسلمين ، المرتكبين الكفر البواح الذي عندنا فيه من الله برهان

(6)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلةَ المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.

(7)
ISSUE: 5 PAGE: 25 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: لقاء مع الشيخ أبي عبدالرحمن الأثري
التحاكم إلى غير شرع الله عز وجل قال الله تعالى (ألم تر إلى الذين يزعمون أنهم آمنوا بما أنزل إليك وما أنزل من قبلك يريدون أن يتحاكموا إلى الطاغوت وقد أمروا أن يكفروا به ويريد الشيطان أن يضلهم ضلالا بعيدا) مثال ذلك من واقعنا التحاكم إلى نظام العمل والعمال ، والتحاكم إلى الغرفة التجارية وغيرها من النظم التي تخالف شرع الله .

(8)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 22 DATE: December 2003
TITLE: كُنّا مستضعفين في الأرض
أولئك الذين يكفرون بطواغيت الأرض كلها من الحكومات العربية والعجمية ، ومن الهيئات الطاغوتية الأممية والعربية والإقليمية .. الذين يتبرؤون من المذاهب الشركية ومسالك الديمقراطية ، ووثنية الوطنية..

(9)
ISSUE: 2 PAGE: 22 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: إضاءة على طريق الجهاد
قال الشيخ عبد القادر عبد العزيز حفظه الله:
" وكون جهاد هؤلاء الطواغيت فرض عين، هو من العلم الواجب إشاعته في عموم المسلمين، ليعلم كل مسلم أنه مأمور شخصيا من ربه سبحانه بقتال هؤلاء.

(10)
ISSUE: 2 PAGE: 17 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: يوسف العييري: شموخ في زمن الهوان
إننا يجب أن نوضح للناس أن الجهاد ما هو إلا تحقيق للتوحيد وتطبيق لمقتضيات شهادة أن لا إله إلا الله وأن محمدا رسول الله ونربط الناس بهذا الأمر ليعلموا أهمية الجهاد

(11)
ISSUE: 5 PAGE: 5 DATE: November 2003
TITLE: بيان حول التراجعات الأخيرة
وإن هذه العبادة ماضية إلى يوم القيامة ، قال صلى الله عليه وسلم: " لن يبرح هذا الدين قائما يقاتل عليه عصابة من المسلمين حتى تقوم الساعة"

(12)

ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003

TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
فقد أثنى الله على المجاهدين في وعيده للمرتدين فقال: (يا أيها الذين آمنوا من يرتد منكم عن دينه فسوف يأتي الله بقوم يحبهم ويحبونه أذلة على المؤمنين أعزة على الكافرين يجاهدون في سبيل الله ولا يخافون لومة لائم) فامتدح الله القوم الذين يأتي بهم مع الجهاد والولاء والبراء بأنهم لا يخافون لومة لائم ، بعد أن عرفوا صحة الطريق وسلكوها على هدى من الله

(13)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
كما أنَّ فيها الحكومة العميلة المرتدَّة التي تطبّق خطط الاستعمار ، وتتولى الكفار ، وتحكم بغير شرع الله الواحد القهَّار.

(14)
ISSUE: 2 PAGE: 12 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: براءة الموحدين من عهود الطواغيت والمرتدي
ثم بين أن أمريكا دولة محاربة بهذا الاعتبار فضلا عن أنها محاربة باعتبار الاعتداء على المسلمين ومباشرته ومباشرة الإعانة على المسلمين في مشارق الأرض ومغاربها ؛ مما يوجب نقض عهدها لوكان لها عهد كيف وعهدها غير لازم في الأصل حيث عقده من ليس له الحق في ذلك من الطواغيت المرتدين

(15)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ومن أعظم الأماكن الّتي تعيَّن فيها الجهاد ووجب: بلاد الحرمين ، ففيها العدوُّ الصليبيُّ المحتلُّ الّذي يسرق خيراتها ، ويرسم سياساتها ، ويحارب المسلمين انطلاقًا منها ،

