



**The European Union in British news  
discourse from 2014 to 2015:  
A Dialectical-Relational Critical Discourse  
Analysis**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis investigates how the European Union is represented in British news coverage and identifies why news coverage of the EU takes this character. Using a dialectical-relational framework of critical discourse analysis, EU-related articles and stories from five high-circulation newspapers and two prominent TV news broadcasts, collected in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament and 2015 General Election, are analysed. Semi-structured interviews with British media professionals and EU press officers complement textual analysis.

The thesis finds that news media only cover a narrow range of the EU's activities, and focus on the UK context. Coverage tends to emphasise negative rather than positive aspects of the EU. Negative representations often draw on dominant, historical discourses about the relationship between the British Isles and mainland Europe. Where positive aspects are communicated these are principally limited to economic benefits. Grammatical, rhetorical, and intertextual features of coverage feed into and reinforce those patterns. The trends – with some differences between outlets– are observable throughout the sample.

Interviews with media professionals show that general trends and differences between news outlets can be explained with reference to perceptions of the journalistic role, organisational structures and pressures within newsrooms and relationships of journalists with EU press officers. In particular, financial pressures necessitate high sales numbers, leading to focus on attention-grabbing events, often reported from an angle perceived to be acceptable to the audience. Interviews feed into a theoretical model explaining the particularities of EU reporting in the sample and more generally.

These findings help us understand some of the dynamics leading to the UK's decision to leave the EU and are suggestive of future representations of the EU and its relations with the UK. The thesis therefore contributes to literature on media representations of the EU, to research on news production, and to literature dealing with UK-EU relations more broadly.



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## Table of Contents

|   |    |
|---|----|
| List of Figures.....  | ix |
| List of Tables.....   | x  |
| Chapter 1. Introduction.....  | 1  |
| 1.1. The significance of media representations for the British public debate about the European Union ..... | 1  |
| 1.2. Scope and contribution of this thesis .....  | 3  |
| 1.3. Limitations of this thesis.....  | 8  |
| 1.4. Structure of the thesis .....  | 10 |
| Chapter 2. The European Union in the news: A literature review .....  | 13 |
| 2.1. Introduction.....  | 13 |
| 2.2. Quantitative research .....  | 14 |
| 2.2.1. Visibility and Europeanisation .....   | 14 |
| 2.2.2. Frame analysis: establishing the tone of EU coverage.....  | 16 |
| 2.2.3. Effects of EU coverage .....   | 18 |
| 2.2.4. Production of EU news coverage.....  | 20 |
| 2.3. Qualitative research: detailed analysis of the British case.....                                       | 22 |
| 2.4. Conclusion: shortcomings of previous research .....  | 26 |
| Chapter 3. Theoretical framework and methodological approach .....  | 29 |
| 3.1. Introduction.....  | 29 |
| 3.2. Theoretical basis and aims of CDA .....  | 30 |
| 3.2.1. CDA in comparison with DA.....   | 30 |
| 3.2.2. Language, power and the European Union .....   | 32 |
| 3.2.3. Criticisms of CDA.....   | 34 |
| 3.3. CDA in comparison to other text analytical approaches .....  | 35 |
| 3.3.1. Linguistic approaches to media text analysis.....  | 35 |
| 3.3.2. Text analytical methods deriving from social sciences or cultural studies .....                      | 36 |
| 3.4. CDA in practice: adaptation of the Dialectic-Relational Approach after Fairclough....                  | 38 |
| 3.5. Analytical tools: contribution of content and frame analysis to CDA.....                               | 40 |
| 3.5.1. Content analysis .....   | 40 |
| 3.5.2. Operationalisation of ‘key topics’ .....   | 41 |
| 3.5.3. Frame analysis.....  | 43 |
| 3.5.4. Operationalisation of frames .....   | 45 |
| 3.5.5. Micro-analysis of language .....   | 45 |
| 3.5.6. Reliability and validity of coding.....  | 47 |
| 3.6. Sampling .....   | 48 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 3.6.1. Sampling of news outlets.....  | 48  |
| 3.6.2. Sampling of relevant articles and broadcast items .....  | 50  |
| 3.6.3. Reducing the sample for frame and micro-analysis .....   | 53  |
| 3.7. Semi-structured, elite interviews with journalists within the dialectic-relational framework .....     | 55  |
| 3.7.1. Advantages and limitations of qualitative interviews with professional elites.....                   | 56  |
| 3.7.2. Sample and interviewing process .....  | 59  |
| 3.8. Summary of methodological framework.....   | 60  |
| Chapter 4. Focus and scope of EU coverage in British news media .....                                       | 63  |
| 4.1. Introduction .....   | 63  |
| 4.2. Analysis of news events: a domestic focus of news coverage .....                                       | 66  |
| 4.2.1. Coding of news events.....   | 66  |
| 4.2.2. Focus on domestic news events .....  | 67  |
| 4.2.3. Differences between news outlets .....   | 70  |
| 4.2.4. Fluctuating coverage of EU-level news events .....   | 73  |
| 4.3. Coverage of EU policy areas.....   | 77  |
| 4.4. Voting with their wallet? Economic factors in the debate about EU membership .....                     | 84  |
| 4.5. Analysis of rhetorical devices and their functions in news coverage: the EU as a campaign issue .....  | 87  |
| 4.5.1. Metonymy: blurring the EU's boundaries .....   | 89  |
| 4.5.2. Battleground Europe: the effect of metaphors in the British debate about the EU .....                | 92  |
| 4.6. Summary .....  | 101 |
| Chapter 5. Establishing the tone of coverage through frame analysis: highlighting the EU's negatives.....   | 102 |
| 5.1. Numerical dominance of negative frames.....  | 102 |
| 5.1.1. Overview of the pattern .....  | 102 |
| 5.1.2. Most common frames .....   | 104 |
| 5.1.3. Differences between data collection periods .....  | 108 |
| 5.1.4. Distribution of frames across newspaper sections.....  | 109 |
| 5.2. Negative representation traced in intersections of framing and policy areas.....                       | 112 |
| 5.2.1. An overview.....   | 112 |
| 5.2.2. Economic and financial policy: opportunity or failure? .....   | 115 |
| 5.3. Intertextuality and assumptions: an analysis of the coverage of the <i>right to be forgotten</i> ..... | 119 |
| 5.3.1. The context .....  | 119 |
| 5.3.2. Description of the subsample.....  | 120 |
| 5.3.3. Significance of intertextuality and assumptions .....  | 122 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 5.3.4. Intertextuality: the EU against the experts .....   | 124 |
| 5.3.5. Assumptions: the EU against common sense.....   | 129 |
| 5.4. Summary.....  | 132 |
| Chapter 6. The UK's relationship with the EU: at a disadvantage.....   | 135 |
| 6.1. EU coverage in the context of <i>governance and decision-making</i> and <i>evolution of the EU</i> .....      | 135 |
| 6.2. Threatening the UK: immigration, legitimate concerns and emergency summits.....                               | 140 |
| 6.3. Analysis of actor representations in news coverage of the refugee crisis.....                                 | 147 |
| 6.3.1. Victimising Britain: the EU as a threat to 'us' .....   | 149 |
| 6.3.2. Mystical EU, familiar UK: constructing remoteness and closeness .....                                       | 152 |
| 6.3.3. Not only different but better: idealising the UK .....  | 156 |
| 6.4. Summary.....  | 159 |
| Chapter 7. Producing EU news: explanations for similarities and differences between media organisations.....       | 161 |
| 7.1. Introduction.....   | 161 |
| 7.2. Sociocultural practices: discursive resources for reporting .....   | 166 |
| 7.2.1. Britishness as distinct from European-ness.....   | 166 |
| 7.2.2. British pragmatism versus European idealism .....   | 168 |
| 7.2.3. The wider world versus a narrow Europe .....  | 169 |
| 7.2.4. British moral superiority against European corruption .....   | 170 |
| 7.2.5. Summary .....   | 172 |
| 7.3. Broadcasters: 'neutrality' and the struggle to make the EU engaging .....                                     | 172 |
| 7.3.1. Individual level influences: professional neutrality and accusations of bias .....                          | 173 |
| 7.3.2. Macro-level constraints: linking broadcast governance and journalists' self-perceptions .....               | 176 |
| 7.3.3. Newsroom routines and interactions: selling the EU to editors and audiences ....                            | 179 |
| 7.3.4. Summary .....   | 184 |
| 7.4. <i>Guardian</i> and <i>Mirror</i> : struggling to construct a pro-European message.....                       | 184 |
| 7.4.1. Individual level influences: aspiring a positive counterbalance .....                                       | 185 |
| 7.4.2. Newsroom routines and interactions: balancing a pro-European editorial line with audience expectations..... | 187 |
| 7.4.3. Macro-level influences: the impact of economic and technological changes on the newspapers .....            | 191 |
| 7.4.4. Summary .....   | 193 |
| 7.5. The <i>Telegraph</i> , <i>Daily Mail</i> and <i>The Sun</i> : Euroscepticism for different audiences.....     | 194 |
| 7.5.1. Individual level influences: scrutinising the EU .....  | 195 |
| 7.5.2. Newsroom routines and interaction: creating outrage about the EU .....                                      | 197 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 7.5.3. Macro-level influences: tension between journalists and EU officials .....                                    | 203 |
| 7.5.4. Summary.....  | 207 |
| 7.6. Summarising the dynamics .....  | 208 |
| Chapter 8. Conclusion.....   | 210 |
| 8.1. Summary of findings.....  | 210 |
| 8.2. Limiting the criticisms of CDA.....   | 214 |
| 8.3. Recommendations for future research.....  | 215 |
| 8.4. Obstacles to changing the discourse and reflections on how to overcome them .....                               | 216 |
| Appendix A Codebook.....   | 221 |
| Appendix B Frames identified in previous research.....   | 243 |
| Appendix C Interview guide.....  | 245 |
| Appendix D Other interview-related documents: contact email, consent form and<br>participant information sheet ..... | 249 |
| Appendix E Further tables.....   | 253 |
| Appendix F List of journalists/contributors in sample.....   | 260 |
| Reference list of data examples cited.....   | 279 |
| Reference List .....   | 282 |

## List of Figures

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Figure 1 Research questions .....  | 3   |
| Figure 2 Visualisation of methodological framework.....  | 62  |
| Figure 3 Weekly average percentage of articles dedicated to stories covering EU-related issue<br>.....   | 72  |
| Figure 4 Percentage of articles dedicated to EU-related content by newspaper per day (Set 1)<br>.....  | 75  |
| Figure 5 Percentage of minutes dedicated to EU related content by broadcaster per day (Set1)<br>.....  | 75  |
| Figure 6 Percentage of articles dedicated to EU-related content by newspaper per day (Period<br>2).....  | 76  |
| Figure 7 Percentage of items dedicated to EU-related content by broadcasters per day (Period<br>2).....  | 76  |
| Figure 8 Percentage of Sources and References coded at different policy areas .....  | 78  |
| Figure 9 Total number of sources mentioning policy areas by news event (Set 1).....  | 82  |
| Figure 10 Total number of sources mentioning policy areas by news event (Set 2).....   | 83  |
| Figure 11 Frequency of references for selected frames and frequency of stories about the<br>refugee crisis throughout the second data collection period..... | 144 |
| Figure 12 Model of EU News Production .....  | 165 |

## List of Tables

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Table 1 Overview of analytical categories, nodes and child-nodes .....  | 42  |
| Table 2 Overview of newspapers included in the sample.....  | 49  |
| Table 3 Sampling criteria for news stories and articles .....   | 52  |
| Table 4 Total number of items selected for each data collection period .....  | 53  |
| Table 5 Criteria for in- and exclusion of items for frame analysis sample.....  | 54  |
| Table 6 Total number of items included in subsample for frame analysis for each data<br>collection period .....   | 55  |
| Table 7 List of interviewees, their organisational affiliation and position .....   | 58  |
| Table 8 Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country<br>at this time? (Please tick up to three; Percentages); Source: YouGov (2014: 2015). 68 |     |
| Table 9 News Event by Week in 2014 European Parliament Elections data collection period<br>(total numbers and percentage articles per week dedicated to news events).....             | 69  |
| Table 10 News Event by Week in 2015 UK General Election data collection period (total<br>numbers and percentage articles per week dedicated to news events) .....                     | 70  |
| Table 11 Number and percentage of items in which referendum/Brexit/re negotiations are<br>mentioned, number of references.....  | 80  |
| Table 12 Differences between news organisations in 'force for good' framing.....  | 85  |
| Table 13 Distribution of sub-sample across news outlets and collection periods .....  | 88  |
| Table 14 Total number and row percentage of references to metonymies for EU actors.....   | 90  |
| Table 15 Distribution of metaphors across news organisations.....   | 93  |
| Table 16 Average distribution of references per item to selected metaphors.....   | 95  |
| Table 17 Number of references to frames highlighting negative aspects of the EU or EU<br>membership.....  | 103 |
| Table 18 Number of references to frames highlighting positive aspects of the EU or EU<br>membership.....  | 103 |
| Table 19 Number of references to subcategories of EU is a source of conflict/crisis frame. 105  |     |
| Table 20 Number of references to threats directed against UK and other countries (row<br>percentages) .....   | 107 |
| Table 21 Distribution of references to frames highlighting negative aspects across newspaper<br>sections.....   | 110 |
| Table 22 Distribution of references to frames highlighting positive aspects across newspaper<br>sections.....   | 111 |
| Table 23 Total number of references to frames by policy area .....  | 114 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Table 24 Summary of differences between news organisations in 'Reform' framing in context of Economic and Financial Policy (over both periods)..... | 117 |
| Table 25 Distribution of newspaper items across newspaper sections by news organisation   | 120 |
| Table 26 Number of news items with references (number of references) to EU policy areas by news organisation .....                                  | 121 |
| Table 27 Number of items with references (number of references) to frames by news organisation .....  | 122 |
| Table 28 Distribution of types of intertextuality across frames (references and row percentage) .....   | 124 |
| Table 29 Distribution of different types of assumptions across frames (Number of references and row percentages).....                               | 129 |
| Table 30 Overview of nuances in framing in the context of 'governance and decision-Making' and 'evolution of the EU' by news organisation.....      | 136 |
| Table 31 Distribution of selected frames (number of references) in reporting of EP elections and EC President Selection .....                       | 138 |
| Table 32 Number of references to Threat frame and subcategories by data collection period .....   | 141 |
| Table 33 Total number of references to frames covering Immigration by news organisation .....   | 142 |
| Table 34 Number of items covering included events for each news organisation .....  | 149 |
| Table 35 Formal codes .....   | 221 |
| Table 36 News event codes .....   | 223 |
| Table 37 Policy area codes (additions to existing coding schemes in bold) .....   | 223 |
| Table 38 Frame codes with examples.....   | 224 |
| Table 39 Frames identified in previous research.....  | 244 |
| Table 40 Distribution of news items by news organisation per week (EP Election collection period) .....   | 253 |
| Table 41 Distribution of news items by news organisation per week (GE collection period) .....  | 254 |
| Table 42 News Event by News Outlet (Total Numbers and percentages of sampled articles/minutes per news organisation dedicated to news events) ..... | 255 |
| Table 43 Total number and percentage of items per newspaper section by news organisation .....  | 256 |
| Table 44 Distribution of items in newspapers (page number) in total numbers and percentages .....   | 257 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Table 45 Distribution of items in broadcast (first or second half) in total numbers and percentages.....   | 257 |
| Table 46 Number of items addressing a specific news event with references to frames in rows (percentage of items addressing a specific news event with reference to frames in rows; read columns)..... | 258 |
| Table 47 Total number of items with both frame in column and frame in row (percentage of items with both references; read columns) .....   | 259 |
| Table 48 List of contributors in sample and number of items they have contributed to by collection period .....  | 278 |



## Chapter 1. Introduction

### 1.1. The significance of media representations for the British public debate about the European Union

The relationship between the UK and the European Union has always been a controversial one. The vote on 23 June 2016 for the UK to leave the EU represents the culmination of a national debate which had been going on throughout the post-war period. Even today, almost one year after the UK government notified the European Union of its intention to leave, this debate is still on-going and it is unlikely to come to an end in the near future.

News media have played a crucial role in this public debate, influencing citizens' knowledge about and attitudes towards the European Union. For example, during the 1975 referendum campaign on the UK's membership of the EEC, campaigners made an effort to convince both print and broadcast media of the benefits of remaining a member because they assumed media coverage would influence the vote (Wilkes and Wring, 2007; Daddow, 2012).

The EU, its institutions and policies, are usually unobtrusive issues, which citizens rarely experience personally (Gavin, 2000; Peter, 2003; Nardis, 2015). Media effects on attitudes towards unobtrusive issues are more likely than on those issues, which we directly experience in everyday life. For unobtrusive issues, like the EU, the media are the main source of information (Norris, 2000; McCombs and Reynolds, 2008; European Commission, 2014b). Only very few people have direct experience of EU-level processes. Although indirect experiences of the EU are possible (for example, travel within the EU, contacts across the EU, the effect of EU policies on everyday lives and the workplace) information is mainly obtained from news media. Very few people will actively read official EU publications, relying instead on news coverage. The remoteness of the institution and the opaqueness of the institution's operations reinforce these tendencies. With people basing their decisions – for example at the ballot box – on information immediately available to them (Zaller, 1992), media representation of the European Union becomes crucial. Consequently, the news media play a vital role in the public debate about the EU, especially in the UK where citizens are not well-informed about the EU, making them dependent on media and opinion leader cues (McCormick, 2014).

News media often fail, however, to capture accurately and comprehensively EU-level decision-making due to the complexity and slow pace of those processes, the alleged communication deficit, as well as pressures of the media market (see for example Dougal, 2003; Wilson of Dinton *et al.*, 2005; Campbell, 2006; Greenslade, 2010). Furthermore, especially in the aftermath of the Leveson Inquiry, suspicion rose with regard to media proprietors' influence on EU news coverage due to commercial and ideological interests resulting in biased, and often too little or simplified information (Leveson, 2012). As de Wilde and Trenz (2012, p. 539) point

out, '[m]edia coverage is not so much a reflection or antecedent of Euroscepticism, it is its primary locus'.

Reliance on news media for information about the EU highlights the importance of this present study, which is preoccupied with the representations of the EU in British news coverage in two election campaigns preceding the EU referendum, the 2014 European Election and 2015 General Election. This thesis argues that British news media have, over the years, created a particular set of representations of the European Union, pre-empting and providing a resource for the referendum campaign, particularly for Leave campaigners, and setting the tone for the debates to come during the negotiations.

Furthermore, these media representations have not emerged from a vacuum but are symptomatic of a wider discourse about the European Union in British public debate. Therefore, this thesis is particularly interested in the characteristics of British EU news coverage as well as in the social practices and structures maintaining and challenging those representations. These media representations in turn reflect, (re)produce and potentially challenge established discursive practices regarding the EU in Britain.

Within this dynamic of discursive (re)production, language use is particularly important. Linguistic phenomena are social phenomena. Social phenomena in turn tend to have a linguistic component (Fairclough, 1998, p. 23). Language shapes society and society shapes language. Language use in media representations of the European Union is on the one hand a reflection of language used in society to talk about the EU. On the other, it is a (re)production of discourses about the EU.

Discourses – a term often used throughout the thesis and defined in more detail in Chapter 3 – refers to language as a social practice, which is restricted as well as enabled by social structures (Fairclough, 1998, p. 17; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). These social structures determine orders of discourse, sets of conventions associated with particular social institutions and shaped ideologically by power relations in social institutions, such as newsrooms, and society. Powerful actors within those social institutions and structures, who have the possibility to shape language use in the media, therefore have the possibility to change the discourse more widely by legitimising, (re)producing or challenging dominant ways of talking and thinking about the EU in Britain. They do so by introducing ideology as common sense through language (Fairclough, 1998, p. 2).

Therefore, 'discourse has effects upon social structures, as well as being determined by them, and so contributes to social continuity and social change' (Fairclough, 1998, p. 17). It is therefore crucial to look at the (re)production of different discourses about the EU in British news coverage in order to understand not only the 2016 vote to leave the EU but the skewed

public debate about Europe characteristic for Britain more generally, particularly in the period since the late 1980s (Wilkes and Wring, 2007; Daddow, 2012).

## 1.2. Scope and contribution of this thesis

The research problem identified above necessitates two, interrelated research questions: Firstly, how is the EU represented in UK news coverage? This question tries to elicit the conventions of the order of discourse ‘European Union in British news media’. Secondly, why is the EU represented in this particular way? This question addresses why the order of discourse follows certain conventions.

In order to approach these two broad questions, a set of sub-questions was developed, which focus on particular aspects of the problem (see Figure 1). Regarding the textual representation, this includes the scope and focus of coverage, the valence attached to the EU in news coverage, the representation of actors and language use. Issues considered in order to answer the second research question about news production include ownership, editorial line, individual journalists’ opinions, as well as contextual factors.

### 1. How is the EU represented in UK news coverage?

- a. What is the **focus and scope** of UK news coverage of the EU? Which news events and policy areas are reported most commonly? Which ones are overlooked?
- b. How is the EU evaluated? How is the EU framed?
- c. How is the **relationship between UK and EU** represented in the news coverage? (How does framing contribute to this?)
- d. How are **EU and UK actors represented** in the coverage? How can this be linked to the represented relationship?
- e. What **arguments are made for and against a referendum/membership**? What is their persuasive potential?
- f. How are these frames and arguments realised **linguistically and rhetorically**? What role does language and rhetoric play in the representation of the EU?

### 2. Why is the EU represented in that way? To what extent do political, societal and organisational circumstances influence the reporting?

- a. Do **ownership, editorial preferences, the journalists’ personal opinion and perceptions of public opinion** play a role in reporting?
- b. How do **economic limitations and time pressure** influence the production process?
- c. How does the textual representation figure within **sociocultural practices** in society?

*Figure 1 Research questions*

The thesis uses the dialectical-relational approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to address those questions (see 3.3 for an explanation of this choice). The framework is particularly interested in the links between discursive and non-discursive moments of social

practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough, 2016). Resting on ontological assumptions of critical realism, the dialectical-relational CDA framework provides the theoretical and methodological underpinning for analysis.

The contribution of this thesis is threefold. Empirically, it provides a detailed account of the coverage of EU-related issues in the run-up to both the European Parliament Election in 2014 and the General Election in 2015, and their immediate aftermath. It goes beyond previous research by including both newspapers and broadcasters, as well as a variety of news events, looking in more detail into language use and rhetoric. As the literature review explains in more detail, previous studies are particularly concerned with EU-level key events, such as EU summits, the introduction of the euro, and treaties (see for example Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; de Vreese, 2001; Campbell, 2006; de Vreese *et al.*, 2006; de Vreese *et al.*, 2011; Hawkins, 2012). This thesis also considers EU-level key events. The European Parliament Elections and the emergency summit on migration held in spring 2015 are certainly two of them. However, it also includes coverage of less prominent EU-level events (for example the European Court of Justice's ruling in the *right to be forgotten*). It also considers coverage of the EU in the context of events, which are not directly linked to the EU itself, for example the General Election campaign and the release of domestic immigration statistics. It combines analysis of broadcast news and print news. Broadcast has tended to be neglected in qualitative research on British news coverage of the EU (see for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Daddow, 2012; Hawkins, 2012; Novy, 2013). An account of language use and rhetoric furthermore contributes to the analysis by uncovering how frames and ultimately discourses are manifested in language, how media language taps into, legitimises and changes discourses about the EU. The thesis therefore provides a detailed and wide-ranging record of EU news coverage in the UK preceding the EU referendum, which acknowledges the powerful role language plays in the (re)production of discourses and already gives an indication of arguments to be used during the referendum.

The thesis combines textual analysis with interviews with media professionals to answer the second research question. Interviews provide empirical evidence with regard to news production, thereby going beyond the mainly descriptive studies of EU media representations and adding an explanatory element. Studies concerned with British news coverage of the EU frequently refer to the media system in order to explain the patterns found in news texts (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004). However, little research has been conducted that is specifically concerned with media professionals' experience of reporting the EU and their perception of influences on EU news production, especially not in combination

with a qualitative analysis of EU coverage including micro-analysis of language (see for example Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Martins *et al.*, 2012).

Methodologically (see Chapter 3), the thesis contributes to the existing literature by combining CDA and frame analysis and applying it to a large sample. On the one hand, this makes CDA more suitable for larger samples and more systematic and rigorous. On the other hand, CDA tools for the micro-analysis of language situate frame analysis in the texts, thereby making coding more valid. While CDA and frame analysis have been combined before (Balch and Balbanova, 2017), this thesis differs from previous attempts by integrating linguistic micro-analysis in the approach. The combination assures both validity (frames grounded in textual evidence) and reliability (application of the frame coding scheme).

The large sample – 2295 items with over 1.6 million words were coded for this thesis – makes the study more rigorous in comparison with previous research. It goes beyond the size of other qualitative studies in the field, and therefore provides a more extensive understanding of EU coverage in the UK. However, in order to manage such a large sample, a coding scheme needed to be developed which allowed for the efficient analysis of the data. The thesis introduces a refined coding scheme for frames, which has been developed deductively from existing literature and expanded inductively throughout the coding process. This coding scheme makes a more detailed analysis of EU news coverage possible, which, for example, can distinguish between the types of benefits highlighted in news coverage: cultural, political and/or economic. Analyses of EU news coverage have so far tended to neglect these differentiations, which allow for characterising media representations more sensitively. It can, for example, contribute to an understanding of which aspects of advantages and disadvantages of EU membership are highlighted by the media, and how these particular aspects figure in the broader discourse about the EU in Britain. The coding system delivers a more refined picture of the conventions of this particular order of discourse.

Theoretically, the thesis makes two contributions. Firstly, it constructs a model of EU news production which can be applied to a variety of news outlets in order to uncover the determinants of news coverage. It uses both the empirical results from semi-structured interviews with media professionals as well as existing theories of news production to explain patterns found in the sampled news texts. However, the applicability of this model is not limited to the present study. It can be used to guide analysis of other, not necessarily British, media organisations.

Secondly, using CDA as the underlying framework, the thesis provides theoretical links between the news texts, production processes and discourses about the UK's historic relationship with Europe. In conjunction, these linkages explain not only the patterns found in

the sampled media texts but also the wider challenges of making a convincing case for the UK's continued engagement with the EU.

The link between textual representation and sociocultural practices makes the thesis particularly significant. While the UK may withdraw from the EU in 2019, the relationship between the UK and EU will not end then. Instead, the UK will have to build a new relationship with the remaining 27 member states against the backdrop of the media trends examined in this thesis. Considering the influence of discourses on sociocultural practice and vice versa it is crucial to not only give a detailed description of media discourses but also to understand them within the broader social context.

When referring to discourses about the EU, this thesis will often use the terms Euroscepticism and Eurosceptics. While these terms are used frequently in public discourse, their meaning is far from straightforward. The concept was originally developed for party politics. However, the buzzword 'Euroscepticism' has entered the public sphere. It is used without acknowledging the original definition or its complexity. It has become a catch-all phrase, which includes anything from public attitudes to governmental negotiation strategies (Flood, 2002), which leads to the perception that opponents of the European Union and European integration can be summed up as one 'uninformed and undifferentiated group of people' (Usherwood, 2013, p. 280).

The most prominent definition, introduced by Taggart and Szcerbiak (2001), assumes a continuum which, at its ends, distinguishes between hard and soft Euroscepticism, with soft Euroscepticism defined as qualified or contingent opposition to European integration, and hard Euroscepticism defined as unqualified and outright opposition to the European integration process. A soft Eurosceptic might well be in favour of the idea of European integration but would, for example, reject how this is realised through particular policies or the procedures in the EU institutions. Taking a hard Eurosceptic position would entail a rejection of the entire project or a wish for withdrawal of member states, and non-accession in candidate states. Despite the definition's dominance in the field, its shortcomings have been noticed. Due to its lack of conceptualisation of pro-European attitudes as well as criticisms that this definition does not appropriately represent different levels of scepticism – towards the institutions or integration itself – different classifications of Euroscepticism have been developed over the years (Flood, 2002; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002; Conti, 2003; Vasilopoulou, 2013). However, classification in these approaches remain unclear, the boundaries between different types of Euroscepticism are ambiguous, and do not lend themselves to capture the changing character of opposition to the European project, which has evolved itself. (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009).

This thesis therefore approaches Euroscepticism using Crespy and Verschueren's (2009) alternative conceptualisation which defines Eurosceptic attitudes in terms of resistances. Resistances, in this context, are defined as manifestations of opposition towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration perceived as a threat with respect to one's values. This implies that no static typologies or positions on a continuum are used to label actors. Rather Euroscepticism takes the form of discursive (inter)actions, which account for the subjectivity and dynamic change in attitudes. Flexibility in the approach to Euroscepticism is crucial as the European integration process is not static, but ever changing.

One of the most important advantages of this approach to Euroscepticism is the possibility to transfer it to the realm of media discourse. The conceptualisations introduced above have all been developed for the mapping of party positions. Transferring these approaches to the study of Euroscepticism outside the realm of party politics might not be appropriate as media discourse and public opinion follow a different logic and actors outside of party politics might resent quite different features of European integration and worry about different consequences thereof than do party political actors. Conceptualisation in terms of resistances is a flexible and unified approach to diverse empirical realities, which allows for more appropriate comparisons of individual and collective actors, even over time.

The concept of resistances also captures the diverse nature of (sceptical) attitudes. As it is impossible to determine objectively the essence of European integration, hostilities towards it are contingent as well. Resistances are not directed towards Europe in general but rather towards forms of Europe, such as a liberal Europe or a social Europe. It is not an objective and univocal state of the EU that actors are hostile towards. It is a certain constructed representation of the EU and particular aspects of European integration that are the object of resistances. Resistances are not always exclusively directed towards certain policies, as some of the conceptualisations introduced above suggest. Of course, certain policies can trigger strong resistance, for example budget contribution. Hostile attitudes, however, are often contesting polity, the competencies and constitutional settlement of the EU (Mair, 2007).

When the thesis employs the term Euroscepticism it is understood as an umbrella term for different resistances against European integration or EU institutions and actors. It acknowledges that even supporters of the European Union may exhibit resistances against some aspects of the institutions, its policies, or the integration process more generally (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009). The term is furthermore not as loaded with negative connotations as Euroscepticism (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009). Where necessary, the different aspects of Eurosceptic resistance will be made explicit in the thesis. When 'Euroscepticism' is used to describe attitudes towards the EU, this thesis acknowledges that Euroscepticism has many

different facets and an umbrella term like this has its shortcomings but may be used for matters of convenience.

### **1.3. Limitations of this thesis**

The scope of this thesis is limited to textual representations and production. It will not consider in any detail the effects media representations of the EU may have on their recipients or recipients' consumption habits. While the endeavour may be worthwhile, particularly in light of the recent vote to leave the European Union in the 2016 referendum, this thesis will instead focus on the production processes impacting on EU news coverage in the UK. Nevertheless, the analysis of news texts and news production rests upon the assumption that these representations do have an impact. Media effects research has established that media can have an impact on knowledge about, awareness and evaluation of political actors and issues.

One of the most influential and widely used theories of media effects is agenda setting. Agenda setting, as developed by McCombs and Shaw (1972), postulates that media determine the salience of topics. A high correlation between media agenda and audience agenda can be regarded as evidence that the media successfully influence the audience's perception of importance, a low correlation for selective perception, a situation in which the audience takes on a more active role of selecting certain news content (McCombs and Reynolds, 2008). In this scenario media are not able to exercise their agenda-setting power.

The first level of agenda setting is the influence of media on audiences' perception of the importance of key issues. In the case of the thesis, this would encompass the salience of the EU and EU-related issues such as immigration from EU member states. Attribute agenda setting, as an advancement of agenda setting, investigates selection of particular attributes of objects in the news media, and the effects of this selection (Kim *et al.*, 2002). If certain attributes are emphasised the recipients of these media messages will be more likely to use them in their assessment of the issue (McCombs and Shaw, 1993; Muddiman *et al.*, 2014). This means, if, for example, a political party's position on the issue of an EU referendum is emphasised frequently, then the audience will use this aspect to evaluate that party.

Closely related to agenda setting, or even a specification of agenda setting (McQuail, 2010), is priming theory. Priming intersects with voting behaviour as it explains the evaluation of political actors. Their general performance is largely assessed by their performance on very salient issues, those which are high on the agenda (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), in this case the European Union or EU-related issues. The media agenda determines which information is accessible for judgements (Van der Brug *et al.*, 2007).



Framing effect theories are of particular importance for this thesis, as frames are a crucial part of the textual analysis. Certain framing patterns in EU coverage can have an influence on public opinion about the European Union (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Bruter, 2009). Theories of framing effects can be traced back to Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1984) who discovered that when presented with framing in terms of losses people were inclined to more risk-seeking, but when a dilemma was framed in terms of gains, people opted for the less risky option. Framing effects theories are varied due to a conceptual ambiguity with regard to frames (Entman, 1993; Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011; Cacciatore *et al.*, 2015). In this thesis, framing effects are understood as applicability effects (Cacciatore *et al.*, 2015): Applicability effects postulate that framing – the emphasis of particular aspects of a story – activates certain schemata in the recipients' minds which can help them to make sense of the story and organise a story in relation to their existing knowledge. Of course, agenda-setting and priming effects cannot be perfectly distinguished from framing effects since certain issues are often combined with a particular frame.

Considering the focus of the thesis as well as the existence of research and theories establishing the types of effect that media representations can have on knowledge, beliefs and attitudes, it is justified to leave aside effects of EU news coverage on UK citizens. It does not further understanding of the issues raised in the research questions (see Figure 1).

While the thesis analyses a large sample of data, representativeness of this sample is nevertheless limited. Partly due to practical reasons only data from two weeks in the run-up to the 2014 European Elections have been collected (in addition to one week after the election), as opposed to five weeks' worth of data in advance of the 2015 General Election, which makes it more difficult to compare both collection periods. However, comparison between two periods is not the aim of this study, but rather the purpose is to compare patterns with regard to different news events across different news outlets. Additionally, the two key events around which data collection was set up, may of course have an influence on media discourse beyond items focussing on these key events. However, as analysis shows, many of the key characteristics of the data sample echo previous findings. They seem to have persisted over time and changed more in nuance than in fundamental term.

To collect a manageable sample, it also had to be limited to a relatively small – but varied – number of news outlets. The choice of these outlets, as well as reasons for exclusion of online news media, are explained in Chapter 3.

Despite these limitations, this thesis will give an in-depth account of said news coverage and pay particular attention to production processes as well as social and discursive structures in which these processes are embedded. Not only does this contribute to filling a gap in the

literature but it also furthers our understanding of the challenges faced by those trying to introduce a more pro-European discourse.

#### **1.4. Structure of the thesis**

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 gives an overview of empirical studies investigating media representations of the EU. It first introduces quantitative studies concerned with the EU's visibility across different member states as well as the tone of news coverage and frames in news covering the EU, again from a comparative perspective. After reviewing studies using mixed methods to investigate not only media representations but also their effects, the chapter provides a brief overview of studies concerned with news production. The literature review then outlines some of the most influential empirical, qualitative studies of British EU news coverage. The chapter identifies a gap in the literature, which this thesis seeks to fill. While the reviewed studies provide useful material for the construction of a codebook (see Appendix A and Appendix B), none of them attempted to combine Critical Discourse Analysis, with qualitative content and frame analysis, which is underpinned by systematic analysis of language use and intertextuality. Furthermore, broadcast media have been neglected. Broadcast news are the main source of information for British citizens with regard to the EU (European Commission, 2014b). The thesis addresses this failure to consider the importance of broadcast news. The thesis also considers a wider variety of news events for analysis than previous research.

Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical and methodological framework. This thesis employs a dialectical-relational approach to CDA (Fairclough, 1995; Fairclough, 1998; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2010; Fairclough, 2016). This framework pays particular attention to the dialectical relationship between discursive and non-discursive moments of social practice. The theoretical framework is open to a variety of analytical tools. Therefore, after introducing the theoretical tenets of CDA and the specific approach, the analytical tools used for textual analysis are introduced. These include qualitative content analysis, frame analysis and micro-analytical tools to investigate language use. The introduction of the theoretical and analytical framework is followed by a description of the sample and the procedures used to reduce the sample.

However, this thesis not only uses text analytical methods. Integrated into the dialectical-relational framework are semi-structured interviews with media professionals. These interviews help to explain patterns found in the textual data and to link the texts to discursive and non-discursive moments in the social practice of news production. This section highlights some of the challenges posed by interviews with professional elites, such as gaining access and maintaining rapport during the interview.

Chapters 4 to 6 are concerned with the textual analysis of media texts. Chapter 4 sets out to address Research Question 1a: What is the scope and focus of EU coverage in British news media? Looking at most frequently covered news events, the chapter establishes the types of news which are most likely to be reported in the British media. EU policy areas are also considered. This type of analysis shows which of the EU's responsibilities and activities are of particular interest to the British news media, thereby establishing the scope and focus of EU news coverage in the UK. This chapter also considers in more detail the focus of arguments brought forward for and against a referendum on EU membership (Research Question 1e). An in-depth analysis of rhetorical devices assesses the persuasive potential of these arguments (Research Question 1f). Analysis of rhetorical choices provides evidence for interdiscursivity (the usage of discourses not directly related to the EU within the order of discourse on the EU) and therefore a better understanding of the conventions within this order of discourse. This in-depth analysis is necessary in order to identify how dominant discourses are (re)produced or resisted. It also helps to identify obstacles to a change in discourse.

Chapter 5 assesses the tone of coverage. Drawing on frame analysis, this chapter addresses Research Question 1b. It outlines the most striking patterns with regard to framing and puts those patterns into the context of the EU's activities. This leads to a better understanding of what exactly is represented as being advantageous to the UK and what exactly has a negative impact on the UK. The chapter pays particular attention to economic and financial policy, since, on the one hand, economic benefits from single market access for the UK economy are regarded as one of the best aspects of membership (Wall, 2009). On the other hand, joining the single currency is ruled out, even by pro-Europeans. Again, the results presented in Chapter 5 are underpinned by detailed analysis of a subsample, in this case the European Court of Justice's ruling regarding the *right to be forgotten*, which forces search engines to take down links to outdated or irrelevant information if requested. The focus here lies on intertextual elements of news coverage. By analysing intertextuality, and assumptions made in the text, this section makes the case that these elements strengthen negative frames, instead of positive frames. Again, analysis of intertextual elements establishes how the discourse about the European Union links to other discourses, which are tapped into as a resource to maintain, produce or challenge the dominant discourse.

In Chapter 6, the relationship between the European Union and the UK is explored (Research Question 1c). Referring back to frame analysis, this chapter sets this represented relationship firstly into the context of policy areas which provide opportunities for the UK to engage in and influence decision-making. It establishes which strategies for UK engagement with the EU different news organisations favour and whether they support cooperation or

confrontation with European partners. Secondly, the chapter considers one of the most common frames in the sample, *EU as a threat*, which is represented to characterise the relationship between the UK and EU, especially by right-wing newspapers. Immigration becomes a particularly salient topic here. After exploring the broader patterns with regard to *threat* framing and immigration, the chapter then uses a subsample to illustrate the points made throughout the previous sections through micro-analysis of language use. Using Van Leeuwen's (1996) system network, the representation of both EU and UK actors are assessed in the context of the refugee crisis. This event is interesting because it deals on the one hand with one of the defining features of the UK's relationship with the EU – immigration – and at the same time it provides opportunities for the UK to engage with European partners. This section also addresses Research Questions 1d and 1f.

Chapter 7 moves beyond the textual analysis. It is concerned with the second set of research questions, and tries to explain why the EU is represented in certain ways. Chapter 7 uses the interview results, established theories of news production and research into the UK's relationship with the EU to construct a theoretical model of EU news production, which aims to be applicable beyond the textual data gathered for this thesis. Using assumptions of CDA, the chapter teases out the relation between discursive and non-discursive moments of news production. It shows which discursive resources are available to journalists and analyses the influence of organisational (social) structures, as well as individual factors, on the production process.

The first section identifies discursive resources. It draws on research which traces current British Euroscepticism in interpretations of British history, which portray the UK as fundamentally different to continental Europe. Interview data is used throughout to illustrate the pervasiveness of these discourses, which are in turn linked to patterns found in framing.

After the exploration of these sociocultural practices, which are shared among the news organisations, the chapter proceeds to apply the remaining layers of the model to three groups of news outlets: public service broadcasters, which are bound by legislation to remain balanced; newspapers with a broadly pro-European editorial line; and newspapers with a broadly Eurosceptic editorial line. While acknowledging the similarities within the groups, the chapter also highlights differences within them and links them to different influences on news production: individual level influences (for example a journalist's personal attitude towards the EU), newsroom influences (for example editorial line) and influences stemming from the media system more broadly (for example digitalisation of news media).

The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which summarises the main results, discusses their implications and provides suggestions for further research.

## **Chapter 2. The European Union in the news: A literature review**

### **2.1. Introduction**

For those not directly involved in the work of European institutions, first-hand experiences of European-level politics are rare and information is almost exclusively obtained through news media, particularly through television and print (European Commission, 2014b). In fact, democratic legitimacy of the EU depends, in part, on informing its citizens about policies and processes in the European institutions through the media (Gavin, 2000). Editors and journalists consequently have some influence on public opinion with regard to the issue (Semetko *et al.*, 2000). Due to its significance, research has increasingly focused on news coverage of the European Union. However, bearing in mind the importance of media contents in the formation of more than 500 million European citizens' attitudes towards and beliefs about the EU, the number of such studies is still relatively small. Comparative studies, such as Peter and de Vreese's (2004) study on EU coverage on national TV news programmes, are more common, presumably because they give a broad overview of general public opinion across the EU and give indications of trends in public opinion and news coverage. In-depth studies of individual member states, however, are rarer.

Overall, previous research suggests that UK media are less likely to cover the EU extensively and when they do, they tend to exhibit a negative bias in reporting of the EU. However, studies conducted so far have neglected detailed linguistic analysis to show how this bias is being produced through language. If they do consider language, it tends to be limited to examples without systematic linguistic analysis. Moreover, few studies try to link the results from textual analysis elements of production processes, organisational structures and other social structures and practices.

Furthermore, most studies focus on EU key events such as EU summits. While this thesis also looks at such a key event – the European parliament election in 2014 – it also considers a domestic key event – the 2015 General Election – and other, less prominent events (see Chapter 3). This makes it possible to compare representations of the EU in different contexts.

This chapter gives an overview of literature providing analysis of news coverage of the EU and related events. It introduces studies with different methodological approaches and research foci, summarises key findings and identifies a research gap. It first introduces quantitative studies, as they constitute the mainstream in the field, before moving on to qualitative studies with a particular focus on the British case.

## **2.2. Quantitative research**

The majority of research in this area is conducted in a quantitative and often comparative manner (for example Semetko *et al.*, 2000; de Vreese, 2001; Anderson, 2004; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Trenz, 2004; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Meyer, 2005; de Vreese *et al.*, 2006; Kriesi, 2007; Vliegenhardt *et al.*, 2008; Zografova *et al.*, 2012; Gattermann, 2013; Dennis and Eilders, 2015), although some triangulate methods. This type of study considers news coverage in different EU member states (and on some occasions candidate countries) and compares the coverage in terms of visibility or evaluation of the European Union generally or particular European institutions and actors (Gattermann, 2013; Gattermann and Vasilopoulou, 2015).

The comparative approach has the important advantage that the researcher will not generalise findings on the basis of one single country with unique contextual characteristics. Cross-national trends identified through comparative analysis are more reliable (Blumler *et al.*, 1992). Additionally, data is often collected over several years, allowing for the discovery of longer-term developments. Quantitative, comparative studies typically look at large numbers of articles or TV news reports. Consequently, only a few categories are considered, for example topics, actors, frequency and frames. Firstly, studies of visibility and Europeanisation are explored before moving on to frame analyses and multi-method approaches combining content analyses with experiments or interviews. The following sections introduce comparative as well as single country studies.

### **2.2.1. Visibility and Europeanisation**

A large body of quantitative research focuses on the EU's visibility in news media. Findings consistently show that reporting of the EU and its institutions is cyclical, suggesting that EU coverage peaks around key events, such as European Parliamentary elections, the launch of the Euro, or during European Council summits (for example Norris, 2000; de Vreese, 2001). During routine periods, the EU becomes almost invisible, reflecting the focus of much research on these key events. Studies of the EU's visibility also consider the visibility of EU actors and Europeanisation of discourse. Europeanised discourse is characterised by an inclusion of EU actors and a move towards interpretation of events from a European point of view, which considers the significance of events for the EU as a whole, not only for individual member states. It is contrary to domesticized discourse which presents European events and processes in terms of their consequences for the respective nation state.

Europeanisation and the emergence of a European public sphere is a major focus of many of these studies (Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Trenz, 2004; Meyer, 2005; Statham and Gray, 2005; Meyer, 2009), which sometimes combine qualitative with quantitative methods (Meyer,

2005), allowing for broader generalisations as well as an in-depth description of particular cases.

They often implicitly assume that more frequent reporting – and therefore higher visibility of the EU for its citizens – enhances the emergence of a European public sphere. This is, however, questionable. Frequent negative reporting might fuel scepticism and hostility towards the EU and its institutions. Therefore, in studies exploring visibility of the EU and Europeanisation, valence of coverage should be taken into account, too, as is the case with some of the studies introduced below.

De Vreese *et al.* (2006) compare news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election campaign in all EU member states, 25 at that time, in three national newspapers, two television newscasts and two weekly newspapers from each country. Inclusion of different types of news outlets can offer some insights into their different approaches to EU reporting. For example, newspapers generally devote more space to political news than television, as they have ‘far fewer constraints in terms of space and production costs’ (de Vreese *et al.*, 2006, p. 483). In this study, quantitative content analysis considers visibility, Europeanisation and tone of news coverage. It measures Europeanisation of news by coding actors in the stories as domestic or European. While this measure indicates the degree of Europeanisation, it neglects more subtle differences between those actors with regard to ascribed agency and valence. However, it should be considered that this study tried to analyse news coverage from 25 different countries. Applying a single coding scheme to such diverse data is a challenge in itself. If codes were more elaborate than frequency counts, the researchers would have to stretch their concepts. If the concept of Europeanisation gained properties beyond the frequency of domestic or European actors in the coverage, these properties might not be comparable across countries and the concept would not reach a high level of abstraction (Sartori, 1970). Therefore, a supplementary, more in-depth analysis of single countries would make it possible to consider particular contexts and address the respective problems.

Particular contextual factors are considered in a cross-national analysis of television news in Germany and Britain covering the introduction of the Euro in 1999. Semetko *et al.* (2000) observe a growing Europeanisation of traditional domestic issues and a stronger focus on EU coverage. In addition, they also notice country specific characteristics of news coverage depending on the country’s position towards the Euro and potential consequences for the respective country. In British TV news, for example, the Euro is interpreted as a potential threat to the national economy and to individual businesses. Correspondingly, in a study investigating the visibility of the EU in British broadcast media during the 1994 and 2004 European elections, Campbell (2006) finds that the domestic emphasis in coverage of EU-related topics has

increased, questioning the thesis of an increasingly Europeanised public sphere in the UK. As the failure of L'Europeen, a pan-European newspaper which tried to move away from domesticized discourse, as well as some pan-European broadcasters, shows, this is symptomatic of other member states, too (Harrison and Woods, 2001; Neveu, 2002). Economic limitations and language barriers as well as national regulations hinder these projects further. Semetko *et al's* (2000) study also provides interesting ideas on factors influencing and impacting on EU news coverage by exploring four relationships within their analytical framework: Media and political systems, media and political organisations, media content and potential effects, and media audiences and audience characteristics. As the study considers an event that took place 15 years ago, news reporting on European issues might, however, have developed further, also not least because the EU has become a more salient issue in UK General Election campaigns (Kriesi, 2007).

Particularly in the aftermath of the 2014 European Elections and the 2016 referendum campaign, studies focusing exclusively on the UK have taken into consideration the visibility of particular actors or points of view in the news coverage to explain the surge in votes for Ukip and the vote to leave the EU. These studies found that the visibility of Ukip and in particular of Nigel Farage in the European Parliament election campaign was high in comparison with other parties and party leaders (Cushion *et al.*, 2015; Deacon and Wring, 2016). However, Negrine (2017) finds that UK news coverage only provides little background information for those Eurosceptic parties contesting the 2014 election. With regards to the referendum campaign, Cushion and Lewis (2017) furthermore find that right-wing views on the European Union dominated news coverage.

### ***2.2.2. Frame analysis: establishing the tone of EU coverage***

Beyond visibility of the EU, research is concerned with its evaluation in the news. News frames in particular have been investigated in both quantitative and qualitative studies in order to address this. Frame analysis can establish valence attached to the EU in news coverage and consequently uncover biases.

Definitions of 'frame' are varied and operationalised in very different ways (Entman, 1993; Vliegthart and van Zoonen, 2011). The concept will be further explored later in this thesis (see Chapter 3). For now, the classic definition of frame, which is applied in most frame and framing analyses, nevertheless clarifies the concept: framing is to '*select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or*



*treatment recommendation* for the item described' (Entman, 1993, p. 52; italics in original). The frame can therefore be regarded as the lens through which a story is explored.

Researchers applying quantitative analysis of news frames work predominantly deductively. They derive frames theoretically from literature and previous empirical work, and then apply them to their sample. The codebook itself is therefore less dependent on the researcher's interpretation of the text, although the coding process itself will still have an interpretative aspect. Deductive analyses tend to be more consistent as no new codes are added throughout the process of coding. However, coding inconsistency can be overcome in inductive coding by keeping an accurate track record of codes and subsequent systematic re-coding of the data.

Quantitative frame analyses – again often conducted in a comparative manner – offer a good overview of patterns in news coverage. Moreover, the identified frames inform my own analysis (see Appendix B). It is therefore worthwhile to revisit quantitative studies analysing framing of the EU in the news (for qualitative frame analyses see 2.3).

Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) use a set of five predefined frames to describe EU news coverage in Dutch TV and print news: conflict, human interest, economic consequences, morality, and responsibility. They apply a range of criteria to the data in order to categorise them into those four frames. For example, to attribute the conflict frame, a story has to reflect a disagreement between parties, individuals, groups and/or countries, and it needs to refer to two or more sides of the problem and refer to winners and losers. The exact topic of the news story is not important in the decision for a frame code.

The conflict and attribution of responsibility frames prove to be the most frequently employed. This is not surprising, considering that conflict is an important news selection criterion (see Chapter 7). A disadvantage of these theoretically derived frames is that they are not specific to EU news coverage. While this makes it possible to compare EU coverage to coverage of other institutions, the kind of broad frame analysis employed in these studies does not allow for a more in-depth analysis of EU coverage which is sensitive to the particularities of the issue. This would require a more specific coding scheme. Furthermore, these frames as such are not valence frames, so they cannot arrive at any conclusions about evaluation of the EU in news coverage.

Valence frames provide measures of negativity or positivity. A valence frame is a frame which evaluates an issue or situation either positively or negatively, in support of it, or in opposition to it (Schuck and de Vreese, 2006). Typically, studies of valence frames are conducted in psychology, marketing or other disciplines related to communication (for example

Bizer *et al.*, 2011). They focus on the effect of valence framing on decision-making or judgement (Levin and Gaeth, 1988).

Schuck and de Vreese (2006) use pre-defined frames of risk and opportunity to describe coverage of EU enlargement. Overall, they conclude that reporting is balanced with regard to these frames, but controversial. Gavin (2000), focusing on the British case in particular, provides a content analysis of TV coverage of the European economy. The study considers benefit and loss framing to analyse the sample. Data was gathered over a period of 18 months, from September 1996 to June 1997, which includes a General Election, and from December 1998 to July 1999, covering the introduction of the single currency. Benefit and loss in this study are used to describe the material value that arises from EU membership for Britain.

Analysis focuses on mid-week, prime-time, coverage from Britain's flagship news broadcasts with large audiences: *BBC Nine O'Clock News* and *ITN* early evening news at 6.30 pm as well as its predecessor, *News at Ten*. In contrast to other studies looking at frames, Gavin's work concentrates specifically on the British case and takes into account the issue of European identity formation as well as theories on political loyalties and media impact. Symbolic representations are investigated with regard to their influence of identity formation. Gavin (2000) comes to the conclusion that, although there is a balance of loss and benefit frames, symbolic representations of Europe 'featuring clashes, disputes and zero-sum games', constitute an 'antithesis of the notion of Europe as a sphere of shared material advancement or achievement' (Gavin, 2000, p. 366).

Interestingly, framing of the EU has not only attracted European scholars' attention. Williams and Kaid (2009) analyse how the 2004 European Union enlargement and elections have been framed in the U.S. media. In a quantitative content analysis, they look at a sample including daily newspapers, weekly news magazines, television and radio. They find that reporting is rather superficial and U.S.-centric.

### ***2.2.3. Effects of EU coverage***

For some research questions a textual analysis might not suffice to answer them. When media effects or production processes come into consideration further methods are needed for empirical investigation (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). The following two sections explore multi-method approaches, specifically studies which address media effects and factors influencing the reporting. Although media effects are not the focus of this research, it is worth exploring those studies briefly as they emphasise the significance of EU news coverage.

Some quantitative studies on news coverage of the EU consider its impact on the audience (see for example Caiani and Guerra, 2017, for an overview of approaches and theories). Media

effects research has a long tradition, with the first widely renowned studies conducted in the 1920s, the Payne Fund Studies, after the success of Hollywood films and increasing concerns of their influence on children (Lowery and DeFleur, 1983). Since then, several influential theories, such as agenda setting, priming and framing effects have been established, which also have relevance for EU coverage (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; McCombs and Shaw, 1993; Scheufele, 2000; Blumler, 2015; see also Chapter 1).

Vliegenhardt *et al.* (2008) compare the results of their content analysis with survey data to investigate the dynamics of EU support. They consider news coverage in seven member states between 1990 and 2006 in order to assess the influence of the EU's visibility and framing on public support for the EU. On an aggregate level, Vliegenhardt *et al.* (2008) come to the conclusion that benefit and conflict frames in particular matter for public support; the first increases support, the latter decreases it. The differences in public support are significant when other independent variables, such as employment rates, are held constant at their means. In contrast, a disadvantage frame does not have any observable effect on EU support.

Schuck and de Vreese's (2006) findings support these results. They combine content analysis with an experiment to measure the relations between news coverage and public support for further EU enlargement. First, they examine the framing of the 2004 EU enlargement in terms of risk and opportunity in German national and regional daily newspapers. Then they investigate the effect both frames have on the support for the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Although the level of support by participants is moderated by political knowledge – less knowledgeable participants are more affected by the news frames and especially more susceptible to the risk frame – the experiment shows a significant causal link between framing of the 2004 EU enlargement and the level of support for it. Again in a German context, a study by Brettschneider *et al.* (2003) sheds light on the connection of visibility and judgement of the Euro introduction with public support for the new currency. Drawing on survey data they conclude, that first the exchange rate towards the U.S. Dollar and at a later point evaluation in media coverage best explain different levels of support. All of these summarised studies suggest that EU media coverage impacts on its audience, which gives empirical justification for studying media representations of the EU.

Studies empirically testing the influence of news coverage on public opinion and attitudes are based on assumptions about factors shaping support for EU institutions and European integration. McLaren (2002) notes that most of them, however, focus mainly on economic factors like benefits and losses. She adds the notion of perceived cultural threat as a potential influence on EU support: 'it seems highly likely that EU citizens are reacting to European integration in a symbolic way, in that they have been socialized to accept the power and

sovereignty of the nation-state. The idea of European integration as such poses a threat to this important symbol.’ (McLaren, 2002, p. 555). The notion of threat also includes perceived threat to the native culture from other cultures.

These findings seem particularly prevalent in the British case. The notion of the sovereignty of the nation state, parliamentary tradition and Britain’s imperial past as well as its role in WWII are often used as explanation for Eurosceptic attitudes among UK citizens, more so than in other EU member states (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004; Daddow, 2006a; Garton Ash, 2006; Daddow, 2013; Spiering, 2015; see also 7.2).

#### **2.2.4. Production of EU news coverage**

For this thesis, another type of study is of great importance: textual analyses of EU news coverage supplemented by interviews with journalists, correspondents or EU officials and press spokespeople. This allows for an analysis of production processes and journalistic culture in the media corporations instead of an analysis of consumption and media effects.

Gleissner and de Vreese (2005) not only conduct comparative content analysis of news coverage of the EU constitution preparation in British, German and Dutch news media, but also supplement their results with interviews with Brussels correspondents of the respective media. This allowed them to investigate the features of coverage as well as influencing factors.

In their deductive content analysis they focus on visibility, framing and domesticity of news stories. Their results show that the constitution enters and vanishes from the news agenda around this key event, is portrayed in a predominantly negative tone and framed as a conflict. Interestingly, British news shows the highest visibility but also the most negative evaluation and strongest focus on domestic consequences. Interviews with Brussels-based correspondents put these findings into context. Correspondents report that the EU institutions’ press work is not supportive towards journalists. According to them, press releases from EU institutions are too dull and overly complicated, contain no pictures and filming at EU institutions is a difficult task. These might not be the only problems facing journalists trying to report on EU-related issues. Decreasing funding for correspondents, EU-related stories lacking news value and an increasingly frustrated public might be further influencing factors, which will be revisited in Chapter 7.

Unfortunately, the problems correspondents report in Gleissner and de Vreese’s study have not yet been solved. In more recent interviews with Brussels-based correspondents it is found that information from EU institutions is perceived as too complex, voluminous and scattered (Martins *et al.*, 2012). Furthermore, correspondents face challenges within their own organisations. Editors regard EU topics as less important than domestic issues. Resources for

EU reporting are very limited and there is no space for broad contextualisation. Nationalised coverage of the EU is the consequence (Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005).

In an earlier study, de Vreese (2001) uses a similar approach but with a slightly different focus. Instead of tone and domesticity, particularly agenda setting and visibility are taken into account. De Vreese (2001) analyses the news coverage of three major EU events – the January 1999 first-step introduction of the euro, the June 1999 European Parliament elections, and the December 2000 summit in Nice – in widely watched British, Danish and Dutch TV news programmes. In line with previous research, the study confirms the cyclical nature of EU news coverage. However, it adds to previous studies of visibility as it takes into account policies and processes within news organisations covering the EU. Interviews with senior correspondents and editorial staff, editors and editors-in-chief shed light on internal journalistic factors shaping the reporting, such as news selection criteria or the editorial approach. However, external factors, like the political system of their home country and its impact on journalistic practices, are left out of the analysis although they might significantly shape the reporting (see also van Dalen *et al.*, 2011). Other factors, which impact on the tone of coverage particularly among UK-based newspapers, include the format of newspaper journalists work for and whether they are based in Brussels or the UK. UK-based tabloid journalists were found to be the most hostile, while broadsheet, Brussels-based journalists covered the EU more favourably (Price, 2009). While Price's (2009) study of British journalists in combination with quantitative content analysis provides some important factors shaping EU coverage, he omits issues like audience expectations and the limitations of the media system.

In a study by Boomgaarden *et al.* (2010), although not supporting their findings with interviews, exogenous factors are drawn on in order to explain weekly variations in visibility. In a two-step computer assisted content analysis, visibility of EU-related issues is counted for seven member states in the years from 1990 to 2006. Over the 17 years under investigation, they notice an overall increase in the amount of EU news coverage in those seven member states under investigation. Although more news cannot necessarily be equated with good news, the increase is 'conducive to increased public awareness of and debate about European politics' (Boomgaarden *et al.*, 2010, p. 518). However, this increase could, at least to some degree, also be explained by the changing nature of the EU, further integration, which includes a widening of the EU's legislative power, as well as the accession of new member states. Furthermore, policy-related, institutional events increase EU visibility (for example Norris, 2000). Less frequent events, such as European Parliament Elections lead to the highest visibility. During national election campaigns, the EU as an issue does not disappear but becomes an important topic in national election campaigns, particularly the UK (de Vries, 2007; Kriesi, 2007).

Predominantly quantitative studies and their results are interesting, also with regard to my own research project they provide a good overview of themes, frames and factors influencing the reporting. These have informed this thesis as they provided a starting point for designing a codebook and interview guide (see Appendices A, B and C).

### **2.3. Qualitative research: detailed analysis of the British case**

Besides quantitative studies, another group of studies uses a variety of qualitative methods in order to produce in-depth description of EU news coverage. The focus of qualitative studies is often different from quantitative ones. Instead of frequency of frames, it is their quality which is being investigated, typically inductively and in more detail (for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Hawkins, 2012). This section will mainly focus on qualitative studies considering the British case, as it is this specific case that is the focus of this thesis. The section first introduces one of the key qualitative studies on EU representations in British news before moving on to more recent research.

One of the most prominent and influential pieces of work in this category is Anderson and Weymouth's study published in 1999. Considering articles from broadsheet as well as the tabloid press from the run-up to the 1997 General Election and during the time of British European Council presidency in the first half of 1998, they provide an overview of dominant themes in the British press related to the EU. The results are structured according to the following, inductive categories, and which have informed the codebook developed for this thesis: economic (with socio-political associations), political (mainly issues of sovereignty and defence) and historic-cultural (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999, pp. 63-64). Overall, Anderson and Weymouth discover a largely Eurosceptic discourse emphasising disadvantages and risks deriving from the UK's membership, with only a few exceptions.

They divide their sample of newspapers into Eurosceptic and pro-European press. Both of these camps include broadsheets as well as tabloids. In the Eurosceptic press, Anderson and Weymouth (1999) find two tendencies: generally, but not exclusively, the broadsheets present 'reasoned and understandable concerns at the prospect of important changes to the governance of the UK', whereas tabloids use more emotive language, evoking a 'depressing miasma of xenophobic forebodings' (1999, p. 90). The pro-European press appears to be less confident in voicing its opinions on the EU and EU membership. Discourse supports the EU in general, but also points out possible risks and disadvantages (in this case particularly from the introduction of the euro). It is more likely to be penetrated by Eurosceptic voices than the Eurosceptic press by pro-European voices. Ideology is not as openly expressed as in the Eurosceptic newspapers.

Another study by Anderson (2004) focuses on two traditionally Eurosceptic broadsheet newspapers, *The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph*. In particular, discourses of nationalism are examined and commented on. Anderson regards them as a disguise for the proprietors' commercial interests. He identifies a language of nationalism and patriotism, as well as three different categories of nationalism as realised through language: co-exclusive nationalism, in which other forms of nationalism are regarded as inferior, subsidiary or servile; cooperative nationalism, which proudly promotes its own values but does accept other forms of nationalism; and qualified co-exclusive nationalism. Qualified co-exclusive nationalism refers to people who share views of co-exclusive nationalists that no further European integration should happen. However, they accept the limitations already implemented by Thatcher's signing of the European Single Act due to their economic ideology. This ideology includes the belief that the European single market is beneficial for economic growth in Britain (Anderson, 2004, p. 153). Not only is this study interesting in terms of discovering a dominant discourse but also because it takes into account the influence of commercial interests on reporting. For example, *The Times*' proprietor Rupert Murdoch, is mainly driven by commercial interests, not ideology, when driving the agenda towards co-exclusive nationalism. Anderson makes a strong, theoretically based argument about commercial motivation for Eurosceptic positions and nationalism in the news coverage about the EU, which has informed the interview guide used in this thesis, particularly with regard to audience expectations<sup>1</sup>.

Besides nationalism, history has been identified as one of the dominant discourses activated in news coverage about the EU (Daddow, 2006a). Focusing on the Eurosceptic tabloid press, Daddow analyses the rhetorical strategies employed in *The Sun* and the *Daily Mail*. Contrary to Anderson and Weymouth (1999) the purpose of the study is not 'to explain why newspapers take the line they do [...] but to understand what kind of history is being used to inform their reporting' (Daddow, 2006a, p. 316). He comes to the conclusion that the particular interpretation of history used to support Eurosceptic arguments emphasises historical conflicts between Britain and Europe as well as cultural differences and therefore a distrust for continental leaders. Euroscepticism in the press, according to Daddow (2006a), is not based on sceptical views on EU policies and institutions but rather on British history, national identity and Britain's presumed place in the world. He furthermore links this use of history in Eurosceptic discourse to the generally Eurosceptic interpretation of history predominant in British society (see also Daddow, 2006b).

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<sup>1</sup> The full interview guide can be found in the Appendix C.

Similar themes can be found in Novy's (2013) comparison between German and British coverage of the debate about the future of Europe. This study is mainly focused on the conditions for the emergence of a European public sphere and how this links to national history and identity. Todd (2016) furthermore introduces immigration as an important issue in the debate about European integration in the UK. Studying media texts as well as political speeches and campaign materials he maps the evolution of discourses about the EU from the 1975 referendum to Cameron's 2013 Bloomberg speech. Besides issues of sovereignty, linked to national identity and history (see below), he traces the emergence of immigration as a major theme in the debate. In a recent discourse analysis, Balch and Balbanova (2017) reiterate Todd's finding that immigration has gained salience in the news discussion about the EU. However, they also find that the EU is often only implicit in the discussion of freedom of movement.

The studies summarised above identify important frames and arguments which are largely overlooked in comparative quantitative research as those frames are specific for the UK context and the British news media, for example nationalism (Anderson, 2004) or nationalist history (Daddow, 2006a).

Hawkins (2012), analysing newspaper texts thematising the European Union Treaty Reform, reaffirms the above-mentioned frames and discourses of nationalism and history but adds another dimension by linking them to representations of the British relationship with the EU. Besides reporting of the EU through a 'lens of nation-state' (Hawkins, 2012, p. 561), Hawkins found in his qualitative discourse analysis that the relationship of Britain with the EU, particularly in the right-wing press is mainly framed in terms of separation and threat – themes that Daddow (2006a) identifies as historically motivated. The EU is portrayed as a foreign power, with a homogenous rump EU from which the UK is excluded, and as a 'bargain forum' in which France and Germany determine pace and direction of European integration to their benefit (Hawkins, 2012, p. 565). The pro-European (left-wing) press on the other hand emphasises the EU as a source of peace, prosperity and democracy. However, the general position of the pro-European press appears to be defensive, protecting the EU from unjustified hostility. It does not actively make a case for the EU. The inter-state conflict, although represented in less emotive rhetoric, is still evident with France portrayed as the dominant decision-maker within the EU.

As a consequence of framing the EU debate as a competition of national interests, people are cued to think of the EU not in terms of issues and policies but in terms of nationality. Again, this finding is supported by Daddow's (2006a) earlier study. Even the more pro-European media is penetrated by Eurosceptic voices, which reinforce those perceptions – a result which echoes Anderson and Weymouth's (1999) observations.



In a commentary on previous research, Daddow (2012) traces back this generally negatively biased reporting in Britain to explain the cultural diffusion of Euroscepticism. There was a shift in media support during the 1980s. Formerly supportive media have become increasingly sceptical of the process of European integration and of the EU as an institution. Daddow (2012) attributes this shift to a large degree to the growing influence of Rupert Murdoch in the British media landscape, who puts his business interests ahead of his political beliefs. Bombastic reporting, giving a sense of urgency, guarantee higher sales. EU regulations inhibiting an expansion of News International's Sky across Europe, might have triggered further dislike from Murdoch.

Similarly to Anderson (2004), Daddow (2012) acknowledges the commercial motivation of employing a Eurosceptic style of reporting as it ensures higher profits. He detects a difference in the type of Euroscepticism expressed in different media outlets: while the tabloids exaggerate for the sake of effect, broadsheets 'express Euroscepticism in a more restrained fashion, while television broadcasters tend to achieve greater balance still. The general trend, however, has been the predominance of coverage tainted by hard Eurosceptical editorialization' (Daddow, 2012, p. 1221). However, there might be other circumstances which enhance the process, such as a deepening of European integration, or more recently the economic downturn since 2008. Domestic problems, in this case, could be and have been attributed to the EU.

In many of the above studies language is highlighted as an important factor in EU coverage. However, there has been little attempt to analyse language use systematically. An exception here is Musloff (2004; 2006; 2012), who identifies dominant metaphors in UK coverage of the EU using a corpus of data. Some prominent metaphors, for example, mapped the EU on the domain of buildings. While his insights into metaphors in news coverage have informed my own research, I also focus on other linguistic and rhetorical characteristics of the texts, as well as a broader range of topics.

Qualitative studies generally support the findings of quantitative research addressing EU media representations. However, they offer analyses of specific cases. Furthermore they take into account sociocultural contexts idiosyncratic to the British case, such as particular understandings of national history. This leads to a deeper understanding of the circumstances which influence the character of EU reporting. What is still lacking, however, is a combination of detailed linguistic analysis with an empirical investigation of production processes and influential factors in those processes.

## 2.4. Conclusion: shortcomings of previous research

Overall, quantitative as well as qualitative studies identify a negative bias in British news coverage on EU-related issues. This trend has been detected in comparison with other EU members (see for example Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005) as well as in studies focussing on the British case in particular (see for example Gavin, 2000; Daddow, 2006a; Daddow, 2012).

Furthermore, a national discourse is still pervasive. European actors are less prominent than national ones and EU-related news are most commonly evaluated regarding their consequences for the UK (see for example Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Vliegenhardt *et al.*, 2008). British news media create a nationalist discourse or discourses which draw heavily on historic stereotypes and repeat common but not always qualified arguments against British involvement in European integration (Daddow, 2006a; Daddow, 2012; Hawkins, 2012).

