The Translation of Politics and the Politics of Translation: a study on the Chinese translations of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*

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Abstract

This thesis examines translation of knowledge claims in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Specifically, it compares and contrasts Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* with its Chinese editions and assesses how some key disciplinary concepts have become both transformed and transformative in the process of translation. Drawing on insights from Reinhart Koselleck's conceptual history and Karl Mannnheim's stylistic approach to the sociology of knowledge, this thesis pursues two lines of argument, one synchronic and one diachronic. Synchronically, it argues that the Chinese language's inherent empiricism has resulted in the change of the ontological status of the selected concepts in the Chinese translations of Waltz's text. This has in turn caused a decrease in the explanatory powers in the Chinese version of Waltz's argument as well as the collapse of the deductive epistemology that Waltz deploys in his theorisation of international politics. Diachronically, the study argues the changes in the translations of the selected concepts in the second Chinese edition has manifested a certain politics of translation which was caused by the changing style of thought in Chinese IR scholarship from "Western learning", which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, to "Chinese IR", which became prominent from the early 2000s. "Chinese IR" as a new style of thought then presented a distinct way of thinking among Chinese IR scholars which manifested linguistically in their attempt to manipulate the translations of the selected concepts. The thesis concludes with the importance in interrogating the role language plays in creating a more inclusive discipline of IR.

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A Note on Conventions

The Romanised terms shown in brackets in this thesis are typically the Chinese pronunciations of their corresponding characters. They are added mainly to facilitate readers who may not possess any reading skills of Chinese characters. For example, one of the Chinese translations of *great power*, 大国, will be noted as 大国 (da guo) throughout the thesis, in order to illustrate both the form i.e. the actual characters as well as the pronunciations of the translation.

Secondly, in keeping with the East Asian tradition, East Asian names throughout this thesis, except those of Asian authors who are resident outside East Asia, are written in the order of family names followed by their first names.

And finally, this study deploys "concept" as its basic unit of analysis. In order to stress this point, all the concepts that are either the object of study or relevant to the arguments made in the thesis will be presented in italics unless precedent by the words of "concept of". For instance, the concept of great power is also expressed as *great power*.

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Introduction: translation and/in international relations

> When the violin repeats what the piano has just played, it cannot make the same sounds and it can only approximate the same chords. It can, however, make recognisably the same "music", the same air. But it can do so only when it is as faithful to the self-logic of the violin as it is to the self-logic of the piano.[1]
> –John Ciardi

The present work is not a contribution to translation studies, but to political science. To be more precise, it is a contribution to the study of how translation can shape the ways in which one understands—and sometimes even conducts—international politics. From W.V. Quine to Walter Benjamin, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak to Jacques Derrida, the importance of translation has been repeatedly theorised by scholars from a wide range of disciplines.[2] The aim of this thesis is not to contribute to this theorisation *per se*—nor is it to critique any of the theorisations that have already been made—but rather to answer a more specific question regarding the translation of knowledge claims in the discipline of International Relations (IR): how do meanings embedded in the language of IR travel among, exchange between, and ultimately become transplanted into different linguistic contexts?

The interest in conducting this research grew out of my frustration with the ways in which historical accounts on international relations are overwhelmingly characterised by trade and war. Yet, it needs to be pointed out that some accounts could acquire a new significance when viewed in a different light—which, in this case, is the light of translation. Take the outbreak of the first Opium War as an example; it is often argued that one of the major causes which led to the final escalation of tension between Britain

[1] John Ciardi, "Translator's Note", in Alighieri, D. *The Inferno*. Translated by J. Ciardi (New York: Penguin, 1982): ix.
[2] For different theorisations of translation, see Willard van Orman Quine, "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 67(1970): 178.; Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1968). ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (London: Routledge, 1993). ; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Translation as Culture", *Parallax*, 6 (2000): 13; Jacques Derrida and Lawrence Venuti, "What Is a 'Relevant' Translation?", *Critical Inquiry*, 27 (2001): 174.

and China was what is now often known as "the Napier affair".[3] In 1833, the Qing government abolished the century-long monopoly of the British East India Company and the China trade finally became available for other British companies who had been lobbying the parliament for free trade for years.[4] As a result, the Chinese Secretary's Office, which had previously served the needs of the East India Company, required an appointment of a new superintendent who would serve to represent the British government in China. The post was later offered to a Scottish lord, naval officer and sheep farmer, William John Napier.[5] When Napier arrived in China in 1834, seeing himself as a government representative, he demanded to talk directly to the governor of Canton province instead of conducting relations through merchants.[6] What he did not know was that any direct interactions between foreigners and Chinese officials had been prohibited by the Canton trading regulations for decades.[7] The Qing government thus rejected Napier's request for a meeting and refused to acknowledge his status as a governmental official. Instead, they sent Napier a letter and provided him with a Chinese title, "夷目 (yimu)", which was translated to Napier by his language informant as "barbarian eye".[8] Outraged by Chinese officials' provocative language, Napier ordered two warships to bomb Chinese forts and fight their ways up the Pearl River, a reaction which eventually led to a state of war.[9]

So far the story is consistent with what is recorded in *The Cambridge History of China*. What is often not mentioned in these historical narratives of the Napier affair, however, is that Napier's misguided policy was inextricably connected to his (mis)understanding of the phrase "夷目 (yimu)". To a great extent, Napier's armed expedition against China was driven by his discontent with the Chinese officials calling him "barbarian eye"—a translation which later turned out to be entirely misleading. In 1836, soon after Napier's

[3]Frederic Wakeman, "The Napier affair", in Fairbank, K. John, (ed.), *The Cambridge History of China: Volume 10 Late Ch'ing, 1800—1911, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 175.
[4] China Trade and the East India Company, *The British Library,* [online] (https://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/china/guidesources/chinatrade/index.html). [Accessed 1 August 2017].
[5] Wakeman, "The Napier affair", 175.
[6] Dilip K. Basu, "Chinese Xenology and the Opium War: Reflections on Sinocentrism", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 73 (2014): 927.
[7] Wakeman, "The Napier affair", 175.
[8] Basu, "Chinese Xenology and the Opium War: Reflections on Sinocentrism", 931.
[9] Wakeman, "The Napier affair", 175.

bombing of Chinese forts, Sir George Staunton, who used to work for the East India Company and was also among the first generation of Chinese-speaking British officials, published a forty-page proposal in which he clarified what he believed to be the true meanings behind the Chinese term "夷目 (yimu)".[10] Quoting Robert Morrison of the London Missionary Society, who wrote the first Chinese-English dictionary in 1815, Staunton argued that "夷 (yi)" according to Morrison's lexicon should be translated as "foreigner" instead of "barbarian".[11] With regards to "目 (mu)", he noted that although the word "目 (mu)" did usually refer to "an eye", it could also mean "the head or principal person".[12] "夷目 (yimu)", he then concluded, did not mean "barbarian eye"; far from it, it was actually a respectable title meaning "foreign principal".

Invoking the tower of Babel, George Steiner says, "Translation exists because men speak different languages".[13] If this is a truism, it can be argued that translation is an inherent part of international relations, so long as countries speak different languages and need to interact with each other. The Napier affair which, according to literary critic Lydia Liu, was "one of the most tragic and costly fabrications in modern diplomatic history"[14], might be an extreme case where a (mis)translation changed the trajectory of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy. However, in the realm of international politics, it cannot be denied that there is a high possibility that one nation's slight misunderstanding of a certain phrase could give rise to a military retaliation from another country. A critical examination of the ways in which certain ideas are translated before any unnecessary misunderstandings and irreversible consequences happen thus becomes highly crucial.

[10] George Thomas Staunton, *Remarks on the British Relations with China and the Proposed Plans for Improving Them* (London: Edmund Lloyd, Harley-Street; and Simpkin and Marshall, Stationers'-Hall Court, 1836).
[11] Ibid., 36.
[12] Ibid., 38.
[13] George Steiner, *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 51.
[14] Lydia H. Liu, "Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century", in Liu H., Lydia, (ed.), *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations* (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1999): 133.

The general orientation of this study is situated within such an assessment of the problematic of trans-lingual circulation of ideas, with its focus placed on the translation of knowledge claims regarding international relations. Precisely, it examines how certain IR terms become both transformed and transformative when they are translated into another language. By this I mean to assess both the changes in the meanings of those disciplinary terms and the changes in the interpretations of the original contexts within which those terms are embedded. The reason for selecting this focal point of research lies in that despite the growing debates on the so-called "non-Western IR theory", recent study reveals that the hegemonic standing of Western IR theory remains unchallenged and that students in non-Western countries still rely mostly on textbooks written by Western scholars to understand international relations.[15] This suggests that in countries where English is not an official language—China, for example—students' understanding of international politics are largely based on the translations—rather than the original versions—of those IR texts. This is problematic because—as the Napier affair has demonstrated *par excellence*—the interpretations of a text based on translated terms might give rise to a very different understanding—if not misunderstanding—of the subject matter.

This study therefore attempts to examine how translation could affect the readings of an IR textbook with particular reference to Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* and its three Chinese editions. Waltz's book was chosen as the subject of investigation for two reasons: firstly, in terms of the impact of research, it is often argued that Waltz is one of the most cited theorists in the discipline of IR. In a recent Teaching, Research, and International Politics (TRIP) survey conducted by Maliniak et al. where 1,112 scholars from the United States and Canada were asked to list up to four IR scholars having had the greatest impact on the discipline over the last two decades, Waltz was named the second and the third most influential author respectively by American and Canadian academics.[16] Of all his publications, moreover, *Theory of International Politics* is

[15] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Conclusion: On the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7(2007): 427.
[16]Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney, "The View from the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of IR Faculty in the U.S. and Canada", in *A publication of the Program on the Theory and Practice of International Relations: A joint venture of Arts & Sciences and the Wendy & Emery Reves Center for International Studies at the College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia* (February 2007)

generally considered as Waltz's most important one; in a political science reading list compiled by Allan Kornberg back in 1981, the book was named the most used general theory of international relations in the discipline.[17] Waltz's undeniable impact is also confirmed by Su Changhe, one of the two translators of the second Chinese edition of *Theory of International Politics*, who wrote in the preface to the book, "be it liberalism or the currently prevailing constructivism, discussions on most issues in international politics cannot avoid Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* [my translation]".[18]

Secondly, content-wise, the main purpose of this study is not to discuss any particular theory of international relations but rather to address the role translation plays in transnational circulation of knowledge. Hence, the lower the degree of misunderstanding surrounding the main argument proposed in the selected text is, the more easily the study can illustrate how a translation has affected its interpretations. Despite criticisms from other schools of IR theory, Waltz's theorisation of international politics can be deemed fairly clear and comprehensible. This is not only because Waltz himself explicitly claims that his theories are built on the "radical simplifications"[19] of the world, but also because it is widely acknowledged that arguments proposed by the neorealist camp of IR theory represented by Waltz are based on "five straightforward assumptions about the international system"[20]: The first is that great powers are the main actors in the anarchic international system. Secondly, each state possesses a certain amount of capability to inflict harm onto others but the distribution of capabilities varies among states. Thirdly, imbalanced distribution of capabilities would lead to the act of balance of power among states. Fourthly, because the international system is anarchic, the goal of each state is survival. And finally, states are rational actors and therefore they are capable of deploying

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[online] (https://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/ivory_tower_view_2007.pdf). [Accessed 15 December 2016].

[17] Allan Kornberg, (ed.), *Political Science Reading Lists and Course Outlines, Vol. 5: Theories of International Relations* (Durham, NC.: Eno River Press, 1981).

[18] Su Changhe, "Yizhong Guoji Zhengzhi de Lilun (A Theory of International Politics)". Preface. In Waltz, N. Kenneth, Guoji Zhengzhi Lilun (Theory of International Politics). Translated by Q. Xin and C. Su. (Shanghai: Shanghai Century, 2004): i.

[19] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", in Kegley, W. Charles (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and Neoliberal Challenge.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): 72.

[20] John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism", in Dunne, Tim, Smith, Steve, and Kurki, Milja, (eds.), *International Relations Theories: Disciplines and Diversity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 78.

sound strategies to maximise their power in order to secure their prospects for survival.[21] A more detailed explanation on Waltz's theory will be presented in Chapter 2; yet, what can be argued here is that compared to some other major texts used in the discipline of IR, such as Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, there is a much lower degree of misunderstanding surrounding the argument Waltz made in *Theory of International Politics*. This enables the present study to exclude the possibility of translators reading Waltz's book in a completely different way—thus affecting the translation—and focus mainly on the impact the change of linguistic context has on the interpretations of the book.

The original version of *Theory of International Politics* was published in 1979. If Kornberg's data on the citations of major IR texts in 1981 is true, it only took two years for the book to become the most cited publication in the discipline. In contrast to such rapid spread of popularity in the Anglophone community, Waltz's book did not make it to Chinese academia until the 1990s. This was mainly due to the turbulent development of Chinese IR scholarship. IR was not recognised as a separate field of study in China until the late 70s.[22] In fact, political science in general did not have a separate identity as an academic discipline until 1977.[23] Although the upsurge in liberal thinking among intellectuals during the May Fourth period (1920s and 1930s) had led to the publication of a series of IR-related books, the adoption of the Soviet education model in the 1950s effectively abolished the study of political science altogether. The study of IR was accordingly assigned to history and law departments.[24] The establishment of the communist regime also brought about the imposition of Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist thought as the officially designated paradigm within which any social science research was to be conducted.[25] Although the Soviet influence reduced greatly after the Sino-Soviet split, there is no doubt that the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist approach was the most important characteristic of Chinese IR before the economic reform in the late 1970s.

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[21] Ibid., 79.
[22] Qin Yaqing, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", *International Studies*, 46 (2009): 185.
[23] Thomas P. Bernstein, *Humanities and Social Science research in China: Recent History and Future Prospects* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1979): 130-139.
[24] Harry Harding, "Political Science", in Orleans, A. Leo, (ed.), *Science in Contemporary China* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1980): 519.
[25] Ibid., 523.

The adoption of the open-door policy in 1978 helped revive Chinese academia, and more importantly, Chinese IR scholarship. In 1979, a number of lecturers from the Beijing Foreign Language Institute designed a module entitled "The Basic Theory of International Struggle" which became the first course on IR theory offered at Chinese universities.[26] In 1980, the National Association of the History of International Relations was established as the first national academic association for the study of IR. In 1986, the Foreign Affairs College introduced a course entitled "An Appraisal of Western IR Theories", which marked the official introduction of Western IR theories into Chinese curricula.[27] Academic journals also began to spring up; some of the most prestigious IR journals in China, such as *国际研究* (International Studies), *欧洲* (Europe), *美国研究季刊* (American Studies Quarterly), *当代国际关系* (Contemporary International Relations), were all established during this period.[28] The embrace of intellectual pluralism in higher education also led to the organisation of the first nation-wide academic conference: In August 1987, 80 IR scholars from around the country gathered in Shanghai to discuss the future of Chinese IR study. on this occasion, debates within the theory panel were reported to be the most heated.[29] Several months later, the first textbook that sought to introduce American IR theory, *当代美国国际关系理论流派文选* (Selected Works of Contemporary American International Relations Theory) was published, and it included translated chapters by Hans J. Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye.[30] The publication of this translation volume marked the beginning of what Qin calls the "learning through translation stage" in Chinese IR scholarship.[31]

The first Chinese translation of *Theory of International Politics* came out in 1992, in the middle of such translation boom.[32] Although the exact reason for the importation of this particular book remains unclear, it can be argued that it was most likely to do with the

[26] Gerald Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 1998): 19.
[27] Ibid., 20.
[28] Wang Yiwei, "China: between copying and constructing", in Tickner, B. Arlene, and Waever, Ole, (eds.), *International Relations Scholarship around the World* (New York: Routledge, 2009): 103-119.
[29] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 21.
[30] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 185.
[31] Qin, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7 (2007):131.
[32] Qin Yaqing, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2011): 231.

popularity of Waltz's work in the United States. In the early 1980s, Chinese students began to be able to go abroad to study, with most of them going to the United States. Some of them studied IR and then decided to introduce Western IR theories into Chinese academia.[33] This was also the time when the Waltzianisation of IR began to dominate the American IR community. Chinese students studying IR at American universities were thus led to believe that Waltz's theory and the realist camp he represented were the most important and conclusive analytical framework; and when these students returned to China and entered academia, they chose to introduce those "important" theories first. This preference of translating realist works during the early 1990s is also manifested by the fact that between 1990 and 1995, the four Western IR textbooks China imported were all written by realist scholars—despite that by then, there had been quite a few other schools of IR theory from which China could have chosen to import. Apart from Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979), the other three were, also from Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (1959), Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* (1948), and Robert Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* (1981).[34]

The second Chinese edition of *Theory of International Politics* was published in 2004, and the third edition came out four years later. There are two reasons why this study decided to examine all three editions instead of focusing on only one of them (although later it turned out that the third edition was completely identical to the second one and therefore was deemed irrelevant to the subsequent analyses. This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.) Firstly, in terms of the actual translations, the first Chinese edition was translated by two professional translators, whilst the second and the third translations were done by two IR scholars from Fudan University in Shanghai. This suggests that there might be some major changes in terms of how certain key disciplinary terms were translated in the second edition. In the preface he wrote for the second edition, Waltz himself also states that he hopes that the new Chinese translation would help encourage Chinese scholars to think more profoundly about the problems that exist in international system, signalling the possibly inadequate translation of the first edition.[35] A

[33] Ibid.
[34] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", 238.
[35] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Zhongwen Ban Qianyan (Preface to the Chinese Edition)". Preface. In Waltz, N. Kenneth, *Guoji Zhengzhi Lilun (Theory of International Politics)*. Translated by Q. Xin and C. Su. (Shanghai: Shanghai Century, 2004): xvii.

detailed examination on how the first and the second editions translated some of Waltz's key terms differently thus becomes crucial.

Secondly, with regards to the context of publication, the second edition was published twelve years after the first edition. During this time window, China went through a series of political, social and intellectual changes. Politically, for example, in 1997, China regained control over Hong Kong's sovereignty. In 2000, Beijing successfully won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics. A year later, China became a member of the World Trade Organisation, which marked the nation's official embrace of globalisation.[36] Political change drives intellectual change; China's increasing influence in the realm of international politics soon gave rise to the nation's immediate demand for students specialised in international relations.[37] Within a few years' time, IR became a hot discipline and more than 60 departments of International Relations were established nation-wide.[38] What is more, since the beginning of the new millennium, issues regarding the construction of the so-called Chinese school of IR began to dominate discussions within Chinese IR community. This is not only due to the increasing significance of IR study, but also due to the "China threat" discourse which started to prevail among some Western journalists and academics in the late 1990s.[39] To counter the "China threat" theory, Chinese intellectuals then came to the conclusion that in order to convince the international community that China will not act as a hegemonic force, it might be necessary to construct China's own IR theory.[40] The publication of the second Chinese translation coincides with this debate on the construction of indigenous Chinese IR; and therefore, it becomes important to assess how such change in intellectual discourse was reflected in the ways in which Waltz's book was (re)translated.

[36] Wang, "China: between copying and constructing", 116.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Su Changhe, "Why There Is No Chinese IR Theory", *International Survey*, 2 (2005): 26.
[39] For examples on "China threat" theory, see: Richard Berstein and Ross H. Munro, "The coming conflict with America", *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1997): 18; Denny Roy, "The 'China threat' issue: major arguments", *Asian Survey*, 36 (1996): 758; Stuart Harris and Garry Klintworth, (eds.), *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a conservative power", *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1997): 33-44.
[40] Hu Weixin, Gerald Chan, and Zha Daojiong, *China's International Relations in the 21st Century: dynamics of paradigm shifts* (Oxford: University Press of America, 2000): 58.

Accordingly, the present study pursues two lines of argument, one synchronic and one diachronic. In his *Course in General Linguistics*, Swiss linguistic Ferdinand de Saussure outlined two dimensions of language that are essential to any linguistic analysis: synchrony and diachrony.[41] Synchronic linguistics, also known as static linguistics, studies what Saussure called the "general grammar" of a "linguistic entity".[42] By "linguistic entity", he was not referring to a word in terms of its lexical expression, which is essentially a succession of meaningless letters. Rather, he was referring to a word that has *become* a linguistic entity through "the association of the signifier with the signified".[43] For examples, words such as "house", "white", "see", according to Saussure, do not count as linguistic entities on their own, but they become linguistic entities when associated with what he calls "sound-images", which are basically the mental impressions associated with those words.[44] For instance, the "sound-image" of a "house" could be a big wooden box with a roof where people can cook, rest, and sleep. The word "house" in this case is the signifier, and the mental impression of a house is the signified. A word is not a "linguistic entity" unless it contains such a two-part mental process through which its meaning is generated; and this mental process is what he meant by the "general grammar" of a linguistic entity. Synchronic linguistics, in other words, deals with the generation of meanings in a language at a specific point of time. Diachronic linguistics, on the other hand, studies the development and evolution of a language over a period of time. Hence, it is also often called evolutionary linguistics.[45] Saussure argued that diachronic analysis is complimentary to synchronic linguistics as "[t]here is really no such thing as absolute immobility…Every part of language is subjected to change".[46] A diachronic analysis therefore can entail the study of the evolution of a linguistic entity at its semantic, phonetic, lexical, or grammatical levels. The discipline of etymology, for instance, which is the study of the origins of words and the development of their meanings, is part of diachronic linguistics.

[41] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966): 99-100.
[42] Ibid., 101-102.
[43] Ibid., 102.
[44] Ibid., 103.
[45] Ibid., 79.
[46] Ibid., 140.

Following Saussure's distinction between synchrony and diachrony, the present study conducts its analysis of the translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* from both the synchronic and the diachronic aspects. By this, I mean to examine both the issues that exist in the Chinese translations themselves, and the differences in the translations across the three Chinese editions. Yet in order to do that, the study has to first establish its unit of analysis, or in Saussure's words, its "linguistic entity". As stated before, Saussure's linguistic analysis applies to all areas of language, including phonetic i.e. sound, syntax, lexis, and so forth. Although all these areas are equally important in the study of a language, due to the limited space and time of this thesis, it is unfortunately not feasible to go through and deal with each one of them in depth.

The present thesis therefore decides to employ "concept" as its primary linguistic entity. The reason for selecting this focal point of study is because in a recent article about the state of IR theory, Stefano Guzzini calls for a more reflexive engagement with key concepts in disciplinary debates.[47] He argues that an engagement with key concepts is necessary for the study of IR theory not only because concepts are the "ontological building blocks" of a theory, but also because they provide essential language through which theorists can generate their arguments.[48] As he states, "concepts…are co-constitutive of theories; they are the words in which…theorising is done".[49] Following Guzzini's argument, Felix Berenskoetter stresses that incorporating concept analysis in the study of IR is highly important because "if the building blocks change, the theoretical house takes on a new form as well".[50] In other words, concepts do not only build theories, but they can also destabilise and unravel them. This intrinsically "deconstructive and reconstructive" nature of concepts, Berenskoetter argues, helps "free space for thinking differently and devising alternative meanings and, thereby, enable theory building".[51] In the context of this study, this means that analysing the Chinese translations of key concepts in Waltz's theory may reveal not only how the meaning of an English term

[47] Stefano Guzzini, "The End of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorising", *European Journal of International Relations*, 19 (2013): 521.
[48] Ibid., 534-535.
[49] Ibid., 535.
[50] Felix Berenskoetter, "Approaches to Concept Analysis", *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 45 (2017): 171.; Also see: Felix Berenskoetter, (ed.), *Concepts in World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2016).
[51] Ibid.,173.

becomes transplanted in the Chinese language, but also how the Chinese translations can essentially destabilise Waltz's original theorisation.

Borrowing insights from Reinhart Koselleck's study of conceptual history, this study accordingly defines "concept" as a word that incorporates "the entity of meaning and experience within a socio-political context within which and for which a word is used".[52] (A more comprehensive discussion on Koselleck's definition of a "concept" will be presented in Chapter 2.) Koselleck's works are selected to inform the conceptual framework of this thesis because in a way, Koselleck's theorisation of a "concept" bears a strong resemblance to Saussure's idea of a "linguistic entity"—which, in fact, is hardly surprising given that majority of the analytical techniques in conceptual history is drawn from structural linguistics.[53] Just as Saussure conceptualises a "linguistic entity" as being made up of a signifier and a signified, Koselleck theorises a "concept" as consisting of a "word" which, for Koselleck, is the linguistic form of a concept, and "the entity of meaning and experience" that the word invokes when it is used. Take the word "state" as an example; "state" as a concept, first of all, has its linguistic form—the word *state*; but when it is used as a "concept", Koselleck argues, it invokes a summation of other meanings that are associated with its conceptuality, such as jurisdiction, army, taxation, and so forth.[54] What the signifier and the signified to Saussure, it can be argued, is what a "word" and its meanings to Koselleck. Such a resemblance in their theorisations demonstrates a theoretical and methodological compatibility between the two authors' works and hence should build a solid theoretical foundation for this study.

In addition to Koselleck's conceptual history, the study also adopts Karl Mannheim's stylistic approach to the study of the sociology of knowledge as part of its conceptual framework. If Koselleck's works can be used to examine how a Chinese translation can alter the conceptuality of an English concept, then Mannheim's works are helpful in

[52] Reinhart Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004): 85.
[53] Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree, "A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History—An Introduction", in Hamsher-Monk, Iain, Tilmans, Karin, and Vree, van Frank (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998): 2.
[54] Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, 85.

explaining how a certain translation comes about. Epistemologically speaking, both Koselleck and Mannheim share the view on the effect of the historical-social conditions on knowledge production; that is to say, they reject the idea that human thought and experience are detached from the social settings they emerge. Yet the two authors are still distinct in terms of their foci: whilst Koselleck's work stresses the linguistic reflections of social and historical changes, Mannheim is more concerned with revealing the history behind the formation of a particular mode of thought. One of the central concepts in Mannheim's theorisation is "style of thought", which is essentially a series of socially constructed arguments that can be traced to a particular social group and also represent that group's particular interpretation of social reality. (Again, a more comprehensive discussion on Mannheim's "style of thought" will be presented in Chapter 2.) Underneath every claim to rational knowledge, Mannheim argues, there lies an "irrational foundation" which is rooted in one's social setting.[55] Hence, any effort to comprehend a style of thought has to be made within the historical-social context out of which such a thought emerges. This notion of "style of thought" will play a central role in the arguments this thesis presents; because for translation theorist Andre Lefevere, there is always a certain ideology behind every translation,[56] and for Mannheim, an ideology is essentially an evolving style of thought.[57] This means that if there exist major differences in the translations of the key concepts across the three Chinese editions of Waltz's text, it could indicate a change in the ideological motives behind those translations, which, using Mannheim's conceptual framework, can be analysed as a changing style of thought.

Following Saussure's distinction between synchrony and diachrony, and drawing on insights from the works of Reinhart Koselleck and Karl Mannheim, this thesis thus argues that the Chinese translation of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* are subjected to double constraints from both the synchronic and the diachronic aspects of language. Synchronically, it argues that the Chinese language's inherent empiricism results in the change of the ontological status of the selected concepts in the Chinese translations of

[55] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936): 28.
[56] Andre Lefevere, *Translating, Rewriting, and the Manipulation of Literary Frame* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2016): ii.
[57] Rodney D. Nelson, "The Sociology of Styles of Thought", *The British Journal of Sociology*, 43 (1992): 26.

Waltz's text. This in turn causes a decrease in the explanatory powers in the Chinese version of Waltz's argument as well as the collapse of the deductive epistemology that Waltz deploys in his theorisation of international politics. Diachronically, this thesis argues the changes in the translations of the selected concepts in the second Chinese edition manifests a certain politics of translation which is caused by the changing style of thought in Chinese IR scholarship from "Western learning", which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, to "Chinese IR", which became prominent from the early 2000s. "Chinese IR" as a new style of thought presents a distinct way of thinking among Chinese IR scholars which manifests linguistically in their attempt to manipulate the translations of the selected concepts.

With reference to Japan's importation of Western liberal theory during the nineteenth century, Douglas Howland argues that, "westernisation [in Japan] was not a linear process—unlike the tree that arrives with its roots secured in soil and burlap, there was no transplanting of the West in a neat package."[58] The same can also be said about translating Waltz's theory into the Chinese context. The purpose of this study, as mentioned at the beginning of the introduction, is to examine how meanings embedded in the language of IR become transplanted into different linguistic contexts; and if there is a central message that runs through this thesis, it is that this process of transplanting is never straightforward and unproblematic. Those concepts that constitute Waltz's theory do not translate well; they do not have a natural fit within the existing Chinese knowledge system. Hence, when they are translated into Chinese, the translations are bound to generate certain side effects due to the conceptual, cultural, and linguistic incommensurability. This thesis is meant to contribute to the diagnosis of these side effects.

The present thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the existing studies on the migration of Western knowledge to China and examines how the Chinese translations of Western terms have changed over the course of four centuries. As in the study of IR, inquiries concerning translations as well as the effect of language on the disciplinary

[58] Douglas R. Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002): 2.

study have only recently started to gain prominence, the present thesis has looked for relevant literature from other disciplines such as sinology, intellectual history, comparative literature, and so forth.[59] One common thread that runs through all the literature presented in this chapter is the idea that the migration of knowledge through cultures and time is often subjected to what Edward Said once termed "conditions of acceptance".[60] These conditions can be linguistic, but they also come from ideological constraints and general intellectual incentives. Hence, in order for a knowledge claim to be successfully transplanted into a different knowledge system, certain accommodations have to be made by the translators. It can be seen that very often, the failure or success of the migration of an idea is to a considerable degree dependent on how much accommodation can be made so that a translation can find its place in the existing Chinese knowledge system.

Chapter 2 outlines the study's approach to the research question and it consists of two parts: the first part of the chapter presents a more detailed account of the study's conceptual framework. It provides a critical discussion of Koselleck's study of conceptual history and Manheim's study of the sociology of knowledge. It will explain how each author's works can help provide enough analytical language, and also set up the key research questions for the thesis to explore using the conceptual framework. The second part of the chapter is devoted to presenting the methodological framework. It will explain what specific concepts are selected from Waltz's book for analysis and the reasons behind their selection. It will also outline the methodological device the study chooses to process, record, and analyse the selected concepts. Following the conceptual and the methodological frameworks outlines in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents the findings from the empirical study. The purpose of this chapter is not only to present what is the Chinese

[59] Very few studies have been conducted on the translations of IR concepts. A few months before the submission of this thesis, *Millennium Journal of International Studies* published an editorial article calling for the inclusion of non-English academic papers. As for translating IR concepts into Chinese, Astrid Nordin published a study on the Chinese translation of the concept of hegemony. See: Astrid Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese? Ba in Chinese International Relations", in Konig, Lion and Chaudhuri, Bidisha (eds.), *Politics of the "Other" in India and China: Western concepts in non-Western contexts* (London: Routledge, 2016): 335.; Sarah Bertrand, Kerry Goettlich, and Christopher Murray, "Translating International Relations: On the Practical Difficulties of Diversifying the Discipline", *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 46 (2018): 93.

[60] Edward W. Said, *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983): 227.

translation for each selected concept, but also to demonstrate whether and how these concepts have retained their conceptualities in the Chinese language. After closely examining the Chinese translations of the selected concepts, this chapter concludes that when it comes to translation of concepts, whether or not an English concept can retain its conceptuality in its Chinese translation depends on whether or not the translation can find a conceptual equivalence in the Chinese language. And when a concept does not have a Chinese equivalence, it either loses or gains meanings in the process of a translation.