(16)
ISSUE: 4 PAGE: 3 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: على الدرب سائرون
وقد أغارت ثلة مباركة من شباب الإسلام المبارك بين يدي هذه العشر على مجمع من مستوطنات الصليبيين في جزيرة العرب ، وتقربوا إلى الله بعملية جهادية في أعدائه ، تعجب المؤمنين وتغيظ الكفار وأولياءهم ... والمجاهدون يقاتلون أعداء الله في كل مكان كما أمرهم الله ، ولا يستهدفون المسلمين ولا يقصدون النيل منهم

(17)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: الافتتاحية
يكتبها المجاهد سليمان الدوسري حفظه الله
ومن العجيب أن كثيرا من شباب الجهاد يتوجهون إلى ميادين أخرى ويتركون هذا الميدان العظيم

(18)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 30 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية
بل سندافع عن أنفسنا ولن نتردد في دفع الصائل من جنودهم ، وسنريهم مِنَّا ما يكرهون والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون

(19)
ISSUE: 3 PAGE: 28 DATE: October 2003
TITLE: بيان من المجاهدين إلى الأمة الإسلامية
ومن ثم فإننا قد سلكنا هذا الطريق بناء على هذه الرؤية ، وعرفنا الحق فلزمناه ونسأل الله الثبات عليه . والجهاد في سبيل الله واجب شرعي ، وقدر كوني ، وعدت الأمة باستمراره قال صلى الله عليه وسلم " لا يزال هذا الدين قائما يقاتل عليه عصابة من المسلمين" فنحن نرجو أن نكون من هذه الطائفة المنصورة التي تقوم بأمر الله والجهاد في سبيله وقتال أعداءه" لا يضرهم من خالفهم ولا من خذلهم".

(20)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 3 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: سنوات خدّاعة: دراسة لواقع دعاة الصحوة
هؤلاء العلماء كانوا إنسان العين بالنسبة لجماهير الشباب ، وكانوا من المراجع التي يعتمد عليها الناس في تنزيل نصوص الوحيين على واقع بئيس سكت فيه الكثيرون ، وكان بعض هؤلاء العلماء يرسلون الشباب إلى الثغور ويقدموهم للساحات إما بأشرطتهم وكتبهم ومضامين أفكارهم القائمة على نبذ الحكم بغير ما أنزل الله وجهاد الطغاة ، وإما بالدعم المادي المتحقق على الأرض فعلا

(21)
ISSUE: 21 PAGE: 32 DATE: July 2004
TITLE: وصايا لأهل الجهاد
العفو العفو يا أهل الجهاد
أما العبادة التي تقومون بها ترجون عفو الله ومغفرة الذنوب فهي جهادكم في سبيل الله الذي جاءت النصوص المتظاهرة من الكتاب والسنة على عفو الله ومغفرته ورفعة درجات من قام به قال تعالى: (يا أيها الذين آمنوا هل أدلكم على تجارة تنجيكم من عذاب أليم تؤمنون بالله ورسوله وتجاهدون في سبيل الله بأموالكم وأنفسكم ذلكم خير لكم إن كنتم تعلمون).

(22)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 16 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: دمعة حزن على فراق شهيد
يوسف العييري: شموخ في زمن الهوان
رحمك الله يا يوسف العييري ، طلبت الشهادة في أفغانستان وطلبتها في الصومال ثم هي تأتيتك لتلقاها مقبلا غير مدبر على أرض الجزيرة العربية..

(23)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 29 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: هل يقال: تركي الدندني شهيد؟
وأسأل الله أن يرزقني الشهادة في

(24)
ISSUE: 1 PAGE: 29 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: هل يقال: تركي الدندني شهيد؟
قتل الشهيد تركي الدندني في الجوف ، على أيدي جنود الطواغيت ، رحمه الله وغفر له وتقبله في الشهداء

(25)
ISSUE: 8 PAGE: 13 DATE: September 2003
TITLE: قال العلماء
قال الشيخ: أبوعمر محمد بن عبدالله السيف
بل عليه أن ينظر إلى الأخطار المحيطة بالأمة . والحرب الأمريكية الظالمة على المسلمين في العراق وفي فلسطين وفي أفغانستان ، وما يتلو حرب العراق من تغيير في خارطة المنطقة وتغييرات في المجتمع والتعليم ، وفرض الديمقراطية الكافرة على المنطقة .والذي يقول على سبيل المثال بحرمة قتل العسكريين الأمريكان في الكويت التي ينطلقون منها لضرب العراق