As far as production processes are considered in the analyses, several factors influencing the reporting have been discovered ranging from the insufficient and complicated, technocratic communication from European institutions to editorial preferences and commercial interests of proprietors (for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Martins *et al.*, 2012). Euroscepticism in British news appears to have become a 'default position' (Hawkins, 2012, p. 573). The reasons for largely Eurosceptic reporting, however, need further empirical investigation. This is one of the tasks of this thesis as it tries to explain news discourse in relation to production processes and organisational circumstances.

Revisiting the existing literature on EU news coverage furthermore points towards a research gap in this area. While there is a large body of quantitative research investigating media representations of the EU, they do not provide in-depth descriptions of individual cases as in this research project the UK, where EU membership has become a highly controversial issue. Quantitative studies, especially when they are comparative, provide a useful overview of larger patterns, but they lack the opportunity to explore those patterns in detail.

Those studies primarily concerned with visibility of the EU also often fail to look into valence of reporting. The assumption that more frequent coverage leads to the creation of a European identity across the EU is questionable. Frequent negative reporting might even enhance growing scepticism and hostility.

Quantitative studies investigating news framing operate with deductive coding schemes. Despite its consistency, deductive frame analysis has some disadvantages. Firstly, it runs the risk of omitting important frames, which are not predefined. Secondly, it assumes that the predefined frames are valid ones, when in fact, a particular sample might require a different set

of frames in order to capture it analytically. For example, Hawkins (2012) derived his frames from collected newspaper data, which ensures that they capture its specific character (see 2.3).

Therefore, this thesis adopts a qualitative approach to text analysis, which addresses the shortcomings of previous quantitative studies as well as qualitative investigations of the British case.

In-depth studies of British media representations of the EU, while providing a richer description of the texts as well as their links to issues such as national identity, often neglect systematic analysis of linguistic features and rhetoric but only mention linguistic features as examples (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Hawkins, 2012; Todd, 2016; Balch and Balbanova, 2017). This project addresses issues of rhetoric and linguistic construction, as well as intertextuality, in a systematic way, in order to explain how frames are actively realised through certain techniques. This gives insight into the workings of language in news coverage. Previous frame analyses, however, are not to be dismissed because of their neglect of linguistic features. Rather, I use them to inform my own coding scheme. I use a hybrid form of frame analysis, based on a deductively derived coding scheme, informed by those studies and theoretical reasoning, which was subject to changes and additions throughout the research process when the data required this. In this way, I address the shortcomings of deductive coding and at the same time provide an initial coding scheme which ensures a higher degree of reliability.

Furthermore, previous studies are imbalanced regarding the types of media outlets they consider. In general, daily newspapers have so far attracted the most attention from scholars in the field, particularly in qualitative research. This seems understandable considering the newspaper's traditional role as opinion former and agenda setter. Its role in shaping public opinions and delivering information is an important reason to give newspapers a high priority in this study as well. However, the importance of television news shall not be overlooked. According to Eurobarometer surveys (2014b) television is still the most used medium of citizens to obtain information about the EU. Although there are some (mainly quantitative) studies taking them into account (see for example Semetko *et al.*, 2000; de Vreese, 2001), qualitative analyses have neglected this medium so far.

Another gap in research can be found when looking at the dates of data collections. The EU is becoming an increasingly important issue in national election campaigns (Norris, 2000; Kriesi, 2007). However, research on media representations of the EU usually focuses on EU events, not on national political events. This is striking considering the salience of the European issue for British political parties. An exception from this pattern is, for example, Anderson and Weymouth's (1999) seminal study on what they call European discourse in the British press. Their findings, based on data collection during the General Election campaign in 1997,

however, are by now outdated and events beyond those domestic and EU-level key events are not analysed.

This research project includes media material gathered during the General Election campaign 2015, as well as coverage around the European Elections in 2014. It furthermore includes other events taking place at the time of data collection, regardless of whether they are related to these key events. This results in a more extensive analysis of EU news coverage in the UK.

Within a framework of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995), the results are then linked to production processes and organisational circumstances, which systematically explain why the EU is represented in a certain way. While some quantitative content analyses are triangulated with interviews with media professionals, qualitative analyses often make arguments about the influences of production processes without empirical data to back up their claims (for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004). This thesis addresses that gap, while at the same time using material from interviews more specifically tailored to the UK media environment than the studies combining interviews with quantitative content analysis (for example Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Price, 2009; Martins *et al.*, 2012).

## **Chapter 3. Theoretical framework and methodological approach**

### **3.1. Introduction**

This thesis uses an adaptation of Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Its main tenets provide the basis for this thesis. However, the thesis adapts methodological tools to address the research questions as appropriate. The adaptations increase the reliability of CDA, and make it more suitable for larger data sets.

CDA is an interdisciplinary, problem-oriented approach to text analysis, which combines linguistics and critical social science into a single theoretical and analytical framework (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 6). It is concerned with the 'role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of dominance' (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 249), dominance being the exercise of social powers by individuals, groups, or institutions. Language is regarded as crucial in this (re)production or challenge of existing power relations. CDA also tries to establish how discourse is constrained or enabled by non-discursive elements of social practice (Van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Fairclough, 2003). For this thesis, this means that the analysed news texts are not artificially separated from the processes of production and the societal context. Both have discursive and non-discursive elements— Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 26) call these elements 'moments' of social practice. The aim of CDA is to unpack how those moments work together in the (re)production of power relations and to identify possibilities for change (Fairclough, 1995; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).

This chapter first explains the theoretical basis of CDA and distinguishes it from the broader Discourse Analysis (DA). It then establishes CDA's suitability for answering the core research questions of the thesis before outlining the analytical framework. CDA is an umbrella term for a variety of approaches. Therefore, it is important to outline the specific framework used; Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach to CDA. Once the theoretical foundation has been laid, the chapter introduces the specific analytical tools applied to news texts. The choice of content and frame analysis as well as micro-analysis of language provides, firstly, a more reliable overview of the data than common for CDA research, and, secondly, still underpins this with a detailed analysis of language and its functions in the (re)production of discourses about the EU. The chapter then outlines sampling procedures for the texts, as well as the rules applied to create a subsample for more detailed analysis.

Finally, an introduction to qualitative interviews with media professionals is given and situated within the CDA framework. Qualitative interviews are used to answer the second part of the research question, which tries to find explanations for the patterns of textual representation in EU coverage by linking them to social practices in the newsroom.

## **3.2. Theoretical basis and aims of CDA**

### **3.2.1. CDA in comparison with DA**

Critical Discourse Analysis is a theoretical approach to studying language rather than a text analytical method. In fact, as Van Dijk (2016, p. 63) points out, CDA is ‘a critical perspective or attitude in the field of discourse studies, using many different methods of the humanities and social sciences’.

CDA is one strand of the more general approach of discourse analysis (DA), which are both concerned with language in use and context (Fasold, 1990; Fairclough, 1998). DA and CDA share their understanding of discourse as a social practice (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) which is based on Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse (1989; 2007). Discourse is ‘the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting’ (Lemke, 1995, p. 8), the ‘way in which knowledge is organized, talked about and acted upon in different institutions’ (O’Halloran, 2003, p. 123; see also Foucault, 2007). Discourse includes both linguistic and non-linguistic semiotics, meaning-making elements of social practice, such as visual images (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 37). Following Foucault (2007), these discourses, which always stand in relation to other discourses, are seen as constituting social life by (re)producing and challenging power relations. Through analysis of discourse, we can therefore make inferences about these relations.

Due to these similarities, the distinction between CDA and DA can be unclear, and some scholars even use the terms interchangeably (see for example Bednarek and Caple, 2014). However, there are some crucial differences between them. Firstly, there is an ontological difference. DA is based on poststructuralist assumptions (Wodak, 2001), which precludes a focus on non-discursive structures. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 28) note that ‘[m]any of those who have worked with the concept of discourse have ended up seeing the social as nothing but discourse’. CDA is also interested in non-discursive structures. This prevents a reduction of social life to discourse alone (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 28), while acknowledging the ‘constitutive potential of discourse within and across social practices’ (Farrelly, 2010, p. 99). CDA is therefore informed by critical realism, a philosophical approach to social science based on the philosophy of science but rejecting positivism. Critical realism acknowledges that reality, the intransitive, exists outside of the transitive, our experience and knowledge about things (Bhaskar, 1975). Regarding the study of social action, critical realism tries to resolve the dualism between humanism and structuralism (Collier, 1994). Society is regarded as the condition but also the outcome of human agency (Bhaskar, 1979).

A critical realist ontology does not contradict a Foucauldian conceptualisation of discourse. Particularly in *The Order of Things* and *Archaeology of Knowledge*, the two texts that CDA refers to most explicitly when conceptualising discourse, Foucault (1989; 2007) acknowledges that ‘discourse gains its power as a complex of imbricated, representational and extra-discursive elements’ (Pearce and Woodiwiss, 2005, p. 61). While discourse is necessary to mediate knowledge, Foucault also clarifies that the world does not depend exclusively on our discursively mediated knowledge of it (Pearce and Woodiwiss, 2005). As he points out in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, discourse and system produce each other (Foucault, 2007, p. 84), echoing Bhaskar’s (1979) understanding of social structures as condition and outcome of human agency.

The framework employed in this thesis (see below) is concerned with the dialectical relation of discursive moments of social practice with non-discursive moments. Practices, here, are defined as habitual ways of doing things, which are tied to particular times, places, people and resources (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 21). Additionally, all social practices are tied to ‘historical contexts and are the means by which existing power relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served’ (Janks, 1997, p. 329).

This thesis shares this view of discourse and social practice, which makes the framework suitable to understand EU coverage in the discursive and non-discursive context of social and organisational structures and practices within the newsroom. Those structures are on the one hand a condition for social action and on the other, the outcome of social action since social actors will consciously or unconsciously reproduce the structures within which they act (Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994). Structures are constraints on action, but at the same time also enable actions (Bhaskar, 1979).

While social actors may not always be consciously aware of these structures and their reproduction, interviews can elicit some of these processes. Firstly, through strategic questioning, the latent reproduction can be made more overt. Secondly, the transcripts from interviews with media professionals show traces of these dynamics as well, for example in the way journalists speak about ‘Europe’ and its relationship with the UK.

The second feature that sets CDA apart from DA is its criticality. Criticality occurs on three levels. On an immanent, textual level, CDA aims to discover ‘inconsistencies, (self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures)’ (Wodak, 2001, p. 65). On the second level, CDA performs socio-diagnostic critique. The aim here is not to establish what is right or wrong. Instead, it tries to show where language has persuasive *potential*, for example by unpacking ideologically charged presuppositions in a text

and linking it to social and political structures. However, this thesis makes no claims about the persuasive *effects* of texts since it is not analysing reception of news texts.

The socio-diagnostic aspect of CDA discovers and bears witness to unequal relations of power which shape language use in society, and reveals how discourse (re)produces (or challenges) socio-political dominance (Fairclough, 1998; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Underlying ideologies, which are normalised by introducing them as common sense, and therefore go often uncontested in society, are unpacked and questioned (Teo, 2000). Ideology in CDA research is understood as ‘constructions of practices from particular perspectives (“one-sided”) which “iron out” the contradictions, dilemmas and antagonisms of practices in ways which accord with the interests and projects of domination’ (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 26). Ideological power, in this sense, means ‘the power to project one’s practices as universal and “common sense”’ (Fairclough, 1998, p. 33). Discourse is the means by which an ideology becomes powerful (Schirato *et al.*, 2012).

The third aspect of critique, prognostic critique, corresponds most clearly with CDA’s explicit socio-political agenda. Its aim is to contribute to transformation and improvement of communication (Wodak, 2001), to promote social action and change (Souto-Manning, 2014; Fairclough, 2016). This change does not necessarily mean the introduction of radically new ideas but rather the transformation of practices related to a particular discourse (Foucault, 2007).

This thesis is particularly concerned with the first two levels of critique, the immanent, text-based critique and socio-diagnostic critique. On the socio-prognostic level, this thesis makes no claim to being able to change public discourse about the EU. However, the results of the analysis can inform the debate about Britain’s future relationship with the EU, how it is handled in the media, and create a heightened awareness of, at times, problematic practices with regard to EU news coverage. This awareness may lead to changes of those practices, which can contribute to a more constructive public debate and approach to post-Brexit relations between the EU and UK.

### **3.2.2. *Language, power and the European Union***

In these processes of persuasion and transformation, CDA sees language as fundamental. While reality exists outside language, ‘it is constantly mediated by and through language’ (Hall, 1980, p. 131). While there are other ways of meaning making apart from language – for example body language or visual semiotics – CDA is preoccupied with the former. Discourses as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive social practices and, at the same time as being constituted by them (Wodak, 2001, p. 66). Institutional or societal structure



employs a code to send a message, which is then decoded and consequently reinforces the structure of a social practice (Hall, 1980). In other words, society shapes and is shaped by discourse. Discourses, however, are not natural but naturalised through discursive practice and therefore a part of the ‘effects of power’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 48; see also Hall, 1980). Language is therefore also a crucial element of power relations, which are not necessarily repressive but always productive and often discursively enacted (Foucault, 2007). However, they can also be resisted (Foucault, 2007). In Hall’s (1980) terms, decoders can take an oppositional stance to the dominant hegemonic discourse, leading to a struggle in discourse, resistance and reinterpretation.

Following Foucault’s notion of power and the possibility of resistance, CDA tries to challenge existing power relations, which the powerful want to maintain to their own benefit (Foucault, 2007). Consequently, issues such as representation of (oppressed) minorities and changing society towards a more equal one have been popular among CDA researchers (see for example Van Dijk, 1986).

Representations of the European Union in the British news may not fit this research agenda at first glance. However, there are questions of unequal power relationships to be answered. Eurosceptic discourses are dominating the public debate, with politicians keen to make their Euroscepticism visible in order to be electable (Fontana and Parsons, 2015). Europhile discourses are marginalised and – as analysis will show – unable to challenge the established order of discourse (see below) about the EU.

Certainly, pro-EU politicians and business elites have been influencing British engagement with the EU. The electorate and media have in the past been permissive (Daddow, 2012). However, prominent Eurosceptics have managed to capture the issue and dominate the media debate (Copsey and Haughton, 2014).

Furthermore, there is an imbalance within the British media system which favours Euroscepticism, with the majority of high circulation newspapers taking a Eurosceptic editorial stance. Consequently, Eurosceptic views are more readily available for citizens. Some information contradicting the common representations may not be reported at all which has a negative impact on the audience’s knowledge and influences their judgement (Bell, 1998).

While at the start of this research project no immediate conflicts in British society had arisen from this inequality in news coverage – apart from heated debates between passionate Eurosceptics and Europhiles – this has changed since the referendum campaign with campaigners on both sides having received threats and abuse. This takes place within a public discourse about Brexit in which newspapers such as the *Daily Mail* have branded judges ‘enemies of the people’ (Slack, 2016) for ruling that Parliament should have a vote on the

triggering of Article 50. The *Daily Mail* also tried to compile a list of academics teaching anti-Brexit propaganda (Martin *et al.*, 2017). This is indicative about a debate which has become hostile and unconstructive.

Furthermore, considering the debate around EU migrants in the UK, this discussion also has consequences for minority groups, who, especially after the referendum, felt marginalised, excluded from the political processes determining their futures and at times discriminated against in diverse social situations like work spaces or public transport (see for example Remigi *et al.*, 2017). The aims of CDA – to unpack how language figures in these dynamics and to find ways of transforming society through discourse – are therefore very much applicable to this research project.

### **3.2.3. Criticisms of CDA**

CDA is not without criticism. CDA is allegedly a tool to verify the researcher's assumptions and perceptions about an issue, producing biased research (Widdowson, 1995; Widdowson, 1998; Poole, 2010). This is intensified through alleged cherry-picking of data and analytical tools, which match the researcher's preconceptions. This thesis tries to address these criticisms by picking methodological tools according to their suitability for tackling research questions (see 3.5). Texts for analysis were sampled according to set criteria as outlined in 3.6, rather than according to researcher's interest.

However, CDA research generally has a socio-political agenda, making some bias unavoidable. The research and researcher are furthermore themselves entangled in the discourses under investigation. Therefore, CDA researchers are particularly concerned with self-reflexivity during their analysis. In particular, I reflected on my position as an EU national in post-referendum Britain during the process of analysis. Triangulation of text analytical methods and semi-structured interviews furthermore helped to balance out personal biases since it was possible to compare results from the textual analysis with interviews giving accounts of EU news production.

Connected to concerns about researchers' biases are concerns about reliability of CDA studies. Reliability can be achieved when another researcher, at another time with the same data comes to the same conclusions. As CDA is subjective by nature and depends on an individual researcher's interpretation this is a major criticism of the methodology and cannot be entirely resolved. Another researcher at another time and place may find herself within a different network of discourses and social practices, which guide the analysis. One way to reduce this limitation of CDA is by outlining the research process (as below). Perfect replicability may still not be possible but interpersonal traceability is achievable (Meyen *et al.*, 2011). This reassures

that the research community can make sense of the results and put them into context. Additionally, the codebook used here (see Appendix A) safeguards validity and reliability of analysis. It not only accounts for the analytical steps taken, but also makes it possible to test consistency of coding (see 3.5.6).

In the past, CDA researchers tried to minimise those limitations by triangulating tools of micro-analysis of language – most commonly used in CDA – with other analytical tools (for example Hardt-Mautner, 1995). Similarly, I used a variety of text analytical methods, combining more interpretative approaches to micro-analysis of language with tools such as content analysis which requires less personal interpretation. As explained below, this thesis uses a codebook for content and frame analysis, which allows for systematic analysis. The textual analysis is contextualised through interviews in order to maximise reliability of findings.

### **3.3. CDA in comparison to other text analytical approaches**

Mass media have received much attention from academic research as they are ‘crucial presenters of culture, politics and social life, shaping as well as reflecting how they are formed and expressed’ (Bell, 1995, p. 23). This interest has subsequently led to the development of diverse text analytical approaches for empirical inquiry in different academic fields, of which CDA research is only one. These approaches can be broadly distinguished into two subject areas: linguistic approaches and social scientific approaches, which are discussed in the following sections.

#### **3.3.1. *Linguistic approaches to media text analysis***

Semiotics derives from structural linguistics, going back to de Saussure (Deacon *et al.*, 2007). It is interested in how a text’s structure determines its function. The fundamental structural component in this analysis is the sign, which consists of a material signifier and immaterial signified. The material signifier can be a word, or a non-linguistic meaning making symbol (see for example Barthes, 1972). Due to conventions, the signifier is linked to a more abstract idea, the signified. Two types of signification are distinguished: denotation and connotation. Denotation is the more direct, immediate form of signification, the manifest content of a sign. Connotation refers to the indirect, latent meaning of a sign and connects to social myths, a social consensus of what has been established as the truth. Those meanings can change over time and signs can be interpreted differently by different people. Semiotic theory questions the railway model of communication which assumes that messages from a sender will reach the addressee unchanged (Gripsrud, 2006), an insight which has informed CDA approaches (Deacon *et al.*, 2007). However, semiotics focuses on the discrepancy between connotation and denotation rather than the dialectical relationship between social structures and

language. CDA provides appropriate tools to investigate the relationship between language and social structure.

Corpus Linguistics (CL) is another linguistic approach to text analysis, but more quantitative and less interpretative compared to semiotics. Usually supported by computer programs, large corpora, bodies of written text or transcribed speech (Kennedy, 1998, p. 1), are analysed for a reliable, frequency-based description of natural language (McEnery and Wilson, 2001). Within a corpus, the occurrence of certain, pre-defined terms can be analysed. Words in the immediate context of these terms, concordances, can be indexed and collocations – groups of words which go together frequently – established. This form of linguistic analysis and description has advantages in terms of reliability and replicability and has in fact been used to investigate usage of metaphors in the representation of the EU (Musloff, 2004; Musloff, 2006). However, CL is not sensitive to the impact of less frequent concordances. It also makes it difficult to discover emerging frames and patterns beyond the predefined set of terms and to establish the topical scope of EU coverage. While CL can be incorporated into a CDA framework (see for example Hardt-Mautner, 1995), CL itself is not so much interested in the interplay between social structures and language.

Conversation Analysis (CA) is a further linguistic approach first utilised to describe and interpret everyday conversations but the method has been extended to institutional talk, including news (Goodwin and Heritage, 1990). It focuses on sequences in interactions, ‘real-time orientations to the preferential practices that underlie, for participants and consequently also for the analyst, the conversational behaviours of turn-taking and repair in different speech exchange systems’ (Markee, 2000, p. 21). However, as it is concerned with micro-analysis of spoken language, only broadcasted news could be included in the analysis, which makes this methodological approach unsuitable for the sample in this thesis.

### ***3.3.2. Text analytical methods deriving from social sciences or cultural studies***

Besides linguistics, social sciences and cultural studies have developed approaches to text analysis. Grounded theory (GT) has been developed in sociology and extended to communication research. GT can be distinguished from most other approaches to text analysis by its specific research focus, which lies on the exploration of data and the development of theories, not on testing existing theories and hypotheses (Titscher *et al.*, 2000). This allows for full openness to emerging phenomena in the investigated texts. Like CDA, GT does not describe a certain method of text analysis but rather a research programme, which shares a number of theoretical assumptions, for example the recognition of everyday knowledge as an ‘indispensable resource’ (Titscher *et al.*, 2000, p. 75) for the scientific process. While GT would

lead to an in-depth description of the sampled data, it is not the aim of this thesis to postulate a completely new theory of news production but rather to use existing social theories in the field of journalism to explain the links between text, production and social context.

Commonly associated with the study of fictional texts, narrative analysis is also applied to news texts. It focuses on the narrative structure of texts (Bell, 1995; Bell, 1998; Gillespie, 2006). Narratives, stories that take place in time (Berger, 1997, p. 6), are assumed to be omnipresent in social life and the means through which we gain and pass on knowledge. Narrative analysis aids to understand how news stories are constructed by their authors and interpreted by the audience (Patton, 2002). Bell (1998) provides a framework for analysis which is tailored to the specific narrative structure of news stories, the ‘what’, ‘who’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘why’ and ‘how’. Mapping out the structural composition of news stories is, however, a complex endeavour, which is unsuitable for large data sets, like the one in this thesis. While it could be applied to a subset of the sample, the research interest of this thesis is preoccupied with linguistic components rather than structural characteristics of texts and their contribution to framing and wider discourses, not how the audience may interpret them. Frame analysis integrated in a CDA framework (see below) already provides an overview of the aspects highlighted in coverage of the EU, a structural component of news stories. It is questionable, whether narrative analysis would add much to the analysis.

A more common approach is content analysis, which has become a mainstream methodology and is used in a variety of disciplines (Van Dijk, 1985; Neuendorf, 2002; Krippendorff, 2004). Some scholars even describe it as the only valid and reliable method for assessing communication content (Riffe *et al.*, 2014). Content analysis is a useful method to establish the scope of EU coverage, while frame analysis - as a particular form of content analysis - is suitable for investigating the valence of coverage (see below for a description of method). Both are interested in manifest and latent content features and provide tools to document those. However, on its own, content analysis lacks the theoretical and methodological tools to link textual patterns to social structures, or to recognise the role of language in discourse. These approaches can therefore make no claims about the role of language in media discourse. While they may map content features of a sample, they are not equipped to demonstrate how content features link to other discourses and the social structures of their production (see 3.5 for more detail on content and frame analysis).

Despite apparent differences, I argue that in order to answer my research questions, CDA and content analysis can be successfully combined without contradicting each other, but rather contribute to overcoming limitations of both approaches. Working within a broader framework

developed by Norman Fairclough (1995) and committing to a CDA perspective on discourse, I outline an analytical approach below.

### **3.4. CDA in practice: adaptation of the Dialectic-Relational Approach after Fairclough**

CDA is an umbrella term for different but related approaches, which provides the theoretical underpinning to CDA studies (Van Dijk, 2016). Within this research programme, three more specific, influential approaches have developed: the discourse-historical approach (Wodak, 2001), the socio-cognitive approach (Van Dijk, 1993; Van Dijk, 2016) and the dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1995; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, 2003). This thesis uses an adaptation of Fairclough's approach since it is most suited to answer the research questions as the following section explains.

The socio-cognitive approach focuses on the cognitive mediation between discourse and society (Van Dijk, 2016). This approach postulates that only through a mental representation, can humans interpret and relate discourses to structures. While analysis of this 'mental interface' is fascinating, it is not a central research interest of this thesis, which is more concerned with the reproduction of discourse through social structures, particularly in news organisations.

The discourse-historical approach (DHA) is mainly concerned with the evolution of discourses. It integrates extensive background knowledge and diverse historical sources into the analysis of discursive events (Wodak, 2001). Some of its techniques – such as triangulation – are useful for this thesis as well. However, again, the central research interest is not the historical development and changes of discourse but rather the (re-)production of discourses through the media system and sociocultural practices with regard to the EU.

Fairclough's approach provides the most suitable theoretical framework for this thesis, especially in the version published in 1995, since it focuses in particular on practices of production in relation to discourse. The different elements of the framework are dialectical in a sense that they are distinct but not discrete. In the case of this thesis, the discursive element – news texts – is related to discursive and non-discursive elements of news coverage, such as the author's position in the news organisation, their relationship to sources, organisational structures or their own attitudes towards the EU.

Within the dialectical-relational framework, the focus is on exactly these relations between discursive and non-discursive moments of social practice in order to establish how discourse figures in the establishment, reproduction and change of unequal power relations (Fairclough, 2010). On the one hand, practices are always partly discursive. For example, the position of a news article is negotiated in the newsroom through discussions but this decision can also have

non-discursive elements, such as the technical limitation of space within the newspaper. On the other hand, practices are also discursively represented. For example, the UK government's position in EU summits can be discursively represented in news texts. Since discourses in this configuration sustain or challenge domination within practice, they are ideological, but not an ideology of themselves (Schirato *et al.*, 2012).

The aim of Fairclough's (1995, p. 2) analysis is to 'map three separate forms of analysis onto one another: analysis of (spoken and written) language texts, analysis of discourse practice (processes of text production, distribution and consumption<sup>2</sup>) and analysis of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice.' On the first level, different analytical tools will be used to uncover patterns of representations of the EU in British news coverage. These range from more quantitative tools like content analysis to tools more commonly associated with CDA, such as intertextuality (see below).

Analysis of processes of text production focuses less on the composition of individual texts with regard to authors' creativity, and more on the broader dynamics in the newsroom which impact on the patterns found in the data. These could constitute obstacles to tackle the problems identified in the textual analysis. The main focus of Fairclough's framework is a dialectical relationship between discourses and other elements of social practice, material activity, social relations and processes, as well as mental phenomena. The interplay between discourses, interdiscursivity, is given particular attention. This thesis maintains the idea that discourse is only one element of social practice, which stands in relation to – is internalised and internalises – other elements. While interdiscursivity is addressed throughout the analysis chapters, this thesis puts a stronger emphasis on the social relations and processes text producers are embedded in. This means a move away from the texts themselves and, instead, an analysis of the relationship between the patterns found in texts and the social structures which contributed to their construction. While this deviates slightly from the original framework proposed by Fairclough, it adds to the originality of this thesis since production processes outside of interdiscursivity have not been given much attention in critical discourse studies.

Both the textual analysis and analysis of text production are connected to an analysis of sociocultural practices. The thesis draws, in particular, upon dominant interpretations of British and European history. By combining analysis of empirical data with an analysis of sociocultural practices, the discursive resources available to journalists and other media professionals, it is possible to uncover 'relatively stabilized configuration of discourse practices' (Fairclough, 1995, p. 2), called orders of discourse, which follows certain, at times unconscious,

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<sup>2</sup> Due to the focus of the thesis audience reception will not be discussed in detail.

conventions, ‘rules of formation’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 42). An order of discourse is a potential which every discourse selectively draws upon and dialectically reworks (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 58). Analysis below shows that the order of discourse about the EU is intimately linked to perceptions of Britishness, which are restricting the ways in which news coverage can approach the EU as a topic.

### **3.5. Analytical tools: contribution of content and frame analysis to CDA**

#### **3.5.1. Content analysis**

Different scholars have different emphases, use various theoretical concepts as frameworks and employ different analytical tools. Therefore, within the broad intellectual framework of CDA, a researcher can adapt the concrete methods of text analysis to their specific research interest and triangulate different methods. Fairclough himself opens his approach to various analytical tools. This lack of a common methodological approach makes it difficult to, firstly, compare CDA studies, and secondly, begin a new analysis as guidelines about how to conduct it are often missing. However, this openness with regard to methods allows for adaptation to the needs of the research project and interdisciplinary approaches. The next section will explore the different analytical tools used in this thesis.

The sample for this thesis is large (see below). Analysis on the one hand needs to ensure that key topics are uncovered, while on the other hand do so in an efficient manner. Qualitative content analysis proves most suitable for this task. While providing an overview and answering questions about the scope of coverage, it also enhances reliability.

Content analysis is traditionally defined as ‘a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). Manifest content refers to meaning that can be directly read off a text. It implies that senders, receivers and researchers share the same understanding of the content. Analysis of only manifest meanings of texts therefore often results in frequency counts, for example how often political parties were mentioned in a sample of texts (Mayring, 2004).

Lasswell (1965) claimed that only quantitative measurement of texts’ content can be regarded as scientific, and that an interpretative approach lacks reliability. This view is now less common, as no content analysis can ever be completely quantitative. Reading itself is a qualitative process, even when computers analyse the sampled texts. After all, their algorithms have been developed by humans and are qualitative in their nature (Krippendorff, 2004). Texts have no ‘reader-independent qualities’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 22). Only when a reader engages with a text does it become meaningful (Fiske, 1990). Considering the complexity of meaning-making and the influence of context in which texts are being read and interpreted, content



analysis looking for strictly manifest meanings will find mainly trivial and insignificant results (Krippendorff, 2004). Contemporary content analysis acknowledges these shortcomings of the original methodological conception and includes latent meanings, which necessitate a more interpretative approach to content analysis.

Content analysis is therefore more aptly defined as ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 18). In this approach, it is not a quantitative measure of manifest, unambiguous content but a clear outline of methodological procedure, theoretical foundation and analytical steps, which ensures reliability and validity. Due to limited time and resources, samples investigated by any type of content analysis are usually not representative for a general phenomenon in all media. Reasoned sampling, however, allows for careful generalisation (Gilens, 1996).

### ***3.5.2. Operationalisation of ‘key topics’***

This thesis uses content analysis to establish the scope and focus of British EU news coverage. While content analysis is not the most suitable method to investigate micro-level characteristics of a text, such as rhetoric, it nevertheless helps to make CDA more systematic and to contextualise results from micro-analysis.

Content analysis uncovers several content features of the sample: the main news event triggering coverage, the EU policy areas mentioned directly or indirectly in the texts and frames (more specifically investigated using frame analysis, see below).

Coding of news stories gives an overview of EU-related events which occurred during the data collection periods. It also puts other findings, for example on frames, into context and provides a sense of priorities in the newsroom. Three broad codes initially structured coding for news events: *Home News*, *International News* and *Economy and Business News*. Soon, however, the need for a separate category for *news closely linked to the EU* emerged because EU-level news do not fit neatly either into the categories of *Home* or *International News*.

These four nodes (the name given in NVivo to codes) constitute the hypernyms. Inductively, hyponyms have been identified and added as sub-categories (child nodes) in NVivo. Naturally, some events, such as the European Parliament Election, trigger more reporting than others, which led to the introduction of a specific child node for this news event. Other events only lead to the publication of one or two articles across all sampled media. If only appearing once in the data, a news event is subsumed under an ‘Other’ code within the respective category.

| Analytical category | Nodes (hypernyms)  | Child-nodes (hyponyms)   |
|---------------------|--|--|
| <b>News event</b>   | Business News, Economy, Finance  | News events centred around banking and central banking (not ECB), the British economy, international markets, and news about corporation and businesses such as the proposed merger of Pfizer and Astra Zeneca                                     |
|                     | Events closely linked to the EU  | News events such as CJEU rulings, introduction of new regulations and laws at the EU-level, European elections and their results (apart from UK results), the response to the refugee crisis and the Greek debt crisis                             |
|                     | Home News  | Includes both political and non-political home news. Non-political home news includes events such as crime and the royal family. Political home news include election campaigns and results, personal stories about politicians, etc.              |
|                     | International News   | Specific events here are varied, and include events such as the Ukraine crisis or the Iran Nuclear deal  |
| <b>Policy area</b>  | Includes policy areas as stated in John <i>et al.</i> (2013) with additions (see Appendix A) | Refining different aspects of policy areas; for example with regard to immigration policy, child nodes distinguish between policies related to freedom of movement of people within the EU and policies regulating immigration from outside the EU |
| <b>Frame</b>        | EU as a Bargaining Forum/Horse-trading   | On cultural, economic and political level  |
|                     | UK makes a difference in the EU, can influence decision-making                               | On cultural, economic and political level; also coded whether EU is taking the UK's side in a conflict or negotiation  |
|                     | Deficiencies of the EU status quo  | Distinguish whether need for reform is emphasised or the incompetence/dysfunctionality of EU and EU actors; again differentiates cultural, economic and political level  |
|                     | EU is competent  | On cultural, economic and political level  |
|                     | EU is a source of conflict or crisis   | On cultural (or social), economic and political level; differentiates further between domestic conflicts/crises in individual member states or internationally   |
|                     | EU is a force for good   | On cultural, economic and political level  |
|                     | EU is important  | On cultural, economic and political level; further coded whether importance for British national interest is highlighted   |
|                     | EU is not important/insignificant  | On cultural, economic and political level  |
|                     | EU is separate from the UK or vice versa   | On cultural, economic and political level  |
|                     | EU is a threat   | On cultural, economic and political level; further differentiated whether threat is directed at UK or others   |

Table 1 Overview of analytical categories, nodes and child-nodes

Items are coded according to the type of event rather than the newspaper section it is covered in. Only one news event per item is coded. In most cases, the news event is clear. In some ambiguous cases, personal interpretation is more important to determine the main news event. Table 1 provides a one-page overview of analytical categories for content (and frame) analysis, as well as the codes and more refined sub-codes (see also Appendix A for full codebook). EU policy areas constitute a second analytical category, which captures the scope and focus of coverage. The coding scheme is based on categories from John *et al.* (2013) and Norris (2000). It indicates which areas of EU action receive attention in British coverage and which do not by measuring attention to ‘certain topics of public policy rather than ascertains their left-right positions in relation to those issues’ (John *et al.*, 2013). This is useful, since British attitudes towards the EU in the UK do not neatly correspond with left-right positions (Balch and Balbanova, 2017).

The original list of policy areas is fairly detailed but during analysis, it became clear that it could not sufficiently capture intricacies of the sample, for example differences between immigration from outside the EU and freedom of movement, or the process of disintegration of the European Union in the form of the UK’s withdrawal. Codes were adapted and added accordingly. In contrast to news events, more than one policy area could be coded per unit of analysis.

### **3.5.3. Frame analysis**

Frame analysis, as a particular type of qualitative content analysis, helps to uncover the themes which connect the ‘different semantic elements of the news stories into a coherent whole’ (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 58). The concept of ‘frame’ is challenging due to its varied definitions and applications in different fields such as sociology, psychology and media effects research (Entman, 1993; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011; Blumler, 2015). They do share, however, the underlying assumption that cognitive representations are structured and that individuals use frames as schemata for interpretation to make sense of the world (Goffman, 1974; Pan and Kosicki, 1993).

Consequently, framing can be ‘studied as a strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse itself’ (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 57). It postulates that all actors – which includes journalists, audiences, sources, and so on – are engaged in the process of framing ‘based on their socially defined roles and are linked to one another by the news discourse that they design, construct, transmit, and act on’ (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 57). Media frames can be conceptualised as cognitive devices used not only for information encoding (constructing news discourse), but also for interpreting and retrieving

(processing). This thesis focuses predominantly on the former, tracing media frames in coverage and relating results to production processes, and does not empirically investigate the latter.

The notion of power, which is significant in CDA research, has to be considered in frame analysis as well. A variety of social actors try to access and influence news production. Politicians of different parties, journalists, and members of other interest groups, compete over news frames. They differ in their success. Therefore, ‘the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power’ (Entman, 1993, p. 55).

Additionally, framing theory rests on similar assumptions to those of CDA. It views texts as vehicles for meaning construction which relies on the one hand on symbolic devices in the text and, on the other, on agents’ individual memories (Pan and Kosicki, 1993). These meaning constructions are, in turn, linked to social practices and power relations (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011, p. 112).

The dialectical-relational approach to CDA is particularly interested in the relation between semiosis (meaning-making) and other social structures (Fairclough, 2016). In this case, it refers to media discourse and journalistic practices. Frame analysis provides a useful analytical category here to link the two. It furthermore adds validity to the CDA framework since it is grounded in systematic procedures of gathering data and identifying signifying elements in the text (Pan and Kosicki, 1993). Consequently, a codebook was set up before coding started and, then, expanded in the process of coding.

To ground the codes theoretically, the concept of frame needs to be defined and operationalised. The classic definition stems from Entman (1993, p. 52; italics in original): framing is to ‘*select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described’. It describes the process or contextual features of news making and receiving (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011).

A frame is a lens through which an issue or story is explored. This lens magnifies certain aspects of the story, thereby giving them more importance for the audience. They guide the audience’s interpretation by prioritising, omitting and linking different elements of a text into a coherent story (Entman, 1993).

According to Bateson (1955), statements themselves do not have intrinsic meaning; they only acquire those in a frame which is constituted by context and style. Erving Goffman (1974, p. 24) elaborates on this, suggesting that meanings arise in processes of interaction, interpretation and contextualization, which results in ‘social frameworks’. These social

frameworks ‘determine what is relevant and irrelevant when considering certain actors, issues or events, and suggest appropriate behaviour’ (Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011, p. 103). CDA research rests on similar assumptions, making the approaches compatible.

#### **3.5.4. Operationalisation of frames**

Previous research on EU media coverage has operationalised frames in different ways and used inductive, deductive, quantitative and qualitative approaches (see 2.2.2 and 2.3 on previous research and Appendix B for overview). Operationalisation ranges from stylistic and narrative features of texts to ideological ones.

In this thesis, there is no space to re-conceptualise frames and framing and to develop a completely comprehensive frame analysis taking into account all aspects covered in previous research (see 2.2.2 and 2.3). However, I have developed an analytical tool which allows for a coherent discussion within the thesis and which can be applied to other data sets of EU coverage.

Previous analyses of frames in the coverage of the EU and EU-related issues provided a starting point for the coding system. This preliminary coding scheme makes analysis of different items and samples more comparable. However, coding was not entirely deductive, but allowed frames to emerge from sampled texts (see 3.6.3). The initial codes were also refined during the coding process. As the sampled data is particular for a specific time period, codes from previous research cannot capture the frames in the thesis’ sample comprehensively. A detailed codebook with examples of coding are attached in Appendix A, and an overview of previous research can be found in Appendix B, Table 39.

Frames in this thesis are treated as content-related rather than structural thereby transcending the strictly manifest meanings of a text. Structural elements such as linguistic features or interdiscursivity, are analysed regarding their role in the process of framing. Coding of frames, however, is based on the (latent) content of news items, its semantic dimensions, not on their structural characteristics.

In earlier works about frames and framing (see for example Goffman, 1974; Vliegenhardt *et al.*, 2008), the possibility of multiple, intersecting frames is acknowledged. They are not seen as mutually exclusive. I will hold on to this notion of intersecting frames: one unit of analysis and even one passage of texts can be coded several times with regard to frames.

#### **3.5.5. Micro-analysis of language**

The overview of CDA and its aims highlight the role of language in society, as a means through which power relations are (re)produced. As Bhaskar (1979) notes, social structures cannot be reproduced without human activity – and texts are the semiotic element of human

activity or social practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2016) – but this human activity is also constrained by social structures. This means that language is restricted due to its position within particular social structures which at the same time it helps to reproduce (Bhaskar, 1979; Harré and Bhaskar, 2005). Consequently, language also (re)produces and reflects ideology. Because language is part of a shared, but not necessarily conscious, lifeworld, participants of discursive events struggle to distance themselves from language and its inherent ideology (Habermas, 1985).

According to Fairclough (1995, p. 2) a range of properties of texts can be regarded ‘as potentially ideological, including features of vocabulary and metaphors, grammar, presuppositions and implicatures, politeness conventions, speech-exchange (turn-taking) systems, generic structure, and style’. While these features are interesting, they are not all relevant for this thesis. For example, multimodal features are not investigated, since the thesis is specifically concerned with the role of language use. Instead, particular grammatical and rhetorical features are chosen which help to answer the research questions.

This thesis understands the study of rhetoric as the study of persuasive communication (Arnold, 1974; Stokowski, 2013). Analysis typically includes an analysis of structural organisation of arguments, the kinds of arguments and claims made, as well as stylistic features which are employed to make an argument more persuasive (Arnold, 1974). Rhetorical analysis in this thesis is particularly interested in the latter. It does not set out to prove the persuasiveness of arguments but rather their potential for persuasiveness. It is focused on rhetorical figures, which feed into particular arguments and claims as discovered through frame analysis. Analysis of grammatical features, intertextuality and interdiscursivity addresses the structural organisation of frames. Respective language features under investigation are explained alongside the analysis to make them more tangible and to avoid repetition.

Micro-analysis of different aspects of language use is underpinned by systemic-functional linguistics (SFL). According to SFL, language does not follow a set of rules but is instead a ‘network of interrelated meaningful choices’ (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 31). Language is understood to be socially structured at its core (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).

It further assumes that language has evolved according to its functions which are, firstly, making sense of our experiences (ideational metafunction), secondly, acting out social relationships (interpersonal metafunction), and, thirdly, facilitating discourse (textual metafunction). In its ideational metafunction, language construes human experience into categories, and thereby provides a theory of experience (Halliday, 1978; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). In its interpersonal function, language enacts human relationships. Language itself becomes an action. The textual metafunction of grammar is to facilitate and

enable the construction of coherent texts, which can combine the ideational and interpersonal metafunction.

This understanding of grammar is particularly useful for CDA since it shares the conception of language as a social semiotic, of language as inextricably linked to its social functions, to the situational and cultural context. SFL does not regard grammar as a finite set of rules but instead sees it as an ever-expanding network of choices, which depend on context. In contrast, Chomsky's (1986) influential theory of a universal grammar regards grammar as an autonomous system, removed from social context.

SFL furthermore corresponds well with critical realism. Grammar in SFL is regarded as limiting speech acts but it cannot determine them, in the same way as social structures limit but do not determine human action (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 45). By using grammar, speakers can maintain or change an existing system, just as actors can maintain or change the existing social structures within which they act (Collier, 1994).

### ***3.5.6. Reliability and validity of coding***

The previous sections highlighted the appropriateness of CDA and different analytical tools for this thesis. However, CDA has been criticised for its limitations with regard to reliability and validity (see above). Self-reflexivity is one way to ensure that personal ideology and – in case of this thesis – personal experiences as an EU citizen in post-referendum Britain do not impact negatively on the study's rigour. I have taken further steps to ensure rigour, reliability and validity.

Firstly, this study includes a cross-selection of news outlets and a larger sample than most CDA studies. Overall, more than 1.6 million words, in 2295 items, were coded. This ensures that cherry-picking is avoided and a variety of different sources are included in the sample. Although the sample focuses on two particular events (see 3.6), this large sample nevertheless makes it possible to detect broader trends in the news coverage.

Secondly, the codebook for news events, policy areas and frames has been developed using both the data at hand and previous research. Coding of grammatical and rhetorical features of the text is based on analytical tools grounded in SFL and developed by CDA researchers such as Fairclough (2003) and Van Leeuwen (1996).

This mix of deductive and inductive coding ensures on the one hand, that the codebook considers the particularities of the sample at hand and, on the other, that analysis is comparable with previous studies. The developed codebook can also be used to analyse new data sets since it is grounded in research and tailored specifically to the British case.

Thirdly, several measures safeguarded reliability of my coding. I discussed the codebook with my supervisors and provided them with examples of my coding to check whether there was agreement over the application of codes. Once the sample was coded, I returned to the data and checked each text reference for consistency. Flawed coding was subsequently corrected. This process of re-coding reduced inconsistency and ensured reliability within the constraints of being a lone researcher.

### **3.6. Sampling**

#### ***3.6.1. Sampling of news outlets***

The sample includes five different newspapers and two TV news programmes which were varied enough to ensure diversity in the sample and to capture different varieties of news coverage characteristic of the British mass media landscape. The newspapers included in this sample are among the top ten best-selling UK newspapers. While newspaper circulation numbers are in decline, they are still important for decision-makers regarding agenda-setting (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Blumler, 2015) as well as readers to inform themselves about the EU (European Commission, 2014b).

Furthermore, the sample covers different formats of newspapers, including broadsheets, tabloids and a mid-market newspaper (see Table 2). They are also carefully selected with regard to partisanship and ownership to provide a diverse sample, which reflects right- and left-wing views as well as different proprietor models. While the sample of newspapers is slightly skewed towards the centre-right of the political spectrum, thereby reflecting a general trend in the British newspaper market (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Greenslade, 2003), they are all owned by different proprietors. *The Telegraph* rather than *The Times* is included to avoid a dominance of News Group newspapers in the sample.

The sample includes daily editions as well as Sunday editions of the respective newspapers. Generally, these will be broadly referred to by the name of the daily edition but specific differences between weekday and Sunday editions will be highlighted in the analysis where appropriate.

For broadcast news, *Channel 4 News* and *BBC News at Ten*, as the two flagship news programmes for each channel have been chosen<sup>3</sup>. While they are both public service broadcasters, they differ in their funding model (see section 7.2). They also differ regarding format, with *BBC News at Ten* following a traditional bullet style news broadcast and *Channel 4 News* using a one-hour long news format, which includes longer and more in-depth coverage of events, more interviews and coverage of more marginal events.

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<sup>3</sup> They will also be referred to as *BBC* and *Channel 4* throughout the thesis.



| <b>Newspaper</b>           | <b>Circulation in June 2014 (The Guardian, 2014)</b> | <b>Format</b> | <b>Political orientation</b> | <b>Proprietor</b>  |
|----------------------------|--|---------------|------------------------------|--|
| <b>The Sun</b>             | 2,033,606  | Tabloid       | Centre-right                 | News Corporation (Rupert Murdoch)                                |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>          | 1,673,579  | Mid-market    | Centre-right                 | Daily Mail and General Trust plc (Chairman: Jonathan Harmsworth) |
| <b>The Mirror</b>          | 958,674  | Tabloid       | Centre-left                  | Trinity Mirror (public owner)                                    |
| <b>The Daily Telegraph</b> | 514,592  | Broadsheet    | Centre-right                 | Telegraph Media Group (David and Frederick Barclay)              |
| <b>The Guardian</b>        | 185,313  | Broadsheet    | Centre-left                  | Guardian Media Trust (public owner)                              |

*Table 2 Overview of newspapers included in the sample*

This research project will not deal with online news outlets for practical as well as theoretical reasons. Television news and newspapers were still more likely to be used as source of information about the EU in Britain than online sources (European Commission, 2014b). This gives a theoretical reason to focus on the two more traditional forms of mass media. Moreover, production processes of online media differ significantly from production processes in traditional media outlets. They are not as restricted with regard to column inches and airtime but can publish as much material as desired. Furthermore, funding models take very different forms with targeted advertising having a much greater role. In addition, consumers can engage in online media much more easily by commenting on social media posts, sharing and liking them, or by commenting on relevant news websites and blogs. Their reactions are much more visible and may influence other consumers' perception of the posts and articles. In traditional mass media formats, consumer engagement is much more limited to, for example, letters to the editor, and reactions hidden from other consumers. These differences make it questionable to compare practices of production within the same framework from a theoretical perspective, since producers in offline and online media formats are under different types of pressures.

On a practical level, sampling is challenging. Online audiences are selective in their choice of website (Williamson *et al.*, 2012). People gather information from varied sources which are difficult to identify and sample representatively. Furthermore, online sources can change very

quickly so that not all readers will receive the same message. Of course, newspapers publish several editions per day, which vary to some extent, however, seldom so substantially.

Data gathering is limited to particular sections of the newspaper. Supplements, advertisements, obituaries, feuillets, sports and clearly marked features, such as the *Guardian* Long Read or travel and lifestyle features,<sup>4</sup> are excluded because not all outlets in the sample cover all of these sections, making comparisons difficult. Letters to the editor are also excluded. Although the EU is mentioned here and some editorial decisions are made about their inclusion, these are not as integrated into the processes of production as the other items included. Newspaper data is consequently collected from four sections: News (Home and International), Business/City News/Money, and Opinion/Columns/Editorial.<sup>5</sup>

Broadcast news were recorded each day of the collection or downloaded from Box of Broadcasts<sup>6</sup>. Relevant news items were then transcribed and transcriptions loaded into NVivo for analysis. Newspapers were read in full and relevant articles picked for analysis. To save time and to make analysis in NVivo more convenient, the articles were downloaded from LexisNexis, instead of being scanned or typed out. In case of discrepancies between the LexisNexis and the hardcopy versions, the LexisNexis version was amended to the hardcopy version. This was particularly necessary in the second collection period for *Guardian* items since LexisNexis only held the online version of articles.

### ***3.6.2. Sampling of relevant articles and broadcast items***

The first data collection period took place from 8 May 2014 to 29 May 2014, because research suggests that the European Union attracts more attention around central events, such as European Elections (Norris, 2000). This period includes two weeks before the European Elections and the week after. European Elections are second order elections which do not receive the same attention as General Elections (Butler and Westlake, 2005). Because it was expected to feature only rarely until immediately before the elections, the two-week period in the run-up to them was sufficient to capture the main characteristics of election campaigns. The week after both elections was included to observe how the EU is covered in the aftermath of the elections, and whether trends in coverage changed in the immediate aftermath.

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<sup>4</sup> Feature-style pieces published in news sections are included as well. While the writing style may differ slightly, news reports and feature-style articles could not be neatly distinguished.

<sup>5</sup> Some items did not neatly fit into those three categories, especially due to more detailed differentiation at the broadsheets. These were also classified with regard to the three categories above, depending on which section they were closest to. For example, articles published in the *Guardian*'s Law section were classified as News.

<sup>6</sup> Box of Broadcasts can be accessed using the following links through university libraries with the appropriate subscription: <https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand>

The second data collection wave took place from 30 March 2015 to 14 May 2015. This period includes the short election campaign in the run-up to the 2015 General Election as well as the week following the elections. The longer period ensures that a sufficient volume of EU coverage is captured, since it was expected that the EU as an issue would feature less prominently in a national election campaign. A longer period also captures different aspects of the debate, not only the most prominent ones in the campaign, such as immigration. Comparisons between the two periods are not a focus of this thesis, but rather the identification of broader trends. Therefore, the different length of collection periods is justifiable.

Inclusion of data from a general election benefits the study. Previous research is focused on EU-level events such as the European Parliament election. However, David Cameron's election promise of a referendum on EU membership as well as issues surrounding EU migration put the EU on the news outlets' agendas. This was an important factor in the choice of this data collection period.

| <b>Criteria for inclusion in sample</b>  | <b>Criteria for exclusion from sample</b>  |
|--|--|
| Mentioning EU policies and politics, EU institutions and politicians, or events at EU level  | Mentioning 'Europe' but not relating to EU; e.g. referring to geographical area, or historical events before establishment of EU and predecessors, such as VE Day celebrations   |
| Mentioning of either of the above in the headline or introductory statement by news presenter  | Mentioning EU or EU member states only as reference point in rankings  |
| Mentioning British relationship with EU (also British actors' position on EU)  | Mentioning EU-level events only as a reference point for other events, without relating them to each other   |
| Issues touching upon EU policies, politics, institutions, politicians or events even if they are not explicitly mentioned, such as immigration from EU member states | Mentioning UK actors who also have a role within EU, but this position is irrelevant; e.g. allegations of homophobia against Ukip MEPs   |
| Mentioning European Court of Human Rights and Council of Europe  | Mentioning parties or politicians, both domestic and from other countries, without referring to their position on the EU or EU-related issues; e.g. discussion of Liberal Democrats' 2014 election results without mentioning their policies towards the EU. |

*Table 3 Sampling criteria for news stories and articles*

Eligible items for analysis were chosen from the newspapers and TV news programmes collected during these two periods (8 May – 29 May 2014 and 30 March – 14 May 2015). In newspapers, each eligible article is treated as a unit of analysis, in television news each news story. A news story can be described as a semantic entity with at least one topic delimited from another story by change of topic (Peter and de Vreese, 2004). Accordingly, one news story might consist of different sections, such as an introduction by the presenter, a short film and an interview.<sup>7</sup>

Sampling of articles and news stories broadly followed Peter and de Vreese's (2004) criteria (see Table 3). Stories which address EU policies and politics, EU institutions and politicians, or events at EU level are included. This encompasses stories not directly naming but dealing with obvious EU issues, such as EU enlargement or the Common Agricultural Policy. However, it can also include stories which are not inherently associated with the EU, for example immigration or defence, as long as EU policies, institutions or politicians are essential components of the story. The sample also includes items discussing the British relationship with the EU.

However, this rationale for selection could not resolve all issues. For example, news stories often represent the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as an EU institution, despite the fact that it is independent from the EU. There seems to be little awareness of this differentiation which means that coverage of the ECHR might be, by audiences as well as authors, interpreted as coverage of the EU. In his Bloomberg Speech, Prime Minister David Cameron even mentions this common mix-up, acknowledging that much of the frustration with the EU should in fact be directed to the ECHR (Cameron, 2013). Keeping this in mind, stories dealing mainly with the ECHR have been included in the sample. Furthermore, if the EU is mentioned in the headline, the story will be included in the sample (see below). To ensure that only items are included which are relevant to the research interest, several types of items were excluded (see Table 3).

This process resulted in a large sample as presented in Table 4. In total, the sample amounts to more than 1.6 million words. These were subject to content analysis, as described above. For more in-depth analysis, however, a subsample needed to be chosen in order to make it manageable (see below).

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<sup>7</sup> Units of analysis will be referred to as items throughout the thesis.

|   | <b>EP Elections Data Collection (8 May – 29 May 2014)</b> | <b>General Election Data Collection (30 March – 14 May 2015)</b> |
|---|---|--|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>                  | 37  | 65   |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>                   | 40  | 60   |
| <b>Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday</b>        | 141   | 286  |
| <b>Guardian/Observer</b>                | 203   | 470  |
| <b>Mirror/Sunday Mirror</b>             | 71  | 76   |
| <b>Sun/Sun on Sunday</b>                | 102   | 103  |
| <b>Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph</b> | 217   | 424  |
| <b>Total</b>                            | 811   | 1484   |

*Table 4 Total number of items selected for each data collection period*

### **3.6.3. Reducing the sample for frame and micro-analysis**

Frame analysis is more time-consuming than content analysis of news events and policy areas. Therefore, the sample needed to be reduced in size in the process of analysis. This is not necessarily restricting the significance of findings but rather ensures that repetitions are avoided while at the same time detecting the broader trends.

In order to decide which stories should be included in a framing analysis, two questions set conditions for the selection: Firstly, is the article mainly representing the EU or is the focus on something else (criteria for inclusion, see Table 5)? Secondly, will my analysis be diminished if this story is not included (criteria for exclusion, see Table 5)? For an article or news broadcast to be included in the subsample, it has to be recognisable for the reader that the story's focus is on the EU, its institutions, actors, events or policies, or British actors' position(s) regarding the EU, even if the EU is not explicitly mentioned. To achieve this selection, a set of criteria determines whether an item is included in the smaller sample for frame analysis.

When the EU is mentioned in the headline or in the introductory statement of a news presenter, it will be included in the subsample. The headline or introduction gives readers and viewers a good cue of what the story is about, in this case the EU. Even when the story has a different focus to what the headline suggests and the EU is not the main issue, readers and viewers will keep it in mind when making sense of the story and link it to it (Van Dijk, 1985, pp. 69-70). The same criteria are applied when EU actors, events, institutions, policies or similar are featured in the headline or lead.

| <b>Criteria for inclusion in subsample</b>  | <b>Criteria for exclusion from subsample</b>  |
|---|---|
| EU, EU policies, politics, institutions, events or actors mentioned in headline, lead or introductory statement by news presenter | EU or EU related issue only mentioned in one sentence and not the main topic of item (at times in short items, EU can be mentioned only once but is still main topic; then it will be included) |
| Items with main focus on EU, EU policies, politics, events, actors or institutions  | EU-related issue only mentioned for illustrative purposes or for clarification  |
| EU introduced as important electoral issue  | Mentioning ‘European’ institutions which are not EU institutions and not funded by EU (exception is ECHR which is used synonymously with EU)  |
|   | Mentioning EU(-funded) reports but reports are not referring to EU-related issues   |

*Table 5 Criteria for in- and exclusion of items for frame analysis sample*

Stories which deal specifically and prominently with the EU, its policies, events, actors or institutions are also selected for the subsample. Some of these articles or TV broadcasts focus on current affairs, for example on particular EU legislation, directives or rulings. Others try to explain how the EU works, how it has developed but also how it could be improved and reformed. A further category of stories focuses on the UK’s role within the EU, the significance of the EU for British government, business, and citizens, the UK’s position within the EU or the part the UK plays or should play in the EU. These are also included in the subsample.

If the EU is introduced as an important electoral issue, for example in order to distinguish party positions, the respective articles or broadcasts are eligible for the subsample. Similarly, articles and broadcasts about political parties, national as well as international, are sampled if their position towards the EU or specific policies, actors, or institutions is given prominent space.

If the decision was still ambiguous after applying these criteria, a second set of criteria helped to decide if they should be included or not. These criteria are summarised in Table 5 under the heading ‘criteria for exclusion’. If those criteria applied, news stories did not focus specifically on the EU, and were therefore excluded.

|   | <b>EP Elections Data Collection (8 May – 29 May 2014)</b> | <b>General Election Data Collection (30 March – 14 May 2015)</b> |
|---|---|--|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>                  | 22  | 37   |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>                   | 29  | 37   |
| <b>Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday</b>        | 87  | 140  |
| <b>Guardian/Observer</b>                | 106   | 201  |
| <b>Mirror/Sunday Mirror</b>             | 42  | 28   |
| <b>Sun/Sun on Sunday</b>                | 75  | 50   |
| <b>Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph</b> | 130   | 220  |
| <b>Total</b>                            | 491   | 713  |

*Table 6 Total number of items included in subsample for frame analysis for each data collection period*

Naturally, not all of the readers will come to the same conclusion and distinguish institutions with the adjective *European* in their name from the EU. However, judging from the data sample, these articles are rare and do not provide interesting aspects which could not be found in any of the other articles. The loss will be justifiable and makes managing the number of articles achievable. The number of items per news outlet for this sample are summarised in Table 6.

The numbers in this subsample are still too large for micro-analysis of linguistic and rhetorical features, which is particularly detailed and time consuming. Three further, small-scale subsamples are chosen based on particular events which prove particularly useful to investigate the research questions in more depth. This includes the CJEU case on the *right to be forgotten* (13 May 2014), the EU emergency summit on migration (23 April 2015) and coverage of the EU in the context of domestic election campaigns (throughout both election periods). Selection of these subsamples is described in the relevant analysis chapters. While these cases are not entirely representative of EU coverage in general, they illustrate some important features of EU coverage and explain how linguistic and rhetorical characteristics of a text links them to other discourses (interdiscursivity) and how this builds up to news frames.

### **3.7. Semi-structured, elite interviews with journalists within the dialectic-relational framework**

One of the key aims of this thesis is not only to analyse the media texts sampled and to make conclusions based on those, but also to understand why particular representations of the EU are more dominant than others. Within the dialectical-relational framework this constitutes the second and third level of analysis, discursive practices of production and consumption as well as sociocultural practices which provide interdiscursive resources for journalists. The

consumption aspect is not a main concern of the thesis. Instead, the focus lies on news production in the context of sociocultural practices with regard to the European Union in Britain and the dialectical relationship between discursive and non-discursive moments in these social practices.

To address this research interest, qualitative interviews with UK journalists as well as EU press officers were conducted. Although Hannerz (2004) concludes that interviewing media professionals can be categorised as studying sideways, interviewing them poses similar challenges to interviewing elites. Elites are those on the top of any socially significant hierarchy, which can be politics, but also sports, academia, religion or even beauty or crime (Moysen and Wagstaffe, 1987). There is no simple dichotomy of elite and non-elite. No one is removed from the effects of power in societies and all those involved in making or influencing important decisions are also affected by the decisions of others (Smith, 2006a, p. 645). Journalists constitute a professional elite since they have much greater power of access with regard to shaping public discourse about the EU. Even though not all of the interviewees are involved in high-level decision-making about a newspaper's content or editorial stance, they nevertheless are more powerful in shaping public opinion than their audiences.

### ***3.7.1. Advantages and limitations of qualitative interviews with professional elites***

While standardised questionnaires and structured interviews offer a convenient way to access a large, representative population, qualitative (semi-structured) interviews rely on smaller samples, especially when elites are the subject of the research. This is, firstly, a consequence of the reduced accessibility of those elites (see below). Secondly, interviews allow for a more in-depth investigation of an issue in comparison to surveys. Consequently, a smaller sample is more suitable in order to manage the richer, qualitative data and time-consuming transcription.

Qualitative interviews have a greater interest in the respondent's point of view than quantitative surveys (Bryman, 2008). Especially with regard to news production, this thesis requires an in-depth knowledge of the processes involved, as well as the flexibility of qualitative interviewing. It allows for ad-hoc questions to respond to salient points brought up by interviewees (Bryman, 2008). Despite the need for flexibility, semi-structured interviews are preferable to unstructured interviews in this case. A prepared interview schedule ensures that information about different influences on reporting is collected, not only those which are most obvious and important to the respondents.

Of course, interviewing has its limitations, too. All interview-based research will be influenced by the interactions and reactions between interviewer and interviewee (McCracken,



1988; Wilson, 1996). The willingness of respondents to open up depends to a large extent on positionality and power relations in the interview, in which the interviewer may set the agenda but is not always in control, particularly in elite research (Schoenberger, 1992, p. 182). This can affect validity and reliability of elite interviews (Mikecz, 2012).

Elites are usually articulate and some of them may appear more persuasive than others, which results in particular interviewees strongly shaping researchers' understanding of an issue (Ostrander, 1995; Berry, 2002). Persuasiveness, however, does not equate to truthfulness. Some elites may exaggerate their own role or repeat the organisation's official stance. As explained below, the latter was particularly concerning due to the controversial nature of EU-related issues at the time of data collection. To counter these effects, interviews are compared and contrasted with previous research within a theoretical model. Furthermore, questions are designed as to elicit truthful responses, for example by giving prompts to critique not only themselves but also others (Hertz and Imber, 1995; Berry, 2002). For example, I asked journalists to judge whether criticism of EU coverage in general is justified or prompted them to assess other news outlets' performance in covering the EU.

In addition, journalists and researchers are believed to hold fundamentally different views of news production: 'journalists often question whether outsiders without relevant media practitioner experience can truly understand the process of a newsroom and tend to view researchers as being ignorant of "real life" and guilty of academic arrogance' (Figenschou, 2010, p. 963). In order to facilitate the interview, improve rapport and decrease imbalance between researcher and researched, the interviews are preceded by thorough planning and background research about the interviewee (Zuckerman, 1972). This makes it possible to tailor research questions to the respective respondent, making the interviews more efficient, informative and focused. Showing expertise and projecting a positive image of the interviewed also helps to gain their respect and cooperation (Harvey, 2011, p. 434).

Participant observation in the different newsrooms would be an interesting additional method to meet some of the shortcomings and get an even more in-depth view of the processes involved in producing EU-related news. However, this goes beyond the scope of this thesis and it is questionable, whether access to the newsroom would have been granted considering the challenges of accessing journalists in the first place.

| <b>Name of interviewee</b> | <b>Organisation<br/>(current/past at time<br/>of interview)</b> | <b>Position of interviewee<br/>(current/past at time<br/>of interview)</b> | <b>Mode of interview</b> |
|----------------------------|---|--|--------------------------|
| <b>EU Official</b>         | European Council<br>(current)                                   | EU official (current)  | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |
| <b>EU Official</b>         | European Parliament<br>(current)                                | EU official (current)  | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |
| <b>EU Official</b>         | European Parliament<br>(current)                                | EU official (current)  | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |
| <b>EU Official</b>         | European Parliament<br>(current)                                | EU official (London;<br>current)   | Phone                    |
| <b>Alex Barker</b>         | Financial Times<br>(current)                                    | Brussels Bureau Chief<br>(current)   | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |
| <b>Jason Beattie</b>       | The Mirror (current)  | Political Editor<br>(current)  | Phone                    |
| <b>Duncan Begg</b>         | The Sun, Daily Mail,<br>Mirror, Guardian (all<br>past)          | Subeditor (past)   | Phone                    |
| <b>Pieter Cleppe</b>       | Open Europe (current)   | Head of Brussels office<br>(current)                                       | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |
| <b>Jon Henley</b>          | The Guardian (current)  | European affairs<br>correspondent (current)                                | Phone                    |
| <b>Peter Hitchens</b>      | Daily Mail (current)  | Columnist  | Phone                    |
| <b>Matthew Holehouse</b>   | Daily Telegraph<br>(current)                                    | Brussels correspondent<br>(current)  | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |
| <b>Sean Klein</b>          | BBC (past)  | Brussels Bureau Chief<br>(past)  | Face-to-face (London)    |
| <b>Mark Mardell</b>        | BBC (current)   | Europe Editor (past)   | Phone                    |
| <b>Cathy Newman</b>        | Channel 4 News<br>(current)                                     | Journalist and News<br>Presenter (current)                                 | Email                    |
| <b>John Stevens</b>        | Daily Mail (current)  | Brussels correspondent<br>(current)  | Phone                    |
| <b>Bruno Waterfield</b>    | Daily Telegraph (past)  | Brussels correspondent<br>(past/currently with The<br>Times)               | Face-to-face (Brussels)  |

*Table 7 List of interviewees, their organisational affiliation and position*

### *3.7.2. Sample and interviewing process*

Overall, interviews took place with 15 media professionals from UK news organisations and the European institutions, as well as one person working for Open Europe, a think tank highly visible in British EU coverage (see Table 7). An email established an initial contact, which included a summary of the research project and suggested potential dates and places for an interview. Email contacts were available online, either on personal social media accounts, on news organisations' websites or on specialist websites.

Once the contacted media professional agreed to an interview, I forwarded a consent form and arranged a date for the meeting. The majority of interviews were conducted via phone, one through email and the rest face-to-face either in Brussels or in London. Interviews took place between February 2016 and July 2017. At least one journalist for each of the media outlets included in this study was interviewed, although some had left these organisations by the time of the interview or left them shortly after the interview. Interviews were largely on record, but the interviewees had the possibility to go off record anytime. EU officials preferred to keep their anonymity protected.

The aim was initially to interview at least two journalists for each media outlet included in the sample. However, gaining access to elites is significantly more difficult than gaining access to other social groups. They are better equipped to protect themselves, work long hours, have tight schedules and travel frequently (Odendahl and Shaw, 2001). This was also the case for the journalists approached (but less so for EU officials). While the final sample is not representative of the whole population of media professionals contributing to the British news coverage of the EU, and relatively small, characteristic of elite research (Goldstein, 2002), the interviews are nevertheless sufficient to explain patterns found in the media texts. There does not appear to be a systematic error with regard to interviewees' attitudes towards the EU, with both pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics taking part in the study. The sample covers all sampled media organisations. During the process, it also became clear that the number of interviews was sufficient to reach a saturation point where interviewees were echoing their colleagues' answers.

Furthermore, the total population of journalists who cover the EU frequently is relatively small. While a large number of journalists contribute to the sample analysed in this thesis – 612 named authors, and 400 items without a named author (see also Appendix F) – only a few of them contribute to more than five items (40 named journalists). Furthermore, there is a substantial turnover in journalists reporting the EU. A third of all authors identified in the first period (116 authors) do not contribute in the second period and more than half of authors named in the second period (284 authors) do not contribute in the first period. This suggests that only

a few individual authors develop an expertise in and gain experience of EU coverage, which is needed for interviews to elicit insightful responses.

Sampling therefore focussed on media professionals which will have had more exposure to the topic of the EU. This resulted in recruitment of mainly political editors, European editors and correspondents. Considering the small total population of particularly experienced or knowledgeable media professionals with regard to EU reporting, the list of interviewees constitutes a useful if not entirely representative sample.

To accommodate the participants and facilitate access to them, telephone interviews were offered, which are time and cost efficient. One of the drawbacks of telephone interviews is invisibility of body language, which is an obstacle to determining the interviewees' emotions during the interview (Bryman, 2008). It also makes it more difficult to provide direct feedback to the interviewees, for example by nodding or smiling, although verbal feedback can substitute this. Technical issues only occurred during one telephone interview which had to be conducted in two parts at different times during a day.