Building on the findings presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and 5 are accordingly devoted to exploring problems regarding the Chinese translation of three specific concepts: *anarchy*, *power*, and *great power*, all of which have lost their conceptualities in their Chinese translations. Drawing on insights from psycholinguistics, Chapter 4 argues that, synchronically, when an English concept is translated into Chinese in the absence of a conceptual equivalence, the fundamentally empirical nature of the Chinese language can alter the ontological status of the concept, which can consequently destabilise the entire theoretical framework of Waltz's argument. Chapter 5 examines the diachronic changes in the translations across the different Chinese editions of Waltz's book and analyses how translation can often be used to serve a political purpose. The main argument of this chapter is that there is a politics of translation in the 2004 Chinese edition of Waltz's book and that such a politics of translation is a linguistic manifestation of the changing social and political environments under which the translation is conducted.

Finally, the present thesis is written in a way that the arguments build gradually, chapter by chapter, and roughly follow the sequences listed above. Each chapter is meant to complement the succeeding ones. To ensure these arguments are properly comprehended, readers are advised to tackle the thesis in its entirety. The two main arguments are presented in Chapter 4 and 5. However, the developments of these arguments would not have been possible without the intense examination of the existing literature in Chapter 1, the construction of a comprehensive conceptual and methodological framework in Chapter 2, and the in-depth analysis of the empirical findings in Chapter 3. With this in mind, the thesis will now move on to its first chapter, which sets the tone for its

subsequent analysis of the Chinese translations of Waltz's text by examining the existing literature on the migration of knowledge through time and space.

Chapter 1. From the Jesuit Mission to Chinese IR: The Problem of Language in the Global Circulation of Knowledge

> …Concerned to reconstruct past ideas, historians must approach the generation that held them as the anthropologist approaches an alien culture. They must, that is, be prepared at the start to find that the natives speak a different language and map experience into different categories from those that they themselves bring from home. And they must take as their objective the discovery of those categories and the assimilation of the corresponding language.[61]
>
> —Thomas S. Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn made the above comment concerning the historical study of scientific progress in his critique of Max Planck's quantum theory, where he argued that Planck's theory demonstrated *par excellence* what he famously termed "paradigm shift" in the history of science.[62] In his ground-breaking work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn challenged the then prevailing perception of science as a linear accumulation of knowledge and argued that the history of science should instead be analysed as a progression in leaps from one "paradigm" to another.[63] Scientific research, according to Kuhn, is essentially a social activity as it is conducted by a community of practitioners instead of a set of individuals.[64] As a community, there should exist a set of unspoken assumptions shared by all members of the group in order for them to conduct scientific practice and elaborate knowledge from those existing assumptions. These assumptions can include specific scientific theories as well as their applications, and they constitute what Kuhn termed a "paradigm".

A "paradigm", according to Kuhn, provides a foundation for "coherent traditions of scientific research", and when a certain paradigm is enough to explain the world as it is perceived, knowledge will be elaborated from within the existing paradigm.[65] However, when an existing paradigm is not sufficient to account for the perceived world, Kuhn argued, a "paradigm shift"—or what he also called a "scientific revolution"—would

[61] Thomas S. Kuhn, "Revisiting Planck", *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences*, 14 (1984): 246.
[62] Ibid., 245.
[63] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
[64] Ibid., 10.
[65] Ibid.

occur, where the previous assumptions would be re-examined and a set of new assumptions i.e. a new "paradigm" would be established. [66] This establishment of a new paradigm, moreover, is often "a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals…changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications."[67] In the case of Planck's quantum theory, for example, Kuhn observed that there was a clear rupture between the tenets of classical physics and Planck's usage of disciplinary concepts: whilst in his pre-1906 papers and lectures, Planck consistently used the phrase "energy element", from 1906 onwards, he changed the word "element" to "quantum".[68] This change in the vocabulary, Kuhn argued, not only signals the alteration in the meaning of the original tenet of physics, but also marks a shift from the pre-existing paradigm of classical physics.

In the above quote, Kuhn then compares such a paradigm shift to the anthropologist approach to a foreign culture, arguing that just like a foreign language has to be converted into anthropologists' own language in order to be understood, practitioners of science often have to reconstruct an old paradigm in a particular way for it to become more useful in generating new knowledge. One of the most illustrative examples of this paradigm shift in the history of science, Kuhn argued, was Copernican astronomy, which was built upon its predecessor, the Ptolemaic system. Although when it comes to predicting the changing positions of starts, Ptolemaic astronomy was as good as the Copernican system, with respect to planetary positions, there were certain discrepancies in the predictions made with the Ptolemaic system.[69] Therefore, when the new generation of astronomers were conducting research based on the Ptolemaic system, they had to make certain adjustments to the existing Ptolemaic paradigm and in so doing reduce those discrepancies. However, as time went on, the practitioners started to realise that the reduction of minor discrepancies was not enough and that the discrepancy corrected in one place was showing up in another.[70] By the early sixteenth century, more and more astronomers in

[66] Ibid., 85.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Thomas S. Kuhn, 'Revisiting Planck', *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences*, 14 (1984): 245.
[69] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 68.
[70] Ibid.

Europe came to the conclusion that the Ptolemaic system was failing in its application to its own astronomical problems. [71] Copernicus was one of them. According to Kuhn, Copernicus's rejection of the Ptolemaic paradigm was the condition for the emergence of Copernican astronomy.[72] The Copernican system, in other words, resulted from the paradigm shift from the previous Ptolemaic system.

What is ironic, however, about the above quote from Kuhn is that despite his illustrative comparison between the history of science and the anthropologist approach to a foreign language, in his own work, Kuhn never considered "language" to be a factor in a paradigm shift. In a way this is understandable as the purpose of his work was to uncover the irrational aspect of the development of science, and the introduction of the problems concerning language might overcomplicate the original argument. However, if a paradigm shift means a change in the basic concepts and experimental practices in the discipline of science as Kuhn defines it, then this implies that a paradigm shift can also occur when those concepts and experimental practices get translated into a different linguistic context and cease to possess the same meanings in a foreign language. Take Kuhn's study of the Ptolemaic system as an example; in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn's argument was mostly concerned with how the Copernican system emerged out of the rejection of the Ptolemaic paradigm—in other words, the scientific revolution of Ptolemaic astronomy in the European context. What he did not anticipate, however, was that knowledge, just like people, migrate. During the eighth through tenth century, the era also known as "the formative period of Islamic civilisation",[73] a large number of Greek scientific literature was translated into Arabic as part of the translation movement.[74] Ptolemy's *Almagest*—the book Kuhn used in his work to demonstrate the idea of paradigm shift—was one of them.[75] According to Montgomery, there were at least five different Arabic translations of *Almagest* in existence by the end of the ninth century. [76] The most famous one of all was the translation by the astronomer and mathematician

[71] Ibid., 69.
[72] Ibid.
[73] L. E. Goodman, "The translation of Greek materials into Arabic", in Young, M. J. L., Latham, J. D., Serjeant, R. B., (eds.), *Religion, Learning, and Science in the "Abbasid Period, 477-97* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 477.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Scott L. Montgomery, *Science in Translation: Movements of Knowledge through Cultures and Time* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000): 110.
[76] Ibid.

Nasir al-Din al-Tusi; this is not only because it was the final known version of the *Almagest* produced during the medieval period, but also because it demonstrated a paradigm shift of the original Ptolemaic system in the translation.[77] Just like the European astronomers who had to make certain adjustments to the existing Ptolemaic paradigm and in so doing reduce those discrepancies, al-Tusi made a "correction" to the Ptolemy's original diagram of planetary motion in order to improve the prediction of planetary positions.[78] Those corrections on the original Ptolemaic astronomy in turn created a foundation for the later flourishing of Arabic science, suggesting that a paradigm shift does not necessarily occur during a scientific research, but also through a translation.

Furthermore, what is rarely mentioned in the study of the history of Arabic science is that Ptolemy's work was not in fact translated directly from Greek to Arabic, but rather first from Greek to Syriac, and then from Syriac to Arabic.[79] This is because during the fifth and sixth centuries, a considerable number of Greek astronomical texts had to be transferred eastward due to the harassing influence of the orthodox Byzantine Church against Nestorian and Monophysite intellectuals.[80] The purges by the emperors Zeno and Justinian especially left members of these communities with no choice but to migrate to the fringes of the Byzantine empire and beyond, into Persia (now Syria, Iraq).[81] After settling in Persia, the exiled scholars began to set up schools for studying and translating the Greek texts of Hellenistic knowledge to Syriac. This was also the time when there was a great flowering of Syriac literature, not only in Syria but also in many parts of the Near East.[82] The spread of Syrian literature eventually reached the Middle East and was then absorbed into Islam, which marked the beginnings of the Arabic translation movement.[83] This means that by the time al-Tusi was translating the text, the original *Almagest* had gone through double linguistic interpretations: first from Greek to Syriac, and then from Syriac to Arabic. Al-Tusi's emendation to the Ptolemaic system already shows that translation could easily give rise to a paradigm shift, and it might be fair to say that it is unlikely that the meanings of the original concepts used in the Greek version of *Almagest*

[77] Ibid., 111.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid., 60.
[80] Ibid., 61.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid., 62.
[83] Ibid.

could remain completely intact in the Syriac translation. If scientific revolution is characterised by a series of paradigm shifts as Kuhn suggests, it can be argued that every foreign translation of a scientific text risks a scientific revolution.

The fact that translations of scientific texts can bring about scientific revolutions in a Kuhnian sense makes one wonder what could the translations of terms circulated in those ideologically sensitive areas, such as politics, lead to. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to review the existing studies on the problem of language in such a global circulation of knowledge, and it will focus principally on the literature that deals with the migration of knowledge claims from the West to China from the late sixteenth century up till now. By "the West", this chapter refers to early modern Europe between 1500 and 1800, and the inclusion of the United States after 1800. The reason for selecting this focal point is because, as stated in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to examine how the meanings embedded in the language of IR travel among different linguistic contexts—with specific reference to Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* and its three Chinese editions. A close examination of the previous studies on how Western terms have been translated into the Chinese language in this sense will help the present study not only highlight the sustaining issues in the Chinese translations of Western knowledge claims and look out for similar problems in the translations of Waltz's text, but also identify how its subsequent analysis of the Chinese translations of Waltz's text can best contribute to the exiting debates.

This chapter is divided into three parts: the first section will examine the Chinese translations of Western knowledge claims from the late sixteenth century up to the late eighteenth century; and the second section will examine the translations from the early nineteenth century up to the late nineteenth century. The reason for this periodisation is because, before the late nineteenth century, Western knowledge was only selectively accepted and translated on the basis of their usefulness to China's statecraft. As such, a majority of the Western knowledge introduced to China during this period of time was of scientific subjects, as they were deemed as non-threatening to China's Confucian

worldview.[84] After the Opium Wars, however, the superiority of Western technology and its military forces led China to come to realisation of its own backwardness. Western knowledge, which was previously deemed only as a supplement to the indigenous Chinese knowledge, became something desirable in the eyes of Chinese intellectuals. From the late nineteenth century, Chinese intellectuals began to actively translate Western texts and more importantly. The Chinese condition of accepting Western knowledge, it can be argued, has changed from "useful for statecraft" to "active engagement".

However, despite the change in the conditions of acceptance, there is one thing that has remained constant in the Chinese absorption of Western knowledge from the late sixteenth century up till now, that is, the use of accommodation strategy to translate unfamiliar Western terms. As this chapter will show, before the late nineteenth century, the translations of Western knowledge were mostly conducted by the Jesuit missionaries who came to China to spread Christianity. In an attempt to render the Western ideas to be more acceptable for the Chinese, the Jesuits equated the meanings of the Western terms with the existing Chinese ones so that they could be easily incorporated into Chinese discourse. After the late nineteenth century, such an accommodation strategy continued to be used—however, this time, it was used to accommodate Chinese knowledge to Western standards. This means that the change in the power dynamics between China and the West was reflected linguistically in the ways Western terms were translated. After such a review of the history of the Chinese translations of Western knowledge, the third section will examine the existing literature on the Chinese translations of IR concepts, and demonstrate how the same translation tactic has also been used in the translations of IR terms.

[84] Harriet T. Zurndorfer, "Science Without Modernization: China's First Encounter With Useful and Reliable Knowledge from Europe" from *Global Economic History Network*, Conference 4 (Leiden: 16-18 September, 2004): 2.

1.1 The Jesuit Mission and China's Early Encounter with Western Knowledge

It is often argued that the migration of Western knowledge to China began with the Jesuits' attempt to spread Christianity outside of Europe.[85] The Jesuits, or the Society of Jesus, to use the official title, is a scholarly religious congregation of the Catholic Church formed in the first half of the sixteenth century. Shortly after it was founded, the Catholic Church fell into a crisis of Protestant Reformation and as a result, the Jesuits became the intellectual bridgehead of the Catholic Church in its struggle against Protestantism.[86] To educate the next generation as well as to disseminate an integrated Christian worldview based on the advancement of natural philosophy and scientific knowledge, the Jesuits set up a growing networks of schools and colleges that stretched across Europe, Asia, and Latin America.[87]

Sinologist Harriet T. Zurndorf in his study on China's early encounter with European knowledge argues that the first Jesuit mission arrived in China in 1583.[88] This, however, is incorrect. Francis Xavier, one of the founding fathers of the Jesuits, arrived in China in 1552, shortly after his journey to Japan where he described the people there as "the best that have yet been discovered".[89] He arrived in the island of Shangchuan, 14km from the south coast of China, but soon died of a fever while waiting for a boat to take him over to the mainland.[90] In his correspondence letter to fellow Jesuits, Xavier then expressed both his anxiety and excitement about conducting mission in China; as he wrote,

> The voyage will be most painful under my present straitened circumstances; it is full of a thousand dangers, of very doubtful issue, and full of terrors. How it will turn out I know not, but I have a firm confidence, and a strong inward assurance, that however things may go, the result will be good.[91]

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[85] Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 2.
[86] Matthias Schemmel, "Stevin in Chinese: Aspects of the Transformations of Early Modern European Science in its Transfer to China", in Cook, J. Harold, and Dupre, Sven, (eds.), *Translating Knowledge in the Early Modern Low Countries* (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2012): 373.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Harriet T. Zurndorfer, "Science Without Modernization: China's First Encounter With Useful and Reliable Knowledge from Europe" from *Global Economic History Network*, Conference 4 (Leiden: 16-18 September, 2004): 2.
[89] M. Antoni J. Üçerler, "The Jesuit enterprise in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Japan", in Thomas Worcester, Thomas (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Jesuits* (Cambridge, 2008): 156.
[90] Mary Laven, *Mission to China: Matteo Ricci and the Jesuit Encounter with the East* (London: Faber and Faber, 2011): 22.
[91] Henry James Coleridge (ed.), *The Life and Letters of St Francis Xavier, Volume the Second* (London: Burns and Oates, Portman Street, 1872): 568.

What Xavier did not anticipate, however, was that, unlike the more open-minded Japanese who willingly absorbed Dutch scientific knowledge in the sixteenth century, the Ming Chinese—just like their Qing successors—had a deep-seated scepticism towards foreign knowledge. As William Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano uncritically describes, "…the general disinterest of the Chinese in Western science…had been tendered at the hands of gentle missionaries."[92] Thirty years after Xavier's death, Matteo Rucci, the founding figure of the Jesuit China Missions, arrived in China in an attempt to fulfil Xavier's wish to convert the Chinese society to Christianity. Yet soon after his arrival, Ricci came to a realisation that the conversion of the Chinese was not as easy as Xavier anticipated in the letter. He noticed that in order to fulfil the Jesuit mission and make the Chinese accept Christian worldview, he first of all had to reconcile two irreconcilable modes of governance with different dividing lines between politics and religion.[93] In the European context, religion had always had a far-reaching impact on moral and political life; however, it was also at the same time counteracted by the secular powers of monarchy.[94] The Chinese mode of governance, on the contrary, had a "state-religion" which was essentially the moral and political teachings of Confucius and it did not have any counteracting power. Different religions were tolerated in China as long as they did not pose any threat to the existing Confucian worldview of the Chinese state.[95] Thus, from the perspectives of the Chinese state, the Jesuit propagation of Christian teachings was allowed as long as it was for the purpose of self-cultivation, on a par with other popular religions in China such as Taoism and Buddhism.[96] From the viewpoints of the Catholic Church, however, such a sub-ordination of Christianity to a non-Christian moral system was regarded as a serious insult and could not be tolerated.[97]

[92] William Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, (eds.), *Sources of Chinese Traditions, vol. 2* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001): 63.
[93] Matthias Schemmel, "The Transmission of Scientific Knowledge from Europe to China in the Early Modern Period", in Renn, Jurgen (ed.), *The Globalisation of Knowledge in History* (Edition Open Access, 2012): 280.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Zurndorfer, "Science Without Modernization: China's First Encounter With Useful and Reliable Knowledge from Europe", 2.
[96] Schemmel, "The Transmission of Scientific Knowledge from Europe to China in the Early Modern Period", 280.
[97] Ibid.

This incompatibility of two belief systems posed a series challenge for the Jesuits during the entire period of their mission, as they were constantly being attacked from two sides: the Roman Church who feared the corruption of the Christian faith through the Jesuits' concessions to the Chinese state, and the Chinese imperial court who believed that the Jesuits were attempting to interfere with the state monopoly in moral and political affairs through their propagations of an alternative doctrine.[98] In seeking to find a compromise between fulfilling their mission and not upsetting the Chinese imperial court, Ricci accordingly came to a conclusion that the only way to spread Christian worldview in China was through a combination of three strategies: top-down evangelisation, maximal cultural accommodation, and indirect propagation.[99] Basically, Ricci believed that the Jesuits should first try to convert members of the ruling class; because China was a highly hierarchical society, if the ruling class had converted, the subjects should just follow.[100] In a letter he sent to the Vice-Provincial in East Asia, Ricci described the importance of persuading the Chinese scholarly elites as follows,

> [I]n this kingdom … sciences and opinions founded on reason are greatly prized … And consequently it seems that it will be easy to persuade the principal men of the kingdom of the things of our holy faith, confirmed with so much evidence of reason, and when the most learned men agree with us, it will be easy to convert the rest.[101]

After the Jesuits decided that their primary focus would be on the ruling class, they began to learn the Chinese language in order to be able to communicate with the scholarly elites. Ricci, in particular, became fluent in written classical Chinese, which enabled him to translate Western texts into Chinese and vice versa.[102] However, the way those texts were translated, according to Elman, has later become one of the most controversial aspects of the Jesuit Mission in China. To avoid upsetting the Chinese imperial court, Ricci and other Jesuits used existing Chinese terms to translate Western knowledge.[103] Their purpose was to allow Christianity to have the maximal flexibility so that it could

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[98] Ibid.
[99] Ashley E. Millar, "The Jesuits as knowledge brokers between Europe and China (1582-1773): shaping European views of the Middle Kingdom", *Economic History Working Papers*, 105 (2007): 27.
[100] Schemmel, "The Transmission of Scientific Knowledge from Europe to China in the Early Modern Period", 275.
[101] Laven, *Mission to China: Matteo Ricci and the Jesuit Encounter with the East*, 214.
[102] Zurndorfer, "Science Without Modernization: China's First Encounter With Useful and Reliable Knowledge from Europe", 12.
[103] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 112.

accommodate Chinese culture and values.[104] Such an accommodation strategy, Ashley Millar argues, "…while virtuous in its ambition, necessitates a stripping away of complexities in order to produce a form that makes two disparate civilisations compatible".[105]

In the introduction, it has mentioned that one of the central ideas in Thomas Kuhn's study of the history of science is the concept of paradigm shift, which essentially refers to the reconstruction of disciplinary assumptions in order to generate new knowledge. Another important concept from *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* is incommensurability, which, according to Kuhn, is the result of a paradigm shift.[106] As discussed earlier, a paradigm shift occurs when a new generation of practitioners deems an old paradigm to be inadequate and develops a new paradigm based on a set of new assumptions. For Kuhn, such a paradigm shift results in the development a theory that is embedded in a different conceptual framework. In this case, the new theory is *incommensurable* with a theory embedded in the previous paradigm as there is simply no common measure between the two to determine what one is more valid or useful.

In a way, translation of Western knowledge into Chinese resembles a paradigm shift; as it essentially means to reconstruct a set of ideas written in one language in a way that they can make sense in another. However, the main challenge of the Chinese translations of Western knowledge lies in that, just like their distinct modes of governance, both China and the West have a very elaborate and comprehensive knowledge system that is distinct to their own culture.[107] This makes the two knowledge systems highly incommensurable. Sidney Gulick describes the difference between the Eastern and the Western mind-sets as "two vast psychological continents", and that this chasm constitutes "a stimulating challenge to inquiring minds".[108] While the Jesuits were undoubtedly equipped with

[104] Millar, "The Jesuits as knowledge brokers between Europe and China (1582-1773): shaping European views of the Middle Kingdom", 27.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 148.
[107] Schemmel, "Stevin in Chinese: Aspects of the Transformations of Early Modern European Science in its Transfer to China", 374.
[108] Sidney Lewis Gulick, *The East and the West: A Study of their Psychic and Cultural Characteristics* (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1963): 17.

inquiring minds, the difficulty of inserting Western knowledge into Chinese discourse left them with no choice but to adopt the policy of cultural accommodation. Moreover, in translation theory, one commonly used translating strategy is called "domestication", and as opposed to the Jesuits' policy of cultural accommodation, the practice of domestication refers to the accommodation of foreign ideas to one's own cultural and linguistic norms. In other words, domestication strategy subdues foreign ideas under one's own cultural and linguistic values, while accommodation strategy subdues one's own norms and values under those of the target culture. In his article attacking Anglo-American translators' preference of domesticating foreign ideas to accommodate their own readers and publishers, translation theorist Lawrence Venuti argues that such an act of accommodation is nothing but a lamentable form of conservative conformity to the dominant values of the target culture.[109] The same argument can also be applied to the Jesuits policy of cultural accommodation. Although they were self-accommodating their own knowledge to the Chinese values, in a way, it signifies a surrender from the side of the Jesuits to the power structure of the Chinese values and knowledge system.

One of Ricci's most contentious translations of Western terms was probably his equating of European higher learning, that is, "*scientia*", with the Chinese idea of "leaning".[110] In the seventeenth century, a large number of Chinese classics were translated into Latin by the Jesuits as part of their Chinese learning project. In their translations, Ricci and his fellow Jesuits frequently used "*scientia*" to translate Chinese classical texts: for example, *Great Learning* and *Doctrine of the Mean*, two of the Four Books of Confucian philosophy, were translated to *Magna scientia* and *Sinarum scientia politico-moralis* respectively.[111] When they were first published in 1687 in Paris, they were edited as part of the book series titled *Scientia Sinicae*, literally meaning "Learning of China".[112] In both of these cases, "*scientia*" was used to translate the Chinese concept of "学 (xue)", meaning "learning", and this is slightly problematic. According to Sorell et al., in early

[109] Lawrence Venuti, "The American Tradition", in Baker, Mona, (ed.), *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies* (London: Routledge, 1998): 310; also see: Lawrence Venuti, *The Translator's Invisibility* (London: Routledge, 1998); Lawrence Venuti, *The Scandals of Translation* (London: Routledge, 1998).
[110] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 4.
[111] Ibid., 109.
[112] Ibid.

modern Western philosophy, "*scientia*" was an honorific term; it was used to refer to systematic knowledge that could only be understood within a given framework.[113] In other words, it is not merely knowledge about why something is true, but why "truths cannot *but* be true given the relevant principles or causes".[114] Hence, in medieval Europe, the concept of *scientia* was usually associated with the studies of philosophy, theology, and natural science.[115]

The Chinese concept of "学 (xue)" i.e. "learning", on the other hand, means something slightly different. The original Chinese character for "学 (xue)" is written as a pair of hands holding a person—implying that in the traditional Chinese thinking, the idea of learning is associated with the idea of being guided by another person. This association is also evident in ancient Chinese philosophical texts, where the concept of "学 (xue)" is often used to refer to the idea of "repetition till recognition". For instance, in *Guangya*, an early 3rd century CE Chinese dictionary, Zhang Yi notes, "To learn, is to recognise things [my translation]"[116]—highlighting the association between the Chinese concept of "learning" with that of "repeating". In fact, this association is still in use in the modern Chinese language. In everyday Chinese conversation, the expression "to learn from someone" is usually associated with the idea of "copying whatever that person does". If a child is told to "learn your father", for instance, it often means "copy your father". It can be argued that if the European concept of *scientia* connotes the *generation* of knowledge via contemplation, the Chinese concept of "学 (xue)", that is, "learning", connotes the *acquisition* of knowledge via imitation. They are conceptually different terms and equating them as if they were imbued with the same meaning is highly problematic.

Another Western term that had been accommodated to the Chinese knowledge system to resolve the issue of incommensurability was *philosophia* i.e. philosophy, which was

[113] Tom Sorell, G.A. Rogers, and Jill Kraye, (eds.), *Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy: Seventeenth-Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge from First Principles* (London: Springer, 2010): vii.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 4.
[116] Zhang Yi, *Guangya* (Xiangxiaoguan Zhushi Xianchen Xu Yikun, 227-232): 4.

equated with the Chinese concept of "穷理 (qiong li)", meaning "exhaustive mastering of worldly principles".[117] According to Elman, when Guilio Aleni was translating *A Summary of Western Learning* into Chinese, he noticed the problem of incommensurability that existed between the Chinese and the Western knowledge systems. Hence, to convey the meaning of the Western concept of philosophy, he first presented a new word which was basically the phonetic transcription of the word "*philosophia*".[118] However, the Chinese scholarly elite did not understand the new word and that is when he decided to link the original term to the Chinese concept of philosophy—which, unsurprisingly, did not mean the same thing as to the Western idea of philosophy. The Chinese concept of "穷理 (qiong li)" is associated with the teachings of Cheng Yi (1032-1085) and Zhu Xi (1130-1200) since the Song dynasty, which can be summarised by the phrase "格物致知 (gewu zhizhi)", meaning "to extend knowledge by investigating things.[119] The idea of "格物致知 (gewu zhizhi)" presupposes that there is a universal principle for all things in the world, and more importantly, this principle is knowable simply via investigation. In other words, just like the above example of the Chinese concept of "learning", the Chinese concept of philosophy presupposes that all knowledge is already out there in the real world and that it is up to people to find and recognise them. This is in a stark contrast to the Western idea of philosophical study which often involves questioning the nature of knowledge itself.

Ricci's policy of cultural accommodation eventually became the model to be followed by all the missionaries in China who would like to propagate Christianity. In 1706, the Kangxi emperor issued an order which stated that all missionaries had to either follow "the rules of Matteo Ricci" or leave the country, implying that the importation of Western knowledge into China was subjected to the condition of cultural accommodation.[120] Hence, when the French Jesuits began to arrive in China in the mid-seventeenth century, they also followed Ricci's precedent of using accommodation strategy to convince the

[117] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 110.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid, 5.
[120] Catherine Jami, "'European Science in China' or 'Wester Learning'? Representations of Cross-Cultural Transmission, 1600-1800", *Science in Context*, 12 (1999): 438.

Chinese ruling class of Christian doctrines.[121] Joachim Bouvet, for instance, not only identified Chinese history with biblical history, but also tried to link the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato to the Chinese *Yijing*, a 9th century BC classic which documents the regularities of heaven and earth.[122] It can be argued that from the late sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, the acceptance of Western knowledge was made possible only because the Jesuit mission did not challenge the state orthodoxy of Confucian teachings, and that they used accommodation strategies to translate Western ideas so that they can be incorporated into Chinese discourse.

However, the use of cultural accommodation was still unable to resolve the hidden tension caused by the incommensurability between the two knowledge systems. As Elman notes,

> [e]ach side sought to efface the other by simple reduction of the other to themselves. Their actual common ground was a hybrid that assumed each side had the same agenda, but each aimed to achieve diametrically opposite results. Ricci and the Jesuits tried to efface the classical content of the investigation of things with western European natural studies, which would then enable the Chinese to know heaven and accept the Church. Chinese effaced Western learning with native traditions of investigating things and extending knowledge, which would allow them to assert that European learning originated from China and thus was assimilable.[123]

This tension between the Jesuits and the Chinese elites reached its zenith in the mid-seventeenth century when the Kangxi emperor died, who was then succeeded by his eldest son, Yongzheng. Unlike his father who relished Western knowledge, especially that of mathematics and astronomy, Yongzheng was deeply sceptical of any foreign knowledge.[124] He hated the Jesuit missionaries and compared them to the White Lotus sect, whom was allegedly plotting to overthrow the dynasty.[125] In 1723, just after Yongzheng took the throne, a letter was sent to a local magistrate in Fujian in an attempt to denounce the missionaries, which was soon followed by the emperor's enactment of

[121] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 170.
[122] Ibid., 171.
[123] Ibid., 113.
[124] Jami, "'European Science in China' or 'Wester Learning'? Representations of Cross-Cultural Transmission, 1600-1800", 427.
[125] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 116.

the prohibition of Christianity.[126] As a result, most of the Jesuits were exiled to Macao and only those who professed their loyalty to the imperial court stayed in Beijing.[127]

Also in the mid-seventeenth century, unhappy with the Jesuits' concessions to the imperial court, the Roman Church began to intervene in the Jesuit missions in China, which infuriated the emperor as he believed the Roman Church was trying to interfere in China's internal affairs.[128] This eventually led to the collapse of the relation between Rome and the Qing; the legations of 1705-1710, 1720-1721, and 1724-1725 were sent to the Qing court to re-establish diplomatic relations between the two parties but they were said to have only widened the gap.[129] As a result, the Jesuits' could not preach Christianity during the Qianlong period (1735-1796), which also backfired on the Jesuits in Europe.[130] As the Jesuits began to lose influence in China, the Society as a whole also started to lose its credibility in Catholic Europe. In 1749, there were 22,600 members of the Society; by the year of 1764, the Society's property had been sequestered and its rich library collection sold.[131] In 1773, Pope Clement XIV dissolved the Society of Jesus, the reason for which was said to be because the Jesuits' accommodation strategy had placed China's Confucian rituals on equal footing with Christianity.[132] The repression of the Society also marked the end of the Jesuit mission in China.

1.2 The Arrival of Protestant Missionaries and the Rise of "Western Learning"

This chapter has so far reviewed the migration of Western knowledge to China from the late sixteenth century up to the late eighteenth century. It has explained how China's early encounter with Western knowledge was mostly through the Jesuit missionaries and their efforts to translate Western texts into the Chinese language. It has also argued that during

[126] Jami, "'European Science in China' or 'Wester Learning'? Representations of Cross-Cultural Transmission, 1600-1800", 427.
[127] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 166.
[128] Jami, "'European Science in China' or 'Wester Learning'? Representations of Cross-Cultural Transmission, 1600-1800", 427.
[129] Nicolas Standaert, *Handbook of Christianity in China, vol. 1* (Leiden: Brill, 2000): 362-363.
[130] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 166.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Malcom May, *Failure in the Far East* (London: Neville Spearman, 1957): 18.

this time period, China's acceptance of Western knowledge was strongly subjected to their sub-ordination to the Confucian worldview of the Chinese state. The incommensurability between the Chinese and the Western knowledge systems eventually led the Jesuits to use accommodation strategy and translate Western knowledge using existing Chinese terms. However, such an accommodation also eventually led to the repression of the Society due to the Roman Church's intolerance of the sub-ordination of Christianity to Confucianism.