Political developments in the UK posed another problem for the interviewing process, especially the referendum on EU membership in 2016. Firstly, this was time-consuming for the target population, since they all worked on EU-related issues within their organisations, making access even more difficult. Secondly, it also influenced the interviews themselves. Prior to the vote, it needed to be considered that interviewees may be more careful about speaking their mind on the matter in order to avoid conflicts with their colleagues. Furthermore, the referendum appeared to be so crucial to their day-to-day work, both before and after the vote that they often answered in relation to the referendum rather than the sampling periods. While many journalistic practices may be similar, the referendum appears to have shifted dynamics in the newsroom, with editors more eager to publish EU-related stories. Careful questioning elicited some of these differences between EU coverage before and after the referendum campaign.

Once recorded, I transcribed the interviews. Participants received a copy of the transcript as agreed in advance. The transcripts were then coded based on the theoretical framework presented in 7.1.

### **3.8. Summary of methodological framework**

This thesis uses CDA within which a variety of analytical tools are integrated. Figure 2 represents the different tools and their contribution to uncovering the representations of the EU in British news coverage, as well as the practices which shape representations. These tools have been deemed to be most suited to answer the research questions (see Figure 1). The thesis

combines text analytical approaches and qualitative interviews with media professionals within a dialectical-relational framework of CDA. This framework is particularly interested in the ways in which discursive and non-discursive elements of social practices are dialectically related and how these configurations (re)produce or challenge existing power relations.

The textual analysis draws upon content analysis and frame analysis to establish the scope and valence of the news coverage. Using micro-analytical tools to investigate linguistic and intertextual features of the texts, analysis will show how frames are constructed through language choices, and how interdiscursivity sustains or challenges dominant social practices surrounding the EU. On the left hand side of Figure 2, the reducing size of the arrows represents the reducing size of the sample, to which tools were applied, and the increasingly detailed and in-depth type of analysis.

The framework does not analyse texts in isolation from processes of production and the social structures in which they are embedded. To explore those other moments of social practice, interviews with media professionals from both UK news organisations and EU institutions are used to establish those networks of practices which lead to particular representations of the EU. Represented on the right-hand side of Figure 2, the arrow represents sociocultural practices regarding the EU in Britain in which the order of discourse is embedded in as well as the process of developing an interview guide based on existing theories of news production. The guide was then applied in interviews to give empirical evidence for assumptions formed based on those theories.

In the following three chapters, results from the textual analysis is presented before they are set into the context of production and wider social practices in Chapter 7.




Figure 2 Visualisation of methodological framework

## **Chapter 4. Focus and scope of EU coverage in British news media**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The following three chapters are concerned with the first set of research questions (see Figure 1). They address how the EU is represented in UK news coverage, establish its focus and scope; how the EU is evaluated through news frames; examine how the relationship between the UK and EU is represented. Using smaller samples, the following chapters also establish how EU and UK actors are represented, what kind of arguments are made for and against (a referendum on) EU membership and show how linguistic and rhetorical strategies contribute to particular representations of the EU.

Studies analysing representations of the EU often focus on news events at an EU-level, such as events linked to EU institutions and policies (see for example Trezn, 2004; Vliegenhardt *et al.*, 2008; Williams and Kaid, 2009; Hawkins, 2012; Van Spanje and de Vreese, 2014). These studies postulate that EU coverage is clustered around key events. Inclusion of domestic and international events provides a great opportunity to analyse how the EU is represented in the context of events, which are not intrinsically EU events. EU reporting is consistently high in the sampling periods, however mainly in the context of domestic news events, such as the release of immigration figures for the UK, not necessarily EU-level events, such as the selection of a European Commission President. While the EU is covered in British news, the focus remains domestic, challenging the assumption that more extensive coverage of the EU leads to the Europeanisation of public debate.

This study therefore adds to the body of research by considering the representation of the EU in different contexts – international and domestic - and particularly in the context of national elections in comparison to European elections. This contributes to an understanding of the interplay between reporting EU-related issues and domestic events, how the EU's on-going influence on domestic life is represented. This chapter outlines the scope of the debate, the contexts in which the EU is reported and the types of EU activities which are covered. Thereby, it addresses the first research question with regard to media representation: What is the focus and scope of EU news coverage?

Analysis then moves on to the valence coverage attaches to the EU and how it evaluates the relationship between the UK and the EU (research questions 1b and 1c, see Figure 1). These two chapters are based on frame analysis, which was conducted with a subsample of data<sup>8</sup>. Frames are an important characteristic of news coverage (see 2.2.2, 2.3 and 3.5.3). They guide

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<sup>8</sup> Approximately half as large as the sample considered in 4.2 and 4.3. For decisions on sample reductions please refer to 3.6.3.

interpretation by highlighting certain aspects of a story while at the same time obscuring others. Frame analysis<sup>9</sup> therefore helps to uncover the themes which connect the ‘different semantic elements of the news stories into a coherent whole’ (Pan and Kosicki, 1993, p. 58). Analysis of news frames shows that positive representations are less frequent and weaker than negative representations, thereby reinforcing previous research in the area, which states that even in pro-European news outlets Eurosceptic representations are frequent (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Gavin, 2000; Anderson, 2004; Daddow, 2012; Hawkins, 2012; Novy, 2013).

Analysis also shows some clear differences between news organisations. Broadcasters tend to emphasise *conflict*<sup>10</sup>. The *Daily Mail* and *Sun* barely use positive frames. Relatively speaking, the *Mirror* is the most positive news organisation with regard to EU coverage but this positive voice is weak: The *Mirror* provides relatively little EU coverage. The *Guardian* is the only news organisation which goes substantially beyond purely economic arguments for continued membership and highlights the political achievements of the EU. The *Telegraph* is an interesting case since it follows a more Eurosceptic editorial line, but highlights consistently the risks for business in the case of Brexit.

Furthermore, representation of the relationship between the UK and EU contributes to the negative representations of the EU. The EU is frequently framed as a *threat* and as fundamentally different to the UK, holding different values and traditions. In this comparison, the UK usually is represented as the more competent, morally superior actor. This links to socio-cultural practices regarding the interpretation of the UK’s historic relationship with the EU. These practices serve as a resource for journalists to construct news stories. Throughout the next three chapters, these resources are alluded to (see also 7.2). Frame analysis also reinforces the results presented in Chapter 4, giving further evidence that coverage of the EU is mainly inward-looking and focussed on the UK, with little consideration of the broader context.

The results add to the existing body of research by implementing a more fine-grained coding scheme which provides nuances previously neglected. These nuances include distinctions between cultural, economic and political dimensions of frames. Frame analysis is furthermore linked to an analysis of policy areas and news events, which again, provides more detailed insights into framing in EU coverage. To provide textual evidence for the realisation of frames, the main arguments are illustrated by case studies, which consider the linguistic realisation of frames. Micro-analysis provides textually grounded evidence of broader arguments made in the following chapters and, in addition, uncovers some of the less obvious

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<sup>9</sup> While definitions for specific frames found in the data will be given throughout this chapter, not all of them can be included here and discussed in close detail. For a full list of frames, their definitions, as well as examples, please refer to Appendix A.

<sup>10</sup> All codes referred to throughout the thesis are emphasised in italics.



ways in which language use can shape and is shaped by, discursive practices in news production and society (Van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1998; Fairclough, 2003). Analysis of language use and rhetoric makes it possible to uncover the intricate ways in which ideology is introduced, maintained and challenged through discourse. It contributes to an understanding of how the order of discourse with regard to the European Union is set up, what its rules and conventions are, and ultimately to identify and tackle the obstacles to making the discourse more balanced.

Prior to interpretation of results, however, a disclaimer needs to be issued. While the following sections refer back to coding matrices<sup>11</sup> and queries summarising the number of references for policy areas and frames, these numbers need to be treated cautiously. Policy area and frame codes can intersect with other codes within text references. Furthermore, the different media formats included in the sample produce different types of data. For example, coding references in tabloids are shorter than in broadsheets but cover similar meanings.

Nevertheless, the numbers presented in the following chapters provide useful evidence. News events, for example, are only coded once per item<sup>12</sup>, which makes it possible to compare and contrast different news outlets as well as to establish the intensity of coverage of particular events. Quantitative measures, especially concerning coding references to frames and policy areas, need to be treated more carefully due to the caveats mentioned above. However, the absence and presence of particular codes within items is still meaningful and the number of references overall are a useful tool to identify prominent patterns in the data which can then be explored in more detail.

Before looking more closely at evaluation of the EU in news coverage, it is important to establish which aspects of the EU actually are reported. Therefore, this chapter sets out some of the key trends regarding the focus of EU coverage in British news media, thereby addressing the research question concerned with the scope and focus of UK news coverage in the EU (see Figure 1). Analysis shows that the EU's variety of activities is not reflected in British news reporting. Only four policy areas are reported in detail (see 4.3), while other areas of EU activity are rarely, mentioned. This creates a rather narrow image of the EU's responsibilities and activities.

Section 4.4 then examines in more detail arguments made within the data set for EU membership. It concludes that the case for remaining a member of the EU is based almost exclusively on economic arguments, neglecting many other achievements and benefits of EU membership and reinforcing the observation that the UK's commitment to the EU is pragmatic

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<sup>11</sup> Coding matrices in NVivo are similar to crosstabs and show how different codes intersect within references and units of analysis.

<sup>12</sup> 'Item' refers to the unit of analysis: one newspaper article or broadcast included in the sample.

instead of ideological (Wall, 2009; Copsey and Haughton, 2014). While cost/benefit analyses of EU membership are not problematic per se, the lack of ideological support for the EU and membership of the EU may lead to weaker commitment to the project, especially when a public lacking widespread knowledge about the EU is faced with strong arguments against membership (Semetko and de Vreese, 2004; McCormick, 2014). The last section of this chapter then uses a small sample of items to illustrate the arguments made throughout the chapter by analysing in detail linguistic strategies in the texts.

## **4.2. Analysis of news events: a domestic focus of news coverage**

### **4.2.1. Coding of news events**

Analysis of the distribution of news items as well as analysis of the news events covered during the two data collection periods shows two clear, interrelated trends. Firstly, the EU is most commonly reported in the context of domestic events and with a focus on consequences for the UK instead of the EU as a whole. Secondly, in domestic contexts, the EU receives consistent attention. For EU-related news events without such a clear domestic link, coverage is less constant but rather erratic. Where these events are concerned, news outlets either pay a lot of attention for a short period, or do not pay very much attention at all.

All sampled items are included because they refer in one way or another to the EU and its institutions. They were then coded according to the news event they were covering. If the event was a domestic one, an event that happened within the UK or focussed on people from the UK, it was coded as *home news*. *Home news* were further split into two categories: *political home news* and *non-political home news*. *Political home news* covers events which concern predominantly the UK government, UK parties and politicians as well as their policies and positions towards certain events, such as immigration statistics. It also includes news stories concerned with the UK's relationship with the EU. All other *home news* were coded as *non-political*. These include mainly human-interest events.

The code *events closely linked to the EU* captures events which happen on an EU institutional level, for example the European Elections or events related to the Eurozone economy, as well as events which concern the EU as a whole, such as the refugee crisis. *Economy and business news* is used to code stories which focus predominantly on financial market and economic news events worldwide (apart from Eurozone in particular), businesses, or banking.

The last code to categorise news events is *international news*. This includes all news which mention the EU in an international context. These stories are not predominantly economic, EU- or UK-related, but are events taking place beyond the EU. The most prominent event here is

the Ukraine crisis of 2014. While the EU is mentioned with regard to this event, for example concerning sanctions for Russia, the event itself is not an EU-level event. Within each category child nodes, sub-categories in NVivo, have been set up to code the specific news event in more detail (see 3.5.2, Table 1 and Appendix A, Table 36).

For most items, it was possible to clearly identify one news event which triggered reporting. However, there are some items – mainly comment pieces – which address several news events. The categories are nevertheless treated as mutually exclusive. If there was more than one news event covered, then the event more prominently featured in the item was used for coding (see also 3.5.2). While this procedure may lose some of the data's richness, it makes it possible to compare items according to news event across categories such as news outlet, policy areas, or frames, without duplicate items appearing in the comparison.

#### **4.2.2. Focus on domestic news events**

Previous studies on EU news coverage are predominantly focused on reporting of events at the EU-level, such as EU summits or treaty ratification (Semetko and de Vreese, 2004; Gleissner and de Vreese, 2005; Schuck and de Vreese, 2006; Vliegenhardt *et al.*, 2008; Van Spanje and de Vreese, 2014). Only a few also take into account domestic events (for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999). Although studies focusing on key EU-level events give important insights of EU representation – and find that coverage of EU-level key events is domesticized – they neglect the diverse contexts in which the EU is reported. After all, the European Union influences the domestic realm on a daily basis, not only during key events.

It is worthwhile to examine a greater variety of news events, particularly because previous research suggests that the EU becomes mainly relevant with regard to its perceived consequences for the domestic sphere, for the everyday lives of the media audiences (see for example Semetko *et al.*, 2000; Peter and de Vreese, 2004; Meyer, 2005; McCormick, 2014). This is supported by opinion polls. Ahead of the 2014 EP Election as well as the 2015 General Election, the EU had a comparatively low salience for voters. They regarded the economy, immigration and health, and other issues as more important (see Table 8), although it needs to be acknowledged that especially immigration and the economy cannot be distinguished neatly from the EU in this context. As shown below, the order of discourse on Europe in the UK draws heavily on discourses about immigration and the economy. EU-related events might therefore not be of much interest to readers if they are not made relevant with regard to domestic politics, for example by linking it to immigration or the economy, which are intrinsically linked to the EU.

|                    | <b>European Elections (May 12-13, 2014)</b> | <b>General Election (April 27-28 2015)</b> |
|--------------------|---|--|
| <b>Health</b>      | 34  | 45   |
| <b>Immigration</b> | 52  | 51   |
| <b>Crime</b>       | 12  | 7  |
| <b>Economy</b>     | 52  | 52   |
| <b>Tax</b>         | 10  | 10   |
| <b>Pensions</b>    | 13  | 9  |
| <b>Education</b>   | 17  | 16   |
| <b>Family Life</b> | 7   | 7  |
| <b>Housing</b>     | 20  | 27   |
| <b>Environment</b> | 10  | 8  |
| <b>Europe</b>      | 14  | 16   |
| <b>Transport</b>   | 3   | 3  |
| <b>Welfare</b>     | 26  | 26   |

*Table 8 Which of the following do you think are the most important issues facing the country at this time? (Please tick up to three; Percentages); Source: YouGov (2014; 2015)*

This is also reflected in the collected data. The majority of items were coded as (mostly *political*) *home news* regardless of the news organisation. The overall increase in eligible coverage throughout the data collection periods (see Figure 3) can furthermore be explained by an increase of coverage of events coded as *home news* rather than *events closely linked to the EU*, indicating a strong domestic focus of coverage (see Table 9, Table 10 and Appendix E, Table 42). This trend would have gone unnoticed if analysis had only focused on EU-level news events, such as the selection of the Commission President. Furthermore, despite the EU's role as an international actor, its involvement in international events is only touched upon marginally, suggesting that in this order of discourse 'News about the EU', the role of the EU as an international actor is not commonly used as a discursive resource. In the first period, the EU's role in the Ukraine crisis (42 items) and, in the second period, its involvement in the nuclear agreement with Iran (14 items) are mentioned. However, the numbers and proportion of coverage remain very low.

Coverage of the 2014 European Parliament election is furthermore characterised by the predominance of a domestic perspective. The EP elections themselves attracted coverage as the main event in 38 items (4.5% of items in first collection period). The results across Europe were covered in 32 items (3.8% of items in first collection period). In contrast, the domestic campaigns of UK parties were reported as the main news event in 89 items (10.6% of items in first collection period). Ukip's campaign alone attracted an additional 72 news items (8.6%). In

the election's aftermath, British results were reported as the main news event in 67 items (8.0%). Additionally, Liberal Democrat election results attracted reporting in 24 items (2.9%). Despite the European dimension of these elections, the focus remains domestic having a clear preoccupation with UK parties and their campaigns, often with a focus on issues which are not even at stake in this particular election. For example, the impact of EU migrants on the British economy and society as well as Cameron's referendum pledge featured heavily, while issues such as the election of a new EU Commission President from European parties' *Spitzenkandidaten* was not discussed in the same depth. Despite the trend for more coverage of the European Elections more generally in comparison with the 2009 election (Cushion *et al.*, 2015), there remains a focus on domestic issues which are not affected by the election result, as is characteristic for second-order elections like European Parliament elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).

|                                 | <b>Events closely linked to the EU (including EU/eurozone economy)</b> | <b>Home Events</b> | <b>Economic Events (including British economy)</b> | <b>International Events</b> |
|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| <b>Week 1 (8. – 14.5.2014)</b>  | 44 (21.9%)   | 114 (56.7%)        | 19 (9.5%)  | 24 (11.9%)                  |
| <b>Week 2 (15. – 21.5.2014)</b> | 69 (25.0%)   | 161 (58.3%)        | 25 (9.1%)  | 21 (7.6%)                   |
| <b>Week 3 (22. – 29.5.2014)</b> | 87 (24.0%)   | 231 (63.6%)        | 18 (5.0%)  | 27 (7.4%)                   |

*Table 9 News Event by Week in 2014 European Parliament Elections data collection period (total numbers and percentage articles per week dedicated to news events)*

The pattern of inward-looking coverage is similar, although not as stark, in the second collection period (see Table 10). Both tabloids and broadcasters increase their share of items covering EU-level events, despite the fact that the main news event in this period – the General Election – is not an EU-level event in the same way as the EP election. The increase in absolute and relative terms is due to the intensifying refugee crisis (covered as a main event in 156 items, or 10.5% of the second period sample) and the Greek debt crisis (covered in 138 items or 9.3% of the second sample). While coverage of the EU across all categories of news events remains relatively stable (see Figure 6 and Figure 7) coverage of EU-level events is more variable (see Table 10), reflecting a quick drop in the number of news items covering EU-related issues after key EU-level events such as the emergency summit on migration.

|                                  | <b>Events closely linked to the EU (including EU/Eurozone economy)</b> | <b>Home Events</b> | <b>Economic Events (including British economy)</b> | <b>International Events</b> |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| <b>Week 1 (30.3.-5.4.2015)</b>   | 34 (17.6%)   | 116 (60.1%)        | 19 (9.8%)  | 24 (12.4%)                  |
| <b>Week 2 (6. – 12.4.2015)</b>   | 37 (18.7%)   | 115 (58.1%)        | 30 (15.2%)   | 16 (8.1%)                   |
| <b>Week 3 (13. – 19.4.2015)</b>  | 64 (32.2%)   | 95 (47.7%)         | 26 (13.1%)   | 14 (7%)                     |
| <b>Week 4 (20. – 26.4.2015)</b>  | 117 (45.9%)  | 92 (59.4%)         | 36 (14.1%)   | 10 (3.9%)                   |
| <b>Week 5 (27.4. – 3.5.2015)</b> | 58 (28.2%)   | 113 (55.7%)        | 21 (10.2%)   | 14 (6.8%)                   |
| <b>Week 6 (4. – 10.5.2015)</b>   | 52 (18.7%)   | 198 (71.2%)        | 18 (6.5%)  | 10 (3.6%)                   |
| <b>Week 7 (11. – 14.5.2015)</b>  | 53 (34.2%)   | 91 (58.7%)         | 5 (3.2%)   | 6 (3.9%)                    |

*Table 10 News Event by Week in 2015 UK General Election data collection period (total numbers and percentage articles per week dedicated to news events)*

This is symptomatic of the practices of news production in an accelerating news cycle (Chadwick, 2011; Chadwick, 2013; see also Chapter 7). Considering the pressures of an accelerated news cycle, it is particularly remarkable that there is a steady interest in the EU in the context of domestic events in the second collection period, such as national elections or in relation to the economy.

#### **4.2.3. Differences between news outlets**

The domestic focus is evident across all news outlets in the sample<sup>13</sup>. However, there are some differences among them. Firstly, the sampled news outlets do not report EU-related issues to the same extent. Confirming previous research, tabloids publish fewer EU-related news stories than broadsheets (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999).

The *Mirror* and *The Sun* dedicate the lowest number and percentage of items to EU-related issues in both data collection periods (see Figure 3 and Appendix E). Percentages for the *Daily Mail* and *Sunday Mail* are slightly higher and show a steadier increase in the first data set.

<sup>13</sup> The Sunday papers have a tendency to be even more domestically focused than the weekday editions but the differences are not very stark (see Table 42).

During the General Election campaign, the *Daily Mail* more frequently reports EU related issues.

Total numbers suggest that the *Telegraph* and *Guardian/Observer* are treating the EU similarly (see Appendix E). Looking at percentages, however, it becomes evident that the *Guardian/Observer* gives more space within the newspaper to EU-related stories (Figure 3). Again, this is visible in both collection periods. In the week following the EP elections as well as in the week of the General Election, the *Guardian/Observer* stand out from the sample. They dedicate 17.18% and 18.1% of their copies' articles to EU related content, almost a fifth of articles (see Figure 3). Although it is expected that broadsheets would cover the EU more often, the difference is nevertheless striking. Furthermore, the distribution of news items shows that the broadsheets are more likely to cover EU-level events as the main news events while tabloids focus more on the domestic level (see Appendix E, Table 42).

Broadcast media differ from print media significantly since airtime is restricted. Unsurprisingly therefore, both *BBC News at Ten* and *Channel 4 News* produced fewer items than the newspapers and have a lower average of items per day (see Figure 3 and Appendix E). However, comparing the percentage of airtime on EU-related stories compared to percentage of articles in newspapers, the picture changes dramatically for both data sets. Figure 3 shows that the two broadcast programmes selected for analysis dedicate a consistently greater percentage of available space to EU-related stories than the newspapers. Although the two measurements are not entirely comparable and therefore the difference might not be as stark, there still seems to be more EU coverage in the sampled broadcast media than the newspapers for the period sampled.

Comparing the distribution of news items, it can also be observed that the broadcasters report the EU less frequently in the context of *economic or business news*. The domestic focus is still strong among broadcasters but the number of EU-level events reported increases in the second period. This is linked to the broadcasters' tendency to report the refugee crisis more extensively than other news events.




Figure 3 Weekly average percentage of articles dedicated to stories covering EU-related issue



#### 4.2.4. *Fluctuating coverage of EU-level news events*

EU coverage in the context of domestic events has a steady and high volume. Coverage of specifically EU-level events is more sporadic. Either a lot of attention is paid to these EU-level events or very little. However, the two data collection periods differ slightly, also due to the types of EU-level events occurring during data collection.

Coverage of *events closely linked to the EU* in the first data collection period increases steadily. Research has shown that EU reporting becomes more frequent around key events, such as EU summits or European Parliament Elections (Norris, 2000; de Vreese, 2001). Although this thesis looks at short time spans, the trend is also visible in the sample collected around the European Parliament Elections in 2014 (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). The increase in reporting is mainly due to the European Elections and the declaration of results, the main news story in the period. When excluding all items predominantly focusing on European Elections and European Election results as well as election campaign stories from the sample, no increase in reporting in the run-up and aftermath of the European elections can be observed. As argued above, however, most of these campaign stories are coded as *domestic news events*, not *EU-level news*, despite increased coverage of the elections in comparison with the 2009 vote (Cushion *et al.*, 2015).

In the second period, an election was again the main news story (349 items – 23.5% of sample – covering the campaign; 178 items – 12% of the sample – covering the General Election and the results). No steady increase of eligible items is detectable in this case apart from an increase around the declaration of results, where the focus shifted to the possibility of an EU referendum (see Table 10, Figure 6 and Figure 7). The election campaign itself, however, attracted large and increasing volumes of reporting. Increasing coverage of EU-related events in the first set, therefore, may be more a characteristic of election coverage in general than European Election coverage in particular (see for example Deacon *et al.*, 2006).

Apart from these general trends, the time series also show spikes in EU coverage, supporting the observation that especially *EU-level events* attract either a lot of attention or do not result in much coverage at all. In the first data set, news media show several spikes between 10 and 14 May 2014. These dates coincided with the European Court of Justice's ruling on internet search providers' responsibility to take down outdated or irrelevant links from search results, the release of immigration figures, and then European Commission president Barroso's speech on the EU's future (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). A further peak in coverage was triggered by a domestic event, Nigel Farage's controversial comments in an LBC Radio interview (16 May 2014) in which he said people would be concerned if Romanians moved in next door. Coverage peaked a third time after the European Election results were declared on Sunday, 25

May 2014. The gains of Eurosceptic parties in these elections triggered increased coverage of the event and analysis of the vote. Those peaks are particularly pronounced in broadcast media. In all cases, however, the spikes are sharp and decline quickly, especially in the case of the two EU-level events: the *right to be forgotten* case and EP Election results.

The trend continues in the second period. The refugee crisis, with one tragic accident in particular (19 April 2015), and the subsequent EU emergency summit (23 April 2015) increased reporting of EU-related issues, in particular among broadcasters. However, interest in specific stories appears to drop quickly.

Although it is particularly obvious among broadcasters, these events, which are *closely linked to the EU* are briefly given a lot of attention across all media outlets, despite the General Election campaign going on at the same time (see Table 10). However, coverage shifts quickly back to the more common pattern after the emergency summit on migration. It appears that reporting of EU-related issues in the context of *EU-level events* is more erratic, while reporting of EU-related issues in the *domestic* context is more stable and consistent. It follows that one of the conventions of the order of discourse about the EU is a higher threshold for non-domestic, EU-related stories to break, as interviews with journalists revealed. They have to have a high intensity or important implications for the domestic realm in order to be reported (see Chapter 7, in particular 7.3).

However, while those increases and spikes are observable across all outlets, the Sunday newspapers counter the trend. The number of eligible items in Sunday editions remained mostly constant with broadly the same numbers in both samples. Especially for the first collection period, this is a trend worth noting since in the daily editions, the average number of articles steadily increased in the three weeks, while the reporting volume on Sunday remained steady. Furthermore, on average, Sunday newspapers included in this study published generally more articles about the European Union per edition than their weekday counterparts and did not show pronounced spikes in the coverage of EU level events. They were reported on more steadily in Sunday papers (see Table 9 and Table 10).




Figure 4 Percentage of articles dedicated to EU-related content by newspaper per day (Set 1)




Figure 5 Percentage of minutes dedicated to EU related content by broadcaster per day (Set1)




Figure 6 Percentage of articles dedicated to EU-related content by newspaper per day (Period 2)




Figure 7 Percentage of items dedicated to EU-related content by broadcasters per day (Period 2)

### 4.3. Coverage of EU policy areas

The previous section concludes that EU news coverage in British media tends to focus on the domestic context. This section shows that reporting is restricted regarding the coverage of EU policy areas. It also gives evidence that immigration and freedom of movement have become more prominent in the coverage of EU-related news (see for example Todd, 2016).

Policy areas were coded according to Norris's (2000) and John et al.'s (2013) categories and expanded, adapted and refined throughout the coding process (see 3.5.2 and Appendix A). While every sampled item is only ascribed to one news event, multiple policy areas can be coded per item to capture all aspects of the EU which are mentioned in news coverage.

The sample covers four policy areas frequently: *governance and decision-making*, *economic and financial policy*, *evolution of the EU* and *immigration* (see Figure 8). While all news organisations focus on these policy areas, it is the broadcasters which do so most clearly and at the expense of other areas. Broadsheets cover the widest range of policy areas followed by the *Daily Mail* and the tabloids.

Television news has restricted airtime while print news journalism does not have to function within the same constraints. Limitations of the medium may therefore drive the broadcasters' focus (see also 7.3). However, considering that most UK citizens obtain their information about the European Union from television news (European Commission, 2014b), this is nevertheless problematic because it provides a limited representation of EU activity.

Selectivity in reporting is not limited to EU coverage (see for example Langer and Sagarzazu, 2017, on coverage of UK budget) and dependent on practices of news production, such as application of news values (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). However, this does not make the restricted coverage any less problematic. When attention is given to certain issues, then political actors can use these issues for their own political agenda. When there is a lack of attention, issues are less visible and can be depoliticised and pushed to the margins of public discourse (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). The focus on particular policy areas furthermore needs to be understood in the context of current news events.




Figure 8 Percentage of Sources and References coded at different policy areas

Overall, there are 415 items in the first data collection period (49.4% of all items in this period; 1286 references) coded as covering *governance and decision-making*. The European Elections fall into this category, which are mentioned in 378 items (45%; 919 references). This goes alongside the coverage of EU institutions, especially the European Parliament and the election of the European Commission's President (24 items; 2.9% of sample; 72 references). Despite these EU-level events taking place in the first data collection period, the domestic focus is again apparent here: The majority of sources with *governance and decision-making* codes are items which are primarily concerned with *domestic political events* (see Figure 9).

After the European Elections, this policy area is not as prominent in the second period. Instead, the most common policy area in the second period is *economic and financial policy*. In total, 2141 references are made to this policy area, 31.6% of all references made to policy areas overall.

In both periods, in the coverage of this policy area the domestic focus is reduced. Instead, *economic and financial policy* is mainly discussed in the context of *EU-level events*. The Eurozone economy in general and the Greek debt crisis in particular attracted a substantial amount of reporting, especially from the broadsheets. They covered *economic and financial policy* extensively in 60 (27.65%) items at the *Telegraph* and 68 (33.5%) items at the *Guardian/Observer* in the first period and 175 (41.3%) and 156 (33.2%) in the second period, reflecting the intensifying Greek debt crisis. Audience expectations can explain this focus to a degree. As interviews show, broadsheet journalists think readers are particularly interested in EU-related, economic issues, even if they are not directly related to the domestic realm (see 7.4).

The *evolution of the EU* constitutes the second most frequently mentioned policy area in both samples and, again, provides evidence for the domestic orientation of EU news coverage in British media. In the first period, 281 news items (33.5%, 930 references) are coded in this category and 553 news items (25%, 1653 references) in the second. This policy area includes integration processes, in depth (closer political integration) as well as in breadth (enlargement). However, the focus here lies on disintegration, in particular the potential departure of the UK from the bloc. Coverage emphasised the possibilities that integration processes might halt and even reverse, and the consequences for the UK, instead of implications of integration and disintegration for the EU more broadly. The British in/out referendum, the potential of a British exit from the EU as well as renegotiations and proposed reforms were the focus of reporting (see Table 11). This preoccupation with the EU referendum, its role as a salient electoral issue, as well as its consequences for Britain rather than the EU as a whole leads to a focus on *domestic political events* (see Figure 10).

|                                  | Total number of items in EP Election collection Period | Percentage of items in EP Election collection Period | Number of references in EP Election collection Period | Total number of items in GE collection Period | Percentage of items in GE collection Period | Number of references in GE collection Period |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|--|
| <b>In/Out Referendum</b>         | 132  | 15.7   | 248   | 456   | 30.7  | 942  |
| <b>Potential of Brexit</b>       | 56   | 6.7  | 92  | 144   | 9.7   | 250  |
| <b>Renegotiations and Reform</b> | 127  | 15.1   | 295   | 162   | 10.9  | 367  |

Table 11 Number and percentage of items in which referendum/Brexit/renegotiations are mentioned, number of references

The third policy area, which is covered extensively, is *immigration*. Immigration can be a news event in itself, for example, when immigration numbers are covered as the main news event. However, coverage mentions *immigration* in a variety of contexts. In the first period, 285 items (34%; 1150 references) referred to *immigration policies*. This included mainly migration within the EU, freedom of movement of people and only to a lesser extent immigration from outside the EU into the EU. Freedom of movement was reported largely with regard to its impact on domestic politics and society.

A text search within the data reveals that the phrase ‘Europe and immigration’ in different variations can be found in 59 (7%) items in the first period. This adds to the finding that the EU is strongly linked to immigration in British news discourse and indeed the British public debate, and gives evidence to the interdiscursive connection of immigration discourse and discourse about the EU. Todd (2016) finds that immigration did not feature in the referendum debate of 1975, but has gradually become more prominent since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, particularly in the recent debate surrounding Cameron’s (2013) referendum pledge. Balch and Balbanova (2017) also find that coverage of EU immigration increased after the 2004 accession of Central and Eastern European countries. This explains why studies such as Anderson and Weymouth’s (1999) did not discuss freedom of movement in much detail: news media did not discuss it in much depth either. The data collected for this thesis, however, suggests that in contemporary news coverage, discourses on immigration have become an important resource in the order of discourse ‘EU in the News’.

While *immigration* takes only third place overall, it is the most frequently mentioned policy area in the *Sun* and the second most frequently mentioned policy area in the *Daily Mail*. This indicates *The Sun* and *Mail*’s reporting preferences which contribute to the ongoing connection between the EU and immigration (Balch and Balbanova, 2017). It could be argued that this is due to reader preferences (Duffy and Rowden, 2005). The *Mirror*’s audience, however, may have similar concerns regarding immigration as the *Sun*’s audience, but its coverage is not as



focused on it (see 7.4). Therefore, to some extent, *The Sun* could be seen as trying to exaggerate the importance of immigration as a concern in order to achieve a different target, strengthening resistance against the EU more broadly. The *Mirror* follows a more pro-European agenda despite potential conflicts with its readership.

Although *immigration* is still one of the most prominent policy areas in the second period, the focus shifts to events more closely linked to the EU. While freedom of movement and migration within the EU is still debated – also because immigration still constitutes an important issue in the General Election – the refugee crisis and the EU’s response to the loss of life in the Mediterranean moved attention to immigration from outside into the EU. This provides further evidence that the attention span in reporting of EU-level events is short and driven by high-intensity events.

*Immigration* is mentioned in 331 items (22.3%) in the second period, with 1088 references. However, *immigration from outside the EU* was coded in 689 references, while *migration within the EU* has been coded only 392 times. The broadcasters in particular dedicate a large share of their airtime to *immigration from outside the EU*. While domestic impact of the refugee crisis is considered, coverage focuses more on the EU and other EU members rather than the UK’s role in it, defying the inward looking trend. *EU foreign policy* which became relevant during the intensifying refugee crisis in spring 2015 was also found in items focusing on the refugee crisis.

It becomes apparent from an analysis of policy areas covered in the sample, that coverage of the EU is restricted to particular areas of EU activity. Only four policy areas were reported in greater detail, mostly with a domestic focus. Other policy areas where more reporting might have been expected, such as *regional policy*, were not high on news media’s agendas. This creates a rather limited representation of the EU, its competencies and potential impact on UK citizens. The following sections look more closely at the debate about EU membership in the UK, which, again, is based on a restricted repertoire of arguments for continued membership, thereby obscuring many of the other competencies of the EU.




Figure 9 Total number of sources mentioning policy areas by news event (Set 1)




Figure 10 Total number of sources mentioning policy areas by news event (Set 2)

#### 4.4. Voting with their wallet? Economic factors in the debate about EU membership

One of the sub-questions for the first overarching research question asks about the arguments for and against a membership referendum and membership more generally (see Figure 1). Previous sections showed that representations of the EU are, overall, limited to particular contexts and activities. In the accelerating debate<sup>14</sup> about the UK's EU membership, another restriction becomes apparent: Arguments for continued membership almost exclusively rely on economic, rational considerations while arguments for leaving appear more emotive. Emotive arguments can contribute to persuasion (Oksenberg Rorty, 1996) and lead to stronger voter mobilisation (Kosmidis and Xezonakis, 2010).

Beyond coding of policy areas and news events, frame analysis becomes crucial here in order to provide evidence for this observation.<sup>15</sup> The most common frame in the sample is *conflict/crisis* (see 5.1 for more detail). The EU is continuously framed as a *source of conflict* in domestic UK politics. UK politicians' position on the issue is highlighted and contrasted throughout the sample. Within this debate, it is the Eurosceptics, who are represented as winning the argument since they understand voters' concerns (see 5.1).

Particularly in the context of the *evolution of the EU*, the EU itself becomes a contentious issue in reporting. Even when the relationship with the EU itself is not the news event triggering coverage, news reporting frequently mentions the referendum as well as renegotiations sought by David Cameron. Coverage frames these as issues of *domestic political conflict*, over which politicians from different parties as well as voters, and news organisations themselves, debate and argue. It appears as if the EU gains importance in news coverage through the Conservative manifesto pledge of a referendum. After the Conservative victory in the General Election, the topic climbs even higher on the political agenda.

In this vivid, constant debate about the referendum, the EU was, especially in the second period, also framed as *competent* and as *important for the national interest*, in particular regarding the economy and business community. Emphasis here was put on informing UK citizens how they can profit from EU membership. Access to the single market with its benefits for the UK economy was the most consistently made argument for remaining a member of the EU. Therefore, it is consistent, that the EU in the context of *economic and financial policy* is often framed as a *force for good* (233 references). Prosperity was the most prominent aspect within this frame (177 references). Bringing forward arguments for remaining a member of the

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<sup>14</sup> This is evident in both samples but more pronounced in the second due to the Conservatives' manifesto commitment to a referendum.

<sup>15</sup> As mentioned in 3.6.3, a sub-sample of data has been coded for frames. Therefore, observations made here are not based on the same sample size as in 4.2 and 4.3. This should not, however, diminish their strength since data reduction followed clear guidelines and created a substantial sample.

EU may be classified as a challenge to dominant Eurosceptic discourses. However, the fact that these arguments remain mainly on the economic level are proof that instead journalists are following mainstream discourse about the EU, which has traditionally neglected membership benefits beyond economics. The UK, self-styled as champion of the free market, in the past advocated wider integration instead of deeper integration as it opens up new markets and facilitates liberalism, while reducing the power of European institutions. For Thatcher, for example, liberalism and the European institutions were not compatible. They were regarded as utopian continental interventionism (Fontana and Parsons, 2015).

| <b>News organisation</b> | <b>Type of benefits (majority of references)</b> | <b>UK-centric/EU-wide benefits (majority of references)</b> | <b>Acknowledgement of historic achievements (are they considered in references, yes or no)</b> |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>   | Economic   | UK-centric  | No   |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>    | Political  | EU-wide   | Yes  |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>        | Economic   | UK-centric  | No   |
| <b>Guardian</b>          | Political  | EU-wide   | Yes  |
| <b>Mirror</b>            | Political  | UK-centric  | No   |
| <b>Sun</b>               | Economic   | UK-centric  | No   |
| <b>Telegraph</b>         | Economic   | UK-centric  | No   |

*Table 12 Differences between news organisations in 'force for good' framing*

Political contributions of the EU within this policy area are acknowledged, mostly with reference to protection of citizens from big corporations such as Google, but less commonly so. Reporting also detaches the single market for goods and services from another crucial element of the single market, namely freedom of movement of people, which tends to be framed negatively (see 6.2). Again, this highlights the more pragmatic, rational arguments for EU membership, which are based to a large degree on economic self-interest, while the continental Europeans are regarded as utopian in their pursuit of ever closer union. News discourse here clearly taps into discourses about Britishness and European-ness (see 7.2).

However, there are differences between news organisations, with regard to not only quantity of references to the *EU as a force for good* frame, but also concerning their quality.

The *force for good* frame – independent of the area of *economic and financial policy* – was divided into three categories: *political*, *economic* and *cultural*. While none of the included news organisations frequently framed the EU as a *force for cultural good*, two groups emerge from the data (see Table 12). *Channel 4*, the *Guardian* and the *Mirror* focus on the *political good* brought by the European Union with the *Guardian* in particular emphasising historic achievements of the EU beyond its benefits for the UK, thereby tapping into a historical discourse more common among the founding member states. Peace on the continent, solidarity and – on an economic level – prosperity for the UK as well as the rest of the continent are of concern here. The *Mirror* puts more emphasis on the benefits to the UK, particularly regarding workers’ rights and consumer issues. Of all included news outlets, the *Guardian* resists and challenges the dominant British discourse most openly.

The *BBC*, *Daily Mail*, *Sun* and *Telegraph* focus more on the *EU as a force for economic good* rather than *political good*. Coverage here was more UK-centric, without acknowledging greater achievements of the EU across the European continent and beyond, reflecting a more pragmatic, less ideological commitment to EU membership, which is dependent on the UK gaining from it economically. This line of reasoning is more in line with the dominant British discourse about its historic relationship with the European continent.

These patterns tie in coherently with distribution of *EU is important* framing. Firstly, the national interest, particularly *economic national interest*,<sup>16</sup> are in focus, which emphasises potential dangers to the UK economy in case of a withdrawal from the EU. It is important to notice that, while in these references a case for continued membership is made, the argumentation is negative. Instead of focussing on the benefits coming from EU membership (which would be coded as *force for good*), the coverage often exclusively focuses on the potential financial losses for the UK in case of a Brexit as well as the UK’s national interest. Only *Channel 4* and the *Guardian* challenge the UK-centric features of the order of discourse while highlighting more prominently EU-wide achievements and benefits for countries other than the UK.

*So long as we are members, the UK has a leading influence in negotiations over the form of those regulations. Within the union we can access the single market and also shape it so that it continues to benefit British businesses and taxpayers. Those campaigning for an exit disregard the reality of Britain's clout in Brussels at the nation's peril. In doing so, they are aligning themselves with the vested interests that clog up our commerce with bureaucracy, rather than staying to finish off the job of bringing them to heel. (Clarke, 23 May 2014, Telegraph)*

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<sup>16</sup> Only the *Guardian* is more preoccupied with the political importance of the EU, both as a global power and for the national interest.

The above example is symptomatic of a wider trend. Instead of emphasising the contribution EU membership could make to economic growth, potential negative deviations from the economic status quo are highlighted. Certainly, economic considerations can have an effect on political participation and ultimately voting behaviour (Bartels, 2006; Kosmidis and Xezonakis, 2010). Therefore a focus on economic arguments is logical. In the case of negative economic expectations, the status quo was previously preferred, as in the Danish referendum on the single currency in 2000 (Semetko and de Vreese, 2004). It could be argued that invoking a negative economic expectation for EU withdrawal might lead to risk-averse behaviour and a vote for Remain. However, as in the Danish case, a purely economic argument is not enough to counter Eurosceptic sentiment among voters, especially since the case for continued EU membership was also often linked to the condition of significant reforms being achieved by Cameron.

In contrast with the prominence of *threat* and *separation* frames, which highlight differences between the UK and the EU (see Chapter 6), this argument appears less convincing. Matthews and Johnston (2010) find that economic considerations do not have as strong of an effect on voting behaviour as previously thought. Instead, the role of emotion is influential in voter mobilisation (Valentino *et al.*, 2011; Namkoong *et al.*, 2012). Anger, in particular, was identified as boosting political participation (Valentino *et al.*, 2011). Anxiety, as invoked by the economic arguments described above, however, can inhibit political participation. Such emotive language and arguments may have more persuasive potential (Kaufmann, 2016).

#### **4.5. Analysis of rhetorical devices and their functions in news coverage: the EU as a campaign issue**

The above section establishes the narrow focus of representations of the EU in UK news coverage, addressing questions about the scope and focus of EU coverage. It also shows that the case against the EU referendum and arguments for remaining within the EU appear to have less persuasive potential than the case for the referendum and arguments against continued membership. This section looks more closely at rhetorical devices used in the run-up to the European and General Elections. This provides more detailed textual evidence, which not only influences framing but also contributes to the persuasive potential of certain (Eurosceptic) arguments.

The study of rhetoric is the study of persuasive communication (Oksenberg Rorty, 1996; Stokowski, 2013). It therefore lends itself to being an analytical lens for looking more closely at the media debate about a potential referendum and EU withdrawal – a debate in which media organisations take clear stances and try to persuade their readership, at least in their comment

and editorial pieces. Voters, at the same time, need to be able to make an informed choice on the issue.

Analysis of rhetoric can involve analysis of structural organisations of arguments, the kinds of arguments brought forward and the stylistic features which enhance the persuasive potential of a text (Arnold, 1974; Stokowski, 2013). While frame analysis contributes to uncovering the kinds of arguments brought forward with regard to the UK’s relationship with the EU (see 4.4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6), analysis of intertextual and interdiscursive elements accounts for some of their structure (see in particular 5.3). This section is concerned with the texts’ stylistic features, specifically rhetorical devices. It will explain how rhetorical devices contribute to the (re)production or challenge of dominant discourses, also by drawing on interdiscursive elements. Through this kind of analysis, the section addresses research question 1e and 1f: What is the persuasive potential of arguments and how does rhetoric contribute to it? Sections 5.3 and 6.3 will complete the picture.

Analysis of rhetorical devices further contributes to the body of literature since it provides not only more nuance to the broader findings but also serves as an intermediary step between the text and the sociocultural and organisational practices by unpacking what appears to be common journalistic language. Detailed analysis of rhetorical devices, as well as intertextuality and linguistic realisation of actor representation (see 5.3 and 6.3) unpacks the opaque ways in which language contributes to, or challenges dominant discourses.

|                        | <b>EP Elections Data Collection (up to polling day)</b> | <b>General Election Data Collection (up to polling day)</b> |
|------------------------|---|---|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | 0   | 5   |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>  | 0   | 2   |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>      | 6   | 7   |
| <b>Guardian</b>        | 10  | 8   |
| <b>Mirror</b>          | 3   | 2   |
| <b>Sun</b>             | 13  | 8   |
| <b>Telegraph</b>       | 15  | 5   |
| <b>Total</b>           | 47  | 37  |

*Table 13 Distribution of sub-sample across news outlets and collection periods*

The original sample is too large to conduct a micro-analysis of rhetorical devices without substantial time and effort (see 3.6.3) and was therefore reduced. This reduction may seem like



a disadvantage since it reduces the generalisability of analysis. However, my broader awareness of specificities of British discourses about the EU, applied to linguistic analysis allows me to identify meanings of rhetorical devices and their uses in news texts. This results in a detailed account of media coverage without unnecessary repetition created by looking at larger samples.

Of particular interest was the coverage of the EU as an issue during election campaigns and how the EU was discussed in relation to the elections. Therefore, only items, which mention the EU referendum, the potential of Brexit or Cameron's notion of renegotiation and reform, were selected. This sample was further narrowed down by selecting only those, which also include at least one *conflict/crisis* frame, *domestic political conflict/crisis*, to be exact. The sample consequently only includes items in which the EU was an area of political contestation in the British context. To ensure a manageable sample, only the last two weeks before the elections were selected. This results in the distribution of items across news outlets as presented in Table 13.

The following discussion does not focus on all rhetorical devices found in the texts. Instead, it focuses on those which are regarded as fundamentals of discourse (Panther and Thornburg, 2007): metonyms and metaphors.<sup>17</sup> They are particularly interesting to CDA, since they make it possible to link the texts to other discursive realms. Both devices rely on conceptual mapping, using particular terms or expressions to refer to something else. However, while metonymy draws contiguity between two concepts coming from the same domain (within-domain mapping), metaphor refers to mapping of two concepts across different domains, assuming similarity (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003; Panther and Thornburg, 2007). Both rhetorical devices are crucial in the representation of the European Union in British news coverage, as explained below.

#### **4.5.1. Metonymy: blurring the EU's boundaries**

Analysis of covered news events and policy areas shows that coverage of the EU focuses on particular topics, while it neglects other areas. However, the restricted image of the EU in UK news coverage is further limited through the usage of particular rhetorical devices. Metonymy emerges from the texts as a powerful device which creates a distorted and rather narrow image of the European Union. Metonymy is 'a semantic link between two senses of a lexical item that is based on a relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression in each of those senses' (Geeraerts, 1994, p. 2477). In other words, in a metonym, the name of one thing (the source) is used to refer to another thing (the target) with which it is associated or to which it is contiguous (Panther and Thornburg, 2007).

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<sup>17</sup> Other rhetorical devices may be mentioned in passing if they contribute to the argument made.

Metonyms are particularly interesting when they are used as rhetorical devices for referring to the EU or EU actors. Metonyms used to refer to EU actors give either a blurry or a skewed and narrow representation of the EU. They either ambiguously refer to ‘Europe’, drawing a linguistic distinction between the UK and the EU (Daddow, 2011), or narrowly to ‘Brussels’, which implies a focus on the European Commission, ignoring other institutions and actors. Other metonyms referring to EU actors are rare in the subsample selected for this particular chapter but throughout the data, there are instances of certain member states being the source for the target ‘EU’.

|                        | <b>‘Brussels’</b> | <b>‘Europe’</b> |
|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | 2 (20.0%)         | 8 (80.0%)       |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>  | 1 (14.3%)         | 6 (85.7%)       |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>      | 3 (16.7%)         | 15 (83.3%)      |
| <b>Guardian</b>        | 6 (18.8%)         | 26 (81.3%)      |
| <b>Mirror</b>          | 0 (0%)            | 3 (100%)        |
| <b>Sun</b>             | 13 (40.6%)        | 19 (59.4%)      |
| <b>Telegraph</b>       | 7 (29.2%)         | 17 (70.8%)      |
| <b>Total</b>           | 32 (25.4%)        | 94 (74.6%)      |

*Table 14 Total number and row percentage of references to metonymies for EU actors*

Table 14 shows how these metonymies are distributed across news outlets. Overall, ‘Europe’ is more common than ‘Brussels’ although both of them are used frequently throughout the subsample and the entire data sample. In particular, at the *Telegraph* and the *Sun*, ‘Brussels’ is used frequently to refer to EU actors. This is a common *pars pro toto* in news coverage, similar to ‘Number 10’ as a metonym for the UK government. However, despite its common occurrence it is worth reflecting on its implications. ‘Brussels’ may be recognised as a metonym for the EU but it also means a focus on the institutions and actors based in Brussels, such as the Council, and Council President Van Rompuy (until December 2014) or Tusk (since December 2014), and, more importantly, the Commission, and EC President Barroso (2004-2014) or Juncker (since 2014). The Commission is a particularly prominent institution throughout the sample, a trend which neglects the intergovernmental aspect of European integration (Balch and Balbanova, 2017). Even in coverage of the EP elections, the Commission takes a prominent position in the reporting. While a *pars pro toto* such as ‘Number 10’ also leads to certain actors – in this case the Prime Minister – being emphasised, the ‘Brussels’ metonym is even more radical since it excludes a diversity of institutions. Most importantly, it excludes those who are

directly accountable to the public, namely MEPs. Heads of states and governments are mentioned in the sampled items. However, and similar to the UK, they are represented as dealing with the EU (with the Commission) as a foreign entity. The fact that they are directly involved in the EU through the Council is neglected. While this kind of metonym may not be unique to the EU, it nevertheless has consequences: it transforms the EU into a bigger threat. Those elements, which are directly accountable to the electorate, are excluded from coverage, while it is at the same time pitted against domestic actors.

‘Brussels’ highlights the Commission as the key institution and decision-maker within the EU. ‘Europe’ as a metonym for EU actors, in contrast, provides a blurry and ambiguous representation of the EU, which ignores differences between geographical and political boundaries, and obscures responsible actors. This process also permits Othering of the EU (Daddow, 2011).

The ‘Europe’ metonym contributes to the confusion of institutions which are and are not EU institutions. The most prominent example here is the ECHR, which is often referred to as ‘Europe’s highest court’ (for example McElroy, 13 May 2014, *The Daily Telegraph*). Although this is not factually wrong, it leads to ambiguity since the European Court of Justice is frequently described with the same words. Similarly, the Council of Europe is not differentiated from EU institutions. They are used mostly synonymously with the European Union or other EU institutions. Very few news items in the sample acknowledge the distinction. Referring to any of them as simply ‘Europe’ is common. If voters are frustrated about ECHR decisions, for example when it comes to issues such as voting rights for prisoners or deportation of foreign offenders, and are not clear about their independence from the EU, this might influence their attitudes towards the EU and ultimately voting behaviour.

Similarly, certain puns obscure the European Union for the readers, as in *The Sun*’s headline for an article covering net migration figures: ‘Eurovision Throng Contest’ (Newton Dunn, 9 May 2014; *The Sun*). The rhetorical equation of the ESC (Eurovision Song Contest) with the EU provides a tool for journalists and authors to explain the processes in EU institutions and the UK’s relationship with the EU through a pop culture reference and vice versa. It breaks down a more complicated process into an oversimplified metaphor (see below), which has the potential to create a strong, lasting impression of the EU as an institution. This specific pun, but also other wordplays on Eurovision and the EU, completely ignore the nuances and real policy making processes in European institutions. Of course, journalists and subeditors use these connections for entertainment purposes or in order to create a catchy headline rather than for consciously evaluating the EU. However, these puns may create a connection between the topics for the readers which, on the one hand, make the EU more tangible since it is linked to

an experience closer to the audience. On the other, these connections further obscure the EU, the EU's actions and responsibilities and possibly leave a bitter aftertaste because of the UK's repeated lack of success in the ESC. It feeds into a narrative of the EU ganging up against the UK. This is enhanced by the discursive differentiation between the UK and 'Europe' which underpins British discourses about the EU (Spiering, 2015; see also 7.2). The UK is regarded as fundamentally different to Europe, not as a European country, which is involved in decision-making on an EU (and Eurovision) level.

The frequent usage of these metonyms – 'Brussels' and 'Europe' – instead of referring to the target itself (i.e. the EU), may be a matter of convenience since the technicalities of EU institutions and responsibilities may go beyond the scope of a news article or broadcast (see Chapter 7). However, these metonyms have become established synonyms for the EU and EU actors, often carrying negative connotations stemming from metaphors which will be discussed below.

#### ***4.5.2. Battleground Europe: the effect of metaphors in the British debate about the EU***

##### Definition of metaphor

Metaphors map conceptual structures from a source domain onto a target domain. The source domain, which is an interdiscursive element, is normally more familiar and closer to the recipient's experiences than the target domain, which tends to be more abstract. The source domain therefore helps to make the target domain more tangible (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). While the source and target domain of a metonymy are the same, source and target domain of metaphors are different although linguists are in disagreement whether these two can always be as clearly distinguished (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003; Panther and Thornburg, 2007). However, for the purpose of this chapter we will rely on Lakoff and Johnson's (2003) differentiation between the two rhetorical devices.

This section does also not make a distinction between metaphorical speech and metaphors. Similes are also included as a weaker form of metaphorical speech. Most metaphors discussed in this chapter are, furthermore, discourse metaphors which, although relatively stable, can change over time according to cultural and social preoccupations. This differs from conceptual metaphors, which are universal, stable and often acquired in childhood (primary metaphors; Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). Discourse metaphors are grounded in these conceptual metaphors but evolve over time, reflecting contemporary issues. Often, an old source domain, stemming from conceptual metaphors, is used to map on to a new target domain, which constitutes – at the moment – a dominant issue. Therefore, discourse metaphors are still grounded in cultural scripts and stereotypes (Zinken *et al.*, 2008). Due to their changeable nature, however,

communicators with an elite position in the production of discourse such as politicians, are able to establish new metaphor scenarios. If successful, they become widely known through further comments and reinterpretations by other elite communicators, such as journalists (Musloff, 2004, p. 94). Often discourse metaphors create a metaphor scenario, ‘a set of standard assumptions made by competent members of discourse community about the “prototypical” content aspects [...] and social/ethical evaluations concerning elements of conceptual domains’ (Musloff, 2004, p. 17).

Metaphors are particularly interesting for CDA since they provide argumentative advantages (Musloff, 2012). Similar to presuppositions (see 5.3), metaphors reduce the need for the author ‘laboriously having to demonstrate and back up their claims with facts, which could be critically tested and challenged’ (Musloff, 2012, p. 303). Instead, they simply invite the recipient to access pre-existing knowledge which needs no further explanation. Metaphor scenarios in political discourse ‘allow their users to make complex political conclusions appear obvious and unproblematic on account of the analogical link to folk-theories and attached common-sense judgements’ (Musloff, 2004, p. 173). Thereby, inconsistencies in metaphors do not obstruct the recipient’s comprehension of it, because a few source elements act as conceptual cues. These cues can then be used to construct a scenario to ‘fit a specific political interpretation of the target topic’ (Musloff, 2004, p. 22).

|                        | <b>Total number of metaphors</b> | <b>Average number of metaphor per item</b> |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | 23                               | 4.6  |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>  | 18                               | 9  |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>      | 120                              | 9.2  |
| <b>Guardian</b>        | 164                              | 9.1  |
| <b>Mirror</b>          | 36                               | 7.2  |
| <b>Sun</b>             | 149                              | 7.1  |
| <b>Telegraph</b>       | 169                              | 8.4  |
| <b>Average</b>         | 97                               | 7.8  |

*Table 15 Distribution of metaphors across news organisations*

A brief look at the distribution of metaphors reveals that the total number found in the sample differs quite significantly with broadcasters using this rhetorical device less frequently than newspapers and broadsheets using them more often than tabloids (see Table 15). However, the average<sup>18</sup> number of metaphors for each news organisation shows little difference between them, although the two traditional tabloids, the *Mirror* and the *Sun*, use metaphors slightly less frequently than the broadsheets. The odd one out here is the *BBC* which uses them least frequently.

A literature research on usage of metaphors generally (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003) and in particular in texts about the European Union (Musloff, 2004; Musloff, 2006; Musloff, 2012) provided a preliminary list of potential domains to be coded in the data. These findings guided the structure of analysis and sharpened my sensitivity to metaphorical references to different domains. Similar to coding of frames, this list was then expanded when new domains were encountered.

While some metaphor domains identified by Musloff (2004; 2006) such as *life-health-strength* or *architecture-house-building* are present, too, this discussion will focus mainly on a domain which is not addressed in previous research on metaphor use in political discourse about Europe. This domain can be classified as *warfare/violent conflict*. As shown below, this metaphor feeds into the most common frame in the sample: *the EU as a source of conflict/crisis*.

#### Electoral warfare

In both data collection periods, the sampled news outlets discuss the EU and the possibility of an EU referendum frequently and present them as one of the deciding issues for voters, despite the relatively low salience of the issue for electoral choice (see Table 8). *Conflict/crisis* framing further heightens the importance of these issues in news coverage. This frame accentuates actors' positions on the issue. Furthermore, metaphors found in the subsample contribute to the construction of *conflict/crisis* frames, as is discussed below.

One source domain, which is persistent throughout both data collection periods and across news organisations, explains elections and electoral strategies in the terms of *warfare* or *violent conflict*.<sup>19</sup> While *race*, *competition* or *test* metaphors – especially in the reporting of opinion polls – are also frequent in the subsample, the *warfare/violent conflict* metaphor dominates. It contributes strongly to the construction of the *EU as a source of domestic conflict/crisis* frame in the reporting of the two election campaigns. The target domain of *political disagreement* or *argument* is mapped onto the source domain of *warfare/violent conflict*, exacerbating the

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<sup>18</sup> Average is calculated by dividing total number of metaphors by total number of items in the sample.

<sup>19</sup> Warfare metaphors are common in news coverage generally, for example in sports coverage, among others.

conflictual nature of these disagreements by linking it to violent conflict, and tapping into one of the most common metaphors in everyday life, *argument is war* (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003).

Table 16 shows that only the broadcasters hold back on this *warfare* metaphor, while newspapers use it on average once in each sampled item to refer to the election. Conflict orientation in print media becomes particularly salient through use of this metaphor. However, while the *warfare* metaphor is prominent in both data sets, it is more common in the first collection running up to the European elections (on average 1.1 metaphors per item) than in the second collection period in advance of the General Election (on average 0.5 metaphors per item).

|                        | Average number of “Election Warfare/Violent Conflict” metaphors per item | Average number of “EU/EU migration = electoral battle ground” metaphors per item | Average number of “EU = violent aggressor” metaphors per item | Average number of “(Re)negotiation = warfare/violent conflict” metaphors per item |
|------------------------|--|--|---|---|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | 0  | 0  | 0   | 0.2   |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>  | 0.2  | 0.5  | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>      | 1.1  | 0.1  | 0.1   | 0.1   |
| <b>Guardian</b>        | 0.9  | 0.8  | 0.2   | 0   |
| <b>Mirror</b>          | 1  | 0.6  | 0   | 0   |
| <b>Sun</b>             | 0.9  | 0.1  | 0.3   | 0.1   |
| <b>Telegraph</b>       | 0.8  | 0.2  | 0.3   | 0.1   |
| <b>Average</b>         | 0.7  | 0.3  | 0.1   | 0.1   |

*Table 16 Average distribution of references per item to selected metaphors*

In this electoral war, news organisations, especially those opposing a referendum (see Table 16), represent the EU and EU migration as ‘key election battlegrounds’ (see example below), making the argument more salient to its readers and thereby emphasising its importance for them. Politicians take different sides in this battle and use their stance to ‘attack’ the opponent. Interestingly, while the *warfare* metaphor was more common in the first data set, the mapping

of the European Union and EU migration as electoral issues on the domain of battlegrounds was more frequent in the second set (0.5 metaphors per item in comparison to 0.2 metaphors per item in the run-up to the European elections). The EU appears to have gained salience as an electoral issue in the General Election. However, it was not represented as such prominent conflict between or within the parties in advance of a European Election. The *warfare* metaphor is also used to refer to election results, with vocabulary such as ‘triumph’, ‘defeat’ or ‘rout’ (see below) or to describe tactics and strategies in the election campaign.

*In contrast, the Tories want to avoid a difficult day for David Cameron turning into a rout<sup>20</sup>. [...] Labour high command has its own serious problems. (Martin, 18 May 2014; Sunday Telegraph)*

*So maintaining a connection with the continent is crucial. But that connection with Europe has become a key election battleground and depending who wins a referendum could see Britain leaving the EU altogether. An outcome that the boss here doesn't favour. (Kennedy, 28 April 2015; Channel 4 News)*

In the sample, metaphors from the domain of *violent conflict* also refer to arguments about the EU within parties, making the conflictual nature of politics more salient to the audience. For example, Eurosceptic Conservatives are reported to be holding ‘the PM’s feet to the fire’ (Newton Dunn, 1 May 2015, *The Sun*) in order to achieve those reforms from the European Union that they expect and to make sure the referendum is delivered.

The example below refers to Nick Clegg’s refusal to make resistance to an EU referendum a priority in any coalition talks, which is referred to as ‘surrender’. While the excerpt below has an intertextual element within a news text, the author nevertheless chose to include this quote verbatim, from a large pool of potential resources (Balch and Balbanova, 2017). Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, it is treated the same as texts originally written by the author (see 5.3 for further discussion of intertextuality).

*Pat McFadden, shadow Europe minister, said: “Although [the Lib Dems] have traditionally prided themselves on being a pro-European force, yesterday’s comments from Nick Clegg look like he is preparing to surrender their position [...]” (Wintour, 7 May 2015; The Guardian)*

However, not only politicians are represented to be entrenched in this warfare but also the voters themselves, mostly with regard to their party allegiances. Party defections in this case are frequently described as ‘deserting’ a party (see example below). Again, this fits in neatly with the overarching metaphor of *elections are warfare*. The reason for their breach in allegiance is cited as the offer of an EU referendum or a cap on EU migration. Voters are reminded that their vote will determine whether the electorate is offered an EU referendum.

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<sup>20</sup> Relevant metaphors are highlighted in the quotes by de-italicising.



While this was a justified argument during the General Election campaign due to manifesto commitments supporting or opposing a referendum, it was not the choice on offer during the European Elections.

*As Britain votes in European elections, the Prime Minister made a last-ditch attempt to stop voters deserting his Conservatives for Nigel Farage and the United Kingdom Independence Party. (Kirkup and Swinford, 22 May 2014; Daily Mail)*

*The Tories are fighting to avoid heavy losses in the European elections, and could lose as many as 11 of the 26 seats they gained in the last elections in 2009. The Tories say they are the only party to definitely offer an in/out referendum. (Olterman and Helm, 18 May 2014; Observer)*

*If you're in one of those 26 battlegrounds, hold your nose and vote Tory on Thursday to keep Labour out. Farage has urged supporters to vote "as wisely as they can". We believe this is what he means. (Editorial, 5 May 2015; The Sun)*

The examples above from the two collection periods illustrate the *warfare* metaphor. The Conservatives' attempt to retain seats is described as 'fighting to avoid heavy losses', a clause clearly associated with warfare. In the example from the *Sun*, the connection is even more direct, calling marginal seats 'battlegrounds'. This metaphor is generic in the coverage of elections in the UK. However, coverage of the EU as the key issue which can win the electoral war is noteworthy.

#### Elitist bubbles and EU aggressions

The *EU = electoral battleground* metaphor is more common in news organisations with a pro-European editorial line, namely the *Guardian* and *Mirror*, thereby emphasising the importance of the issue for the electorate. *Channel 4* uses this metaphor as well but it is almost absent in the right-wing papers and on the *BBC*. Instead, particularly the right-wing newspapers use the *warfare* metaphor for the target domain of UK dealings with the EU, such as (re-) negotiations. The right-wing press is furthermore most likely to represent the EU metaphorically as a *violent aggressor* (either as a single entity or particular institutions and actors) which threatens the UK. This also feeds into *threat* framing as discussed in 6.2, contributing to the construction of a European enemy against which the UK has to defend itself. This metaphor taps into discourses about the historical relationship between the British Isles and European continent, which emphasises different values, violent encounters between the two and the aggressive nature of 'Europe' (see 7.2).

*TORY big beast Boris Johnson marched through the key battleground of the North West yesterday and insisted: The only way to stand up to Europe is vote Conservative. (Newton Dunn, 1 May 2015; The Sun)*

In newspaper opinion pieces in particular, these and further metaphors appear to help build an argument for or against a referendum, with the pro-referendum side sometimes using

emotive language to make their case for the vote. For example, *The Telegraph* discussed in two separate pieces Iain Duncan Smith's warning that a vote for UKIP was a 'suicide note' since it will diminish the chances of a Conservative majority and therefore an EU referendum (Dominiczak, 5 May 2015, *The Daily Telegraph*).

Furthermore, on this side of the argument, the referendum is presented as a unique opportunity for voters to 'have a say', mapping the process of voting on the domain of *speaking* (and being listened to). This complements another metaphor prominent in the texts, which maps political elites onto the concept of a *bubble*, which is exclusive and secluded from the electorate whose voices normally do not penetrate this *bubble*. The pro-European cause and opponents of a referendum thereby become condescending, detached elites, which refuse to listen to citizens, making discourses about elites a useful resource to tap into when talking about the EU. A referendum in this source-target mapping becomes the popular and common-sense decision the electorate deserves. This is underlined by rhetorical questions, which emphasise the common-sense aspect of the referendum. In the example below, rhetorical questions feed into the representation of pro-Europeans as elites and Euroscepticism as the popular cause of British people. This line of reasoning works well, since it is combined with a representation of the EU as a *violent aggressor*, which the UK must resist.

*We ask ourselves - who does this country belong to? Does it belong to all the softbellied, Oxford-educated nonentities in Westminster? Does it belong to unelected, corrupt bureaucrats in Brussels? Or does it still belong to the British people? (Parsons, 26 April 2015; The Sun on Sunday)*

Rhetorical questions are questions which expect no answer (Frank, 1990). Answers are already presupposed (Schmidt-Radefeldt, 1977). In the terms of Speech Act Theory, rhetorical questions constitute an indirect speech act which can have multiple purposes but none of them is for eliciting information, since the answer is already implied in the question (Frank, 1990). Especially when rhetorical questions are posed in combination with relevant information for making a judgement, they can constitute an effective persuasion strategy (Frank, 1990; Howard, 1990). At the same time, the question format of these indirect speech acts can serve as hedges which make controversial opinions more acceptable, for example opposition to EU immigration (e.g. Is it racist to suggest borders should be controlled?). Frank (1990, p. 738) summarises the effectiveness of rhetorical questions as follows: 'by strengthening assertions and mitigating potential threats to face, they enable people to win an argument (short term), while not jeopardizing a relationship (long term).'

### Floods of migrants

Immigration features prominently in the arguments for a referendum, giving further evidence for the assertion made above that the order of discourse ‘immigration’ is closely linked to the order of discourse ‘EU in the News’. Another, powerful metaphor is used here, which simplifies immigration policies and turns controlling immigration into a straightforward and, again, common-sense endeavour. Firstly, the *threat* posed by immigration is emphasised by mapping the target domain (immigration) onto the source domain of *inflows of water* (for example influx, flood, inundation). The metaphor, as illustrated below, dehumanises the migrants and therefore detaches the issue from its complex human aspect (see also 6.3 on refugees). Almost exclusively right-wing newspapers use this metaphor, particularly frequently the *Sun*. In the example below, the author uses ‘pour in’ to describe the movement of migrants, which are referred to in terms of large numbers. ‘To pour’ is normally used in relation to liquids, not people, thereby dehumanising the migrants.

*Experts believe more than 30,000 Romanians and Bulgarians have poured in looking for work since restrictions were lifted in January. (Editorial, 12 May 2014; The Sun)*

Secondly, national borders are mapped onto the conceptual domain of *physical obstacles*, in particular walls with doors. The metaphor is again particularly frequent in right-wing newspapers but features in other outlets as well. In particular, the reference to *doors* fits into the metaphor of *Europe and individual countries as a house* (Musloff, 2004; Cap, 2017). These doors are described to be open, leading to uncontrollable immigration. Politicians are expected to shut this door but as long as the UK remains a member of the EU they are not able to. Of course, immigration policy is more complex than opening and closing a door but as mentioned above, metaphors simplify abstract processes in order to persuade the audience.

### EU withdrawal: gambling with separation

Overall, this configuration of metaphors creates a strong argument for voting for parties offering a referendum or even withdrawal from the EU, turning it into a democratic right, an anti-elitist cause and emphasising the threat posed by immigration. Correspondingly, while on both sides of the argument, Brexit is metaphorically referred to as a *physical separation of the UK from the continent*, in items supporting the referendum, advocates for a referendum represent Brexit to be initiated by the UK as a whole. The UK in this context is collectively referred to, as in the following example which exemplifies not only the popular aspect of Brexit, the electorate’s informed decision, but also the UK’s agency in the process of exiting the EU.

*The boss here says he is proud of British heritage and he believes British business should be proud of their heritage too, that means pulling back powers from Europe, cutting loose from the endless stream of rules and regulations, and if that renegotiation can't be*

*completed, he believes we shouldn't be afraid of walking away. (Kennedy. 28 April 2015; Channel 4 News)*

In texts favouring a referendum, Brexit is characterised as actively ‘walking away’, which involves decision-making by the whole electorate (even though there may be differences in the electorate on the topic) and a straightforward process. Opponents of a referendum represent the movement as involuntary, as ‘being dragged out’ against better judgement and, most importantly, against the will of the British people. It is represented as a tactic by Cameron to appease the right wing of his party, which may backfire not only on him but the entire country.

Journalists therefore urge voters to listen to their ‘head’ not their ‘heart’ to guide their electoral choice, presenting a vote for parties opposing a referendum as the rational choice, which safeguards the economy. In this context, the referendum is often metaphorically referred to as a *gamble*, which carries incalculable risks. HSBC’s announcement of a headquarter review is used to illustrate the risk of the *gamble* pointing out the consequences of this uncertainty before the General Election result was even announced. Interestingly, exactly the same event is used by the Conservative-supporting press, which downplays the Brexit aspect of this decision and instead either blames Labour’s policy proposals or attacks HSBC as immoral.

*David Cameron and George Osborne are gambling with British jobs, British earnings and British prosperity by threatening a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union.*

*The selfish pair are jeopardising our nation's future for the sake of their party, dropping their own opposition to a referendum to avert a civil war among Conservatives and hoping to lure back a few votes from UKIP. (Editorial, 24 April 2015; The Mirror)*

*It is perfectly true that HSBC, in common with most large companies, fears a Brexit, or British exit from the European Union, and would really rather not see the referendum that has been promised by David Cameron.*

*In most cases, however, businesses are even more scared of the kind of militant 1970s-style socialism that would be ushered in by Miliband and his backers, the trade union barons. (Sunderland, 24 April 2015; Telegraph)*

The relationship with the EU is throughout characterised as a ‘deal’ rather than a ‘partnership’, emphasising the utilitarian commitment to the EU. This reduces the emotional appeal of continued membership or opposition to a referendum.

The metaphors used in this subsample show some general trends throughout the data, such as the frequent mapping of the *warfare* domain onto the election domain. However, news organisations differ with regard to the metaphors used in their discussion for Brexit. The Eurosceptic press in particular is using metaphors effectively to build an emotive and popular argument for a referendum while economic arguments for remaining or for opposition of a referendum appear to have relatively little persuasive potential and seem subservient to the aggressive EU.

#### 4.6. Summary

This chapter set out to provide an overview of scope and focus of EU coverage in UK news media (research question 1a, see Figure 1). Analysis shows that coverage is largely inward-looking. The EU is most commonly reported in the context of domestic events, echoing findings of previous research (for example Campbell, 2006). When EU-level events are reported, consequences for the UK are emphasised. This is particularly evident in the broadcast and tabloid data, with broadsheets engaging more in EU level events even when they do not directly affect the UK.

Furthermore, this chapter provided evidence that only a limited number of policy areas are reported in depth by most news outlets included in this sample. Again, the broadcasters are particularly focused on those few policy areas, while broadsheets cover a wider range. They nevertheless spend most space on those four identified areas: *Governance and decision making, evolution of the EU, immigration and economic and financial policy*.

Arguments for continued membership of the EU are similarly restricted. Mainly economic reasons are brought forward, while political advantages of membership are less common and concentrated in pro-European news outlets. Historic achievements of the EU are correspondingly also rarely reported. Only the *Guardian* and *Channel 4 News* make an effort to do so. These trends are supported by journalists' rhetorical choices. Metonymies and metaphors contribute to a narrow scope of coverage, undermine pro-European arguments and furthermore provide a textual link to different discourses which are integrated into the order of discourse 'EU in the News'.

## **Chapter 5. Establishing the tone of coverage through frame analysis: highlighting the EU's negatives**

The previous chapter showed that the scope of coverage of the EU is restricted. In this chapter, the distribution of news frames is considered to determine how media coverage evaluates the EU (Research question 1b, see Figure 1). The chapter reiterates previous studies' findings that negative representations of the EU outweigh positive representations in British news coverage (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Daddow, 2012; Hawkins, 2012). However, the chapter goes beyond this observation exploring the distribution of frames, facets of frames, their links to particular news events and policy areas, as well as their linguistic realisation. This extra level of detail deepens our understanding of discursive practices as realised in 5.2.2 which shows how different news organisation highlight the need for different kinds of EU-reform (cultural, economic, political) and consider different beneficiaries (the UK or the EU more broadly). Furthermore, an analysis of the linguistic realisation of frames contributes to an understanding of the hybridity of news texts, their conventions and rules and subsequently to identify obstacles to a change in discourse. Analysis of language grounds the identified frames more firmly in the texts. It uncovers the ways in which language choices can highlight particular aspects of a story, contributing to the framing of the EU. Understanding how these choices achieve framing helps the researcher to identify frames and provides a textually grounded justification for coding choices.

This chapter shows, firstly, a numerical dominance of negative frames compared to positive frames, and, secondly, a pattern in the distribution of frames which foregrounds negative frames. Major news events and frequently reported policy areas are more likely to be framed negatively, while positive framing is more common in the coverage of events and policy areas, which are not covered commonly. The last section of this chapter will use one particular news event – the CJEU's ruling on the *right to be forgotten* – to show how links to external texts contribute to the realisation of both negative and positive frames as well as the dominance of the former over the latter. Throughout the chapter, I highlight the interdiscursive links to historical discourses about continental Europe, which feed into framing and intertextual elements of news coverage.

### **5.1. Numerical dominance of negative frames**

#### ***5.1.1. Overview of the pattern***

Simply looking at the number of coding references makes one pattern obvious: the predominance of negative frames. This confirms previous research which finds a negative representation of the EU in British news coverage to be more common than positive portrayals

(see for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Anderson, 2004; Hawkins, 2012). While this is not an entirely new insight, the margin is nevertheless striking (see Table 17 in comparison to Table 18). Positive representations are much less frequent and therefore not as readily available to the news audience than negative ones. The sheer frequency of negative frames gives evidence that the whole order of discourse is tilted towards negativity. This makes it difficult to introduce more positive arguments into news coverage and the discussion more widely since they do not match the conventions of the order of discourse.

|   | <b>EP Elections Data Collection (8 May – 29 May 2014)</b> | <b>General Election Data Collection (30 March – 14 May 2015)</b> |
|---|---|--|
| <b>EU is a Bargaining Forum/ Horse-trading</b>                  | 214   | 223  |
| <b>EU in need of reform</b>                                     | 250   | 74   |
| <b>EU incompetent or dysfunctional</b>                          | 516   | 706  |
| <b>EU needs to act</b>  | 13  | 167  |
| <b>EU as source of conflict or crisis</b>                       | 1323  | 1383   |
| <b>EU not important or insignificant</b>                        | 53  | 36   |
| <b>EU separate from Britain - Britain separate from EU</b>      | 126   | 223  |
| <b>EU is a Threat</b>   | 873   | 758  |
| <b>Total references to frames highlighting negative aspects</b> | 3368  | 3570   |

*Table 17 Number of references to frames highlighting **negative** aspects of the EU or EU membership*

|   | <b>Collection Period I</b> | <b>Collection Period II</b> |
|---|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Britain makes difference in EU</b>                           | 59                         | 174                         |
| <b>EU as competent</b>  | 14                         | 119                         |
| <b>EU is a force for good</b>                                   | 208                        | 304                         |
| <b>EU is important</b>  | 117                        | 276                         |
| <b>Total references to frames highlighting positive aspects</b> | 398                        | 873                         |

*Table 18 Number of references to frames highlighting **positive** aspects of the EU or EU membership*

Table 17 and Table 18 give an overview of frames in both data sets.<sup>21</sup> Table 17 shows the clear predominance of the *conflict/crisis* frame, as well as the *threat* frame – which can be directed at the UK, at countries including the UK, or just other countries excluding the UK – followed by the *incompetent/dysfunctional* frame. Positive frames such as *EU as a force for good* or *EU is important* are far less common (see Table 18) and are more likely to be found in items which also use negative frames. Items with negative frames are less likely to also highlight the EU’s positive aspects (see Appendix E, Table 47). Furthermore, the *important* frame focuses mainly on the *importance of the EU for the UK’s national interest*, reiterating previous findings of a domestic focus, without necessarily recognising the achievements of the EU. Only when the EU is represented as actively improving citizens’ lives or economies, then the *force for good* frame is employed, but this frame is least commonly used in *home news* (*EU is competent* is also rare in these types of items; see Appendix E, Table 46). Negative frames are more common in *home news* items, making these aspects more relevant for the UK audience (see Appendix E, Table 46). Positive and negative frames also differ regarding the aspects they highlight. Positive framing of the EU highlights mainly the economic aspects, while negative frames also put emphasis on political and cultural aspects.

Acknowledgement of non-economic achievements do not match dominant historical discourses about ‘Europe’, posing an obstacle to changing the discursive conventions. It contradicts the dominant discourse about the UK’s relationship with ‘Europe’, in which the UK’s involvement is represented as utilitarian rather than ideological. This is based on a particular interpretation of history which perceives continental Europeans as utopian and impractical while the UK is characterised by pragmatism (see 7.2).

### 5.1.2. Most common frames

The most common frame in the sample is *the EU as a source of conflict or crisis*. This frame was introduced since the *threat* frame could not sufficiently capture acute crises and conflicts. The code is used when the EU is represented as causing or at least as having some substantial responsibility for these crises or conflicts. The frame highlights the EU’s contribution to both domestic and international conflicts or crises on a *cultural/social, economic* and *political* level (see Table 19). This includes, for example, references in which the EU’s contribution to economic struggles of Greek citizens is highlighted or references in which the EU is represented as an issue fought over by domestic politicians.

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<sup>21</sup> Each overarching frame summarises a number of sub-nodes which provide more detail on the framing, for example whether the EU is framed as *incompetent* in *political, economic* or *cultural* terms. These differences for the most common frames will be addressed throughout these chapters (please also refer to Appendix A for an overview of frames).



| <b>Frame code</b>   | <b>Sub-categories</b>  | <b>EP Elections Data Collection (8 May – 29 May 2014)</b> | <b>General Election Data Collection (30 March – 14 May 2015)</b> |
|---|--|---|--|
| <b>EU as source of CULTURAL/SOCIAL conflict/crisis</b>      |  | 28  | 133  |
|   | Cultural/Social DOMESTIC conflict/crisis                     | 21  | 16   |
| <b>EU as source of ECONOMIC conflict/crisis</b>             |  | 76  | 211  |
|   | Source of DOMESTIC economic conflict/crisis                  | 23  | 157  |
| <b>EU as source of POLITICAL conflict/crisis</b>            |  | 1259  | 1117   |
|   | EU as source of DOMESTIC POLITICAL conflict or crisis/crisis | 908   | 617  |
|   | Eurocepticism wins votes                                     | 167   | 66   |
|   | Losing support, no support                                   | 317   | 75   |
|   | EU criticised  | 1   | 3  |
|   | Legitimacy of concerns about EU/EU-related issues            | 118   | 22   |
| <b>Total References to EU as a Source of Conflict Frame</b> |  | 1323  | 1383   |

*Table 19 Number of references to subcategories of EU is a source of conflict/crisis frame*

These references also often contain a tacit assumption or explicit statement that in any of those domestic conflicts and crises, Euroscepticism will win electoral support (see also 4.4). While this is the most common frame throughout, there is a tendency among Sunday newspapers to use this frame less frequently. Considering the nature of Sunday newspapers, which are more concerned with commentary and analysis rather than (often conflictual) breaking news, this is not entirely surprising.

The category of *political conflict/crisis* contains a sub-node for *EU is losing support/has no support*: due to the lack of support, or the loss of support, the EU itself is in crisis. This lack of support can furthermore create conflict among domestic actors. In about a third of references highlighting the lack of support for the EU, framing also highlights the legitimacy of such Eurosceptic sentiments. Here, overt statements, such as the example below, are coded. Interesting in this example, and contributing to *threat* framing, are inflammatory modifications such as ‘devastating’, or ‘corrupt, unaccountable’. They make resistance against the EU appear even more legitimate.

*The public's deep concerns over mass immigration, with its devastating impact on housing, hospital services and schools, and the loss of sovereignty to a corrupt, unaccountable Brussels, were dismissed as the ravings of bigots and fanatics. (Editorial, 24 May 2014; Daily Mail)*

Throughout the sample, resistance towards the EU, European integration, and even EU migration, is rarely challenged but instead presupposed. These assumptions rely on a particular interpretation of British history, within which Europe is not only regarded as fundamentally different from the UK, but is also often seen as inferior (see 7.2). These assumptions provide a useful discursive resource for journalists, while at the same time posing an obstacle to any challenges to the dominant discursive conventions.

Predominance of the *conflict/crisis* frames is not surprising. Acute conflict is one of several news values, which make it more likely for a story to be included in a newspaper or broadcast (see Chapter 7, in particular 7.4). Furthermore, very prominent (frequently reported) news events in the sample, such as the intensifying refugee crisis or Greek debt crisis, are inherently crisis- or conflict-oriented. It is not surprising journalists deduce that the EU has contributed to these crises and conflicts (see also 5.2.2 and 6.2).

Additionally, data collection took place during election campaigns – a period rife with conflict (Valentino *et al.*, 2011). The *conflict/crisis* frame is used consistently in stories covering elections, election campaigns and election results, both on a domestic and on a European level. Different positions towards the EU are employed to contrast parties and individuals and to show how these positions are important in the fight for votes. In particular,

in news stories covering the General Election campaign, the EU is framed as an issue, which can be instrumentalised in the chase for votes or in coalition talks (see 4.4 and 4.5). Again, this taps into discourses of British pragmatism and a perception that support of EU membership in the UK is based on cost/benefit calculations (see 7.2).

|                                 | <b>Directed at the UK</b> | <b>Directed at other countries</b> | <b>Directed at both UK and other countries</b> |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| <b>EU as a cultural threat</b>  | 328 (77.5%)               | 17 (4%)                            | 78 (18.4%)                                     |
| <b>EU as an economic threat</b> | 438 (55.5%)               | 259 (32.8%)                        | 92 (11.7%)                                     |
| <b>EU as a cultural threat</b>  | 309 (67.5%)               | 87 (19%)                           | 62 (13.5%)                                     |
| <b>Total</b>                    | 1075 (64.4%)              | 363 (21.7%)                        | 232 (13.9%)                                    |

*Table 20 Number of references to threats directed against UK and other countries (row percentages)*

The second most commonly used frame in both sets is emphasising the *threat* posed by the EU. The *EU as a threat* frame is different to *EU as a source of conflict/crisis* because it is not emphasising an acute conflict, problem or crisis, but is more abstractly highlighting the EU's likely potential to inflict danger or damage without necessarily providing manifest evidence for it. Often the *threat* frame refers to less imminent problems than the *conflict/crisis* frame, which emphasises specific issues at the time of reporting. While a *threat* frame may refer to a particular conflict or crisis, it explores the event from a different angle which does not highlight its conflictual nature but the EU's likely negative impact in a particular event on actors such as the UK. This is illustrated in the example below which covered the EU's proposal for refugee quotas (see also 6.3).

*EVERY country within the EU could be forced to accept a quota of refugees under highly controversial plans to be unveiled by Brussels this week.*

*Britain said it would refuse to accept the proposal by the European Commission to share the refugees and asylum seekers - who have arrived in their thousands in southern Italy in recent months - among the EU's 28 member states.*

*The plan, driven by Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the European Commission, is "practically seen as a declaration of war", one senior EU official said. (Philipson, 11 May 2015; Telegraph)*

The *threat* frame in the example above refers to threats both to the UK and other countries. Overall, the UK is represented to be most likely at the receiving end of those threats (see Table

20). However, *economic threat* is also often used to emphasise a danger for other countries – Greece specifically. *Cultural* and *political threats* are by far more likely to be emphasised for the UK.

### 5.1.3. Differences between data collection periods

While these patterns of negative frames outnumbering positive frames are consistent throughout both data collection periods, there are some slight differences between both samples. The first period is defined by one major EU-related news story, the EP election, which is most commonly reported using the *conflict/crisis* frame, also due to the conflicts arising from Eurosceptic parties' successes. In the second period, EU-related news stories are more varied with several major EU stories breaking during the collection period, which are reported using a variety of frames. The contrast between negative and positive framing is not as stark. *Important* as well as *competent* frames, highlighting the importance of the EU for the business community, are more frequent in the second period. At the same time, the *EU and UK are separate* frames become more frequent, which tap into the dominant historical discourse of 'Europe' as the Other (see 7.2). This reflects an accelerating referendum debate, which emphasises both the possibility of separation and the importance of the EU for UK interests.

Secondly, however, EU coverage in the second period becomes even more negative in some respects due to a shift within the *deficiencies of the EU's status quo* sub-frames. In both periods, framing frequently highlights the deficiencies of the EU's status quo. However, frames in the first period also emphasise the *need and potential of reform* as a solution for problems within the EU (for which there are 250 references). In the second period, the focus lies almost exclusively on the *EU's incompetence* and the inadequacy of EU actions. This is an interesting change in the reporting of EU deficiencies. Despite the government's promise to reform the UK's relationship with the EU, the *need for reform* is not emphasised to the same extent (about which there are 74 references). Within the order of discourse, this signifies a gradual shift away from soft Euroscepticism seeking reform to a harder variety of Euroscepticism which excludes opportunities to improve the EU and the UK's relationship and instead promotes leaving as the most suitable option to deal with reported problems about the EU.

It appears as if Eurosceptic discourse hardened between the two election periods. The circumstances of a General Election may contribute to this. During the campaign, Cameron repeatedly confirmed that if his reform proposals were not implemented to his satisfaction he would recommend a leave vote in a referendum on membership (Cameron, 2015; Oliver, 2016). Ed Miliband, in contrast, opposed a referendum. Hardening positions in the media outlets mirror this dynamic.

It also indicates that confidence in the EU's ability to reform to the benefit of the UK was waning. Possibly Cameron's unsuccessful campaign to contest Jean-Claude Juncker's nomination to become Commission President after the 2014 European Election contributed to this perception. In the media coverage directly after the EP election, he is portrayed as the status quo candidate who would not consider the UK's proposals for reform. This is exacerbated by the fact that nobody in the UK could vote for him in the first place. Other events, such as the EU's insistence on quotas for the distribution of refugees and the handling of Greece's renewed debt crisis may have further weakened trust.

Additionally, the focus of reform changes in the second period. When framing the EU as *in need of reform*, in the first period, this is reform aimed at changing the EU as a whole. In the second period, reform refers to changing the UK's terms of EU membership and the UK's relationship with the EU. This is linked to an increased awareness of a potential EU referendum. Therefore, also the *bargaining* frame is mainly used in the context of stories covering the UK's relationship with the EU rather than in stories covering EU-related events. This corresponds with an increase of *separate* frames in the second period, highlighting the differences between the UK and EU on policy decisions, in their approach to economics and with regard to values and norms (see also 6.1 and 7.2).

#### **5.1.4. Distribution of frames across newspaper sections**

The distribution of frames across different types of newspaper articles contributes to the observed imbalance. Although news reports are more common, it can be observed that EU-related issues generated a large number of commentary pieces in the newspapers, particularly in the first collection period. The broadsheets furthermore dedicate a lot of space to EU-related issues in their economy and business sections (see Table 21 and Table 22 as well as Appendix E for further tables). It ties in well with previous observations, that the *force for good* frame, as well as the *competent* and *EU is important* frames, are most common in the Business or Finance Section of newspapers. This reinforces the finding that EU support is based mainly on economic considerations. The pattern can be seen most clearly in the *Telegraph*.

Particularly interesting is the coverage of EU-related issues in editorials and other opinion pieces. Editorials clearly state a newspaper's official line with regard to certain issues, in comments and columns the opinions of individual people are presented. They offer evaluation of an issue (Van Dijk, 1998) which may serve as a guide for readers to interpret the situation but also for policy makers to judge public opinion (Druckman and Parkin, 2005; Firmstone, 2008). In line with assumptions about the media's agenda-setting powers (McCombs and Shaw,

1972), if many comments and editorials are dedicated to a specific subject, it may create the impression of salience (Pfetsch *et al.*, 2010).

In both periods, *The Sun* focuses on EU-related issues in their editorials and therefore made very clear their views on the EU. Not only did the *Sun* publish a large proportion of opinion pieces (see Appendix E, Table 43), there was also a clear dominance of *threat, incompetent* and *conflict/crisis* frames in these items.

The *Mirror* also publishes a large number of eligible editorials in the first data collection period,<sup>22</sup> when compared to its overall coverage of the EU which is the least extensive of all sampled media outlets. Framing in those editorials looks very different in comparison to the *Sun*. The *Mirror* is much more likely to frame the EU as a *force for good* in their opinion pieces, confirming the observation that the *Mirror* follows a more pro-European editorial line.

|   | News         | Editorial/Opinion | Business/Finance/Economy |
|---|--------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>EU is a Bargaining Forum/ Horse-trading</b>                  | 254 (64.6%)  | 96 (24.4%)        | 43 (10.9%)               |
| <b>EU in need of reform</b>                                     | 95 (31.6%)   | 131 (43.5%)       | 75 (24.9%)               |
| <b>EU incompetent or dysfunctional</b>                          | 421 (37.5%)  | 384 (34.2%)       | 318 (28.3%)              |
| <b>EU needs to act</b>  | 84 (73%)     | 25 (21.7%)        | 6 (5.2%)                 |
| <b>EU as source of conflict or crisis</b>                       | 1258 (54.1%) | 587 (25.2%)       | 480 (20.6%)              |
| <b>EU not important or insignificant</b>                        | 31 (32.8%)   | 34 (41.5%)        | 17 (20.7%)               |
| <b>EU separate from Britain - Britain separate from EU</b>      | 180 (59.4%)  | 72 (23.8%)        | 51 (16.8%)               |
| <b>EU is a Threat</b>   | 789 (51.4%)  | 338 (22%)         | 408 (26.6%)              |
| <b>Total references to frames highlighting negative aspects</b> | 3112 (50.4%) | 1667 (27%)        | 1398 (22.6%)             |

Table 21 Distribution of references to frames highlighting *negative* aspects across newspaper sections

<sup>22</sup> Less so in the second one

|   | News        | Editorial/Opinion | Business/Finance/Economy |
|---|-------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>Britain makes difference in EU</b>                           | 125 (59.8%) | 49 (23.4%)        | 35 (16.7%)               |
| <b>EU as competent</b>  | 52 (43.7%)  | 8 (6.7%)          | 59 (49.6%)               |
| <b>EU is a force for good</b>                                   | 174 (39.1%) | 97 (21.8%)        | 174 (39.1%)              |
| <b>EU is important</b>  | 122 (34.4%) | 87 (26.7%)        | 127 (39%)                |
| <b>Total references to frames highlighting positive aspects</b> | 473 (42.7%) | 241 (21.7%)       | 395 (35.6%)              |

Table 22 Distribution of references to frames highlighting *positive* aspects across newspaper sections

In comparison, the *Guardian* dedicates a small number of editorials to EU-related issues, particularly in the first period, considering the large volume of coverage of EU-related issues in the paper overall. The EU referendum, however, sparks interest at the *Guardian*, indicating its importance for news organisations, and contributes to a higher volume of editorials in the second period. Furthermore, the *Guardian* is more likely to use the *force for good* frame in opinion pieces, although the *threat* frame is still frequent in the *Guardian's* News and Business News sections.

In both data sets, the *Daily Mail* focuses less on EU-related issues in their editorials. However, a large number of eligible comments is published. More than a quarter of sampled *Daily Mail* items in the first period are comments. The percentage for the second period is lower at 16.1%. The *Telegraph* publishes fewer comment pieces; only 7.8% of items sampled around the EP elections were comments. This increases to 10.6% in the second collection period but this is still lower than other outlets. Instead, the EU is more prominent on the *Telegraph's* Business pages (26.3% and 44.3%). Despite the numerical difference, the *Daily Mail* and the *Telegraph* share a predominance of *threat*, *conflict/crisis* and *incompetent* frames in both opinion pieces and news reports. This clarifies editorial opinion and columnists' opinion on the EU but also frames the EU negatively in supposedly information-focused news items, which contravenes the tenets of the genre. News reports should be separated from opinion even though it is questionable whether this ideal form of separation is practised in reality (Druckman and Parkin, 2005). However, due to this distinction, readers decode messages in these dissimilar formats differently. The *Telegraph* and *Daily Mail* as well as the *Sun* are also more likely to

frame the EU negatively on the first ten pages of the three newspapers, which arguably attract more attention from readers (see also Appendix E, Table 44).

## **5.2. Negative representation traced in intersections of framing and policy areas**

### **5.2.1. An overview**

The previous section established that negative framing is more common than positive framing in the sample. This section supplements these observations by showing which specific policy areas are linked to particular frames. Such an analysis can tell us, for example, what about the EU is seen as a *threat* or what about the EU is seen as a *force for good*. A broad, but not entirely surprising, trend emerges. The most common policy areas reported in the sample appear to correlate with the most common frames in the sample. While news coverage does acknowledge some of the EU's achievements in areas such as *environmental policy*, those areas themselves receive very little attention. In contrast, in the context of policy areas which news organisations pay most attention to, for example *freedom of movement*, the EU is more likely to be framed negatively. This reinforces the observation that negative framing is stronger in the sample than positive framing (see Table 23). Audiences are more likely to encounter negative frames than positive frames, especially in the coverage of salient policy areas.

The EU is framed as a *force for good* mainly when covering less prominent policy areas, such as *environmental policy*, *regional policy*, *social policy* or *science, research and development*. Although newspapers recognise positive contributions from the EU in these areas, the positive contribution does not generate much coverage. These policy areas seem to be of limited interest to the news organisations in this study.

If we examine the data from another angle – which policy areas are referred to most commonly in a specific frame rather than which frame is most frequently used in the coverage of a particular policy area – the picture becomes clearer. The positive frame *force for good* refers to *economic and financial policy* most commonly. Similarly, *important for national interest* and *competent* frames appear mostly in connection with this policy area. This supports the aforementioned observation that support for the EU or EU membership is mainly expressed in terms of economic gain, rather than ideological commitment. However, even in this policy area, *conflict/crisis* and *threat* frames still outweigh positive frames, both quantitatively and – as will be explored later – qualitatively. This may be linked to the media organisations' perception of audience interest but also news values such as negativity (see Chapter 7).



|   | <b>Bargain-<br/>ing<br/>Forum/<br/>Horse-<br/>trading</b> | <b>UK makes<br/>difference<br/>in EU</b> | <b>Deficien-<br/>cies of the<br/>EU status<br/>quo</b> | <b>EU as<br/>competen<br/>t</b> | <b>EU as<br/>source of<br/>conflict or<br/>crisis</b> | <b>EU is a<br/>force for<br/>good</b> | <b>EU is<br/>important</b> | <b>EU not<br/>important<br/>or<br/>insignifi-<br/>cant</b> | <b>EU and<br/>UK are<br/>separate</b> | <b>EU as a<br/>Threat</b> |
|---|---|--|--|---------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Administrative<br/>matters</b>         | 3   | 0  | 46   | 0                               | 20  | 6                                     | 0                          | 0  | 10                                    | 94                        |
| <b>Agricultural policy</b>                | 4   | 0  | 17   | 0                               | 4   | 16                                    | 3                          | 1  | 2                                     | 36                        |
| <b>Audiovisual policy</b>                 | 0   | 0  | 0  | 0                               | 0   | 0                                     | 0                          | 1  | 0                                     | 0                         |
| <b>Consumer policy</b>                    | 2   | 1  | 9  | 0                               | 5   | 29                                    | 1                          | 0  | 4                                     | 32                        |
| <b>Economic and<br/>financial policy</b>  | 102   | 35                                       | 842  | 125                             | 1048  | 233                                   | 96                         | 5  | 94                                    | 646                       |
| <b>Education policy</b>                   | 0   | 0  | 1  | 0                               | 3   | 1                                     | 0                          | 0  | 0                                     | 4                         |
| <b>Energy policy</b>                      | 3   | 7  | 34   | 2                               | 8   | 2                                     | 3                          | 0  | 2                                     | 10                        |
| <b>Environmental<br/>policy</b>           | 0   | 11                                       | 18   | 3                               | 15  | 42                                    | 4                          | 0  | 3                                     | 30                        |
| <b>Evolution of the EU</b>                | 393   | 184                                      | 418  | 4                               | 916   | 124                                   | 298                        | 23   | 159                                   | 264                       |
| <b>Fisheries policy</b>                   | 0   | 0  | 5  | 0                               | 7   | 0                                     | 0                          | 0  | 1                                     | 4                         |
| <b>Foreign policy</b>                     | 10  | 33                                       | 163  | 28                              | 99  | 23                                    | 32                         | 4  | 20                                    | 60                        |
| <b>Governance and<br/>decision-making</b> | 125   | 84                                       | 381  | 17                              | 653   | 46                                    | 56                         | 36   | 98                                    | 165                       |
| <b>Immigration</b>                        | 87  | 93                                       | 513  | 44                              | 916   | 97                                    | 27                         | 31   | 158                                   | 722                       |
| <b>Industrial policy</b>                  | 0   | 0  | 8  | 0                               | 0   | 3                                     | 0                          | 0  | 1                                     | 14                        |

|  | <b>Bargain-<br/>ing<br/>Forum/<br/>Horse-<br/>trading</b> | <b>UK makes<br/>difference<br/>in EU</b> | <b>Deficien-<br/>cies of the<br/>EU status<br/>quo</b> | <b>EU as<br/>competen<br/>t</b> | <b>EU as<br/>source of<br/>conflict or<br/>crisis</b> | <b>EU is a<br/>force for<br/>good</b> | <b>EU is<br/>important</b> | <b>EU not<br/>important<br/>or<br/>insignifi-<br/>cant</b> | <b>EU and<br/>UK are<br/>separate</b> | <b>EU as a<br/>Threat</b> |
|--|---|--|--|---------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Information,<br/>communication,<br/>and cultural policy</b> | 0   | 0  | 5  | 0                               | 6   | 1                                     | 0                          | 0  | 0                                     | 13                        |
| <b>Justice and internal<br/>affairs</b>                        | 17  | 15                                       | 81   | 17                              | 66  | 52                                    | 15                         | 0  | 24                                    | 185                       |
| <b>Labour and<br/>Employment</b>                               | 2   | 6  | 50   | 1                               | 46  | 19                                    | 5                          | 9  | 4                                     | 71                        |
| <b>Regional policy</b>   | 1   | 1  | 3  | 0                               | 2   | 4                                     | 2                          | 0  | 0                                     | 4                         |
| <b>Regulations</b>   | 2   | 8  | 28   | 2                               | 16  | 15                                    | 10                         | 1  | 3                                     | 39                        |
| <b>Science, research<br/>and development<br/>policy</b>        | 0   | 0  | 6  | 0                               | 3   | 10                                    | 0                          | 2  | 0                                     | 19                        |
| <b>Social policy</b>   | 25  | 6  | 39   | 0                               | 67  | 26                                    | 3                          | 3  | 8                                     | 103                       |
| <b>Telecommunication<br/>and information<br/>technology</b>    | 3   | 2  | 45   | 0                               | 36  | 41                                    | 8                          | 0  | 2                                     | 83                        |
| <b>Trade policy</b>  | 7   | 4  | 17   | 0                               | 18  | 21                                    | 23                         | 2  | 4                                     | 34                        |
| <b>Transport policy</b>  | 1   | 0  | 5  | 8                               | 0   | 17                                    | 3                          | 0  | 1                                     | 23                        |

*Table 23 Total number of references to frames by policy are*

In the context of frequently covered policy areas, which are salient to the audience (see Table 8), such as *economic and financial policy*, *immigration* or *governance and decision-making*, the EU is more likely to be framed as a *source of conflict/crisis*, a *threat*, or as *incompetent/dysfunctional*. *Threat* is the most common frame in the coverage of the majority of policy areas. These range from *administrative matters* (for example *economic threat* from ‘waste’ in the EU institutions) to *telecommunications* (the CJEU’s ruling on the *right to be forgotten* was framed as a *threat*, see 5.3.4). *Immigration* is a further policy area, which attracts the *threat* frame, particularly with regard to freedom of movement. The *Sun* and *Daily Mail* connect these two most clearly. These *threats* are most frequently directed at the UK or UK actors (see Table 20).

The *EU as a source of conflict/crisis* frame is used in a majority of references referring to *economic and financial policy*, *evolution of the EU*, *governance and decision-making* and *immigration*. These are the most frequently covered policy areas in the sample. Coverage also emphasises *dysfunctions/incompetence* and the *need for reform* of the European Union – perceived or real – in the context of popular policy areas, such as *foreign policy*, *regulation*, *governance and decision-making*, *economic and financial policy*, among others. The following section takes a closer look at one of these popular policy areas, *economic and financial policy*.

### **5.2.2. *Economic and financial policy: opportunity or failure?***

In the UK, even the most enthusiastic pro-Europeans generally oppose any prospect of the UK joining the single currency and are very quick to criticise the introduction of the euro and the subsequent governance of the Eurozone. At the same time, single market access and free trade within the market with its benefits for the UK economy are regarded as the best aspects of membership (Wall, 2009; see also above), tapping into discourses about British pragmatism (see 7.2). Coverage of *economic and financial policy* seems at a first glance similarly contradictory. On the one hand, the most prominent frames are *conflict/crisis*, *threat* and *dysfunctional/incompetent*. On the other, most references to the *EU as a force for good* cover this policy area. This section explores in more detail the dynamics in reporting this policy area.

In the second data collection period, the intensifying Greek debt crisis attracted a large volume of coverage. In this context, *economic and financial policy* is an important aspect of EU policy which news coverage consequently referred to and discussed intensely. *Dysfunctional/incompetent*, *conflict/crisis* (domestic, economic and political) and *threat*, in particular to the Greek population but also to the Greek government’s sovereignty) are used frequently as frames through which to explore the story.

The Greek debt crisis is one of the rare news events in which *threat* directed to countries other than the UK is emphasised more commonly than *threats* to the UK. Across news outlets the inflexible approach of the EU is highlighted as one of the reasons why the problem has become so acute and will not be solved quickly. While the IMF is not spared criticism, it is the eurogroup, in particular Germany, and the ECB, which are represented as particularly problematic. The ECB as an institution is furthermore framed as undemocratic and as an imposition on Greek sovereignty.

While in this case threats are directed against Greece, not the UK, coverage still relies on the same frames, showing that they are an established convention of the order of discourse. However, not only does coverage – particularly in the right-wing newspapers – highlight failures of the EU in handling the Greek debt crisis specifically, but it questions the introduction of the euro itself and frames this as an *incompetent* decision, doomed to fail and create economic and political *crises* across the continent.

Criticism is not restricted to right-wing newspapers. The *Guardian* emphasises the lack of flexibility in the EU's handling of the problem and how it is diminishing democracy as well as living standards in Greece. The *Guardian* is the most sympathetic news organisations regarding Greece. Others acknowledged the sacrifices made by Greece, however, they were also highly suspicious of Greece's left-wing government. Reporting of these news events therefore highlights the UK media's tacit support for capitalist market principles (see also Herman and Chomsky, 1994, on anti-communism) as well as their opposition to EMU, their suspicion of far-left politics as well as EU institutions.

However, *conflict/crisis* and *dysfunctional/incompetent* frames are not restricted to coverage of the Greek crisis but are evident in more general coverage of issues in the Eurozone. In this policy area, *incompetent* framing outstrips *competent* and *force for good* framing across all news organisations. Furthermore, *incompetent* framing is also more frequent than *EU in need of reform*. Both of these frames highlight the EU's deficiencies. However, while *EU in need of reform* includes potential solutions, *incompetent* framing does not. The euro itself is seen as a deficiency, which, in combination with undemocratic and stubborn institutions and actors, has created this crisis. This produces a bleak picture of the EU's future since no possibility is opened up to address these deep-seated, structural deficiencies.

| <b>News Organisation</b> | <b>Area for Reform (in majority of references)</b> | <b>Purpose of reform (in majority of references)</b> | <b>Proposed solutions (in majority of references)</b> | <b>Likelihood of improvement (in majority of references)</b> |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>   | Mostly political                                   | Improvement for UK                                   | Less integration                                      | N/A  |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>    | Political and cultural                             | Improvement for UK and France                        | Less integration                                      | N/A  |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>        | Mainly economic                                    | Improvement for UK                                   | Less integration                                      | Low  |
| <b>Guardian/Observer</b> | Mainly economic (also political and cultural)      | Improvement for UK, Greece and EU more broadly       | More integration                                      | Medium   |
| <b>Mirror</b>            | N/A  | N/A  | N/A   | N/A  |
| <b>Sun</b>               | Mainly economic                                    | Improvement for UK                                   | Less integration                                      | Low  |
| <b>Telegraph</b>         | Mainly economic                                    | Improvement for UK, and EU more broadly              | Less integration                                      | Low-Medium   |

*Table 24 Summary of differences between news organisations in 'Reform' framing in context of Economic and Financial Policy (over both periods)*

While the *EU in need of reform* frame is less frequent than *incompetent* in all news organisations, there are differences between them with regard to the areas for potential reform, the purpose of reform, the solutions they propose and the likelihood of successful reform (see Table 24). A frame not only highlights a particular problem but can also include the promotion of different aspects of a problem, as well as potential solutions and evaluation of solutions (Entman, 1993). While broadcasters are more concerned with reforming political structures, the newspapers focus on economic reform. The *Guardian* furthermore points out the need for *cultural reform* to make the EU fairer.

With regard to the purpose of reform, two groups emerge from the data: news organisations which focus mainly on the effects reform will have on the UK and news organisations which are also concerned with improvements for other EU countries and citizens. The *Daily Mail*, *Sun* and *BBC* are mainly concerned with the positive effects EU-wide reform could have on the UK

economy, business and citizens, confirming previously made observations that news discourse about the EU is generally inward-looking. The *Guardian*, *Telegraph* and *Channel 4* widen the discourse and look more explicitly beyond the UK with *Channel 4* being particularly concerned with France, the *Guardian* with Greece and the *Telegraph* with the Eurozone more broadly. The *Mirror* does not cover *economic and financial policy* in much detail at all. Therefore, no trends for the *Mirror* can be reported here.

The type of reform proposed within this frame again divides the news organisations into two groups, but they are less balanced. Almost all of the news organisations in the sample saw reduced integration as the best way to go forward, which is in line with Eurosceptic reasoning throughout the years (Daddow, 2013). The *Daily Mail* and *Telegraph*, in particular, both advocated a reduction of integration and a looser, trade-based community, and use the UK as a role-model which the EU should follow due to the UK's strong economic performance and its successful handling of the financial crisis. This line of reasoning links media coverage to discourses about the historical relationship between the UK and EU, which emphasises the UK's competence and superiority (see 7.2).

Only the *Guardian* proposed deeper integration as a solution to improve *economic and financial policy* in order to harmonise markets and create solidarity within the bloc, thereby challenging the dominant discourse. While the *Guardian* did not go so far as to suggest that the UK should join the euro, it advocated a completion of the single market and British engagement in the process. Considering the more pro-European disposition of *Guardian* readers (see Chapter 7), it is questionable whether this challenge has much of an impact. It may challenge the dominant discourse within society but it can be argued that *Guardian* readers are not as committed to this discourse in the first place.

Despite these proposed solutions, optimism for their realisation is low, particularly at the *Daily Mail* and *Sun*. This is attributed to the EU's centralising tendencies as well as its *incompetence* in financial matters. The *Telegraph* and *Guardian* held more faith in the EU's ability to realise reforms but compared to frequent *incompetent* framing, this optimism could not counter the rather bleak vision of the EU's economic future.

*Furthermore, areas of incompetence include fundamental aspects of the EU, such as the euro itself – a development which can hardly be reversed without severe consequences for the whole of the European continent. The Daily Mail, Telegraph and the Sun, and to a lesser extent the Guardian and BBC, directly blamed the introduction of the euro for economic difficulties across Europe. This matches the criticism of too much integration, which most of those newspapers propose to be reduced, and is complemented by an assessment of the EU as complacent and dictatorial (see 7.2). It is highlighted that, despite the evident shortcomings of the euro, the EU remains determined to enforce its policies, even if it means to take away sovereignty from countries like Greece. This then generates*

*extremist voting behaviour across the EU. Stimulative monetary policy may not still be in play in two years' time, they said, according to reports of the committee's March meeting.*

*Members warned that growth projections for 2017 relied on several elements that might turn out to be less supportive than forecasts assumed. (Spence, 2 April 2015; Telegraph)*

In contrast, the *EU as competent* frame is used far less frequently throughout the sample and is limited to particular actions, such as quantitative easing. This does little to mitigate the overall impression of the EU as incompetent and dysfunctional with regard to *economic and financial policy*, especially because *competent* frames are usually qualified by statements limiting the positive impact of those competent actions, as the example above illustrates.

### **5.3. Intertextuality and assumptions: an analysis of the coverage of the *right to be forgotten***

#### **5.3.1. The context**

In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided that the *right to be forgotten* included citizens' right to request Google and other search engines to remove links to irrelevant information. The CJEU ruled in favour of Mario Costeja Gonzalez who had demanded that a link should be removed from Google search results. This referred to an article in a Spanish newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, covering the auction of his house due to social security debts. He felt the link appearing in search results was an infringement of his privacy because the debt had since been paid off.

Despite concerns about the implications for free speech, and against the Advocate-General's previous recommendation, the CJEU established that upon request, search engines needed to consider removing links to information which is 'inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes for which they were processed and in the light of the time that has elapsed' (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2014, p. 3).

This case is selected for further analysis because the decision is covered extensively in British mainstream media compared to other CJEU decisions involving digital companies occurring during collection periods (for example ruling on Google's dominant position in the market, 15 April 2015). The *right to be forgotten* also has implications for journalism itself, which makes it an interesting, and unusual, case to look at. Nevertheless, coverage of the decision displays typical patterns of EU coverage in UK news media, such as a predominance of negative frames like *threat*, especially directed against the UK. Despite the patterns identified as typical for EU coverage in British news media, this case is particularly interesting since it may directly affect UK journalism and therefore tap into a wider discussion about press freedom, which goes beyond this ruling. It lends itself to an investigation of interdiscursivity which establishes how the order of discourse 'EU in the News' is constructed by tapping into

other orders of discourse, in this case concerning freedom of speech and information. This section will use tools from CDA – particularly an analysis of assumptions and intertextual elements – to provide further evidence for the assertion made that negative frames not only outnumber positive frames but that they are also more forceful.

### 5.3.2. Description of the subsample

For this sample, all items which cover the *right to be forgotten* as the main news event are included in the sample, totalling 25 items. Table 25 shows the distribution across news outlets, and where appropriate across newspaper sections. Traditional red top tabloids are underrepresented, especially compared to the *Guardian* and *Daily Mail*. The majority of news items are published or broadcast in the days between 13 May 2014, the day of the decision, and 19 May 2014. Only one comment piece in the *Guardian* is published at a later stage, on 26 May 2014. All the items on the day of the decision are broadcast items, reflecting the immediacy of broadcast media.

|                           | <b>Daily Mail</b> | <b>Guardian</b> | <b>Mirror</b> | <b>Sun</b> | <b>Telegraph</b> | <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | <b>Channel 4 News</b> |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Comment and Debate</b> | 4                 | 4               | 1             | 0          | 2                | n/a                    | n/a                   |
| <b>News</b>               | 4                 | 3               | 0             | 1          | 2                | n/a                    | n/a                   |
| <b>Total</b>              | 8                 | 7               | 1             | 1          | 4                | 2                      | 2                     |

Table 25 Distribution of newspaper items across newspaper sections by news organisation

The most common policy areas covered in those items are *justice and internal affairs* and *telecommunication and information technology* (see Table 26). In fact, every sampled item touched upon these two policy areas, which are not normally covered in much depth.

The distribution of frames is comparable with the general trends in the larger sample described above. Three frames in particular dominate the reporting: *EU as a force for good*, *EU is dysfunctional/incompetent* and *EU as a threat* (see Table 27). The number of references shows that *threat* is the most common frame in the subsample. The imbalance is particularly stark in the right-wing press, with the *Sun* avoiding any positive frames. Negative framing is not only visible in news reports but also in editorials, indicating the organisations' stance on the issue. The *Mirror* is the only exception, which published only one eligible article. In this one item, however, the EU was framed positively, highlighting the benefits of the decision for its readers.



| <b>Policy Area</b>                                   | <b>Daily Mail</b> | <b>Guardian</b> | <b>Mirror</b> | <b>Sun</b> | <b>Telegraph</b> | <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | <b>Channel 4 News</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|--|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| <b>Evolution of the EU</b>                           | 1 (1)             | 0 (0)           | 0 (0)         | 0 (0)      | 0 (0)            | 0 (0)                  | 0 (0)                 | 1 (1)        |
| <b>Justice and Internal Affairs</b>                  | 8 (34)            | 7 (28)          | 1 (3)         | 1 (1)      | 4 (11)           | 2 (4)                  | 2 (10)                | 25 (91)      |
| <b>Regulations</b>                                   | 0 (0)             | 1 (1)           | 0 (0)         | 0 (0)      | 0 (0)            | 0 (0)                  | 0 (0)                 | 1 (1)        |
| <b>Science, Research and Development</b>             | 0 (0)             | 1 (1)           | 0 (0)         | 0 (0)      | 0 (0)            | 0 (0)                  | 0 (0)                 | 1 (1)        |
| <b>Telecommunications and Information Technology</b> | 8 (22)            | 7 (33)          | 1 (1)         | 1 (1)      | 4 (12)           | 2 (5)                  | 2 (19)                | 25 (93)      |

*Table 26 Number of news items with references (number of references) to EU policy areas by news organisation*

Some aspects of the event are highlighted through frames. For the *threat* frame, censorship and restriction of freedom of speech and information are relevant. This supports the argument that resistance against press regulation affects coverage in this case. Threats to UK sovereignty, due to the binding nature of the decision, are mentioned particularly in the *Daily Mail* and *Telegraph*. Both use this line of argument frequently in general, which is a crucial characteristic of the broader order of discourse (see 6.2).

Concerns about the practicability of the ruling constitute the aspect most prominent in references coded under *incompetent*. For *force for good*, the protection provided to EU citizens against powerful US technology firms is mentioned. These issues appear across all news outlets. The three most prominent frames are considered in the analysis of assumptions and intertextuality below. Since they are the most common frames throughout, they provide enough data to analyse the impact of assumptions and intertextuality but also reflect trends in the bigger sample.

| Frame   | Daily Mail | Guardian | Mirror | Sun   | Telegraph | BBC News at Ten | Channel 4 News | Total    |
|---|------------|----------|--------|-------|-----------|-----------------|----------------|----------|
| EU as Bargaining Forum/Horse-trading                | 0          | 1 (1)    | 0      | 0     | 0         | 0               | 0              | 1 (1)    |
| EU is dysfunctional/incompetent                     | 5 (12)     | 7 (15)   | 0      | 1 (1) | 3 (8)     | 2 (3)           | 1 (3)          | 19 (42)  |
| EU needs reform                                     | 0          | 1 (1)    | 0      | 0     | 1 (1)     | 0               | 0              | 2 (2)    |
| EU as source of conflict or crisis                  | 1 (1)      | 1 (1)    | 0      | 0     | 0         | 0               | 1 (1)          | 3 (3)    |
| EU as a force for good                              | 2 (2)      | 6 (13)   | 1 (4)  | 0     | 2 (3)     | 2 (2)           | 2 (9)          | 15 (33)  |
| EU is important/EU matters                          | 0          | 1 (1)    | 0      | 0     | 0         | 0               | 0              | 1 (1)    |
| EU not important or insignificant/does not matter   | 0          | 0        | 0      | 0     | 0         | 0               | 0              | 0        |
| EU separate from Britain - Britain separate from EU | 2 (2)      | 0        | 0      | 0     | 0         | 0               | 0              | 2 (2)    |
| EU as a threat                                      | 8 (54)     | 6 (29)   | 0      | 1 (2) | 4 (25)    | 2 (4)           | 1 (10)         | 22 (124) |

Table 27 Number of items with references (number of references) to frames by news organisation

### 5.3.3. Significance of intertextuality and assumptions

Intertextuality and assumptions are two important analytical categories in CDA. They link the analysed texts to other texts and discourses. Discourse, and every statement within discourse, stands in relation to others, just as a book does not limit itself to its covers but always connects to other books (Foucault, 2007). CDA is therefore not only analysis of a text, but also of its relations with other texts. As Fairclough (2003; 2016) points out, most texts are hybrid texts, which draw heavily on other texts and discourses, linking different orders of discourse to each other.

Intertextuality refers to the usage of specific external texts. Although reporting of other people's voices is a major, routine part of news reporting, it nevertheless contributes to construction of frames. Text producers need to choose which intertextual elements to include and exclude, how they present them and their originators (illocutionary intention) which can

influence interpretation of the represented text (perlocutionary interpretation; Fairclough, 1992). Although intention and interpretation may not necessarily coincide, the originator has rhetorical and linguistic devices to steer interpretation in the intended direction. The analysis below identifies some of them, for example lexical choice and semantic relations.

Intertextuality, following Fairclough, not only focuses on direct quotes, which are easily identifiable, but also forms of indirectly reported speech and narrative report of intertextual elements. These are references to external texts without necessarily stating its content (for example ‘the report will be published tomorrow’).

Unlike intertextuality, assumptions rarely indicate their originator. Again, this analysis follows Fairclough’s inclusive approach: ‘Assumptions’ include presuppositions, logical implications and implicatures, which are often distinguished in linguistic pragmatics (Fairclough, 2003). Unlike intertextuality, which refers to a specific text, an assumption is a ‘nebulous “text” corresponding to general opinion, what people tend to say, accumulated textual experience’ (Fairclough, 1992, p. 283). They are represented as uncontested common sense, and are therefore difficult to challenge without marginalising oneself. Assumptions draw on resources of background information and conviction, which, in Habermas’ (1985) terms, constitute a shared lifeworld. By drawing on this lifeworld, assumptions also give coherence to a text and help the interpreter to make sense of it. Ideology introduced – consciously and unconsciously – as a background assumption ‘lead the text producer to “textualize” the world in a particular way, and [...] lead the interpreter to interpret the text in a particular way’ (Fairclough, 1998, p. 85). We can distinguish between different types of assumptions: existential (about the existence or absence of something), propositional (about what will or could be) and value (whether something is good or not; Fairclough, 2003, p. 55).

Intertextuality and assumptions are furthermore instrumental in creating or diminishing difference and creating or diminishing consensus. While intertextuality generally opens up the possibility of difference by including various voices in a text, assumptions have a tendency to reduce difference and create consensus by ‘assuming common ground’ (Fairclough, 2003, p. 41). This consensus can lead to normalisation and marginalisation of diverging views but also create solidarity by focussing on commonalities. Difference can be accentuated and emphasise a conflict between opposing views or create an open dialogue between the opposing views. It can even lead to a resolution (Kress, 1985; Fairclough, 2003). As the following sections show, this is not the case for the sample analysed in this section. Instead, the focus lies on conflict, a struggle between norms, and marginalisation of divergent views.

While it may seem at times that analysis of intertextuality and assumptions contradicts the initial frame analysis, it, in fact, refines it. The absence or presence of frames has been

established through frame analysis. Analysis of links to external texts and other characteristics of language use can demonstrate which characteristics of a text support these frames and whether some frames are more effectively supported by language and intertextuality than others.

#### 5.3.4. Intertextuality: the EU against the experts

Intertextuality provides an opportunity to create dialogue between opposing views but also to accentuate conflict and to highlight power struggles over norms. This section shows that the latter is more commonly the case. While dialogue is created in some texts, there are few attempts to overcome these differences and to find a solution. Instead, the supporters of the ruling appear less trustworthy than the opponents, which are more likely to be presented as experts.

As mentioned above, intertextuality can be realised in different forms. Table 28 summarises the distribution of these types of reported speech across the three most common frames. Directly reported speech and narrative report are more common in references to negative frames than the positive one, while indirectly reported speech is more common in references to *force for good*. Especially more frequent, direct quotations in the negative frames indicates news organisations' focus on these.

|                                 | Dysfunctional/Incompetent | Threat      | Force for good |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| <b>Direct reported speech</b>   | 22 (23%)                  | 60 (62.5%)  | 14 (14.6%)     |
| <b>Indirect reported speech</b> | 15 (17.9%)                | 43 (51.2%)  | 26 (31%)       |
| <b>Narrative report</b>         | 41 (19%)                  | 138 (63.9%) | 37 (17.1%)     |
| <b>Total</b>                    | 78 (19.7%)                | 241 (60.9%) | 77 (19.4%)     |

Table 28 Distribution of types of intertextuality across frames (references and row percentage)

This distribution alone does not give much of an idea of the ways in which intertextuality is realised through references to external texts. However, when we look at the originators of the reported texts, a clearer picture emerges. The text most commonly referred to throughout the reports is the CJEU's press statement explaining the decision, linking legal discourse to 'EU' discourse. In 18 references (direct, indirect or narrative report) this text is contributing to *force for good* framing. References to this external text underline the advantages citizens can secure from this ruling and its limited impact on journalism, as in the example below.

*They also made clear that there was a balancing public interest defence against deletion, especially if the individual was involved in public life. But the judges said that it was the search engine's role in being able to create a "ubiquitous" list of results that can provide a detailed profile of an individual's private life that "heightened" the interference with privacy rights. (Travis, Arthur and Kassam, 14 May 2014; Guardian)*

More often, however, this externalised text is used for negative framing (26 times in *incompetent* frame references, 66 times in *threat* references). The text is commonly introduced in a simplified summary, which neglects most of the details, possibly due to time and space constraints. Only two passages of the original text are frequently reported directly: the phrase ‘right to be forgotten’ and the description of the type of data the ruling refers to (‘irrelevant, excessive or no longer relevant’). The use of those very brief extracts with quotation marks around them can imply a contestation of their legitimacy (Fairclough, 1992). They question the CJEU’s competence in the matter, if they are presented in the appropriate context, which, for example, highlights the futility of the decision. It suggests that the *right to be forgotten* is not a genuine right and ‘irrelevant, excessive or no longer relevant’ data is actually relevant. The context within which the quote is presented contributes to this interpretation because preceding or following the quote, articles highlight the importance of concerned information for the public. This pattern is particularly evident in the *Daily Mail* as well as to a lesser extent in the *Telegraph* and *Guardian*.

In addition, lexical choice influences the negative evaluation attached to this particular external text, and contributes to negative framing of the EU, since its originator is an EU institution. As with any language use, vocabulary is a matter of choice (Fowler, 1991). This choice may not always be conscious and often dependent on conventions of the media organisation as well as the originator’s repertoire. It nevertheless actively contributes to framing. Newspapers, and tabloids in particular, typically use more evaluative vocabulary (for example modifiers in the form of adjectives and adverbs) compared to broadcasters, which, following the regulations of the medium defined by legislation, aim to provide balanced reporting (Conboy, 2006).

In particular, but not exclusively, in data from the *Sun*, *Daily Mail* and the *Telegraph*, the CJEU’s decision is referred to in emotive terms such as ‘Brussels doctrine’ or ‘edict’. Pre- and post-modifications describe it as ‘authoritarian’, ‘ill-considered’ or ‘an act of hubris’. The vocabulary used here invokes *threat* – again linking metaphorically to *violent conflict* – as well as *incompetent* frames since it alludes to threats to the UK’s sovereignty and free journalism but also the CJEU’s inability to come up with a practical solution, adequate for the digital world. It taps into a discourse of British superiority in comparison to ‘Europe’, both regarding

competence and morality. The dominant discourse highlights the UK's democratic history in comparison to continental Europe's tendency for authoritarianism (see 7.2).

Furthermore, semantic relations between the CJEU text and other textual elements contribute mainly to negative framing, not positive framing. Semantic relations can be used to legitimise certain opinions, values and attitudes and help to construct logical arguments (Fairclough, 2003). By establishing these links and establishing coherent meaning relations, semantics contribute to the construction of frames. In the case of the *force for good* frame, this is done through conditional semantic relations, linking the CJEU's ruling to (often fictional) intertextual elements which could be removed from Google search results.

*Lives lived online. Information captured forever, somewhere on the world wide web. But what if that's information you'd rather forget. Today the European Union Court of Justice ruled in favour of what's been called the right to be forgotten. (Newman and Long, 13 May 2014; Channel 4 News)*

Similar to the *force for good* frame, conditional semantic relations but also elaborative, temporal and causal relations provide examples of the ruling's impact. However, here they are used to highlight the threat posed by powerful and dangerous people abusing the decision. *Daily Mail* authors use this strategy the most, but it is also evident in other outlets, like the *BBC*.

*'What about crooked policemen, or workplace bullies? Or men guilty of sex crimes involving children? I don't want this information airbrushed out of history.'* (Street-Porter, 19 May 2014; *Daily Mail*)

*'Those making the requests include a former politician and a man convicted of possessing child abuse images. Our technology correspondent, Rory Cellan-Jones, is with me. And Rory, I suppose, really, the potential impact of this is enormous.'* (Edwards and Cellan-Jones, 15 May 2015; *BBC News at Ten*)

Using (potential) claims as intertextual elements in the coverage of the CJEU ruling contributes mostly to negative framing. Not only is it more common but it also refers to actual cases, while in *force for good* references, only Mario Costeja Gonzalez's original claim and hypothetical scenarios are used. The requests reported for *threat* frames in particular are more tangible and – as will be explained below – match pre-existing assumptions.

In addition to intertextual references to the CJEU's press release as well as to requests for material to be removed from search results, voices of supporters and critics of the ruling have been included in the news coverage. Again, coverage is skewed in favour of negative framing through different patterns: firstly, opposing voices outnumber the supporting voices, and, secondly, opposing voices appear more trustworthy on the issue. In this configuration, difference between the views is accentuated instead of accepted, and opposing voices appear more credible.

Even among broadcasters, sources opposing the ruling outnumber sources supporting the ruling despite obligations to provide a balanced view and give airtime to sources with different opinions. Both are public service broadcasters. However, the *BBC* is the only broadcaster receiving public funds, which results in stricter regulations with regard to balance (see Chapter 7). Therefore, surprisingly, it is the *BBC*, which is the least balanced. *Channel 4* attempts to provide balanced debate. With twice as much airtime as *BBC News at Ten* it is possible for *Channel 4 News* to run longer discussions with a variety of interview partners. However, it needs to be acknowledged that both broadcasters only aired very few items on the topic.

The right-wing press favours opposing voices most clearly. The *Daily Mail* cites 16 sources to illustrate the shortcomings of the ruling, but only two, which support it. In the *Telegraph* the ratio is 15 to three and in the *Sun* item three to nil. However, the *Guardian* also favours critics, 13 to 7.<sup>23</sup> Imbalance is not only evident in opinion pieces but also news reports.

Patterns of intertextuality contribute to the CJEU's representation as out of touch. Most other sources, which include lawyers, high-profile politicians and campaigners, appear to contradict the court. Even the CJEU's own Advocate General is reported to oppose the ruling, highlighting the court's incompetence. Presented as experts, critics are mostly quoted directly. Expert authority does not need further justification to legitimise opinions and actions (Van Leeuwen, 2008). By using expert authorisation for critics and denying authorisation for supporters, the use of external sources strengthens the *incompetent* frame.

*Duncan Lamont, of law firm Charles Russell, said: 'Shoplifting is an example of the sort of minor offence which people might succeed in putting under the right to be forgotten.'*  
*Niri Shan, of lawyers Taylor Wessing, said: 'There are going to be a lot of requests to search engines to remove links. We don't know how they are going to deal with it. It does look as if this ruling will have a widespread effect.'* (Doughty and Seamark, 16 May 2014; *Daily Mail*)

On the other side of the argument, only a small number of different supporters are given space. The main sources here are EU Commissioner Viviane Reding, whose credibility might be questioned by large parts of the audience given her role within the EU, and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, who brought the case in the first place. The most notable exception is David Davis, at the time a Eurosceptic Conservative MP, later Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, who is quoted twice. He has a reputation as a Eurosceptic as well as civil libertarian. His approval therefore weakens the *incompetent* frame. However, credible supporters are comparatively rare. Citizens apart from Mario Costeja Gonzalez do not get a say, which weakens the assertion that citizens with legitimate claims can have an advantage from the

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<sup>23</sup> The *Mirror* did not quote anyone but took a generally supportive stance.

ruling. While at the time of the ruling no other citizens had made use of it, news media could have still gathered citizens' opinion on the issue, particularly those with genuine grievances with regard to their online presence. This diminishes any opportunity to overcome difference and rather accentuates the struggle over norms in the digital world. In this struggle, freedom of information – advocated by experts - overrides privacy rights – advocated by the CJEU.

Furthermore, the lexical choice of verbal process verbs to report their views is interesting, since they often discredit supporters while giving more authority to opponents. While critics' views are reported with rather neutral verbal process verbs such as 'say', the CJEU itself as well as supporters' views are introduced with more negatively connotated verbs, often deriving from discourses about authoritarianism. Examples include 'decreed', 'ruled', 'demand' and 'claim'. On the one hand, these verbal process verbs contribute to *threat* framing, particularly with regard to a threat to British sovereignty as they imply that the EU is exerting power over the UK through handing down rules in a strict hierarchy. On the other hand, verbs such as 'demand' and 'claim' convey less legitimacy of the reported intertextual elements. The difference can be observed in the two examples below. In one of them a credible campaign group is cited directly, in the other support is expressed through indirectly reported speech without identifying the source. The expression 'is being seen' also distances the journalist from the argument, reducing its credibility.

*Rightly, the Index on Censorship said: This is akin to marching into a library and forcing it to pulp books.' (Editorial, 14 May 2014; Daily Mail)*

*This is being seen as a victory for the man and woman on the street, on the internet at least. (Newman and Long, 13 May 2014; Channel 4 News)*

Supporting intertextual references are usually affiliated with the EU, while those opposing ones tend to stem from 'legal experts', well-known British politicians, or experts in the digital industry. While there are attempts to create dialogue between the two sides of the argument, a more conflictual relationship is more often fostered, frequently realised through contrastive semantic relations. The coverage overall provides less of a dialogue between supporters and opponents but rather highlights the incompatible nature of both arguments. There are only a few examples of people actually in dialogue, such as the *Channel 4* broadcast in which Max Moseley represented the supporters and Jodie Ginsberg (Index on Censorship) the critics. Again, however, Max Moseley may be credited with less trust due to his previous court case against a news organisation. While he may be remembered for his campaigning regarding the phone hacking scandal in 2011, this is not acknowledged in the discussion. His court case to remove pictures of an orgy from a news website is referred to explicitly. Overall, instead of



leading to a resolution or a respectful acceptance of differing views, the coverage pushes for consensus, which will be elaborated below.

### 5.3.5. Assumptions: the EU against common sense

Analysis established that negative framing is supported by citation of expert opinion but also by lexical choice and semantic relations. Positive framing is diminished by a lack of supporting expert opinion as well as a lack of citizens' voices, which could highlight the positive impact of the ruling.

This section deals with assumptions, which cannot be attributed to a particular source and which are mostly not clearly marked in a text. Table 29 shows the distribution of different types of assumptions across the three frames considered in this section. It is clear from the table that the *force for good* frame is mainly supported by existential assumptions, while for the two negative frames, propositional and value assumptions are more frequently invoked. As this section shows, the value assumptions create pressure for consensus to oppose the ruling, while the assumptions forming the basis of the *force for good* frame contradict what is presented as common sense.

|                                 | <b>Dysfunctional/Incompetent</b> | <b>Threat</b> | <b>Force for good</b> |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Existential Assumption</b>   | 36 (24.7%)                       | 73 (50%)      | 37 (25.3%)            |
| <b>Propositional Assumption</b> | 13 (28.9%)                       | 29 (64.4%)    | 3 (6.7%)              |
| <b>Value assumption</b>         | 21 (17.6%)                       | 86 (72.3%)    | 12 (10.1%)            |
| <b>Total</b>                    | 70 (22.6%)                       | 188 (60.6%)   | 52 (16.8%)            |

Table 29 Distribution of different types of assumptions across frames (Number of references and row percentages)

One of the most striking existential presuppositions consistently reproduced by all media outlets, and strengthening the *incompetent* frame, concerns digitalisation and the role of digital media in everyday life. News coverage treats it as a given that tech companies hold personal information about individuals and there is little an individual can do about the development. The *Daily Mail* even goes so far as to say that Mario Costeja Gonzalez was 'self-centred' and did not understand that his problem was but a characteristic of modern life which we need to accept (Glover, 15 May 2014; *Daily Mail*). This line of reasoning is underlined by examples – fictional or real – of unflattering information about individuals being published online as something that happens to everyone. 'Googling' is presupposed to be a shared common

practice. Google is treated as the primary if not sole source of information for anyone from the ordinary citizen, journalist to academic researcher.

These existential assumptions are presented as consensual truth, and rarely challenged throughout. Commitment to these assumptions about a digital world achieves consensus building. Modality gives an indication of authors' commitments to a statement or prediction (Fairclough, 2003): if modality indicates certainty, the statement's content will probably make a stronger impression on the reader than if it indicates uncertainty. Modality can be expressed through different linguistic strategies, most commonly modal verbs (see Fairclough, 2003). In the case of these existential assumptions, a lack or hedging modal verbs and other indicators of modality indicates a strong commitment to them. In the example below, the storage of personal information is not questioned but instead presupposed as a feature of modern life, unchallenged by hedging modal construction ('is' instead of 'might be stored online'). In contrast, the usage of 'should' instead of, for example, 'must' indicates that the author distances himself from the ruling. For framing, it matters which modals are used and in which contexts.

*Europe's highest court has ruled that people should have a say in what information about them is stored online. (Edwards and Cellan-Jones, 15 May 2014; BBC News at Ten)*

The CJEU ruling in contrast seems out of touch, anachronistic and ill-judged. It appears to be in conflict with modern life and common social practices shared across the digitalised globe. The CJEU is too slow to adapt to digitalisation and when it tries to it does so with little success and in an impracticable way. Even in references to the *force for good* frame, this underlying assumption diminishes its strength. Implicitly and explicitly, the CJEU's good intentions are juxtaposed with the realities. Any practical application of these intentions is therefore questionable.

*So on the face of it, a new ruling from the European court upholding the "right to be forgotten" looks good news. As the privacy debate has raged around the disclosures of Edward Snowden, pictured, for the past year, putting the genie back in the bottle seems appealing.*

*But this creates a quagmire for any company offering information online: after how long does a bankruptcy ruling become something that should be private? (Mayer-Schoenberger and Ball, 14 May 2014; Guardian)*

Across all media outlets, the *threat* frame is, furthermore, built upon this existential assumption of digital media as an essential element of modern life and, particularly, modern journalism. Google is presupposed to be the most important tool to access information. Therefore, any judicial decision, which restricts access through search engines, is a threat to civil liberties as the following example illustrates, tapping into discourses about freedom of speech and information and their role in democracies. Again, the high commitment of the author

to this claim gives more persuasive potential to the *threat* frame, which is based on existential assumptions about journalism and information gathering.

*'The edict will allow the likes of debtors and dodgy car dealers and workmen to censor a chequered past, since there will be no way of finding the information.'* (Editorial, 14 May 2014: *Daily Mail*)

The essential role of digital media is linked to assumptions concerning free speech. Firstly, it is assumed that freedom of speech and information do exist in contemporary British society. Secondly, it is presupposed that this is good for society, citizens and democracy while censorship is detrimental, as illustrated by comparisons with countries with less liberal free speech legislation. Because this is represented as consensually shared among citizens, the CJEU decision appears at odds with it and in fact a threat to it. It is in conflict with the common (British) understanding of democracy and is therefore an imposition on political sovereignty. Again, news coverage invokes the discourse of British superiority which makes the argument even more meaningful.

In one particular column, this reasoning is combined effectively with an intertextual reference to George Orwell's *1984*. O'Neill (15 May 2014, *The Daily Telegraph*) compares the decision to the Ministry of Truth. Literary references are interesting, not only because they link different genres, but also because they assume the readers are aware of their content and can see the parallels. As *1984* is such a well-established trope, however, even those who have not read it will regard the Ministry of Truth as something undesirable and threatening. It provides a shorthand to convey complex issues and practices. The novel has become an established metaphor, which is used frequently to highlight threats to civil liberties. For example, in a study on media discourses about surveillance, Barnard-Wills (2011) found that besides its re-occurrence in surveillance discourse, the metaphor had spread and become a media frame in itself. It equates contemporary society with a dystopia and thereby creates a simple equivalent between those two worlds. These connections between literary works, *1984* in particular, and real events can create strong mental representations of institutions. In this case, the CJEU and other EU institutions are equated with Orwell's totalitarian Ministry of Truth which contributes greatly to the construction of a *threat* frame.