After the French revolution and Napoleonic Wars, Christian missionaries again took the lead in the development of Sino-European interactions.[133] The victories over Napoleon consolidated Britain's global importance; by 1820, the British Empire controlled over one quarter of the world's population. The American Revolution in the late eighteenth century also shifted Britain's expansionist ambitions towards Asia and, more importantly, China.[134] In the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century, British Protestants grew to perceive China as an obstacle to a world capitalist market and Christian evangelism.[135] Especially after China's rejections of the Macartney mission in 1793 and the Amherst mission in 1816, Britain began to feel increasingly anxious about the usefulness of diplomacy in dealing with the Chinese.[136] The call for free trade climaxed among English politicians and merchants after they realised that between 1828 and 1836, China spent more than $38 million on importing illegal opium which was principally sponsored by the British East India Company.[137] As mentioned briefly in the introduction, after years of lobbying the parliament for free trade, the monopoly of the East India Company was finally abolished in 1833. The opening of the Chinese market accordingly forced the East India Company to permit missionaries to come into its territory, which led to the beginning of the Protestant mission in China.[138]

[133] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 283.
[134] James Chandler, *England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic Historicism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998): 1.
[135] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 283.
[136] Frederic Wakeman, "The Canton Trade and the Opium War", in Fairbank, K. John, (ed.), *The Cambridge History of China: Volume 10 Late Ch'ing, 1800—1911, Part I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 173.
[137] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 283.
[138] Ibid.

Despite officially non-denominational, the London Missionary Society (LMS) played a significant role in shaping the Anglo-Chinese relations throughout the nineteenth century after its founding in 1795. Unlike the Society of Jesus that was founded to spread Christian worldview, the LMS was founded as a coalition of several denominations such as Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Independent ministers, and was one of the many missionary societies founded during that period of time.[139] In the previous section, it has been mentioned that the Jesuits of the sixteenth century began to learn the Chinese language *after* they realised that that was probably the most effective way to convert the Chinese elites. Although they claimed to have taken a "top-down" approach to the spread of Christianity, from what has been discussed earlier, it can be seen that the Jesuit approach to the spread of Western knowledge was nothing but a bottom-up persuasion: they believed that as long as they persuaded the elites to accept Christian doctrines, the subjects would follow; but in reality, what they ended up doing was lowering their own standards in translations so that the Western terms could be successfully incorporated into Chinese discourse. In short, before the nineteenth century, China had the upper hand when it comes to the importation of Western knowledge.

The arrival of the Protestant missionaries, however, changed the power dynamics. This is not only because of the social and political turbulence in China during the nineteenth century, but also because, unlike the Jesuits, the Protestant missionaries took a dissemination approach to the spread of Western knowledge. The Protestant mission began when Robert Morrison, who, as mentioned in the introduction, wrote the first English-Chinese dictionary in 1815, was labouring for the LMS. Morrison had served as a translator for the East India Company between 1809 and 1815, and in 1816, he served as the interpreter for the Amherst mission.[140] In 1818, Morrison moved to Malacca where founded the first Anglo-Chinese College whose purpose was to publish Christian works in China.[141] In 1823, with the support of the Royal Asiatic Society of London, Morrison published one of the first translations of Bible.[142] In contrast to the French Jesuits who thought that the Bible was alien to the Chinese and therefore had to identify Chinese

[139] Ibid., 284.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.
[142] Federico Masini, "The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898", *Journal of Chinese Linguistics: monograph series*, 6 (1993): 12.

history with biblical history, Morrison arranged a corpus of Christian literature, translated them into Chinese, and disseminated them to the Chinese public. On top of the Old and New Testaments he prepared for translations, he also managed to publish several missionary journals, such as 察世俗每月統記傳 (A General Monthly Record, Containing an Investigation of the Opinions and Practice of Society), which later became the first magazine in modern Chinese history.[143]

With reference to the failure of the spread of Christianity in China between 1552 and 1583, Ricci once observed that, "…they [the Jesuits] were all newly arrived and could only study the language and letters of this land so as to be able to perform their task", highlighting the link between the success of the migration of Western knowledge to China and the missionaries' possession of the knowledge of the Chinese language.[144] For the Protestant missionaries, however, this problem did not exist when they arrived in China as Morrison's efforts had already managed to lay a solid foundation for the future missionary work. Moreover, the publications of missionary journals also gave rise to a series of linguistic innovations in the Chinese language: in the 1830s, south China was penetrated with missionaries and their Christian publications which often presented portraits of the Western powers, especially of Britain and the United States.[145] The popularity of publications accordingly led to the creation of a new Chinese lexicon for a range of subjects including politics, philosophy, and economics.[146]

What did not change, however, was the strategy used to translate some of the Western terms. The previous section has mentioned that when the Jesuits were translating Western knowledge into Chinese, they often had to equate a Latin word with an existing Chinese term so that it could be accepted by the Chinese elites. This strategy of cultural accommodation was also used in the early nineteenth century when the Protestant

[143] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 285.
[144] Matteo Ricci, Della Entrata della Compagnia di Giesu e Christianita nella Cina; cited in Masini, Federico, "The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898", *Journal of Chinese Linguistics: monograph series*, 6 (1993): 5.
[144] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 285.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.

missionaries arrived in China to spread Western science. For example, among the Protestant missionaries arrived in China, there were also some medical missionaries. In 1838, the Medical Missionary Society was founded in Guangzhou, whose sole purpose was to promote Western medical knowledge in China.[147] Among them, the translations of medical texts were mostly assigned to Dr. Benjamin Hobson, one of the key translating pioneers in the late 1840s and early 1850s.[148] Soon after his arrival in China, Hobson became a freelance lecturer in a medical school in Guangzhou. In order to better educate his students, he began to translate texts on Western medicine. When he was translating his *Treatise of Natural Philosophy*, he employed the Chinese term "博物 (bo wu)", meaning "all range of things", to translate "natural philosophy". The previous section has mentioned the Jesuits' translation of *philosophia* to the Chinese idea of "穷理 (qiong li)" in the sixteenth century, and how the two are conceptually different. The exact same argument can also be applied to Hobson's translation of "natural philosophy": as the term "natural philosophy" comes from Latin *philosophia naturalis*, and as for the Chinese term "博物 (bo wu)", just "穷理 (qiong li)", it essentially refers to a close investigation of all things knowable in the real world. Thus, as with the Jesuit translation of Western texts in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the Protestant translations of Western medicine in the nineteenth century also accommodated to the pre-existing Chinese knowledge system.

What is different between the Chinese translations of Western texts in the nineteenth century from those of the seventeenth century is that this strategy of cultural accommodation was not only utilised by the Protestant missionaries, but also by the Chinese intellectual elites. In the mid-nineteenth century, there emerged a medical tradition stressing the "heat factor therapies" in south China. According to Elman, this coincided with the publication of Hobson's translation of *Treatise of Natural Philosophy* where he introduced the concept.[149] Inspired by the Western medical knowledge, some Chinese doctors also began to write books on the so-called "hot factor disease". In 1838, one year after the publication of Hobson's *Treatise of Natural Philosophy*, Wang

[147] Elman, *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900*, 285.
[148] Ibid., 287.
[149] Ibid., 288.

Shixiong, a physician in Suzhou, published a book titled *Warp and Weft of Warm and Hot Factor Disease*, where he acknowledged the usefulness of Hobson's concept of "heat factor".[150] However, in his writings, he did not deploy Hobson's original meaning of "heat factor" which was related to Hobson's anatomical depictions of female reproductive organs, but instead subordinated the information to the traditional Chinese therapeutic regime, which was heavily based on the idea of controlling the circulation of internal conduits of "气 (*qi*)", meaning "life energy" and has a similar connotation to Hobson's "heat factor".[151] In other words, Wang accepted Hobson's idea of "heat factor" because he assimilated the original idea to the Chinese concept of "气 (*qi*)". It can be said the Chinese doctor self-accommodated a Western term to his own knowledge system.

This accommodation strategy used by the missionaries and the self-accommodation strategy used by the Chinese intellectuals began to change from the mid-nineteenth century—and more specifically, from the 1860s. The heavy defeats in the two Opium Wars crushed China's perception of itself as the superior civilisation to the rest of the world; the shift in the power dynamics forced Chinese officials and intellectuals to realise that China had been absorbed into the European-dominated international system and that they were no longer at the centre of the world. As such, from the beginning of the 1860s, a number of Chinese intellectuals began to advocate for the so-called "Western learning", that is, to learn and acquire knowledge *of* and *from* the West.[152]

One of the most obvious signs of the beginning of this "Western leaning" was in the ways in which Western terms were translated from the 1860s. In 1864, for instance, Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* was published and it was translated by American missionary William Martin, who frequently deployed the Chinese term "民主 (min zhu)" to translate "democracy" in Wheaton's text. This translation was not only

[150] Ibid.
[151] Wang Shixiong, *Wenre Jingwei (Warp and Weft of Warm and Hot Factor Disease*) (Shanghai: Qianqing tang, 1863): 2.
[152] Atsuko Watanabe and Ariel Shangguan, "How Did Two *Daos* Perceive the International Differently?", in Rösch, Felix, and Watanabe, Atsuko (eds.), *Modern Japanese Political Thought and International Relations* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018): 30.

problematic but it also ended up changing the modern Chinese lexicon, as in pre-modern Chinese language, the concept of "民主 (min zhu)" resembled nothing remotely close to the English idea of "democracy". In *Book of Documents*, a Confucian classic of history, for example, one sentence reads, "Once he superseded Xia, he became '民主 (min zhu)'", and "民主 (min zhu)" here refers to the lord of the people in the Xia Dynasty.[153] The same usage of "民主 (min zhu)" can also be found in another sentence that says, "God helps the people to find a "民主 (min zhu), and he delegates the task to Cheng Tang and lets him be the "民主 (min zhu)".[154] In this text, the Chinese concept of "民主 (min zhu)" was, again, used to refer to Cheng Tang's role as the leader of the region, not a political system where the multitude discuss politics. In fact, up till the early nineteenth century, there was no single term in Chinese lexicon to translate "democracy".[155] In the English-Chinese dictionary he compiled in 1815, Morrison defined democracy as "improper, since it is improper to be without a leader".[156] Similarly, in Medhurst's *English and Chinese dictionary*, "democracy" was defined as "disorderly administration by many".[157] Xiong argues that because neither Morrison nor Medhurst had a favourable view of democracy, the lack of a Chinese equivalence had in fact helped them express their unfavourable views of the concept in a full sentence.

Martin's translation of "democracy" to "民主 (min zhu)" had an immense effect, as according to Xiong, from that time onwards, Chinese officials who were sent abroad began to use the Chinese term "民主 (min zhu)" when writing about democratic political systems.[158] In his *Treatise on Japan*, Chinese scholar and official Huang Zunxian, for

[153] James Legge, *The Chinese Classic: With a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copious indexes* (Taipei: Southern Materials Centre, 1985): 563.
[154] Ibid., 588.
[155] Xiong Yuezhi, "'Liberty', 'Democracy', 'President': The translation and usage of some political terms in late Qing China", in Lackner, Michael, Amelung, Iwo, and Kurtz, Joachim (eds.), *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 73.
[156] Robert Morrison, *A Dictionary of the Chinese Language* (Macao: Hourable Easy India Company's Press, 1815): 14.
[157] Walter H. Medhurst, *English and Chinese Dictionary* (Shanghai: Inkstone Press, 1847): 180.
[158] Xiong, "'Liberty', 'Democracy', 'President': The translation and usage of some political terms in late Qing China", 74.

example, argued that all countries in the world can be divided into three type of government: monarchy, democracy, or constitutional monarchy. In his writing, he translated the English "democracy" to the Chinese "民主 (min zhu)", indicating the change in the meaning of the original Chinese term from "the lord of the people" to "rulership by the people". Similarly, Guo Songtao, who later became China's first diplomat to be sent to Europe, made following observations about Western democratic system in his diaries,

> This system is very good idea! Conditions in non-democratic countries in comparison are unbearable. The reason for the longevity of the Western nations is because the ruler and the people jointly control the policies of the government [my translation].[159]

And again:

> Western countries can be divided into two categories: monarchies and democracies. However, duties and powers are usually exercised and controlled by parliament. This makes them very sensitive to public opinion and sentiment [my translation].[160]

Apart from "democracy", another Western term that ended up changing the original meaning of its Chinese translation was "liberty". In modern Chinese language, "liberty" is often translated as "自由 (zi you)" and the term itself has been in use since the fifth century. However, it was not until Walter H. Medhurst's translation of "liberty" to "自由 (zi you)" in 1847 that the Chinese term began to connote the idea of "liberty", or "freedom".[161] In *Books of Rites*, the fifth century Confucian classic, for instance, one phrase reads, "To leave or to stay is not up to one's liking [my translation]."[162] In this phrase, the original Chinese "自由 (zi you)" was translated to "one's liking"; although it cannot be said that the expression "one's liking" was completely unrelated to the meaning of "liberty", there is no indication in the original phrase that "自由 (zi you)" can be used as a political concept. Similarly, in one famous Chinese ballad from the Han Dynasty, *Southeast the Peacock Flies*, we can find one line which reads, "For a long time I have

[159] Guo Songtao, *Guo Songtao Riji (The Diaries of Guo Songtao)* (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1911): 179.
[160] Ibid., 535.
[161] Xiong, "'Liberty', 'Democracy', 'President': The translation and usage of some political terms in late Qing China", 69.
[162] Ruan Yuan (ed.), *Liji (Books of Rites)* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1980): 1512.

found her infuriating/ How dare you try to have your own way?"[163] "自由 (zi you)" in this case was translated to "have one's own way"—which, again, is not necessarily wrong at the semantic level, but it does not connote the political meaning of "liberty" that is inherent in the English original concept.

The political usage of the Chinese term "自由 (zi you)" became particularly evident from the late nineteen century. In 1887, *Shenbao*, a local newspaper in Shanghai, published an article entitled "论西国自由之理相爱之情 (On the Western Idea of Liberty and Mutual Love)" where the Western concept of "liberty", which was translated to the Chinese "自由 (zi you)", was described as follows,

> The Western idea of "liberty" means the closeness between the ruler and the people, and the equality in the amount of power they possess. There are communications between the above and the below, and if anything happens in the country, the officials and gentry always assemble and discuss the issue together. The people are also involved in the public debate. If the ruler says something must be carried out but the people are against it, it will not be carried out. If the people are for something but the ruler is against it, it will also not be carried out. Thus, public affairs in the West are a matter of both the ruler and the people. Even if the ruler is violent, he may not arbitrarily violate his subjects. And if a subject is guilty, the ruler cannot bend the law and be lenient towards him—as public law is of the highest order. If the people are just and respect the law, the ruler cannot do anything to punish him. If the people are cautious and full of self-respect, they will never in their lifetime have to attend a court or meet an official. If the people simply indulge in studies, eat well, drive around in carriages, and innocently gain money, and have integrity and enjoy tranquillity—even though they may be poor, but what harm is there? This, is called "liberty" [my translation].[164]

This was the first substantial explanation of the Western idea of "liberty". From this time onwards, the modern Chinese lexicon began to use "自由 (zi you)" in both political and non-political senses, and the English "liberty" has also by default been translated to "自由 (zi you)" since.

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[163] Burton Watson, (ed.), *The Columbia Book of Chinese Poetry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984): 82.
[164] Unknown, "Lun Xiguo Ziyou zhi li, xiang'ai zhi qing (On the Western Ideal of Liberty and Mutual Love", *Shenbao* (2 October, 1987): 1

What can be observed from the cases of "democracy" and "liberty" is that compared to the early period when the missionaries had to accommodate Western terms to suit the Chinese understandings, from the late nineteenth century, the meanings of Chinese terms began to change in order to accommodate Western values. In fact, looking back on history, this Chinese accommodation of Western values began right after the second Opium War: the introduction of this thesis mentioned a British governmental official named William John Napier, who ended up changing the entire trajectory of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy because he could not decipher the correct meaning behind the Chinese term "夷目 (yimu)". This story, in fact, did not end there. After Napier's mistranslation of the Chinese term, a general crisis began to build up around the Chinese arrogance and their xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners. The British seriously believed that their national honour was insulted by the Chinese officials' provocative language and were determined to find a way to ban those terms from future diplomatic intercourse.[165] After the British won the second Opium War, they then lost no time in asserting dominance over the Chinese in the linguistic aspect of diplomacy. As Article 50 and 51 of the British Treaty of Tianjin (1858) stipulate:

> All official communications, addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of Her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese authorities, shall, henceforth, be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a Chinese version, but it is understood that, *in the event of there being any difference of meaning between the English and the Chinese text, the English Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense*…It is agreed that, henceforward, the character "夷" (barbarian), shall not be applied to the Government or the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese Authorities either in the Capital or in the Provinces. [my emphasis][166]

As explained in the introduction, the Chinese term "夷 (yi)" does not necessarily mean "barbarians" but can also refer to "foreigners". Yet, because of the Napier affair, the British still decided to ban the usage of the character from future diplomatic practices—based on what *they assumed* to be the meaning of the character. What they did not

[165] Liu, "Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century", 132-133.
[166] *Treaty between Her Majesty and the Emperor of China, signed, in the English and Chinese Language, at Nanking, August 29, 1842* (London: T. R. Harrison, St. Martin's Lane, 1844): 47.

anticipate, however, was that this ban turned out to be much more effective and successful than anyone could have imagined. A study conducted by Fang Wengui on the lexical changes of "夷 (yi)" (barbarian) since the nineteenth century suggests that since the British ban in 1858, the character began to be gradually replaced by other terms that connote the meanings of "foreigner". And by the end of the nineteenth century, the term "夷 (yi)" (barbarian) has been completely erased from the modern Chinese lexicon.[167] It can be argued that the shift in the power dynamics between the Europeans and the Chinese plus the beginning of "Western learning" had not only led to China's signing of an unequal treaty, but also changed the entire modern Chinese vocabulary.

Also, in the previous section, it has been mentioned that when translating a Western term that did not exist in the pre-existing Chinese conceptual network, the Jesuits attempted to equate two conceptually different terms for the foreign idea to be willingly incorporated into Chinese discourse. This translation tactic was also adopted in the late nineteenth century, but this time, by the Chinese intellectuals who were attempting to resolve the incommensurability between Chinese and Western knowledge systems. Kang Youwei, for instance, one of the most influential thinkers of the late Qing period, was attempting to develop a way to scientifically explain societal conduct; as he wrote,

> If a law is derived from geometry axiom, then the truth it claims is substantial; if it is set up by man, then the truth it claims is relatively weak. A law of geometry axiom is called absolute substantiality, as well as eternal substantiality; a law of man is called equivocal substantiality [my translation].[168]

Kang's purpose of writing the above passage was to equate the Confucian idea of "substantial truth" with scientific validity. For Kang, the order of the Chinese society is based on the Confucian teaching of "substantial truth" which advocated a great unity among people and harmony between people. However, Kang argues that such a substantial truth is not sufficiently substantial if it does not possess a universal validity. Inspired by the accuracy and universality of Euclidean geometry, Kang accordingly

[167] Fang Wengui, "Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms: The Transition From "Barbarian" to "Foreigner" in Nineteenth Century", in Lackner, Michael, Amelung, Iwo, and Kurtz, Joachin (eds.), *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 95.
[168] Kang Youwei, Kangzi Neiwai Pian (The Inside and Outside of Kangzi) (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju, 1886): 198.

asserts that if a law shall be based on substantial truth, it has to be scientifically verifiable. In other words, by claiming that the Confucian teaching can be explained using the Euclidean geometry, Kang was trying to turn the incommensurability between the Chinese and the European knowledge systems into a condition of universality. What hence can be concluded here is that the role, it seems, has been reversed between the Chinese and the Westerners with regards to the importation of Western knowledge: whilst in the early seventeenth century Western knowledge was rendered to accommodate Chinese values, since the 1860s the Chinese were desperately trying to accommodate their own knowledge to Western standards.

1.3 Translation and/in International Relations

This chapter has so far discussed the history of the Chinese translations of Western knowledge from the late sixteenth century up to the late nineteenth century. It can be seen that since the late nineteenth century, there was a clear rupture from the previous era in terms of the ways in which Western knowledge was translated, which was mostly due to China's heavy defeats in the Opium Wars. It has also identified that when translating a new Western term into Chinese, translators often use accommodation strategy to resolve the problem of incommensurability between the two knowledge systems. The final section of this chapter will hence apply these observations made in the previous two section to the translations of IR concepts and see whether and how the existing studies on the Chinese translation of IR terms manifest similar issues.

It has to be pointed out first that very few studies have so far been conducted on the Chinese translations of IR concepts. Probably the earliest discussion on the subject matter was conducted during an interview in 1992 with Yuan Ming, the director of the Institute of International Relations at Peking University, who explains how the Chinese understanding of the concept of "balance of power" is based on a similar Chinese concept from the Warring State period.[169] The previous section has mentioned that the Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* was published in the 1860s. This translation, in fact, has not only brought in the concept of international law to China, but

[169] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 9.

also some IR concepts—and *balance of power* was one of them.[170] Although the theory has been formulated in many ways over the centuries, as one of the most influencial concepts in realist canon, *balance of power* proposes that when a state is at or near the top of the international heap in resourses of power, other states tend to balance against threats of the most powerful by developing or mobilising their military capacities.[171] In his *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz argues that such an act of balance of power will result in the formation of the structure of the international system which can be a divided into three categories: bipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony.[172] During the Warring State period, just like Europe during the nineteenth century, China was a multipolar structure with seven great powers trying to balance against each other.[173] In Chinese language, this act of power balancing was termed "均势 (jun shi)", literally meaning balancing power. Yuan Ming accordingly argues that the reason for the immediate acceptance of the Western idea of balance of power in China was because Chinese scholars find that the English concept share many similarities with the Chinese "均势 (jun shi)" and therefore feel related to the concept.[174]

Fast forward to 2016, a similar argument has also been made by Astrid Nordin in her recent study on the Chinese translation of "hegemony", which is "霸 (ba)".[175] In the realm of International Relations, the concept of hegemony often denotes the regional or global dominance of one state over others. In the realist camp of IR theory, however, the concept has been preoccupied regarding the questions of state power and associated with the idea of zero-sum power politics.[176] The Chinese "霸 (ba)" also has a similar connotation. As with the case of *balance of power*, the Chinese concept of "霸 (ba)" was coined during the

[170] Ibid., 11.
[171] Jack S. Levy, and William R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999", *Security Studies*, 14 (2005): 1.
[172] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 128.
[173] Zhuo Zhengwei, Youshi yu Junshi: Chunqiu Zhanguo Shiqi Zhongguo yu Jindai Ouzhou Xiandai Bijiao (Advantage and Balance of Power: a comparison between China during the Warring State period and Europe during thenineteenth century), *Aisixiang*, (19 November 2012) [online] (http://www.aisixiang.com/data/59228.html) [Accessed 18 September 2017].
[174] Ibid.
[175] Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese? Ba in Chinese International Relations", 335.
[176] Ibid., 336.

Warring State period when there was a power struggle between multiple states. In Chinese classics, the concept of "霸 (ba)" is used very heavily and often denotes the idea of not only a politically dominant but also a morally corrupt leadership. In *Book of Rites*, for instance, one sentence reads, "When Gonggong was the hegemon in Jiuzhou, he had a son who managed to distribute resource fairly among the people and thus was loved and worshiped by the public [my translation]."[177] In this sentence, the concept of "霸 (ba)" was used to describe the doings of Gongong who was not loved and worship by the people as much as his son was. Also, in *Records of Grand Historian*, a Chinese historical classic from 91BC, we can find another sentence which uses the concept of "霸 (ba)" to describe a morally questionable leadership: "Those who were trying to stop him were defeated, and those who were defeated now bow to him. He never lost a war, and that's why he is the hegemon [my translation]."[178] Nordin accordingly argues that by translating the Western concept of hegemony to "霸 (ba)", the Chinese translation has imbued the English original concept with a moral dimension associated with an aggressive leader operating through coercion and force.[179] In other words, the English concept of hegemony has been accommodated to the Chinese idea of "霸 (ba)" that connotes moral corruption and political coercion.

The above two case studies demonstrate that when it comes to translating Western IR concepts that already have similar terms in the Chinese language, they tend to get accommodated to the pre-existing Chinese meanings. The next question is what about those concepts that do not have Chinese equivalences. In 2001, William Callahan published an article in which he examined the Chinese translation of "sovereignty". As with *balance of power*, *sovereignty* was also one of the IR terms that were brought in to China via Henry's *Elements of International Law*. According to Callahan, very few international law neologisms crafted then by William Martin in his translation of Wheton's book can still be

[177] Confucius, Liji (The Book of Rites), *Gushiwen Wang* (June 2010) [online] (https://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/bfanyi_1681.aspx) [Accessed 17 September 2017].
[178] Sima Qian, Shiji (Records of Grand Historian), *Gushiwen Wang* (June 2010) [online] (https://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/bookv_95.aspx) [Accessed 17 September 2017].
[179] Nordin, "Hegemony in Chinese? Ba in Chinese International Relations", 344.

found in Chinese discourse today—and yet *sovereignty* is one of them.[180] The Chinese translation of *sovereignty* is "主权 (zhu quan)", and it consists of two characters: "主 (zhu)", meaning ruler, master; and "权 (quan)", which means rights, but also power (not in the positive sense of the power of a legitimate authority, but in the negative sense of one's privileged position to manipulate rules). "主权 (zhu quan)" thus means the rights, or power, of the master. In *Guanzi*, a 7th century BCE political and philosophical text, for example, one paragraph reads,

> If we reward the subjects too much we will risk exhausting the national treasury; if we are too lenient towards the subjects we will risk undermining the authority of the national law. The exhaustion of the national treasury will undermine the power of the monarch ("主权 (zhu quan)"); and the leniency towards the subjects will undermine our national security. Thus, everything has to be balanced and nothing can be overdone [my translation].[181]

Similarly, in *Qianfulun*, philosopher Wang Fu from the Han Dynasty says, "Those in power have greed; so they hate those with integrity. Those in power will do anything to hide those with integrity; because they pose threats to the power of the monarch [my translation]".[182] In both of these cases, "主权 (zhu quan)" was used to refer to the power of the monarch instead of the authority of a state. Callahan accordingly argues that because the notion of sovereignty in Chinese harkens back to the pre-modern conception of sovereignty that is associated with the monarch, "…sovereignty deconstructs itself via its Chinese translation."[183] This argument, however, is slightly misleading. The Chinese concept of "主权 (zhu quan)" indeed used to refer to the power of the monarch; and yet, as Callahan himself argues, its meaning has been replaced with the Western notion of sovereignty since the publication of the Chinese translation of Wheaton's book. This means that just like the cases of "liberty" and "democracy" as discussed in the previous section, the Chinese concept of "主权 (zhu quan)" has accommodated its meaning to the

[180] William A. Callahan, "China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: discussion of 'Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics'", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10 (2001): 75.
[181] Guanzi, Qi Chen Qi Zhu (Seven Officials and Seven Rulers), *Gushiwen Wang* (June 2010) [online] (https://www.gushiwen.org/GuShiWen_37b591a524.aspx) [Accessed 18 September 2017].
[182] Wang Fu, *Qianfulun (Comments of a Recluse)* (June 2011) [online] (http://www.zwbk.org/MyLemmaShow.aspx?lid=180778) [Accessed 18 September 2017].
[183] Callahan, "China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: discussion of 'Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics'", 83.

Western notion of sovereignty. Hence, what can be argued here is that the Chinese usage of the concept of sovereignty does not demonstrate China's manipulation of Western IR terms as Callahan suggests, but rather, it is a manifestation of the shifting power dynamics between China and the West during the late nineteenth century.

The above three studies are pretty much all the existing literature so far on the Chinese translations of Western IR concepts. Despite the limited number of research, it can be seen that the translations of IR concepts manifest the same issue regarding cultural accommodation as the previous translation of Western knowledge from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. The final part of this section discusses a Chinese IR concept that has been the centre of disciplinary debate in the recent years, that is, "天下 (tian xia)", meaning "all under heaven". This concept is of relevance to this study because, unlike all the other terms that have been discussed so far, "天下 (tian xia)" is not meant to be a translation for any Western IR concept. However, as the rest of the section will show, the historical and political contexts of the term suggest that the term was in fact proposed to accommodate the Western idea of "international". Hence, in a way, "天下 (tian xia)" can be seen as the Chinese (re)translation of the concept of "international".

Although the concept of "天下 (tian xia)" did not appear in IR until 2005, it is in fact one of the most frequently adopted concepts in ancient Chinese texts. In *Mencius*, for example, one passage reads,

> [T]hus, it can be said that people cannot be controlled simply by closing the borders; a state cannot be protected simply by being surrounded by steep mountains and a raging torrent; all under heaven cannot be conquered simply by using forces [my translation].[184]

The most common translation of the Chinese concept of "天下 (tian xia)" is "all under heaven". Depending on the context, the "heaven" can mean the world or sometimes only China. In 2005, Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang famously proposed the term as a new

[184] Mencius, Mencius, Gushiwen Wang (June 2010) [online] (https://www.gushiwen.org/GuShiWen_c1ed2e7b1a.aspx) [Accessed 18 September 2017].

analytical concept for the discipline of IR.[185] Despite Zhao's complex reasoning, the term can in general be summarised as follows:

1. The world must be seen as a political entity under a commonly agreed institution;
2. The world should be the highest level of political measurement; from the perspective of international relations, this means that world affairs and issues should be analysed by a world standard, not a nation-state standard;
3. Political institutions at each level must be of the same essence. The political principle must be able to be universalised and transitively run through all political levels;
4. The legitimacy of a political institution should be rooted in the ethical.[186]

Different from the Westphalian state system which stresses the equality of each individual state, Chinese "天下 (tian xia)" emphasises a family-state system which favours hierarchy. According to Zhao, the world governed by the state system is a "non-world", for inter-state institutions cannot solve trans-state problems. The "天下 (tian xia)" system, on the other hand, sees "the whole world as one family" and therefore is capable of creating a global system, thus solving global problems.[187] Some Western scholars such as Willian Callahan then criticise that the concept is a way to promote Chinese-style hegemony.[188] Zhao, however, claims that this is not true, and arguing that what he really wanted to promote is the idea of "world-ness"—a new way of thinking about international relations which goes beyond current state-centric approach. As he argues:

> Chinese political philosophy defines a political order in which the world is primary, whereas the nationa/state is primary in Western philosophy. Certainly, westerners do think about the world, but the Western imaginations of the world are nothing higher and greater than international alliances or unions of natio/states, not going beyond the framework of nation/state. Such projects have essential difficulties in reaching the real integrality of the world for they are limited by the perspectives of

[185] Zhao Tingyang, *Tianxia Tizi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun (The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution)* (Nanjing: Jiangsu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2005): 5; Zhao Tingyang, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All under Heaven'", *Social Identities*, 12 (2006): 29.
[186] Zhao, *Tianxia Tizi: Shijie Zhidu Zhexue Daolun (The Tianxia System: A Philosophy for the World Institution)*, 32.
[187] Ibid.
[188] Callahan, "China and the Globalisation of IR Theory: discussion of 'Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics'", 83.

> nationa/states, due to the lack of a vision of world-ness. To see the world from its world-ness is different from seeing it from part of it.[189]

Upon its publication, Zhao's idea was hotly debated by both Western and Chinese scholars. Though Zhao is a philosopher, not an IR theorist, his "天下 (tian xia)" argument supports the application of traditional Chinese values and concepts to the study of international relations. When asked for his motivation to propose the theory, Zhao said that given China's status as a rising power, he believed the timing was right for rethinking what China can give to the rest of the world.[190] Whether this was Zhao's true intention or not remains to be discovered; yet given the fact that "天下 (tian xia)" has since become a widely used IR concept, it is probably necessary to explore the hidden political as well as intellectual motivation behind such theorisation. In fact, in 2005—the year the concept was first introduced—Chinese President Hu Jintao proposed a Chinese vision for world order on the anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations. In his speech, he made four suggestions to build "a harmonius world with long-lasting peace and common prosperity":

1. We should set up a new security concept based on mutual trust, benefit, and equality;
2. The UN should take tangible measures to implement the Millennium Development Goals and accelerate the development of developing nations;
3. We should respect the right of each country to independently choose its social system and ways of development;
4. We should safeguard the authority of the UN through reasonable and necessary reform, raise the efficiency of the organisation and strengthen its capacity to cope with new threats and challenges.[191]

The political and intellectual motivations underlying "天下 (tian xia)" become clear when one juxtaposes these suggestions with the four arguments Zhao made regarding the concept: Firstly, the United Nations should be seen as a governing world institution with the highest political authority. Secondly, the UN has the highest authority and therefore the

[189] Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All under Heaven'", 31.
[190] Ibid., 32.
[191] Hu Jintao; cited in Wang, "China: between copying and constructing", 110.

responsibility to implement the commonly agreed political goal which, in this case, is the Millennium Development Goals. Thirdly, one political principle that all nation-states should obey is to respect each country's own ways of development, namely, sovereignty and rights. And finally, if the UN can fullfil these obligations, it shall receive corresponding support and endorsement from people. It seems that the world order Hu proposed was not only a practical application of "天下 (tian xia)" *par excellence*, but also a political strategy to safeguard China's national interests and sovereignty via creating the so-called commonly agreed rules. If Callahan's concern regarding the construction of a Chinese hegemony is true, then it can be argued that the promotion of the Chinese concept of "天下 (tian xia)" at both political and intellectual levels have made the first step towards the emergence of such a Chinese hegemony. Because what both President Hu and Zhao are doing, is essentially replacing the Western notion of international relations, or, more specifically, the concept of "international", with the Chinese idea of "天下 (tian xia)" and the hierarchical order it connotes. "天下 (tian xia)", it thus can be argued, is in fact a Chinese (re)translation of the Western idea of "international".