A combination of value and propositional presuppositions further emphasises the *threat* and *incompetent* frame, in particular in items from the *Telegraph*, *Sun* and *Daily Mail* but also to a lesser extent from the broadcasters and the *Guardian*. Following the decision, some people with criminal records and people of public interest asked for links to be removed. The underlying value assumption suggests that they are not entitled to have information removed due to their misdeeds. It is also assumed that more people will illegitimately try to abuse the

decision (propositional presupposition), thereby strengthening the *threat* frame. In combination with an unchallenged assumption that the ruling will lead to censorship, any opposition to these criticisms appears almost impossible without pardoning criminal behaviour or questioning freedom of speech.

The possibility of legitimate claims is not considered and is even marginalised. Throughout the sample, there are no examples of real legitimate claims apart from Costeja Gonzalez's, which is discredited throughout. Only hypothetical scenarios are provided and these are frequently dismissed as an inevitable part of modern life.

*All this potential airbrushing (even if the events concerned happened long ago) makes me think we're better off accepting some inaccuracies online, rather than letting people with dodgy pasts pretend they never happened. (Street-Porter. 19 May 2014; Daily Mail)*

The CJEU's decision therefore appears not only *incompetent* but also as a *threat* since it allows information of public interest to be removed. Apart from the *Guardian*, no effort is made to challenge the claim that removal of certain pieces of information is censorship but that instead citizens may have legitimate grievances regarding their online presence. Little consideration is given to the idea that in certain circumstances, people should be given a chance to put the past behind them and move on. Most news coverage treats anything that could be demanded to be deleted from search results as documents of public interest. Removal is therefore always a threat. So, in the struggle about norms referred to in the previous section on intertextuality, it becomes clear that through assumptions only one norm can legitimately win the argument. Only through opposing the ruling – as it is argued in the majority of items – can freedom of information and freedom of speech, which outweigh any privacy considerations, be safeguarded.

#### **5.4. Summary**

In this chapter, research question 1b was addressed (see Figure 1). British mainstream news coverage evaluates the EU overwhelmingly negatively, with a dominance of *conflict* frames. In opinion pieces the discrepancy between news organisations becomes particularly evident with right-wing newspapers using *threat* and *incompetent* frames frequently, while left-wing papers are more likely to frame the EU as a *force for good*.

Positive frames are used, particularly in the left-wing newspapers, but these are often restricted to policy areas which are not reported on frequently. Especially in coverage of *economic and financial policy*, the EU's *incompetence* is emphasised. When *reform* is proposed, focus lies on the UK's benefits and the route to reform is almost uniformly regarded as reduced integration. This highlights the scepticism towards the EU and again gives evidence to the inward-looking focus of coverage.

The last section demonstrated how reference to external texts can strengthen and weaken the persuasive potential of frames, thereby addressing research question 1f. In this case, it is the *threat* and *incompetence* frames which are supported by these references and the *force for good* frame which was diminished. In 7.2, intertextuality and assumptions become relevant again because they connect the data to sociocultural discursive practices and therefore contribute substantially to the dialectical relationship between discourse and society.

The analysis of intertextual elements also shows how different discourses are combined within the order of discourse 'EU in the News'. The *right to be forgotten* ruling is an unusual case because it does not match common news values with regard to EU coverage. The focus on civil rights within this coverage is furthermore remarkable in comparison with coverage of other CJEU or ECHR court cases, such as the ruling on prisoners' right to vote. In this case, civil liberties were not regarded as worthy of protection (McNulty *et al.*, 2014). In particular, the right-wing press was most clearly opposed to granting them their civil rights. In fact, it was not even framed as a civil right but rather as a privilege which they lost by committing a crime. In the sample considered in this section, these are the outlets most in favour of protecting a civil right: freedom of information.

It could be argued that the right to privacy is also a civil right and arguing against it in favour of freedom of information is consistent. However, Gies (2011) found that British news organisations tend to advocate more privacy, which is contradictory with their behaviour in the *right to be forgotten* case. These patterns give evidence to the assumption that it is not necessarily the EU itself, which is the target of these negative frames. Instead, the issue here lies with press regulation and its implications for the news organisations. Of course, there are other ways of finding information apart from a Google search. However, these are more time-consuming and not as practical in a 24-hour news cycle. These issues will be touched upon again later in Chapter 7 which discusses practices of production.

However, the underlying opposition to press regulation, which drives reporting, does not obfuscate the fact that coverage here takes the EU as a scapegoat. UK citizens often distrust the press and would potentially embrace further press regulation, particularly after the phone-hacking scandal and Leveson inquiry (Coleman, 2012). However, arguments about the EU's threat to UK sovereignty and values will be shared more widely among the audience. This does not diminish the significance of the representation of the EU in this case. On the contrary, it shows how deeply embedded and readily available these arguments are in British society (see also 7.2).

This chapter showed that negative frames are not only more common, but they also fit more neatly the external texts referred to. Together these patterns create strong, coherent arguments

while positive frames about the EU are not supported by widely-shared assumptions or credible intertextual elements.

## Chapter 6. The UK's relationship with the EU: at a disadvantage

The previous chapters showed that negative framing tends to outweigh positive framing, leading to a rather unbalanced account of the EU. The present chapter links these patterns to representations of the relationship between the EU and UK (research question 1c; see Figure 1). At the heart of this chapter lies the observation that news coverage consistently represents the UK to be disadvantaged. Furthermore, difference and conflict between the two actors are emphasised. The EU appears to be an entity the UK deals with but is not part of, while, at the same time, news coverage portrays the UK as superior in terms of values, traditions, and policy approaches (see also 7.2). Dominant discourses about the European continent and its history in contrast with the UK support those evaluations.

This chapter explores these dynamics in three steps. First, it examines representations of the EU in the context of policy areas which deal specifically with opportunities for the UK to influence the direction and shape of the European project: *Governance and decision-making* as well as *evolution of the EU*. These two policy areas are particularly interesting to look at when considering the relationship between the EU and UK. They include the proposed EU referendum and renegotiations regarding the UK's terms of EU membership. This was not only one of the most frequently debated issues in both samples, it also highlights different visions of a European future in the EU and UK. In addition, decision-making in the EU is represented. These domains present opportunities for the UK to make a mark in the EU but also highlight areas of disagreements between the two most clearly.

In the second part of this chapter, *threat* framing and its links to *immigration policy* will be investigated in more detail. As shown in Table 8, immigration is one of the top issues for UK voters. News coverage reflects this and covers (EU) immigration frequently. Since immigration is such a crucial aspect of EU news coverage, it is worthwhile considering the policy area in more detail. The section identifies some of the features of news discourse which contribute to the representation of the UK as disadvantaged through EU membership despite the UK's superiority (according to some UK media organisations).

The last part of this chapter examines the EU emergency summit on migration specifically, to provide micro-analytical evidence for the broader patterns in representation. It does so by undertaking an analysis of actor representation following van Leeuwen's (1996) approach.

### 6.1. EU coverage in the context of *governance and decision-making* and *evolution of the EU*

Especially in the second period of data collection, news coverage gave greater emphasis to the UK's capability to influence EU actions. With increasing awareness of a potential EU referendum, discussion about benefits and drawbacks of membership pick up in the news

coverage towards the end of the first collection period and in the second collection period. This includes deliberations about the EU's importance for the UK as well as whether the UK can make a difference in the EU, stands somewhat removed from EU dealings, or is even sidelined in negotiations between the two.

| <b>News organisation</b> | <i>Separate or UK makes difference more frequently used as frames</i> | <b>Evaluation of differences (in majority of references)</b> | <b>How to achieve influence (proposed in majority of references)</b> |
|--------------------------|---|--|--|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>   | Separate  | UK deals better with economic issues                         | Confrontation; fears of Brexit                                       |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>    | Separate  | UK deals better with economic issues                         | Confrontation; fears of Brexit                                       |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>        | Separate  | Differences are historic; UK values are better               | Confrontation; fears of Brexit; UK should lead EU                    |
| <b>Guardian</b>          | Separate  | Separation puts UK at disadvantage, should work with EU      | Cooperation  |
| <b>Mirror</b>            | Makes a difference  | Separation puts UK at disadvantage, should work with EU      | Confrontation  |
| <b>Sun</b>               | Separate  | Differences are historic; UK values are better               | Confrontation; fears of Brexit                                       |
| <b>Telegraph</b>         | Makes a difference  | Differences are historic; UK values are better               | Confrontation; fears of Brexit; UK should lead EU                    |

*Table 30 Overview of nuances in framing in the context of 'governance and decision-Making' and 'evolution of the EU' by news organisation*

In the accelerating debate about the referendum, frames highlight, in particular, differences between the EU and UK. They are framed as separate entities, often having different aims and values and achieving different degrees of success with their approaches. For example, looking at handling of economic problems, the UK is consistently held up as superior to the EU, having addressed issues like unemployment, growth and a dysfunctional banking system more effectively. As shown in previous chapters, this reasoning taps into broader discourses about the UK and 'Europe' (see also 7.2). Table 30 summarises differences between news



organisations regarding their framing of the EU as either *separate* from the UK in the context of *governance and decision-making* and *evolution of the EU* or framing as an actor which can *make a difference* in EU-level decision making. The news organisations also differ with regard to the evaluation attached to this separation between the UK and EU and proposed solutions in order for the UK to make more of an impact on EU-level decisions.

The *Daily Mail*, *Sun*, *Telegraph*, and the broadcasters in particular focus on historic differences in values, traditions, and the UK's relationship to democracy, which they deem to be more natural and simply better than the EU's attitude towards democracy, echoing common sociocultural discourse practices regarding 'Europe'. The same news organisations evaluate differences in the handling of the economy, the UK's view on European integration and handling of particular events, such as the refugee crisis (see 6.2), as not only different from the EU but also as better, more realistic, and closer to voters' preferences. For example after the appointment of a new Commission President, this pattern became apparent.

*Mr Juncker is one of the most vocal supporters in the EU of the federalist dream of a United States of Europe. Arriving in the Belgian capital after visiting a building site in London, Mr Cameron said he would only support candidates who understood that the EU needed to change. (Martin, 28 May 2014; Daily Mail)*

The selection process for the Commission President sparked usage of *UK is separate from EU* frames due to the UK's opposition to all of the candidates (see Table 31). The frame *EU as a bargaining forum* is also used to highlight the horse-trading going on at EU level for this high position,<sup>24</sup> emphasising the intergovernmentalist aspect of integration rather than the neo-functional aspects (Balch and Balbanova, 2017). In these negotiations, the outsider position of the UK is emphasised. The EU and other EU states are framed as sidelining Britain in the negotiations, which creates threats to the UK's plan to renegotiate terms of membership as well as to their sovereignty due to the perceived federalist mindset of likely contenders for the position. It also links to perceived differences in values and political preferences, such as different ideas of integration.

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<sup>24</sup> As set out in Chapter 3, more than one frame can be coded for the same passage of texts, if several aspects are highlighted within it. This makes it possible to better capture the richness of the data.

| <b>Frame</b>                       | <b>Sub-category 1</b>              | <b>Sub-category 2</b>                | <b>EC President Selection</b> | <b>EP Elections and Results (other than UK)</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|--------------|
| <b>EU as a bargaining forum</b>    |                                    |                                      | 16                            | 30  | 46           |
|                                    | EU as a cultural bargaining forum  |                                      | 0                             | 0   | 0            |
|                                    | EU as an economic bargaining forum |                                      | 0                             | 3   | 3            |
|                                    | EU as a political bargaining forum |                                      | 16                            | 27  | 43           |
|                                    |                                    | UK is side-lined                     | 8                             | 6   | 14           |
|                                    |                                    | EU is subject to domestic bargaining | 0                             | 5   | 5            |
| <b>EU and UK are separate</b>      |                                    |                                      | 14                            | 27  | 41           |
|                                    | Separate Culturally                |                                      | 1                             | 8   | 9            |
|                                    | Separate Economically              |                                      | 0                             | 5   | 5            |
|                                    | Separate Politically               |                                      | 13                            | 15  | 28           |
| <b>UK makes a difference in EU</b> |                                    |                                      | 3                             | 11  | 14           |
|                                    | EU is on UK's side                 |                                      | 3                             | 3   | 6            |

*Table 31 Distribution of selected frames (number of references) in reporting of EP elections and EC President Selection*

However, not all news organisations follow this pattern. The *Guardian* and, to an extent, the *Mirror*<sup>25</sup> do highlight the UK's separation from the rest of the EU in cultural, economic and political terms but instead of evaluating the UK's position as the superior one, they are rather critical of this separation, thereby resisting the dominant discursive practice of the 'European Other'. The *Guardian* highlights the disadvantages the UK has from disengaging from the EU. It criticises the UK's approach as unconstructive. This presents a challenge to the dominant discourse of the UK as superior to continental Europe, which has fed into discourses about the EU (see 7.2). However, it is still perpetuating the idea that the UK and 'Europe' are two separate entities.

*Britain has plenty of natural allies in the EU in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland and central Europe. But none of them any longer wants to be associated with the truculent British prime minister. (Traynor, 31 March 2015; Guardian)*

News coverage makes apparent different interests of the UK and other EU partners in political, economic and cultural terms. Consequently, when bargaining processes are highlighted (particularly in the context of the policy area *evolution of the EU* due to the renegotiations sought by Cameron), the EU is frequently framed as disadvantaging and even sidelining the UK (see above). The *Sun* goes as far as representing the EU as an elite conspiracy which works to the disadvantage of UK citizens, while the *Guardian* blames this sidelining on the UK's confrontational approach to the EU.

Despite the focus on difference and separation, the UK's ability to shape developments in the EU with regard to *governance* and *evolution* also receives attention. Across all news organisations, the potential for improvement of the EU through the UK's input is highlighted. News coverage concentrates especially on the discussion of Cameron's renegotiation plans but also on the possibilities to influence the direction of European integration more generally and approaches to specific events, the refugee crisis specifically. Again, there are differences between the news organisations, particularly with regard to the mechanisms through which the UK can influence the EU (see Table 30).

At the *Daily Mail*, *Sun* and *Mirror* as well as the broadcasters, the focus lies on confrontation. In this line of argument, the UK can influence the EU by fighting it. This taps into intergovernmentalist interpretations of European integration and draws a clear us-and-them dichotomy. At the same time, the UK is regarded as a powerful negotiator because the EU depends on UK membership.

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<sup>25</sup> Not many references from the *Mirror* in this node so claims need to be treated carefully.

Contrarily, the *Guardian* proposed cooperation as a way for the UK to influence actions at the EU-level. Again, it is highlighted that the EU needs the UK to remain a member but, instead of adapting a confrontational framework, emphasis is put on co-dependence. By proposing this approach, the *Guardian* resists and challenges the dominant discourse which favours confrontation.

The *Telegraph* takes an intermediate position, emphasising the UK's capacity to 'lead the way' on reforming the European Union and the EU's dependency on the UK to do so, which emphasises the UK's superiority.

*These reforms - completing the Thatcherian [sic] vision of the single market - will be good not just for Britain, but for families and businesses across Europe. It is the right way forward for Europe, and never in our lifetimes has a British prime minister had such an opportunity to lead the way. And that is because there are plenty of people in Brussels who agree - however secretly and shyly - with what we are saying. (Johnson, 11 May 2015; Telegraph)*

Two lines of argument become apparent here: The first one is critical of the UK's disengagement and blames this approach for the EU's sidelining in negotiations. The EU could be improved for all members if and when the UK cooperates with European partners. The second and more common argument emphasises the confrontation and conflict between the UK and EU, which emphasises the UK's superiority. At the same time, the EU is represented as ganging up against the UK, putting the UK at a disadvantage and ignoring the UK's attempts to improve the EU.

## **6.2. Threatening the UK: immigration, legitimate concerns and emergency summits**

Chapter 5 established that *threat* is the second most common frame in the sample (see 5.1.2). The *threat* frame becomes particularly important when considering the relationship between the UK and EU because it uses as resources, very obviously, established discourses about the UK's relationship with 'Europe' (see 7.2). As with most other frames in this study, *threat* is coded on a cultural, economic and political level (see Table 32).<sup>26</sup> At the economic level there is a relatively strong focus on the perceived wastefulness of the EU, particularly in the run-up to the European elections (covered in 34 items).

Problems in the Eurozone are also linked directly to the UK, despite the fact that the UK is not part of the Eurozone. The *Daily Mail*, *Sun* and *Telegraph* in particular are explicit in identifying a danger of an economic downturn in the UK due to failing economies within the single currency bloc. The broadcasters as well as the *Guardian* acknowledge the potential repercussions for the UK but focus more on the EU as a whole.

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<sup>26</sup> It also includes references to the EU as being a hindrance to internationalism, although almost only economic internationalism was of interest here.

*Why Europe threatens Britain's recovery; our neighbours need to grow if we are to achieve our goal of a balanced economy. (Warner, 16 May 2014, Daily Telegraph)*

*The EU as a political threat* is the most common aspect and taps into one of the most prominent discourses about the EU: it highlights the authoritarian tendencies of 'Europe' and consequently the perceived imposition of the EU on UK sovereignty. The potential erosion of sovereignty is a particularly prominent theme at the *Daily Mail* (65 references), *Sun* (47 references) and *Telegraph* (107 references). On a cultural level, threats to British values and traditions, emphasising the UK's superior culture, complement the picture.

| <b>Sub-category 1</b>                   | <b>Sub-category 2</b>                       | <b>EP Elections Data Collection (8 May – 29 May 2014)</b> | <b>General Election Data Collection (30 March – 14 May 2015)</b> |
|---|---|---|--|
| <b>EU as threat - cultural</b>          |   | 318   | 131  |
|   | EU contrary to Internationalism – Cultural  | 1   | 1  |
| <b>EU as threat - economic</b>          |   | 329   | 506  |
|   | EU as waste                                 | 78  | 9  |
|   | EU contrary to Internationalism – economic  | 2   | 21   |
| <b>EU as threat - political</b>         |   | 300   | 198  |
|   | EU contrary to Internationalism – Political | 1   | 0  |
|   | EU as Imposition/Superpower                 | 181   | 79   |
| <b>Total references to threat frame</b> |   | 873   | 758  |

*Table 32 Number of references to Threat frame and subcategories by data collection period*

The *threat* frame is particularly relevant in the context of *immigration policy*. The often-repeated claim that nobody is talking about immigration is certainly not true for the sample collected for this study. *Immigration policy* is mentioned in 616 items (2201 coding references).

This corresponds with voter priorities during the two collection periods. Immigration was high on voters' agendas (see Table 8). It is consequently reasonable to assume that items covering EU immigration policy attract a big audience and that coverage of this policy area constitutes a crucial convention of the order of discourse.

Considering editorial lines and audience preferences (see Chapter 7) negative framing is not entirely surprising. However, the degree of this trend is nevertheless striking. In the context of *immigration* policies (freedom of movement, Schengen but also policies regulating immigration from outside the EU) reporting commonly frames the EU as a *threat* (722 references) or as a *source of conflict/crisis* (916 references). *Force for good* or *important* frames, on the other hand, are rare (97 and 27 references respectively).

This trend is not uniformly mirrored in all news outlets (see Table 33): *Daily Mail*, *Telegraph* and *Sun* are more likely to frame immigration as a *threat* than the broadcasters, who use the *conflict/crisis* frame most prominently. Left-wing papers are more likely to frame the EU as a *force for good* compared to other outlets. *Force for good* is less common throughout the sample but in the context of *immigration* policies, the *Daily Mail* and *Sun* use this frame very rarely or not at all. The *Guardian*, *Mirror*, *Telegraph* and the broadcasters highlight the positive aspects of *immigration policy* in comparison more frequently.

|                        | <b>Deficiencies of the EU status quo</b> | <b>EU as source of conflict or crisis</b> | <b>EU is a force for good</b> | <b>EU as a threat</b> |
|------------------------|--|---|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | 32                                       | 55  | 6                             | 18                    |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>  | 63                                       | 85  | 14                            | 29                    |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>      | 91                                       | 187                                       | 2                             | 268                   |
| <b>Guardian</b>        | 162                                      | 241                                       | 39                            | 32                    |
| <b>Mirror</b>          | 20                                       | 51  | 8                             | 20                    |
| <b>The Sun</b>         | 50                                       | 120                                       | 0                             | 143                   |
| <b>Telegraph</b>       | 95                                       | 177                                       | 28                            | 212                   |
| <b>Total</b>           | 513                                      | 916                                       | 97                            | 722                   |

Table 33 Total number of references to frames covering Immigration by news organisation

When talking about EU immigration policy, it is important to distinguish between policies regulating immigration from outside the EU and freedom of movement within the EU. These are not only very different policies with different implications, but the EU is framed differently depending on the type of immigration. Regarding *immigration from outside the EU*, coverage highlights policy differences between the UK and EU institutions and other member states. In this comparison, the UK's approach is generally evaluated as more suitable. Concerning *freedom of movement*, the *threat* it poses to the UK is emphasised. Despite those nuances, both types of migration can be used to illustrate some key features of the represented relationship between the UK and EU.

In the second data collection period, the intensifying refugee crisis and subsequent EU emergency summit attracted a large volume of media coverage. With the EU's border agency Frontex controlling irregular immigration, the Dublin Agreement regulating asylum claims and the EU drawing up an agenda on migration, news coverage evaluated the EU's action extensively in this context. The frame most commonly used was *EU as source of conflict or crisis*, followed by *incompetent* and *EU and UK are separate*. Figure 11 illustrates how all three of these frames increase around key events in the refugee crisis. In particular, *incompetent* and *separate* frames provide an insight into ways in which UK news media represent the relationship between the UK and EU.

Across all news outlets, it is argued that the EU's decision to scale down rescue operations led to the drowning of hundreds of refugees, thereby contributing substantially to the crisis. However, news outlets, in particular the *Daily Mail* and *Sun*, do not attribute blame for the deaths to the UK, despite the British government's advocacy of scaling back Mare Nostrum, the search and rescue mission initiated by the Italian Navy and partly funded by the EU.

Interestingly, however, after the emergency summit resulted in reinstating search and rescue operations, coverage still frequently used the *incompetence* frame. While the *Guardian* argued that the measures agreed at the summit only scratched the tip of the iceberg, the right-wing papers branded further search and rescue missions as the wrong decision which would only cause more refugees to put their lives at risk. They equally labelled quotas as a dangerous pull factor. 'Migrants' (the term refugee is used less frequently in the right-wing papers) might be lured into risking their lives. The UK's opposition to these measures is presented as right, effective and moral. The broadcasters stay away from any strong judgements and instead highlight disagreements among EU members.




Figure 11 Frequency of references for selected frames and frequency of stories about the refugee crisis throughout the second data collection period.



Furthermore, proposals for refugee quotas and reform of the Dublin agreement are framed, again mainly in the right-wing media, as a *threat* to UK sovereignty and a *threat* to the country in the form of large numbers of refugees settling in the UK. *Threat* framing in the *Guardian*, *Mirror* and at the broadcasters is either non-existent (broadcasters) or highlights the *threat* the EU's lack of concerted action poses to refugees.

The *EU and UK are separate* frame also becomes important in the coverage of proposals. Coverage in particular emphasised the UK's opposition to certain measures proposed at EU level, especially quotas, and their preference for other solutions, such as deterrence of refugees. However, while all news outlets used the *separate* frame, they evaluate this opposition of preferences differently. The *Guardian*, in particular, strongly criticised the UK's policy preference for deterrence and instead lauded the EU's suggestion of expanded rescue operations and quotas as a possible solution to the crisis. In this context, the EU is framed as a *force for good*. Nevertheless, the *Guardian* did not uncritically embrace the EU's proposals. It still highlighted the potential for conflict and inefficiencies in the EU's approach.

Distribution of frames differed in the context of freedom of movement and migration from other EU member states to the UK. In the case of freedom of movement the *threat* frame was most prominent as opposed to the *conflict/crisis* or *separate* frames. Coverage of freedom of movement invoked the *political threat* frames, albeit less frequently. The EU was framed as a *threat* to sovereignty, especially by the *Daily Mail* and *Sun*, when discussing the UK's (reduced) powers to control or stop flows of inward migration, a strategy which combines immigration discourses with discourses about the EU.

*BY [sic] his own admission David Cameron has failed to curb soaring immigration. As long as our borders are open to the EU that will remain so - no matter who's in Downing Street. (Editorial, 14 May 2014; The Sun)*

When reporting freedom of movement, *economic threat* was highlighted in particular. Coverage of immigration from outside the EU largely neglected this aspect. Through freedom of movement, the EU posed a *threat* through a steady supply of cheap labour from Eastern Europe, disadvantaging British workers. Freedom of movement, in this argumentation, leads to lower wages in the UK, especially for low skill workers. Furthermore, particularly the right-wing newspapers highlighted the (perceived) *economic threat* from EU migrants claiming in-work and out-of-work benefits and sending child benefits abroad. These arguments were more common in the right-wing press, particularly in the *Sun* and *Daily Mail*. The *Sun* even goes so far as to pose an ultimatum to the government to bring down net migration in their Red Line Demand on curbing EU immigration. Language use in these papers, which dehumanises EU migrants, such as in the headline below, strengthens these arguments.

*MORE JOBS GO TO EU LOT; RECORD 31M IN WORK; Foreigners beat British to new posts (Hawkes, 14 May 2015; The Sun)*

Migrants are referred to mainly in terms of large numbers and as a homogenous mass, which also carry negative and threatening connotations. While these patterns were also observable at the other news organisations, they occurred less frequently and language was less inflammatory.

Even more frequently than *economic threats*, news reporting highlighted *cultural and social threats*. This includes potential clashes between communities, threats to the British way of life, UK services and British culture as well as threats from non-British health workers with insufficient knowledge of English, or foreign criminals. The *Daily Mail* and *Sun* highlighted these issues most commonly. While the *BBC* looked mostly at the changing shape of society and *Channel 4* focused on Nigel Farage's claim regarding criminality among Romanians, the *Mirror* remained almost silent on the issue. The *Guardian* was mainly concerned with clarifying party positions on the issue. While they did not actively construct these *threat* frames but rather repeat politicians' statements on benefits tourism, for example, they also did not challenge them.

*In possibly the liveliest section, on immigration, the conflict between Farage and Cameron largely focussed on whether the prime minister had any realistic chance of negotiating with his EU partners to end freedom of movement of workers. Farage insisted: "This is not about benefits. This is about numbers. I don't blame a single migrant that wants to come from Eastern Europe" adding the UK "has to build one house every seven minutes just to cope with immigration". (White, 3 April 2015; Guardian)*

The right-wing press was more straightforward in highlighting *threats* to the UK and Britons through foreign nurses' insufficient English language skills or criminals travelling freely into the UK. Examples of British people disadvantaged by freedom of movement contribute to the frame.

*As for immigration, it is much less of an issue in Essex than across the Thames in Kent, where those arriving at Dover and Folkestone burden health, education and social services. However, South Essex people whose families for years worked at the now-closed Ford factory in Dagenham, or at Tilbury docks, feel all the main parties have wilfully ignored their fears about getting a job while competing with thousands of immigrants happy to work for minimum wages. (Heffer, 24 May 2014; Daily Mail)*

On the other side of this equation, news organisations covered the benefits of freedom of movement rarely. It was even scarcer when discussing immigration from outside the EU, despite the EU's role in offering asylum. Reported benefits of EU migration are limited almost exclusively to migrants' economic and tax contributions, as well as their contribution to social services, like the NHS (see also 4.4). Only *Channel 4* and the *Guardian* mentioned diversity as

an asset to society. The EU was never framed as a *force for good* in the *Sun* and only once in the *Daily Mail*.

When combined with the predominantly negative framing in terms of *threat*, rational arguments for EU migration appear weak (see also 4.4). This is, on the one hand, due to the difference in the number of references, which is already striking. On the other, freedom of movement was framed as an issue of legitimate citizen concern, indicating a normalisation of *threat* framing.

*In an exclusive interview with The Sunday Telegraph, Sajid Javid says voters have legitimate fears over "excessive" immigration and are justified in wanting Britain to have more control over its borders. (Ross, 18 May 2014; Sunday Telegraph)*

This pattern was particularly evident in the tabloids and right-wing press. Firstly, news workers actively constructed these arguments. Secondly, politicians used such statements, which are consequently picked up on in the news coverage. Even when legitimatisation was not as blunt as in the above quote, very rarely did coverage of EU migration challenge the underlying assumption that concerns about freedom of movement were always legitimate. Even the *Mirror*, which disavowed *threat* framing, maintained the categorisation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ characteristic of xenophobic and racist discourses (Van Dijk, 1986).

*On Wednesday, a family member who'd been discharged from hospital remarked how lovely the nurses on his ward were, but said he was surprised that everyone was a foreigner. On the same day a report showed that last year, 5,217 nurses from other EU countries had come to work in our hospitals. A 51% increase on the previous year. (Reade, 17 May 2014; Mirror)*

The example, in which the author speaks of ‘our’ hospitals for which ‘foreigners’ work, illustrates this categorisation. Therefore, despite the more positive approach to EU migration, the *Mirror*’s coverage reinforces the discursive construction of distinct groups.

### **6.3. Analysis of actor representations in news coverage of the refugee crisis**

In the previous sections, analysis established that the relationship between the EU and the UK is characterised by two main frames in news coverage: *Threat* and *the EU and UK are separate*. News coverage treats the EU and UK as two separate, unequal entities. While there are differences among news organisations, the UK is most commonly represented as the superior entity, with regard to its values, norms, commitment to democracy as well as in terms of economic performance and political talent. News coverage also highlights the *threats* the EU poses to the UK, which influences the relationship between them, as illustrated above.

Linguistic analysis of the subsample used for this section provides further, textual evidence for these observations. Because this chapter is concerned with the relationship between the UK

and EU, it is worthwhile looking at the linguistic representation of social actors. This also contributes to answering research question 1d, which is interested in the representation of actors and the links of these representations to the relationship between the UK and EU (see Figure 1).

Van Leeuwen (1996) provides a particularly useful framework for this endeavour. While other studies analysing actor structures in media representation are predominantly concerned with the frequency with which particular actors or groups of actors are covered (for example Walter, 2017), this framework goes a step further. It considers their (grammatical) positioning within the text and provides the tools to uncover exclusion of particular actors from coverage. It helps to map differences between the representations of actors beyond frequency and gives indications of assumed agency, roles, as well as the relationship between actors.

Van Leeuwen's system network is based on a Hallidayan (2004) understanding of grammar (see 3.5.5). It works with categories of function rather than grammatical categories. A focus on functions is therefore inherent to the analytical framework, but it also avoids needlessly complicating analysis presented in this section. Lexico-grammatical realisation of functions is therefore only highlighted when relevant to the examples.

Van Leeuwen's (1996; 2008) system network introduces 50 different analytical categories. However, for the purpose of this section, only those are reported which contribute to framing and consequently the representations of the UK's relationship with the EU. When fine-grained analytical categories (for example types of nomination) did not provide further insight into the construction for frames, this section does not specifically address them. For the complete system network of social actors, including explanation for categories not analysed for the purpose of this chapter, refer to Van Leeuwen (1996).

Employing Van Leeuwen's (1996) framework requires in-depth textual analysis, which cannot be achieved with as large a sample as the one used for frame analysis (see also 3.6.3). The chosen subsample for analysis covers events illustrating how the EU dealt with the refugee crisis. This includes the EU emergency summit on migration, held on 23 April 2015 (before the General Election) as well as coverage of quota proposals (11 May 2015 onwards; after the election). News coverage of these events is particularly insightful. Firstly, it includes typical patterns of framing with regard to the relationship between the EU and the UK. Secondly, it permits an analysis of the most contentious issues in British politics: immigration. A word search identified all items covering the summit or quotas.<sup>27</sup> The sample was then further reduced to include only those items which included frames established as relevant in the

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<sup>27</sup> Search terms allowed for variations of the terms "summit" and "quota". Items which were produced by the word search but did not cover those two events were excluded from the sample.

reporting of EU-UK relations in the previous sections (*bargaining forum, Britain makes a difference, UK and EU are separate and threat*) and in which the relationship between the EU and UK became a focal point in reporting.

Overall, 27 items were analysed, with each news organisation contributing at least two items. Distribution of the subsample mirrors trends of the full sample (see Table 34).

|                   | EU emergency summit | European Agenda on Migration proposals |
|-------------------|---------------------|--|
| <b>BBC</b>        | 1                   | 1                                      |
| <b>Channel 4</b>  | 2                   | 2                                      |
| <b>Daily Mail</b> | 0                   | 5                                      |
| <b>Guardian</b>   | 2                   | 3                                      |
| <b>Mirror</b>     | 2                   | 0                                      |
| <b>Sun</b>        | 1                   | 2                                      |
| <b>Telegraph</b>  | 3                   | 3                                      |
| <b>Total</b>      | 11                  | 16                                     |

Table 34 Number of items covering included events for each news organisation

The following sections describe and analyse patterns in the sample and how they affect framing and therefore interpretation of the texts. The analysis also considered the representation of refugees. However, these results are not reported within the thesis as they are not crucial to answering the research question regarding the UK’s relationship with the EU.<sup>28</sup>

This section does not intend to identify any media organisations’ motives behind the discovered patterns. A variety of newsroom practices unrelated to ideological considerations can explain some of the patterns (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the findings since they – regardless of the media’s motives – uncover how linguistic realisation of social actors contributes to framing of the EU.

### 6.3.1. *Victimising Britain: the EU as a threat to ‘us’*

The previous sections established that the EU is frequently represented as a *threat* to the UK. This defines the relationship between the actors as one in which the UK is consistently regarded as a (potential) victim. Representation of actors contributes to this framing, in particular patterns of *activation* and *passivation*. The distinction between *active* and *passive* role allocation helps to identify the agent (actor), the patient, client or goal in an activity (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). ‘*Activation* occurs when social actors are represented as the

<sup>28</sup> However, I do acknowledge that excluding the representation of refugees in the coverage of the refugee crisis replicates an unsettling trend of news coverage itself: it largely ignores refugees themselves.

active, dynamic forces in an activity, *passivation* when they are represented as “undergoing” the activity or as being “at the receiving end of it” (Van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 44). Textual role allocation may not always reflect reality but rather reflect particular perceptions or interests.

The quote below, taken from a *BBC* broadcast, illustrates two of the grammatical realisations of *activation*. The reporter here (‘I should add’) takes an active role through a grammatical participant role. The reporter (‘I’) is the actor in the sentence who does the ‘adding’, he is the sayer in this verbal process clause (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), putting focus on the actor and highlighting the reporter’s agency. Grammatical participant roles are the most straightforward grammatical realisation of *activation*, but there are other ones, too. In the example below, ‘three helicopters’ are also activated, through circumstantialisation (‘by’).

*I* [activated through active participant role] *should add that the ship* [passivated] *will be accompanied by three helicopters* [activated through circumstantialisation] *for a search role (...)* (Edwards and Adler, 23 April 2015; *BBC News at Ten*)

Other realisations include post- and pre-modification. In ‘mass influx of refugees’, where ‘of refugees’ acts as a prepositional phrase that postmodifies ‘influx’. The refugees do not take a grammatical participant role but are nevertheless activated (a full summary of grammatical realisation can be found in van Leeuwen, 1996).

In the sample considered for this chapter, UK actors are overall *activated* more frequently than EU actors. However, this pattern is reversed in references to *EU as a threat*. While the EU is *activated* as the actor posing a threat, the UK is *passivated*, as the recipient of the threat, taking the role of beneficiary (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). This means that the UK constitutes a third party, which receives something from the EU’s activity. ‘Benefit’ in this case is not necessarily positive but a recipient is affected by it – unlike a goal (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) or *subjected* passive actor (Van Leeuwen, 2008) who does not ‘benefit’ from an action. In most cases, this ‘benefit’ is a high number of refugees the EU threatens to send to the UK through a quota system. In this scenario, refugees are normally *passivated* and *subjected* as goals in this material process of sending refugees to the UK (see section below). The following example highlights the mechanisms described.

*Britain* [passivated; beneficialised] *may be forced* [EU implicitly activated but not explicitly included] *to take in tens of thousands of Mediterranean migrants* [passivated, subjected; EU as threatening in this clause excluded but will be highlighted further below], *it emerged last night. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission* [activated], *will confront David Cameron* [passivated; beneficialised] *with plans for a mandatory migrant* [passivated; subjected] *quota system.* (Editorial, 11 May 2015; *Daily Mail*)

In this extract from the *Daily Mail*, Jean-Claude Juncker is *activated* through the grammatical participant role he takes in the clause, via the use of a modal verb of intention ('will'), as the sayer in a verbal process clause (see Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004). Although the EU is implicitly *activated* as the actor who implicitly forces, in 'may be forced', Juncker is the only *activated* actor who is actually named and included in the text, which highlights his personal role. 'Britain' in the first sentence takes the grammatical participant role of a 'recipient' in a material process clause. Similarly, David Cameron becomes the receiver in a verbal process clause,<sup>29</sup> which transforms him into the 'beneficiary' of the action. In this particular example, the positioning of Juncker and Cameron is also interesting. It appears as a stand-off between these two powerful men in which Juncker has the role of the challenger.

However, refugees in both instances are *subjected* instead of *beneficialised*. Instead of being treated as third party in an exchange, they are treated as the object of an exchange. In the first sentence, they are the goal of the material process clause,<sup>30</sup> in the second sentence they are subjected through premodification of the 'quota'. 'Migrant' here is a noun functioning as premodifier of the noun phrase 'migrant quota'. The use of 'migrant' also excludes the idea of 'refugees'.

*Activation* and *passivation* most clearly contribute to *EU as a threat* framing by highlighting the UK's exposure to threatening, dynamic EU activity, which puts the UK at a disadvantage. However, some more subtle mechanisms further add to the frame. Social actors can be referred to as individuals – represented through singularity (*individualisation*) – or as groups – represented through plurality (*assimilation*). Mass nouns, such as 'the European Union', used here as a metonym, realise *assimilation* since they represent a group of people. Those represented as groups (*assimilation*) can be *aggregated* (quantified) or *collectivised* (not quantified).

*Assimilation* of UK actors can have a strong influence on *threat* framing. Through first person pronouns such as 'us' (see example below) and 'we' and corresponding *collectivisation* of UK citizens, the threats posed by the EU appear to be directed against the audience since it is included in this *collectivisation*. *Collectivisation* of the British public makes the threat more personal, while at the same time implies a single homogenous entity, regardless of actual impact on individuals within the British public.

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<sup>29</sup> Verbal processes concern 'symbolic relationships constructed in human consciousness and enacted in the form of language, like saying and meaning' (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p. 171)

<sup>30</sup> A material process clause is a clause of 'doing-&-happening: a "material" clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events as taking place through some input of energy' (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004, p.179).

*THE UK* [assimilated; collectivised] *faces being ordered to take in thousands of Med boat migrants* [assimilated; aggregated] - *as Brussels* [assimilated; collectivised] *tries to force an emergency "quota" on us* [assimilated; collectivised]. (Hawkes, 12 May 2015; *The Sun*)

The migrants in this excerpt are *aggregated* through the addition of a numerative ('thousands of'). However, both 'the UK' and 'Brussels' are *assimilated*. While both 'the UK' and 'Brussels' lack a human component (they are *impersonalised* through reference to a place, called *spatialisation*), 'us' is *personalised*. The *collectivised* 'us' in this case is a powerful strategy since it includes the audience and implicates a sense of mutual belonging. Therefore, the *threat* of a refugee quota is not only directed towards political actors but towards the British public as a whole, of which the audience is a part.

The example given above illustrates another pattern discovered in the representation of the EU, which was discussed in 4.5. The author refers to Brussels, rather than the EU as a whole, leading to a focus on the European Commission and delivering a restricted image of the EU. In this subsample the focus is particularly strong, with only Commissioners included as *individualised* EU actors in the coverage. This is a rather one-sided representation of EU actors which excludes those who are directly accountable to the public, namely MEPs. Heads of states and governments are included in the sample, however, in similar fashion to the UK, they are represented as dealing with the EU (with the Commission) rather than as being involved directly through the Council. While in *EU as bargaining forum* frames intergovernmentalist integration theories are invoked, these patterns seem to tap into neo-functional arguments, which do not recognise the role of national governments (Balch and Balbanova, 2017). This transforms the EU into a bigger threat since those elements, which can be directly influenced by the electorate, are excluded from coverage.

### **6.3.2. Mystical EU, familiar UK: constructing remoteness and closeness**

The previous section explained how linguistic representation of actors contributes to *threat* framing. This section looks into a further pattern feeding into *threat* and *separate* frames. Throughout the sample, linguistic representation makes the UK appear more humanised. The EU, in comparison, emerges as a faceless, anonymous institution, which the UK does not appear to be part of. The juxtaposition feeds into *threat* framing.

*Genericisation* and *specification* refer to the representation of actors as either specific, identifiable individuals or as classes of actors (Van Leeuwen, 1996). Actors can be *generalised* through a plural without article, which suggests an indefinite number, the singular with a definite article or indefinite article. This mechanism removes the *generalised* actors from our everyday experience. *Generalised* reference to EU actors therefore implies its remoteness and detachment from everyday life in Britain. This matches patterns of *individualisation* and



*nominalisation*, and adds to *separate* framing. Through *genericisation*, actors become more remote, are ‘symbolically removed’ from audiences’ experiences (van Leeuwen 1996: 48). When *generalised*, the EU becomes a distant other, which is separate from the UK and British citizens’ everyday lives. They, again, become separate entities. The UK is dealing with the EU but is not part of it.

*This is a problem that defies easy answers and simple solutions. However, one thing is clear: if Britain [specified] is to take in some of the huddled masses [specified] washing up on Europe's southern shores, that should be decided in London by politicians [generalised] answerable to the British people [specified], not in Brussels by bureaucrats [generalised] accountable to no one [generalised]. (Editorial, 13 May 2015; Daily Telegraph)*

This example illustrates the finding vividly. Although both ‘politicians’ and ‘bureaucrats’ are *generalised* (through a combination of plural and omitted article), there is a stark difference between them. UK politicians are accountable to the ‘British public’, which is *specified* through the definite article, and *collectivised*, implying unanimity among the British public. However, the ‘bureaucrats’ are only qualified with another *generalisation*. As discussed above, the focus here again lies on the Commission, excluding those institutions and actors which are in fact accountable to the public. The example implies that while the UK government is directly accountable to the British public, EU actors are removed from them, and cannot be influenced by British citizens. Parallelism highlights the difference particularly. The structure (actors; place; public they are accountable to) is the same for both clauses but content is contradictory.

The previous section explained *individualisation* and *assimilation*. Van Leeuwen (1996) suggests, that news organisations *specify* and *individualise* those actors which they consider of more interest to the audience. In the case of this sample, it appears to be UK actors, which news coverage deems more important to the audience. UK actors are more frequently *specified* and *individualised*, while EU actors, UN actors, refugees (or immigrants) and smugglers are more likely to be *generalised or assimilated*. Not only does this give an indication of importance assigned to the respective actors, but it also makes the UK actors more tangible in comparison to EU actors. The example below from the *Guardian* illustrates the different representations of British actors (‘David Cameron’ here is *individualised*) and other European actors (‘Germany’ and ‘Ireland’ are *assimilated*). While readers may have thought of Angela Merkel or Enda Kenny when reading the text, they cannot be sure that it was them making the decision or may not make this connection at all. ‘David Cameron’, however, will have evoked a clear image of the Prime Minister, making him more tangible than German or Irish decision-makers, who remain anonymous.

*David Cameron [individualised] also said two smaller cutters or patrol vessels would be sent, as well as three Merlin helicopters fitted with advanced radar capable of spotting small craft at sea from a range of 100 miles.*

*Germany [assimilated; collectivised] was also said to have offered at least one frigate, while Ireland [assimilated; collectivised] promised one fully crewed and equipped boat. There were certain to be further pledges. (Traynor, 24 April 2015; Guardian)*

Because few EU actors are *individualised*, the EU appears to be an impersonal collective, which is not approachable or tangible. This is exacerbated by the more frequent usage of singular verbs to describe EU actions ('The EU is proposing a refugee quota' as opposed to 'The EU are proposing a refugee quota'), which indicates that the EU is a single united body, tapping into the discursive resources of neo-functionalism (Balch and Balbanova, 2017). This also renders the EU more opaque since single actors cannot be as easily identified in this united body. The EU, firstly, appears unaccountable and, secondly, as a united, impenetrable front against the UK. UK actors are more approachable, more relatable to for the audience since they are more likely to be *individualised*. This also makes the *threat* posed to those UK actors more relatable to for the audience. Furthermore, the distinction fuels the *separate* frame, as it highlights the different nature of the EU and UK (see also below).

The pattern of *individualisation* and *assimilation* matches the observation that UK actors are more likely to be *nominated* than EU actors, which again renders them relatable to audiences. *Nomination* refers to the representation of social actors as unique. Mostly this means simply using someone's name. *Nomination* is the opposite of *categorisation* of social actors. Social actors can be *categorised* according to shared identities (for example 'the British') or functions, such as 'minister' (Van Leeuwen, 1996). While EU actors are *nominated* as well, they are more likely to be *categorised* and the range of *nominated* actors is rather narrow in comparison to UK actors. This might be due to audiences' familiarity with EU actors and news organisations' deliberations whether their audiences would appreciate more detail here. However, this also gives an indication of the importance ascribed to actors. When they are *nominated* and *individualised*, they are more prominent in the text and therefore more prominent to the reader or viewer.

The anonymity of EU actors is further enhanced through *functionalisations* (e.g. 'commissioner' or 'member') rather than *identifications*. EU actors are more likely than UK actors to be described in terms of their functions, what they are doing (*functionalisation*), rather than with regard to who they are (*identification*). UK actors' identities are more prominent. While this is not entirely surprising – UK actors will be more familiar and recognisable for the audience than EU actors – the patterns found in the texts reinforce this gap in public knowledge instead of closing it by identifying and naming EU actors. They remain obscure.

One aspect of UK actors' identities becomes particularly important, namely being British. This also fits a pattern found in the representation of *impersonalised* actors. EU actors are *impersonalised* through *utterance anonymisation*. *Utterance anonymisation* refers to clauses in which an utterance (for example 'proposal', 'plan' or 'document') takes a grammatical participant role. This again highlights the EU's functions. In contrast, UK actors are *impersonalised* through *spatialisation*, in which the human actor is replaced by a place. UK actors become 'the UK', while EU actors become 'EU proposals'.

*The European Commission's new policy document [impersonalisation; utterance autonomisation] says all 28 EU members [functionalisation] should share a mandatory and automatically triggered relocation system when a mass influx emerges. The number of refugees and asylum seekers will depend on criteria such as size of GDP, population and number of unemployed. So Britain [impersonalisation; spatialisation] would have to take many more because its unemployment is half that of the Eurozone [impersonalisation; spatialisation]. (Rugman, 11 May 2015; Channel 4 News)*

*Spatialisation* of UK actors as 'the UK' – although impersonal – constitutes a point of identification, a reference point for British audiences. *Utterance autonomisations*, more frequent in *impersonalisation* of EU actors, do not fulfil this function. Instead of referring to an identity, they shift the focus to the EU's technocratic dimension. Furthermore, when *spatialisation* is used to refer to EU actors as in the above example – Eurozone – the place is more abstract, since it consists of a number of countries. Considering that UK citizens identify more strongly as British rather than European (European Commission, 2014a), these *spatialisations* may not attract much of a reaction, whereas references to the UK match identity constructions of British citizens more neatly.

This even has implications for EU support. Strong national identity correlates with lower support for European integration (McLaren, 2002). Clements and Nanou (2012) found that Britons who report a European identity, as opposed to those identifying exclusively with their nationality, showed stronger support for deeper European integration. Correspondingly, in Eurobarometer surveys at the time of data collection, UK citizens reported comparatively low attachment to the EU and Europe, and were not as likely as the majority of other member states to feel like European citizens. Instead they were the most likely to identify with their nationality only as opposed to identifying as both British and European or European only (European Commission, 2014a). Considering strong national identities which are partially constructed by setting them apart from European identities (Gamble, 2003, p. 18), resistance of those identifying as primarily British – or maybe rather English, Scottish, Welsh – can be explained to a degree. Particularly the English see Europe as a threat to their national identity, while in the devolved nations, particularly Scotland, European identity is stronger (Spiering, 2015).

Despite the resistance to seeing themselves as European, however, Europe has become Britain's primary partner since the decline of the British empire. Consequently, Britain has become an awkward partner, demanding opt-outs and causing controversies within Europe. The role of Britain as an 'awkward European partner' has become a self-fulfilling prophecy (McCourt, 2011, p. 155).

### ***6.3.3. Not only different but better: idealising the UK***

The UK sees itself as fundamentally different to continental Europe and consequently the EU (see 7.2). Frame analysis has found that the UK is in some instances represented as an active influence on EU action (*Britain makes a difference* frame). However, the more common *separate* frame is enhanced by evaluations of the UK as superior compared to the EU, especially in the right-wing papers (see 6.2). Again, analysis of social actors' linguistic representation helps to trace these frames in the texts. This section focuses on those actor representations which set apart the UK from the EU before moving on to explain which strategies contribute to the idealisation of the UK in comparison to the EU.

*Association* and *dissociation* are possibly the most straightforward categories to look at in order to trace the *separate* as well as the *makes a difference* frame. *Association* describes the grouping of different social actors. However, these *associations* are not stable and do not refer to one united group. The *associated* actors appear more like an 'alliance only in relation to a specific activity or set of activities' (Van Leeuwen, 1996, pp. 50-51). Frequently, *associations* are realised through parataxis, a series of often short sentences or phrases of which none is subordinate to the other. Other linguistic realisations of *associations* can be achieved through circumstances of accompaniment (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004) or through possessive pronouns and attributive clauses (Van Leeuwen, 1996). Circumstances of accompaniment extend the participant role to another actor through addition or variation, for example as in 'Merkel arrived with Juncker at the summit' or 'both Merkel and Juncker arrived at the summit'. *Association* through possessive pronouns (e.g. 'Germany's share of refugees is larger than ours' associates two groups of refugees to Germany and to 'us') and possessive attributive clauses (e.g. 'The UK belongs to the EU' associates the UK and the EU) tend to be more stable than those formed through parataxis and circumstances of accompaniment (Van Leeuwen, 1996). When these alliances are dissolved, we speak of *dissociation* (Van Leeuwen, 2008).

In the case of this subsample it becomes apparent that the UK is *associated* with other EU members, in references to the *UK makes a difference* frame. However, when the focus shifts to the UK's opposition to other EU actors, these alliances are dissolved, and the UK is *dissociated* from the EU or other member states. The *dissociations* emphasise the difference between the

actors. Simultaneously, the *associations* give textual evidence to the *UK makes a difference* frame by highlighting the fact that the UK is not alone in its criticism of EU actors and indeed has allies in the EU. The example from the *Telegraph* below illustrates the dynamic.

*The long-awaited European Agenda on Migration has strong support from Italy, Austria and Germany [association through parataxis], which, together with Sweden,[association through circumstances of accompaniment] takes almost half of asylum seekers in the EU [association through possessive attributive clause]. However, Britain, Slovakia, Hungary and Ireland [association through parataxis] oppose the plan - which will need approval from all 28 EU governments before it can be implemented. (Philipson, 11 May 2015; Telegraph)*

In the example, two opposing groups of countries are formed. On the one hand the author introduces Italy, Austria, Germany and Sweden as a group through parataxis, which share their commitment to providing refuge and their support for a quota system to distribute refugees across the EU. On the other hand, Britain, Slovakia, Hungary and Ireland are *associated*, again through parataxis. This alliance may not be a common one in other EU-related matters, but in this context, they are all grouped together because they are united in their opposition to the plans.

The patterns of *association* and *disassociation*, however, also show the conflict within the EU by emphasising different alliances with different interests among the member states. *Differentiation* makes it even starker. *Differentiation* explicitly distinguishes social actors from other, similar actors, creating ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomies (Van Leeuwen, 1996). *Differentiation* highlights in this case how differently engaged EU members are in the handling of the refugee crisis, as can also be observed in the example above. Generally, emphasis of the UK’s opposing view on quotas and resettling of refugees sets the UK apart most explicitly, which enforces the *separate* frame. UK actors here are clearly *differentiated* from the EU.

*The idea is backed by Germany, the key Brussels power broker which received 200,000 asylum applications last year.*

*Italy, Malta, Austria and Greece, where large numbers of migrants arrive by boat, also argue that Britain is not taking its fair share.*

*But ministers, led by Home Secretary Theresa May, are refusing to agree to the request, which will be formally made by Brussels tomorrow. (Slack, 12 May 2015; Daily Mail)*

This extract from the *Daily Mail* clearly shows an *association* of a group of countries and the EU. An emphasis on UK ministers’ – and Theresa May’s in particular – opposition to the quota system starkly *differentiates* UK actors from the EU. The reference to ministers instead of institutions in the case of the UK also implies that these autonomous actors have come to their shared view through independent deliberations. The EU members advocating refugee quotas, however, are not ascribed the same degree of autonomy since they are treated as

homogenous, impersonal entities. *Differentiations* like this draw a clear line between the EU (here *impersonalised*) and the UK (*personalised*) and create an ‘us-and-them’ dichotomy. They have to deal with each other but it is not necessarily acknowledged that the UK is an important, influential member of the EU.

As explained in 6.1 and 6.2, in this separation between the UK and EU, the UK generally emerges as seemingly superior with criticism of UK disengagement as the exception. This purported superiority is realised through different strategies, one of them being patterns of *exclusion* and *inclusion* of social actors. ‘Representations include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended’ (Van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 38). Some exclusions are radical and leave no traces in a text. When traces are left, the individual text can be analysed without significant problems. Then it can be distinguished between *suppression* (actor is not mentioned anywhere else in the text) and *backgrounding* (actor is mentioned somewhere else in the text). When *exclusion* does not leave traces, a singular text will not give the analyst any clues about these *exclusions*. Radical *exclusions* can only be analysed if texts can be compared or if the analyst has sufficient knowledge of the covered event. For example, if news reports radically *exclude* (not mention) the UK’s role in ending Mare Nostrum, this would not emerge from an individual text. However, if the analyst knows about the UK’s actual role in the process, they can discover this radical *exclusion*.

An interesting finding from the data emerges with regard to *exclusion* of the UK in reports covering handling of the refugee crisis, in particular with regard to the aforementioned cancellation of Mare Nostrum. When arguably inhumane decisions are reported – like ceasing extended rescue missions which was followed by the death of several thousand refugees – the UK as an actor is *backgrounded* or *suppressed*. Despite rather negative public opinion about refugees in the UK, this appears to fulfil the purpose of mitigating the negative reactions for such an approach or at least direct these negative reactions towards the EU, which is not *excluded* in those instances. When coverage, however, is focused on rescuing refugees and providing help in the Mediterranean, the UK is *included* and represented as an active, dynamic force in the handling of the refugee crisis.

EU actors are often *excluded* in references reporting rescue missions. Overall, EU actors are the actors most commonly *excluded* from the texts. In some cases, this appears to be innocent *backgrounding* or *suppression*. For example, when coverage focuses on the European Agenda on Migration, it may be deemed unnecessary to specify that it was tabled by EU actors. News workers could assume that readers can make this connection themselves. However, *exclusion* of the EU appears at times strategic. Coverage does not give much credit to EU rescue

operations: Italy is most commonly reported as running Mare Nostrum, often without acknowledging EU funding. Contrarily, the Royal Navy is highlighted as a crucial asset to rescue operations. Not only does this pattern build up to *UK makes a difference* framing but in particular emphasises the UK's superiority. By making the EU responsible for the fateful decisions leading to refugee drownings, the UK maintains its superior status over the EU through its *activation* in coverage of rescue efforts.

Van Dijk (1986; 1993) explains this pattern with his notion of an *ideological square*. In this configuration, the positive actions of the in-group – in this case the UK – are highlighted, while their negative actions are downplayed. For the out-group – EU actors – the pattern is reversed. Their positive actions are downplayed or excluded, while their negative actions are showcased. When negative actions – for example denying access for refugees – are mentioned these are minimised by referring to the UK's 'proud history of offering asylum' (Slack, 12 May 2015; *Daily Mail*). The dynamic results in a favourable representation of UK actors, while EU actors appear inferior, and at times even dangerous.

*Following calls from David Cameron, Federica Mogherini, the EU's top diplomatic, has been tasked with drawing up plans to "identify, capture and destroy" potential people-trafficking vessels. (Holehouse and Hope, 24 April 2015; Telegraph)*

Similarly, the rare *association* of EU actors with UK actors – as in the example above – highlight the UK's superiority in relation to the refugee crisis. In the few cases where EU and UK actors are *associated*, the EU actors are represented as following the UK's leadership in a matter, rather than the other way round. Again, this highlights the UK's positive contribution while it diminishes the actions of the EU as simply following the UK's lead.

#### **6.4. Summary**

This chapter set out to trace representations of the EU's relationship with the UK – in order to answer research question 1c (see Figure 1) – by looking at two groups of policy areas. The first group included *governance and decision-making* and *evolution of the EU*, the second was preoccupied with *immigration* from outside the EU and freedom of movement. Several characteristics of the relationship were uncovered here. Firstly, the UK is represented as a separate entity, detached from the EU. While some news organisations see this as problematic and advocate for more British cooperation within the EU, most base this detachment on the idea that the UK is superior to its European partners. Instead of more cooperation, they tend to advocate confrontation and threatening withdrawal in order for the UK to get its way in negotiations. Secondly, the UK is represented as being *threatened* and disadvantaged by the EU, especially through eroding sovereignty and by causing large migration movements into the UK.

This initial analysis of frames was supplemented with an in-depth analysis based on Van Leeuwen's (1996) system network, which helped to show how frames are realised textually and which addressed research question 1d (see Figure 1). Patterns of *activation* and *passivation* contribute substantially to the construction of the *threat* frame, which consistently characterises the relationship between the EU and UK in the news coverage. EU actors are *activated* to convey the *threat* they pose to the UK. In these cases, the UK – normally represented as an *active* actor – is *beneficialised* as the recipient of these *threats*. *Collectivisation* of the UK public through usage of first person pronouns ('us', 'we') makes the *threats* even more personal since they appear to affect everyone in the British public.

Analysis uncovered further, more nuanced details, which feed into the *threat* frame but also into the *separate* frame. The EU is most commonly represented as an unapproachable, faceless and opaque institution, inaccessible to the British public. This is realised through *generalisations*, *assimilation*, *functionalisation* and *impersonalisations*. UK actors are more likely to be *specified*, *individualised*, *identified*, *nominated* and *personalised*. This not only makes them more prominent in the text to the readers but also makes them more tangible. It will be easier for the audiences to identify with the *personalised*, more familiar UK actors, instead of *impersonalised* EU actors, whose unaccountable and opaque decisions threaten the British public.

The most obvious linguistic representations of social actors contributing to the *separate* frame are *associations* and *dissociations*. The UK is grouped into an *association* with the EU in references to *UK makes a difference* frames but *dissociated* from the EU in references to *separate* frames. In these instances, it is often *associated* with opponents of the proposed migration policy which also highlights the internal conflict among EU members.

*Inclusions* and *exclusions* further feed into the finding that within this *separate* frame, the UK is most commonly regarded as the morally and practically superior one. Van Dijk's (1986; 1993) ideological square helps to interpret the discovered patterns. Positive actions of the EU are downplayed – in this case through *exclusion* of the EU in the coverage of these actions – while their negative actions are emphasised – through *inclusion* in the coverage of these actions, for example abandoning Mare Nostrum. For the UK, the pattern is reversed, with positive actions emphasised through *inclusion* and negative actions minimised through *exclusion*, for example the UK's role in abandoning Mare Nostrum. This creates a positive image of the in-group (the UK) and a negative image of the out-group (EU).



## **Chapter 7. Producing EU news: explanations for similarities and differences between media organisations**

### **7.1. Introduction**

News is never simply reported. News is always the product of a complex process involving a variety of actors making multiple decisions within a particular societal and institutional context. These decision makers also need to follow complex discursive rules when encoding real events into news messages in order for them to be decoded as a story (Hall, 1980). Decisions range from deeming an event newsworthy, to the exact wording of the headline. Therefore, a news story will never mirror reality but rather construct a representation of news events (Hall, 1973). EU news stories are no exception. Particular decisions lead to a certain representation of the EU which can affect public opinion and knowledge of the EU (McCormick, 2014).<sup>31</sup>

The previous chapters presented findings of a textual analysis. They were concerned with the first set of research questions regarding the characteristics of representations of the EU in British news coverage by outlining general trends, and differences between news organisations (see Figure 1). This chapter sets out to answer the second set of research questions, which is concerned with explanations for the characteristics found in the texts. Why is the EU represented in a certain way? What are the factors which might favour a certain representation and not another? It takes into account how individuals but also the broader societal context or regulatory framework can affect news coverage. This chapter introduces a model of EU news production (see Figure 13 Model of EU News Production

Figure 14) which aims to explore and explain influences on EU coverage. The model was initially constructed based on relevant theories of news production, especially on newsroom ethnographies. It helped to design the interview schedule. The interviews with media professionals in turn informed the model's discussion in this chapter. While the model guided analysis of interviews, it was refined in the light of interview results. The model introduced here builds on the levels of influence introduced by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) as well as Firmstone (2008, p. 124): internal organisational, internal individual, and external (beyond the media organisations). Internal individual factors concern the individual journalist or writer. These include for example, age, sociodemographic background or political ideology but also journalistic role perception and socialisation. Particularly important in the case of EU coverage

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<sup>31</sup> Media effects are not discussed in detail in this thesis but a summary can be found in the introduction.

is also individual journalists' own attitudes towards the EU and European integration as well as the degree of direct exposure they have had to EU institutions and Europe more generally.

Internal organisational factors are dependent on circumstances within a particular media organisation, for example ownership, editorial line or target audience. The level considers routines and interactions between editors (E), journalists (J), commentators (C) and other news workers (O), such as subeditors. These relationships are often complex and affected by external forces (Donsbach, 2004; Catenaccio *et al.*, 2011). The model acknowledges that decision-making in newsrooms is complex and constrained by the particularities of the medium: '[news workers] have to make these decisions usually under severe time constraints and under the pressure of competition. For many news decisions they lack objective criteria and their decision becomes immediately public, i.e. visible to many others, which carries the risk of public failure' (Donsbach, 2004, p. 137). Of particular interest with regard to EU reporting is the (mis)match between editorial line and audience attitudes towards the EU, the media outlet's proprietors' investment in the topic and whether the EU poses particular challenges with regard to newsroom routines, for example its suitability for broadcast news. Factors external to the media include, for example, the political system within which media organisations operate, and legislation regulating the media. Discussion here will repeatedly refer to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) classification of the UK media system as North Atlantic or Liberal, which taps into wider sociocultural practices regarding the political system, commitment to press freedom, and the commercial character of media organisations. This level also includes the media's relationship with the EU institutions and changes in the media system, such as increasing commercialisation and digitalisation.

However, the level goes beyond issues related to media themselves but furthermore considers the role of sociocultural discourse practices in a given society with regard to the European Union. As explained in 3.2, media discourses about the EU, draw on other discourses dominant in society. With regard to the UK, particular, dominant interpretations of British and European history as well as British national identity will be of concern.

The full model is embedded in the overarching theoretical framework guiding the empirical analysis of this thesis, Fairclough's (1995; 1998) concept of discourse as constitutive for and constituted by social structures. The model sets the foundation for analysing the interplay of organisational and social structures and the texts. It gives empirical evidence for the relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements of the social practice of covering the EU and provides further insights into the conventions of the order of discourse under investigation.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> For a more detailed account of the theoretical analytical framework please refer to Chapter 3 on methodology.

The results presented in the preceding chapters guide the discussion of news production in this chapter, since it tries to explain these trends. The relationship between the different levels of influence on EU news production in the model below are, as in the levels in Fairclough's (1995; 1998) framework, reciprocal. Therefore, the model's levels are represented as concentric circles rather than elements of a flow chart. The processes are intertwined and closely related, therefore a straightforward causality cannot be assumed. Instead, the model assumes that multiple influences on different levels are impacting on the production of news simultaneously. Levels of influence are therefore not sharply distinct from each other but overlap, as we shall see in the discussion below.

Sociocultural practices do not only supply discursive resources to producers and audiences but also influence how the role of media is perceived in a country by supplying a particular interpretation of the country and its traditions. This shared knowledge about journalism and media culture affects newsroom decisions and individual journalists. By reproducing this shared knowledge in their output, they enforce it, but also have opportunities to challenge dominant representations. As Foucault (2007) points out, there is no discourse without resistance.

Considerations of economic viability will drive proprietors and board members. If audiences move away from traditional media, news organisations will come under economic pressure and be less likely to challenge dominant sociocultural practices regarding the EU or shared knowledge about journalism. Commercialisation can be a result, affecting decisions in the newsrooms and the individual journalist who internalises these practices. Ideology, linked to sociocultural practices, may be another driver for proprietors and editors to maintain or challenge dominant discourses.


This echoes the theoretical assumptions of critical realism, which underpin the thesis. While working within the structures of a news organisation – and indeed society – journalists and other affiliates reproduce these structures due to socialisation (Bhaskar, 1979), possibly even without reflecting on a newspaper's position. However, news workers are not without agency and they can consciously produce structures, too (Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994). Individuals in these organisations do have reasons and motives to act either in accordance in nonconformity with rules and conventions of the organisation and wider society, reasons and motives which can be investigated. Through these purposeful actions, individuals create new structures in news organisations and society. They can challenge practices within the newsroom and initiate changes in its structure and practices, which can affect wider discourse practices and social structures. They can also decide to maintain established structures as, for example, this is calculated to deliver higher revenues because it does not challenge an audience's

preconceptions. These new structures again socialise actors, who unconsciously reproduce them but who are also capable of consciously producing new structures (Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994).

Although this chapter aims to address different layers in turn, it is necessary to understand news production in the context of many different, overlapping influences which shape the final output. Consequently, the structure of the following sections does not follow one formula but adapts to the particularities of the news organisations under investigation. Furthermore, not all potential influences will affect different news organisations to the same extent. This is reflected in the depth of discussion in respective sections.

This chapter draws heavily on the experiences of journalists working on EU related issues as well as the previously presented textual analysis. In combination with theoretical approaches to news production, this will contribute to understanding the dynamics of EU news coverage, a major contribution of this thesis. The following section will outline the sociocultural practices with regard to the European Union and the UK's relationship with it, which serve as discursive resources for the news workers and give evidence to a dominant ideological position in the UK. The next three sections apply the model to three different groups of media. The broadcasters are discussed first. While broadcasters have an obligation to balance, analysis of their EU coverage suggests otherwise. The model contributes to our understanding of their inability to maintain this balance. The second section examines in detail the two most pro-European newspapers in my sample and why their coverage is more pro-European but also why they struggle to build a powerful pro-European discourse. The last section of this chapter applies the model to those newspapers with the most negative coverage of the EU. Similarities but also differences between those news organisations will be explained by relating to the model presented in Figure 13 Model of EU News Production

Figure 14.



- Predominance on negative stories due to news values
- Focus on topic the audience is interested in (e.g. migration, Euromyths) due to commercial orientation of news outlets
- Adaptation of style and language to audience demands and media logic
- Influence of editorial line and ownership preferences on framing

Figure 13 Model of EU News Production

Figure 14 Model of EU News Production

## 7.2. Sociocultural practices: discursive resources for reporting

All media outlets included in the sample are located in the British public sphere, and cater primarily for a British audience. Therefore, beyond the characteristics of the newsroom or media landscape, sociocultural practices regarding the EU influence reporting. They constitute the pre-text and underpinning of media representations, shared knowledge and a resource for both producers and consumers of news. At the same time, reporting reproduces shared knowledge and thereby maintains sociocultural practices. These discourses – which are not natural but a product of convention – provide a common framework into which new events can be integrated in order to make sense (Hall, 1980).

While this chapter refers to British discourses or the UK as a whole, it is important to note that the assertions made refer mainly to England. Devolution may have an impact in the perception of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish citizens.<sup>33</sup> A detailed account for these nationalities goes beyond the scope of this thesis [see Gamble (2003) or Spiering (2015) for more detail on other nations within the United Kingdom]. Considering that British history has mainly been interpreted as English history, and English dominance in British governance and European policy, as well as the fact that this thesis deals with predominantly English editions of newspapers, it is justified to mention differences between the British nations only in passing.<sup>34</sup>

While analysis has shown that some outlets resist the dominant discourse about the EU, this section outlines particular interpretations of European and British history that restrict and at the same time enable media discourses about the EU across all outlets. They are restrictive in the sense that it is difficult to construct an argument contradicting these interpretations since they provide associated and accepted ways of thinking about the EU. They are also enabling because they provide discursive resources which media professionals can use to construct a coherent argument which resonates with audiences.

### 7.2.1. *Britishness as distinct from European-ness*

Identities can and do connect individuals with social groups, for example to national and supranational groups. Identities furthermore shape social interactions by interpreting out-groups as an oppositional reference point to the self-identity (Clements and Nanou, 2012). These out-groups, the Other(s), may be seen as friendly, neutral or threatening (Gibbins, 2014), but are, in any case, different to the Self. At the heart of sociocultural discourses about the EU

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<sup>33</sup> These differences are for example mirrored in the EU referendum result with both Scotland and Northern Ireland favouring Remain.

<sup>34</sup> To some extent, nations apart from England also have their own media ecologies.

lies such a distinction, a way of thinking and talking about 'Europe' as different. Britishness is fundamentally different to European-ness (Gamble, 2003; Daddow, 2006a; Daddow, 2006b; Garton Ash, 2006; Daddow, 2015; Spiering, 2015), resulting in an ambivalence with regard to the UK's place in Europe (Ludlow, 2002).

The English Channel physically separates Britain from mainland Europe. Consequently, geography has often offered explanations for British distinctiveness. However, the discourse of an island nation was created in retrospect to construct a national identity and a justification for detachment from the continent (Spiering, 2015). This discourse ignores the many entanglements between the European continent and the British Isles, and ignores differences between the nations and regions of the UK (Gamble, 2003; Novy, 2013; Spiering, 2015). Nevertheless, the image of an island nation, with exceptional history and destiny, has been persistent and helped define first England, and then Britain uniformly in opposition to a patchy European continent (Gamble, 2003; Garton Ash, 2006; Gibbins, 2014). This fits neatly with the usage of 'Europe' as a metonym found in the news texts, which appears to exclude the UK (see 4.5.1).

Popular literary works using the island notion, such as *Our Island Story*, David Cameron's favourite childhood book, as well as politicians' linguistic distinction between Britain and 'Europe', underpin the discourse (Ludlow, 2002; Daddow, 2006a; Daddow, 2006b; Copsey and Haughton, 2014; Spiering, 2015). While the island story is challenged at times by more pro-European actors, the fundamentals of the discourse, the distinction between the UK and continental Europe, the un-European identity of Britain, is rarely questioned, even by those who try to make a case for more engagement in Europe (Spiering, 2015). In pro-European arguments the EU (or its predecessors) are framed as a friendly Other (Gibbins, 2014). It may not be hostile to the UK but it is still clearly distinct from it.

This island discourse is also evident in research interviews. One EU official who works closely with UK journalists expresses it as: '[...] Europe is seen more as a world news package rather than a home news package.' Sean Klein, former *BBC* Brussels bureau chief, highlights the island discourse by saying 'I think many countries see themselves as islands. Britain, geographically as well, is an island.' Journalists' insistence that European officials do not understand the adversarial British traditions of journalism and politics, further supports the distinction between the UK and 'Europe' which shapes UK media professionals' thinking. This shows how the interdiscursive links to a particular interpretation of British history contribute to shaping the order of discourse governing EU news coverage by setting rules and conventions.

The underlying discourse gives the framing coherence and does not need further explanation since it taps into a shared cultural knowledge of both journalists and audience about

the UK's relationship with the continent. Instead of challenging this discourse, for example to create awareness of the UK's historical and contemporary entanglement with the rest of Europe, *separate* framing reinforces the island discourse. On the other hand, framing which emphasises British engagement in the UK – *UK makes a difference in the EU* – is comparatively rare and struggles to fit coherently into the island discourse dominating British identity and discourse. This echoes Daddow's (2011) observations regarding New Labour's failed attempt to change both discourse and policy toward the EU.

### **7.2.2. British pragmatism versus European idealism**

The discourse of an island nation goes hand in hand with a perception of British islanders exhibiting distinct character traits. Pragmatism is one. Europeans, in contrast, are regarded as too idealistic and theoretical, which is reflected in the EU's cumbersome, utopian, and unworkable institutions, laws and decision-making processes (Fontana and Parsons, 2015; Spiering, 2015).

Accounts of the UK's applications for EEC membership highlight British pragmatism. British economic decline, as well as the loss of the Empire and disappointment with the US over the Suez crisis were pragmatic reasons to join the EEC in 1973, while the ideological goals (such as ever closer political union) were not shared with other EEC members (George, 2000; Gifford, 2010; Cosey and Haughton, 2014; Fontana and Parsons, 2015). David Cameron, in his Bloomberg speech in 2013, mirrored these considerations 40 years later: 'For us, the European Union is a means to an end [...] not an end in itself.' The British vision for Europe is one of flexibility and co-operation to strengthen the single market, instead of an ever closer political union (Cameron, 2013; 2015). Consequently, arguments for continued membership, or against a referendum, as revealed in the data sample fall back on pragmatic considerations about the economic risks of leaving.

The dominant discourse of a utopian 'Europe' and pragmatic Britain influences journalists, too, as illustrated by the quotes below. Regardless of editorial line in the news outlet, they tap into this dominant perception, proving again, that sociocultural practices also shape the thinking of those who shape public discourse.

*One of the problems with the European Union is, it has always resembled – to me – a builder trying to build a house and starting at the roof. A common European currency is as likely as a common European weather. It's beyond our power to create. It is trying to make water flow uphill. [...] It's a utopian project. And if you like that sort of thing, that's fine. But it is very un-British to like utopian projects. (Peter Hitchens, Daily Mail; phone interview)*



*It never shared the emotional appeal that clearly Europe had at least for many years. [...] We saw it always as a market and Europe saw it as a sort of noble, political project. That wasn't the case here. (Jon Henley, The Guardian; phone interview)*

*[The readers] kind of expect to see what is going on, what the British understanding is. They like the absurdity of the place as well. [...] It is absurd. So much that is going on is just mad. (Matthew Holehouse, Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

This shared knowledge about an impractical Europe opens up the discursive possibility that the UK would do better outside the EU. Stories focusing on EU bureaucracy – regarded as an argument to leave the then EEC in 1975 (Gibbins, 2014) – MEPs' expenses, and other waste stories, as well as reports highlighting the *dysfunctionality* or *incompetence* of the EU fit well into the discourse of an impractical European Union, which leaves the pragmatic Briton puzzled. The EU's perceived lack of common sense, also underpins the representation of the EU in the coverage of the *right to be forgotten*. It legitimises and makes plausible the imbalance of sources and justifications for the different sides – with 'experts' and common sense opposing the ruling – and at the same time reinforces the dominant discourse.

An ideological argument based on firm commitment to the political aspects of the European Union does not fit this narrative. Consequently, Europe in the dominant discourse remains a choice, framed by pragmatic rather than ideological considerations, and therefore not a fixed part of the political landscape (Daddow, 2013). This becomes even more salient now that UK voters have decided to leave the EU despite the EU taking the most Anglophone form it has ever had (Copsey and Haughton, 2014).

### **7.2.3. *The wider world versus a narrow Europe***

The UK has perceived itself exceptional also due to its past as a seafarer nation and imperial power. Gamble (2003, p. 35) uses the term 'world island' to describe on the one hand isolationism towards the European continent, while, on the other hand, a 'sense of openness [...] by conceiving England as the centre of a global empire and a global hegemony', although other European nations also controlled large overseas territories, for example Spain, Portugal or Belgium (Colley, 2006). Churchill's metaphor of three interlocking circles, a powerful discursive resource, ranks the United States, the Atlantic world, closest to the UK, followed by the Commonwealth and former Empire colonies as close second. Europe only occupied the most remote third circle (Forster, 2002).

Consequently, the UK originally declined to join the Founding Six in shaping the EEC (Burgess and Edwards, 1988; Wall 2009). In the 1950s, half of the UK's trade was with the Commonwealth and only a quarter with Europe (Burgess and Edwards, 1988), reducing the perceived economic benefit of joining and risking Commonwealth trade (Gaitskell, 1996; Wall,

2009). Although the UK's international outlook was sometimes used as an argument for engagement with the EU, it was feared European integration would damage relations to more important, culturally closer allies (Gamble, 2003). This argument persists in contemporary discourse, with Eurosceptic MPs and campaigners advocating more co-operation with Commonwealth countries in particular.

Beyond economics, the Commonwealth appears culturally closer than the European continent (George, 2000). Here a non-discursive moment of social practice – migration from Britain to the white dominions – affects discursive moments of social practice. The idea of a shared language becomes a point of identification and strengthens the UK's attachment to English-speaking (white) peoples of the Commonwealth as well as the US.

Regarding the special relationship with the US, Churchill also emphasised the (perceived) shared values and history, including a commitment to human rights, democracy, liberty and free market economy, historical heritage, language, personal ties and common institutions (Bogdanor, 2005, p. 689; see also Porter, 2010). This 'ensures that Washington and London see eye to eye on many issues more or less automatically' (Jakobsen and Ringsmose, 2015, p. 137) and creates cultural proximity, as described by Sean Klein below. Although the special relationship throughout the years was characterised by conflicts and resolutions, the perceived cultural proximity remained, while lingering prejudices against France and Germany diminish a shared European identity (George, 2000).

*[...] despite the fact that it is geographically further away, people – I suppose because we all speak English – people believe that they relate more to the American situation than the European, oddly [...] But because the language barrier is not there – broadly speaking – and because people have names that they can relate to because they are broadly speaking Anglo-Saxon. (Sean Klein, former Brussels bureau chief for the BBC; interview in London)*

However, the discourse of a global Britain with global influence is far from objective and based in tropes rather than reality. Particularly the special relationship is a relationship between a superior – the US – and inferior partner – Britain (Bogdanor, 2005, p. 693). The discourse is nevertheless persistent and serves as an important interdiscursive resource for news producers and consumers. Rooted in a dominant interpretation of historical events which emphasise the UK's power and global influence, these assumptions have socialised decision-makers despite contradictory political realities (McCourt, 2011).

#### **7.2.4. British moral superiority against European corruption**

Previous sections identified some of the perceived differences between the UK and 'Europe' as reflected in discourse. It is implicit in these that the UK is superior to the EU. While the British are characterised as mild-mannered, civil, and democratic, continental Europeans

are seen as more susceptible to fraud, corruption, revolution and dictatorship (Spiering, 2015). Again, a particular interpretation of history has shaped this discourse affecting media representations of the EU.

The reformation has been identified as a key event leading to a distinction between Protestant Britain and Catholic 'Europe', which is linked to assumptions of morality (Spiering, 2015). Subsequent wars with Catholic powers further shaped perceptions. In these conflicts, Britain imagined itself as the isolated, but morally superior power, despite the major contributions European allies made to British victories during conflicts. In combination with the experiences of the British Empire, in which Britain saw its role as a civilising one, this historical discourse fed the feeling of national greatness (Gamble, 2003; Broad and Daddow, 2010), while Europeans have repeatedly proven their inferiority (Bogdanor, 2005, pp. 691-692).

This discourse of national greatness, distance and distinctiveness towards Europe (Novy, 2013, p. 88) has shaped British identities as well as engagement with the European Union. Britain did not feel the need to join the founding six members (McCourt, 2011). Critics not only saw the EEC as an utopian project doomed to fail but as undemocratic, corrupt and as a threat to parliamentary sovereignty (George, 1998; George, 2000; Fontana and Parsons, 2015), an argument highly visible in the data analysed in this thesis and the 2016 referendum campaign.

*Threat* framing, one of the most common frames in the sample, fits in neatly with the discourse of presumed British superiority, highlighting the EU's alleged undemocratic power grab, resulting in reduced sovereignty for the UK, a development incompatible with the UK's long and at times heroic democratic tradition. These shared cultural assumptions – even if at times challenged – legitimise a vocabulary which highlights the allegedly dictatorial nature of the EU and its actors, and underpins intertextual elements which, for example, equate the EU with Orwell's Ministry of Truth.

Fittingly, in particular journalists working for Eurosceptic media organisations, point out that European institutions closed themselves to scrutiny from journalists, thereby acting undemocratically and denying their citizens accountability. The representation of European institutions as wasteful and inconsiderate of their citizens also matches this preconception and may therefore resonate more strongly with audiences who are socialised into these discursive patterns, and who use those discourses to make sense of news coverage, who interpret news texts with these discourses in mind.

Besides this dominant discourse of British superiority, pro-integrationists have pointed out beneficial developments in the EU. Pro-Europeans on the left of the political spectrum in particular emphasised better protection of workers and the EU's efforts to keep those protections high (Spiering, 2015). These arguments feed into the *force for good* frame.

However, this frame contradicts the very dominant notion of a superior Britain, which – at best – does not need the rest of Europe or – at worst – is threatened by it.

The *force for good* frame is further undermined by the fact that those constructing a pro-European argument are often reinforcing the idea of British superiority. Advocates of British entry into the EEC, for example, saw Britain as a natural leader in Europe, capable of saving the Europeans from their own, destructive tendencies (Gibbins 2014: 181). This logic is also evident in the sample: the UK is encouraged to engage in order to reform and improve the current EU. Disengagement, on the other hand, would betray the UK's duty to shape the EU in its preferred (and inherently superior) way (Daddow, 2006b; see also 6.1).

### **7.2.5. Summary**

This section has provided an overview of sociocultural practices with regard to the EU in the UK. It has found that a particular interpretation of historic events affects the discourse about the EU in Britain, and provides an interdiscursive resource. However, the continuity and coherence of historical accounts is rather misleading. It hides inconsistencies and disruptions which dominant discourse has retrospectively glossed over (Foucault, 2007). This coherence makes the historical interpretation of the UK's relations with continental Europe particularly appealing.

As Daddow (2006b, p. 77) points out, history 'has always played an important role in identity construction whether for individuals, families, communities, regions or countries'. He also highlights the power of historical discourses to shape the vocabulary used to describe the EU, as well as appropriate connotations which fit the overarching discursive system (Daddow, 2006a). Europe is regarded and discursively constructed as the often threatening 'Other', endangering national culture and identity (McLaren, 2002; Broad and Daddow, 2010). Those arguing for British engagement in the EU struggle to resist these dominant discourses. They also cannot rely on any shared cultural knowledge about Europe to help them construct convincing arguments. Consequently, even pro-European texts link to the discursive resources summarised in this section, thereby reinforcing them. This societal context is shared across media outlets and explains some of the general trends found in the sample. The next sections look more closely into the differences between the organisations to account for variations in patterns of EU coverage.

### **7.3. Broadcasters: 'neutrality' and the struggle to make the EU engaging**

Textual analysis found that negative framing clearly outweighs positive framing among the broadcasters. However, they are more balanced than the right-wing newspapers. While they display a strong focus on conflict, emphasising the EU's shortcomings (*EU is incompetent, EU*

*needs to act*), they also frame the EU as *important*, internationally and for the UK's national interest. When they characterise the relationship between the UK and EU through *separate* framing, they focus on policy differences rather than historical and cultural differences. They also advocate more British engagement and cooperation in the EU, again distinguishing them from the right-wing press.

Nevertheless, framing is skewed towards the negative, the angle of reporting is mainly domestic, and only a limited number of policy areas are covered in depth, echoing some of the concerns of the 2005 inquiry (Lord Wilson of Dinton *et al.*, 2005). Considering their obligations as public service broadcasters (PSB), the negative framing and very restricted coverage is worrying. According to Ofcom (2015), 97% of UK households had access to digital TV in 2015. On average, UK viewers spend 220 minutes per day watching TV. Furthermore, TV is still regarded by citizens as the most trustworthy news source (Thompson, 2011; European Commission, 2014b). Broadcasting has to deal with very specific constraints, set by external forces in terms of regulation, a characteristic of the North Atlantic or Liberal media model predominant in the UK (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). This affects newsroom routines, which also have to mitigate particular limitations of broadcast media.

### ***7.3.1. Individual level influences: professional neutrality and accusations of bias***

On an individual level, the broadcasters and in particular the *BBC* had to deal with criticisms their journalists are unrepresentative of their audience and favours a left-of-centre, liberal worldview, reflected in their news coverage. The National Council for the Training of Journalists (2013) found that *BBC* news workers were more likely to have attended private schools (26% of *BBC* executives had attended independent schools, compared with 7% of the UK population), have degrees (82%) and to have obtained them from Oxford or Cambridge (33% of *BBC* executives). This lack of diversity in journalism is symptomatic of the whole profession, including other broadcasters and newspapers included in the sample for this research (Spilsbury, 2017). In the case of the EU, the *BBC* in particular has been accused of a pro-EU bias due to the distinct characteristics of its work-force, which is allegedly positioned at the centre left of the political spectrum (Lord Wilson of Dinton *et al.*, 2005; Aitken, 2008). This allegation is also brought forward by interviewed journalists working for right-wing papers.

*The BBC is very much on the other side. That the BBC is impartial on this is laughable and the BBC recognises in the European Union an organisation rather like itself. Therefore, naturally it feels an affinity. (Peter Hitchens, Daily Mail; phone interview)*

However, my interviews with *BBC* journalists, could not detect such a clear correlation. While they appear more favourable towards the EU than their counterparts in the Eurosceptic press, they emphasise their obligation to abstain from letting their individual opinions influence their reporting, echoing the demands of a professionalised and balanced broadcast system typical for liberal media landscapes (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

*Well, personally I don't have any views because I'm a BBC journalist. Certainly, in the referendum it's very important that we do give all sides of the story and that we give the widest possible debate. I just want to avoid people not answering hard questions. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

Broadcast journalists interviewed define their role as information transmitters or educators, not as interpreters or watchdogs. Role perception on an individual level is an important factor influencing news reporting of the EU. While certain universal values are shared among the journalistic workforce in Western democracies, role perceptions can vary, also due to journalistic socialisation through training as well as exposure to newsroom routines and policies (Shoemaker *et al.*, 2001; Sanders *et al.*, 2008; Mellado *et al.*, 2013). After all, other journalists are the main reference point when making decisions on reporting (Donsbach, 2004).

Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) identify five fundamental values, or norms, of journalism, which are particularly prevalent in liberal media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). These norms should – theoretically – also apply to EU coverage. They share a sense of ethics and autonomy, free of censorship and independence of authorities. A value, which is observable throughout but is particularly clear in the interviews with broadcast journalists, is providing a public service. They see their task in informing the public independent from partisan interference in order for them to make informed choices, politically and privately.

*I think [the most important duty as the BBC's Europe editor was] probably explaining the European Union, how it worked, how it has affected people's lives in Britain and Europe as well as covering the news stories more directly. And I believe that's the role of any editor, giving a bit of context of why things are as they are. There was a sort of almost civic pledge for a role as the BBC conceived it, as I conceived it. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

A second journalistic norm emerging clearly from the interviews, especially among broadcast journalists, is objectivity. Although criticised as a notion (Boudana, 2011), a desire for balanced, impartial reporting is one of the basic values in journalism as it awards it credibility (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2001). Again, this is a key norm in liberal media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), showing how wider sociocultural practices of journalism impact on the individual.

*The most important duty for me is being completely impartial. The EU is a very contentious subject, so it's imperative for me to be straight down the line, giving both sides a fair hearing, and getting beyond the spin to the heart of the story. (Cathy Newman, Channel 4 News; email interview)*

While these values were shared among all journalists interviewed for this thesis, broadcast journalists differ in their role perception from newspaper journalists, especially from those working at the Euroscletic press. Roles are understood as different self-perceptions of their contribution to society, formed by newsroom socialisation and professional experience (Breed, 1955). These role perceptions are regarded as universal across different genres and occupational areas of journalism and influence the shape of journalistic outputs (Deuze, 2005; van Dalen *et al.*, 2012; Skovsgaard, 2014). News content, decision-making and professional role perception are interlinked (Patterson and Donsbach, 1996; van Dalen *et al.*, 2012).

Role perceptions differ with regard to the degree to which journalists commit to the goal of holding powerful elites to account, but also in the way they achieve this goal. While several scholars created different typologies of role perceptions, they all distinguish between journalists who see their responsibility mainly as informing the public more or less neutrally and journalists who prioritise holding authorities to account (Johnstone *et al.*, 1976; Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996; Weaver and Willnat, 2012; Mellado *et al.*, 2013). In interviews, it becomes clear that broadcast journalists – according to their responses – regard informing the public without personal interpretations as their most important duty.

*Setting the context, what does it mean, what does the EU actually mean for everyday life, for citizens of this country and elsewhere. From my point of view, the type of journalism that I have been involved in, it is very much not campaigning journalism. For me it is information and education. It is complicated. It is a massive responsibility. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

Taking on the role as objective conveyer of information, broadcast journalists also refute accusations of systemic pro-EU bias. They counter them by pointing out the bias of other news outlets and highlight the objectivity of their EU coverage.

*If you have 9 out of 10 media outlets being hostile to the EU it's not surprising that the casual observer would say that the tenth that is more neutral is biased. It doesn't mean – if you're the only man in the room telling the truth it doesn't mean you're actually biased. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

It is interesting, however, that broadcast Europe editors and correspondents are likely to have spent significant time abroad on the continent, and often have European, non-British parents. For example, the current *BBC* Europe editor, Katya Adler, in post at the time of the second data collection wave, has German heritage. Although her native language is English, she has studied German and Modern Languages and spent time in Vienna, working for the

Austrian PSB. Matt Frei, Europe editor for *Channel 4 News*, was born in Germany to Silesian parents. Sean Klein, former Brussels bureau chief for the *BBC*, started his career as a conference interpreter and is fluent in several European languages.

Direct experience of the EU and its institutions, knowledge of European languages and time spent in other European member states can enhance European identity formation and an attachment to Europe (Lijphart, 1964; Fuss *et al.*, 2004; Jacobone and Moro, 2015; Mitchell, 2015). This shows how non-discursive elements of social practice – even of social practices unrelated to the order of discourse ‘EU in the News’ – can influence discursive practices and ultimately news output. Although broadcast journalists denied any influence of their personal opinion on coverage, it may be the case that they have developed a stronger interest in the matter, a better understanding of the member states, or were able to adapt more easily to working in an EU context. Research shows that longer exposure to the EU and its institutions leads to this socialisation (Lecheler and Hinrichsen, 2010). Off-record comments of several interviewees with similar experiences (not only broadcast journalists) further suggest they are particularly interested in European matters and link this to their connection to the continent.

### ***7.3.2. Macro-level constraints: linking broadcast governance and journalists’ self-perceptions***

Broadcast journalists’ commitment to neutral professionalization is best understood when linking them to external obligations of broadcasters, which constitute strict rules within the order of discourse. Broadcast media in the UK is – unlike the print media – regulated by Ofcom, the Office of Communications, which was established in 2003 to replace the five former regulatory bodies (Smith, 2006b). In Britain, three forms of economic models for broadcasting exist: license fee funded broadcasting, broadcasting funded by advertisement, and broadcasting funded by subscriptions. Furthermore, there is a distinction between public service broadcasters and commercial broadcasters. In Britain in particular, the public service ethos is strong. Broadcasters try to serve a unitary, general interest in society (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Public service broadcasters (PSBs), like the *BBC* and *Channel 4*, reinvest their profits in programmes and have a commitment to serve civil society. They try to balance political views and follow a strict code of conduct (Katsirea, 2012, p. 155). Governance of British PSB, particularly the *BBC*, is independent from political parties. Board members and staff are selected due to professional qualities. This sets them apart from many continental counterparts which try to ensure balance by including parties in governance (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Both broadcasters included in this study can be classified as PSB despite different funding models (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Due to their wide reach and reputation as balanced



providers of non-partisan information, they play a particularly important democratic role. Journalists working for these broadcasters are acutely aware of this, which is reflected in their self-perceived role(s), showing how non-discursive elements of a social structure, wider sociocultural practices, influence specific practices and ultimately discourse.

*I'd always want to be impartial in my reporting and presenting, but the EU is even more sensitive as the referendum looms, people are preparing to vote, and we as broadcasters have additional licence obligations to be impartial. (Cathy Newman, Channel 4 News; email interview)*

*The thing that everybody talks about is information. And given my background, working with somebody like the BBC, this has to be as impartial as possible. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

However, the idea of impartiality can be contested and is, consequently, not always achievable. Especially during the referendum campaign in 2016, the *BBC* was accused of misunderstanding their obligations and broadcasting factually wrong claims by Leave campaigners in order to avoid further allegations of pro-EU bias (Oliver, 2016; Cushion and Lewis, 2017). In the terms of Herman and Chomsky's (1994) propaganda model, flak received from audiences for perceived pro-EU coverage acts as a filter on news reporting, resulting in a Eurosceptic bias. This also explains why negative framing is dominant in the data and why pro-EU voices are often excluded (see 5.3).

The relationship between regulations, self-perceived journalistic roles and, ultimately, news output, shows how the levels of the model but also discursive and non-discursive elements have a dialectical relationship. In this case the broadcasters' public service commitments and the consequently (self-)ascribed journalistic role explain the less emotive, more factual and balanced reporting. This type of reporting also helps broadcasters establish better working relationships than the right-wing newspapers, which EU press officers often regard as unreasonable and at times even hostile (see 7.5). However, there are some differences between the two PSBs included in the sample based on their different funding models. While the *BBC* is licence funded, *Channel 4* – although working under a PSB remit (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) – funds itself through advertising allowing it 'a bit of attitude' (Cathy Newman, *Channel 4 News*, email interview) in their coverage of the EU.

Licence funding puts additional pressure on *BBC* journalists. First and foremost, the *BBC* needs to serve the public interest (Department for Culture, 2006). This includes sustaining citizenship and civil society, promoting education and learning, stimulating creativity and cultural excellence, representing the UK, its regions and communities, bringing the UK to the rest of the world and vice versa and promoting the benefit of new technologies (Department for Culture, 2006). While broadcasting in liberal media systems is largely insulated from political

control (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), there are indirect ways of exerting political influence. Ultimately, it is the government which will decide on renewing the Royal Charter in 2027 and on licence fees. Previously, the government has been accused of trying to make the *BBC* more compliant through this process (BBC, 2015). Furthermore, the *BBC* is under increasing pressure to achieve commercial success to keep the licence fee down and, at the same time, maintain public support without which the license fee would not be justified (Johnson, 2013). Therefore, commercial services have been introduced in the form of *BBC Worldwide*, which is promoting British programmes and generating income for both the *BBC* itself and British broadcast industry in general as it tries to generate interest in British broadcasting among viewers around the globe (Johnson, 2013).

Commercial orientation is also necessary for *Channel 4*, since advertising is one of their main sources of income.<sup>35</sup> Unlike the *BBC*, it does not require licence fees. This gives it more freedom in spending and generating of profits (Keene, 2014). *Channel 4* does not have to justify itself to any fee payers and can make decisions on content more independently from their viewers preferences – as long as advertisers are still supportive. Dependences for *Channel 4* are therefore fundamentally different to those of the *BBC*. It does not have to rely on government support to secure funding; however, it does have to sell adverts, leading to stronger audience-orientation. As will be discussed below, journalists emphasised the importance of drawing the audience in by making EU stories interesting. Materialised through newsroom routines and influenced by technical constraints of the broadcast format, audience orientation is translated into the broadcasters' approach to EU news coverage, which is characterised by a narrow focus on specific events and policy areas and distinct spikes in event coverage. While a short attention span is evident across all media, this is particularly visible in the TV news data. EU events are quickly abandoned for other events. However, this appears to be less of a characteristic of EU coverage but of news coverage more generally.

These dynamics are accelerated by increasing digitalisation and the development of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013). Traditional mass media and newer technologies are not distinct but are interdependent with older news media adapting to new technologies and actors in newer media formats still seeking exposure in traditional formats. While this can have positive effects – such as a greater variety of sources, immediacy of information, for example through Twitter, or attracting a larger audience for traditional media outlets – it can also negatively affect news coverage. In a quest for quick, real-time coverage of events, facts may not be double-checked (Chadwick, 2013). Furthermore, in the context of real-time, rolling news

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<sup>35</sup> Other sources of income include, for example programme sales or sponsorship deals (which are related to advertising).

coverage, attention will be deflected quickly from events, as was the case with EU events among the broadcasters in particular. In a restricted time slot, only those stories will be included which remain newsworthy. An older story – even if still relevant such as the refugee crisis – may therefore be abandoned quickly as well. In the newsroom, it will be discursively negotiated as to how to deal with these non-discursive moments of the social practice of ‘EU news coverage’ (see below).

### ***7.3.3. Newsroom routines and interactions: selling the EU to editors and audiences***

Routines are ‘patterned, routinized practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs’ (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p. 105), unwritten rules, learned through praxis (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001) and a manifestation of ideology within the news organisation (Hall, 1973). Observation of responses to similar situations leads to an adaptation to these patterns. While the routines may be initially discursively negotiated among social actors, their adaptation is often non-discursive, for example based on experiences of non-publication. This is part of the socialisation of news workers, but is also specific to the news organisation they work in as editorial line and proprietor preferences can influence the shape of those routines. PSBs, however, are free from owners’ interference since they are not privately owned. Constraints of particular media formats also dictate some of the routines, highlighting the influence of non-discursive elements of social practice. Material moments of social practice, for example, determine the space available.

The routine of news selection has been intensively researched. News values theory postulates a list of characteristics and scenarios which make it more likely that a story is regarded as newsworthy (Galtung and Ruge, 1973). These news values include factors like unexpectedness or reference to elite persons. Particularly relevant for the coverage of EU-related issues appear to be references to something negative, relevance (for the UK) and consonance (the story fits the media’s expectations of the EU), among others. For broadcasting, another news value is whether a story lends itself to visualisation, a particularly challenging aspect for reporting the EU. Its complexity and the slow pace of policy development as well as the consensus-oriented nature of EU institutions are difficult to capture within the constraints of broadcast news. Journalists missed, for example, the conflictual nature of British politics, which is regarded as more newsworthy and interesting.

*[M]ost people who look at British politics that are interested in British politics, are used to a fairly, a fair deal of conflict, whereas the EU is designed to – not doing well at the moment – but is designed to avoid conflict, to reach consensus and that is not always an exciting story. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

While journalists internalise news values, this socialisation is directed by gatekeepers who enforce particular patterns of news selection and restrict publications of stories which do not match their preconceptions of a good story. These gatekeepers include the individual journalist but also other gatekeepers, such as the publisher, editor and subeditor. Gatekeeping can be defined as a ‘series of decision points at which news items are either continued or halted’ (Shoemaker *et al.*, 2001, p. 233). Although these decision points are individuals, Lewin (1947), who first used the concept of gatekeeping – albeit in a different context – discovered that gatekeeping happened more through routine forces than individuals. In these routines, again, ideology can be manifested (Hall, 1973; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Donohew (1967) set up a list of predictor variables which determine whether and how a news story is reported. The editor has significant impact on the decision. The editor’s opinion as well as the editor’s estimate of the public opinion will inform his choice.

Interviews show that EU-related stories are often harder to sell to the news desk compared to domestic political stories, especially at broadcasters where space is much more limited than in newspapers. The editorial line at broadcasters is not partisan – after all they have obligations of due impartiality – but rather manifests itself in news selection. Sean Klein explains how EU-related stories are less likely to pass the gatekeepers because of the audience’s perceived lack of interest in the subject. Mark Mardell points out how the importance of news stories is negotiated in press conferences, showing how discourse within a news organisation can impact the end product.

*The filter was a bit denser. I think editors – I’m not here to speak for them – but I think editors would argue that they are reflecting their audience. Because that’s what they have to do. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

*[T]here is a constant battle with all journalists at the news desk, hey my story is more important, no my story is more important. Domestic people covering the law think their story is more important than people covering health. I mean, it’s not a sort of unique thing. But I think it’s tougher with Europe because people even in the office today – I know that I’m the guy that sometimes people think is banging on about Europe. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

There will be a common understanding within a news organisation which events are to be deemed newsworthy and which are not (Harcup and O’Neill, 2001). Rules internalised through slanting can include what to publish, what is regarded as newsworthy, but also how the events are interpreted and presented. Gatekeepers therefore have a significant impact on the output of a newsroom. By routinely reinforcing policies on decision-making, individual reporters, having internalised the rules of the organisation, become gatekeepers themselves who act according to the policies set up by higher level gatekeepers. These, in turn, do not constantly need to monitor their subordinates’ work. While journalists emphatically deny direct influence on them (see

below), they did report their awareness of expectations at the news desk, as Mark Mardell's quote below illustrates.

*I speak to them and say 'are you interested in this work'. I kind of know what they are interested in and not. The main thing is whether they are interested, is it interesting. That is the litmus test. [...] I've worked there for about six years, I have a grip on what is interesting, what they care about, what they don't care about. You talk it through. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

The above quotes also highlight the audience-orientation at the broadcasters, which leads to selection of particular stories and adoption of perspectives invoking a human reaction from their audiences to draw them in. Firstly, audiences are more interested in stories which affect them personally. Therefore, a domestic angle and a focus on domestic actors is more common, in particular because EU institutions and actors appear far removed from everyday experience. This explains why the EU is more steadily reported in the context of domestic events, while EU-level events, which appear more remote and do not impact on British citizens immediately, need higher intensity and are only reported for short periods of time. In this respect, the broadcasters are similar to the tabloids. They also share the strong focus on policy areas which impact on the UK immediately, such as *evolution of the EU*, which includes the referendum, the potential of Brexit and Cameron's proposal for renegotiations, and Ukip's impact. Cushion *et al.* (2015) found that the broadcasters followed Ukip's policy agenda in the run-up to the European Elections, which raises questions of agenda-setting. The attention given to Ukip by right-wing newspapers may have created pressure for the broadcasters to follow suit, as might have Ukip's demands for more representation. Audience orientation also provides an explanation for the *BBC*'s and right-wing press's emphasis on EU membership benefits for the UK, while *Channel 4 News* and the *Guardian* also consider EU-wide benefits of integration: Their audiences appear more interested in the supranational element of European integration.

*[The audience] expect[s] to have an explanation why a particular story will impact on some major aspect of their lives, be it health, education – those are probably not very good examples. Basically, it is money in their pockets. I think that's the main thing. [...] I think news that appears here, Ten O'Clock News, whatever it might be, it has to fulfil the general requirements of a news story, that it is of interest and unusual and catches the eye and then it is 'why do I need to know this?'. You either need to know it because either it adds to your general knowledge of a subject that you should probably know a lot about or it explains how it is going to impact on your life or the lives of people that you care about. That might be your local community, it might be your family, it might be the region you live in, or it might be the industry that you work in. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

*Making the EU understandable and engaging is the biggest challenge. So much of our lives are governed by EU laws, and yet it's so hard to explain all the intricacies in a way which engages viewers, rather than switching them off. (Cathy Newman, Channel 4 News; email interview)*

Secondly, audiences are more likely to pay attention to a story with a human angle. The EU, however, is regarded as faceless, bureaucratic and dry. This explains, for example, why broadcast news covers *economic and financial policy* only rarely, except when they can point towards, for example, the impact on Greek citizens. Stories with a human component, such as those involving freedom of movement or the refugee crisis are more likely to be covered since they lend themselves to being constructed as a gripping story.

*That is one of the kind of issues of how news stories work and how you drag people in. If effectively what you are saying is 'look what is happening' in brackets 'in a community that is not unlike your own', that draws people in. So, I'm not saying that Channel 4 or the BBC is about drawing people in, a sport of ratings, but, nevertheless, from a news point of view, it is quite easy to draw people into a news story if you are saying 'here is something that actually affects people like you, communities like yours'. And I suppose what you are saying by default is: 'so this might not be far away from your own doorstep'.*

[...]

*Television audiences, particularly in an Anglo-Saxon context, have become very accustomed to a very clear narrative and an arc of a story. It is all about telling a story, it is not about listing facts, not about stating A's opinion and B's opinion. [...] So, therefore the tips for doing EU stuff, as much as anything else, is about engaging the audience in a way that they feel they have some sort of involvement. And that may be the story, it may be emotion, it may be anger, it may be indignation, it may be whatever. But it is all about eliciting some sort of response. Because the worst thing is no response at all. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

With regard to immigration – both in the form of freedom of movement or the refugee crisis – broadcast journalists considered the importance of the issue for the audience. They cited their public service commitments as a reason to address immigration in such detail while neglecting other policy areas the EU is active in. Again, Ukip's influence on media agendas needs to be mentioned here (Cushion *et al.*, 2015).

*Just look at the opinion polls. Immigration is always one of the issues voters say they care most about, so politicians talk about it a lot, and our viewers want to hear about it. Of course, not all Channel 4 News viewers will care more about immigration than other issues, and some will be much more supportive of mass immigration than viewers on other channels. So, the focus we put on these stories has to reflect that. (Cathy Newman, Channel 4 News; email interview)*

*I think there was a feeling, rightly or wrongly, that we had ignored the story, that it hadn't been – you know, sometimes the BBC or even the media gets blamed when there are stories that everybody's ignored and nobody's done anything. [...] I think it was one of those hidden stories that maybe people just didn't realise concerns on the ground because it wasn't being raised necessarily by elites in parliament, but being raised through mutterings in pubs. So, I think that, probably something I would say is that you do need to keep your ear to the ground on what people are saying. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

Dramatic stories such as the refugee crisis also are more straightforward to visualise, whereas many events happening on an EU level are difficult to broadcast. Stories about more technical aspects of the EU are difficult to package in a few minutes of broadcast news. Oversimplification was criticised in the inquiry mentioned above (Lord Wilson of Dinton *et al.*, 2005), and can partially be seen as a result of this difficulty. In the sample analysed for this thesis, for example, the usage of metonyms to refer to EU institutions and actors is one symptom. The complexity is challenging to convey in brief broadcasts and the backdrop of EU institutions does not make for entertaining television, also because of the lack of open conflict on an EU-level, as mentioned above.

*If it's an explosion or things going bang, that naturally can be very good TV. If it's something like the Lisbon Treaty, that's extremely bad TV [...] But more often I think you have to actively – I try to think, at the talk I gave an example of how I illustrated the Lisbon Treaty. One thing I remember was going on a European, not the European army but the European military sort of – I cannot remember what they are called now – units. Going along to their exercises and stress what people wanted more of after the Lisbon Treaty, things like that. So, lots of thinking, talking, discussing how best to illustrate stuff. And that goes on between the producers and the bureau and the editors in London and myself. (Mark Mardell, BBC; phone interview)*

*First of all, the process by which decisions are taken. It is extremely complex and has to be. That makes it very difficult from a reporting point of view because decisions and their processes don't fit neatly into news bulletins necessarily. The results might, if it's a particularly eye-catching result. But, certainly during my time with the BBC in Brussels, what we were doing, we were taking an example and follow through these legislations from its conception to coming into law. It is extremely – it is a very long process and therefore a very difficult thing to clearly demonstrate. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

EU press officers do recognise this problem and try to package news stories in a way that highlights the impact an EU level event will have on British citizens and provide more audio-visual material. However, the interviewed journalists question their usefulness and instead rely on their own judgement for finding and visualising interesting stories. Digitalisation thereby is seen as providing new opportunities for journalists since they open up new sources and make it easier to follow interesting stories and to keep on top of developments. However, journalists also voice concerns that digitalisation of particularly *BBC* services could lead to even more audience orientation and selectivity from the audience as the quote below illustrates.

*But my sense is that the younger audience would pick and choose, to watch the iPlayer, and therefore I suppose, what becomes critically important, is the caption headline and the caption photograph. What is going to draw me in? [...] Writing the headline, drawing somebody into the story is always huge but I suspect an awful lot of time is devoted just to those words now and more so than it was in the past. [...] they are trialling a system that will, based on a reasonable length of time, devise a daily bulletin for you. A short email will drop into your inbox that will say based on what you have been watching these are the five stories you might be interested in. In a way that is kind of what a news bulletin or a*

*newspaper does already. Personally, as an older person, I don't want an algorithm that tells me what to read. [...] It is, from a democratic point of view, a slightly alarming thing. (Sean Klein, BBC; interview in London)*

As Sean Klein's concerns highlight, digitalisation could be detrimental to EU coverage. Again, this gives evidence to the theoretical assumption that non-discursive elements of social practice (technological advances) influence the discursive moments of social practice (news output).

#### **7.3.4. Summary**

Application of the model presented in Figure 13 Model of EU News Production

Figure 14 to the broadcasters considered in this thesis, tested through interviews with broadcast journalists, provides explanations for the patterns found in the textual data. The perceived journalistic duty of objectivity, which is linked to the PSB's obligations to balanced reporting and education of citizens, leads to a more balanced, and in comparison to the Eurosceptic press more favourable, representation of the EU. The language used is correspondingly also less emotive, but simpler than in newspapers, since it comprises (and at times imitates) natural spoken language. However, due to an audience orientation strengthened by growing commercialisation of broadcast news, particular news values influence EU coverage: relevance for a domestic audience leads to a focus on the domestic aspect of news stories. The EU, while regarded as an important issue, is a challenging topic for broadcast journalists since its complexity does not lend itself to being packaged into short, easily comprehended clips. While educating citizens is a task of public service broadcasters, education about the EU is only 'drip-fed' (Sean Klein, *BBC*, face-to-face interview) in order not to alienate viewers during the programme. The necessity for gripping visual material, as well as the need to package news as a story with human appeal to draw viewers in, favours stories about migration.

#### **7.4. *Guardian* and *Mirror*: struggling to construct a pro-European message**

The *Guardian* and the *Mirror* are left-leaning newspapers. The *Mirror* is a strong supporter of the Labour party, the *Guardian* has in the past endorsed the Liberal Democrats but in the 2015 General Election endorsed Labour. The two newspapers also resemble each other with regard to their editorial line on the EU. They are broadly supportive of EU membership, and endorsed Remain during the referendum campaign. Their coverage during the collection periods of this thesis also suggests a pro-EU approach. Consequently, their news coverage is the most positive in the sample, framing the EU most commonly as a *force for good* and



highlighting the importance of EU membership for the UK's economy, security and position in the world. They are less likely than the broadcasters or the right-wing papers to frame the EU in terms of *threat* and more frequently emphasise opportunities for cooperation instead of differences between the UK and EU. *Conflict/crisis* and *the EU is incompetent* framing are still dominant in these outlets, however, they are not as concerned with the potential disadvantages arising for the UK (unless they decided to leave the EU). While these patterns are similar in both outlets, they differ in one important aspect: the *Guardian* covers the EU extensively, considering many different policy areas and publishing high numbers of comments and editorials on the topic, the *Mirror* publishes the least about EU-related issues compared to other news outlets included in this sample, focussing on a limited number of policy areas. This section, using the model for EU news production, explains why those similarities and differences exist.

#### **7.4.1. Individual level influences: aspiring a positive counterbalance**

Interviews with broadcast journalists found that they have subscribed to the role of objective disseminators of information. While journalists working for broadly pro-European titles also stress the importance of reporting accurately, they emphasise the need to make a case for the EU. They express their disappointment with the coverage provided by other newspapers and partially also the broadcasters.

*I think that the general tone of the debate in Britain, the European debate, the coverage of the EU by large parts of the British media has created a situation in which it is very difficult to have a kind of objective and accurate discussion around the European Union. So, I think, I certainly consider the primary duty as reporting accurately what's going on and that kind of implies I think that much of the reporting in certain sort of newspapers particularly is either inaccurate, at worst inaccurate and at best sort of biased, essentially. (Jon Henley, Guardian; phone interview)*

Consequently, they see their role as counterbalancing these representations of the EU. In a way, they show a similar motivation to broadcast journalists who aim to balance out the negative bias with accurate, impartial reporting, as the quote from Jason Beattie, political editor of the *Mirror*, suggests.

*I think it comes down to the values of the paper, strong values. Often, I find myself asking if we don't cover the stories – who will? (Jason Beattie, Mirror; phone interview)*

However, especially Jon Henley's self-perceived duty differs from this understanding by explicitly stating that he came to review the journalistic norm of objectivity in favour of what he feels to be right, thereby resisting the dominant sociocultural practices associated with the liberal model of media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). He admits that his personal opinion has had an impact on EU coverage. While it is impossible to make sweeping claims about all

*Guardian* writers covering the EU, it shows the potential of pro-EU attitudes within a pro-European news organisation resulting in a more positive representation of the EU.

*[T]wo days before the referendum, [I did] a very big piece that was basically the five questions you should really ask yourself before you vote in the referendum, which was a long piece, two pages and it was a real effort, a very conscious effort to debunk some of the myths and lies, many of the general complaints that were made by the Leave campaign. I know that maybe shouldn't be necessarily one's job as a journalist but I felt at that time - and I still do feel in what I've been writing about Brexit since then - that [...] with Brexit, I'm kind of obliged to review my attitude to strictly, objective journalism and actually kind of say to myself, you know, it's necessary here to balance the scale because the sheer weight of negative broadcasting and newspaper coverage is so enormous that you need to counter it in some way. (Jon Henley, *Guardian*; phone interview)*

Like many broadcast journalists, Henley has had exposure to the EU in different ways, having worked as Paris correspondent for several years, and speaking French fluently. According to him, this experience helped him greatly to understand and report EU-related issues. The *Guardian* furthermore has two permanent representatives in Brussels. The *Financial Times*, another newspaper with a pro-European editorial line has five permanent staff in Brussels. The *Mirror*, on the other hand, does not have any permanent correspondents for the EU institutions. Regardless of changes in opinion and attitudes, however, the interviews show that direct, frequent interaction with EU institutions and officials can be helpful to establish and maintain useful contacts and develop a better understanding of the processes within EU institutions.

*Lots of different journalists covering EU subjects. Some are really professionals, they know everything, every single detail. Sometimes I don't know the detail because I don't need to. [...] And then we have people who have their own angle and they will use their angle and it's their right because they have their audience and they kind of try to find their angle. And you have people who have been assigned something ad hoc [...] and they don't understand how it works here and they have to just really learn from the beginning. And then of course we try to explain how it works. (EU press officer; interview in Brussels)*

This difference between *The Guardian* and *Mirror* explains partially why *Guardian* coverage is more varied, covers a larger range of policy areas and provides more insight into events on the EU-level, even if they do not involve the UK, in comparison to the *Mirror*. With permanent correspondents, a news organisation has access to sources beyond official briefings and can make contacts with relevant EU officials. A journalist without this kind of access will produce different news reports compared to a journalist who has this exposure. Furthermore, analysis of the distribution of authors shows that the EU is covered by a large number of journalists with only a few of them covering the EU more than once during the collection periods. This suggests that newsrooms often have only a small number of specialists with regard to EU-related issues generally (see Appendix F for a list of authors who contributed to the

sample collected for this thesis). In the case of the *Mirror*, this leads to a narrow UK-centric coverage, reflecting their editorial interest (see below).

*I mean first of all you need a correspondent here on a permanent basis. There are some now that have come for Brexit. But permanent correspondents, none of the tabloids have that. And that means you will have better contacts and you will have trust with people. And as I said before, people like me will inevitably rely on trust and relationship and if you build up a relationship with somebody you will be more inclined to give. A lot of things in Brussels work just like our interview, in the background. So you need to find people willing to do it. (EU press officer; interview in Brussels)*

Individual influences, such as attitudes, experiences and knowledge, impact on personal relationships between media organisations and sources which, in turn, affect news coverage. Of course, a bureau of permanent correspondents is dependent on economic constraints and on the newspaper's priorities. This is intertwined with audience expectations. The following section looks more closely at newsroom routines and interactions to uncover those relationships for the pro-European press.

#### **7.4.2. Newsroom routines and interactions: balancing a pro-European editorial line with audience expectations**

Both newspapers discussed in this section follow a left-of-centre, generally pro-European editorial line. However, they are not equally forthcoming about their pro-EU view. Jason Beattie described the *Mirror*'s stance on the EU as 'not necessarily pro-EU but more balanced', while Jon Henley described the *Guardian* as 'broadly pro-European'. This already points to some of the most important differences in newsroom routines when it comes to covering the EU. Particularly the audiences' expectations shape news values and gatekeeper decisions. Different gatekeeping decisions based on audience expectations explain why the *Guardian* publishes large volumes of comment pieces on the EU, while the *Mirror*, despite a predominant *force for good* frame, reduces them substantially in the run-up to the General Election.

Research suggests that the newspaper proprietor is the most powerful gatekeeper (Donahew, 1967). However, both pro-European titles included in this sample distance themselves clearly from the idea that any proprietor would influence their journalistic work, also because they do not have one powerful proprietor. Instead they are owned by trusts which ring-fence journalistic decisions from any owner's influence (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Pfetsch *et al.*, 2010).

*We don't have a proprietor, really. We are owned by a sort of foundation. We don't have shareholders, we don't have an owner. We have always been quite independent. Personally, I have never had any experience of that. (Jon Henley, Guardian; phone interview)*

*Let's stay clear. I have never ever had any instructions from the owners. We are a publicly owned company, there is no interference at all from that level. [...] I have to stress that very important point. We don't have owners and they don't interfere at all and never have done. (Jason Beattie, Mirror; phone interview)*

Although it can be argued that the proprietor nevertheless impacts on reporting indirectly as a filter, which journalists are unaware of (Herman and Chomsky, 1994), the lack of empirical findings from interviews restricts any claims about their influence. However, there are other powerful gatekeepers. Editors have an especially strong influence on EU coverage by setting particular policies, including news values, which are internalised and only sometimes contested by the journalists (Clayman and Reisner, 1998; Shoemaker *et al.*, 2001).

In most newspapers, including the *Mirror* and *Guardian*, editorial decisions about publication and form of stories are guided by audience expectations, often measured by sales numbers. Again, this shows how a non-discursive moment of social practice – sales of newspapers – can have an influence on discourse within the newsroom (for example negotiations regarding news selections) and ultimately the news coverage, which in turn feeds into the public discourse.

Even the two newspapers with the most positive framing of the EU besides being the clearest advocates for more engagement of the UK in the EU, use negative frames most commonly, such as *conflict/crisis* and *incompetent* frames. Negative news is more likely to be reported because, firstly, it occurs with higher frequency, secondly, it is usually unambiguous and consensual, unlike positive events which are evaluated differently by different people, and thirdly, it tends to be unexpected (Galtung and Ruge, 1973). These news values, as guided by audience interest and sales numbers, are a convention within this social institution 'print journalism' and the attached order of discourse.

*I think that is news values. [...] Conflict is more newsworthy than sort of peace and joy. (Jon Henley, Guardian; phone interview)*

While this is understandable, it nevertheless contributes to a largely negative discourse about the EU. In addition, the domestic angle of EU news coverage appears to stem from news values and gatekeeper decisions based on their perception of audience interest. Jon Henley recalled instances when the editors would push back on stories because they did not fulfil the required news values. He found it particularly difficult to convince editors to include the European angle of a story, in addition to the UK's view on an issue. Stories which affect the UK readership are regarded as more newsworthy than those that do not. This pattern is even more pronounced for the *Mirror*. Jason Beattie highlights the audience interest in the domestic angle in the quote below.

*We sell newspapers to a domestic audience. Therefore, our coverage will be dictated by that audience. We're not writing for the Economist, which is more interested in the global context. So that is not really our job. (Jason Beattie, Mirror; phone interview)*

*Or there is some kind of conflict going on between Britain and a European country or Britain and the EU, that story will very often be kind of led by the Westminster correspondent here, the UK political correspondents and you sometimes have to fight to ensure that the European point of view is adequately put. (Jon Henley; phone interview)*

The domestic angle, while seen as inevitable considering that the newspapers are catering for a domestic audience, contributes to a rather narrow representation of the EU, even at those newspapers which are trying to engage their audiences with the topic. Jon Henley is aware of that and sees this as one of the critical factors, which contributed to the referendum result in 2016.

*The base position, if you like, is a UK-centric one. Which is understandable in a sense that most British governments have been... if not actively Eurosceptic, at least kind of Euro-ambivalent. So, [...] the media were simply reflecting the position of the political class in that. But I think it's a major factor in what has happened over the last year. We haven't informed as broadly and comprehensively as we should have done. (Jon Henley, Guardian; phone interview)*

The *Mirror*, out of all the news outlets included in the sample, uses positive framing the most, stays away from *threat* framing and overly emotional language to describe EU actions, actors and their relationship with the EU, but they do not cover the EU or EU migration in much depth. They publish comparatively few news reports and comment pieces on the EU and do not often refer to politicians' stances on the referendum during the General Election campaign. As Jason Beattie explains, the EU is not regarded as a core issue for *Mirror* readers and is therefore not covered extensively.

*Because we are understanding that our readers have other priorities. And all newspapers are based on editorial decisions and our editorial decision is that our readers care more about jobs, they care more about standards of living, they care more about community, they care more about housing and then they do care whether it is or is not interfering in our lives. (Jason Beattie, Mirror; phone interview)*

However, there is more to the avoidance of EU-related stories at the *Mirror*. Not only is the audience assumed to be less interested in EU news, its readers hold divided views on Europe with a substantial section opposed to the newspaper's editorial stance. In order to avoid losing their Eurosceptic readers, *Mirror* editors appear hesitant to make their line on the EU too obvious. While the *Mirror* is framing the EU most positively out of all the news organisations included in this study, the lack of coverage prevents a big impact on its readership, but also a backlash. Consequently, the *Mirror* publishes comparatively few editorials and comments discussing the EU. Editorials 'are the only place in a newspaper where the views of the paper

as an organisation are represented. [...] In selecting and presenting issues according to their own agenda, free of the obligation to be objective, the editorial function enables newspapers to take on an active role in public deliberations of politics' (Firmstone, 2008, p. 213). Editorials can function as agenda setters and actively engage in the public debate, addressing both readers and, indirectly, political actors (Druckman and Parkin, 2005; Pfetsch *et al.*, 2010) and are influenced by routine forces and dynamic interactions in the newsroom (Clayman and Reisner, 1998). The production process follows four steps: issue selection, decision on content and editorial line, written by a lead writer and approval by editor. As opposed to news values, Firmstone (2008, p. 217) speaks of 'editorial values', which guide the initial selection of stories. These do include news values as explained above but also editorial interest, readership interest and the wider media debate. While commentators enjoy more freedom from the editorial line, strong readership interest guides their topic selection as well. In the case of the *Mirror*, the avoidance of the subject in comment and editorial pieces appears to be justified by the audience's lack of interest. However, considering the quote below, the split in readership views on EU issues seems to matter, too.

*[O]ur readers are overwhelmingly Labour supporters. [...] So, it is very, say, straightforward when it comes to tackling domestic politics, [...]. On the EU our readership is split. We don't have the liberty on giving thoughts as we were perhaps with domestic politics. (Jason Beattie, Mirror; phone interview)*

This differs clearly from the *Guardian's* audience. Jon Henley points out that *Guardian* readers were the most likely to vote to remain a member of the European Union in the 2016 referendum. The most popular stories among the readership after the referendum were those showcasing negative consequences of Brexit. He described the *Guardian's* readership as particularly interested in the EU, which explains the high volume of news coverage and commentary at the *Guardian*, as well as the frequent coverage of *economic and financial policy*, especially the Greek crisis. This has not necessarily an immediate impact on their readers but – like *Telegraph* readers – they are more interested in these topics. This is similar to another pro-European newspaper, the *Financial Times*, which sees its EU coverage as one of its selling points.

*I think there are more people who do buy us because of our strength in Europe, yes. That's one of the core selling points of the paper. (Alex Barker, Financial Times; interview in Brussels)*

For the *Guardian*, however, the audience alone is too simplistic an explanation for the volume and relative depth of coverage. The readership permits this kind of journalism. However, it appears as if they made a conscious and visible effort to make a case for the

European Union's principles, achievements and the UK's engagement within the EU. This is reflected in Jon Henley's emphasis of the *Guardian* as a counterbalance to other mainstream newspapers. Although Jason Beattie mentioned this as well, the lack of coverage and the *Mirror*'s obvious consideration of potentially Eurosceptic readers prevent such campaigning journalism.

While the newsroom routines can explain patterns found in the data, they should be contextualised with influences coming from outside the newsroom, which drive this audience-oriented approach to covering the EU. It is also worth looking at the relationship those pro-European news organisations have with EU press offices and other EU actors, since it illustrates how different social institutions are interlinked and how these links influence discourse.

#### ***7.4.3. Macro-level influences: the impact of economic and technological changes on the newspapers***

In order to understand the differences in news routines and output between the *Guardian* and the *Mirror*, one has to understand some particularities about the British media system. British liberal media culture, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) explain, has historically been subdivided into a tabloid press, a quality press and broadcasting which all follow their own internal logic. In general, in the liberal systems, commercial newspapers dominate rather than newspapers owned and heavily influenced by political parties. Class-stratified markets are more influential in shaping news production in the UK than political intervention (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 228). Market orientation of newspapers was spurred on in the early 1990s by Murdoch's 'price war' (Greenslade, 2003, p. 558), which forced other news organisations to lower prices, aim for a wider audience and generate more advertising revenue. On the one hand, this gave news organisations independence from political influence, on the other, a consumption-oriented approach of news organisations, as well as the strong influence of individual owners has been criticised (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 228; see also below).

Due to its commercial character, the UK newspaper market in particular is characterised by a strong audience orientation, which also considers political affiliation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 206) and in the case of the EU, attitudes towards the European Union and European integration. This trend is even accelerated by increasing economic pressure. While the *BBC* is licence funded, privately owned media organisations need to raise funds through advertisements (52.6% from copy sales in quality press, 58.2% in popular press; see Rt. Hon Lord Justice Leveson, 2012, p. 95) and copy sales or subscriptions. Traditionally, the most profit was generated by news media by advertising (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). However, financial hardship during and after the financial crisis in 2008 made advertisers spend more

carefully (Rowe, 2011) and often move online where they reach larger audiences. Newspapers in particular are struggling as they are losing shares of the market (Chadwick, 2013). At the same time, production costs have not reduced significantly (Rt. Hon Lord Justice Leveson, 2012, p. 93).

Newspapers will adjust their style but also their choice of topics according to audience preference to ensure high circulation numbers. Tabloids in particular choose their news stories according to what is deemed to be popular with the readership as the quote from Duncan Begg, former subeditor for the *Mirror*, illustrates (see also news values above). In the case of the *Mirror*, this constraint is particularly visible. Economic pressures force the newspaper to avoid certain topics and instead only cover them as soft news, for example consumer issues, although it stays away from scandal stories which are more prevalent in the right-wing press (see below). As Jason Beattie put it, their job is to ‘sell newspapers’ by exhibiting those traits that tabloid readers prefer.

*So, again, at the end of the day the Mirror is a tabloid and is trying to tap into base interests and they place a lot of value on sort of righteous, humorous, amusing stories and stories that are emotive, stories that evoke emotions among their readers. The Mirror had no axe to grind, had a more left-of-centre outlook, so there wasn't a huge amount of interest for their audience for covering EU stories which would seem far removed from the lives of their audience. (Duncan Begg, former subeditor at the Mirror, among other newspapers; phone interview)*

This is not to say that the *Guardian* does not act with economics in mind. This non-discursive constraint affects the *Guardian* as well. However, the format of the newspaper and its readership's expectations allow for a more in-depth coverage of the EU in comparison with the *Mirror*. Nevertheless, Jon Henley sees the avoidance of a very strong pro-European discourse within the paper as partly responsible for the referendum outcome.

*There have been very, very few outspokenly pro-European politicians in the UK. Being positive about the EU is not going to win you any votes as a politician in the UK and I guess the feeling is similarly being too positive about the EU won't win you any readers either. I think there might be a case to be made – and I know some people have made this – that we could have been more pro-European in the past. But you know, there you go. We are where we are. (Jon Henley, Guardian, phone interview)*

This also feeds into the finding of the textual analysis that arguments against a referendum or for membership of the EU are based mainly on economic calculations. The *Guardian* does go beyond economic arguments, highlighting historical achievements and cultural and political benefits of membership. However, they still formulated negative arguments in terms of risk rather than coming up with a positive case. This also links to audience orientation. Passionate,



ideological arguments for EU membership do not resonate with the average reader of even the *Guardian* (see also 7.2 on sociocultural practices).

The commercial focus in these papers is also reflected in the journalists' usage of online metrics for articles published on the papers' websites. Advancing technology and newly emerging media have always transformed existing media culture. Similarly, the emergence and development of digital media has transformed the wider media culture and consumption habits and thereby traditional mainstream media (Chadwick, 2013). A complex, hybrid system has evolved in which all media formats are intertwined.

In a speech to News Corp editors, Murdoch (2005) stressed the commercial gains to be made through digitalisation. He asked his editors to give the audience what it wants. Audience feedback is enhanced through direct and time-efficient methods of contact, and many-to-many discussions about news content (Domingo, 2008). Even statistics on the number of views an online news item received can be used as audience feedback. These numbers, which are provided to news professionals on a regular basis, can influence decisions on homepage content (Domingo, 2008; Vu, 2014). Even at the *Mirror* and *Guardian*, journalists report that they monitor traffic on their site and adjust at least to a degree.

*We should keep our editorial, our journalistic judgement what we consider a good story and not a good story. But what it can do is to help you to present it in a better way. It can help you to judge the right length of it. Very often we write too long. Basically, if you know that most people abandon a story after about 500 or 600 words, then that's a useful thing to know. All that has been extremely useful. The main thing is that it has brought us much more into contact with the readers, in terms of comments that are underneath articles and on social media. You are much more aware of what readers think and how they are reacting [...]. (John Henley, Guardian, phone interview)*

*What is heartening is that the audience for the online politics website is rising and rising substantially. What I've noticed, I'm giving you half secrets here, that the audience online for EU stories was minimal before Christmas and has started to rise eventually in the last few weeks and months. It is becoming an issue, it is beginning to attract people online. But it is as I said earlier, it was never a core issue for the Mirror, online or the papers. It is starting to become more relevant. If you are obsessed by the EU you are reading this on another platform. (Jason Beattie, Mirror; phone interview)*

Digitalisation and hybridisation of traditional media can democratise journalism and involve the citizens. However, from the interviews it becomes clear that these developments also feed into the already commerce-oriented media landscape in the UK, resulting in UK-centric, conflict-oriented EU coverage – if it is covered at all.

#### **7.4.4. Summary**

The *Mirror* and *Guardian* are the two most pro-European titles in the sample. However, while *Guardian* readers share this view with their newspaper, *Mirror* readers are split on the

issue. Due to economic pressure on newspapers, heightened by a changing media culture which is moving online, the *Mirror* therefore avoids upsetting readers by declaring too obviously their stance on Europe. A focus on selling newspapers also drives the two outlets to focus on aspects of particular interest to their audiences. This leads to a predominant domestic angle and *conflict/crisis* framing in news coverage of the EU. Interestingly though, at both outlets there appears to be an effort to provide a counterbalance to the overwhelmingly negative coverage in other media outlets. They both struggle to meet this goal. In the case of the *Mirror* this is due to its avoidance of the issue. Even though they frame the EU most positively and avoid stories about threats to UK sovereignty, they nevertheless fail to construct a convincing argument, simply because they do not talk about it sufficiently. In the case of the *Guardian*, there is far more coverage, which touches upon a variety of policy areas and topics, again framing the EU more positively than the right-wing newspapers. However, they are – due to news values – conflict orientated, which decreases the strength of their argument. Furthermore, they are struggling to make a passionate case for remaining a member of the EU, concentrating mainly on the economic case.

#### **7.5. The *Telegraph*, *Daily Mail* and *The Sun*: Euroscepticism for different audiences**

The three right-wing newspapers included in this sample share important characteristics with regard to EU coverage. They are most likely to use *threat* frames and to propose less integration as a solution to the EU's problems. They are less likely to acknowledge the EU's achievements. Language use in these newspapers is also more emotive than in the left-wing papers or broadcasters. They frame the EU as separate entity and highlight the conflictual nature of negotiations between the UK and EU with strong warfare metaphors. In these encounters, the UK is generally represented as superior, based on historic differences between the UK and the continent. However, these newspapers also differ concerning the strength of hostility they show through their news coverage and language use.

The following sections will explore the different levels of influence on EU coverage at the right-wing papers which can explain both general trends and differences between organisations, starting at the individual level. The interviewed journalists from these newspapers feel a stronger duty to scrutinise the EU institutions and actors. They are embedded in newsrooms which follow a broadly Eurosceptic editorial line, although in different intensities and which cater for different target audiences. Those journalists in particular also criticise the EU officials' hostility towards them, resulting in a somewhat tense relationship, which affects coverage.

### **7.5.1. Individual level influences: scrutinising the EU**

All journalists interviewed for this thesis state accuracy and information transmission as their first and foremost duty, not only with regard to reporting the EU but more generally. However, journalists from right-wing newspapers – despite a similar sociodemographic background – differ from other journalists with respect to a further duty they try to fulfil when reporting the EU. They take up a watchdog role in addition to their role as information disseminator. They referred to the adversarial tradition of Anglo-Saxon journalism, which sees its responsibility in holding the powerful to account, again exacerbating the distinction between Britishness and European-ness. Baisnée (2000) calls this role perception of EU correspondents investigative or political journalism.

*This again is the reflexive British tradition of journalism going back over 150 years - the invention of the Telegraph, which is where the Telegraph [newspaper] came from - is not to be a representative of an institution at home, it is to be your readers' eyes and ears on people who spend their money and make their laws. (Matthew Holehouse, Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

Among journalists working for pro-European titles, the watchdog role is evident as well; however, they are more clearly devoted to information transmission and interpretation. While they do not fit neatly into Baisnée's (2000) category of institutional journalism, which attempts to protect the EU institutions, they appear less adversarial to the EU institutions and elites. This can explain some of the discrepancies found in coverage and the more positive framing in, for example, the *Guardian*, while *threat* and *conflict/crisis* frames are more prevalent in those newspapers whose journalists defined their duty as holding EU actors to account.

The focus on the domestic context – which is not exclusive to the right-wing newspapers, but particularly pronounced at the *Sun* and *Daily Mail* – can also be partially explained through role perceptions of British journalists. Most journalists in the sample stated that they see their role as informing about and interpreting EU events for a British audience. Journalists from right-wing papers in particular reject the idea of creating a more supranational, cosmopolitan discourse (Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2006; 2008) but instead emphasise the importance of national relevance of stories. The quotes below illustrate this thinking, described as classic professionalism (Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2006; 2008) or politicisation through national politics (Baisnée, 2000).

*A lot of the day-to-day stuff the Commission is announcing is less relevant now [...] You know, there's no point covering it because it's less relevant now. (John Stevens, Daily Mail; phone interview)*

*And then, really, to explain in the news report why it is important, what the context is to your readers. And the readers, in my case now, [...] it is members of the public in Britain. Thus, the duty. (Bruno Waterfield, Times and Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

Furthermore, these journalists also differ in their personal opinion regarding the EU, showing more concern about its shortcomings and in one case even hostility towards the project as a whole. The quote below, from Peter Hitchens, columnist at the *Daily Mail*, illustrates not only his personal opinion, in which he distinguishes clearly between the UK and EU as a foreign entity (see 7.2), but also how this influences his writing. As a columnist, he is not bound by journalistic objectivity but is free to give his own opinion.

*Well, yes, it is, because I'm against the whole idea of this country being governed by a foreign entity whereas I am not against the idea of the British government. The fact that I have been, for many years, hostile to the whole idea of Britain being in the European Union must colour what I write about. To answer that, no one reading what I write about could be in any doubt of my hostility. They would be able to make allowances for that. (Peter Hitchens, Daily Mail; phone interview).*

With regard to the EU as a subject of coverage, personal, direct experience with EU institutions can shape those personal opinions. While among broadcast journalists and journalists interviewed from left-wing media, exposure appears to have had a positive effect on their attitudes and opinions, exposure to EU institutions in the case of journalists working for right-wing newspapers, seems to result in more Eurosceptic attitudes. The quotes by Matthew Holehouse and Bruno Waterfield illustrate the dynamic.

*So much that is going on is just mad. I came out here, everybody who comes out here [...]. I know BBC reporters who come out here; they go through a phase of going full Ukip for three months. I guess working somewhere like the UN would be a very similar experience, or the World Bank. It is a supranational body. It is a bit like a university town, the sort of norms and rules, sort of weird little bubble. It has its own norms. (Matthew Holehouse, Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

*I've been in Brussels for 13 years, covering the EU for 16 years. I was probably fairly agnostic to begin with. Moments for me which made me much more critical were the referendums in the Netherlands, in France in 2005 and then the Lisbon Treaty effort to ignore those. I think – and this goes for a lot of people – the response to the financial crisis across Europe has been pretty poor, as it was in Britain. And then the Greek crisis sort of underlining that. (Bruno Waterfield, The Times and Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

However, not all journalists interviewed agree in this regard. Duncan Begg, who worked at the *Sun* as well as the *Daily Mail* as a subeditor, points out that his own political views, and his opinion on the EU in particular, often clashed with the official editorial line. He also emphasises that this was the case for a large number of his colleagues.

*I was pro-EU and I was a left-of-centre journalist. It would always clash. And I think it was the same for many of my colleagues at the Sun. Way more than 50% had views that were associated with liberalism and would be more pro-EU. And even at the Mail most people*

*were disgusted by their racist stories and the anti-immigration stories. (Duncan Begg, former subeditor for the Sun and Daily Mail, among others; phone interview)*

While this supports suspicions that journalists tend to be more left-leaning than their newspapers and even the general public (Aitken, 2008), it also shows that these personal opinions not necessarily always translate into more left-leaning coverage. Begg acknowledges that people would refuse to run stories they regarded as immoral but, overall, they followed the editorial line. This dynamic is discussed in more detail in the following section.

### **7.5.2. Newsroom routines and interaction: creating outrage about the EU**

At first glance, the news values attached to EU stories in the right-wing newspapers do not differ significantly from those identified for other news outlets. Due to audience orientation, coverage is UK-centric, focused on UK actors and concentrated on those policy areas regarded as most relevant to the audience. Negativity, again, appears to be a news value making EU news more publishable. Furthermore, coverage of migration both within and from without the EU attracts a large volume of coverage due to the audience's interest in these issues and in case of the refugee crisis due to the scale, negativity and human aspects.

*Really now, between Brexit, Greece, migration, terrorism, all happening at the same time, I have no complaints. I have no problems getting stuff in. I often get a phone call asking if I had a front-page story we could do. Particularly migration because it is so interesting in terms of policy. [...] To answer your question, no, we have no problems selling European stories to our readers.*

[...]