1.4 Conclusion

The literature this chapter has reviewed concerning the Chinese translations of Western knowledge is by no means exhaustive. For example, when it comes to the Chinese acceptance of scientific knowledge from the sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century, Elman's study is much more detailed. With regards to the Chinese translations of Western terms during the late Qing period, both Masini's work and that of Lackner et al. have a much more comprehensive examination of the terms translated during this period of time.

The purpose of this chapter is not only to review the existing studies on the Chinese translations of Western knowledge, but also to identify the sustaining issues that exist that have, and have not, been addressed in the Chinese translations of Western terms. And from what has been discussed in this chapter, it seems clear that the there exists a fundamental incommensurability between the Chinese and the Western knowledge

systems. Such an incommensurability is often overcome by the accommodation strategy developed by the Jesuits in the sixteenth century and, since then, it seems to have been the common way to resolve the tension caused by the two irreconcilable knowledge systems. However, although accommodation has been in use since the sixteenth century, the subject of accommodation has changed over time. As discussed in the second section, after the 1860s, the change in the power dynamics between China and the West has reversed the role when it comes to the Chinese translations of Western knowledge; whilst previously it was Western terms that had to accommodate the Chinese values, from the late nineteenth century onwards, the Chinese intellectuals have been actively accommodating their own knowledge to Western standards. And from what has been discussed in the third section, it can be seen that this accommodation strategy is also manifested in the Chinese translations of IR concepts. This means that when examining the translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, such an accommodation strategy might also appear. With that in mind, the second chapter of this thesis will outline how this study is going to examine the Chinese translations of Waltz's text.

Chapter 2. The Meaning and History of Political Concepts: An Analytical Framework

> …when an ideology…profoundly marked by the peculiar conditions of the society that produces it, is universalised and applied to another country with a different historical and social structure, it is apt to become highly abstract, in extreme cases retaining no more than the original terminology.[192]
> —Masao Maruyama

As stated in the introduction, this thesis studies the Chinese translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Its purpose is to examine how some key concepts Waltz uses to theorise international politics have become both transformed and transformative in the process of translation. The previous chapter has reviewed the history of the Chinese translations of Western knowledge as well as the existing research on the Chinese translations of IR concepts. It has demonstrated how, in the course of four centuries, the Chinese acceptance of Western knowledge has shifted from conditional to active engagement. It has also explained how, despite the change in the conditions of acceptance, the incommensurability between the Chinese and the Western knowledge systems still remains to be the biggest obstacle when translating a Western concept into Chinese, and the translations often have to culturally accommodate to either of the knowledge systems.

Following the observations gained by reviewing the existing literature on Chinese translations, the present thesis decided that in order to best capture the differences between the original concepts from Waltz's book and their Chinese translations, the investigation should be carried out from two aspects of the translation: one synchronic, and one diachronic. As mentioned in the introduction, synchronic research investigates change in the meaning of language at a given moment, while diachronic research studies the change in the meaning over time. In the case of this particular study, the synchronic aspect of the Chinese translations of Waltz's original concepts would be how the meaning of a particular concept changes when it is translated from English to Chinese; the diachronic aspect would be how the meaning has changed across the three different

[192] Masao Maruyama, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, translated by M. Hane (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974): 7.

Chinese editions. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to develop an analytical framework that can best capture and examine both aspects of the translations.

This chapter is divided into two parts: the first part of the chapter will lay out the conceptual framework within which this research is placed; its aim is to inform the general direction of the research as well as to provide enough analytical language for the later discussions. Two authors' works have been selected to inform the conceptual framework of this thesis: Reinhart Koselleck, and Karl Mannheim. As this chapter will show, Koselleck's works will be mostly used to analyse the synchronic aspect of the Chinese translations of Waltz's text, whilst Mannheim's works are particularly useful in informing the diachronic aspect of the translations. The second half will then explain what concepts from Waltz's book have been selected for analysis and what method has been employed to extract, organise, and analyse those concepts. Its purpose is to describe the actions that have been taken to investigate its research question.

2.1 Conceptualising Translation: Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte* and Mannheim's stylistic approach to the sociology of knowledge

Despite being a study on translation, this project did not base its conceptual framework on translation theory. The reasons for this is because, as mentioned already in the introduction, this thesis uses "concept" as its basic unit of analysis, and when it comes to the study of translation of concepts, translation study alone is simply not sufficient in explaining how the meanings embedded in a specific concept get transplanted into a different linguistic context. This is because, as intellectual historian Christopher Hill argues, most of the translation-focused studies have difficulty deciding on the difference between a word and a concept.[193] Moreover, when it comes to examining the diachronic aspect of translation, translation theory seems not to be able to provide enough analytical language apart from describing the differences in translations across the three Chinese editions.

[193] Christopher L. Hill, "Conceptual Universalisation in the Transnational Nineteenth Century", in Moyn, Samuel, and Sartori, Andrew (eds.), *Global Intellectual History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013): 143.

Accordingly, in seeking to theorise the processes through which the key concepts in Waltz's text come into being in Chinese discourse, this study took its lead from Reinhart Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte* and Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. The rationale for the choice of such conceptual framework is based on the observation that both authors' works have their theoretical advantage in contributing to the analysis of the Chinese translations of Waltz's concepts. Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte*, for instance, relates conceptual change to social history; the most prominent advantage of this approach lies in its choice of concepts as distinct units of analysis. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge treats human thought as being influenced by socio-political conditions and thus stresses the "relational validity" of all knowledge.[194] The two frameworks have different emphases; however, they both share a commitment to examining any knowledge claim within a variety of contexts. It is upon this epistemological common ground that this study would like to assert the compatibility of these two authors' works and justify its conceptual tool.

2.11 Translating Social and Political Concepts: Begriffsgeschichte revisited

As mentioned in the introduction, this study attempts to examine how the meanings of a particular concept become transplanted into a different linguistic context when it is translated into another language. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to first understand the process whereby a new concept generates meanings in the target language—namely, the linguistic aspect of the translation. The conceptual framework this study chooses to adopt to investigate this process is based on Reinhart Koselleck's *Begriffsgeschichte* (also known as the history of concepts or conceptual history). I say "based on" because—as Keith Tribe, the translator of Koselleck's *Futures Past*, says—"*Begriffsgeschichte* is more a procedure than a definite method. It is intended not as an end in itself but rather as a means of emphasising the importance of linguistic and semantic analysis for the practice of social and economic history."[195] Since it is not the purpose of this study to achieve the linguistic comprehensiveness of Koselleck's methods, instead of reviewing every philological, linguistic, and historical method emphasised in

[194] Robert H. Coombs, "Karl Mannheim, Epistemology, and the Sociology of Knowledge", *The Sociological Quarterly*, 7 (1966): 230.
[195] Keith Tribe, "Introduction", in Koselleck, Reinhart, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, xvi.

Begriffsgeschichte, this section will examine these methods in a pragmatic manner and focus on the ones that can best help theorise the process of translating Waltz's ideas into Chinese discourse. It is hence worth noting that the analytical language this study borrows from *Begriffsgeschichte* only constitutes part of Koselleck's methodological framework.

Begriffsgeschichte, or conceptual history, is an interdisciplinary historiographic approach to social and political concepts developed since midcentury in Germany. The term *Begriffsgeschichte*, according to Koselleck, derives from Hegel, and has existed as an explicit mode of inquiry and retained a permanent position in historical lexicography since the eighteenth century.[196] In the late 1950s, Koselleck, who was a lecturer in Heidelberg and also had been the foremost exponent and practitioner of *Begriffsgeschichte*, proposed a project to develop a new kind of conceptual history at a meeting of Arbeitskreis für Moderne Sozialgeschichte (a working group of historians who first introduced modern social history into a German context).[197] The theoretical goal of this project, in the words of Melvin Richter, is to "relate thought, once social and political change had been conceptualised, to changes in the structures of government and society".[198] The proposal later turned into a multi-volume historical dictionaries *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Basic Concepts in History: A Dictionary on Historical Principles of Political and Social Language in Germany),*[199] which charts the principal historical shifts in the conceptual vocabularies and special languages of politics, government, and society in German-speaking Europe between 1750 and 1850.[200] Although due to the publication's limited uses of concepts relating to the German-speaking region the dictionary *per se* is much less well-known in the English-speaking world, the theoretical and methodological importance of the contribution is well-documented in a series of essays published later by Koselleck who was also the project director of the account.

[196] Hayden White, "Forward", in Koselleck, Reinhart, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002): i.
[197] Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, viii.
[198] Melvin Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995): 20.
[199] Since the two dictionaries never made into the English-speaking world, here I used Richter's translations of the book titles.
[200] Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*, 248.

German genre of conceptual history, in fact, is not the only approach to the study of political concepts. In the United States, for example, Arthur O. Lovejoy famously founded the discipline known as the history of ideas with his book *The Great Chain of Beings* (1936), in which he traces the migration of what he calls "unit-ideas" from one intellectual domain to another and in so doing reveals ambiguities and confusions in the development of Western philosophical systems and ideologies.[201] Although Lovejoy places great stress on conceptual shifts across different ages, his method is predominantly psychological. The enterprise derives from the assumption that in the history of Western philosophy, there are only a few unit-ideas that thinkers must draw from and moreover, the book does not even mention any systematic method for accurately identifying these so-called "unit-ideas". Perhaps the nearest Anglophone analogue of *Begriffsgeschichte* is represented by the work of intellectual historians from the Cambridge School, who emphasise the historical investigation of political language: J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn, Richard Tuck, James Tully, Quentin Skinner, just to name a few. Compared to Koselleck's works such as *The Practice of Conceptual History* (2002) and *Future Past* (2004), which were done at far greater length on a more delimited period, the work of the Cambridge School scholars shows much less interest in dealing with the way groups, parties, or any collectives that are larger than individual theorists perceive or evaluate structural changes. Richter speculates that this is likely due to the School's well-received objection to the abusive usage of class categories by Marxist scholars.[202] Yet in comparison to Koselleck's work, which identifies both individuals and groups struggling with one another over the priviledge of being able to define social and political terms, the work of the Cambridge School appears to be much narrower in its scope. Finally, unlike *Begriffsgeschichte*, the analytical language of which is mostly drawn from semantic studies and linguistics, the authors of the Cambridge School have never been willing to base their findings on any theory of language—despite the School's primary emphasis being the relationship between language and political theory. It is precisely upon this methodological advantage that this research decides to base its conceptual analysis on *Begriffsgeschichte*.

[201] Arthur, O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936).
[202] Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*, 139.

Generally, t*wo* analytical frameworks utilised in *Begriffsgeschichte* are of particular relevance to the present study: the differentiation between a concept and a word, and the theorisation of the temporal dimension in political language. These two methods are not only inextricably linked to each other, but also represent two distinct analytical stages in Koselleck's practice of conceptual history. At the heart of the method of *Begriffsgeschichte* is its attempt to overcome the limitation of traditional historical philology and lexicography by separating "concept" from "word".[203] Throughout his writings, Koselleck repeatedly tries to theorise the difference between concepts and words—because for him, "each concept is associated with a word, but not every word is a social and political concept"; and "*Begriffsgeschichte* deals with the convergence of *concept* and history [my emphasis]".[204] One specific pair of linguistic devices then enables him to differentiate the two lexemes: semasiology and onomasiology. In his essays Koselleck never gives any detailed account of the actual methodological procedure of the two devices; however, it has to be noted that the application of semasiology and onomasiology to his analyses of social and political concepts is one of the very features which distinguish *Begriffsgeschichte* from other approaches such as the Cambridge School and those identified with A. O. Lovejoy.

Semasiology and onomasiology as two closely related branches of linguistics have hardly found their way into the Anglo-Saxon world. Even in the continental European tradition of lexicological research where the heritage of semasiology and onomasiology is preserved, the terms still have not made their way into the standard set of terms to be found in introductory courses of linguistics.[205] Both methods were brought about as the result of the "structural turn" in the discipline of linguistics and introduced as unique branches of lexicology which deal with the relationships between words and reality.[206] The main difference between the two is that they represent opposite ways of perceiving the link between "a concept" and what Geeraerts calls the "word form"—namely, the lexical expression of the concept.[207] The following quote from Kurt Baldinger, a Swiss linguist and philologist, illustrates the distinction between the two methods *par excellence*:

[203] Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank van Vree, "A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History—An Introduction", 2.
[204] Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, 86.
[205] Dirk Geeraerts, "Salience Phenomena in the Lexicon: a typology", in Albertazzi, Liliana (ed.), *Meaning and Cognition: a multidisciplinary approach* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2000): 79.
[206] Kurt Baldinger, *Semantic Theory: Towards a Modern Semantics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980): 280.
[207] Geeraerts, "Salience Phenomena in the Lexicon: a typology", 82.

"Semasiology…considers the isolated word and the way its meanings are manifested, while onomasiology looks at the designations of a particular concept, that is, at a multiplicity of expressions which form a whole".[208] In other words, a semasiological perspective takes the word form as its starting-point and examines how several concepts—or meanings—are associated with that word; by contrast, an onomasiological perspective starts with the concept and asks for the corresponding words that best express the given idea. Take the word "apple" as an example; a semasiological question regarding the word "apple" could be, "what is the meaning of the term 'apple'?", to which one answer could be, "a type of fruits that is round and red". An onomasiological approach, on the other hand, starts from the concept and asks for its names; therefore, in this case, an onomasiological question could be, "what is the name of a fruit that is round and red?", to which one answer could be, "apple".

Following this distinction between semasiology and onomasiology, Koselleck accordingly differentiates concepts from words on three levels: the lexical unit by which they are expressed, the object (s) to which they refer, and the meaningful content intended by thought:

> The meaning of the word always refers to that which is meant, whether a train of thought or an object, etc. The meaning is therefore fixed to the word, but it is sustained by the spoken or written context, and it also arises out of the situation to which it refers. A word becomes a concept if this context of meaning in which—and for which—the word is used, is entirely incorporated into the word itself. The concept is fixed to the word, but at the same time it is more than the word.[209]

A word, therefore, consists of two parts: the linguistic form and the idea or the object for which the form stands. Such theorisation bears a strong resemblance to Ferdinand de Saussure's language of semiotics as discussed in the introduction. In fact, Koselleck's idea becomes clearer when it is juxtaposed with Saussure's theory: what is a word to Koselleck, therefore, is a sign to Saussure; it has the signifier (the lexical form) and the signified (the objects to which the word refers). The word "state", for example, first of all, has its linguistic form—the word *state*; then it has its signified object, that is, a country considered as an organised political entity. The meaning, as Koselleck says, is fixed to the word and

[208] Baldinger, *Semantic Theory: Towards a Modern Semantics*, 278.
[209] Reinhart Koselleck, 1967; cited in Douglas R. Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth Century Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press, 2002): 26.

there is no ambiguity in defining the term.[210] The complexity arises, however, when "state" becomes a concept. A concept, in Koselleck's view, is a word that incorporates "the entity of meaning and experience within a socio-political context within which and for which a word is used".[211] A concept hence has a plenitude of meanings and can often be designated by more than one word. In the case of "state", Koselleck argues, in order for the word "state" to be registered as a concept, one must at the same time invoke a variety of other circumstances with their own conceptuality, such as jurisdiction, army and taxation—namely, a summation of meanings which can only be obtained by abstraction.[212] Put succinctly, a word can be defined, but a concept can only be interpreted. It is probably upon this aspect of Koselleck's theory that leads Melvin Richter to conclude that "an individual or group may possess a concept without having a word by which to express it".[213]

Koselleck's differentiation between concept and word is highly relevant to this study as his distinction between a concept and a word offers a new way of problematising translation by questioning whether or not a concept can preserve its conceptuality when it is translated into another language; and by "conceptuality", I mean the entirety of meanings that are inherent in a particular concept. In other words, conceptuality is what makes a concept, a concept. This question is important because if the word *was* conceptualised, it would beg a follow-up question of how all the historical and social experience represented by the original concept was actually transplanted in a different cultural context; alternatively, if the term was translated into a word with a fixed meaning, then it would be worth considering what exactly inhibited the process of conceptualisation. Accordingly, the first research question to be addressed in this study is simply: what are the key concepts in Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* translated *into* in the Chinese editions of Waltz's book? Using Koselleck's method of differentiation, the answers can thus be grouped into two categories: concept and words. By "concept", this study refers to the translated terminologies which "have incorporated the full extent of the context of meaning in which the word is used".[214] As for "words", this study decides to use Koselleck's concept of word in its plural form to refer to the semantic description of the original concept without its

[210] Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, 85.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid.
[213] Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*, 9.
[214] Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, 85.

conceptuality. This is mainly due to the nature of the Chinese language which uses logograms where several characters stand for a word or a concept. This issue regarding the nature of the Chinese language will be further discussed in Chapter 4; but for now, one good example of this "words" type of translation would be the translation of anarchy, that is, "无政府状态 (wu zhengfu zhuangtai)", which literally means "state with no government".

It needs to be noted here, again, that it is not the aim of this study to achieve the linguistic comprehensiveness of Koselleck's work. In fact, Koselleck himself does not regard *Begriffsgeschichte* as a contribution to linguistics. The linguistic aspect of conceptual history, for him, is merely an essential way to record the usage of political and social concepts; or, as Richter interprets, "since language is both an agent and an indicator of structural changes, research into the history of concepts must adapt to its own purposes a battery of methods derived from philology, historical semantics, and structural linguistics".[215] The ultimate purpose of the *Begriffsgeschichte* project is not only to understand conceptual change politically, but also to examine political change conceptually. To investigate this interaction between a socio-political change and its linguistic reflection, Koselleck accordingly develops another analytical framework—and this is also the second aspect of his work from which this study borrows analytical insights—the temporal structure of political language.

It is no coincidence that the study of conceptual history originated from Germany. Early in the nineteenth century, in theological faculties, practitioners of *Dogmengeschichte*—the history of dogma—had already started conducting research on the history of the formation of theological concepts.[216] After the Second World War, in seeking to provide material for a European *Geistesgeschichte*—the history of ideas—propagated by Wilhelm Dilthey, cultural philosopher Erich Rothacker published the first volume of *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* (Archive for Conceptual History), a German peer-reviewed journal devoted to publishing works on the history of the concepts of science, philosophy, religion,

[215] Richter, *The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction*, 39.
[216] Ibid.

etc.[217] It can be said that prior to the publication of the first volume of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* in the 1970s, there was already a rich tradition of conceptual history in Germany.

Nevertheless, the release of *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* still drew much attention to this new approach to conceptual history as compared to the previous studies; Koselleck's project was not only much more ambitious in terms of its scope, but also more explicit in terms of the direction of the research. The guiding proposition that holds together all the research covered in Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte project is the idea that social and political language (in Germany) since 1750 began to change into the language of modernity which was characterised by four processes: *Politisierung* (politicisation), *Demokratisierung* (democratisation), *Ideologiesierbarkeit* (ideologisability), and *Verzeitlichung* (temporalisation).[218] Politicisation and democratisation refer to the growing political and social scope of the language used. "Ideologis-ability" pertains to the increasing susceptibility of social and political concepts to be abstracted from their concrete and historical referent.[219] Temporalisation, finally, refers to the changing conception of time; Koselleck uses the term to characterise concepts which traditionally expressed static situation that are now used more and more to describe processes. This concept of temporalisation is not only central to the underlying principles behind *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, but also of fundamental significance for Koselleck's own writings on conceptual history. This section will thus discuss what Koselleck means by *Verzeitlichung* and how the idea can be applied to the context of translation.

As a renowned historian, it is not surprising that Koselleck's conceptions of time and temporality stem from his study of history. For Koselleck, German history from antiquity can be divided into two distinct periods: *Historie* and *Geschichte* (both translated as

[217] Pim Den Boer, "The Historiography of German *Begriffsgeschichte* and the Dutch Project of Conceptual History", in Hamsher-Monk, Iain, Tilmans, Karin, and Vree, van Frank (eds.), *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998): 13.
[218] Pim Den Boer, "The Historiography of German *Begriffsgeschichte* and the Dutch Project of Conceptual History", 15.; Also, here, the translation of *Verzeitlichung* to temporalisation is slightly problematic as the original German word means something more like "historicisation" or "time framing". Yet for the convenience of the subsequent argument, this study decided to adopt Boker's translation of "temporalisation".
[219] Ibid.

"history" in English). *Historie* represents an old form of history and according to Koselleck, it had characterised people's social and political experience from the time of Aristotle up to the Enlightenment.[220] Following Cicero's conception of history as the school of life, *historia magistra vitae*, Koselleck argues that *Historie* assumes that all historical events are rooted in "nature" and embedded in biological pre-givens:

> In the past, the natural course of time served as the immediate substratum for possible histories. The calendar of saints and sovereigns was organised by means of astronomy; biological time provided the framework for the natural succession of rulers, on which self-reproducing legal titles in the wars of succession depended…[221]

In other words, before the eighteenth century, human experience was organised according to natural chronology. History, hence, was "a report, an account of what had occurred".[222] People studied the past and managed to collect experience which was sufficient to predict the future; this is because despite changes in social structures, the temporal internal structure of human experience would always remain the same. To use the words of cultural theorist Michael Pickering, histories of *Historie* were "a supreme form of instruction, directing everyday lives in the present by means of exemplary cases, models, and types".[223]

Since around 1750, however, this *Historie* as the old ideal form of history began to be eroded by the idea of *Geschichte* which, according to Koselleck (2004), has two distinct characteristics: singularisation and temporalisation. The shift from the previous *Historie* to the new *Geschichte* started first at the linguistic level: In German language *Geschichte* and *Geschichten* are the plural forms deriving from the singular forms *das Geschichte* and *die Geschichten.* Yet since about 1770, a movement of what Koselleck calls "the linguistic concentration" began to take place across the European continent, which resulted in the condensation of the words that were previously prevailed in the plural into the form of collective singular.[224] In 1775, Koselleck notices, the plural *die Geschichten* began to be

[220] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, 126.; Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, 83.
[221] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, 9.
[222] Ibid., 32.
[223] Michael Pickering, "Experience as Horizon: Koselleck, expectation and historical time", *Cultural Studies*, 18 (2004): 271-289.
[224] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, 33.

used as a collective singular for the first time; and moreover, the change at the lexical level of the word also facilitated the displacement of the pre-modern conception of history:

> The collective singular…made possible the attribution to history of the latent power of human events and suffering, a power that connected and motivated everything in accordance with a secret or evident plan to which one could feel responsible, or in whose name one could believe oneself to be acting.[225]

What Koselleck attempts to say here is that there is a singularisation of "history" at its conceptual level. *Historie*, as stated before, is an "account" of what happened and such account has neither an intelligible beginning nor a satisfying ending. In *Historie*, there is no *history* but only *histories* as it is a collection of the narratives of events. *Geschichte*, conversely, narrates a story with a clear linear progression; it presents the past as a single unity with the temporal gradations of "now", "then", and "earlier". *Geschichte*, in other words, assumes the totality of history.

One concomitant of such singularisation and totalisation of history is the changing conception of time. For Koselleck, the shift from *Historie* to *Geschichte* does not only permit the re-conceptualisation of history, but also the change of temporalities.[226] The definition of "temporality"—which was never given in Koselleck's own writings—is formulated nicely by Hayden White in the Foreword of *The Practice of Conceptual History*:

> …temporality is multileveled, is subject to differential rates of acceleration and deceleration, and functions not only as a matrix within which historical events happen but also as a causal force in the determination of social reality in its own right.[227]

To put it differently, temporality is a framework within which one's social and political experience is generated at nonrecurring rates of acceleration and deceleration.[228] *Historie*, in this sense, is "timeless" because it assumes the existence of the constancy of human nature and the human condition. *Geschichte*, on the other hand, possesses a completely different temporality. The new form of history no longer presumes a constancy in human

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[225] Ibid., 35.
[226] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, 126.; Koselleck, *Future Past: on the semantics of historical time*, 83.
[227] Hayden White, "Forward", in Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, xii.
[228] Again, the present thesis is aware that the translation of "temporality" is slightly problematic. Yet for the convenience of the subsequent discussion, this thesis adopts White's translation of "temporality".

experience; instead, it has generated "a temporal coefficient of change" into human experience—that is, the possibility of progress.[229] In the words of Pickering, "time" in *Geschichte* is no longer neutral but has attained "its own quality of historicality"—and this deneutralisation of time is what Koselleck means by temporalisation.[230]

Koselleck then moves on to discuss how the shift from the old to the new form of history has influenced the ways in which political concepts are used in modernity. Central to his argument is the idea that since the Enlightenment, there has been a continuing expansion of fracture between experience and expectation. In 1864, the Victorian historian James Anthony Froude already noted that "The world moves faster and faster, and difference will probably be considerably greater. The temper of each new generation is a continual surprise."[231] Koselleck's work not only elaborates on Froude's argument but tries to understand this social change linguistically. From Aristotle until Kant, Koselleck argues, the concepts of political language—such as monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy—had always been grounded in experience.[232] Those concepts primarily served to indicate or record given facts from the past so that people could collect experiences and directly draw useful conclusions for their future. Since *Geschichte* became the dominant form of history, however, this has changed radically. The new conception of history as a constantly progressing collective singular endowed political language with a sense of movement: in Kant's work, the old notion of "republic" that used to be filled out with experiences was replaced by "republicanism"—a term, according to Koselleck, that indicates nothing but "a historical objective that could be deduced from practical reason".[233] Republicanism was soon followed by the creations of liberalism, socialism, communism and fascism. The common feature of all these new concepts is that they do not have any "content in terms of experience"; these terms, which during the time of Aristotle were used to refer to different forms of government, no longer indicate the finite possibilities of political organisation, but instead signify new possibilities for people to strive toward.[234] Put differently, they become the concepts of expectation. It is this linguistic reflection of the changing experiences of

[229] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, 6.
[230] Pickering, "Experience as Horizon: Koselleck, expectation and historical time", *Cultural Studies*, 273.
[231] James Anthony Froude, cited in Asa Briggs, *The Making of Modern England* (New York: Harper, 1965): 3.
[232] Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: timing history, spacing concepts*, 128.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid., 129.

time that leads Koselleck to conclude that "the question of the temporal structure is a *conditio sine qua non* of social-historical knowledge".[235]

After a somewhat extensive explanation on Koselleck's theory of temporality, the question remains how this theory can be applied to the context of translation. With reference to Jorge Luis Borges's review of Pierre Menard—the French writer who is most famous for his outstanding translation of *Don Quixote*, literary critic Robert Scholes says that every translation is subject to "the curse of temporality".[236] What Scholes means here is that every language is embedded in a larger context—or, to use his own words, "there is no meaning without a meaner". Language, for Scholes, can never be self-referential because in order to understand a language one must locate it "within a frame of reference which is ineluctably cultural and temporal".[237] A language, in other words, is subjected to the temporal structure of a society; and translation is an act of transferring ideas across two (or more) different temporal structures. In the context of this study, this means that if there is a diachronic change that happens between the different Chinese editions of Waltz's text, it implies that there might be a change in the temporal structure of society—which, according to Koselleck's theory, also indicates the change in the social, political, and intellectual conditions. Therefore, by investigating the changes in the social, political, and intellectual environments under which each translation was produced, the present study might be able to identify what exactly has caused the diachronic changes in the Chinese translations of key concepts across the three editions. The next section will therefore discuss how this change in the social, political and intellectual conditions can be conceptualised and explained using Karl Mannheim's approach to the sociology of knowledge.

2.12 A Style of Thought and/in Translation: Mannheim's sociology of knowledge

In the previous chapter, it has been mentioned briefly that the beginning of the use of IR concepts in China largely stemmed from the country's resistance against the European aggression in the nineteenth century. In a way, it can be argued that the Chinese interest in

[235] Ibid., 123.
[236] Robert Scholes, "The Reality of Borges", *The Iowa Review*, 8 (1977): 21.
[237] Ibid.

learning about *and* from the West was triggered in response to the nation's existential crisis. It can be argued, therefore, that any attempt to understand the nature of a discipline must take into account the theoretical and practical context of its emergence. Sociology of knowledge as a field of inquiry that promised to provide a more profound understanding about social life also developed in an atmosphere of acute political tension marked by the crumbling of the Weimar Republic. The crisis resulted in the rise of extensive literature that attempted to seek tenable solutions to the ongoing crisis.[238] Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia*—the book which later became the founding text for the sociology of knowledge—was one of them.

The central thesis of Mannheim's work, if there is one word which can describe it, is *Standortgebundenheit*—or, to use Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch's translation, "the temporal and spatial conditionality and contingency of knowledge".[239] In the previous section, it was mentioned that one key aspect of Koselleck's conceptual history is the idea that one's social and political experience is shaped by the temporal structure within which such experience is embedded. In a way, Mannheim's *Standortgebundenheit* shares similarities with Koselleck's framework as they both reject the detachment of human thought and experience from social reality. Yet the two approaches are still distinct in terms of their foci: Whilst Koselleck's work stresses the linguistic reflections of social and historical changes, Mannheim is more concerned with revealing the history behind the formation of a particular mode of thought. Mannheim is deeply sceptical of the modern epistemological and psychological methods of studying cultural phenomena, in which individual mind is often conceived as separate from the group. He dismisses the idea that human thought arises out of an act of purely theoretical contemplation—as it is often assumed in the field of philosophy—and instead believes that all thought is "bound up with the existing life-situation of the thinker".[240] Underneath every claim to rational knowledge, he argues, there lies an "irrational foundation" which is rooted in one's social setting.[241]

[238] Louis Wirth, "Preface", in Mannheim, Karl, *Ideology and Utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge*, xiii.
[239] Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, *The Concept of the Political* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 44.
[240] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: an introduction to the sociology of knowledge*, 28.
[241] Obviously any statement which asserts that *all* knowledge is socially determined disproves itself. Mannheim, of course, does not say "all" thinking is socially conditioned. In *Ideology and Utopia*, he clearly states that his theory does not apply to mathematical and natural science. The "knowledge" Mannheim talks about in his work mostly refers to historical, social and political knowledge—all of which belongs to what he calls the "existentially connected knowledge".

Hence, any effort to comprehend a mode of thought has to be made within the historical-social context out of which such thought emerges—and the aim of the sociology of knowledge is to provide an analytical framework for such investigation.

After the publication of *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim continued to release a series of essays in an attempt to refine his methodology; he was constantly introducing new concepts, or modifying old ones, and sometimes keeping the original ideas but not the terms that express them, or vice versa. In a sense, essays collected in volumes such as *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (1952) and *Essays on the Sociology of Culture* (1956) are all sequels to his original idea. Yet despite all the changes, there is one concept which remains at the heart of the method of the sociology of knowledge: that is, style of thought. The following discussion will therefore provide an account of the basic features of Mannheim's sociological analysis of styles of thought and explain how this method can be employed to address the research question.