*There is a strong interest in what the British are doing, how it's affecting them. [...] It [the South Stream pipeline project] is a big issue for Poland and Germany. I need to be aware of it, on top of it, but never write about it. (Matthew Holehouse, Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

Relevance as a news value also explains why some policy areas are not covered in great detail at all. If a policy area does not appear immediately relevant to the UK, it is less likely to be covered in the news (see quote above). The discrepancy between the right-wing newspapers regarding the number of policy areas they cover can also be explained through perceived audience interest. In this aspect, the *Telegraph* is more similar to the *Guardian*, since both their readerships are particularly interested in the EU, according to interviewees, even though they may hold different opinions about it. According to one interviewee, a conscious, editorial decision was taken to focus more explicitly on the EU, also due to the pressure from Ukip, mirroring patterns discovered with regard to the broadcasters (see also Cushion *et al.*, 2015).

In the *Telegraph* which has a substantial business section, *economic and financial policies* are covered extensively and in a more balanced fashion which reflects the audience's interests

in technical details, according to Matthew Holehouse. Despite a Eurosceptic editorial line (see below), the *Telegraph* highlights the risks of Brexit for businesses and the British economy, again tapping into their audience's interests. They consequently mostly ignore political or cultural benefits beyond the economic advantages of membership.

However, the right-wing papers differ from the other outlets in an important aspect. They are keener to publish scandalous stories about the EU. Prioritisation of trivial and soft news over hard news as reported by EU officials may also be explained by audience orientation. Scandalous and bizarre stories, such as sex orgies during EU summits or the lack of a British breakfast at a Council meeting (according to one press officer) may not conform to classic news values but they are entertaining. The EU officials interviewed stress the popularity of stories about EU bureaucracy and perceived waste, as well as Euromyths, in particular among the British Eurosceptic press.

*I think the immediate, instinctive answer is Euromyth. There are plenty of them and they cover a number of policy areas and a lot of them are stretches even of imagination in my opinion, but here we are. Euromyth [...] when it comes to European Parliament, MEPs expenses are forever popular in the UK. I think to the astonishment of a number of member states. (EU press officers; phone interview)*

*The UK press makes stories about very mundane and stupid things that other press just wouldn't care about, which other countries just wouldn't [cover]. (EU press officer; interview in Brussels)*

According to Duncan Begg, these types of stories are particularly sought after at the *Sun*, where he would look for aspects of EU-related stories, which lend themselves to ridicule, following the approach taken by Boris Johnson in his years as the *Telegraph's* Brussels correspondent (Quatremer, 2016). He cites the audience's interest but also the editorial line as guidelines for his choice of emphasis, which are influenced by particular constraints and pressures of tabloid newspapers.

*For the Sun you [as the subeditor] would be looking for the story the reporter wrote and they [the reporter] imagine the Sun would choose, wouldn't be the one. Maybe [a detail] right at the end of the story and you would turn that into a really big thing. [...] You often went to the base interest when you are writing for the Sun. Something that would excite or titillate or move or provoke feelings of anger or frustration or disgust. These are the sort of emotions you would try to latch on to. (Duncan Begg, former subeditor at the Sun; phone interview)*

These stories, often presented as outrageous evidence for the EU's decadence, detachment and condescension for its citizens, fit editorial lines that range between resistances to particular policies, actors or actions, to outright hostility to the whole endeavour. Such stories reaffirm values rather than engage in rational debate (Cottle, 1993; cited in Matthews and Brown, 2011). As in other news outlets, stories and their presentation are negotiated in the newsroom, with

certain gatekeepers having greater power in the decision-making process. Donohew (1967) regards the publisher's – or proprietor's – attitude as the strongest predictor of gatekeeping decisions. The publisher sets a news policy, which staff generally follow (Statham, 2007). There are different motivations driving a proprietor's approach. Firstly, the proprietor's commercial motives can shape news coverage, giving evidence to the model's assumption of overlapping and interlinked influences.

Peter Osborne, former chief political commentator for *The Daily Telegraph*, resigned over the Barclay Brothers' profit-driven approach to running the newspapers which he felt undermined some of the basic journalistic values and role perceptions, and consequently journalistic quality (Osborne, 2015), a development Herman and Chomsky (1994) predicted in their propaganda model. Furthermore, according to Osborne (2015), advertising has taken priority over editorial judgment. Although direct advertiser pressure succeeds relatively infrequently, strong economic pressure can sometimes lead to a more permissive approach resulting in advertisers overtly influencing editorial decision-making (Nyilasy and Reid, 2011). This ultimately leads to a failure of journalism to fulfil its duty, because proprietors, not only *The Telegraph's* Barclay Brothers but also many other proprietors of influential news media, prioritise commercial goals over the democratic function of journalism. Again, this dynamic highlights not only the linkages between the model's levels but also how non-discursive moments of social practice – profit generation – can impact on public discourse. Resources are cut and staff are reduced. The remaining employees are expected to generate a vast amount of news content in a very limited timeframe, which at the same time is supposed to appeal to the broadest possible audience (Davies, 2008; Leveson, 2012, p. 98). Consequently, audience-orientation and systematic prioritisation of commercial goals have led to criticisms accusing British media of tabloidization.

Tabloidization – as a broader trend of media culture – can be seen as the 'direct result of commercialized media, most often promoted by the pressures of advertisers to reach large audiences' (Esser, 1999, p. 291). In order to increase revenue, viewers are given what they want: 'In a commercial culture, the viewer has more power than the journalist' (Davies, 2008, p. 134). This leads to further simplifications of political processes and an even stronger focus on soft news, scandals and sensationalist stories. Tabloids are typical for the British media landscape (Conboy, 2006). However, further tabloidization, in particular tabloidization of broadcast news and the quality press, is regarded as worrying (Blumler, 1999). While tabloids are still more likely to publish those scandal stories, the interviewed EU press officers give evidence to the hypothesis that tabloidization also spreads to broadsheets.

A news organisation's editorial line can also be heavily influenced by the proprietor's policies as an expression of a collective, organisational identity or 'culture' (Statham, 2007, p. 464). This leads to fears about media plurality (Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Doyle, 2002). Concerns from broadcast journalists and journalists working for broadly pro-European titles highlight the lack of plurality with regard to EU coverage (see above). Owners of right-wing newspapers in particular are under suspicion of influencing news coverage to a worryingly high degree.

One proprietor has fuelled more concerns over media plurality and diversity of opinion than many others. Rupert Murdoch entered the British newspaper market in 1966 and used his media to more or less openly intervene in British politics (Shawcross, 1993). During the Leveson Inquiry he stated that *The Times* and *The Sunday Times* enjoyed editorial freedom, although he cited Europe as one of the major issues he would get involved in. Furthermore, Murdoch admitted, that '*if any politician wanted my opinions on major matters, they only had to read the editorials in the Sun*' (Murdoch cited in Leveson, 2012, p. 108). This explains, in part, the negative framing of the EU in the *Sun*'s editorials but also in its news reports, since this strong influence would be internalised by news reporters. However, Bruno Waterfield and Duncan Begg, who both have experience of working at Murdoch-owned newspapers, clarify:

*When you work for a newspaper you are so far away from the proprietor and in fact the executives who run the paper. [...] If he is pulling a string it is certainly not one of yours. The fact that he takes a healthy interest in The Times – he certainly seems to read it – is a good thing. The Times would not exist if it wasn't for that. And I could also say after working 8.5 years for the Telegraph, no one, no proprietor, or news executive, ever lent on me. (Bruno Waterfield, The Times and Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

*But those instructions from Murdoch, or from someone up high, never explicitly filtered down to us. We would just know the way to handle those stories. You would know. (Duncan Begg, former subeditor at the Sun; phone interview)*

As the quotes above illustrate, staff will not automatically follow policies set by proprietors if they feel they violate core journalistic values (Donohew, 1967). Policies are not enforced by commanding subordinates but by slanting. Socialisation within the newsroom assures conformity: 'Basically, the learning of policy is a process by which the recruit discovers and internalizes the rights and obligations of his status and its norms and values' (Breed, 1955, p. 328), the conventions of an order of discourse attached to a social institution such as a media organisation. Rules can include what to publish, what is regarded as newsworthy, but also how the events are interpreted and presented.

By routinely reinforcing policies on decision-making, individual reporters, having internalised the rules of the organisation, become gatekeepers themselves and act according to the policies set up by higher level gatekeepers. These, in turn, do not need to constantly monitor



their subordinates' work. While the interviewed journalists emphatically deny proprietors' direct influence on them (see above), their comments suggest that they may have internalised policies and follow them in order to avoid punishment, for example by non-publication. Even though proprietors' negative attitudes towards the EU are not openly enforced, they are still passed down to journalists through subtle mechanisms (Clayman and Reisner, 1998). Content editors are crucial in this process, and as in other news outlets considered in this chapter, they have a powerful position in deciding newspaper's content.

*Obviously, any paper, the news is put together into a news list and that goes into editorial conference with the editor and then they choose which stories they like, which stories they don't, and where they go in the paper. (John Stevens, Daily Mail; phone interview)*

*The relationship between a reporter and news editors is that they're a filter. [...] There is always a negotiation. Obviously, you want your stories on the front [page], the front possibly. There is a [...] healthily tense relationship. [...] Sometimes you would write a story where a politician, minister, George Osborne, the chancellor, probably the person who has the most sort of clout and they are worried about something and they would start making telephone calls [...] And then the pressures rise. (Bruno Waterfield, Times & Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

*This is the funny thing. You wouldn't have instructions. You would come in as a subeditor, even when I was a freelancer [unclear] you got given a story about the EU and you basically had a sense what the newspaper would be looking for from this story. [...] But as a journalist who is familiar with the Sun's stance would know what to look for in a story and what to sort of highlight. [...] But this was a political view that wasn't explicitly talked about. That's the sort of strange thing about working at the Sun. And certainly, if I had got it wrong, and hadn't gone for this angle that I knew would go down well in the higher echelons of the paper, they would have just rewritten it. And if I had carried on making those mistakes I certainly wouldn't have been taken on as a staff member. [...] your judgement would be questioned, you probably wouldn't get on very well. (Duncan Begg, former editor at the Sun; phone interview)*

However, some editors, such as Paul Dacre are even accused of dictatorial tendencies in the way they enforce policies. Considering his strong opinions about the EU – he calls himself a profound Eurosceptic (Sommers, 2017) – it can be assumed that this feeds into his handling of EU news at the *Daily Mail*.

*[H]e's this like weird fascist madman, this weird character who loomed large in the newsroom. And definitely set the sort of poisonous tone of the Daily Mail. Even though – I have to emphasise – there [are] lots of lovely people working at the Daily Mail, like really lovely people that I liked a lot. But there is this poisonous atmosphere and I felt that came from him as well as this negative world view that the Daily Mail generally has. (Duncan Begg, former subeditor at the Daily Mail; phone interview)*

Editorial line at the right-wing newspapers can explain the absence of positive framing especially at the *Daily Mail* and *Sun*, as well as an emphasis of the UK's superiority in comparison to the EU and continental member states, their historical differences, and the

disadvantages the UK has from membership. It also matches the observation that these newspapers advocate for less integration to solve some of the EU's problems.

However, it is not only content editors and reporters who exercise power in the newsroom and determine the output. Sub-editors can exercise a very strong influence regarding the final output of a news organisation, both regarding the wording and the design (Keith, 2015). The power of sub-editors goes far beyond proof-reading and cutting stories (Vandendaele *et al.*, 2015), especially at tabloids like *The Sun*, according to Duncan Begg, who worked as a subeditor at different news organisations. He emphasises the crucial role he had in re-writing reporters' copy and reported little resistance from reporters he met at the *Sun*.

Therefore, this group of news workers should not be overlooked when analysing production processes shaping EU coverage. In particular with regard to EU news, which is seen as technical and dry, sub-editing plays an important role in shaping the final story with regard to focus and language. Especially at the *Sun* and *Daily Mail*, EU stories undergo a specific sub-editing process to make it more spectacular, entertaining or attention grabbing, following the logic of tabloid newspapers. The complexity of EU news makes it particularly difficult for subeditors to summarise, especially in a tabloid format. Subeditors also shape language of a news report. The emotional language found in the *Daily Mail* and *Sun*, however, is not particular to EU-related news but a characteristic of the format.

*When it was just a straight news item [...], which was in there on its merit, which couldn't be avoided by the Sun and didn't need to be approached with any sort of cynicism or a skewed political sort of view, yeah, you would just write it straight and summarise it as best as you could and that would involve value judgements. But I guess you would still be looking for a slightly more emotional story than if you were the Guardian subeditor. [...] A lot of the time you just try to imagin[e] yourself in a room with a group of people and trying to tell a story which is going to hold their attention. So you are as clear as possible and you use emotive language as often as possible. That's the key to being a subeditor for the Sun and the Mail. Certainly I don't think it was more emotive language in EU stories than in other stories. (Duncan Begg, former subeditor at the Sun; phone interview)*

Another group of news workers, who are sufficiently captured by gatekeeping and news values theory, are commentators and columnists. Especially at the *Telegraph* and *Daily Mail*, a high volume of comment pieces on the EU was published in my sample period. Peter Hitchens, a columnist at the *Daily Mail*, points out their function.

*People will know the facts you have in your paper the night before. The only way you can make yourself interesting or useful is by interpretation. News columns are full of interpretation, always have been, but they are fuller than they used to be. (Peter Hitchens, Daily Mail; phone interview)*

Columnists and commentators take up an important role in talking to audiences. Columnists can have a greater influence than other journalists due to the personal nature of their comments.

They provide cues for the audience on how to interpret events (Rosi, 1967). Commentators can even be regarded as ‘publicity agents’ (Bro, 2012, p. 442) for their employers. Research on selection processes concerning column and commentary topics, however, is scarce, despite their potential impact. The interview with Peter Hitchens suggests that columnists and commentators enjoy much greater freedom from editorial influence and other pressures than their colleagues working on news reports. They do not always align with an editorial line on the European Union. Jon Henley gives the example of Jacob Rees-Mogg and other prominent Eurosceptics being given space in the *Guardian*, a newspaper with a ‘broadly pro-European line’ (Jon Henley, *The Guardian*, phone interview).

The Sunday newspapers devoted a lot of space to commentary during the collection periods for this research, a trend which fits Chadwick’s (2013) findings. He suggests that the news week culminates in the Sunday editions of newspapers, which provide their interpretations of the week’s events. Sunday papers generally provide more EU coverage, which may be because they are pre-planned and the more complex EU stories can be prepared in more detail, according to Bruno Waterfield. It is interesting, however, that Sunday and daily editions do not always follow exactly the same editorial line, as different endorsements during the referendum campaign at both the *Telegraph* and *Mail* bear witness to.

All right-wing newspapers included in this thesis show a tendency towards Euroscepticism. However, the *Sun* and *Daily Mail* stand out in their hostility, which cannot be explained through audience interest alone. This line appears to be influenced by powerful proprietors and editors who enforce their policies through slanting, creating organisational cultures which only allow for hostile approaches to covering the EU. The *Telegraph*, on the other hand has to balance their Eurosceptic editorial line with an audience with broader interests, including a demand for technical business news.

### **7.5.3. Macro-level influences: tension between journalists and EU officials**

In the sections above, commercial pressures and changes in the media system were discussed in relation to gatekeeping decisions. While these impact on news coverage of all included outlets to different degrees, it is the relationship with EU officials which sets the Eurosceptic press clearly apart from other news organisations. Interviews find a misunderstanding between EU press officers and UK journalists from right-wing papers, creating tense relationships and resulting in accusations on both sides. These dynamics ultimately influence news outputs.

News media and the EU are co-dependent to a degree. If the EU needs publicity, it has to rely on journalists to distribute the message. If journalists need information for an authentic

EU-related story, they often have to rely on EU officials. ‘The relationship between sources and journalists is based on an exchange of resources: Journalists control access to the media but need information from government sources, who, in turn, control this information, which they offer journalists in exchange for media exposure’ (Laursen and Valentini, 2015, p. 29).

However, when first established, the European institutions did not put much emphasis on external communication (Brüggemann, 2010; Laursen, 2012; Laursen and Valentini, 2015). This posed questions of legitimacy, especially after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty which encountered strong resistance in the European population (Laursen, 2012). The alleged lack of legitimacy and communication were consequently addressed by increased engagement with the news media to attempt to create a European public sphere (Bijsmans and Altides, 2007; Statham, 2008). The problem arising in the case of UK-based media, particularly the right-wing press, is a relationship between journalists and EU officials which is characterised by distrust and frustration.

The EU press officers based in Brussels report their frustration with British journalists, especially those from Eurosceptic, right-wing papers. They feel their reporting was unfair, too obsessed with mundane facts and at times misleading. At the UK-based press offices, there is more understanding for the British approach to journalism. However, Brussels correspondents nevertheless feel at a disadvantage due to their adversarial approach to journalism, for which they find no understanding in the institutions. Consequently, they think that EU officials withheld information and instead gave it to media organisations with a more consensual and pro-European approach to news coverage, such as the *Financial Times*. They interpret this behaviour as a resistance to scrutiny.

*In terms of leaks or policy drafts, the first document, that only ever goes to the papers they like which is the Financial Times, some of the top German ones and they are quite naked in saying ‘we have the papers that we trust, that we like, we will give all the stuff to them and everybody else can forget about it’. This is fine, for example with the euro I am not expecting to be the first in line. But maybe if it is about Brexit I expect a little bit more out of reach [sic]. We have half a million readers. We’re the house journal of the Tory party. Why don’t you give your briefings to us rather than Le Soir? That makes me very angry. I think British papers are perceived as a problem to be contained. (Matthew Holehouse, Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

EU press officers on the other hand feel that the British right-wing press, and the tabloids in particular, treat the institutions unfairly. While they say they would still answer their questions and try and find requested information, they also admit that particular pieces of information would not be briefed to those newspapers in the first instance that were engaged in what they feel is unjustified EU-bashing. EU officials who deal mainly with continental media might misinterpret liberal media logic, characterised by a strong commercial orientation,

detached from political actors, and in the UK's case high political polarisation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

Both EU officials and UK journalists list accurate, factual reporting as the main duty of journalism, but they appear to operationalise this differently. This highlights the different conventions attached to the order of discourse in two separate social institutions. For UK journalists at right-wing, Eurosceptic papers, conventions include open criticism of the EU's institutions and actions. EU officials do not oppose scrutiny per se. However, they expected more factual coverage of what they regard as important topics and acknowledgement of the EU's positive achievements rather than scandal and mundane stories. This mismatch seems to sour the relationship between the two groups.

*I think most of the newspapers are very good at making sense out of what is going on and at giving factual reporting. There is a minority of newspapers that are kind of on a mission to destroy the European Union which is not... And their reporting is mostly emotional, is not factual, is not trying to make sense out of it. It's just trying to find ways of attacking it and for me that is not my ideal view of journalism. (EU official; face-to-face interview)*

Despite this, EU institutions are trying to connect more effectively with the media through higher budgets and more dedicated personnel (Meyer, 2009). Interviewed EU officers also report the development of more effective communication strategies, which adapt to the media logic, for example by prioritising particular issues, translating legal language into media language and highlighting national relevance for their target journalists. This way they also try to ensure they get their preferred angle across, albeit with limited success (Balčtienė *et al.*, 2007; Bijsmans and Altides, 2007; Meyer, 2009; Laursen and Valentini, 2015). A UK-based EU official, for example, notes the importance of knowing a media landscape in order to deal with its journalists more appropriately. However, their efforts are not necessarily acknowledged by journalists working at right-wing Eurosceptic newspapers, who continue to criticise the volume and complexity of information.

*[A] lot of the time I feel like I'm sending out the press release, I am reaching out to journalists, I am picking up the phone trying to call them, try to meet for a coffee. There's only so many times you will try until you decide it is probably not worth your time and you get discouraged. It is very much a two-way relationship and I think every now and again journalists forget about that. (EU official; phone interview)*

Furthermore, the information is scattered, as it is provided by different institutions which are not co-ordinating their activities (Martins *et al.*, 2012). Journalists have to put the pieces together themselves (Anderson and McLeod, 2004). The sheer volume of information is criticised by Brussels correspondents as well, pointing out that especially for journalists of daily newspapers this is difficult to master (Martins *et al.*, 2012). This might be one reason why

personal contacts and private networks have become just as important to obtain information as the official press activities (Martins *et al.*, 2012).

Their problems are multiplied by the tendency to lack permanent representatives in Brussels. There appear to be two types of reporters covering EU affairs. The first are well-informed journalists who are permanently based in Brussels and follow the processes and events closely on a daily basis. The second can be described as occasional reporters who are less well-informed and not based in Brussels. They only come to Brussels when there are major events to be covered (Laursen and Valentini, 2015, p. 32). Tabloid journalists normally fall into this category. The *Sun* and *Mirror* do not have a Brussels correspondent, while the *Daily Mail* only installed one in the run-up to the referendum. However, as mentioned above, in neither of the newspapers included in this sample could a clear specialisation of journalists be detected, with a large number of journalists covering EU-related issues. Among broadcasters, a closer circle of reporters and editors appears to be involved in EU reporting (see Appendix E).

Within a media culture with an accelerated speed of producing news content in a digitalised 24/7 news cycle (Goyette-Côté *et al.*, 2012, p. 757), this complexity becomes difficult to overcome for tabloids with regard to EU coverage. Without established personal contacts at the institutions and with limited time to research complex EU stories, reliance on press releases grows. Even broadsheets often only employ one permanent correspondent in Brussels, putting them under pressure to pick and choose.

*A lot of what goes on here is not that interesting. Because by definition it's a regulatory organisation. 90% of the work it does is regulating pipes and all the other stuff that goes into the single market. It's just me being here, it's a one-person operation. You have to be quite choosy. There is this thing at six, one thing I want to do today. (Matthew Holehouse, Telegraph; interview in Brussels)*

Under time pressure, information can often not be double-checked. This can also lead to reproduction of PR material, often distributed by campaign groups or lobbies with particular goals (Davies, 2008). Churnalism is the result of tightly restricted resources and time to research a story independently. One EU official who was interviewed showed his disappointment with the British tabloids' lack of fact-checking of information.

*People from, especially from the tabloids, let me say this. Before Brexit, the tabloids never were in touch with us. And now, as well, very little. They just make up their own stories or find them somewhere else. And they don't fact-check, they don't investigate it and they're not objective, most of them. I'm not taking everybody over one line but you would – I would never have the Sun call me to say, "is this actually true?" (EU press officer, interview in Brussels)*

Although press releases are not inherently full of lies and bias, it needs to be acknowledged that they are written for a specific agenda of communication management. Copying and pasting

of PR statements is therefore a questionable activity which undermines the purpose of journalism (Davies, 2008). Greenslade (2010) notices that the Eurosceptic campaign group *Open Europe* very successfully offers media organisations concise reports and press statements which are often uncritically used while the source's agenda is not acknowledged. *Open Europe*, as well as groups like *Migration Watch* feature frequently in the sample collected for this thesis, with them being represented as unbiased experts on the topics discussed. They understand the British media logic and use it successfully to target the relevant media outlets.

*I think we try to be relevant. We try to think, what would a journalist be interested in or, more fundamentally, what would people be interested in. We did a few waste and fraud stories but you [shouldn't] overdo that, it's no use anymore. [...] Most people on the street are just not as passionate about this particular problem as you are. It's a strength if you realise that because that will help you to dose it a bit. Don't send a policy brief every day, complaining. I'm not saying we're not guilty of these things, we probably are, but I think that is probably one of the things we get right. To try to be a bit more sensible and real about things. (Pieter Cleppe, Open Europe; interview in Brussels)*

Considering the sour relationship right-wing newspapers have with EU officials, the influence of these organisations may have an even stronger impact on their output than those of organisations with better contacts in EU institutions.

#### **7.5.4. Summary**

This section explained the patterns of EU coverage in the right-wing press by linking them to particularities of news outlets regarding their production processes. Journalists working for these outlets feel a stronger duty to scrutinise EU institutions and actors, explaining this duty by referring to Anglo-Saxon traditions of journalism. This more adversarial approach can explain the predominance of *conflict/crisis*, *threat* and *incompetent* framing as opposed to *force for good* framing. Reporting the positives does not fall into the remit of a watchdog journalist. Furthermore, those news outlets have powerful proprietors and editors, who indirectly set the tone of the news coverage by creating particular organisational cultures in which there is a common understanding of how the EU as a news topic is to be approached. Unlike the *Mirror*'s audience, the audience of these news outlets agrees with Eurosceptic editorial lines. The combination results in a large proportion of scandal stories, as well as an accentuation of the shortcomings of the EU. In addition, journalists working for these outlets have challenging relations with EU officials, who mistrust them, and therefore rely more on information gathered otherwise. Since only the *Telegraph* at the time of data collection had a permanent correspondent in Brussels, a lot of news coverage is based on brief visits to the institutions or second-hand information from campaign groups.

## 7.6. Summarising the dynamics

This chapter set out to answer the question how wider sociocultural practices and practices of news production impact on EU coverage and how they can explain patterns found in the data. It set out a model of news production which summarises the key influences on EU news coverage on an individual level, the newsroom level, and influences from outside the newsroom. After a summary of common sociocultural practices regarding the EU, the model was applied to three different groups of media organisations: the broadcasters; pro-European, left-wing newspapers; and right-wing Eurosceptic newspapers. By applying this model to the three groups and testing it with empirical evidence from research interviews with journalists from those news organisations, this chapter provides explanations for general trends and particularities of EU representation found in the data sample.

One characteristic they all share – and which impacts on EU coverage at all news organisations although with different outcomes – is a strong audience orientation. With commercial success as top priority at the newspapers, and at least an important consideration at the broadcasters, the audiences' demands become powerful in shaping EU coverage. At all outlets, this leads to a UK-centric angle and a reproduction of particular interpretations of British and European history, which rarely challenges the audience's preconceptions. Journalists and news organisations operate within a society which is defined by historical discourses. These discourses can explain why some types of news coverage resonate better than others with the audience. Furthermore, journalists are not free of those historical discourses shaping, and shaped by society, and use them in their coverage to make sense of events. However, this is not unique to the UK, but a pattern in most European media cultures. Exceptions are media outlets catering for a more international audience, such as the *Financial Times*, which cannot rely on shared interests and knowledge.

A predominance of negative framing can also be explained by audience orientation. Negative stories sell better than positive ones, which shows how a non-discursive moment of social practice – sales figures – can influence discourse. However, differences in framing arise from other factors, too, such as self-perceived journalistic roles, editorial line, ownership preferences, access to EU institutions, and whether a frame fits shared knowledge about 'Europe'. While all journalists interviewed for this thesis state accurate, objective information as their most important responsibility, journalists employed at the right-wing Eurosceptic press emphasise the need for scrutiny, resulting in a stronger focus on the EU's shortcomings. This corresponds with the editorial and proprietorial preferences at these newspapers, which are reinforced through slanting in the newsroom.



Broadcast journalists and journalists at the left-wing newspapers highlight the need to counterbalance the Eurosceptic press, resulting in comparatively less negative framing and less inflammatory language. In the *Guardian* and *Mirror*, the pro-European editorial line furthermore manifests itself in more positive framing of the EU and in the *Guardian*'s case in a high volume of editorials and comments arguing for the UK's engagement of the EU, possibilities for reform and the benefits coming from EU membership, thereby at times challenging predominant discourses about 'Europe'. However, they fail to create a strong, positive discourse because they focus mainly on the economic benefits, while the Eurosceptic press uses strong emotive messages. It is also questionable whether fervent Eurosceptics would engage with the *Guardian*'s arguments at all. The *Mirror* furthermore has to balance a pro-European editorial line with a partially Eurosceptic readership. To avoid a backlash, there is little coverage of the EU throughout.

All news outlets have to deal with the complex nature of the EU, which is difficult to package in news reports and broadcasts. In addition, the right-wing Eurosceptic press has a tense relationship with EU press officers. While they feel unfairly excluded due to their adversarial approach to journalism, EU officials feel unfairly treated by the British Eurosceptic press, pointing out misrepresentation and an obsession with mundane stories. The EU institutions are trying to adapt to the UK's media logic but there is little acknowledgement from UK journalists. Development of good working relationships – and therefore informed reporting – are further hindered by the fact that the three best-selling newspapers at the time of data collection did not have permanent representatives in Brussels. It seems overall, that the UK media logic does not match EU events.

## Chapter 8. Conclusion

### 8.1. Summary of findings

The aim of this thesis has been to establish how British news coverage represents the EU and why it represents it in particular ways. The thesis used a CDA approach focused on the dialectical relationship between different social structures and discourses, and between discursive and non-discursive moments of social practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). In order to address the research questions, frame analysis as well as semi-structured interviews were incorporated into the broader framework. This facilitates a more systematic text analysis. It also uses tools for linguistic analysis commonly associated with CDA to ground frames more firmly in textual characteristics. Analysis was broader than other qualitative work in the field. It included a large number of texts from both broadcasters and newspapers. Analysis also provided an in-depth analysis of language in the news.

Semi-structured interviews with media professionals made it possible to evidence theoretical claims about news production with empirical findings. I interviewed journalists based in Brussels and the UK, working in a variety of journalistic roles, and from different news organisations, as well as EU press officers. This adds to previous research by including a variety of views which can explain patterns found in news texts. Both strategies, incorporation of semi-structured interviews as well as the combination of CDA and frame analysis, constitute two major contributions of this thesis.

Textual analysis allowed for investigation of EU coverage in a range of contexts because it includes a variety of news events, and does not focus exclusively on particular EU-level key events (see for example de Vreese *et al.*, 2006; Boomgaarden *et al.*, 2013; Negrine, 2017). It found that the focus and scope of EU coverage was rather narrow. Coverage was UK-centric and focused on particular policy areas, which are particularly relevant for the UK. *Governance and decision-making, evolution of the EU, immigration and economic and financial policy* were the most frequently covered policy areas in the sample. This trend was visible across news outlets but particularly prominent at the broadcasters, followed by the tabloids.

In the context of election campaigns, it was found that arguments opposing a referendum rely predominantly on economic arguments about benefits of EU membership, a pattern which appears to have been repeated in the referendum campaign (Oliver, 2016). Arguments supporting a referendum on membership are more emotive. They highlight the political and cultural threats of EU membership and in particular EU migration into the UK. They also play upon the notion of elitism. A referendum would give the people a say as opposed to elites deciding for them. Again, these patterns were replicated in the 2016 referendum campaign and in its aftermath.

Furthermore, media representations of the EU in British news coverage were more likely to be negative than positive, echoing findings by Anderson and Weymouth (1999), Daddow (2012), and Hawkins (2012). News frames highlighting *conflict/crisis*, *threat* and *incompetence* were more prevalent throughout the samples than news frames emphasising the EU's achievements with regard to peace, democracy, prosperity and cultural enrichment. However, due to a refined codebook which recognises particular aspects of, for example, *threat* frames, this thesis is more sensitive to the specificities of British media coverage. Through this coding scheme, it was possible to establish that even considerations of the EU's importance for the UK were rare in comparison with negative frames. If merits of EU membership were highlighted through framing, this was restricted to economic benefits, as mentioned above. Only the *Guardian* and *Channel 4* mentioned historic political achievements from which both the UK and the rest of Europe benefitted more commonly. In a case study of the *right to be forgotten* coverage, it also became apparent that intertextual elements such as direct quotes from politicians and experts on the subject were used to back up the negative media frames such as *threat* or *incompetent*, while mainly EU-level actors were cited to highlight the positive aspects of the ruling. These actors, however, may be less credible due to their EU affiliation. Analysis of this event also reiterates Anderson and Weymouth's (1999) findings that pro-European titles are more likely to be penetrated by Eurosceptic voices, while Eurosceptic outlets do not commonly include pro-European views.

Moreover, assumptions made in the texts again mainly support negative frames, invoking shared cultural knowledge about the realities of digitalisation, which are contradictory to the EU's attempt for regulation, but also shared cultural knowledge about morality. This was invoked in particular to point out how the *right to be forgotten* may benefit those who do not deserve to be forgotten, such as people with criminal convictions. Because argumentation here is based on a shared lifeworld, they are difficult to challenge (Habermas, 1985). Not only has the analysis of intertextual elements in EU news coverage been neglected by previous research, it was also enlightening with regard to the construction of frames and the contribution of interdiscursivity to the creation of news discourse about the EU.

Regarding the relationship between the UK and the EU, textual analysis found that it was characterised by two ideas: separateness and disadvantage. News coverage represents the UK as detached from the rest of Europe and the EU. This detachment highlighted in the texts stems from policy differences which are emphasised, as well as representation of Britishness as different to European-ness, a difference of traditions, values and identities. Among the right-wing newspapers in particular, the UK is represented as being more pragmatic and more devoted to democracy in comparison to the EU and some of its member states. However, it is

questionable, whether this opposition to further integration and membership itself has always been as pragmatic. For example, while electoral dynamics demanded a centrist approach of any new Conservative leader in 2001, electability – the pragmatic consideration – was neglected in favour of Euroscepticism (Fontana and Parsons, 2015). Similarly, a vote to leave the European Union does not appear particularly pragmatic considering the economic downturn forecast in advance of the vote. National identity constructed in opposition to European identity, as well as a sense of superiority and attachment to nations beyond Europe may have played a greater role in this decision, despite their contradiction of British pragmatism. This dynamic is also visible in the right-wing, Eurosceptic press which emphasises British pragmatism but then advocates for the referendum and even withdrawal on grounds of fundamental principle.

At the left-wing newspapers, this pattern is not as clear and they propose to improve the relationship through cooperation, while the Eurosceptic titles advocate for the UK to confront the EU in negotiations. The refined codebook was able to detect this subtle distinction between engagement through cooperation as opposed to engagement through confrontation. This also sets apart this study from previous studies investigating discourses about the EU in UK news outlets (for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999).

In addition, the EU is more frequently represented as disadvantaging the UK as opposed to benefitting it. Of particular interest here was representation of EU migration as straining UK public services while EU migrants' contributions are rarely mentioned. One further theme arising here is the issue of sovereignty. Especially with regard to free movement – although the UK could use controls which news coverage fails to mention and explain – but also in other matters, EU laws are represented as an infringement of UK sovereignty and parliamentary democracy. These patterns have been supplemented by a linguistic analysis of actor representation which provides evidence based on grammatical constructions for the above findings. The UK is portrayed as the superior but disadvantaged actor, which generally has the more appropriate solutions for problems – in this case the refugee crisis – but is side-lined in negotiations and forced to accept EU decisions which are seen as threatening for the UK.

The thesis then put findings of textual analysis into context by relating them to a model of news production which also considers persisting, historical discourses about the EU. While previous studies have considered these contexts (for example Anderson, 2004), none have recently combined qualitative analysis of British news coverage with semi-structured interviews with media professionals in order to establish the dynamics between texts and contexts within a broader CDA framework. Both the news production processes and the sociocultural discourse practices, with regard to the EU in Britain, act as a restriction on EU news coverage through technical, economic and editorial constraints but also through defining

vocabulary and arguments which are deemed appropriate by the audiences, defining an order of discourse. After all, audiences are also using sociocultural discourse practices as a guide for interpretation and evaluation of news coverage, since they constitute their shared lifeworld (Habermas, 1985).

Audiences, as well as media professionals, are active (re)producers of broader discourses about the European Union, while at the same time using those pre-existing discourses as a resource for interpretation and construction of news texts covering the EU. Invoking these discourses not only provides shortcuts for producers, operating under time and economic pressures, but also assure that audiences will understand texts in the intended way and feel as if their preconceptions match the news coverage. Challenging dominant discourses about Europe and the EU may lead to a decreasing audience by challenging their beliefs and values. This thesis contributes to the literature by showing the links between those discourses and news texts, to highlight the dynamics which connect the two.

The sociocultural discourse practices underlying EU news coverage are based on a rarely challenged perception of the UK as separate and detached from 'Europe', a British identity defined as opposed to European-ness (Daddow, 2006a; Daddow, 2011; Spiering, 2015). Even scholars critiquing the UK's relationship with the EU fall at times into this discursive trap rather than challenging the preconception (see for example Anderson and Weymouth, 1999). The island story, reinforced by particular interpretations of British history (Ludlow, 2002; Spiering, 2015), dominates thinking about 'Europe' and highlights the detachment of the British Isles from the continent. While this European 'Other' is at times regarded as neutral, the dominant discourse assumes British superiority in the relationship, while countries on the continent as well as the EU itself have exhibited dictatorial tendencies and corruption. 'Europe' and by extension therefore the European Union, is regarded as impractical and utopian, while the UK is pragmatic. It is also deemed to be protectionist and inward-looking. The UK, regarding itself as exceptional due to its seafarer past, constitutes a world island (Gamble, 1994; Ludlow, 2002; Garton Ash, 2006; Spiering, 2015), with global links, and which does not want to commit itself to the European continent. It follows that the UK does not need to rely on the rest of Europe but can maintain its role as a global actor outside of 'Europe' on its own. This discourse has been invoked frequently. Beyond the periods examined in this thesis, Leave campaigners used it during the referendum campaign, as well as by Prime Minister Theresa May in her ambitions of a global Britain after Brexit.

On a more immediate level of news production, editorial line appears to override journalists' own attitudes towards the EU and explains either Eurosceptic or pro-European tendencies of reporting. The editorial line also influences subediting processes. While

journalists interviewed for this study have rarely experienced direct influence from editors, it appears that the funding model as well as private proprietors' positions on the issue of Europe have an influence on editorial lines through slanting. In the broadcasters' case, this led to attempts to achieve balanced reporting which was aimed to be as factual as possible. At the right-wing newspapers, a more Eurosceptic stance is in line with private proprietors' preferences although these appear to be passed down to individual journalists through newsroom socialisation, not direct orders.

Ideology is not the only driving force behind editorial lines. All media organisations need to attract large audiences, either in order to make a profit through sales in the case of newspapers, in order to justify fees in the case of the *BBC*, or to attract advertisers, particularly important for *Channel 4* but also the newspapers. Consequently, proprietors and editors try to tailor their news coverage to their audiences' needs and preferences. This leads to a more domestic focus of news coverage, as well as the predominance of particular policy areas which the audience is interested in, such as immigration, but also influences editorial line on Europe. The *Mirror* is particularly interesting here, since editorial line follows the Labour party's line on the EU which at time of data collection was opposing a referendum and supporting continued membership. A large group of *Mirror* readers, however, have a differing view. Consequently, the *Mirror* published very few items on EU-related issues to avoid negative reactions and falling sales figures (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). In this case, interviews elicited a more comprehensive explanation for the *Mirror*'s low volume of EU coverage than, for example, Anderson and Weymouth (1999) provided without interviews.

This thesis has linked those different levels of discourse together and has helped to explain what the representation of the European Union in British news discourse looks like. It provided a model for EU news coverage, which can be applied to a range of media outlets and countries to explain similarities and differences. The thesis has given detailed insights into the contribution of language, rhetoric and intertextuality to the creation of public discourse. Linking these insights to news production and sociocultural practices in the UK with regard to the EU, it has also has given important insights into the dynamics which shape and reinforce these representations, and which prevent successful challenges of Eurosceptic discourses in the UK.

## **8.2. Limiting the criticisms of CDA**

As noted in Chapter 3, CDA comes with several criticisms. While I addressed some of them by incorporating both frame analysis and interviews in the framework, others nevertheless persist. In particular, my own position in the UK, as an EU citizen whose rights have been the subject of heated debate since the referendum in 2016, needs to be acknowledged. Being an EU

citizen in post-referendum Britain has certainly influenced both my research interest and my approach to the data. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) point out, self-reflexivity of the researcher in relation to the problem under investigation, is a crucial part of CDA. While my own experience as an EU citizen in the UK has undoubtedly coloured my interest in the subject and generated a particularly critical stance towards the media's representation of EU migration, it has also provided me with greater sensitivity towards the issue and its impact on people's lives. Furthermore, despite the interpretative nature of CDA and qualitative frame analysis, which again may be influenced by my own experiences, the methodological approach chosen has helped to reduce the subjectivity of the study. Allegations of cherry-picking of data (Widdowson, 1995; Widdowson, 1998) have been countered by including a variety of news outlets in the study as well as a variety of news events.

The allegation of cherry-picking could also be applied to the choice of analytical tools for the analysis of language and texts more broadly. While this thesis tried to incorporate analytical tools based on their suitability to address the respective research questions, it needs to be considered that there are some approaches which have not been included. For example, the narrative structure of texts has not been given particular attention in this thesis, as have some aspects of grammatical construction or rhetorical devices which were not central to addressing the research questions.

### **8.3. Recommendations for future research**

While this thesis provided an in-depth account of language use, as well as news framing, multimodal elements of news discourse have been neglected so far. In future research, these multimodal features could be taken into consideration to understand how they interact with the written and spoken texts, as well as how they relate to wider discursive practices with regard to the EU. This is not only important with regard to broadcast news which are often accompanied by short films, which, as interviewees pointed out, are designed to draw viewers in, but also for print publications. A photograph alongside a story can influence greatly how it is interpreted. Therefore, it is worth looking into the multi-modal elements of news in addition to language use.

As Chapter 3 explained, this study is also limited with regard to the scope of collected data. Future research could try to trace any similarities and changes in discourse in the run-up to the referendum, and in its aftermath, with the patterns uncovered in this thesis. This would show whether discourse has become even more hostile towards the EU and EU migrants or whether challenges to these dominant discourses are more prevalent after this momentous decision for EU withdrawal.

Furthermore, in order to keep the data manageable, certain publications and broadcast news formats have not been included in this thesis. While the sample provides a good overview over the British newspaper and TV market, further research may include other outlets, such as *The Times* or *Sky News*. Online media outlets and online editions of newspapers and broadcasters could be considered in future research. It can be expected that online offers will increase their impact in the years to come, particularly among younger cohorts. Social media sites might be valuable to examine. Influential Twitter users and Facebook pages often challenge mainstream discourses more forcefully since they do not operate within the same constraints as mainstream media outlets, and introduce more radical notions in the public discourse. Especially with regard to the issue of the UK's exit from the EU, social media arguments sometimes descend into mutual abuse, and thereby normalise it. However, at the same time, non-traditional media outlets appear to challenge the dichotomy between Britain and 'Europe' more effectively.

This thesis has not specifically dealt with media effects. While effects of media discourse were not of central interest to the thesis, it has made some theoretical claims about the relationship between media discourse and shared cultural knowledge, shared cultural practices with regard to the EU. An empirical study investigating this relationship could clarify the processes involved and add substance to the discourse theoretical assumptions CDA research of texts is based upon.

Lastly, this thesis uncovered a variety of problems and imbalances regarding British media discourse about the EU and identified a number of obstacles to tackling them. In order to create a less conflictual debate and ultimately better engagement with EU partners, future research should try to identify strategies to counter these obstacles, which includes engaging with powerful communicators and influential decision makers. The goal should be to successfully challenge the often damaging discourse about the UK's relationship with Europe, and for Britain to realise that it is indeed a European country.

#### **8.4. Obstacles to changing the discourse and reflections on how to overcome them**

This thesis gave new insights into the construction of discourses and the underlying dynamics favouring particular EU representations while creating obstacles to challenging the dominant discourse and changing the ways of thinking and talking about the EU. It could be argued that this is no longer relevant now that the process of leaving the EU has been initiated. However, at the time of writing, it might be even more important. British news coverage of the EU has led to irritation among EU member states and actors, as is evidenced in the interviews with EU press officers. While this is not a new phenomenon, it now can influence negotiations and, ultimately, whether a favourable result for both sides can be achieved. In order to create a



more productive environment for negotiations it is necessary to avoid further irritation by changing the discourses about 'Europe' and its citizens.

The thesis identified several obstacles to challenging discourses. Some of them lie in the media system, which is increasingly audience-oriented, driven by economic considerations and concentrated in the hands of a limited number of media organisations. Even though journalists denied direct influence from proprietors on their work, it needs to be acknowledged that the British media system lacks pluralism, both with regard to editorial lines and ownership. When looking at circulation numbers, Eurosceptic titles dominate the media landscape with proprietors supporting the UK's exit of the European Union being overrepresented.

Of course, it is the duty of journalism to scrutinise powerful institutions such as the EU. However, shrinking media plurality not only leads to a narrow ideological focus but also to an even stronger audience orientation through commercialisation (Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Greenslade, 2003). This dynamic favours particular kinds of Eurosceptic stories, namely the sensationalist ones. Both newspapers and broadcasters have been accused of tabloidization, a process in which news coverage is becoming popularised and sensationalised. This inhibits rational, informed debate and instead creates a media environment more concerned with entertainment than information (Esser, 1999). A complex issue like the European Union or the negotiations preceding the UK's exit, however, does not fit this formula unless it is presented in a sensationalist, conflict-oriented manner which highlights preconceptions about the European Union. It appears as if many of the issues brought up in the 2005 *BBC* investigation (Wilson of Dinton *et al.*, 2005) have still not been resolved and instead are present across media outlets, leading to a debate in which rational arguments are not taken up and levels of information are low. The UK in particular has low levels of knowledge about the EU, making them reliant on media cues (McCormick, 2014).

Audience orientation also leads to greater attention being paid to negative responses to a media statement or programme from audiences (Herman and Chomsky, 1994). These responses used to reach newsrooms in the form of letters or phone calls, petitions or boycotts, which could impact advertising revenue. Today, the ongoing digitalisation of media outlets makes it possible for audiences to send feedback in real-time in the form of comments on social media sites or on the websites of news organisations. As the interviews showed, website statistics and comments have an impact on news production as they serve as direct feedback for the news producers not only how popular particular items are but also how they are received. While this makes the news production process more democratic by involving consumers in the production process and making their views visible, it also acts as an obstacle to changing news discourse about the European Union in the UK. If challenges to the dominant discourse attract strong

opposition from consumers, which is visible to other consumers in form of comments, it is questionable whether media organisations, which rely on sales and advertising revenue based on the number of consumers, will push a discourse contradicting the public's preconceptions and challenge them.

Furthermore, the dominant discourses about 'Europe' and consequently the EU, are, as Chapter 7 showed, a useful resource for Eurosceptic arguments but are almost contradictory to many pro-European arguments. They emphasise the UK's detachment from the European continent, and a national identity defined in opposition to a European Other. This European Other is often regarded as inferior, which makes it difficult to construct a strong argument highlighting the UK's European-ness or the UK's need for engagement with the EU. It also explains why arguments against a referendum or for continued membership are mainly based on economic arguments: with the UK perceived as a pragmatic nation, benefit and loss calculations to support pro-European arguments fit into the dominant discursive conventions. It has been assumed that this economic, rational argument would suffice to convince UK citizens to vote to remain.

The discourse of British common sense is also visible in news coverage of Cameron's proposal to renegotiate the UK's deal. Both the UK government and the media emphasise the necessity to get a 'fair deal for Britain' ahead of the referendum, implying a common sense, reasonable demand to an unreasonable, impractical European Union. The renegotiations and reform proposals themselves are tailored towards maximising economic benefits while reducing regulation for the EU as a whole and opting out of the commitment to an ever closer union for the UK in particular.

Much historiography suggests that British support for, or opposition to, European integration is based on pragmatic calculations of economic and political benefits. However, the British discourse about the EU is based on value judgements about the rest of Europe (Ludlow, 2002; Spiering, 2015). The dominant discourse constructs the UK and mainland Europe as different entities, which impacts on discourses about the European Union. It also defines the opportunities to change discourses about the European Union, as Daddow (2011) found in his analysis of New Labour's attempt to re-create British discourse about and engagement with the EU.

Even though pro-European politicians, journalists and other actors sometimes challenge the dominant discourses or try to make them fit a pro-European argument, Eurosceptic interpretations of the relationship remain the pervasive framework within which the debate is conducted. Media professionals interviewed for this thesis are likewise entangled in these discursive practices. They often explain their approach to reporting by tapping into the

dominant discourse, giving evidence to the theoretical assumption that sociocultural discursive practices shape – and are shaped by – media representations, which can legitimise, normalise, conserve and challenge them.

A particular interpretation of British history has led to a dominant way of thinking about Europe and Britain as two entities, and the UK as the isolated hero, standing alone against dictatorships and corruption of the continent. While Euroscepticism is far from exclusive to the United Kingdom (see FitzGibbon *et al.*, 2016), the UK's planned exit from the European Union nevertheless gives evidence for the troubled relationship between the UK and its European partners. Not only political differences have led to the current situation. At the heart of it lies an important cultural factor, a way of thinking and talking about 'Europe': Britishness is different to European-ness (Gamble, 2003; Daddow, 2006a; Daddow, 2006b; Garton Ash, 2006; Daddow, 2015; Spiering, 2015).

Of course, many British citizens do regard themselves as European, as evidenced by large pro-European demonstrations following the Brexit referendum. However, media organisations will struggle to challenge dominant discourse in their coverage since they can expect to meet strong opposition from a vocal group of consumers, and ultimately may lose revenue from sales and advertising, or in the case of the *BBC*, government support.

This poses the question, how the identified obstacles can be overcome in order to create a discourse which recognises the European-ness of Britain, and ultimately creates a more cooperative approach to the EU during the negotiations and beyond. It appears that simple tweaks to news coverage, such as emphasis of economic benefits of membership or EU migration are not enough to change public discourse about the EU. While these arguments do not fundamentally challenge dominant discourses, it could be argued that they are at least acceptable to large parts of the public and therefore can have an impact by aiming for voters' heads, not hearts. The referendum result and consequent discussion of possible Brexit scenarios, however, shows, that simply adjusting pro-European messages to the existing order of discourse does not create a strong enough argument.

A more holistic approach is needed to change the discursive framework. It needs to challenge the fundamental distinction between 'Britain' and 'Europe' in order to create a public discourse which can serve as the foundation for cooperation with the EU instead of confrontation. As Foucault (2007) points out, to challenge discourse, we do not necessarily need a radical new idea. Instead, practice itself needs to transform, both discursive and non-discursive practice, practice directly related to the discourse as well as neighbouring practices. This not only involves media professionals but also other elite individuals such as politicians,

as well as a structural change in news production (see for example Collier, 1994, on changing social relations and events).

Journalism relies on sources in order to compile news reports. Important sources are domestic politicians and other elites. If these sources are reproducing the current conventions of the order of discourse, then journalists will inevitably continue to reproduce through intertextual references to these sources, since they have no other material to incorporate which challenges dominant discursive practices. While Tony Blair, in particular, tried to shift discourse towards a more inclusive way of talking and thinking about the UK and EU, New Labour tapped into Eurosceptic discourses to appeal to voters (Daddow 2011). This highlights again the negative response a challenge to dominant discourses can elicit.

Furthermore, the media environment needs to allow for more time and resources in order to minimise journalists' reliance on pre-prepared press releases from think tanks or on particularly vocal elite communicators, which try to push their agendas (Copsey and Haughton, 2014). If press releases from *Open Europe* or *Migration Watch*, which clearly have particular aims in their media engagement, are used as material for news coverage, it is likely that the end product will feed into dominant, Eurosceptic discourses instead of challenging them. In a profit-driven media environment, which is under pressure from digitalisation and non-mainstream news outlets, however, this is unlikely to happen without a structural reform of the UK's media system, or at least a shift in priorities with regard to types of news stories and an allocation of more resources for EU-related news coverage.

Of course, a change in discourse initiated from elite communicators will attract resistance of some parts of the audience. However, ultimately, if powerful communicators, such as politicians and journalists, change their approach to talking and writing about the EU, and challenge the dominant conventions of discourse, they will provide a new vocabulary for the general public to also change their discursive practices with regard to the European Union. The more the normalisation and legitimisation of Eurosceptic and at times discriminatory discourses is challenged, the more space there will be for a change in the discourse. Following the logic of the dialectical-relational approach to CDA, this change in the discursive moment of social practice can have an effect on non-discursive moments of social practice. It could lead to a better relationship between EU actors and British media professionals. On a wider scale, it may influence the UK's post-Brexit relationship with the EU and ultimately have an effect on economic conditions in post-Brexit Britain.

## Appendix A Codebook

| Classification category       | Explanation   |
|-------------------------------|---|
| <b>Date</b>                   | DD/MM/YYYY  |
| <b>Name of news source</b>    | BBC News at Ten<br>Channel 4 News<br>Daily Mail<br>Mail on Sunday<br>Guardian<br>Observer<br>Mirror<br>Sunday Mirror<br>Sun<br>Sun on Sunday<br>Telegraph<br>Sunday Telegraph |
| <b>Page</b>                   | For newspapers only; page number; in Telegraph's case Business section starts with page number 1  |
| <b>Minutes into programme</b> | For broadcast only; minute the relevant story starts  |
| <b>Week</b>                   | Which week of data collection item was published in   |
| <b>Length in minutes</b>      | For broadcast only  |
| <b>First half</b>             | For broadcast only: whether item was broadcast in first half of programme   |

*Table 35 Formal codes*

| News event category                | Child nodes (events related to)            | Further, more detailed nodes      |
|------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| <b>Economy/business news</b>       | Banking                                    | Co-op/ HSBC                       |
|                                    | British economy                            | Growing economy, sales or exports |
|                                    | Chinese market                             |                                   |
|                                    | US Federal Reserve news                    |                                   |
|                                    | Merger of Pfizer and Astra Zeneca          |                                   |
|                                    | Stock market news                          |                                   |
|                                    | Tax avoidance                              |                                   |
|                                    | Other                                      |                                   |
| <b>Events closely linked to EU</b> | Car tracker proposal                       |                                   |
|                                    | EC President election                      |                                   |
|                                    | ECHR rulings                               |                                   |
|                                    | European Election results (not in UK)      |                                   |
|                                    | European Election                          |                                   |
|                                    | Eurozone economy                           |                                   |
|                                    | Google competition charges                 |                                   |
|                                    | Google <i>right to be forgotten</i> ruling |                                   |

|                                  |   |   |
|----------------------------------|---|---|
|                                  | Greek debt crisis   |   |
|                                  | Heads of states dinner (after EP election)                  |   |
|                                  | Protesters attacking Mario Draghi                           |   |
|                                  | Refugee crisis  |   |
|                                  | Woolworth ruling  |   |
|                                  | Other   |   |
| <b>Home News (Political)</b>     | Cabinet appointments  |   |
|                                  | Conservative/Lib Dem coalition                              |   |
|                                  | Conservative splits/arguments over EU                       |   |
|                                  | Election campaign   | BBC personal views/Debates/Election promises/interviews, visits, broadcasts/manifestos/opinion polls/attacks against parties or candidates/supporters   |
|                                  | Election results  | Coalition and support deals/European election result and analysis/General Election results and analysis/Lib Dem results (not EP)/Local election results and analysis (not when only focused on Lib Dems)/resignations |
|                                  | EU immigration (statistics, consequences)                   |   |
|                                  | General Election (not directly campaign or results related) | Challenges for government after GE/immediate plans for after GE/risk of hung parliament   |
|                                  | Government achievements                                     |   |
|                                  | Newark by-election  |   |
|                                  | Personal stories about politicians                          |   |
|                                  | Relationship between UK and EU                              |   |
|                                  | Scottish referendum 2014                                    |   |
|                                  | Ukip related  | Threat to mainstream parties/Ukip racism claims   |
|                                  | Other   |   |
| <b>Home News (non-political)</b> | Airport expansion Heathrow/Gatwick                          |   |
|                                  | Consumer issues   |   |
|                                  | Crime   |   |
|                                  | Environmental issues  |   |
|                                  | Eurovision Song Contest (British performance)               |   |
|                                  | Halal scandal 2014  |   |

|                           |                              |  |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|--|
|                           | Health                       |  |
|                           | NHS                          |  |
|                           | Royal family                 |  |
|                           | Technology                   |  |
|                           | Other                        |  |
| <b>International News</b> | Germanwings crash            |  |
|                           | Iran nuclear agreement       |  |
|                           | Nepal earthquake             |  |
|                           | Russia-related (not Ukraine) |  |
|                           | Turkey                       |  |
|                           | Ukraine conflict             |  |
|                           | Other                        |  |

Table 36 News event codes

| <b>Policy area node</b>  | <b>More specific child nodes</b>  |
|--|---|
| Administrative matters   | Expenses, salaries, work benefits   |
| Agricultural policy  |   |
| Audiovisual policy   |   |
| Consumer policy  |   |
| Economic and financial affairs   | Austerity policies/banking regulations/Britain's position in European market/ budget/ competition policies/EU fiscal compact/Eurozone, euro or EMU/Greek financial crisis/insurance/single market with economic or business focus/taxes |
| Education policy   |   |
| Energy policy  |   |
| Environmental policy   | Animal welfare  |
| Evolution of the EU  | Brexit/evolution in breadth/evolution in depth/EU referendum/renegotiations and reform/union and peace  |
| Fisheries policy   |   |
| Foreign Policy   | Defence/sanctions   |
| <b>Governance and decision-making (e.g. European Parliament Elections)</b> | Accountability/democracy/EU Institutions/European Elections/President of the European Commission/Treaties   |
| <b>Immigration policies</b>  | Immigration from outside the EU into the EU/migration within the EU or freedom of movement of people  |
| Industrial policy  |   |
| Information, communication and cultural policy                             |   |
| Justice and internal affairs   | Human rights  |
| Regional policy  |   |
| Science, research and development policy                                   |   |
| Social policy  |   |
| Telecommunications and information technology                              |   |
| Transport policy   | TTIP  |

Table 37 Policy area codes (additions to existing coding schemes in bold)

| Frame   | Child node | Grandchild | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote   |
|---|------------|------------|------------------|---|---|
| <b>EU as Bargaining Forum/Horse-trading/Zero-Sum Game</b> |            |            |                  | One nation's advantage is to the disadvantage of another/ Everyone is out for their own advantage/Negotiations, Horse-trading; you can make demands at EU- level. | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes  |
|   | Cultural   |            |                  | Everyone is out for their own cultural advantage; one member gains from other members' losses   | No examples   |
|   | Economic   |            |                  | Everyone is out for their own economic advantage; one member gains from other members' losses   | "Governments have since responded to help the commission draw up a balanced programme of sanctions to ensure that particular countries, such as Germany, do not take on a disproportionate burden. This is very sensitive information of great interest to Russia and is top secret", said a European diplomat. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 10 May 2014) |
|   | Political  |            |                  | Everyone is out for their own political advantage; one party gains, the other loses; Political negotiating and horse-trading                                      | These elections will elect the parliament and then, after a horse-trading session between national governments, the European Commission for the five years to 2019. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 8 May 2014)   |

Table 38 Frame codes with examples



| Frame                                   | Child node | Grandchild  | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote  |
|---|------------|---|------------------|---|--|
|   |            | Britain side-lined (by EU or other member states) |                  | Britain is portrayed as being on the losing side/disadvantaged in negotiations/side-lined/ignored/overruled   | Britain could be outvoted next month over the appointment of Mr Juncker because France, Spain and others back him for the post ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 28 May 2014); He returned from his top-level Brussels dinner with nothing but a bill for £500million ( <i>The Sun</i> , 29 May 2014)   |
|   |            | Domestic Bargaining                               |                  | EU as a bargaining chip in domestic discussions/contestation; EU is tradable as an issue (for example Liberal Democrats will not treat referendum as a red line in manifesto)   | Farage said he talked to some Conservatives informally about working with them to secure an early EU referendum in the next parliament and some were keen, while others were "milky" ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 31 March 2015); Lib Dem Chief Nick Clegg raised the chance of another Tory coalition - by refusing to say he would torpedo an EU referendum ( <i>The Sun</i> , 31 March 2015) |
| <b>Britain makes a difference in EU</b> |            |   |                  | Britain contributes to the EU (through cooperation or confrontation), makes the EU better, makes its own voice heard in the EU, wins in negotiations; includes considerations of Britain's contribution to the EU and potential losses in case of a Brexit for the EU | Britain ignited bonfire of Brussels' bureaucracy. We must stay to finish the job ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 23 May 2014); Every nation in the EU is to follow Britain's lead and introduce tough measures to slash the use of plastic bags after a vote yesterday ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 29 April 2015)   |

| Frame                                | Child node         | Grandchild | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote   |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|------------------|---|---|
|                                      | EU is on UK's side |            |                  | EU institutions or EU member states support the UK's point of view. Instead of being isolated, the UK is actually supported by parts of the EU/individuals in the EU; UK is regarded as important in the EU; Britain makes an actual difference, gets what it wants; 'wins' arguments | But in a triumph for British sovereignty, the European Court of Human Rights ruled his case was inadmissible and threw it out. It was the latest in a string of verdicts that have gone Britain's way following Conservative threats to leave the controversial court's jurisdiction. Backbenchers have said this shows what could be achieved if Britain stood up to European institutions. ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 13 May 2015) |
| <b>Deficiencies of EU status quo</b> |                    |            |                  | Generally, that EU is able to perform its tasks, is incompetent, is dysfunctional. Focus lies on the faults of the EU rather than on the consequences (these are rather coded as threat or conflict)  | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes  |
|                                      | In need of reform  |            |                  | Dysfunctional but acknowledging the potential to improve the EU, to make it better. Usually quite critical of EU's status quo but opens up possibility to make it better if action follows.   | Nothing coded at this node, only as subnodes  |
|                                      |                    | Cultural   |                  | Values/norms of EU need to be changed because they are currently inadequate or a problem  | That the language of Europe, the language of the institution I'm speaking to you from has to change fundamentally if it is to connect with ordinary voters of this vast continent who have just spoken. ( <i>Channel 4 News</i> , 27 May 2015)  |

| Frame | Child node   | Grandchild | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote   |
|-------|--|------------|------------------|---|---|
|       |  | Economic   |                  | Economic policies/approach/status quo are inadequate, but EU can (and must) reform its economy and economic approach. Still the possibility to actually change course of action for the better (however defined).   | The weak performance will heap further pressure on the European Central Bank (ECB) to take action to boost the flagging region, after months of speculation. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 16 May 2014)   |
|       |  | Political  |                  | Political approach/system is not adequate for its tasks and needs to be reformed. The underlying assumption is that the political system/approach is dysfunctional but there is scope to improve (often urgently) the system/approach   | What emerges is a picture of a Europe at the crossroads. Alongside fear of the anti-Europe parties doing well is the optimistic hope and expectation that this will shake the established order into realising the need for greater transparency and democracy. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 8 May 2014) |
|       | EU is incompetent/<br>dysfunctional/<br>inadequate |            |                  | Focus on incompetence or deleterious state the EU is in, incapability or inadequacy to deal with current issues. Compared to 'in need of reform', there is less of a focus on potential solutions and the possibilities to improve but mainly on the problems without providing solutions. Comparing it to classic definitions of 'frame' it highlights a problem, evaluates it but does not give a solution. | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes  |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote   |
|-------|------------|------------|------------------|--|---|
|       |            | Cultural   |                  | Values/Norms of EU/EU institutions are immoral or out of touch; are negative for the citizens; are not what is needed for its purposes; complacency, elitism, no solidarity, immorally always out for own advantage, not considering the citizens, out of touch. | Abusing the desire of the Greeks, the Irish and others to be part of Europe - and their fear of being forced out of the euro - to impose iniquitous conditions on them is the very opposite of the solidarity on which the European project is meant to be based. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 16 May 2014)  |
|       |            |            | Elitist          | The European project is inadequate because it favours, and is supported by elites rather than citizens. Often also highlighted as undemocratic.  | By contrast, what the EU stands for is monopoly government - by the elites, for the elites. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 19 May 2014)   |
|       |            | Economic   |                  | Economic approach/policies/shape of EU economies dysfunctional. EU in economic decline due to failure of euro/policies. Focus is on dysfunctional system/approach/policies, not on the crisis caused in many countries, or the threat posed by them.             | For month after month, eurozone deflation has dropped more than expected. The ECB was caught off guard when it fell to 0.5 pc in March, and off guard again when the (temporary) April spike was just 0.7 pc. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 8 May 2014)  |
|       |            | Political  |                  | Political approach/institutions/policies are inadequate/dysfunctional for the problems at hand, have undesired effects.  | The European rules, which came into effect in January, are intended to stop multi-nationals undercutting rivals by setting up in low-tax countries. But critics say they are too complex for small firms to cope with. Sellers of digital products and services ranging from ebooks to knitting patterns must now charge VAT at the rate applied in whichever country the buyer lives in. ( <i>Mail on Sunday</i> , 5 April 2015) |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild | Great-grandchild                    | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote   |
|-------|------------|------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|
|       |            |            | Dominated by Germany                | Germany as the main powerbroker in the UK, the dominant voice, rigging everything to their advantage, treating other countries unfairly. This frame is only applied if German dominance is framed as a problem, not if - rather neutrally - Germany is described as powerful. | Farage Highlight: At his most confident when talking on his home territory the EU. 'Mrs Merkel is the real boss in Europe', he told the PM. ( <i>Mirror</i> , 3 April 2015)   |
|       |            |            | Bureaucratic institution            | Focus is on the bureaucratic (and by implication inefficient) structure of the EU and EU-decision making. Alludes to the EU's distance from reality and voters.   | Estate bosses have described the project, which has ended up costing about £4,000 for each newt, as 'bureaucracy gone mad'. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 10 May 2014)   |
|       |            |            | Undemocratic /unaccountable/corrupt | Focus on (perceived) undemocratic nature of the EU; EU not just incompetent but undemocratic or corrupt (therefore distant from citizens/losing support/inefficient/...)  | Displaying the EU's habitual contempt for democracy, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker reportedly ruled out any renegotiations of Britain's membership terms before he steps down in November 2019 - whatever voters decide on May 7. ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 16 April 2015)             |
|       |            |            | Powerless/toothless                 | EU does not have influence; even if EU tries it cannot change how things are going; has no real power.  | EU weaker than a bunch of chickens ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 8 May 2015)  |
|       |            |            | Stubborn, no flexibility            | EU is ineffective, inefficient or incompetent because it is inflexible and incapable of reform, therefore cannot keep up with problems; does not actually address the problems it needs to.   | Why has the deferral of the apparently inevitable been so protracted? First, each side has thought that the saga could have a happy ending because it has underestimated the determination of the other side to stick with its pre-existing position. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 20 April 2015) |

| Frame                            | Child node | Grandchild                 | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote   |
|----------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|------------------|--|---|
|                                  |            | EU needs to act (urgently) |                  | EU has so far not acted on particular issues (e.g. refugee crisis) and needs to react, change course or do something. Unlike 'reform' the EU itself is not to be changed, rather within the existing system the EU needs to formulate action and engineer a solution.  | "We need support from the EU", says Skail. "We don't need men to work with us - we have very well experienced men. We need boats, we need directional positioning equipment. Europe has all this equipment and still can't overcome the smuggling. How can we do it when we don't have half what they do?" ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 20 April 2015)<br>The message of the people to the Euro-nomenklatura is simple: change ou mourir. ( <i>The Sunday Telegraph</i> , 26 April 2015) |
| <b>EU is competent/effective</b> |            |                            |                  | EU is framed as a competent actor; actions have the desired effect; a rational, effective and efficient actor which produced the desired outcomes. This is to be distinguished from <i>force for good</i> because the lens is exemplifying the EU's competence, not the benefits it brings. The argument can go along the lines of 'because the EU is a competent actor, the EU is a <i>force for good</i> . | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes  |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote  |
|-------|------------|------------|------------------|--|--|
|       | Cultural   |            |                  | See above, with regard to culture. For example, successful use of normative power; EU united in their causes (and therefore a competent, efficient actor).   | In a landmark ruling they undermined the idea that no foreigner should be thrown out of a country if it will interfere with their right to a family life. ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 10 April 2015)<br>What has changed is the tone of the debate. There is an acceptance now in all EU countries that this is a European crisis, not just a problem for Italy and Greece ( <i>BBC News at Ten</i> , 20 April 2015) |
|       | Economic   |            |                  | See above, with regard to economics. EU as is an economically competent actor; EU economy is prospering as a consequence of EU policies. This is not the same as the idea that EU brings prosperity automatically. Emphasis here lies on competence of relevant actors, not so much on the benefit of membership. For example, EU actors working competently to counter economic problems in the Eurozone and on the content more widely | The QE scheme has already been effective in reducing borrowing costs and weakening the euro. ECB purchases began last month, as the euro area entered a fourth straight month in deflationary territory. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 3 April 2015)  |
|       | Political  |            |                  | EU actors are competent in exercising (geo)political power. Their political manoeuvring has the desired outcomes; problems are being solved due to the EU's political actions.   | A diplomatic source told a news agency that the EU's 28 member states were widely mobilised to approve the statement's wording, reflecting a growing willingness to launch an operation to fight the traffickers. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 23 April 2015)  |

| Frame                                       | Child node                         | Grandchild                                  | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote  |
|---|------------------------------------|---|------------------|---|--|
| <b>EU as a source of conflict or crisis</b> |                                    |   |                  | The conflict/crisis frame was introduced because the 'threat' frames could not sufficiently capture turmoil in the EU at the moment, as well as conflicts that have already arisen. Conflict/crisis frames focus on current turmoil or has already happened, not impending, a <i>threat</i> . The EU, when reported using this frame, is represented as causing these conflicts/crises or at least be to a large part responsible for them. | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes   |
|   | Cultural or social conflict/crisis |   |                  | EU causing cultural or social conflict/crisis such as clashing cultures or tragedy in the Mediterranean.  | EU law is often mind-bogglingly technical, but it still matters, particularly to consumers, businesses and the environment. And it still engages fierce arguments about values. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 19 May 2014)   |
|   |                                    | Domestic cultural or social conflict/crisis |                  | Above, but on a domestic level, e.g. conflict between British people and EU migrants due to different lifestyles. This is different to <i>threat</i> of British culture being eroded.   | In the early years after 2004, a lot of the new arrivals were young and single and most spoke poor or no English. Keri Thomas, a Labour member of Carmarthenshire council for a ward in central Llanelli said that led to problems in the community.<br>“They couldn’t speak English they didn’t have anywhere to live. They were bringing in the people the country doesn’t need. Some of them had criminal records. They were horrible.” ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 12 May 2014) |