Despite the fact that the analysis of thought styles forms the basis of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, the term "style of thought" (*Denkstil*) is never explicitly defined in any of his writings. In *Conservatism*, the notion is vaguely explained as "the main currents in the world of thinking which, when they are present, move against or towards one another in historical variation, and occasionally merge in whole or in part".[242] Such definition seems to be overly abstract; yet the idea behind it can be deduced from a close reading of Mannheim's texts: In his study on the early German conservatism, Mannheim argues that Western society since antiquity has been characterised by two contrasting styles of thought that represent two opposite interpretations of history and human progress. He names those two styles "progressive" and "conservative". The progressive style of thought is often typical of the liberal mode of thinking (although in his analysis Mannheim also considers socialism as a "progressive" style of thought) and can be dated back to the Enlightenment. One major trait of this type of thinking is its insistence on the notion that human thought and the validity of knowledge belong to two distinct logical spheres; it presupposes the existence of a universal reason in which all human beings take part and through which a

[242] Karl Mannheim, *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1925): 111.

definitive and objective truth can be reached. Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945), in which he dedicates an entire chapter to criticise sociology of knowledge as a form of "radical scepticism" is one telling example of this style of thinking.[243] "The progressive always experiences the present as the beginning of the future", Mannheim argues; "[it] looks for the blueprint, it searches for a pattern of connectedness which is not intuitively concrete but rather rationally analysable".[244] To use the words of Koselleck from his critique of modernity—the progressive style of thought assumes the totality of historical process and the linearity of human progress.

The conservative style of thought emerged in reaction to such excessive rationalism resulting from the Enlightenment. Compared to the progressive mode of thinking which takes its point of departure in natural law and human rationality, the conservative thought style gives primacy to "being" over "thinking", "concreteness" over "abstraction". This is mainly due to the tendency of progressive thinkers to frame problems in abstract ways, Mannheim says, and thus the conservative thinkers are "clinging to what is immediate and concrete in a practical way".[245] One manifestation of this conservative preference for concreteness can be detected in the writings of conservative authors, in which property is not simply treated as a legal possession, but as something that has a "voice" and a "reciprocal relationship" with the owner.[246] Moreover, unlike the progressive to whom the past has passed and the future is what generates meanings, the conservative mind regards the past as "surviving in the present" and seeks meanings in "what lies behind".[247] "Every point in our present has come to be", Mannheim quotes Johann Gustav Droysen, "what it was and how it came to be is the past; but this past remains within it, in an ideal sense".[248] To be sure, the conservative temporality is diametrically opposed to the progressive futurity—where the progressive mode of thinking attempts to expand its horizon of expectation, the conservative style of thought seeks to complete its experience of the present. In short, time, for the former, is linear, whereas for the latter, it is cyclical.

[243] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemy* (London: Routledge, 1994 [1945]): 421.
[244] Mannheim, *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*, 97.
[245] Ibid., 88.
[246] Ibid., 89.
[247] Ibid., 97-99.
[248] Ibid.

What can be concluded from Mannheim's study of conservatism is that different styles of thought not only deliver different answers to social and political issues, but they often depart from completely different premises and assumptions:

> Every epoch which has been slightly complex has been marked by more than one tendency and style of thinking, more than one standpoint, and even such seemingly uniform periods as the Middle Ages are filled with a number of tendencies and standpoints in thinking. But the distinctive feature of modern development is that, beginning in the seventeenth century and culminating in the nineteenth, *the political element increasingly becomes the point around which all of the currents in the ideological universe crystallise*.[249]

In Mannheim's view, every society is characterised by different styles of thinking, and each "style" approaches reality from its own particular "standpoint". Since the beginning of modernity, however, such pluralism of styles of thought became increasingly politicised and as a result, different social groups began to contend for the privilege of being able to expound the public interpretation of the world. The formation of German conservatism as a resistance against liberal-Enlightenment thinking is an example *par excellence* of this phenomenon. Mannheim further proclaims this point in his *Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon*—probably more openly than he ever did—where he argues: "every historical, ideological, sociological piece of knowledge…is clearly rooted in and carried by the desire for power and recognition of particular social groups who want to make their interpretation of the world the universal one".[250] He also attributes the difficulty in reaching consensus among social groups on politically laden issues to the radically different ways in which different styles of thought perceive and organise social reality. Following this thread, a "style of thought" can thus be deemed as a series of socially constructed arguments which can be traced back to a specific social group and reflect that group's particular way of interpreting reality.

The next question is how this concept of style of thought is a useful analytical tool for this study. Generally speaking, the employment of style of thought as a key analytical construct can be justified on the basis of three analytical merits. Firstly, as mentioned before, the present thesis attempts to investigate both the synchronic and the diachronic aspects of the

[249] Ibid., 51.
[250] Karl Mannheim, "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon", in Wolff, H. Kurt, (ed.), *From Karl Mannheim* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971): 404.

Chinese translations of Waltz's text. Translation theorist Andre Lefevere famously argues that there is always a certain ideology behind every translation,[251] and for Mannheim, an ideology is essentially an evolving style of thought.[252] This means that if there exist major differences in the translations of the key concepts across the three Chinese editions of Waltz's text, it could indicate a change in the ideological motives behind those translations, which, using Mannheim's conceptual framework, can be analysed as a changing style of thought.

Secondly, Mannheim's concept of style of thought provides a means to group together all articulated thoughts with a specific political-philosophical orientation without the constraint on its units of analysis. According to Rodney Nelson, Mannheim's conceptualisation of style of thought is the extension of the concept of "style" from the field of art history.[253] By the time Mannheim became interested in the ideas of styles of thoughts, European art historians were beginning to develop a theoretical framework to explain the relationship between a worldview and its artistic products.[254] The concept of "style" was accordingly devised to classify the different cultural patterns that had been observed in the field of fine art. Mannheim borrowed this artistic expression and appropriated the concept in an attempt to identify different "styles" that exist in human thought as well as their relations to the times and spaces within which they are embedded. Thus, in a way, the concept of style of thought provides an "intermediary level" of analysis between research on individual thinkers (such as those done by the Cambridge School) and those on the basic units of ideas that are deemed ahistorical (such as the ones identified with A. O. Lovejoy). Both of these approaches, Mannheim argues, are oblivious to the social conditions under which ideas come into being and "there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured".[255] In the context of this study, this means that it can identify the change in a style of thought in the Chinese translations of Waltz's text without constraining itself to studying individual thinkers or any change in the units of ideas.

[251] Lefevere, *Translating, Rewriting, and the Manipulation of Literary Frame*, ii.
[252] Nelson, "The Sociology of Styles of Thought", 26.
[253] Ibid.
[254] Ibid.
[255] Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, 2.

Thirdly, the concept of style of thought does not imply any moral connotations inherent in the arguments of the asserting subject. This makes style of thought a more applicable tool of analysis than other similar concepts used in the sociology of knowledge, such as ideology. In fact, according to Nelson, Mannheim's conceptualisation of style of thought was mostly motivated by his attempt to distance himself from the Marxian "pejorative, self-interested connotations of the concept of ideology, as well as its identification with social class".[256] In his *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim accordingly attempts to develop an alternative understanding of ideology. In *The Communist Manifesto*, for example, Marx and Engels are able to effectively discredit their opponent's thought by calling attention to the ideological pretensions of class interests:

> But don't wrangle us with so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notion of freedom, culture, law, etc. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of bourgeois production and bourgeois property…[257]

What Mannheim wants to do in his work, then, is to generalise the Marxist approach so that it can be made a useful analytical tool; as he himself acknowledges, "What was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history generally."[258] He starts off by ridding the Marxist conception of its polemics and differentiating what he calls the "total" and the "particular" conceptions of ideology. He argues that the Marxist conception of ideology is *particular* because it "always refers only to specific assertions which may be regarded as concealments, falsifications, or lies without attacking the integrity of the total mental structure of the asserting subject".[259] This, he argues, is problematic because every cognitive claim can be valid only within the social-historical setting within which such claim emerges. What the sociology of knowledge does, instead, is to take the mental structure of the knowing subject "in its totality" and examine the way in which the thinker's whole system of opinions becomes determined by his historical and social setting.[260] This total structure of one's consciousness and thought is what Mannheim means by a "total ideology". It can be said that in Mannheim's conceptualisation, style of thought and ideology belong to two different analytical categories; while ideology is concerned with the *totality* of the ontological and

[256] Nelson, "The Sociology of Styles of Thought", 26.
[257] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin, 1967): 238.
[258] Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, 69.
[259] Ibid., 238.
[260] Ibid.

epistemological assumptions that stem from one's consciousness, a style of thought stresses the *epistemology* of such ideology.

After explaining why and how the concept of style of thought is relevant to this study, the rest of this section is going to discuss how a style of thought can be effectively identified using Mannheim's analytical framework. In his *Das konservative Denken* (Conservative Thought), Mannheim gives a succinct statement on how one should conduct an analysis of a style of thought:

> The sociology of knowledge faces a series of tasks, in an inquiry with such an orientation in mind: to determine the specific *morphology* of this style of thought; to reconstruct its *historical* and *social roots*; to explore the *change of forms* in this style of thought *in relation to* the social fates of the *bearing groups*; to show its pervasiveness and sphere of influence in the whole of German intellectual life until the present.[261]

According to Mannheim, the most systematic exploration of a style of thought can be carried out through the analysis of its morphological structure which is divided into two parts: content and form. Unfortunately in Mannheim's own analysis of conservative style of thought, the conceptual difference between the two categories is not well illustrated. The distinction is much clearer, in fact, in his aesthetic analysis of works of art. In his essay *On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung*, Mannheim argues that in the field of plastic arts, the distinction between "form" and "content" can be understood in either of the following ways: the representational content and its representational form, or the material content and its formal dimension.[262] Considering that the emphasis of the second classification is placed on the materiality of the cultural product—which does not apply to the case of human thought—here I will only elaborate on the first type of distinction.

By "representational content", Mannheim refers to the "in-formations" of the artistic works that can be considered as "objective, inasmuch as they can be ascertained merely by looking at the picture, without reference to the artist and his consciousness".[263] In other words, the

[261] This paragraph is not included in the main text of Mannheim's Conservatism but was later added by the translator in the note. See Mannheim, Conservatism: *A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*, 189.
[262] Karl Mannheim, "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung", in Wolff, H. Kurt (ed.), *From Karl Mannheim* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971): 48.
[263] Ibid., 49.

"content" is the essence of an artistic product; it is the meaning that can be immediately grasped by the audience without giving much thought to the contextuality of the product. In terms of the "form", Mannheim does not provide an exact definition in his writing. Instead, he decides to exemplify the concept by giving the following aspects of an oil painting which he deems as illustrating the form of its artistic expression:

> …the choice of particular visual phase of a temporal sequence of events; the arrangement of the figures—whether hierarchically rigid or merely secular in its ordering; whether brought about exclusively by effects of lighting, colouring, and linear rhythm; whether animated by lifelike gestures or frozen in a static design pointing beyond mere lifelike realism; whether based upon a rhythmic-architectonic pattern or upon effects of intersection and foreshortening; whether presented as seen by the outside spectator or organised around a point of reference within the picture.[264]

From the above passage, it can be argued that the "form" of a cultural product is concerned with the ways in which the content of the product is presented; it refers to all the relevant materials, techniques, and procedures used to complete the "content" of the product. This can be a particular colouring technique the artist deploys in his creation, a specific artistic style he adopts, or a type of medium that is used to present his work. In the case of Mannheim's analogy of an oil painting, the "content" of the painting is what the painting is *about*, and the "form" of the painting refers to *how* the painting is painted. To illustrate this point more clearly, the "content" of Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* is the half-length portrait of Mona Lisa, the wife of Francesco del Giocondo, while the "form" of the painting refers to colouring, lighting, and any necessary techniques da Vinci deployed in completing the portrait.

Mannheim applies this form/content distinction to his morphological analysis of the conservative style of thought. Although the distinction is not as sharp as it is in the aesthetic analysis, he still asserts that the early nineteenth century German conservatism as a style of thought developed both an identifiable "form" and "content". He begins by distinguishing conservatism from traditionalism which, he believes, is not tied to any political motive but

[264] Ibid.

rather a psychological phenomenon that can be found in most of the world's population—that is, according to Mannheim, one's instinctive acceptance of past ways and the aversion to change.[265] Before the Enlightenment, traditionalism was the predominant force in the society and there was a "harmony between individual will and the larger will of the organic whole".[266] To act in a traditional way means to act out of one's pure will (*Wollen*). However, the dynamism brought about by the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and French Revolution challenged this traditionalist way of living and thinking. This dynamism quickly took the form of social differentiation in which some groups—namely, the liberal-Enlightenment thinkers—wanted to further the process while others—the traditionalists—held it back. This means that for traditionalists, what was once self-evident and natural was raised to consciousness and in need of articulation; and to want to preserve one's pure will means to resist against the progressive thinking. Conservatism emerged out of this traditionalist frustration with modernity, along with a specific political orientation, that is, to preserve "what lies behind". This "drive to preserve", according to Mannheim, is the major formal feature of conservatism—it represents the perpetual opposition to the progressive rationalism and individualism; it is the *vis inertiae* of society; and it serves as the vehicle for the conservative style of thought.

In terms of the "content" of conservatism, Mannheim states: "If there is a conservative way of experiencing and thinking, it must be experience and thinking in a very special sense, a way of thinking and experiencing with a very distinctive character".[267] Mannheim's later analysis accordingly shows that the early German conservatism presents two distinct ways of experiencing and thinking social reality: concreteness and its scepticism towards the natural-law mode of thinking. The first feature had already been discussed in the earlier writing; in reaction to the progressives' tendency of increasing abstraction and speculation, the conservatives were moved to accentuate the concrete, existing feature of things. Similar to their writing on the "estate-conservative experience of proprietorship", the conservative conception of freedom stresses the "qualitative character" of the idea of freedom; they rejected the liberal-egalitarian conception of freedom which is often in conjunction with its

[265] Mannheim, *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge,* 88.
[266] Collin Loader and Willian G. Shafer, *The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985): 78.
[267] Mannheim, *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge,* 72.

complementary element, equality, and substitutes it with the freedom of individuals to develop their "innermost being".[268] This is mainly because unlike the progressive who takes the idea of equality as its theoretical starting point, the conservatives acknowledge that human beings are naturally unequal. Such an opposing views on the idea of equality between the progressive and the conservative, Mannheim further argues, stems from their different takes on the natural-law mode of thinking which presumes the universal validity of certain rights and values, such as equality.[269] The liberal, being abstract thinkers and reasoning on the basis of the possible, see equality as a universal norm into which every individual should fit. The conservative, on the other hand, prefer to emphasise the individuality that is inherent in human beings; that is, instead of advocating for what one *should* have, the conservative emphasise what one *already* has. In the conservative style of thought, it can be said, "being" is prioritised over "thinking". To conclude, from Mannheim's mophological analysis, it can be argued that the identifications of the "form" and the "content" of a style of thought occupy two different analytical dimensions: the "form", is the "emotive worldview" which undergirds the general orientation of the ideational trend.[270] It is the driving force behind a particular style of thought. The "content" of a style of thought, on the other hand, is something that has been diffused into *and* can be detected in the actual texts produced by the stylistic thinkers. In the context of this study, this means that if there is a change in the style of thought in the Chinese translations of Waltz's text, it means that there will be changes in both the "form", which is the driving force behind a particular way of thinking, and the "content", which is the distinct way of thinking that is inherent in a particular style of thought.

2.2 Regarding Method: corpus linguistics and lexicography

The aim of this thesis, just to reiterate, is to examine how the meanings embedded in the language of IR circulate among, exchange between, and become reproduced in a different linguistic context—with particular reference to Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Borrowing insights from Koselleck's and Mannheim's works, the first half of the chapter has laid out a two-layered conceptual framework for this study; Koselleck's approach to

[268] Ibid, 91, 99.
[269] Ibid., 92.
[270] Nelson, "The Sociology of Styles of Thought", 27.

conceptual history has set out "concept" as the basic unit of analysis and offered a linguistic framework to understand the process of conceptualisation/ deconceptualisation. Mannheim's idea of style of thought has helped build a conceptual framework through which the potential diachronic changes in the Chinese translations of Waltz's text can be explained and delineated a theoretical structure within which this study can construct its arguments. The conceptual framework has also set up two research questions:

1) What are the key concepts from Waltz's book translated *into* in its Chinese editions? In other words, do they remain concepts, or do they deconceptualise and thus become words i.e. semantic description of the original concepts?
2) Based on the conceptual changes identified from the first question, what might be the reasons behind the synchronic and diachronic changes in the Chinese translations of the selected key concepts from Waltz's text?

The second half of this chapter will therefore outline the methodological framework through which the above research questions can be answered. Yet before that, it is necessary to list the concepts that this study has chosen for investigation and the reasons behind their selection.

2.21 Selection of Concepts

This section will give an account of which IR concepts have been chosen from Waltz's text and why they were selected. In order to do so, it shall first explain what exactly Waltz argues in his book—since the concepts were selected largely based on their significance to his arguments. It is probably worth stressing here, however, that the aim of this study is not to discuss Waltz's theory *per se* but rather to look at how some ideas he uses to theorise international politics have become both transformed and transformative through the Chinese translations. Therefore, it is not in the interest nor the intention of this section to critique any of his arguments.

In the introduction, it has been mentioned briefly that Waltz is one of the most cited authors and his *Theory of International Politics* is one of the most influential publications in the discipline of IR. One major reason for his influence is that he proposed a series of

provocative but nonetheless coherent arguments which challenged the then prevailing viewpoints in significant segments of the (Western) IR community. Waltz is often considered as the founding father of neorealism, a school of IR theory that is arguably now the most dominant paradigm of understanding international politics. In contrast to classical realism, which represents the practical, historical and normative approach to international politics, neorealism postulated by Waltz emphasises the deductive and explanatory nature of a theory. For Waltz, when it comes to theorising international politics, there is a need to differentiate a theory from an analysis; the purpose of a theory is to "explain regularities…and leads one to expect that the outcomes…will fall within specified range".[271] In his *Realism and International Politics* published in 2008, he furthers this point by saying:

> …theory is not a mere collection of variables. If a 'gap' is found in a theory, it cannot be plugged by adding a 'variable' to it. To add to a theory something that one believes has been omitted requires showing how it can take its place as one element of a coherent and effective theory.[272]

Waltz's point here is that a theory is not a theory if it cannot be generalised and does not offer systematic predictions and explanations. A theory of international politics, for example, should be able to explain why wars happen and also indicate possible political conditions that might lead to wars—or, in his own words, it should serve to explain "recurrences and repetitions" in the realm of international politics. Classical realism, on the other hand, is only a form of analysis because it fails to construct a comprehensive and predictive theory of international politics and stresses too much of "the accidental and the occurrence of the unexpected".[273] An analysis can include what is left out of a theory—that is, "the accidental and the occurrence of the unexpected"—but by doing so it fails to become a theory. In short, in Waltz's view, a theory should only concern the variables that make the most difference, whereas an analysis can be applied to discuss other lesser factors.

Based on this assumption of theory as a generalizable prediction, Waltz concludes that a theory of international politics is basically a theory of *great powers* and thus to theorise

[271] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 68.
[272] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Realism and International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2008): 89.
[273] Ibid., 75.

international politics means to focus on the interactions of the great powers of an era. As he argues,

> In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves…It would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica as it would be to construct an economic theory of oligopolistic competition based on the minor firms in a sector of an economy.[274]

Waltz's argument here is generally characterised by another key concept, that is, *self-help*. In Waltz's neorealist understanding of international politics, the international environment is essentially a self-help system where states have no one to rely on but themselves. This concept of *self-help* is linked to another concept which Waltz repeatedly mentions in his book and which, too, serves as the foundational assumption for not only Waltz's theory but also the neorealist school of IR as a whole, that is, *anarchy*. Neorealism argues that since states are sovereign and there is no higher authority to enforce rules over individual states, the international system is fundamentally anarchic. The concept of *self-help* was hence put forward in response to the assumption of an anarchic world system.[275]

Another important concept which appears constantly in Waltz's arguments is *power*. The concept of *power* is a key premise to both the classical realist and the neorealist accounts of international politics. The difference between the two, however, lies in that in classical realism, the desire for power is said to be rooted in human nature and thus power is an end in itself, whilst neorealism believes that power is only a means to an end. Waltz articulates this point with reference to states' preferences of forming alliances with the weaker of two coalitions; as he argues,

> We do not expect the strong to combine with the strong in order to increase the extent of their power over others, but rather to square off and look for allies who might help them…Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal the system encourages them to seek is security.[276]

[274] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 72.
[275] Ibid., 111.
[276] Ibid., 126.

The above quote has brought out another key concept in Waltz's theorisation of international politics, that is, *security*. Unlike classical realism which assumes that states primarily pursue power, neorealism argues that in an anarchic international system, security is what matters the most to individual states because the lack of a central authority renders the survival of individual states to depend ultimately on the policies of others.[277] In order to secure their own survivals, therefore, states will attempt to increase their power. Because states are unequal in the amount of power they possess, furthermore, Waltz maintains that the states that score the highest in the amount of power are the ones that are called *great powers*.[278]

Also, since the international system is anarchic and does not have a clear order, the nature of the system can shift according to the changes in the distribution of power among states. Waltz accordingly proposes that there exist in general three types of system: unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. As their names suggest, a unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar one contains two, and a multipolar system consists of more than two great powers. All three systems are the results of *balance of power*, a situation where the power distributions among states are roughly equal. Balance of power occurs when certain states are at or near the top of the international heap in resourses of power and other states try to balance against the threats by increasing their own powers.[279] With particular reference to the Cold War, Waltz then argues that a bipolar system is the most stable of all three because the formation of the two camps represented by two great powers signals the end of any external balancing and therefore the only balances of power left are the ones between the states within each camp. This means that the outbreak of a major war is much more unlikely in a bipolar system. The relative peacefulness of the Cold War era, Waltz argues, has illustrated the validity of this theory.

Before moving on to the discussion on methods, it is probably worth emphasising why the above six concepts can be conceived of as concepts by Koselleck's standard. In the

[277] Ibid., 70.
[278] Ibid., 131.
[279] Jack S. Levy, Jack. S and Willia R. Thompson, "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe, 1495-1999", 30.

previous section, it has been stated that for Koselleck, a concept contains a wealth of meanings which can only be interpreted according to different contexts. Whilst the meaning of a word is bound to the word, the meanings of a concept is historically, socially, and politically contingent. In order to understand a single concept, therefore, one has to reference other concepts. In other words, the meanings of a concept can only be invoked within a specific theoretical constellation or a conceptual diagram. The six terms extracted from Waltz's arguments, in this sense, can be categorised as concepts because the full meanings of these terms can only be invoked within Waltz's particular theorisation of international politics. Waltz explicitly claims his theory to be a deductive theory, which indicates that all the key concepts he uses to characterise his theory shall operate like a cascade of deductions: from the international system is by default an *anarchy* follows the idea of *self-help*; from *self-help* follows the goal of *security*; from *security* follows the idea of *power* maximisation; from *power* maximisation follows the creations of *great power*; from the rise of *great powers* follows the act of *balance of power*. The meanings of each term are fully manifested when the term is understood with reference to other terns that are central to Waltz's theorisation of international politics. It can be argued that even if these terms were not intended to be used as concepts, they have become conceptualised in the process of Waltz's highly deductive theorisation.

2.22 Methodological Device

Now that the six key concepts have been identified, the next question is: what method should be used to extract these concepts from the four texts that this study engages with, that is, Waltz's original text and its three Chinese translations? Albeit claiming not to be a study of translation, the present study decided to rely on linguistic and translation literature to construct a methodological device through which the identification of those key concepts became possible. This is mostly because neither conceptual history nor the sociology of knowledge could provide a tangible and generalizable method that can be applied to this particular study. While sketching his approach to create a methodological framework which combines discourse analysis and comparative linguistics, German linguist Reinhard Hartmann argues that in translation studies, the description of a method

is often confused with the *theorisation* of a method.[280] The same argument is also applicable to Koselleck's and Mannheim's work. In neither Koselleck's conceptual history nor Mannheim's study of style of thought was there a description of a specific method through which the outcomes of their analyses were acquired. Although in Koselleck's work, the application of semasiology and onomasiology was relatively clear, there was no mentioning of how each linguistic device should be operationalised.

This study accordingly turned to corpus-based translation studies for its method to extract those key concepts from the texts. This is mainly due to the amount of data this study has to process; Waltz's original text plus its three Chinese translations totalled over 800 pages, and since all the selected concepts were deemed central to Waltz's argument, the frequency of their occurrences in the texts was likely to be high. Thus, a methodological device through which a large amount of texts can be processed appeared to be suitable. Corpus-based translation studies grew out of the marriage between translation studies and corpus linguistics, with the purpose of generating "a coherent, composite and rich paradigm that addresses a variety of issues pertaining to theory, description and the practice of translation".[281] A corpus is a body of texts "selected and ordered according to explicit linguistic criteria in order to be used as a sample of the language".[282] Corpus linguistics, therefore, is a study of language phenomena through large collection of corpora i.e. multiple bodies of texts. One of the most famous corpora is The British National Corpus (BNC), which consists of over 4000 samples, totalling over 100 million words, of modern British English, both written and spoken.[283] In translation studies, although Hans Lindquist was already stressing the importance of deploying corpus-based approach to train translators as early as 1984, it was not until the early 1990s after the publications of a series of ground-breaking work from linguists and translation theorists that debates on corpus-based translation studies started to prevail. One of the earliest works of corpus-based approach to translation studies was conducted by John Laffling,

[280] Reinhard R. K. Hartmann, *Contrastive Textology: studies in descriptive linguistics* (Heidelberg: Groos, 1980): 13.
[281] Sara Laviosa, "The corpus-based approach: A new paradigm in translation studies", *Meta* 43 (1998): 474.
[282] John Sinclair, "Preliminary recommendations on corpus typology", *EAGLES* (1996) [online] (http://www.ilc.pi.cnr.it/ EAGLES /corpustyp /corpustyp.html). [Accessed 1 October 2017].
[283] Guy Aston and Lou Burnard, *The BNC Handbook: Explore the British National Corpus with SARA* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

who attempted to discover the missing translation equivalents in the contemporary German-English dictionary by studying political party manifestos from Britain and Germany.[284] Two years later, Mona Baker published an article titled "*Corpus Linguistics and Translation Studies*" where the idea of applying corpus linguistics to approach translation studies was proposed for the first time in the discipline.

In her paper published in 1995, Baker then addresses three types of corpora that are either already being used or should specifically be designed for research in translation studies. The first type of corpus is called **parallel** corpus which is basically two identical texts from different languages.[285] This is also the type of corpus that is immediately associated with translation studies. According to Baker, the most important contribution of parallel corpora is that they shifted the emphasis of translation studies from a prescriptive to a more descriptive approach. This point is also echoed by Kaibao Hu,

> Conventional translation research, which relies heavily on intuition, anecdotal evidence, or a small number of samples, assumes the primacy of the source text and argues that the target text should seek to be as equivalent to the source text as possible. Corpus-based translation studies, however, are primarily concerned with describing the features of translation…in an attempt to uncover the nature of translation and the interrelationship between translation and social culture, based on statistical analysis of a wealth of corpus data.[286]

The second type of corpus, which is less relevant to this particular study than the other two, is **multilingual** corpus which refer to "sets of two or more monolingual corpora in different languages, built up either in the same or different institutions on the basis of similar design criteria".[287] Multilingual corpus is very similar to parallel corpus, but it contains several languages that are translated from the same text. This type of corpus is particularly useful for the study of lexicography—comparing dictionaries of different languages, for instance. The third type of corpus is called **comparable** corpus and it is composed of two bodies of "similar" texts in either different languages or different

[284] John Laffling *Towards High Precision Machine Translation* (Berlin: Foris, 1991): 20.
[285] Mona Baker, "Corpora in Translation Studies: An Overview and Some Suggestions for Future Research", *Target*, 7 (1995): 223.
[286] Hu Kaibao, *Introducing Corpus-based Translation Studies: New Frontiers in Translation Studies* (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, 2016): 1.
[287] Baker, "Corpora in Translation Studies: An Overview and Some Suggestions for Future Research", 232.

varieties of the same language.[288] One telling example of this comparable corpus would be the first and the second (or the second and the third, or the first and the third) Chinese translations of Waltz's book: although they are essentially the "same text" i.e. they are translated from the same English book, the translations differ. Hence, in this case, they can be deemed as a comparable corpus of different varieties of the same language. According to Baker, the most useful trait of this type of corpus is that it can tell researchers more about the process of translation.[289] By comparing and contrasting the two, researchers can reveal how translation changes across different varieties of the same text.

Following Baker's categorisation, the four texts used in this research were accordingly grouped as one set of parallel sub-corpora with two sets of comparable sub-corpora. The original *Theory of International Politics* and its first Chinese edition were paired as a set of parallel sub-corpora. The first and the second Chinese editions, and the second and the third editions, on the other hand, were paired as two sets of comparable sub-corpora respectively. The first pairing is easy to understand as Waltz's original text and the three translations fit perfectly with Baker's definition of parallel corpora as consisting of "original, source language-texts in language A and their translated versions in language B".[290] As for the two sets of comparable sub-corpora, I put aside Waltz's original text for a moment and placed the first and the second Chinese translation as the point of reference respectively for the second and the third edition. This means that from the viewpoints of the second translation, it was not compared to the content of Waltz's book, but rather to the first Chinese translation of Waltz's book; similarly, for the third edition, it was not compared to the original nor to the first translation, but to the second edition.

The reasons for this (re)arrangement of the corpus are twofold: firstly, from the perspectives of practicality, it is simply much easier and clearer to compare two texts at the same time rather than four. And secondly, more importantly, by arranging the corpus in this way, this study could examine two types of conceptual change that happen across

[288] Ibid., 234.
[289] Ibid, 234.
[290] Ibid., 230.

the four texts: diachronic and synchronic. As mentioned in the introduction, Saussure argues that any linguistic analysis can be conducted from two viewpoints, one diachronic one synchronic.[291] A diachronic approach studies the changes that happen in language over time; it is therefore often historical, fluid, and sensitive to process. A synchronic approach, on the other hand, "freezes" time; it is more interested in what happens in a given moment and does not concern itself with the passage of time. This study accordingly applied such diachronic/ synchronic distinction to examine two types of conceptual change; conceptual changes that happen synchronically can be assessed by analysing the parallel sub-corpora i.e. the original with the three translation, while the diachronic conceptual changes can be explicated comparing the two sets of comparable sub-corpora respectively.

The next key question then is how these three sets of sub-corpora were processed in this study. The majority of the contemporary studies of corpus linguistics process their data through software packages. The process of the actual coding is rather simple; one has to type in the key words that one wants the software to find from the corpus, and the package will automatically generate a new collection of texts with all the key words highlighted. This machine processing of text is particularly helpful when a study has to process a large number of texts. In this study, however, this process was conducted manually—by highlighting the key concepts one by one directly in the texts; this is mostly because the Chinese translations were not in a machine-readable form and hence could not be processed using software packages. Past studies suggest that a manual counting of corpora is not a novelty. Najah Shamaa, for example, manual counted a small corpus of English translations of Arabic novels and discovered that words such as *day* and *say* appeared much more frequently in the English translations than they did in original Arabic texts.[292] In her 1993 article, Baker also acknowledged the possibility of processing corpora manually by stating that the term corpus in translation studies has often been used to refer to a much smaller collection of texts than it is in corpus linguistics.[293]

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[291] Winfred P. Lehman, "Saussure's dichotomy between descriptive and historical linguistics", in Lehmann, W. P. and Malkiel, Y. (eds.) *Directions for historical linguistics: a symposium* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968): 45.
[292] Najah Shamaa. *A Linguistic Analysis of Some Problems of Arabic to English Translation.* Oxford University. [Ph.D. Thesis., 1978]: 168.
[293] Mona Baker, "Corpus Linguistics and Translation Studies: Implications and Applications", in Baker, Mona, Francis, Gill, and Tognini-Bonelli, Elena, (eds.), *Text and Technology. In Honour of John Sinclair.* (Philadelphia, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1993): 3-250.