| Frame | Child node               | Grandchild                         | Great-grandchild           | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote   |
|-------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---|
|       | Economic conflict/crisis |                                    |                            | Above, on an economic level, e.g. failing Eurozone due to mismanagement on EU level. This is different to <i>threat</i> of another crisis, fears that economy in Eurozone will stagnate.                           | My VAT rules ruined firms, says Eurocrat, but I'm not to blame ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 19 May 2014)   |
|       |                          | Domestic economic conflict/crisis  |                            | Above, on domestic level, e.g. Greek debt crisis and its effects on population.  | The Greeks have paid a terribly high price, not merely for their own disastrous profligacy, but for the European elite's determination to preserve the euro. ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 27 May 2014)   |
|       | Political                |                                    |                            | Above, on political level; e.g. EU causing friction between nations, EU causing geopolitical crises, upsets other nations or powers.   | Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's president, has accused the EU of declaring 'enmity' on his country as next week's centenary commemorations of the massacres of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire descend into bitter rows. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 18 April 2015) |
|       |                          | Domestic political conflict/crisis |                            | Same, on a domestic level, e.g. EU as an electoral issue; EU causing political arguments in the UK, clashing politicians over issue of Europe, EU so unpopular that it causes political turmoil on domestic level. | It's still a live political issue whether or not Romania and Bulgaria becomes a flood or otherwise. ( <i>Channel 4 News</i> , 14 May 2014)  |
|       |                          |                                    | Euro-scepticism wins votes | In these domestic conflicts, Euroscepticism wins over the electorate.  | Across Europe, it is mainly the anti-establishment and eurosceptic parties that have made the big gains. ( <i>BBC News at Ten</i> 26 May 2014)  |

| Frame  | Child node | Grandchild                          | Great-grandchild               | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote   |
|--|------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|---|
|  |            | Disunity within the EU              |                                | Conflict within the EU between its member states. Member states do not work together, or clash. The dynamic often results in ineffective/inefficient policies.   | Last autumn, Mare Nostrum, an Italian search-and-rescue mission that saved more than 100,000 people at sea in 12 months was discontinued following a row over funding and Italian exasperation that it was shouldering the burden of responsibility alone. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 20 April 2015)   |
|  |            | EU has no support/is losing support |                                | Lack of support creates conflicts within member states and EU (for example through electoral gains for extremist parties).   | Italians used to be the biggest Europe enthusiasts, seeing Brussels as a means of escape from the dysfunction of the state that gave the world Silvio Berlusconi. But the Europe described by Grillo to his audiences shares the DNA of the "eurocracy" presented to French voters by Marine Le Pen: anti-democratic and, in its pursuit of austerity, economically ruinous. ( <i>The Observer</i> , 11 May 2014) |
|  |            |                                     | Legitimacy of resistance to EU | In the (political) conflict, it is legitimate to worry about EU-related issues.  | But the central policy of Ukip is that our country would be better off outside the EU. And there is nothing loony about that. ( <i>The Sun on Sunday</i> , 18 May 2014)   |
| <b>EU as a force for good; source of prosperity, peace and democracy</b> |            |                                     |                                | EU is furthering good causes, such as democracy, peace, solidarity, prosperity. When coded at this frame the EU is represented as fulfilling those principles and therefore improving people's life within and outside the EU. | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes  |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild                           | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote  |
|-------|------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|---|--|
|       | Cultural   |                                      |                  | EU as force for cultural good, e.g. diversity, tolerance; EU as a moral/normative actor with genuine influence  | In such a dramatic moment for the whole European project, it is worth going back to the very origins, to the 1948 Congress of Europe, where the veteran advocate of Pan-Europa, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, admonished his fellow founders: 'Let us never forget, my friends, that European union is a means and no end.' That is as true today as it was then. European union is not an end in itself. It is a means to the end of delivering better - more prosperous, free, secure - lives for its people. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 27 May 2014) |
|       |            | EU as a safe and desired destination |                  | EU is represented as desired destination for, for example, refugees due to being a force for good   | In the calm seas of the Mediterranean, another boatload of desperate migrants seeking sanctuary in Europe. ( <i>Channel 4 News</i> , 11 May 2015)  |
|       | Economic   |                                      |                  | EU as source of prosperity, EU is represented as causing economic growth not simply as important for economic stability. A crucial actor in maintaining it. | That's an official, if tacit, admission that the arrival in the UK of predominantly young and industrious migrants makes the UK economy bigger. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 12 May 2014)  |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild                      | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote  |
|-------|------------|---------------------------------|------------------|---|--|
|       | Political  |                                 |                  | EU as source of democracy and peace. EU is represented as integral in maintaining peace within Europe and also in spreading democracy and peace in the world. | In 1945 Europe was a scene of devastation after almost six years of war. French foreign minister Robert Schuman and diplomat Jean Monnet drove the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, a proto-common market overseen by a supranational authority. The aim was to bind the states together economically, ensuring that war was 'not only unthinkable but materially impossible'. ( <i>The Observer</i> , 11 May 2014) |
|       |            | EU as protector of its citizens |                  | Highlights EU's role in protecting citizens, for example, from big corporations, or protecting their data.  | Under EU rules, passengers delayed for more than three hours can claim up to £500 for hold-ups. ( <i>Sunday Mirror</i> , 11 May 2014)  |
|       |            | Having support/Gaining support  |                  | Highlights that citizens recognise the EU as a force for good, recognise European identity.   | I'm more European - Are you? - Absolutely. I mean, as in I go visit Europe a lot, I spend a lot of time out there. Yeah, I love Europe. ( <i>BBC News at Ten</i> , 26 May 2014)  |

| Frame                  | Child node | Grandchild                                    | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote  |
|------------------------|------------|---|------------------|---|--|
| <b>EU is important</b> |            |   |                  | EU is represented as an important actor both on a global stage as well as for individual countries' national interest. Distinguished from <i>force for good</i> since here the EU's contribution to prosperity/cultural richness/political stability is not represented as crucial. Rather it is the self-interest of other actors and the influence of the EU on these self-interests than the EU's achievements as a <i>force for good</i> . Most of the time the emphasis is not on the contribution the EU has made but on the problems would follow if, e.g. the UK left the EU. | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes   |
|                        | Cultural   |   |                  | Above, on a cultural level.   | And then, Europe is also necessary as a moral anchor. Europe has somewhat different values than the US. Europe is right about some things. The US is wrong about some things. ( <i>The Sunday Telegraph</i> , 18 May 2014) |
|                        |            | EU as global cultural/normative power         |                  | EU regarded/represented as a strong power with regards to its normative role, has a lot of influence.   | No data coded at this node   |
|                        |            | EU important for national interest (cultural) |                  | Highlights the significance/importance EU has for domestic cultural life  | No data coded at this node   |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild                                    | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote   |
|-------|------------|---|------------------|--|---|
|       | Economic   |   |                  | Above, on economic level.  | The bank says there's a number of economic uncertainties which could affect its success, but one that stands out is whether or not the UK remains a member of the EU. ( <i>Channel 4 News</i> , 24 April 2015)  |
|       |            | EU as global economic power                   |                  | EU as global, influential force in economic matters. Does not state a positive influence or contribution. If it did then it would rather be coded as <i>force of good/economic</i> .                         | As the CBI's director-general, John Cridland, put it on Friday: "The majority of businesses want to stay in a reformed European Union which opens up the world's largest market of 500 million consumers." ( <i>The Observer</i> , 10 May 2015)   |
|       |            | EU important for national interest (economic) |                  | Focus here is not on the crucial contribution the EU made for UK prosperity but rather on the risk for national economic interest if they were to leave. More negative than <i>force for good/economic</i> . | Dulex has been making paint inside this factory since the 1950s. Today, 70% of these products are sold in Great Britain. But outside the UK, Europe remains its biggest market. So maintaining a connection with the continent is crucial. But that connection with Europe has become a key election battleground and depending who wins a referendum could see Britain leaving the EU altogether. An outcome that the boss here doesn't favour. ( <i>Channel 4 News</i> , 28 April 2015) |
|       | Political  |   |                  | Above, on political level.   | While there is clearly a low level of engagement with MEPs, the poll shows that more people (43%) think the European parliament is important in the way Britain is governed than those who think it is unimportant. ( <i>The Observer</i> , 11 May 2014)  |

| Frame                                       | Child node | Grandchild  | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote   |
|---|------------|---|------------------|--|---|
|   |            | EU as global political power                      |                  | EU as global, influential force in political matters. Positive influence or contribution is not stated. If it did then it would rather be coded as <i>force for good/political</i> .                             | Mr Rogoff, who now teaches economics and public policy at Harvard, added: By becoming more integrated, Europe has more weight in the world [...]. ( <i>The Sunday Telegraph</i> , 18 May 2014)  |
|   |            | EU is important for national interest (political) |                  | Claims regarding damage done to UK's geopolitical status if it left rather than emphasising what the political contributions of the EU to UK (or other members) have been.                                       | She told the Observer: 'We cannot throw the baby out with the bathwater. I'm a committed European and believe Europe is necessary for France and other nations in order to remain at the world table.' ( <i>The Observer</i> , 18 May 2014) |
| <b>EU is not important or insignificant</b> |            |   |                  | Here emphasis is on assessment of EU as unimportant or insignificant, e.g. EP elections inconsequential; important decisions are not made on EU level, etc.  | In the frenzy created by swivel eyed loons who shun Brussels Sprouts as a federalist plot to enslave Britons, we're ignoring local democracy. ( <i>The Mirror</i> , 12 May 2014)  |
| <b>EU and UK are separate</b>               |            |   |                  | Emphasis here is placed on fundamental differences between EU and UK. They are treated as separate and even opposed units instead of emphasising the UK's role within the EU and how they are interlinked.       | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes  |
|   | Culturally |   |                  | UK is culturally different to EU, e.g. history of UK is different to history of rest of EU, often emphasised that UK is 'better' culturally, has been a powerful nation ever since, has never been occupied etc. | Being insular, we naturally assume it's the 440 million continentals who are out of step with us. In fact, it could be our 60 million who are out of step with our neighbours. ( <i>The Guardian</i> , 8 May 2014)                          |

| Frame  | Child node      | Grandchild | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote  |
|--|-----------------|------------|------------------|--|--|
|  | Economically    |            |                  | UK is politically separate (and often superior) to rest of EU. Emphasis for example on UK having an opt-out of the Eurozone; UK economy performing better than other EU economies.   | The prime minister's negotiating strategy depends on the assumption that the EU is waking up to the fact that Britain will never join the euro, and that any notion that all EU members want to be led to the same destination is over. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 9 May 2014) |
|  | Politically     |            |                  | UK is politically separate (and often superior) to rest of EU. Making political decisions differently, often being more democratic; having different views on issues than EU or parts of EU; opposing for example Juncker as Commission President or advocating a different approach to managing the refugee crisis. | The government in the UK however will be wary. Almost all these candidates want closer union, more integration. The battle for Europe's top job may prove to be long and divisive. ( <i>BBC News at Ten</i> , 15 May 2014)   |
| <b>EU is a threat (all below coded as either directed towards UK or other countries)</b> |                 |            |                  | EU is a threat. Distinct from crisis/conflict since it does not address a particular crisis/conflict that has happened or is happening. Fears are abstract. Impending doom and general threat rather than acute crisis/conflict.   | Sources only coded according to more refined child nodes   |
|  | Cultural/social |            |                  | For example, to social cohesion, in British communities; threat to 'British' way of life; but also threat to social cohesion across the continent.   | Vulnerable pensioners may be at risk of poor care and even abuse because so many home helps cannot speak English properly, a government adviser warned yesterday. ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 8 May 2014)  |



| Frame | Child node | Grandchild                                  | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)   | Example quote  |
|-------|------------|---|------------------|--|--|
|       |            | EU is contrary to cultural internationalism |                  | EU as hindering UK to follow its traditional internationalism in cultural terms.   | Older respondents were less afraid of their job prospects and their view is more global than European ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 21 April 2015)  |
|       | Economic   |   |                  | EU as threat to economic stability/growth (often due to mismanagement and incompetence). Also threat British workers income due to labour market pressures following EU migration to the UK. EU as a threat to industries like fishing/agriculture | The government believes the gadget [proposed by the EU], designed to help emergency services find crashed vehicles, will add at least £100 to the cost of vehicles without providing significant safety improvements. ( <i>Mail on Sunday</i> , 11 May 2014) |
|       |            | EU is waste                                 |                  | EU is an economic threat because it wastes money (e.g. high salaries for European civil servants, expensive and ineffective projects)  | £10m on Euro MPs chauffeur limos ( <i>The Sun</i> , 13 May 2014)   |
|       |            | EU is contrary to economic internationalism |                  | EU is a hindrance to UK in following its traditional economic internationalism, cannot make trade deals on their own; therefore a threat to UK's economy.  | Sorry Tony, we now trade more with the rest of the world than EU ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 10 April 2015)  |
|       | Political  |   |                  | EU as a political threat; in particular threat to sovereignty, interfering in national politics, imposition. Also threats of political conflicts.  | Under EU rules, Britain is powerless to stop anyone coming here from the other 27 member states. ( <i>The Sun</i> , 9 May 2014)  |

| Frame | Child node | Grandchild                                   | Great-grandchild | Explanation (what is emphasised)  | Example quote  |
|-------|------------|--|------------------|---|--|
|       |            | EU is an imposition/acting like a superpower |                  | EU as a threat since it is acting like a superpower, threatening sovereignty of member states.  | The ECJ judgement - which cannot be appealed and is binding for all EU states – [...] ( <i>Daily Mail</i> , 16 May 2014)   |
|       |            | EU is contrary to political internationalism |                  | EU as hindrance to UK's traditional political internationalism. Bound to EU instead of acting as a world power; favouring EU states as opposed to other allies worldwide (e.g. Commonwealth). | Mr Abbott, [...] said the country had 'come a long way down' since the days of the Empire and he feared that 'if we don't do something about it... within this generation's lifetime we will not be a sovereign nation. We will be a part of the Federal State of Europe ruled by Brussels'. ( <i>The Telegraph</i> , 22 May 2014) |

## Appendix B    Frames identified in previous research

| Authors                       | Frame                                | Operationalisation  |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) | <b>Conflict</b>                      | Does the story reflect disagreement between parties/individuals/groups/countries?<br>Does one party/individual/group/country reproach another?<br>Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem/issue?<br>Does the story refer to winners and losers?  |
| Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) | <b>Human Interest</b>                | Does the story provide a human example or ‘human face’ on the issue?<br>Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy/caring, sympathy, or compassion?<br>Does the story emphasise how individuals and groups are affected by the issue/problem?<br>Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?<br>Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy/caring, sympathy or compassion?   |
| Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) | <b>Attribution of responsibility</b> | Does the story suggest that some level of gov’t has the ability to alleviate the problem?<br>Does the story suggest that some level of the gov’t is responsible for the issue/problem?<br>Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?<br>Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue/problem?<br>Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action?   |
| Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) | <b>Morality</b>                      | Does the story contain any moral message?<br>Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?<br>Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?   |
| Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) | <b>Economic consequences</b>         | Is there a mention of financial losses or gains now or in the future?<br>Is there a mention of the costs/degree of expenses involved?<br>Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?  |
| Daddow (2006a)                | <b>History</b>                       | Analysing rhetorical strategies, from them a ‘national history’ frame emerges; however, he does not talk about frames, but rather narratives, myths and discourses; Daddow has identified a recurring frame in the reporting, picks it out and analyses how it is constructed.  |
| Hawkins (2012)                |                                      | Framing of negotiations of Lisbon Treaty; focus on framing of relationship. <i>Definition of frame: particular ways of depicting processes, institutions and events which highlight certain aspects of these at the expense of others, presenting issues in varying degrees of positivity and negativity.</i><br>However, Hawkins (2012) does mix up terms, using <i>discourse, frame</i> and <i>narrative</i> almost interchangeably.<br>In addition, the way the frames have been analysed seems to differ slightly between the sceptical and more pro-European discourses. With regard to the right-wing press he seems to put far more emphasis on the language used, |

|                                   |  |  |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
|                                   |  | whereas in more left-wing papers he is focusing mainly on the content  |
|                                   | <b>Europe as a foreign power</b>                       | Depicts the EU not as an international organization of which the United Kingdom is a member, but as a state-like entity from which the United Kingdom is excluded and with which it engages in a bilateral relationship → hostile, quasi-imperial power which poses an existential threat to the United Kingdom  |
|                                   | <b>Europe as a bargaining forum</b>                    | The United Kingdom's interests are set against those of other Member States, particularly France, Germany and a shifting coalition of allies. Furthermore, the policies and institutions of the EU are seen to work against the United Kingdom's interests.  |
|                                   |  | Politics within the EU as bargaining forum is seen as a zero-sum game played out between competing member states with clear winners and losers emerging from each new regulation or treaty revision. Where one state benefits from a certain measure, this comes at the expense of another. Any idea that the EU involves attaining common goals or creating a new form of political community is simply not considered. Instead, the EU is a means of maximizing state interests; in these conflicts the UK is constantly losing and the costs of membership are far higher than the benefits |
|                                   | <b>Nationalist meta-narrative</b>                      | Lens through which both overarching Eurosceptic discourses are viewed; claim very much based on the us-them dichotomy found in data (inductively)  |
|                                   | <b>EU as source of peace, prosperity and democracy</b> | Treaty revision described as development and consolidation for EU  |
| Vliegenhardt <i>et al.</i> (2008) | <b>Benefit</b>   | Does the author or any kind of actor mentioned in the article express/argue that one's country has benefited from the EU/EC either generally or specifically (or that the situation in one's country has improved or will [potentially] improve because of the EC/EU)?<br>Does the article present numbers, figures, statistics that indicate that one's country has benefited from the EU/EC?   |
| Vliegenhardt <i>et al.</i> (2008) | <b>Disadvantage</b>                                    | Does the author or any kind of actor mentioned in the article express/argue that one's country has had disadvantage from the EU/EC either generally or specifically (or that the situation in one's country has been negatively affected or will [potentially] be negatively affected because of the EC/EU)?<br>Does the article present numbers, figures, statistics that indicate that one's country has been negatively affected from the EU/EC?  |
| Statham and Gray (2005)           | <b>Cultural-historical</b>                             | e.g. national identity; historical precedents, cultural identities   |
| Statham and Gray (2005)           | <b>Political</b>                                       | Emphasise key political elements of the relationship, for instance by referring to the British traditions of parliamentary democracy and sovereignty as reasons to oppose further integration  |
| Williams and Kaid (2009)          | <b>Backlash/payback frame</b>                          | Focuses on voters getting even with established parties or political leaders by voting them out  |

Table 39 Frames identified in previous research

## Appendix C Interview guide

### FOR JOURNALISTS/EDITORS

The interview guide needs to cover three dimensions of influences, **individual-level influences**<sup>36</sup>, influences from **within the news organisation**, and influences from **outside the news organisation**.

#### Personal influences

1. To you, what is the most important duty of journalism when it comes to reporting the EU? (**Self-perceived journalistic role**)
2. What was the key event that shaped your opinion on the European Union and European integration?

#### Newsroom influences

3. An EU-related news story breaks. What happens next? (**Newsroom Routines**)
4. Is reporting/writing on/commenting on the EU in any way different to reporting/writing on/commenting on, for example, the UK government? (For editors: Do your editorial decisions on the EU differ to other editorial decisions?) (**News routines**)

#### Newsroom and external influences

5. What are the challenges of reporting the EU? (**can include influences on all levels**, if some categories are not mentioned, prompt)
  - a. Editorial line
  - b. News routines, newsroom ideology
  - c. Proprietor
  - d. Economic constraints
  - e. Technological developments
  - f. Audience orientation
  - g. EU-press relations
6. Has there ever been an incident in which EU reports/comments/articles in your organisation have created conflict with the editor/proprietor? (For editor: Has there ever been an incident in which EU reports/comments/articles in your organisation have created conflict between you as an editor and the journalists/between you as the editor and the proprietor?) (**Prompt editorial line, proprietor influence**)

These are the categories explored in Chapter 7 and expected to come up in one way or another; can be prompted

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<sup>36</sup> Some of the individual level influences were researched before the interview (personal experience with EU, personal career, etc.).

7. In my sample, I have a high number of editorials (and comments) which are concerned with EU-related issues. Why do you think the EU has become such a popular topic for opinion pieces? (**prompt editorials, editorial line**)
8. In my sample, I found a strong focus on immigration. Why is immigration such a dominant topic in the news? (**prompt audience orientation; economic pressure**)
9. Another finding was a focus on the role of the EU in domestic politics. Why is there not more of a supranational debate that goes beyond the domestic context? (**links to resources as well as audience orientation**)
10. What does the typical reader/viewer of XY expect from EU-related articles/broadcasts? (Do you think they agree with you on matters relating to the EU?) (**audience orientation**)
11. In much of the research I reviewed concerns are voiced that all mainstream media are distributing the same negative image of the EU. Is that a fair verdict? (**pluralism; ideology**)
12. The media landscape is moving away from traditional mass media towards a more diversified, individualised media environment. Most mainstream news organisations have invested in online editions. How do you feel has this impacted on your everyday work? (**prompt technological developments**)
13. Do you often get the chance to visit EU institutions to gather information about EU-related issues?
14. I know this is a sensitive issue, but in general terms, where do you normally get your information for EU-related stories from? (**Sources; economic constraints; should probably come towards the end, if at all, to not upset the interviewee**)

## **FOR SOURCES**

### **Personal influences**

1. What do you regard as your responsibility in the production of EU-related news?
2. To you, what is the most important duty of journalism in this process of reporting the EU?

### **Relationship with journalism/journalists**

3. From your point of view, as a provider of information about the EU, how would you describe your relationship to media professionals?
4. What are the challenges of working with UK media professionals in particular?
  - a. Are they any different to other European journalists?
  - b. What are those differences?
5. Which ones are the UK media organisations you prefer to work with and why?

### **Strategies, successes, failures**

6. Which are the kinds of stories that are most popular with UK media professionals?
  - a. Can you name an example?
  - b. How is that different to other European journalists? (Does it differ?)
7. What can you do to improve your chances of getting your take on a story into the (UK) news?
  - a. Why do you think these strategies are successful?
  - b. Are those strategies different for UK journalists and correspondents compared to other nationalities? (Do you have to approach them differently?)
8. Has there ever been an incident when you felt that the information you had given out was distorted?
  - a. Can you describe the situation?
  - b. Why do you think this has happened?

### **Particularities of different institutions/organisations**

9. There has been research published that suggests that the European institutions are not very good at communicating with the media. Information is too complex, too boring, too technical, not enough, too much – are those fair verdicts?
  - a. In some of the literature, it has been suggested that the **Council** is the least successful one – or least open one – of the European institutions when it comes to communicating with the media. Is that true?
  - b. What has the Council/Parliament/Commission done to address these problems?
10. At **Open Europe** you appear to be very successful at getting your stories or your take on stories into the UK press in particular.

- a. What is your recipe?
- b. How have you become this authoritative voice?
- c. What can you offer that the European institutions can't?



## **Appendix D Other interview-related documents: contact email, consent form and participant information sheet**

### **Contact Email**

Dear XY,

I am writing to you to ask you for an interview. I am a 3rd year PhD student in Politics at Newcastle University looking at media representations of the EU in British news coverage. I believe you have extremely valuable and unique experiences which would further my understanding and the quality of my thesis.

In my research, I am studying media representations of the European Union. The project involved sampling different kinds of media content and analysing them in terms of content, tone and language use. At this stage of my studies, I would like to go a step further and investigate the processes which shape media representations. Full details of the research project are set out in the attached Participant Information Sheet.

I think you have particularly important insights into the subject and talking to you would help me clarify some of the questions I have with regard to newsroom practices. Those include questions about the challenges of reporting the EU, your own experience of reporting the EU but also more generally the different pressures a journalist has to deal with on a daily basis as well as your observations in this area.

[or]

I think you have particularly important insights into the subject and talking to you would help me clarify some of the questions I have. It would be great to hear from you how the EU deals with media generally, your experiences of working with journalists, particularly those from UK media, and which challenges you face in your role. Interviews will take between 30 and 60 minutes.

Interviews will take between 30 and 60 minutes. If you are available for an interview I am happy to meet you at your convenience. I will be in London on 10 June as well as 4 & 5 July. If you would like to arrange a different date or prefer a conversation via telephone, I am more than happy to accommodate this.

I am looking forward to hearing from you and to the opportunity to speak to you,  
Anna Wambach

## Consent form

### Representing Europe: The Character of EU Coverage in British News Media

#### Informed consent form for qualitative interviews with adults

(Interviews will regard news coverage during two data collection periods, which include the European Parliamentary Elections and the General Election: 08/05/2014 – 01/06/2014 and 09/04/2015 – 14/05/2015)

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

|    |   |                          |
|----|---|--------------------------|
| 1. | I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated _____.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. | I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my participation.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. | I voluntarily agree to participate in the project.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. | I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn.   | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. | The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained to me: I am aware that my answers given in this interview will be attributed to me or my organisation unless I explicitly wish otherwise (for the whole interview or parts of it). | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. | Terms of consent for interviews, audio or other forms of data collection have been explained and provided to me.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. | The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been explained to me.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. | I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified in this form.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. | I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form.  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

#### Participant:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

#### Researcher:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Researcher

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

## Participant information sheet



Newcastle upon Tyne, 24 February 2016

## Representing Europe: The Character of EU Coverage in British News Media

### Contact details of the researcher

Anna Wambach



Email: [a.m.wambach@newcastle.ac.uk](mailto:a.m.wambach@newcastle.ac.uk)

### Contact details of the project supervisory team

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### Ethical Approval

Ethical Approval for this project has been obtained by the Faculty Ethics Committee, Newcastle University, on 14 October 2014. This project is self-funded by the student. Complaints should be directed to the researcher or the supervisory team.

### Purpose and aims of the research

The thesis aims to answer two interrelated research questions. The first one regards the characteristics of coverage of the European Union in the contemporary British news media, the second research questions asks which factors account for this pattern of coverage. Contemporary in this study refers to two clearly defined periods of data collection, which include the European Parliamentary Elections and the General Election: 08/05/2014 – 01/06/2014 and 30/03/2015 – 14/05/2015. Analysing news coverage is important and insightful as it is the primary, and in many cases only, source of information for citizens about the European Union, the policies and institutions and can therefore help understand attitudes towards and opinions about the EU.

The objectives of this research project do not only lie in the analysis of the news texts due to their potential effects on their audience. As the production processes and organisational circumstances are assumed to play an important part in the shaping of news coverage, media professionals' perceptions of and opinions about news production regarding the EU will make a highly valuable contribution to this study.

### Possible conflicts of interest

The researcher is aware that for the participants the desire to keep their sources confidential and to protect their organisations from criticism might conflict with participation in this research project. Any concerns will be taken seriously by the researcher. Moreover, goal of the research project is not criticising media professionals but rather contribute to the knowledge and understanding of organisational and societal discourses that shape news production.

**Participation**

The participants will be asked to complete an interview with the researcher. This should ideally happen in person and will take up to 60 minutes. The researcher is willing to travel to the interviewees' preferred meeting point. Financial rewards or reimbursement for any travel expenses, however, cannot be given as the funding for this project is limited.

For the participants, the interview will not pose any physical and/or psychological discomfort, distress or embarrassment.

**Terms for withdrawal**

As participation is entirely voluntary, interviewees are free to withdraw from the study at any time before and during the interviews. The answers gathered up to this point, however, will be used by the researcher unless the participant does not permit this.

**Usage of the data**

Data gathered from the interviews will be recorded (unless the participants wish not to have their interview recorded), transcribed and consequently analysed. The audio files as well as the original transcripts will only be accessible to the researcher and the supervisory team during the research process. They will be stored securely in a locked drawer and digitally in a password-secured folder on a university owned computer. In case of publication, the participants consent for the usage of their data will be gathered in advance.

It is assumed that the participants are willing for their answers to be attributed to them and/or their organisations unless they wish to remain anonymous. Security procedures to maintain anonymity and confidentiality will be put into place upon request. This can happen for whole interviews or parts of the interviews.

Your participation in this study would be highly appreciated and it would significantly contribute to the quality of the research project.

With kind regards,

Anna Wambach

## Appendix E Further tables

|                          | <b>Week 1<br/>Total</b> | <b>Week 1<br/>Daily<br/>Average</b> | <b>Week 2<br/>Total</b> | <b>Week 2<br/>daily<br/>Average</b> | <b>Week 3<br/>Total</b> | <b>Week 3<br/>Daily<br/>Average</b> |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>Daily Mail</b>        | 22                      | 3.7                                 | 37                      | 6.2                                 | 62                      | 8.9                                 |
| <b>Sunday Mail</b>       | 7                       |                                     | 5                       |                                     | 8                       |                                     |
| <b>Guardian</b>          | 38                      | 6.3                                 | 58                      | 9.7                                 | 81                      | 11.6                                |
| <b>Observer</b>          | 10                      |                                     | 8                       |                                     | 8                       |                                     |
| <b>Mirror</b>            | 8                       | 1.3                                 | 25                      | 4.2                                 | 22                      | 3.1                                 |
| <b>Sunday Mirror</b>     | 7                       |                                     | 7                       |                                     | 2                       |                                     |
| <b>The Sun</b>           | 19                      | 3.2                                 | 31                      | 5.2                                 | 36                      | 5.1                                 |
| <b>The Sun on Sunday</b> | 4                       |                                     | 5                       |                                     | 7                       |                                     |
| <b>Telegraph</b>         | 43                      | 7.2                                 | 46                      | 7.7                                 | 79                      | 11.3                                |
| <b>Sunday Telegraph</b>  | 17                      |                                     | 18                      |                                     | 14                      |                                     |
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>   | 11                      | 1.6                                 | 8                       | 1.1                                 | 18                      | 2.6                                 |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>    | 8                       | 1.1                                 | 15                      | 2.1                                 | 17                      | 2.4                                 |
| <b>TOTAL</b>             | 194                     |                                     | 263                     |                                     | 354                     |                                     |

*Table 40 Distribution of news items by news organisation per week (EP Election collection period)*

|                              | Week 1<br>Total | Week 1<br>Daily<br>Average | Week 2<br>Total | Week 2<br>Daily<br>Average | Week 3<br>Total | Week 3<br>Daily<br>Average | Week 4<br>Total | Week 4<br>Daily<br>Average | Week 5<br>Total | Week 5<br>Daily<br>Average | Week 6<br>Total | Week 6<br>Daily<br>Average | Week 7<br>Total | Week 7<br>Daily<br>Average |
|------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Daily Mail</b>            | 33              | 5.5                        | 28              | 4.7                        | 42              | 7                          | 42              | 7                          | 25              | 4.2                        | 45              | 7.5                        | 35              | 8.8                        |
| <b>Sunday Mail</b>           | 4               |                            | 7               |                            | 4               |                            | 4               |                            | 10              |                            | 7               |                            | 0               |                            |
| <b>Guardian</b>              | 48              | 8                          | 53              | 8.8                        | 56              | 9.3                        | 65              | 10.8                       | 50              | 8.3                        | 61              | 10.2                       | 49              | 12.3                       |
| <b>Observer</b>              | 12              |                            | 11              |                            | 12              |                            | 15              |                            | 15              |                            | 23              |                            | 0               |                            |
| <b>Mirror</b>                | 8               | 1.3                        | 8               | 1.3                        | 7               | 1.2                        | 14              | 2.3                        | 10              | 1.7                        | 14              | 2.3                        | 5               | 1.3                        |
| <b>Sunday Mirror</b>         | 2               |                            | 2               |                            | 0               |                            | 2               |                            | 1               |                            | 3               |                            | 0               |                            |
| <b>The Sun</b>               | 9               | 1.5                        | 14              | 2.3                        | 9               | 1.5                        | 14              | 2.3                        | 17              | 2.8                        | 14              | 2.3                        | 10              | 2.5                        |
| <b>The Sun on<br/>Sunday</b> | 1               |                            | 5               |                            | 2               |                            | 3               |                            | 2               |                            | 3               |                            | 0               |                            |
| <b>Telegraph</b>             | 52              | 8.7                        | 49              | 8.2                        | 36              | 6                          | 57              | 9.5                        | 41              | 6.8                        | 64              | 10.7                       | 39              | 7.8                        |
| <b>Sunday Telegraph</b>      | 10              |                            | 14              |                            | 12              |                            | 16              |                            | 15              |                            | 19              |                            | 0               |                            |
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>       | 8               | 1.3                        | 3               | 0.5                        | 12              | 2                          | 9               | 1.5                        | 12              | 2                          | 14              | 2.3                        | 7               | 1.8                        |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>        | 6               | 1                          | 4               | 0.7                        | 7               | 1.2                        | 14              | 2.3                        | 8               | 1.3                        | 11              | 1.8                        | 10              | 2.5                        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                 | 193             |                            | 198             |                            | 199             |                            | 255             |                            | 206             |                            | 278             |                            | 155             |                            |

*Table 41 Distribution of news items by news organisation per week (GE collection period)*

|                         | <b>Events closely linked to the EU (including EU/Eurozone economy)</b> |                  | <b>Home Events</b>        |                  | <b>Economic Events (including British economy)</b> |                  | <b>International Events</b> |                  |
|-------------------------|--|------------------|---------------------------|------------------|--|------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|
|                         | <i>EP Election Period</i>  | <i>GE Period</i> | <i>EP Election Period</i> | <i>GE Period</i> | <i>EP Election Period</i>                          | <i>GE Period</i> | <i>EP Election Period</i>   | <i>GE Period</i> |
| <b>Daily Mail</b>       | 27<br>(22.5%)  | 58<br>(23.2%)    | 81<br>(67.5%)             | 155<br>(62%)     | 4<br>(3.3%)  | 27<br>(10.8%)    | 8<br>(6.7%)                 | 10<br>(4%)       |
| <b>Sunday Mail</b>      | 3 (15%)  | 8<br>(22.2%)     | 13<br>(65%)               | 24<br>(66.7%)    | 1<br>(5%)  | 4<br>(11.1%)     | 3<br>(15%)                  | 0<br>(0%)        |
| <b>Guardian</b>         | 53<br>(29.9%)  | 114<br>(29.8%)   | 79<br>(44.6%)             | 179<br>(46.9%)   | 23<br>(13%)  | 41<br>(10.7%)    | 22<br>(12.4%)               | 48<br>(12.6%)    |
| <b>Observer</b>         | 6<br>(23.1%)   | 20<br>(22.7%)    | 14<br>(53.9%)             | 56<br>(63.6%)    | 4<br>(15.4%)                                       | 7<br>(8%)        | 2<br>(7.7%)                 | 5<br>(5.7%)      |
| <b>Mirror</b>           | 7<br>(12.7%)   | 17<br>(25.8%)    | 46<br>(83.6%)             | 40<br>(60.6%)    | 0<br>(0%)  | 6<br>(9.1%)      | 2<br>(3.6%)                 | 3<br>(4.5%)      |
| <b>Sunday Mirror</b>    | 2<br>(12.5%)   | 3 (30%)          | 12<br>(75%)               | 7<br>(70%)       | 0<br>(0%)  | 0<br>(0%)        | 2<br>(12.5%)                | 0<br>(0%)        |
| <b>Sun</b>              | 14<br>(16.3%)  | 23<br>(26.4%)    | 66<br>(76.7%)             | 60<br>(69%)      | 3<br>(3.5%)  | 4<br>(4.6%)      | 3<br>(3.5%)                 | 0 (0%)           |
| <b>Sun on Sunday</b>    | 2<br>(12.5%)   | 2<br>(12.5%)     | 14<br>(87.5%)             | 14<br>(87.5%)    | 0<br>(0%)  | 0<br>(0%)        | 0 (0%)                      | 0 (0%)           |
| <b>Telegraph</b>        | 46<br>(27.4%)  | 116<br>(34.3%)   | 90<br>(53.6%)             | 153<br>(45.3%)   | 17<br>(10.1%)                                      | 51<br>(15.1%)    | 15<br>(8.9%)                | 18<br>(5.3%)     |
| <b>Sunday Telegraph</b> | 9<br>(18.4%)   | 13<br>(15.1%)    | 24<br>(49%)               | 57<br>(66.3%)    | 9<br>(18.4%)                                       | 11<br>(12.8%)    | 7<br>(14.3%)                | 5<br>(3.1%)      |
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b>  | 9<br>(24.3%)   | 22<br>(33.8%)    | 23<br>(62.2%)             | 39<br>(60%)      | 2<br>(5.4%)  | 2<br>(3.1%)      | 3<br>(8.1%)                 | 2<br>(5%)        |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>   | 11<br>(27.5%)  | 19<br>(31.7%)    | 26<br>(65%)               | 36<br>(60%)      | 0 (0%)   | 2<br>(3.3%)      | 3<br>(7.5%)                 | 3<br>(6.3%)      |

Table 42 News Event by News Outlet (Total Numbers and percentages of sampled articles/minutes per news organisation dedicated to news events)

|                                    | News           |                | Comment and Debate (without editorials) |               | Editorials    |               | Business and Finance |                |
|------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|----------------|
|                                    | EP Period      | GE Period      | EP Period                               | GE Period     | EP Period     | GE Period     | EP Period            | GE Period      |
| <b>Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday</b>   | 83<br>(58.9%)  | 156<br>(54.5%) | 39<br>(27.7%)                           | 46<br>(16.1%) | 10<br>(7.1%)  | 13<br>(4.5%)  | 9<br>(6.4%)          | 71<br>(24.8%)  |
| <b>Guardian/Observer</b>           | 113<br>(55.7%) | 258<br>(54.9%) | 43<br>(21.2%)                           | 68<br>(14.5%) | 14<br>(6.9%)  | 38<br>(8.1%)  | 33<br>(16.3%)        | 106<br>(22.6%) |
| <b>Mirror/Sunday Mirror</b>        | 45<br>(63.4%)  | 55<br>(7.2%)   | 18<br>(25.4%)                           | 11<br>(14.5%) | 8<br>(11.3%)  | 5<br>(6.6%)   | 0 (0%)               | 5<br>(6.6%)    |
| <b>The Sun/The Sun on Sunday</b>   | 62<br>(60.8%)  | 60<br>(58.3%)  | 21<br>(20.6%)                           | 25<br>(24.3%) | 17<br>(16.7%) | 13<br>(12.6%) | 2<br>(2.0%)          | 5<br>(4.9%)    |
| <b>Telegraph/ Sunday Telegraph</b> | 119<br>(54.6%) | 166<br>(39.2%) | 17<br>(7.8%)                            | 45<br>(10.6%) | 24<br>(11.1%) | 25<br>(5.9%)  | 57<br>(26.3%)        | 188<br>(44.3%) |

*Table 43 Total number and percentage of items per newspaper section by news organisation*



|                                   | Page Number <= 10 |             | Page Number > 10 |             |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
|                                   | EP Period         | GE Period   | EP Period        | GE Period   |
| <b>Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday</b>  | 55 (39%)          | 98 (34.3%)  | 85 (60.7%)       | 188 (65.7%) |
| <b>Guardian/Observer</b>          | 65 (32%)          | 127 (27%)   | 138 (68%)        | 343 (73%)   |
| <b>Mirror/Sunday Mirror</b>       | 36 (50.7%)        | 41 (53.9%)  | 35 (49.3%)       | 35 (46.1%)  |
| <b>The Sun/The Sun on Sunday</b>  | 64 (62.8%)        | 68 (66%)    | 38 (37.3%)       | 35 (34%)    |
| <b>Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph</b> | 136 (62.7%)       | 286 (67.5%) | 81 (37.3%)       | 138 (32.5%) |

*Table 44 Distribution of items in newspapers (page number) in total numbers and percentages*

|                        | First half of programme |            | Second half of programme |            |
|------------------------|-------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|
|                        | EP Period               | GE Period  | EP Period                | GE Period  |
| <b>BBC News at Ten</b> | 20 (54.1%)              | 32 (49.2%) | 17 (45.9%)               | 33 (50.8%) |
| <b>Channel 4 News</b>  | 30 (75%)                | 39 (65%)   | 10 (25%)                 | 21 (35%)   |

*Table 45 Distribution of items in broadcast (first or second half) in total numbers and percentages*

|  | <b>Events closely linked to the EU</b> | <b>Home news events</b> | <b>Economy/ Business/ Money</b> | <b>International news events</b> |
|--|--|-------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>EU is a Bargaining Forum/ Horse-trading</b>         | 81 (14.7%)                             | 156 (27.9%)             | 1 (1.7%)                        | 0 (0%)                           |
| <b>UK makes a difference in the EU</b>                 | 70 (12.7%)                             | 67 (12.0%)              | 0 (0%)                          | 0 (0%)                           |
| <b>Deficiencies of the EU's status quo</b>             | 377 (68.3%)                            | 181 (32.4%)             | 23 (40.0%)                      | 16 (45.7%)                       |
| <b>EU is competent</b>                                 | 69 (12.5%)                             | 6 (1.1%)                | 7 (12.1%)                       | 4 (11.4%)                        |
| <b>EU is source of conflict/crisis</b>                 | 378 (68.5%)                            | 436 (78.0%)             | 18 (31.0%)                      | 18 (51.4%)                       |
| <b>EU is a force for good</b>                          | 127 (23.0%)                            | 111 (19.9%)             | 12 (20.7%)                      | 13 (37.1%)                       |
| <b>EU is important</b>                                 | 42 (7.6%)                              | 118 (21.1%)             | 17 (29.3%)                      | 6 (17.1%)                        |
| <b>EU not important/insignificant</b>                  | 11 (2.0%)                              | 37 (6.6%)               | 6 (10.3%)                       | 1 (2.9%)                         |
| <b>EU is separate from UK – UK is separate from EU</b> | 91 (16.5%)                             | 98 (17.5%)              | 7 (12.1%)                       | 0 (0%)                           |
| <b>EU is a threat</b>                                  | 293 (53.1%)                            | 274 (49.0%)             | 27 (46.6%)                      | 9 (25.7%)                        |

*Table 46 Number of items addressing a specific news event with references to frames in rows (percentage of items addressing a specific news event with reference to frames in rows; read columns)*

|  | <b>EU is a Bargaining Forum/ Horse-trading</b> | <b>UK makes a difference in the EU</b> | <b>Deficiencies of the EU's status quo</b> | <b>EU is competent</b> | <b>EU is source of conflict/ crisis</b> | <b>EU is a force for good</b> | <b>EU is important</b> | <b>EU not important/in-significant</b> | <b>EU is separate from UK – UK is separate from EU</b> | <b>EU is a threat</b> |
|--|--|--|--|------------------------|---|-------------------------------|------------------------|--|--|-----------------------|
| <b>EU is a Bargaining Forum/ Horse-trading</b>         | 238 (100%)                                     | 29 (21.7)                              | 94 (15.7%)                                 | 3 (3.5%)               | 121 (14.2%)                             | 6 (2.3%)                      | 18 (9.8%)              | 0 (0%)                                 | 46 (23.5%)   | 60 (10.0%)            |
| <b>UK makes a difference in the EU</b>                 | 29 (12.2%)                                     | 137 (100%)                             | 60 (10.1%)                                 | 8 (9.3%)               | 51 (6.0%)                               | 11 (4.2%)                     | 17 (9.3%)              | 0 (0%)                                 | 36 (18.4%)   | 20 (3.3%)             |
| <b>Deficiencies of the EU's status quo</b>             | 94 (39.5%)                                     | 60 (43.8%)                             | 597 (100%)                                 | 19 (22.1%)             | 305 (35.9%)                             | 51 (19.4%)                    | 37 (20.2%)             | 6 (10.9%)                              | 70 (35.7%)   | 235 (39.0%)           |
| <b>EU is competent</b>                                 | 3 (12.6%)                                      | 8 (5.8%)                               | 19 (3.2%)                                  | 86 (100%)              | 24 (2.8%)                               | 22 (8.4%)                     | 1 (0.5%)               | 3 (5.5%)                               | 9 (4.5%)   | 15 (7.7%)             |
| <b>EU is source of conflict/crisis</b>                 | 121 (50.8%)                                    | 51 (37.2%)                             | 305 (51.1%)                                | 24 (27.9%)             | 850 (100%)                              | 72 (27.4%)                    | 80 (43.7%)             | 27 (49.1%)                             | 72 (36.7%)   | 257 (42.6%)           |
| <b>EU is a force for good</b>                          | 6 (2.5%)                                       | 11 (8.0%)                              | 51 (8.5%)                                  | 22 (25.9%)             | 72 (8.5%)                               | 263 (100%)                    | 49 (26.8%)             | 1 (1.9%)                               | 10 (5.1%)  | 40 (6.6%)             |
| <b>EU is important</b>                                 | 18 (7.6%)                                      | 17 (12.4%)                             | 37 (6.2%)                                  | 1 (1.2%)               | 80 (9.4%)                               | 49 (18.6%)                    | 183 (100%)             | 4 (7.2%)                               | 11 (5.6%)  | 29 (4.8%)             |
| <b>EU not important/in-significant</b>                 | 0 (0%)   | 0 (0.0%)                               | 6 (1.0%)                                   | 3 (3.5%)               | 27 (3.2%)                               | 1 (0.4%)                      | 4 (2.2%)               | 55 (100%)                              | 3 (1.5%)   | 6 (1.0%)              |
| <b>EU is separate from UK – UK is separate from EU</b> | 46 (19.3%)                                     | 36 (26.2%)                             | 70 (11.7%)                                 | 9 (10.5%)              | 72 (8.4%)                               | 10 (3.8%)                     | 11 (6.0%)              | 3 (5.5%)                               | 196 (100%)   | 64 (10.6%)            |
| <b>EU is a threat</b>                                  | 60 (25.2%)                                     | 20 (14.6%)                             | 235 (39.4%)                                | 15 (17.4%)             | 257 (30.2%)                             | 40 (15.2%)                    | 29 (15.8%)             | 6 (10.9%)                              | 64 (32.7%)   | 603 (100%)            |

Table 47 Total number of items with both frame in column and frame in row (percentage of items with both references; read columns)

## Appendix F List of journalists/contributors in sample

|                         | EP Election collection period | GE collection period |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| No by-line              | 86                            | 163                  |
| Editorial               | 57                            | 94                   |
| Patrick Wintour         | 18                            | 20                   |
| Hew Edwards             | 17                            | 28                   |
| Tom Newton Dunn         | 17                            | 12                   |
| Rowena Mason            | 15                            | 19                   |
| Jon Snow                | 14                            | 23                   |
| James Chapman           | 14                            | 13                   |
| Krishnan Guru-Murthy    | 13                            | 9                    |
| James Kirkup            | 13                            | 4                    |
| Nicholas Watt           | 12                            | 13                   |
| Jane Hill               | 11                            | 0                    |
| Ian Traynor             | 9                             | 19                   |
| Peter Dominiczak        | 9                             | 15                   |
| Steve Hawkes            | 9                             | 14                   |
| Daniel Martin           | 9                             | 7                    |
| Steven Swinford         | 8                             | 18                   |
| Matthew Holehouse       | 8                             | 17                   |
| Ambrose Evans-Pritchard | 8                             | 16                   |
| Jason Beattie           | 8                             | 6                    |
| Kevin Schofield         | 8                             | 6                    |
| Nick Robinson           | 8                             | 4                    |
| Kevin Maguire           | 8                             | 3                    |
| Bruno Waterfield        | 8                             | 0                    |
| Emily Ashton            | 8                             | 0                    |
| Christopher Hope        | 7                             | 25                   |
| Tim Ross                | 7                             | 10                   |
| Gary Gibbon             | 7                             | 7                    |
| Jack Doyle              | 7                             | 4                    |
| Christopher Booker      | 7                             | 3                    |
| Henry Samuel            | 7                             | 1                    |

|                        |   |    |
|------------------------|---|----|
| <b>Toby Helm</b>       | 6 | 11 |
| <b>Alan Travis</b>     | 6 | 10 |
| <b>Gavin Hewitt</b>    | 6 | 4  |
| <b>Hugh Muir</b>       | 6 | 3  |
| <b>Kim Wilsher</b>     | 6 | 2  |
| <b>Larry Elliot</b>    | 5 | 15 |
| <b>Jason Groves</b>    | 5 | 9  |
| <b>David Barrett</b>   | 5 | 6  |
| <b>Michael Crigg</b>   | 5 | 5  |
| <b>Julia Kollewe</b>   | 5 | 4  |
| <b>David Wooding</b>   | 5 | 3  |
| <b>Matt Frei</b>       | 4 | 15 |
| <b>Szu Ping Chan</b>   | 4 | 15 |
| <b>Ian Drury</b>       | 4 | 12 |
| <b>Trevor Kavanagh</b> | 4 | 6  |
| <b>Andrew Pierce</b>   | 4 | 4  |
| <b>Stephen Glover</b>  | 4 | 4  |
| <b>Michael White</b>   | 4 | 2  |
| <b>Simon English</b>   | 4 | 1  |
| <b>Benedict Brogan</b> | 4 | 0  |
| <b>Georgia Graham</b>  | 4 | 0  |
| <b>Vincent Moss</b>    | 4 | 0  |
| <b>Helena Smith</b>    | 3 | 22 |
| <b>James Slack</b>     | 3 | 20 |
| <b>Nick Squires</b>    | 3 | 9  |
| <b>Andrew Rawnsley</b> | 3 | 7  |
| <b>James Landale</b>   | 3 | 7  |
| <b>James Titcomb</b>   | 3 | 7  |
| <b>Shaun Walker</b>    | 3 | 7  |
| <b>Tamara Cohen</b>    | 3 | 4  |
| <b>Martin Kettle</b>   | 3 | 3  |
| <b>Paul Mason</b>      | 3 | 3  |
| <b>Roland Gribben</b>  | 3 | 3  |
| <b>Steve Doughty</b>   | 3 | 3  |

|                           |   |    |
|---------------------------|---|----|
| <b>Tom Clark</b>          | 3 | 3  |
| <b>Tony Parsons</b>       | 3 | 3  |
| <b>Katherine Rushton</b>  | 3 | 2  |
| <b>Louise Mensch</b>      | 3 | 2  |
| <b>Michael Deacon</b>     | 3 | 2  |
| <b>Robert Mendick</b>     | 3 | 2  |
| <b>Vicky Young</b>        | 3 | 2  |
| <b>Ashifa Kassam</b>      | 3 | 1  |
| <b>Jackie Long</b>        | 3 | 1  |
| <b>Jeremy Clarkson</b>    | 3 | 1  |
| <b>Brendan Carlin</b>     | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Damian Thompson</b>    | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Daniel Sandford</b>    | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Denise Roland</b>      | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Ephraim Hardcastle</b> | 3 | 0  |
| <b>James Lyons</b>        | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Lucy Fisher</b>        | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Philip Oltermann</b>   | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Press release</b>      | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Rod Liddle</b>         | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Tim Kington</b>        | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Will Stewart</b>       | 3 | 0  |
| <b>Nils Pratley</b>       | 2 | 10 |
| <b>Quentin Letts</b>      | 2 | 8  |
| <b>Jeremy Warner</b>      | 2 | 7  |
| <b>Alex Brummer</b>       | 2 | 6  |
| <b>Alister Heath</b>      | 2 | 6  |
| <b>Jack Blanchard</b>     | 2 | 6  |
| <b>Ben Glaze</b>          | 2 | 5  |
| <b>Emily Gosden</b>       | 2 | 5  |
| <b>John Stevens</b>       | 2 | 5  |
| <b>Sophie Raworth</b>     | 2 | 5  |
| <b>Andrew Critchlow</b>   | 2 | 4  |
| <b>Caroline Davies</b>    | 2 | 4  |

|                              |   |   |
|------------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Paraic O'Brien</b>        | 2 | 4 |
| <b>Richard Littlejohn</b>    | 2 | 4 |
| <b>Alec Luhn</b>             | 2 | 3 |
| <b>Boris Johnson</b>         | 2 | 3 |
| <b>Clive Myrie</b>           | 2 | 3 |
| <b>John Prescott</b>         | 2 | 3 |
| <b>Damian Carrington</b>     | 2 | 2 |
| <b>James Ball</b>            | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Jonathan Freeland</b>     | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Mark Townsend</b>         | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Philip Sherwell</b>       | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Sebastian Shakespeare</b> | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Seumas Milne</b>          | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Simon Jenkins</b>         | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Timothy Garton Ash</b>    | 2 | 2 |
| <b>Angela Monaghan</b>       | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Edward Malnick</b>        | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Fraser Nelson</b>         | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Ian Black</b>             | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Jennifer Rankin</b>       | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Matthew Goodwin</b>       | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Paul Routledge</b>        | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Peter Hitchens</b>        | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Robert Booth</b>          | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Rory Cellan Jones</b>     | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Severin Carrell</b>       | 2 | 1 |
| <b>Alison Phillips</b>       | 2 | 0 |
| <b>Carole Walker</b>         | 2 | 0 |
| <b>Charles Arthur</b>        | 2 | 0 |
| <b>Ciaran Jenkins</b>        | 2 | 0 |
| <b>Gerry Peev</b>            | 2 | 0 |
| <b>Harriet Salem</b>         | 2 | 0 |
| <b>Helen Pidd</b>            | 2 | 0 |
| <b>James Meikle</b>          | 2 | 0 |

|                          |   |    |
|--------------------------|---|----|
| <b>Jeremy Vine</b>       | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Jessica Winch</b>     | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Julian Coman</b>      | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Lizzy Davies</b>      | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Louise Armitstead</b> | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Matt Warman</b>       | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Michael Seamark</b>   | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Nicholas Owen</b>     | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Peter Osborne</b>     | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Roland Oliphant</b>   | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Ros Wynne-Jones</b>   | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Scott Campbell</b>    | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Simon Danczuk</b>     | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Simon Heffer</b>      | 2 | 0  |
| <b>Reeta Chakrabarti</b> | 1 | 13 |
| <b>Daniel Boffey</b>     | 1 | 11 |
| <b>James Salmon</b>      | 1 | 9  |
| <b>Katie Allen</b>       | 1 | 9  |
| <b>Polly Toynbee</b>     | 1 | 8  |
| <b>Dan Hyde</b>          | 1 | 6  |
| <b>Julian Borger</b>     | 1 | 6  |
| <b>Roger Bootle</b>      | 1 | 6  |
| <b>Ruth Sunderland</b>   | 1 | 6  |
| <b>Sean Farrell</b>      | 1 | 6  |
| <b>Mary Riddell</b>      | 1 | 5  |
| <b>Glen Owen</b>         | 1 | 4  |
| <b>James Quinn</b>       | 1 | 4  |
| <b>Matthew D'Ancona</b>  | 1 | 4  |
| <b>Peter Campbell</b>    | 1 | 4  |
| <b>Simon Watkins</b>     | 1 | 4  |
| <b>Charles Moore</b>     | 1 | 3  |
| <b>Craig Woodhouse</b>   | 1 | 3  |
| <b>Esther Addley</b>     | 1 | 3  |
| <b>Harriet Alexander</b> | 1 | 3  |



|                          |   |   |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Iain Martin</b>       | 1 | 3 |
| <b>Mishal Husain</b>     | 1 | 3 |
| <b>Nick Fletcher</b>     | 1 | 3 |
| <b>Owen Bowcott</b>      | 1 | 3 |
| <b>Richard Spencer</b>   | 1 | 3 |
| <b>Sarah Boseley</b>     | 1 | 3 |
| <b>Andrew Cave</b>       | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Ashley Armstrong</b>  | 1 | 2 |
| <b>David Cameron</b>     | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Dominic Sandbrook</b> | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Gwyn Topham</b>       | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Hannah Roberts</b>    | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Jane Moore</b>        | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Janet Daley</b>       | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Justin Huggler</b>    | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Nigel Farage</b>      | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Philip Johnston</b>   | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Sarah Knapton</b>     | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Tracy McVeigh</b>     | 1 | 2 |
| <b>Allison Pearson</b>   | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Levy</b>       | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew MacDowall</b>  | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Anna White</b>        | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Brian Reade</b>       | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Daniel Hannan</b>     | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Don MacKay</b>        | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Ewen MacAskill</b>    | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Fiona Harvey</b>      | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Graham Ruddick</b>    | 1 | 1 |
| <b>James Forsyth</b>     | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Jamie Doward</b>      | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Jane Fryer</b>        | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Jason Burke</b>       | 1 | 1 |
| <b>John Bingham</b>      | 1 | 1 |

|                        |   |   |
|------------------------|---|---|
| <b>John Harris</b>     | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Katie Hopkins</b>   | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Leo McKinstry</b>   | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Mark Sweney</b>     | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Matthew Taylor</b>  | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Max Hastings</b>    | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Nick Cohen</b>      | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Ray Massey</b>      | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Rebecca English</b> | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Ruki Sayid</b>      | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Sarah Vine</b>      | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Shane Hickey</b>    | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Simon Johnson</b>   | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Simon Tisdall</b>   | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Steven Morris</b>   | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Tom Kelly</b>       | 1 | 1 |
| <b>Adrian Shaw</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Aidan McGurran</b>  | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Alan Cochrane</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Alan Little</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Alexandra Jones</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Allan Little</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Andrew Penman</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Anne Penketh</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Ben Jackson</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Bill Gardner</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Black Dog</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Brendan O'Neill</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Briget Kendall</b>  | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Cherrill Hicks</b>  | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Chris Brooke</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Chris Cummings</b>  | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Chris Greenwood</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Chris Huhne</b>     | 1 | 0 |

|                            |   |   |
|----------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Chris Stephen</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Christina Patterson</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Claire Carter</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Cole Moreton</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Colin Cortbus</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Damien McElroy</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Dan Jones</b>           | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Daniel Bates</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Daniel Johnson</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>David Sainsbury</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Dean Dunham</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Deborah Orr</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Des Wilson</b>          | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Diane Abbott</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Dominic King</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Dominic Raab</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Ed Miliband</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Edward Lucas</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Emily Bell</b>          | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Felicity Cloake</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Fiona Govan</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Guy Adams</b>           | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Harriet Sherwood</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Holly Watt</b>          | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Ian Martin</b>          | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Isabel Hardman</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>James Edgar</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>James Hurley</b>        | 1 | 0 |
| <b>James O'Brien</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>James Tozer</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>James Walsh</b>         | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Janet Street-Porter</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>John McTernan</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>John Naish</b>          | 1 | 0 |

|                         |   |   |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| <b>John Vidal</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Josh Halliday</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Kate Hodal</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Keith Perry</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Ken Clarke</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Kevin O'Sullivan</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Laura Clark</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Laura Donnelly</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Leah Green</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Lord Glasman</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Lorraine Kelly</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Louie Smith</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Luke Harding</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Mark Easton</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Mark Reckless</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Mark Shapland</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Mark Stephens</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Martin Banks</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Martin Beckford</b>  | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Mats Persson</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Matt Chorley</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Matthew Barzun</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Mike Pflanz</b>      | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Miranda Prynne</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nabeelah Shabbir</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nick Clegg</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nick Collins</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nick Harding</b>     | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nick Owens</b>       | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nicola Methven</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Nicole Blackmore</b> | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Octavius Black</b>   | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Orlando Figes</b>    | 1 | 0 |
| <b>Owen Jones</b>       | 1 | 0 |

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|---------------------------------|---|----|
| <b>Paul Goodman</b>             | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Paul Lewis</b>               | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Peter Lauritzen</b>          | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Philip Hensher</b>           | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Philippe Legrain</b>         | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Rachel Pettigrew</b>         | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Rebecca Smith</b>            | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Rebecca Smithers</b>         | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Richard Eden</b>             | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Richard Marsden</b>          | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Rob Davies</b>               | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Rob Pattinson</b>            | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Robin Lustig</b>             | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Sally Hamilton</b>           | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Sarah Butler</b>             | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Sian Boyle</b>               | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Simon Danczuk</b>            | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Simon Israel</b>             | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Simon Walters</b>            | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Stephanie Flanders</b>       | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Stephen Hayward</b>          | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Taku Dzimwasha</b>           | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Tim Stanley</b>              | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Tim Walker</b>               | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Tony Paterson</b>            | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Valerie Elliott</b>          | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Vikram Dodd</b>              | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Viktor Mayer-Schonberger</b> | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Yvette Cooper</b>            | 1 | 0  |
| <b>Mehreen Khan</b>             | 0 | 32 |
| <b>Hugo Duncan</b>              | 0 | 19 |
| <b>Philip Inman</b>             | 0 | 18 |
| <b>Peter Spence</b>             | 0 | 14 |
| <b>Heather Stewart</b>          | 0 | 13 |

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| <b>Patrick Kingsley</b>       | 0 | 12 |
| <b>Vicki Owen</b>             | 0 | 10 |
| <b>Agencies</b>               | 0 | 9  |
| <b>Ben Riley-Smith</b>        | 0 | 9  |
| <b>Ben Wright</b>             | 0 | 9  |
| <b>Jill Treanor</b>           | 0 | 9  |
| <b>Kate McCann</b>            | 0 | 9  |
| <b>Christopher Williams</b>   | 0 | 8  |
| <b>Katya Adler</b>            | 0 | 8  |
| <b>Marion Dakers</b>          | 0 | 7  |
| <b>Tom Parfitt</b>            | 0 | 7  |
| <b>Elizabeth Anderson</b>     | 0 | 6  |
| <b>Kate Moore</b>             | 0 | 6  |
| <b>Larisa Brown</b>           | 0 | 6  |
| <b>Liam Halligan</b>          | 0 | 6  |
| <b>Anne Perkins</b>           | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Arthur Neslen</b>          | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Ben Farmer</b>             | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Ben Martin</b>             | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Colin Freeman</b>          | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Graham Hiscott</b>         | 0 | 5  |
| <b>James Reynolds</b>         | 0 | 5  |
| <b>John Ficnek</b>            | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Natalie Nougayrede</b>     | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Rebecca Burn-Callander</b> | 0 | 5  |
| <b>Alberto Nardelli</b>       | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Alessandra Bonomolo</b>    | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Ashley Cowburn</b>         | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Frances Perraudin</b>      | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Jonathan Rugman</b>        | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Libby Brooks</b>           | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Matthew Lynn</b>           | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Peter Preston</b>          | 0 | 4  |
| <b>Rafael Behr</b>            | 0 | 4  |

|                                |   |   |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Sam Greenhill</b>           | 0 | 4 |
| <b>Siobhan Kennedy</b>         | 0 | 4 |
| <b>Stephanie Kirchgaessner</b> | 0 | 4 |
| <b>Will Hutton</b>             | 0 | 4 |
| <b>Alice Philipson</b>         | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Angelique Christafis</b>    | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Ben Rossington</b>          | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Ben Spencer</b>             | 0 | 3 |
| <b>David Blair</b>             | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Helen Lewis</b>             | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Jane Martinson</b>          | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Karl Mathiesen</b>          | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Kelvin MacKenzie</b>        | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Laura Chesters</b>          | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Marina Hyde</b>             | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Peter Beaumont</b>          | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Quentin Somerville</b>      | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Richard Bilton</b>          | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Robert Ford</b>             | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Robert Peston</b>           | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Russell Myers</b>           | 0 | 3 |
| <b>Alan Posener</b>            | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Alan Tovey</b>              | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Alex Forsyth</b>            | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Alex Hawkes</b>             | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Armando Iannucci</b>        | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Barney Henderson</b>        | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Ben Wilkinson</b>           | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Carole Malone</b>           | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Claire Duffin</b>           | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Con Coughlin</b>            | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Cordelia Lynch</b>          | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Damian Grammaticas</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Damien Gayle</b>            | 0 | 2 |

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|---------------------------|---|---|
| <b>David Crouch</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>David Marr</b>         | 0 | 2 |
| <b>David Pegg</b>         | 0 | 2 |
| <b>David Smith</b>        | 0 | 2 |
| <b>David Williams</b>     | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Dominic Lawson</b>     | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Emma Howard</b>        | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Fatima Manji</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Gaby Hinsliff</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>George Arnett</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Gordon Rayner</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Harriet Sime</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Jessica Elgot</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>John Grace</b>         | 0 | 2 |
| <b>John Philips</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Kamal Ahmed</b>        | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Karren Brady</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Lindsey Hilsum</b>     | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Louisa Loveluck</b>    | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Lucy Manning</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Miles Brignall</b>     | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Patrick Barkham</b>    | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Patrick Collinson</b>  | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Peter McKay</b>        | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Pub Landlord</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Rupert Steiner</b>     | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Sarah Bridge</b>       | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Tom Payne</b>          | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Tom Stevenson</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Vanessa Allen</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Victoria Ward</b>      | 0 | 2 |
| <b>Aditya Chakraborty</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Aislinn Laing</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Al Murray</b>          | 0 | 1 |



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| <b>Alan Johnson</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Alex Duval Smith</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Alex West</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Alexander Betts</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ali Ansari</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Alison Flood</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Amanda Platell</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Amelia Gentleman</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Amelia Hill</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Anders Lustgarten</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Anthony</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Formica</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Gilligan</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Harrop</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Hilton</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Lilico</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Oxlade</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Sparrow</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andrew Symeou</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Andy Nolan</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Anthony King</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Arif Ansari</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ashley Kirk</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ben Griffiths</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ben Marlow</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ben Quinn</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Beth Gardiner</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Brian Flynn</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Bryony Gordon</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Charles Grant</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Chris Deerin</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Chris McGreal</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Christopher Hart</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Chuka Umunna</b>      | 0 | 1 |

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| <b>Claire Ellicott</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Constanze Letsch</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Craig Brown</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Dan Hodges</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Daniel Jones</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Daniel Nolan</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Chazan</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Coleman</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Craik</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Marquand</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Shukman</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Steel</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>David Thomas</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Denis Campbell</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Dina Indrasafi</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Eleanor Harding</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Elizabeth Day</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Emily Fairbairn</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Emily Kent Smith</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Fiona Macrea</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Frances Hardy</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Frank Field</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gabrielle Jackson</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gary Younge</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gavin Esler</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gemma Aldridge</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gemma Godfrey</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Geoffrey Levy</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Georgia Birch</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gethin Chamberlain</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Grace Macaskill</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Graeme Wearden</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Grant Rollings</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Gregory Walton</b>     | 0 | 1 |

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| <b>Guido Fawkes</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Hakim Bello</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Harriet Meyer</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Harriet Swain</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Helena Morrissey</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Henry McDonald</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Holly Black</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Hugh Pym</b>          | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Iain MacWhirter</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Iain Watson</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ian Murphy</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ian Sample</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ishwar Rauniyar</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>James Bartholomew</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>James Graham</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jamie Grierson</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jane Deeth</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jane Dudman</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jason Gwynne</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jim Norton</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jim White</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Joanna Moorgead</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>John Hooper</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>John Humphrys</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>John Nelson</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>John Redwood</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>John Sparks</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Jon Rees</b>          | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Juliette Garside</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Kate Connolly</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Kevin Rawlinson</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Lauren Fruen</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Lee Sorrell</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Liam Fox</b>          | 0 | 1 |

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|---------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Louise Cooper</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Louise Eccles</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Louise Tickle</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Lyse Doucet</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Mark Anderson</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Mark Milner</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Mark Rice-Oxley</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Martin Bagot</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Martin Evans</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Matthew Drake</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Matthew Elliot</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Matthew Stadlen</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Melissa Thompson</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Menelaos Tzafalias</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Michael Burleigh</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Michael Heseltine</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Michael Safin</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Mike Sullivan</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Monica Mark</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Naomi Smith</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Nazia Praveen</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Neal Ascherson</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Neal Lawson</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Neil Craven</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Neil Sears</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Nick Craven</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Nick Pisa</b>          | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Nicola Davison</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Nicola Sturgeon</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Nigel Rudd</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Patrick Butler</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Peter Ridell</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Peter Walker</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Philip Booth</b>       | 0 | 1 |

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|--------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Rajeev Syal</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Richard Adams</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Richard Kay</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Richard Olver</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Richard Orange</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Richard Sambrook</b>  | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Robert Hardmann</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Robert Tait</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Robert Verkaik</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Robin McKle</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Rosie Scammell</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Ryan Shorthouse</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sam Creighton</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sam Jones</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sam Marsden</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sarah Rainsford</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sean Poulter</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sean Worth</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Simon Bowers</b>      | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sophie Curtis</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Sophie Jamieson</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Stephen Cushion</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Stephen Pritchard</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Steve Huntingford</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Steven Ottner</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Stewart Lee</b>       | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Stuart Basten</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Susan Richards</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Toby Rush</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Toby Young</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Tom Clarke</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Tom Rowley</b>        | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Tom Utley</b>         | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Tony Blair</b>        | 0 | 1 |

|                          |   |   |
|--------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Tristram Hunt</b>     | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Victoria Bischoff</b> | 0 | 1 |
| <b>William Keegan</b>    | 0 | 1 |
| <b>William Lowther</b>   | 0 | 1 |
| <b>Yvonne Roberts</b>    | 0 | 1 |

*Table 48 List of contributors in sample and number of items they have contributed to by collection period*

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