Before moving on to the section on compilation, it is worth mentioning how Koselleck's conception of "concept" can work well with the above corpus-based approach to translation studies. French translation theorists, Jean-Paul Viney and Jean Darbelnet, who conducted one of the earliest studies on translation comparisons between French and English, state that one of key elements in translation studies is the identification of what they call a "translation unit"; for they constitute the building blocks of any translation.[294] According to Viney and Darbelnet, a translation unit is more than a word or a linguistic expression; it is "a lexicological units within which lexical elements are grouped together to form a single element of thought".[295] To use a simple example; when translating the English term "box office", a translator is unlikely to translate the two words, "box" and "office" separately but rather to see the term as one fixed unit, namely, "box office". This is because, the meaning of the term is not generated separately through two different words, but rather through their juxtaposition. This thus makes the term "box office", a translation unit. To quote Charles Bally, a Swiss linguist, a translation unit is "an accumulation of meanings"[296]—which is also what Koselleck calls "a concept".

Following the method of corpus linguistics listed above, the present study then first compared and contrasted the first set of sub-corpora, that is, the English original of Waltz's book and its first Chinese translation published in 1992. I began by highlighting all the occurrences of the six concepts in Waltz's text and then moved on to find and highlight the corresponding Chinese translations in the Chinese edition. The reason for doing this instead of comparing the two sub-corpora sentence by sentence is because, due to the grammatical differences between the Chinese and the English language, an English sentence in Waltz's text could be translated into two separate sentences, or vice versa. Also, a passive voice sentence in the English text could be translated to an active voice sentence in the Chinese version. This means that if comparing sentence by sentence, the study might end up misidentifying the corresponding translation in the Chinese edition and consequently sabotage the results. Therefore, the study asserts that it is better to have a general understanding of how the whole text, or even just one page of text, is translated

[294] Jean-Paul Vinay and Jean Darbelnet, *Comparative Stylistics of French and English: A methodology for translation* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1977 [1958]): 20.
[295] Ibid., 21.
[296] Ibid.

so that it can identify more correctly the corresponding translation of a particular concept in the Chinese edition. After examining both texts and highlighting all the relevant concepts and their translations, the next key question that needs to be addressed, then, is how the findings should be recorded so that the answers to the research questions can be easily identified from the findings. The ultimate goal of this study is to examine the changes of the meanings embedded in the selected six concepts after being translated into Chinese. It therefore needs to compare and contrast the meanings of the original English concepts with those of the Chinese translations. Hence, an ideal method of documentation should be able to demonstrate such comparisons and contrasts between the original concepts and the three translations as clearly as possible. The next section will therefore explain how the findings have been recorded in this study.

2.23 Compiling concepts

After much exploration, I decided to borrow insights from specialised lexicography, a type of lexicography which is often used to create a subject-specific dictionary—a dictionary specialised in international politics, for example.[297] Applying the approach of lexicography, however, does not require this study to develop a dictionary that consists of IR terms, as this would almost certainly involve discussions of questions such as what a dictionary is and what a dictionary should intend to be—the main theoretical inquiries that lie at the heart of lexicography.[298] What this study does intend to do is to borrow the techniques that are used to compile a specialised dictionary and apply them to the findings collected from the above research. Lexicography is useful when it comes to providing detailed steps and techniques to construct a database thanks to its primary dedication to crafting effective and user-friendly dictionaries.

[297] Henning Bergenholtz and Sven Tarp, *Manual of Specialised Lexicography: The Preparation of Specialised Dictionaries* (Amsterdam: John Benjamin, 1995): 54.
[298] Heming Young and Jing Peng, *Bilingual Lexicography from a Communicative Perspective* (Amsterdam, John Benjamin, 2007): 1.

In their contribution to specialised lexicography, Henning Bergenholtz and Sven Tarp listed eight basic elements that should be taken into consideration when compiling a specialised lexicography:[299]

1) Lemma (plural: lemmata): usually known for the entry word for a dictionary.[300] For instance, in an Oxford English Dictionary, the first lemma would be capital A. In the case of this study, the lemmata would be *every* occurrence of the six concepts selected from Waltz's text if taking into account the fact that the same concept might not always be translated in the same ways in Chinese editions. Also, it was mentioned in the last section that this study attempted to assess both the diachronic and synchronic conceptual changes. Hence, it would be helpful to see the potential patterns in the changes that have occurred in the ways some concepts were translated. Moreover, Bergenholtz and Tarp state that there is a tradition in lexicography where lexicographers tend to lemmatise nouns in singular forms.[301] This issue will be discussed later in the findings section as this tradition might not make as much of a difference in the Chinese context.
2) Equivalence: this entry is particularly important here as it refers to the translations of the lemmas in a target language.[302] In this study, the equivalences would be the corresponding Chinese translations of the lemmas. According to Bergenholtz and Tarp, equivalence as an element is only available to bilingual or multilingual dictionaries.[303]
3) Macrostructure: this refers to the way in which the lemmas are ordered. Bergenholtz and Tarp state that in general, there are two ways of macrostructuring: alphabetical or systematic.[304] Alphabetical structuring refers to the listing of all lemmas in alphabetic order, while systematic structuring entails ordering the lemmas according to, say, different themes. In this study, for the sake of the convenience, the lemmas would be arranged according to the order of their first occurrences in the original text.

[299] Bergenholtz and Tarp, *Manual of Specialised Lexicography: The Preparation of Specialised Dictionaries*, 15.
[300] Ibid.
[301] Ibid.
[302] Ibid .
[303] Ibid .
[304] Ibid .

4) Microstructure: microstructure refers to the structure of the information assigned to each individual lemma.[305] In lexicography, this can include the lemma's grammatical information, collocations, pronunciations, synonyms, antonyms, and probably examples.[306] In other words, microstructure provides additional information that is regarded as important to understand the lemma. The second guiding research question in this study is to explore the intellectual impact the shift in the meanings of the key concepts is likely to have on understanding of the original text. This means that it is important to note the original context of which each original concept was part of. Hence, the microstructure of each lemma in this study would be dedicated to the documentation of the original contexts of each lemma.
5) Outside matter: Bergenholtz and Tarp define this as "dictionary components which are not part of the word list, including preface, user's guide, encyclopaedic section, dictionary grammar, etc."[307] In other words, outside matter concerns the texts that are outside the main text of the dictionary.
6) Frame structure: this refers to the way of arranging the components of the dictionary. By components, Bergenholtz and Tarp mean the following sections that are usually included in a dictionary: contents, preface, introduction, user's guide, encyclopaedic section, dictionary grammar, word list, index, appendix and informative label.[308] The order of the sections are not definitive are therefore which frame structure would suit a particular type of specialised lexicography has been a focal point of discussion.[309]
7) Access structure: access structure is related to the user-friendliness of the lexicography. The colour, image, the layout of a dictionary, for example, can all be discussed under the issue of access structure.[310]
8) Cross-reference structure: and finally, similar to access structure, cross-reference is also about the user-friendliness of a dictionary, but placing more emphases on the dictionary's ability to provide readers with enough guidance to find additional

[305] Ibid
[306] Ibid., 200.
[307] Ibid, 15
[308] Ibid., 167-188.
[309] Franz Josef Hausmann and Herbert Ernst Wiegand, "Component Parts and Structures of General Monolingual Dictionaries: A Survey", in Hausmann, Franz Josef, (ed.), *An International Encyclopaedia of Lexicography*. (New York: De Gruyter, 1989): 328.
[310] Bergenholtz and Tarp, *Manual of Specialised Lexicography: The Preparation of Specialised Dictionaries*, 216.

> or supplementary information.[311] According to Bergenholtz and Tarp, a good cross-reference structure should not exceed three cross-references.[312] If a user tries to find certain information and needs to consult extra three sources, it should be deemed a bad cross-reference structure.

What can be concluded from the above eight elements in developing a specialised lexicography is that the first four elements mainly concern the content, or the actual text, of the dictionary, whereas the last four are talking about the paratexts of the dictionary. (Paratext is a term for all added written material included in a book that does not count as the main text. See Chapter 3 for more detail.) Applying the above eight elements of compilation to this study, it then became clear that the best way to document the findings was to use a spreadsheet which detailed all the lemmata and their equivalents, in the order of the lemmata's occurrences. The original text within which each lemma was based was also included in the spreadsheet as part of the microstructure construction. Apart from the contexts, the study inserted another element as part of microstructure, that is, the back translations of the Chinese translations. (Back translation refers to the translation of a targeted document back to the original source language. See Chapter 3 for more detail.) These back translations have a significant role to play for the subsequent analysis because by comparing the original concepts with the back translations, the study could identify both the synchronic and the diachronic changes in the translations. To follow the point about creating a user-friendly database proposed in the last of Bergenholtz and Tarp's elements, the study also added chapter numbers, page numbers, and column numbers in the spreadsheet. The aim is to demonstrate that anyone could go back to the four texts and identify each lemma this study identified with the spreadsheet. In this way, the method becomes replicable and the reliability of the findings improved.

Now that a spreadsheet has been developed, the next step was to enter the data into the spreadsheet. By this time I have finished examining the first set of sub-corpora. Hence, I first entered all the key concepts that have been highlighted in Waltz's text in the spreadsheet. This is shown in Column A. I then entered all the contexts within every

[311] Ibid, 16.
[312] Ibid, 216.

occurrence of a key concept was embedded into Column B and entered their page numbers in Column C. The corresponding Chinese translations from the first edition were then entered in Column D and their page numbers in Column E. I then moved on to compare the second set of sub-corpora, that is, the first and the second Chinese translations. Since this time, they were parallel corpora, unlike the first set of sub-corpora, I compared them sentence by sentence as it was more efficient. I then highlighted the Chinese translations of the key concepts in the second Chinese edition and entered them into the spreadsheet along with their page numbers. This is shown in Column G and H. The same process was then repeated for the third set of sub-corpora and the results are shown in Column J. After entering all the translations, I then back translated each one of them into English. These back translations are shown in Column F and I. Since the data in column G and J, that is, the Chinese equivalences of the lemmata in the second and the third editions, are completely identical, no separate column is assigned to the back translations of the concepts in the third edition. (A more detailed discussion on the issues regarding the identical translations between the two editions will be presented in the next chapter.) The completed spreadsheet is attached as Appendix 1.

After completing the spreadsheet, I then moved on to analysis. I first calculate how many occurrences of the selected concepts have been collected altogether, and how many times each one of them has occurred in Waltz's text. I then analysed their Chinese translations from both the synchronic and the diachronic perspectives: synchronically, I first compared Column A and D to see whether a concept has been translated consistently in the Chinese translations. If a concept was not translated consistently, I then examined how many different translations have been used for a particular concept. Diachronically, I compared Column D and G (and then G and J in the case of the third set of sub-corpora) to see whether there was any change in the Chinese translations of the selected concepts across the three editions. If there was a change in the way in which a particular concept was translated, I then underlined its corresponding back translation. This can be seen in Column F and I.

2.24 Preliminary Findings

The study has identified altogether 473 occurrences of the selected concepts in Waltz's text; this includes 221 instances of *power*, 145 instances of *great power*, 39 instances of *security*, 26 instances of *balance of power*, 21 instances of *anarchy*, and 21 instances of *self-help*. In order to achieve the comprehensiveness of the analysis, the plural forms for the selected concepts were also recorded. This is due to the fact that there are no plural forms for non-personal nouns in Chinese language and therefore *anarchies, powers, great powers* and *balances of power* are conceptually identical to their singular forms.

The first finding that is immediately observable from the spreadsheet is that the translations of all the selected concepts in the second Chinese edition are completely identical to those in the third edition (see Column G and J in the spreadsheet). After a further examination on the differences between the second and the third Chinese translations of Waltz's text, it became clear that the two editions only differ in their paratexts. Again, issues regarding paratextual differences between the two Chinese editions will be discussed in the next chapter as part of the diachronic changes. Since in terms of the actual translations, there is no difference between the second and the third editions, the present section regards the third Chinese edition to be *methodologically* irrelevant when it comes to investigating the synchronic aspect of the translations. All the following discussions in this thesis will therefore only be based on the results from the first and the second Chinese translations of Waltz's text.

The study discovered that among the six concepts, three of them have been translated consistently in both the 1992 and the 2004 editions; they are: *security*, *self-help*, and *balance of power*. With regards to *great power* and *anarchy*, they were translated consistently in the 1992 edition but not in the 2004 version. As for *power,* preliminary findings suggest that over ten different translations were used for the concept in both editions. In order to demonstrate the results more clearly, the study accordingly created two tables juxtaposing the original concepts and their English back translations:

Concepts (occurrences)	**Back translations of the concepts in the 1992 edition (occurrences)**
Anarchy (21)	State with no government (21)
Power (219)	Pouvoir (120), Puissance (28), Country (25), Big country (16), Not Translated (8), Power (7), Capability (7), Force (1), Powerful (1), Strength (1), Regime (1), Might (1)
Security (39)	Security (39)
Self-help (21)	Self-help (21)
Great power (145)	Big country (145)
Balance of power (26)	Balance of power (26)

Table 1.

Concepts (occurrences)	**Back translations of the concepts in the 2004 edition (occurrences)**
Anarchy (21)	State with no government (16), no government (5)
Power (219)	Pouvoir (132), Puissance (7), Country (21), Big country (6), Strong country (14), Not Translated (10), Power (8), Capability (6), Force (2), Powerful (1), Strength (8), Strong (2), In power (1), Control (1)
Security (39)	Security (39)
Self-help (21)	Self-help (21)
Great power (145)	Big country (101), Strong country (33), Imperial powers (1), Super big country (1), Pole (2), Not translated (7)
Balance of power (26)	Balance of power (26)

Table 2.

As it can be seen from the two tables above, *security*, *self-help*, and *balance of power* have been consistently translated to “安全 (an quan)”, meaning “security”, “自助 (zi zhu)”, meaning “self-help”, and “势力均衡 (shi li jun heng)” or 均势 (jun shi)” (which is the abbreviated version of “势力均衡 (shi li jun heng)”), meaning “balance of power”, in both the 1992 and 2004 editions. As for to *great power* and *anarchy*, in the 1992 edition, they were both consistently translated to “大国 (da guo)”, meaning “big country”, and “无政府状态 (wu zhengfu zhuangtai)”, meaning “state with no government”; however, in the 2004 edition, more variations of translations were used for both concepts. Finally, in both the 1992 and 2004 editions, *power* was translated in over ten different ways, with the most common ones being “力量 (li liang)”, meaning “puissance” and “权力 (quan li)”, meaning “pouvoir”. The next chapter will therefore discuss what each one of these translations means as well as their implications.

Chapter 3. Unequal Exchange:

Conceptual Changes in the Translations of *Theory of International Politics*

> [T]hey suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men, with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea, were such as by the hearer were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine, whether the idea they, and those they discourse with have in their minds be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose that the idea they make it a sign of is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.[313]
>
> –John Locke

With reference to the works of Koselleck and Mannheim, the first half of the previous chapter has shown that for historians of thought, the ideas of a given age are principally shaped by their historical contexts. The present thesis is no exception. The empirical part of this thesis was conducted in the middle of the 2016 United States Presidential Election, where in a surprise victory, the Republican ticket of businessman Donald J. Trump defeated the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Trump's victory presented some interesting case studies not only for linguists all over the world, but also for this particular study. Jennifer Sclafani, an associate teaching professor in Georgetown University's Department of Linguistics, states in her recent study of Trump's speech patterns that, "He is interesting to me linguistically because…President Trump creates a spectacle in the way that he speaks."[314] In his *Constructing the Political Spectacle* published in 1988, American political scientist Murray Edelman famously characterised the twentieth-century American politics as a "political spectacle".[315] By this he meant that contemporary American politics is just like a theatrical display where the public involvement as well as the allocation of benefits for the many are only for symbolic purposes. Moreover, for Edelman, language is at the heart of such a political spectacle

[313] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: T. Tegg and Son, 1836): 292.
[314] Bastien Inzaurralde, "This linguist studied the way Trump speaks for two years. Here's what she found", *The Washington Post,* (7 July 2017) [online] (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/07/this-linguist-studied-the-way-trump-speaks-for-two-years-heres-what-she-found/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.51a4cb37fa59). [Accessed 8 August 2017].
[315] Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

due to its ambiguous nature; as he argued, when words are used for political purposes, "[d]ictionary meanings are operationally close to irrelevant".[316]

This is certainly the case with Trump's ability to create a spectacle simply by uttering incoherent sentences and repeating exaggerating words; but it is also the case with Trump's recent interaction with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Last year, after the US president referred to Kim as "rocket man" during his maiden address at the UN General Assembly, the North Korean leader fired back by sending an insulting letter in which he called President Trump a "dotard".[317] This unusual and slightly awkward use of the English word soon created a large-scale spectacle not only in media but also among the public. Interest in the word "dotard" on Google search surged as people were trying to decipher what the term actually meant.[318] According to journalist Josh Horwitz's investigation, the term "dotard" originated from the medieval-era word "doten", meaning "to be foolish, to rave", and the word was most frequently used during the nineteenth century. However, since the 1920s, the word has been rarely used in modern English language, which explains the dramatic increase of the word on Google search.[319] From the word's popularity chart generated by Google dating back to the sixteenth century, it is fair to say that if was not Kim's letter to President Trump, the word "dotard" might have completely disappeared from the modern English lexicon in a few decades' time.[320]

However, a close examination of the original letter written in Korean and its English translation indicates that there might be a hidden agenda behind this particular translation of "dotard". The Korean phrase used by Kim in the letter was "늙다리 미치광이", meaning "old crazy person"; although it is generally used as a derogatory way to describe an old person, according to journalist Hyung-jin Kim, sometimes it can also be translated

[316] Ibid., 139.
[317] Guardian staff, "'A rogue' and a 'dotard': Kim Jong-un's statement on Trump in full", *The Guardian*, (22 September 2017) [online] (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/22/a-rogue-and-a-gangster-kim-jong-uns-statement-on-trump-in-full). [Accessed 22 September 2017].
[318] Josh Horwitz, "Dotard: Kim Jong-un's latest insult to Donald Trump roughly translates as 'old lunatic beast'", *Quartz*, (22 September 2017) [online] (https://qz.com/1084464/dotard-north-koreas-latest-insult-to-donald-trump-roughly-translates-as-old-lunatic-beast/). [Accessed 22 September 2017].
[319] Ibid.
[320] Ibid.

to the neutral "old person" depending on contexts.[321] Kim also reports that in the past, there have been occasions where the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) have chosen not to publish the English translations of the insults against US presidents; and yet this time the news agency decided to translate an insulting phrase to an even more inciting word in English.[322] The intention behind such a translation is obvious: by deliberately translating and equating the Korean concept of "늙다리 미치광이 (old crazy person)" to the English "dotard", Kim Jong-un did not only manage to insult Trump blatantly on the international stage, but also created a major media spectacle for his publicity.

The reason for beginning this chapter with the foolish interaction between Trump and the North Korean leader is certainly not to discuss Kim Jong-un's political tactic, but rather to demonstrate that to a great extent, translation is essentially an act of equating the meanings of two different terms of two different languages. In Chapter 1, it has been discussed that when the Jesuits arrived in China to spread Western knowledge, it often had to accommodate the Western terms to the Chinese values in order to be accepted by the Chinese elites. Yet, from a different perspective, it can also be argued that in the cases of *scientia* and *philosophia*, what the Jesuits did was not only accommodating Western terms to the Chinese norms, but also equating the Western concepts with the existing Chinese ones. In both of those cases, only by equating *scientia* with the Chinese concept of "learning" and *philosophia* with the Chinese idea of "exhaustive mastering of worldly principles" did the Jesuits manage to persuade the Chinese intellectuals to accept those Western terms—even though those Chinese concepts have fairly different connotations. Similarly, in the above case of the interaction between Trump and Kim, the original Korean term "늙다리 미치광이" could have been translated to any other English terms ranging from "old crazy person" to "old person"; and yet, the North Korean news agency decided to translate it to the most dramatic "dotard". As Jorge Luis Borges once observed, "[T]he dictionary is based on the hypothesis—obviously an unproven one—that

[321] Hyung-jin Kim, "North Korean leader Kim called Trump a what? A 'dotard'", *Associate Press*, (22 September 2017) [online] (https://apnews.com/c2d919f8a5864d838e638d88ac5e8569). [Accessed 22 September 2017].
[322] Ibid.

languages are made up of equivalent synonyms. And it's not so."[323] It can be argued that it is in this act of equating two concepts that are not necessarily imbued with the same meaning that the power of a translation lies.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the Chinese translations of the six concepts selected from Waltz's text—that is, *anarchy*, *power*, *security*, *self-help*, *great power*, and *balance of power*—from this perspective of translation as an equation of meanings. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the research questions of this thesis is to examine whether or not the key concepts from Waltz's book have retained their conceptualities in the Chinese translations. By this I mean whether the entirety of meanings that are embedded in one of the original concepts remains intact in its Chinese translation. Because if they did remain intact, it implies that there was a conceptual equivalence in the Chinese language for this particular concept and that the translation is much less problematic. However, if they have lost their conceptualities in the Chinese translations, i.e. become de-conceptualised, it means that there were no conceptual equivalences in the Chinese language for some of the key concepts used in Waltz's argument, and that those concepts have been translated to other Chinese terms that may not necessarily share the same meanings as the original concepts. And if concepts are the building blocks of a theory as Guzzini says, then this suggests that the changes in the meanings of those concepts who have lost their original conceptualities are likely to destabilise Waltz's theory as a whole. Thus, in a way, this chapter serves to lay an empirical foundation for Chapter 4 and 5 by filtering out the concepts that have retained their conceptualities in the Chinese translations and singling out the ones that have failed to conceptualise and therefore need further examinations in the subsequent chapters.

This chapter is divided into two parts: the first section will discuss the changes in the paratextual elements of the Chinese translations of Waltz's text. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first finding that is immediately observable from the spreadsheet is that the translations of all the selected concepts in the second Chinese edition are

[323] Jorge Luis Borges, *Twenty-four Conversations with Borges: including a selection of poems, interviewed by Roberto Alifano 1981-1983*, translated by N. S. Arauz, W. Barnstone, and N. Escandel (Housatonic, MA: Lascaux Publishers, 1984): 51.

completely identical to those in the third edition. After a further examination on the differences between the second and the third Chinese translations of Waltz's text, it became clear that the two editions only differ in their paratexts. The purpose of this section hence is to explain what a paratext is and what might be the implications of those paratexual changes. Following the preliminary findings presented in the previous chapter, the second section will then move on to discuss the conceptual changes that have happened in the Chinese translations of Waltz's text from both the synchronic and the diachronic aspects. Drawing on insights from Saussure's political economy approach to linguistics, this section will demonstrate whether and how the concepts of anarchy, great power, power, balance of power, security, and self-help have retained their conceptualities in their Chinese translations. This section is divided into three subsections and each subsection represents one type of conceptual change observed from the Chinese translations of the selected concepts, and they are: conceptualised, de-conceptualised, and contextualised.

3.1 On Paratext

The term "paratext" was first coined by French literary theorist Gerard Genette in 1981, and it refers to the "accompanying productions"[324]of a text, which in general can be divided into two groups: 1) the sections surrounding the core text to transform it to a publishable book, which include a book's title, authors' names, cover images, prefaces, etc.; and 2) any external material that helps support and substantiate the core text, such as advertisements, book reviews, authors' interviews, etc. According to Genette and Maclean, the first group of paratexts is called "peritexts", the second "epitexts", and they construct, frame, and communicate "the means by which a text makes a book of itself and proposes itself as such to its readers, and more generally to the public".[325] In other words, paratexts, at least to some extent, determine the ways in which a text can be read. One telling example of such paratextual influence, as discussed by Genette, is that readers who possess the knowledge of an author's biographical facts, such as sexuality and ancestral

[324] Gerard Genette, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997:1.
[325] Gerard Genette and Marie Maclean, "Introduction to Paratexts", New Literary Critic 22(1991): 261-272.

background, are very likely to read his or her works differently from those who are not aware of those information.[326]

The study of paratextual influence, in the words of Yuste Frias, often involves analysing "the impact of the aesthetic, political, ideological, and cultural discourses underpinning the paratexts used to frame a translated text in its new reception setting".[327] In translation studies, there has been a growing number of studies in recent years concerning the relation between texts and their paratextual elements. As Pellatt maintains, "Paratext primes, explains, contextualises, justifies and through beautification, tempts."[328] Discussions have been focused primarily on the functions of paratext of the source text and to what extent these functions can influence the way the target text is received by its readers. Speaking of the increasing global presence of Italian crime novels, Carol O'Sullivan, for example, describes the ways in which foreign publishers change the original cover images of the Italian novels when they publish them in their native languages and how such change in the cover image in fact shifts the focus of the story.[329] In a similar vein, Cecilia Alvstad explores how Swedish publishers orientalise literature from Africa, Asia, and Latin American by creating certain types of paratexts that reflect Eurocentric views on the target cultures.[330] In one of the most recent studies on feminist translation, Ruth Abot Rached discusses how the stories about Iraqi women's politics narrated in Zangana's *Dreaming of Baghdad* were repacked, appropriated, and consequently orientalised by the U.S. publisher by adding three extra chapters written by U.S. academics with particular political orientations.[331]

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[326] Genette, *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation*, 8.
[327] Jose Yuste Frias, "Paratextual Elements in Translation: Paratranslating Titles in Children's Literature" in Gil-Bajardí, Anna, Orero, Pilar, and Rovira-Esteva, Sara, (eds.), *Translation Peripheries. Paratextual Elements in Translation*, (Wien: Peter Lang, 2012): 118.
[328] Valerie Pellat, (ed.) *Text, Extratext, Metatext and Paratext in Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 1.
[329] Carol O'Sullivan, "Translation, pseudotranslation and paratext: the presentation of contemporary crime fiction set in Italy", *EnterText*, 4 (2004): 62-76.
[330] Cecilia Alvstad, "The Strategic moves of paratexts: world literature through Swedish eyes", *Translation Studies*, 5 (2012): 78-94.
[331] Ruth Abou Rached, **"**Feminist Paratranslation as Literary Activism : Iraqi Writer-Activist Haifa Zangana in the Post-2003 US", in Castro, Olga and Ergun, Emek, (eds.), Advances and Innovation in in Translation Studies (London: Routledge, 2017): 195-207.

Despite being fully aware of its significance, the present study does not intend to conduct a lengthy paratextual analysis on Waltz's text and its three Chinese translations. This is because it has become clear during the process of the research that a thorough investigation into the paratextual influence on the translations of Waltz's book can easily be a study on its own. Therefore, any discussions regarding paratexts in this study will only be conducted when they are deemed to be able to substantiate the main arguments, that is, the conceptual changes in the translations of Waltz's book. This, however, does not mean that the present study in any way intentionally dismisses the importance of paratext in the study of translation.

The main paratextual changes that can be observed across the four texts used in this study are between Waltz's original text and the first Chinese translation, as well as between the first and the second Chinese editions. In contrast to the source text whose cover image consists of national flags of various countries, the first Chinese translation of *Theory of International Politics* only has the book title, the author's name, the translators' names, the editor's name and the name of the publisher printed on a plain cover (see Appendix 2.1). Moreover, the book literally only consists of the core text—that is, no contents page, preface, footnotes, bibliography, or any of the appendices is included in the publication. Discussion on paratext in this case becomes important because, as it will be argued in Chapter 6, such extreme lack of paratextual elements, along with the distinct conceptual changes manifested in the first Chinese translation of Waltz's text, are both the manifestations of a specific constellation of social, political, and intellectual conditions of China.

The same goes for the second edition, which was published twelve years after the first translation. Unlike the first edition which was translated by two professional translators, the second Chinese edition of Waltz's book is much more professionally produced: the text not only includes all the peritexts that are missing in the first edition, but also has a much more aesthetic cover (see Appendix 2.2). The dramatic paratextual shift between the first and second translations coincides with China's rapid economic development since the beginning of 2000, as well as with the gradual convergence of the intellectual discourse between the Western and the Chinese IR communities. Inquiry into the

connections between the paratextual change and the social contexts under which the translation was produced therefore becomes necessary in order to understand possible factors that lead to certain conceptual changes that occurred between the first and the second translations.

As for the third edition published in 2008, after a detailed examination of the text and its paratext, the present study discovered that the main differences between the second and the third translations lie in the cover images and some layouts of the core texts such as spacing and the font size of a heading: In comparison to the cover of the second edition which has a relatively bright colour with some decorative patterns, the third edition features a plain dark green cover with no images or patterns (see Appendix 2.3). The aesthetics and presentation of the book in general conveys a sense of seriousness and professionalism compared to the second edition. It cannot be denied that these paratextual changes to some extent illustrate the shifting social and intellectual environment of that specific period of time. Yet, given that the translations of all the selected concepts are identical between the second and the third editions, the influence of the paratext on the conceptual changes that occur within the core text is probably relatively minor and therefore discussion on paratextual influence in this case is probably not entirely relevant.

Before moving on to discuss the Chinese translations of the six selected concepts, it is probably necessary to address the issue regarding back translations in this thesis, in other words, my English translations of the Chinese translations of the selected concepts. The problem of back translation has been addressed numerous times; in the field of translation study, back translation is often used for the purpose of quality control.[332] In other words, when a document is translated from one language into another, back translation is sometimes used to test the quality of the translation by translating the translated document back into its original language. By comparing the back translation and the original document, translators can find the discrepancies between the two and examine potential

[332] Alexandrina Barajin, *Reverse Translation as a Method of Proofreading Translation* (GrinVerlag: Open Publishing, 2016): xii.

issues in the translation.[333] The most common issues that can arise from back translation is asymmetry and heterogeneity.[334] For instance, the French word "Banque" would normally be translated to "Bank" in English; however, if we back translate the English "Bank" to French, due to the meaning of "river bank" that is also available in the English word, we probably would translate the English word to the French expression of "river bank". This is what Inaba et al. call the problem of asymmetry.[335] Heterogeneity refers to the variations of back translations; in the above example of the French "banque", the fact that the English back translation could either be "banque" or the French expression for "river bank" would be categorised under the problem of heterogeneity. The main problem with heterogeneity is that translators can manipulate back translations to suit his or her research agenda.[336]

This thesis is fully aware that, to some extent, the back translations of the selected concepts would lead to a decrease in the level of credibility of the present study. Because any back translation is just as, if not more than, problematic as a normal translation. What a back translation essentially does is to have the original concept go through double linguistic interpretations: first from English to Chinese, and then from Chinese back to English. Nevertheless, given that it is unlikely that every reader of this thesis will possess enough knowledge of the Chinese language to understand all the Chinese translations, the present thesis has to risk the potential issues caused by the back translations for the sake of the comprehensiveness as well as the accessibility of the arguments. The study accordingly endeavoured to make the back translations as literal as possible so that the discrepancies between the meanings of the Chinese translations of the selected concepts and those of the back translations could be minimised. Readers are welcome to check my back translations as they are indicated in Column F and I of the spreadsheet attached, and any criticisms will be sincerely appreciated.

[333] Sin-wai Chan and David E. Pollard, *An Encyclopeadia of Translation: Chinese-English, English-Chinese* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2001): 36.
[334] Naomi Yamashita and Toru Ishida, "Effects of Machine Translation on Collaborative Work", in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work* (2006): 515-524.
[335] Rieko Inaba, Yohei Murakami, Akiyo Nadamoto, and Toru Ishida, "Multilingual Communication Support Using the Language Grid", in Ishida, Toru, and Fussell, R. Susan, (eds.), *Intercultural Collaboration* (Berlin, Springer, 2007): 120.
[336] Ibid.

3.2 On the Question of Equivalence: *Theory of International Politics* in Chinese

In his *Grundrisse: foundations of the critique of political economy*, Karl Marx once made the following observation regarding the translations of an idea into a foreign language,

> [L]anguage does not transform ideas, so that the peculiarity of ideas is dissolved and their social characters run alongside them as a separate entity, like prices alongside commodities. Ideas do not exist separately from language. Ideas which have first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order to circulate, in order to become exchangeable, offer a somewhat better analogy; but the analogy then lies not in language, but in the foreignness of language.[337]

Although Marx's book is on labour theory and has nothing to do with language or translation, this particular passage nonetheless illustrates an important concept that is often not addressed in translation literature, that is, the idea of exchangeability. What Marx is essentially arguing here is that a foreign idea requires translation to make it exchangeable; and when something is exchanged, it is automatically given a value, just like the price of a commodity, and what is exchanged *with* determines the value it represents. Hence, the moment a word is translated into a different language is also the moment the value of the original word is equated with the value of its translation.

But what is the "value" of a word? Following Marx's argument, Saussure stresses the proximity of the study of political economy and that of linguistics, arguing that "both sciences are concerned with *a system for equating things of different orders*—labour and wages in one and a signified and a signifier in the other."[338] According to Saussure, the study of synchronic linguistics should first of all start by distinguishing the "meaning" of a sign from the "value" of a sign.[339] For a word, its "value" is the signified of the word, whereas its "meaning" is its signifier. And in the study of translation, we often mistake the exchange of meanings with that of values. One example Saussure uses is the French word "mouton" and its English translation "sheep"; he argues that the French "mouton" has the same meaning as the English "sheep" but not the same value. This is because in the English language, a different word, "mutton", is used to refer to the meat of a sheep,

[337] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: foundations of the critique of political economy* (New York: Random House, 1973): 163.
[338] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 79.
[339] Ibid., 80.

but in French, the word "mouton" covers both.[340] In other words, when in use, the French word "mouton" invokes both the meaning of a sheep and that of its meat, but the English translation only invokes the meaning of a sheep. This means that for Saussure, the "value" of a word is essentially its conceptual aspect—or, conceptuality, to use a different word—and a valid translation should be between two words that have the same, or at least very similar, "values" i.e. conceptualities.

Drawing on this idea of translation as an exchange of values, this section will answer the first research question set up in the previous chapter, that is, whether the six key concepts selected from Waltz's text have been translated into "concepts" or "words"? In other words, have the original concepts retained their conceptualities in their Chinese translations? The previous chapter has discussed that the main difference between a word and a concept, to reiterate Koselleck's argument, is that a word is a linguistic representation with a fixed meaning that often refers to a specific object, whereas a concept is a summation of meanings which can only be interpreted according to different contexts. It has also explained why the six terms selected from Waltz's text can be considered as concepts using Koselleck's theory. And if a valid translation is the one that is between two words of the same "values" i.e. conceptualities as Saussure suggests, this means that this study can identify whether a concept has failed to conceptualise in Chinese by investigating the conceptuality of its Chinese translation. By this I mean to study whether its Chinese translation is a concept that is imbued with very similar social and historical meanings to that of the original concept. Because if the translation does have the same social and historical meanings, it means the original concept has conceptualised in the Chinese translation and therefore the translation is much less contested. However, if not, then it means that the original concept has either de-conceptualised, meaning that have become the semantic description of the original concept; or it has re-conceptualised, meaning it has become a different concept.

3.21 Conceptualised in Translations: security, self-help, balance of power

Preliminary findings from Chapter 2 concluded that among the six concepts selected, three of them have been translated consistently in both of the 1992 and the 2004 editions;

[340] Ibid., 115.

they are: *security*, *self-help*, and *balance of power*. In Chapter 1, it has already been mentioned that the concept of balance of power was quickly accepted by the Chinese intellectuals during the nineteenth century when the translation of Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* brought in some IR concepts. This was because the Chinese concept of "均势 (jun shi)", literally meaning balancing power, share many similarities with the English concept of balance of power. In other words, the Chinese "均势 (jun shi)", which is also the translation used for *balance of power* in both the 1992 and the 2004 editions of Waltz's book, is the conceptual equivalence of Waltz's concept of balance of power.

In terms of *security*, its Chinese translation is "安全 (an quan)" and it can either mean "safety" or "security". However, when it is used in a context of war or transnational relations, the concept has very similar connotations to that of *Waltz's neorealist concept* of security. It is important to stress here that when it comes discussing the Chinese equivalences of the key concepts, this chapter is talking about the concepts whose meanings are based on Waltz's theorisation of international politics. In the case of *security*, for example, it is one of the most contested concepts in the discipline of IR and different theories of security have different understandings of the concept.[341] In this thesis, however, the concept of security is strictly understood within Waltz's theoretical framework. In *Replies to the Letters of Zhao Yuanhao* by Fan Zhongyan, a poet from the Northern Song Dynasty, for example, we can find the following sentence where the Chinese concept of "安全 (an quan)" is used,

> …there are relentless wars. We are always constrained by the powers of those from Guangnan, Xinan. Jiangnan, Jinghu, and Xichuan…with your lord being the head of the state, your country is just as secure as it used to be [my translation].[342]

[341] For theories of security, see e.g. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991): 313.; David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies,* 23 (1997): 5.; Bary Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (eds.), *Security: a framework for analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1997); Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Strategies* (London: Routledge, 2002).
[342] Fan Zhongyan, Da Zhao Yuanhao Shu (Replies to the letter of Zhao Yuanhao), *China Institute of Fan Zhongyan Research*, (2011) [online] (http://www.zgfanzhongyan.org/fan/navs/shiwen/dazhaoyuanhao) [Accessed 20 November 2017].

In this passage, the idea of "安全 (an quan)" is not only used to describe a state that is free from danger and threat as it is the case with the idea of security, but also used to describe something craved by a country in a state of "relentless wars". This usage resembles strongly with Waltz's concept of security which is theorised as something a state is constantly in pursuit due to the anarchic nature of the international system. In short, the Chinese translation of "安全 (an quan)" has the same conceptuality to Waltz's concept of security.

A similar observation can also be made in the case of *self-help*. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in Waltz's understanding of international politics, the international environment is essentially a self-help system where states have no one to rely on but themselves. The Chinese translation of *self-help* is "自助 (zi zhi)", literally meaning "self-help", and in ancient Chinese political discourse, it is often used to denote that in dealing with public affairs, an official has no one to rely on but himself. As Lu Jia, a scholar and politician from the Han Dynasty, wrote in *Xinyu*, "...the lord doesn't understand self-help; the good have left the imperial court for a peaceful life in the village, and yet those who do not care about the state affairs have stayed and they don't know anything [my translation]."[343] Although Lu Jia is not exactly talking about the international system in this passage, the way he describes the state of the imperial court—the ruler is alone and should trust no one but himself—resembles greatly to Waltz's conception of the international system. The Chinese "自助 (zi zhi)", it therefore can be argued, is conceptually equivalent to the English "self-help".

So far this section has illustrated that among the six selected concepts, *security, self-help*, and *balance of power* have retained their conceptualities in the Chinese translations. According to Saussure's political economy approach to synchrony, this implies that the translations of these three concepts can be seen as exchanges of equal "values" i.e. conceptualities, and that they are linguistically valid translations. Hence, these three concepts will no longer be discussed in the remaining chapters of this thesis and the

[343] Lu Jia, Xinyu, *Zhongguo Zhexue Shu Dianzi Jihua* (2006) [online] (https://ctext.org/xinyu/zizhi/zhs) [Accessed 20 November 2017].

following discussion will solely be focused on the translations of *anarchy*, *great power*, and *power*.

3.22 De-conceptualised in Translations: anarchy, great power

Apart from *security*, *self-help*, and *balance of power*, the preliminary findings also suggested that two other concepts have been consistently translated in the 1992 edition of Waltz's text: *anarchy*, and *great power*. However, unlike the previous two concepts, neither *anarchy* nor *great power* has been conceptualised in their Chinese translations. *Anarchy* was consistently translated to "无政府状态 (wu zhengfu zhuangtai)", meaning "state with no government", while *great power* was translated to "大国 (da guo)" which literally reads "big country". In contrast to the Chinese translations of *security* and *self-help*, the translations of *anarchy* and *great power* are not imbued with specific social and historical meanings. Moreover, compared to the translations *security* and *self-help*, the translations of both *anarchy* and *great power* sound overly descriptive. In fact, in the case of *anarchy*, the Chinese translation is essentially the dictionary definition of the original concept; as the entry for "anarchy" in *Oxford Dictionary* is "absence of government".[344] With regards to the concept of great power, the previous chapter has argued that according to Waltz's theory, a "great power" is a state with the largest amount of capabilities they possess, and this can include territorial size, military strength, economic power, etc. Although territorial size is indeed one of the indicators of state power, it is not the sole indicator. Hence, by translating *great power* to "big country", the Chinese translation has actually diminished all the other possible indicators of a great power from its original concept. It is probably fair to say that the both *anarchy* and *great power* have lost their original conceptualities in the Chinese translations and become de-conceptualised.

What is interesting, however, about *anarchy* and *great power* is that, despite their consistent translations in the 1992 edition, the 2004 version broke away from this consistency. As shown in Table 2 from the section on preliminary finding in the previous

[344] Angus Stevenson (ed.), *Oxford Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 56.

chapter, unlike in the 1992 edition where *anarchy* was consistently translated to "无政府状态 (wu zhengfu zhuangtai)", meaning "state with no government", the 2004 edition has two different translations of the concept "无政府状态 (wu zhengfu zhuangtai)" i.e. "state with no government", and "无政府 (wu zhengfu)" which literally means "no government". Similarly, in contrast to the 1992 edition where there was only one translation for *great power*, the 2004 edition has five different variations of translation: "大国 (da guo)" i.e. big country, "强国 (qiang guo)", meaning "strong country", "超级大国 (chao ji da guo)", which literally means "super big country" but is also the same translation for "superpower", "极 (ji)", meaning "pole", and finally, "列强 (lie qiang)", meaning "imperial powers". The potential reasons behind the changes in these translations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Yet, juxtaposing the 1992 Chinese translations of the two concepts with the ones from the 2004 edition, what can be observed immediately is that the 2004 translations are much less descriptive. Especially with the case of *great power*, although the translation "big country" is not necessarily wrong at the sematic level, as discussed earlier, it still diminishes all the other indicators of state strength and consequently renders the original concept to lose its conceptuality. By translating it now to five different variations of translations, however, the 2004 has demonstrated its awareness in the limited capacity of the expression "big country" in conveying the original conceptuality of *great power*. This is also manifested from the fact that apart from "big country", "strong country" was the second most commonly used translation for *great power*. It is probably fair to say that unlike "big country", the expression "strong country" can refer to a state's strength from not just the aspect of territorial size, but also those of military strength, economic power, and so forth.

3.23. Contextualised concept: power

Finally, *power*—arguably the most complicated but nevertheless interesting concept of all in terms of its Chinese translations. In the realm of International Relations, *power* is probably one of the most, if not the most, utilised concepts. In Felix Berenskoetter's edited volume, *Concepts in World Politics*, Stefano Guzzini dedicated a chapter to discuss

the ubiquitous presence of the concept in the discipline of IR.[345] Yet despite the level of controversy surrounding the concept, in Waltz's theory of international politics, *power* is a fairly straightforwardly concept. As discussed in Chapter 2, unlike classical realism which supposes that the desire for power is rooted in human nature and therefore power is an end in itself, Waltz and the neorealist camp of international politics he represents, argue that power is nothing but a means for a state to achieve security. In other words, *power* in Waltz's theory is an indicator of the strength of an actor in the international system, and consequently of capacity to affect or control events.

The 1992 Chinese translation of Waltz's book has eleven different translations for *power*; they are: "权力 (quan li)", meaning "pouvoir", "力量 (li liang)", meaning "puissance", "国家(guo jia)", meaning "country", "大国(da guo)", meaning "big country", "力 (li)", meaning "power", "能力(neng li)", meaning "capability", "势力 (shi li)", meaning "force", "强 (qiang)", meaning "powerful","实力(shi li)", meaning "strength" "政权 (zheng quan)", meaning "regime", and "威力(wei li)", meaning "might". Eliminate the occasions where *power* is used to refer to "state", for instance, in the concept of great power, this leaves the present study nine different variations of the Chinese translations of *power*. It can be noticed that among these nine translations, I back translated one of them as "power", that is, "力 (li)". The next question naturally would be: if there *is* a Chinese concept for *power*, why the translators did not use it to translate all the "powers" in Waltz's text. The reason for this is because, although the Chinese character "力 (li)" is arguably the closest term to the English concept of power, when in use, it usually has to be combined with another character in order to make sense. This is why all of the nine translations, apart from "政权 (zheng quan)", that is, "regime", contain the character "力 (li)". I also discovered that that one occasion where power was translated to "力 (li)" was in the phrase "explanatory power", where "力 (li)" was in fact the abbreviated form of "能力 (li liang)", that is, "capability". This demonstrates that although "力 (li)" may be the closest Chinese expression to the English concept of power, it is not a valid term on its own.

[345] Stefano Guzzini, "Power", in Berenskoetter, Felix, (ed.), *Concepts in World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2016): 44-65.

Another translation that can probably be eliminated from the discussion onwards is "强 (qiang)", meaning "powerful". After examining the context in which this translation was used, I discovered that the translation was the abbreviated form for "强权 (qiang quan)", meaning "enormous pouvoir". Hence, this translation can be categorised under the discussion of "权力 (quan li)" i.e. pouvoir. The same process of elimination also goes for "政权 (zheng quan)", meaning "regime", as the term is the abbreviated form for "政治权力 (zheng zhi quan li)", which means "political pouvoir". The process of elimination thus eventually leaves this study with six Chinese translations for *power*; they are: "权力 (quan li)", meaning "pouvoir", "力量 (li liang)", meaning "puissance", "能力(neng li)", meaning "capability", "势力 (shi li)", meaning "force", "实力(shi li)", meaning "strength", and "威力(wei li)", meaning "might".

As mentioned earlier, all of the six translations contain the character "力 (li)", meaning "power", and each one of them indicates a different aspect of "力 (li)", that is, "power". Felix Rösch in his study of the concept of power in Mogenthau's work argues that superficial accounts on the study of Morgenthau's works often present his concept of power in a traditional Hobbsian sense of a means of self-preservation.[346] However, a close reading of Morgenthau's works indicates that Margenthau's conception of power contains two dualitic conceptualisations: "pouvoir", which, according to Rösch, is the "empirical form of power…the ruthless and egoistic pursuit of the drive to prove oneself", and "puissance", a positive and normative form of power which "enables people to pursue their interests and work together for a common good".[347]

In the Chinese language, there are also different variations of power and the translations of Waltz's concept of power have demonstrated this *par excellence*; among the six translations, "权力 (quan li)" and "力量 (li liang)" have very similar connotations to what

[346] Felix Rösch, "*Pouvoir*, *puissance*, and politics: Hans Morgenthau's dualistic concept of power?", *Review of International Studies*, 40 (2014): 349.
[347] Ibid., 354.

Rösch argues about Morgenthau's conception of power: the Chinese "权力 (quan li)", as with Morgenthau's idea of pouvoir, is often used as a negative form of power. It refers to one's capacity to control and dominate and it is generated in the form of, in the words of Morgenthau, "the desire for power".[348] In *The Book of Han*, for example, one sentence reads, "Wan Zhang and Shi Xian are such good friends; Wan Zhang even managed to gain power ("pouvoir") and fame thanks to Shi Xian [my translation]."[349] In this context, the author of the book was describing how Wan Zhang used his friendship with Shi Xian to raise his status and gain influence. A similar usage the Chinese "pouvoir" can also be found in Liu Zongyuan's *In Memory of Liuzhou Sima Menggong*, where he says, "the law is the right way; it cannot be changed by those who hold power ("pouvoir")", indicating the negative connotation that is inherent in the Chinese concept of pouvoir.[350]

"力量 (li liang)", on the other hand, usually has a positive connotation when used in Chinese political discourse, which is also quite similar to Morgenthau's concept of puissance, that is, a form of power that makes people work for the common good. In the Chinese idiom "人多力量大 (ren duo li liang da)" which literally means "more people, more puissance", for example, the "力量 (li liang)" i.e. "puissance" refers to one's ability to achieve something positive as a group. Yet what is particularly interesting about this Chinese concept is that unlike "权力 (quan li)" i.e. "pouvoir", "力量 (li liang)" i.e. "puissance" was not used to refer to political power until the end of the 1940s—in other words, right before the communist revolution. Back in the Southern Song Dynasty, for instance, poet Lu You described his experience as a wine-maker, "I still lack the power ("puissance") and the knowledge [to make good wine] [my translation]."[351] In this context, the meaning of the Chinese "puissance" was still closer to the idea of "capability". Now fast forward to the Republican period; in the 1930s, after his trip back from Venice, Zhu Ziqing, a renowned poet and essayist, made the following observation about the painting, *The Crucifixion*, "…The Crucifixion was displayed in the upstairs

[348] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (London: Latimer House, 1947): 165.
[349] Han Gu, *Hanshu: Youxiazhuan* (The Book of Han), Gushiwen Wang (2018) [online] (https://so.gushiwen.org/guwen/bfanyi_2467.aspx) [Accessed 8 August 2018].
[350] Zhang Hongwei, "Gugesi de Jiezhi (The Ring of Gyges)", *Fazhi Ribao*, (27 July 2017) [online] (http://www.calaw.cn/article/default.asp?id=7369). [Accessed 8 August 2018].
[351] Lu You, Yin Jiu (To Drink), *Zhonghua Shici Wang*, (2009) [online] (http://www.haoshici.com/Luyou84733.html) [Accessed 8 August 2018].

attic. It has the strongest power ("puissance") [to draw people in] [my translation]."[352] Again, in this sentence, although "puissance" was used as a form of positive power, there was still no indication of any political usage of the concept.

Since the late 1940s, however, the Chinese concept of puissance began to be imbued with a strong political connotation. In Mao's writings, especially, the term "力量 (li liang)" i.e. "puissance" began to be increasingly used together with terms such as "people", "revolution", "solidarity". In a short writing he produced in 1948, he used the term "puissance" eleven times, and it was used in phrases such as "the puissance of democracy", "the puissance of the people", "the puissance of the revolution" etc.[353] In fact, the idiom above, "more people, more puissance" was also first proposed by Mao in 1958 to describe the then Chinese society.[354] It can be argued that although the Chinese concept of puissance in many ways are similar to Morgenthau's conception of "puissance" i.e. a form of power that makes people work for the common good, the (modern) Chinese conception of "puissance" often has a very specific connotation as to what this common good is, that is, revolution.

Before moving on the discussion on other four translations, it is necessary to first address one problem regarding my back translations of the Chinese "权力 (quan li)" to "pouvoir", and the Chinese "力量 (li liang)" to "puissance". The present thesis is aware that from the perspective of a native French speaker, the French term "pouvoir" does not necessary refer to the negative form of political power, and neither does "puissance" necessarily connote the positive form of political power. In this regard, the pouvoir/puissance distinction articulated by Rösch might be slightly controversial, if not problematic. This thesis is also aware that the introduction of the third language, namely, French, as part of my back translations is likely to undermine the validity and accuracy of the argument

[352] Zhu Ziqing, Weinisi (Venice), *Ruiwen* (9 May 2017) [online] (http://www.ruiwen.com/wenxue/zhuziqing/27831.html) [Accessed 8 August 2018].
[353] Zhongguo Zhongyang Wenxian (ed.), *Mao Zedong Wenji* (The Writings of Mao) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1996): 54.
[354] Renmin Wang, Dayuejin Mao Zedong Fandui Jieyu (Mao against One Child Policy During the Great Leep), *Sohu*, (31 October 2015) [online] (http://war.163.com/15/1031/09/B78ATVKH00014OVF.html)) [Accessed 8 August 2018].

proposed in this chapter. However, since there is no English conceptual equivalence to either of the Chinese terms, this study decided to take the risk and insisted on deploying the pouvoir/puissance distinction proposed by Rösch to back translate "权力 (quan li)" and "力量 (li liang)". It is therefore important to point out here that the pouvoir/puissance distinction used to facilitate the arguments in this thesis is entirely based on Rösch's writing on the concept of power in Mogenthau's work, and therefore does not reflect the correct usage of the terms in the French language.

As for the other four translations, the Chinese term "能力 (neng li)", meaning "capability", has a very similar connotation to that of "力量 (li liang)" i.e. puissance, but it often refers to something more tangible. For instance, in the 1992 edition, "能力 (neng li)" i.e. "capability" was adopted seven times for the translation of *power*; and five out of seven times the "power" in the original sentence was not used to refer to political power, but to the types of power such as "spending power", "explanatory power", "predictive power", "borrowing power" and "production power". This also goes for "实力 (shi li)", meaning "strength", which occurred only once to describe the "power" in "military power"—in other words, as with "能力 (neng li)" i.e. "capability", "实力 (shi li)" denotes the type of power that is tangible and also measurable. As for "势力 (shi li)", meaning "force", and "威力 (wei li)", meaning "might", "势力 (shi li)" is usually the default translation for the "power" in the concept of balance of power. In the Chinese translation of *balance of power*, that is, "均势 (jun shi)", the "势" in the phrase refers to "势力 (shi li)" i.e. force. This also explains why the only time power was translated to "势力 (shi li)" i.e. force was in the context where Waltz was discussing states attempting to equalise their powers. Finally, in terms of "威力 (wei li)", which means "might", the present study argues that this is an awkward translation as in the context where this translation was adopted, Waltz was using the word "power", along with "elegance", to describe a theory. The original sentence was, "…it [a theory] gains in elegance and power". The Chinese idea of "威力 (wei li)", that is "might", however, is often used to describe the powerfulness of machinery, such as a washing machine or a car engine, and therefore does not seem to be a suitable translation on this particular occasion.

After a lengthy discussion on the Chinese translations of *power*, it can be argued that unlike the de-conceptualised concepts of anarchy and great power, the meaning of *power* has in fact been contextualised and multiplied in its Chinese translations. In contrast to the English concept of power which can be used on different occasions and is already imbued with a range of different meanings, the Chinese language is more precise when it comes to compartmentalising different forms of power. Moreover, the discussion above also suggests that in the Chinese language, there is a clear distinction between political forms of power, and non-political forms of power: while "权力 (quan li)", that is, "pouvoir", and "力量 (li liang)" i.e. "puissance" can connote political power, the rest of the four translations refer to the types of power that are more tangible and specific (apart from "势力 (shi li)" which can refer to political power but only in the case of *balance of power*). This also explains why "pouvoir", and "puissance" were the most frequently adopted translations for *power* in the Chinese editions of Waltz's text.

Similar to the cases of *anarchy* and *great power*, there were also some changes in the translations of *power* in the 2004 edition. The first observable change is that although the same amount of variations of translation (over ten) were used to translation the concept, some translations have been replaced with different expressions. For instance, in the context where *power* was translated to "政权 (zheng quan)", meaning "regime", in the 1992 edition, the 2004 version adopted the expression "执政 (zhi zheng)", meaning "in power", which has much less negative connotation. The second interesting change in the 2004 translations of *power* is that it shows that the change in the translations of one concept can often lead to the change in others. As discussed earlier, the 2004 edition introduced the term "strong country" to translate the concept of great power. This change also affected the translations of power: among occasions where *power* was used to refer to a state, it can be seen that there were 17 occasions where the concept of power was also translated to "strong country", surpassing the ones where it was translated to "big country". The fact that the translators of the 2004 edition did not only translate more *great powers* to "strong country" but also more *powers* to "strong country" indicates that

between 1992 and 2004, there was a clear shift in the Chinese conceptualisation of "great power".

Probably the most intriguing change in the translations of *power* that occurred between the two Chinese editions was that the number of occasions where *power* was translated to "pouvoir" has increased from 120 to 132. This was also concomitant with a dramatic decrease in the number of occasions where *power* was translated to "puissance" from 28 to only 7 in the 2004 edition. As stated earlier, the Chinese term "权力 (quan li)", that is, "pouvoir", has a strong negative connotation and it is often associated with the idea of coercive control. "力量 (li liang)" i.e. "puissance", on the other hand, refers to a positive form of political power that makes people act together to achieve common good. By translating more "powers" to "pouvoir" and reducing the number of the occurrences of "puissance", the 2004 Chinese edition seems to be trying to portray a more negative image of the nature of international politics.

3.3 Discussion and Conclusion

In his "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", Roman Jakobson argues,

> Equivalence in difference is the cardinal problem in language and the pivotal concern of linguists. Like any receiver of verbal messages, the linguist acts as their interpreter. No linguistic specimen may be interpreted by the science of language without a translation of its sign into other signs of the same system or into signs of another system. Any comparison of two languages implies an examination of their mutual translatability, widespread practices of interlingual communication, particularly, translation activities, must be kept under constant scrutiny by linguistic science.[355]

What Jakobson is arguing here is that translation is essentially a structural practice whereby the meanings of words are equated with the meanings of other words, either from the same or other languages. This is certainly the case with the Chinese translations of the six concepts from Waltz's book. Following Saussure's political economy approach to linguistic analysis, the present chapter has demonstrated that when translating an English concept to Chinese, this process of equating meanings can result in three types of

[355] Roman Jokobson, "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation", *On Translation*, 3 (1959): 233-234.

conceptual changes: conceptualisation, whereby an original concept does not lose any meanings in its Chinese translation and thus retains its original conceptuality in the Chinese language. The cases of *security, self-help*, and *balance of power* have demonstrated this type of conceptual change. In this scenario, the reason the original concepts managed to retain their original conceptualities was because they all had conceptual equivalences in the Chinese language.

Secondly, de-conceptualisation, whereby an original concept loses some meanings in its Chinese translation and consequently loses its original conceptuality in the Chinese language. This is manifested in the translations of *anarchy* and *great power*; in both examples, the original concept has been rendered into an overly descriptive language and consequently lost its conceptual nature due to the lack of conceptual equivalences. In the case of *great power*, particularly, by translating the concept to "big country", the 1992 edition has diminished all the other indicators of a great power aside from territorial size that were inherent in Waltz's original conception.

And finally, contextualisation, or multiplication, whereby an original concept gains extra meanings in its Chinese translation and this is most vividly demonstrated through the example of *power*. This type of conceptual change, it can be argued, is mostly caused by the asymmetry that exists in the different granularity levels of the two equating concepts. By this I mean in the case of *power*, for example, the reason for its multiplication of meanings was driven by the asymmetry between the Chinese language's precision in expressing different aspects of power using different lexical terms and the English language's usage of the word "power" to indicate all aspects of power. And whenever this asymmetry happens, the concept that has lower granularity level is likely gain extra meanings when translated into a different language where the same concept is expressed with multiple lexical terms. It can therefore be concluded that in the absence of a conceptual equivalence, the process of translating one of Waltz's concepts into Chinese can be expressed as the following mathematical equation:

> "Chinese translation"= "original concept"+/- (meanings resulted from linguistic differences between English and Chinese)

Thus, in the case of *power,* the linguistic difference was the asymmetry in the granularity levels between the Chinese and the English ways of expressing the concept of power. This consequently resulted in the Chinese translations of *power* gaining (+) more meanings. In terms of *anarchy* and *great power*, since there was no conceptual equivalence for either concept, the Chinese translations ended up losing (-) meanings. But what exactly was the linguistic difference between the Chinese and the English language in this case? With this question in mind, the next chapter will accordingly discuss one fundamental difference between the Chinese and the English linguistic systems which led to the losing of meanings in the translations of *anarchy* and *great power*.

Chapter 4. The Linguistic (Re)Shaping of Politics:

Chinese Empiricism and/in the Translations of *Theory of International Politics*

> The nature of their [Chinese] Written Language is at the outset a great hindrance to the development of the sciences. Rather, conversely, because a true scientific interest does not exist, the Chinese have acquired no better instrument for representing and imparting thought. They have, as is well known, beside a Spoken Language, a *Written Language;* which does not express, as our does, individual sounds — does not present the spoken words to the eye, but represents the ideas themselves by signs. [356]
>
> —Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

The Eurocentric nature of Hegel's work is well known.[357] Despite being one of the most influential thinkers in the history of Western philosophy, Hegel did not gain a good reputation from many of his claims regarding the non-Western world. Wilhelm Halbfass, Professor of Indian philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, once wrote that Hegel was "not a neutral scholar" and that he represented "like few others the glory and greatness as well as the futility and arrogance of philosophy".[358] The above quote comes from the chapter on China in *The Philosophy of History*, where Hegel claims that the fixed nature of the written form of Chinese language indicates a lack of potential for progress and therefore China, along with other non-Western civilisations, "still lie outside the World's History".[359] In Hegel's view, "true history" follows a pattern of progress characterised by a dialectic movement of subjective and objective freedom.[360] By objective freedom, he refers to an individual's level of identification with the social whole in terms of religion, moral codes, customs, and so forth. Moreover, when there is only objective freedom, Hegel argues, those societal laws and rules are regarded as something

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[356] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel*, The Philosophy of History.* Translated by J. Sibree. (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001 [1837]): 152.
[357] The most comprehensive indictment of Hegel is probably: Teshale Tibebu, *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011). Also see: Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996); Robert Bernasconi, "Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti", in Barnett, Stuart (ed.), *Hegel After Derrida* (New York: Routledge, 1998): 41-63; Susan Buck-Morss, "Hegel and Haiti", *Critical Inquiry*,26 (2000): 821-865.; Sandra Bonetto, "Race and Racism in Hegel: An Analysis", *Minerva*, 10 (2006): 35-64.
[358] Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An essay in understanding* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988): 98.
[359] Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, 133.
[360] Ibid., 477.

fixed and that "the subjects are consequently like children, who obey their parents without will or insight of their own".[361]

Subjective freedom hence arises when individuals want to reject the constraints of mere objective freedom and become aware of their own potentials without making references to the substantial world. It refers to one's ability to see oneself apart from the social whole and separated from it when necessary.[362] One telling example of the arising of subjective freedom from objective freedom is the departure from the domination of church and monarchies during the Enlightenment in favour of reason and individual liberty. The history of Western civilisation, as far as Hegel observes, is characterised by such a dynamic contrast between the objective existence of the substantial world and the emergence of human self-realisation of potential; it is linear, progressive, and it is about "becoming".[363] The non-Western world, on the contrary, is about "being"; it values traditions over progress, stresses unity over individuality, and conceives the universe in its entirety over its coherence—and nowhere is this "beingness" manifested more vividly than Chinese characters. As he puts it,

> …the contrast between objective existence and subjective freedom of movement in it, is still wanting, every change is excluded, and the fixedness of a character which recurs perpetually, takes the place of what we should call the truly historical.[364]

The reason for beginning this chapter with Hegel is certainly not to embrace his Eurocentrism. Nor is it to defend the argument concerning whether or not China, or any non-Western civilisations for that matter, should be deemed to lie outside of the realm of world history. Hegel's observation is illustrative here because by arguing for the negative impact of the Chinese language on scientific progress, he sheds light on an important question regarding the role of language in knowledge construction, that is, whether and how the language one speaks could/should/would shape the way one thinks *theoretically*. In 1986, Robert K. Logan, an interdisciplinary physicist and linguist, made a similar argument to that of Hegel's; he claimed that "the first scientific literature…was destined

[361] Ibid., 122.
[362] Ibid.
[363] Ibid., 124.
[364] Ibid., 133.

to be written in alphabetic script because the alphabet creates the environmental conditions under which abstract theoretical science flourishes", highlighting the positive correlation between the Indo-European alphabetic system and Europe's achievements in science and technology.[365] The aim of this chapter is not to discuss whether such theory is tenable or not. Yet, what is of relevance here is that if the characteristics of a particular linguistic system could indeed determine the type of knowledge constructed by means of such a language, would the act of translating certain knowledge claims from one linguistic system into another potentially transform the nature of the knowledge claims itself? To put it in the context of this study, could the Chinese translation of *Theory of International Politics* possibly alter or diminish a certain theoretical framework of the book which may only be accessible when reading it in English?

The answer this chapter endeavours to present is an unequivocal "yes". Its main proposition is that translating Waltz's text from the alphabetically construed English language to the logographic Chinese characters transformed both the ontological and the epistemological assumptions of the original argument. The argument will proceed in three sections: The first section will outline some key characteristics of the Chinese linguistic system. It will argue that in comparison to the English alphabetic system which is fundamentally connotative in nature, Chinese linguistic symbolism is largely denotative and more empirically oriented. Drawing on insights from psycholinguistics, the second section will explain how such empirical nature of the Chinese language could inhibit abstract and counterfactual thinking. Its purpose is to highlight that when it comes to knowledge production, anything that is expressed in the Chinese language is almost always grounded in the empirical world. This, however, could be problematic for the Chinese translation of *Theory of International Politics*, as the highly deductive nature of the book calls for a strong need of abstract thinking upon its comprehension which is absent in the Chinese linguistic system. With reference to the translations of *anarchy*, *power*, and *great power* discussed in the previous chapter, the final part of this chapter will then demonstrate how the inherent empiricism in the Chinese language has not only

[365] Robert K. Logan, *The Alphabet Effect: The Impact of the Phonetic Alphabet on the Development of Western Civilization* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986): 46.

reduced the explanatory and predictive powers of Waltz's theory, but also re-shaped the entire theoretical framework of Waltz's argument via translation.

4.1 The Chinese Empirical Mind: the impact of language on thought

Before examining certain characteristics of the Chinese language and seeing how they could shape the Chinese way of thinking, it is necessary to first address that to date there is no consensus among philosophers, linguists, psychologists, or anthropologists on how exactly one's language can influence one's thinking. In Western philosophy, discussion around the idea that language influences human thought emerged as early as 1836 in the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who argued that,

> [w]e must look upon language, not as a dead *product*, but far more as a *producing*, must abstract more from what it does as a designator of objects and instrument of understanding, and revert more carefully, on the other hand, to its origin, closely entwined as it is with inner mental activity, and to its reciprocal influence on the latter.[366]

According to Humboldt, human conceptions of things are conditioned by the categories into which they are placed. Hence if those categories are of different languages, the conception of the things placed in them shall also change accordingly. This is because every language contains a specific *Weltanschaung*, meaning "worldview", which causes its speakers to perceive the world in a different way from the speakers of other languages.[367] This is what is commonly known as the theory of linguistic relativity. In the nineteenth century, Humboldt's theory gave rise to a series of discussions among Western philosophers. In 1892, in his "On Sense and Reference", Gottlob Frege famously drew an analogy between language and a telescope pointed towards the moon: he argued that if the moon is the referent within the non-linguistic world, language would be the telescope projecting the moon to the linguistic world of humans. Humans see the moon through the telescope and believe what they see is the moon; and yet what they actually see is the

[366] Wilhelm von Humboldt, *On Language: the diversity of human language-structure and its influence on the mental development of mankind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 48.
[367] Robert L. Miller, *The Linguistic Relativity Principle and Humboldtian Ethnolinguistics* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968): 10.

reflection of the moon projected on the inside mirror of the telescope. [368] Analogously speaking, as the telescope shifts from one viewing point to another, the reflection of the moon also changes. The moon itself, nonetheless, remains invariant.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, however, under the influence of Darwinian naturalism, discussion on linguistic relativity started to be replaced by the tendency to regard language as nothing but a small part of the natural world that is accompanying but not fundamentally altering human experience. In Germany at least, it was not until the 1920s that a small group of intellectuals headed by Leo Weisgerber and Jost Trier began to revisit Humboldt's thesis.[369] At the same time, independent of the German current, an American version of linguistic relativity started to emerge and gain popularity in the Western hemisphere, with the most famous study being the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, also known as the Whorfian hypothesis, was proposed in the 1940s by American anthropologist-linguist Edward Sapir and linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf. The hypothesis states that human thought is determined by the words and syntactic structure of a language. This is because different languages vary in their semantic partitioning of the world and the structure of a particular language shapes the ways in which its speaker understands the world. Therefore, speakers of different languages shall perceive the world differently.[370]

Upon its initial publication, the Whorfian hypothesis was widely embraced, drawing experimental support from Roger W. Brown and Eric H. Lenneberg's study which showed that compared to English speakers, Zuni speakers had much greater difficulties in telling yellow and orange apart as they used the same term for both colours.[371] However, from the late 1950s, a new paradigm called cognitive structuralism started to emerge and

[368] Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference", in Geach, Peter, and Black, Max, (eds.), *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960 [1892]): 56-78.
[369] Miller, *The Linguistic Relativity Principle and Humboldtian Ethnolinguistics*, 11.
[370] Benjamin Lee Whorf, "The relation of habitual thought and behaviour to language", in Spier, Leslie (ed.), *Language, Culture, and Personality* (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1941): 75-93; Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1956); Mandelbaum, G. David, *Selected Writings of Edward Sapir* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1949).
[371] Roger W. Brown and Eric H. Lenneberg., "A study in language and cognition", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 49 (1954): 454-462.

challenge the Whorfian hypothesis, with the most representative works of all being those of Noam Chomsky. Chomsky essentially argues that the Whorfian hypothesis is overly concerned with the surface structures of languages, while on deeper levels all languages are in fact of the same universally human trait.[372] And since all languages are acquired in the same way, there should exist a realm of cognitive structure that is separate from language which begins its development in a child before the advent of language and which, too, provides the cognitive basis for subsequent language acquisitions.[373] In short, in contrast to the Whorfian hypothesis which proposes that it is the language that shapes human thought, cognitive structuralism argues that there is a universal cognitive structure shared by all humans despite what language one speaks.

Following the paradigm shift in the 50s and the 60s, during the 70s and the 80s, the Whorfian hypothesis continued to receive scepticisms and a number of studies were published to challenge its linguistic determinism. Particularly effective in undermining the hypothesis was a study conducted by psychologist Eleanor R. Heider where she demonstrated that the Dani people (a tribe in New Guinea) had little trouble learning and memorising the set of English colour categories despite the fact that in their own language, they only had two words for colour.[374] Towards the end of the 1980s, it gradually became clear that the overly linguistically deterministic nature of the Whorfian hypothesis was no longer deemed as a tenable theory in either linguistics or psychology. However, in the recent years, debates on the credibility of the Whorfian hypothesis began to resurge and a number of studies have been published to support Sapir and Whorf's initial proposition. A study conducted by Lera Boroditsky on the relation between language and temporal perceptions, for instance, reveals that Mandarin speakers are more likely than English speakers to think of time vertically due to the vertical representations of time in the Chinese language (for example, "last month" is expressed as "upper month" in Chinese),[375] confirming the hypothesis that the language one speaks does affect the

[372] See Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures* (The Hague: Mouton, 1957); Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of theory of syntax* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); Noam Chomsky, *Language and Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006 [1968]).
[373] Chomsky, *Language and Mind*, 23.
[374] Eleanor R. Heider, "Universals in Colour Naming and Memory", *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 93 (1972): 10-20.
[375] Lera Boroditsky, Orly Fuhrman, and Kelly McCormick, "Do English and Mandarin speakers think about time differently?", *Cognition*, 118 (2011): 123-129.

way he or she understands the world. It may be fair to say that the discussion on the Whorfian hypothesis will continue to be at the centre of inquiry for the domain of psycholinguistics and no conclusive answers can be expected anytime soon.

So far this section has outlined a very brief history of the major language-thought debates that occurred in the last century. Its purpose is to demonstrate not only the significance of the topic outside the realm of political science, but also the level of controversy surrounding the discussion. What, however, is interesting—and also of particular relevance to this study—is that albeit the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the relationship of language to thought, a certain level of consistency is exhibited in scholarly discussion when it comes to the effect of the Chinese language on the Chinese ways of thinking, with one recurrent proposition being that the empirical nature of the Chinese language is heavily influential in shaping "the reality-centred values of China", as opposed to "the theoretical abstract values of the West"[376]. Liu Hong accordingly argues that the question of whether the linguistic differences between Chinese and Indo-European languages could lead to cognitive differences between the two groups of people might fall into a distinct category of its own.[377] This is because:

> [t]he Chinese are also the only people operating with a non-Indo-European language who developed an entirely indigenous interest in some grammatical features of their own…Chinese civilisation is the only non-Indo-European civilisation in the world which has developed independently of outside influences an indigenous and powerful lexicographic tradition and a sustained systematic interest in the definition of terms.[378]

The most significant linguistic difference between the Chinese and the English languages lies in their entirely different writing systems. Indo-European languages such as English belong to what is called the phonetic alphabet system where a small number of letters or visual symbols are used to represent the speech sounds of a spoken language.[379]

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[376] Alfred H. Bloom, "The Role of the Chinese Language in Counterfactual/ Theoretical Thinking and Evaluation", in Wilson, W. Richard, Wilson, Auerbacher, Amy, and Greenblatt, L. Sidney, *Value Change in Chinese Society* (New York: Praeger, 1979): 63.
[377] Liu Hong, *The Chinese Strategic Mind* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015): 53.
[378] Christoph Harbsmeier, *Science and Civilization* in *China, Volume 7, Part I: Language and Logic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998): xxii.
[379] Robert K. Logan, *The Alphabet Effect: A Media Ecology Understanding of the Making of Western Civilization* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2004): 2.

According to Logan, the first phonetic alphabet was invented over 3,500 years ago in the Near East by Semitic people and it later became the model for most of the modern alphabetic languages including English, German, French, Greek, Russian, Arabic, Hebrew, and so forth.[380] One key characteristic of phonetic alphabetic system is that it establishes a direct link between the written symbols and their speech sounds, as it is based on converting auditory signals into visual signs.[381] As a result, despite the thousands of years of evolution, the sound values of many modern alphabets often remain identical to their original Canaanite letters. Take the Roman letter B as an example; the "b" sound, which is represented in English or French with the letter B, is derived from the Greek letter beta, β, which is in turn derived from the Hebrew beit, ב, which in the original Canaanite letter was drawn as a box as an indication of a house.[382] The shape of the letter has changed over the course of the linguistic evolution; however, its sound value is still easily recognisable from one speaking group to another. This explains why it is often fairly easy for one to render the approximate pronunciation of a foreign word if it is written with Roman alphabet, even though he or she does not speak that particular language.

Logan accordingly argues that this phonetic nature of the Indo-European linguistic system was what facilitated the flourishing of abstract science in the West. Although the earliest form of science was indeed practiced in China, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, it was mostly concerned with practical questions and not based on any theoretical foundation.[383] He also notes that despite the fact that North American children only have to learn 26 letters compared with memorising over 1,000 characters required for Chinese schoolchildren, North American children take just as long to learn to read and write as Chinese kids. This is because unlike Chinese characters which denote the empirical world, the phonetic alphabetic system is fundamentally connotative and consists essentially of "meaningless phonemic elements represented visually with equally meaningless signs".[384] This meaningless nature of the English writing system then provides schoolchildren with extra lessons in abstraction (because they have to associate a meaningless word with a specific

[380] Ibid., 3.
[381] Ibid., 4.
[382] Ibid., 3.
[383] Logan, *The Alphabet Effect: A Media Ecology Understanding of the Making of Western Civilization*, 5.
[384] Ibid., 4.

meaning) and analytical thinking (because each word is broken down into its basic phonemes).[385] Abstract theoretical science was destined to originate from the West, Logan argues, simply because abstract and analytical thinking is "an intellectual by-product"[386] of the phonetic alphabetic system.

In contrast to the auditory-oriented alphabetic system of the English language, the Chinese writing system is more visually oriented. It belongs to logographic writing, in which each spoken word is represented by its own unique visual sign, often denoting the word either symbolically or pictorially.[387] Logographic writing is the oldest form of writing system, dating back to 3100 B.C., which, according to Harbsmeier, means that the Chinese writing system probably evolved along much the same lines as Mesopotamian and Egyptian writing did.[388] One of the most distinct traits—or, as the next section will show, disadvantages—of the Chinese logograms is its highly empirical and aesthetic nature. Unlike the phonetic alphabetic system which does not establish any immediate link between a written symbol and the worldly entity it connotes, a Chinese character usually denotes the *immediately apprehended aesthetic form* of a particular worldly entity. To give a few simple examples: the character for the moon, 月, comes from the shape of a half-moon; and the character for water, 水, is meant to represent the physical form of a river. The character for man is 人, denoting a standing man; adding a horizontal line to the character for man, one then gets the character for big, 大, which is based on the image of a man spreading his arms and legs (see appendix 3 for examples on the evolution of Chinese characters). In short, the Chinese writing system tends to portray *directly* the empirical as well as the aesthetic experience of the substantial world.

This highly empirical and aesthetic nature of the Chinese language, according to American comparative philosopher Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop, has one advantage:

[385] Ibid., 5.
[386] Ibid.
[387] Ibid.
[388] Harbsmeier, *Science and Civilization in China in China, Volume 7*, 36.

Because each Chinese character is an independent and immediately experienced referent, Northrop argues,

> …the Chinese language gains superlative degree of fluidity, a capacity to convey the unique particularity, nuance, and precisely refined richness of the specific, individual experience which probably no other mature language in the world today achieves.[389]

A similar argument has been made by André Malraux, a French novelist and former Minister of Culture in Charles de Gaulle's cabinet, whose seminal work, The Temptation of the West, depicts the irreconcilable cultural differences between China and the West through the form of an exchange of letters between a Chinese intellectual visiting Paris and a Frenchman travelling to China. In one of the letters sent to the young Frenchman, the Chinese intellectual described how the Chinese and the Western minds have different ways of registering a particular linguistic term using the example of "cat":

> When I say "cat" what dominates my mind is not a picture of a cat, but an impression of certain supple, silent movements peculiar to cats. You distinguish among species only by their outlines. Such a distinction applies only in death…It marks the profound distinction between your conquest and our own: you go from obvious analogies to more obscure ones, while we proceed to irreconcilable differences.[390]

Malraux's depiction of the Chinese way of thinking resonates with Northrop who argues that the Chinese linguistic system's capacity to immediately capture "the totality of the nature of things" to a considerable extent shapes not only the Chinese way of thinking, but also the Chinese way of living in general.[391] As he observes,

> [i]t is doubtful if any other people have such capacity as have the Chinese, having visited, lived with, and immediately experienced the culture and psychological reactions of another people... A Chinese student, after living a brief period upon the Left Bank in Paris, becomes often more French than the French. In the United States, similarly, he shows a capacity to catch the exact shade of American humour and American slang to a degree which no Englishman, even though he is supposed to speak our language, can ever hope to achieve.[392]

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[389] Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West: an inquiry concerning world understanding* (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1979): 318.
[390] *André Malraux, The Temptation of the West (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992): 64-65.*
[391] Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West: an inquiry concerning world understanding*, 319.
[392] Ibid., 318.

Before moving on to the next section on the impact of the Chinese linguistic system, it is probably necessary to address one of the critiques put forward by a Japanese translation theorist, Yanabu Akira, regarding the characteristics of the Chinese language—as it does not only challenge and reveal the potential limitations of the argument presented in this chapter, but also touches upon an issue that is often not adequately addressed in Western scholarly discussions on the Chinese language. This section has so far discussed that compared to the connotative alphabetic system, the Chinese logographic system is largely denotative and that the meaning of a character can be read and understood directly from the character itself. Yanabu, however, states that this proposition will no longer be tenable if one takes compounded characters into account: Although the character for tree, that is, 木, does denote a tree, when it comes to characters such as 樱 (cherry), 松 (pine), and 枫 (maple), those characters do not in and of themselves allow people to understand what kinds of tree they represent; and therefore, he argues, the way Chinese speakers understand the meanings of these characters "is just the same as with the understanding of the English words *cherry*, *pine*, or *maple*".[393]

Yanabu's observation, it can be argued, is partially correct; the characters for cherry, pine and maple indeed do not denote the immediately apprehended aesthetic experiences of those trees. This is because unlike the character for tree which is an ideogram, the ones for cherry, pine, and maple belong to a different type of logogram called phonograms. Ideograms are characters whose meanings can be understood directly from the script; the previous examples of 月 (moon), 水 (water), 人 (man) and 大 (big) all belong to this category. Phonograms, on the other hand, are characters consisting of two parts, one indicating meaning and the other sound. Yanabu's 樱 (cherry), 松 (pine), and 枫 (maple) are examples of such phonographic characters: the 木 (tree) on the left side of each character indicates that the phonogram most likely denotes some type of a tree, and the phonemes on the right side, that is, 婴 (infant), 公 (duke), and 风 (wind), hint the pronunciation of the respective character. What Yanabu attempts to argue is that just like the phonetic system where the link between a visual symbol and its meaning is arbitrary,

[393] Yanabu Akira, "In the beginning was the Word?", translated by Indra Levy, in Levy, I. (eds.), *Translation in Modern Japan* (London: Routledge, 2011): 49.

Chinese phonograms also do not indicate the meaning of a particular character; therefore, Chinese characters can just be as connotative as the English alphabets.

This argument, however, is misleading. The fact that phonographic characters are auditory-based does not automatically suggest that they share the same linguistic features as the English alphabets. Take the character for *maple,* 枫, as an example; the character is pronounced as fēng, based on the pronunciation of the character of its right side, 风, meaning wind. Yanabu argues that the character is essentially connotative because the only denotative part of the character is the 木 (tree) on its left side; although this might help readers understand that the character is some type of a tree, the association between the character and its full meaning i.e. a maple tree is just as arbitrary as the one between the English word "maple" and a maple tree. However, what Yanabu fails to recognise is that in Chinese phonograms, the phonetic element of a character very often also serves to indicate key traits of the object that the character refers to. In *Shuowen Jiezi* (Explaining and Analysing Chinese Characters), an early second-century Chinese dictionary which contains the first comprehensive analysis of the structure of Chinese characters, the entry for 枫 (maple) is written as follows:

> 枫: pronounced as fēng, a type of tree, thick leaf, thin branch, often shaking in wind. The phonetic element [风 (wind)] indicates both the pronunciation and the meaning of the character.[394] [my translation]

Basically, the 风 (wind) on the right side of 枫 (maple) which indicates the pronunciation of the character, also describes one of the key features of a maple tree, that is, it shakes easily in wind. Although the character itself might not denote the aesthetic experience of a maple tree, the way the character is composed directly describes what kind of a tree the character signifies.

In the same vein, *Shuo Zi* (Explanations of Characters), another early Chinese dictionary from the Northern Song Dynasty, explains the composition of 松 (pine) as follows: "Pine

[394] Li, Enjiang and Jia, Yumin*, Shuowen Jiezi Yishu (Explaining and Analysing Chinese Characters in Modern Chinese)* (Zhenzhou: Zhongyuan Nongmin Chubanshe, 2000): 493.

is the tallest of all trees, thus the 公 as its phoneme. [my translation]"[395] In pre-modern China, there were five ranks of nobility and 公 (conceptually similar to the English "duke") was of the highest rank in the peerage system. Moreover, since the beginning of the Chinese civilisation, Chinese intellectuals have always used the evergreen nature of pine tree as a metaphor for one's virtue and integrity. Confucius, for instance, famously said,

> [m]en do not look into running water as a mirror, but into still water. It is only the still water that can arrest them all, and keep them (in the contemplation of their real selves). Of things which are what they are by the influence of the earth, it is only the pine and cypress which are the best instances—in winter as in summer brightly green.[396]

The above passage also explains why it is not the character for tall, 高, that is on the right side of the character for pine. By assigning 公 (duke) as its phoneme, the character for pine, 松, literally reads "the highest and most noble tree*"*. It can be argued that compared to ideograms whose meanings are mostly captured via the aesthetic experiences of a worldly object, phonograms tend to describe the empirical features of the object via character compositions. The representations of meanings in phonograms hence appears to be much more subtle compared to those of ideograms. This, however, does not alter the *fact that* in contrast to the English language where the meaning of a word have to be externally granted, the meanings of a Chinese character are almost always already inscribed in the character itself. Hence, in response to Yanabu's critique, the present thesis asserts that the Chinese language is largely denotative and fundamentally empirical.

4.2 Chinese empiricism and/in the Chinese thought

The empirical nature of the Chinese writing system, however, also carries with it certain intellectual consequences, with the most significant one being its limited capacity for abstract and counterfactual thinking. The previous section has discussed the works of Robert K. Logan who asserts that the flourishing of theoretical science in Europe is

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[395] Cao, Jinyan and Zhang, Zongxiang, *Wang Anshi Zi Shuo Ji (The Compilation of Wang Anshi's Zi Shuo)* (Fujian: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 2005): 12.
[396] Zhuang Zi*, Inner Chapters: The Seal of Virtue Complete*, translated by James Legge, Chinese Text Project (2006) [online] Available at: https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/seal-of-virtue-complete/ens [Accessed 27/06/2018].

inextricably linked to its phonetic linguistic system. According to American psychologist and linguist Alfred H. Bloom, one of the psycholinguistic explanations behind the Indo-European languages' ability to facilitate such high level of theoretical thinking is what he calls "entification", a cognitive process of extracting theoretical entities from one's baseline model of reality.[397] In the English language, this process of entification is generally achieved through the use of two of its grammatical features: articles and nominalising suffixes—neither of which features in the Chinese linguistic system. This section will therefore explain how the Chinese language's inability to facilitate this cognitive process can affect the Chinese ways of thinking.

It is often said that the use of articles is one of the hardest things to master for Chinese students of English.[398] This is because in the English language, addition of articles often signals the shift from description of the empirical world to description of the conceptually extracted world.[399] For example, if one says "there is a cat over there" during a conversation to refer to a particular cat in the real world, for the rest of the conversation, the participants of the conversation are naturally going to use the phrase "the cat" to refer to the same cat. The addition of the definite article, according to Bloom, marks the cognitive shift from a perception of a cat in the real world to the conception of a particular cat in one's mind. A similar process also occurs when one adds nominalising suffixes such as "-ity", "-ness", "-ance", "-tion": When an English speaker adds a nominalising suffix to an adjective—for instance, "sincere" to "sincerity"—he or she converts a property of things which is observable in reality into a theoretical entity. This entity does not exist in the empirical world but in a detached, conceptual realm.

In the Chinese language, unfortunately, this process of entification does not exist, and two issues arise from this: Firstly, the inability to entify an empirical experience into a conceptual one signals that Chinese speakers, especially the monolinguals ones, might encounter great difficulties in conducting theoretical thinking. In fact, even the Chinese

[397] Alfred H. Bloom, *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought: a study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981): 36.
[398] Ibid.
[399] Ibid., 37.

definition for the lexical term "theoretical" differs greatly from its English counterpart. When English speakers say that they are "speaking theoretically", often they do not necessarily mean that they are speaking in terms of a particular theory. Rather, what they usually mean is that they are speaking hypothetically, or shifting from description of an actual event to speaking of a more consciously hypothesised world.[400] If one looks up "theoretical" in a Chinese dictionary, however, one will find that the term literally means "of a theory" in the Chinese language: "a theoretical example" thus in Chinese means an example of a theory, and "thinking theoretically" refers to the idea of thinking in relation to a particular theoretical framework. It is reasonable to say that the inability to understand the concept of "theoretical" outside the realm of scholarly discourse is the first hurdle for Chinese speakers to conduct theoretical thinking.

That being said, the above discussion on the Chinese language's particular understanding of the term "theoretical" touches upon an important issue regarding the metatheoretical aspect of Waltz's text. Although the primary focus of the present study is on whether and how the Chinese translations of *Theory of International Politics* have transformed Waltz's original argument concerning the nature of international politics, it is essential to point out that Waltz's spent the first three chapters of his book explaining his fundamental epistemological position-taking regarding the idea of "theory". Although there is no discussion on the nature of international politics within those chapters, it can be said that, in order to understand how Waltz's theorisation of international politics has come about, one has to first understand his epistemological stance regarding what exactly he means by "theorising"—which, from what has been discussed Chapter 2, is to "radically simplify" the world so that it can be explained using limited numbers of variables.

What is interesting, however, about the Chinese translations of those three chapters is that some of the key concepts which constitute Waltz's argument on his metatheoretical stance on the idea of a theory have been translated in a way that undermines his epistemological position. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, one of Waltz's core argument concerning his epistemological stance is that, an effective theory should be

[400] Ibid., 53.

based on assumptions. In the Chinese translations, the term "assumption" has been translated consistently to "假设 (jia she)". On the semantic level, such translation is not wrong as almost every Chinese-English dictionary translates "assumption" as "假设 (jia she)". However, on the conceptual level, if we read ancient Chinese texts where this term was used, we can find that the Chinese term "假设 (jia she)" often connotes the idea of fabrication and falsehood—neither of which is present in the connotations of the English term "assumption". In Gu Yanbin's *Daily Reports: on assumption*, for example, one sentence reads, "when writing, poets tend to use fabricated language ('假设之辞 (jia she zhi ci)') to dramatize their verses. Thus, we should not take those languages very seriously [my translation]", indicating the fabricated nature of the meaning of the Chinese term "假设 (jia she)".[401]

This translation of "assumption" as "假设 (jia she)" becomes particularly problematic when it is coupled with the Chinese translation of the term "theory", namely, "理论 (li lun)". In Chapter 2, it has been mentioned that, when the Jesuits arrived in China, they translated *philosophia* i.e. philosophy to the Chinese concept of "穷理 (qiong li)", meaning "exhaustive mastering of worldly principles". The Chinese term "理论 (li lun)" consists of two characters, "理 (li)" and "论 (lun)"; from the above translation of "穷理 (qiong li)", it can be seen that the character "理 (li)" means "worldly principles", and the second character "论 (lun)" means "to debate". "理论 (li lun)", hence, literally means "to debate worldly principles". Chapter 2 has also explained that in Chinese philosophical thought, "worldly principles" refer to the universal rules which can be observed via investigation. In simple terms, the Chinese term "理 (li)" connotes the idea that there is a truth about everything and it simply needs to be uncovered through human efforts. In this

[401] Gu Yanbin, Rizhilu: Jiashe zhi Ci (Daily Reports: on assumption), *Cang shu Wang* [online]. Available at: http://www.99lib.net/book/341/13163.htm [Accessed: 10/11/2018].

regard, the Chinese translation of "theory", that is, "理论 (li lun)", actually indicates the idea of a truth-seeking practice.

Now, if we juxtapose the Chinese translations of "theory" and "assumption", we can immediately tell how the translations have undermined Waltz's original epistemological position: the Chinese translation of "theory" indicates a truth-seeking practice, and that of "assumption" means "to fabricate, to make up". Waltz argues that a theory should be built upon assumptions—which, translated into Chinese, essentially means "to debate the truth about worldly principles based on fabrications". Waltz's epistemological position-taking becomes self-contradictory when it is expressed in Chinese. The metatheoretical framework of Waltz's book, it can also be argued, deconstructs itself in the Chinese translations.

To come back to the discussion on the Chinese language's limited capacity to facilitate theoretical thinking, Bloom also observes that for Chinese speakers, the idea of "theoretical thinking" pretty much remains in the domain of science; when he asked a monolingual Chinese speaker to imagine a "theoretical kangaroo", she replied, "What do you mean by 'theoretical kangaroo'? Either you are talking about a single kangaroo or about all kangaroos. What else is there?"—suggesting the speaker's unfamiliarity with ascending an empirical experience to a conceptual realm.[402] Another good example is the following: in a traditional Western art school, a student of drawing is often instructed to begin with the laborious copying of the three-dimensional casts of Greek statues to master the science of geometrical optics before moving on to the drawings of living human figures—for in the eyes of Western artists, only by understanding and mastering the scientifically verified theory of geometry can one produce a great piece of work on human figure.[403] Chinese painting, on the contrary, does not rely on any prescribed knowledge but solely on what the painter sees; because in the Chinese thinking, it is the visible world which provides "a sense of fact which is the foundation of human

[402] Ibid.
[403] Ibid., 317.

experience".[404] The very first thing a Chinese painter is asked to acquire, therefore, is to capture the immediately apprehended aesthetic features of the target object using the elementary brush strokes.[405] The measure of a great Chinese painting is not how well one can understand and apply the theoretically formulated knowledge to the real world, but how well one can capture the aesthetic experience of the universe in its purity. In simple terms, when it comes to ways of thinking, the Western thinking seems to gravitate towards understanding how something *ought* to be, whilst the Chinese thought is more concerned with what something *is*.

One consequence that follows from this non-theoretical way of Chinese thinking is that because it so profoundly remains on the periphery of the visible world and factual truth, the type of philosophical, religious, and moral doctrines it produces often lacks a sense of abstraction. This is particularly evident if one reads ancient Chinese philosophical texts: The previous section has already mentioned a passage from Confucius who, instead of theorising in an abstract sense what it means to be virtuous as it is usually the case with Western philosophy, used pine tree to represent the zenith of human virtue. Similarly, in The Tree on the Mountain, Zhuang Zi outlined arguably the most famous lesson on friendship in the history of Chinese thought:

> … the friendship between the good is tasteless as water, while that of the despicable is often sweet as new wine. But the tastelessness of the good leads on to affection, and the sweetness of the despicable to aversion. [my translation][406]

The above passage echoes Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* where he states that there are three types of friendship—one of utility, one of pleasure, and one of the good—and that the perfect form of friendship is that between the good, the one that is between two people who resemble each other in virtue.[407] Juxtaposing the two arguments, it then becomes clear that, although both Zhuang Zi and Aristotle are essentially contemplating the essence of friendship, the way they expound their ideas differs greatly: unlike Aristotle who analyses, defines, and categorises the types of friendship that he observes,

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[404] Ibid., 318.
[405] Ibid., 317.
[406] Zhuang Zi, *The Tree on the Mountain*, Chinese Text Project (2006) [online] Available at: https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/seal-of-virtue-complete/ens [Accessed 27/06/2018].
[407] Aristotle, 'Nicomachean Ethics', in Barnes, J. (ed.) *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 1729.

and then uses logical reasoning to reach the conclusion as to what is the best form of friendship, Zhuang Zi—just like Confucius—uses metaphors and concrete examples to convey his point. In fact, almost all Chinese moral and practical precepts are presented as if they were common sense; rarely any reasoning or arguments are given for their validity. Northrop hence argues that because of the logical whole-part relation between one alphabet and another that is embedded in the Indo-European linguistic system, the type of knowledge construed through the English language tends to value the factor in the nature of things that cannot be immediately apprehended, such as trends and patterns; whereas the Chinese type of knowledge concentrates its attention on "a portion of the nature of things which can be known only by being experienced".[408] This also means that even when it comes to abstract concepts such as friendship, Chinese thought has to rely on concrete and common-sense-like examples to express and convey the idea.

The second issue that arises from the Chinese language's inability to entify empirical experience is that Chinese monolingual speakers might experience a hard time understanding a counterfactual expression in the English language. As Bloom says, one of the key characteristics of the English language is that it entifies not only properties and actions, but also entire conditions and events, that is, to talk of a condition or an event as if it was a thing. This is usually done by adding a nominalising suffix and changing certain word orders; to use some examples from international politics, the expression "the international system is anarchic" can be entified into "the anarchy of international system", the notion "to have great powers is important in the international system" can become "the importance of having great powers in the international system", and "Russia has been persistently reluctant to invade Syria" can be entifed into "Russia's persistent reluctance to invade Syria" etc. What this linguistic feature of entification does, in other words, is to allow speakers to render a description of conditions and events into a theoretical entity so that it can be talked about in a hypothetical sense.[409] Bloom, who discovered that Chinese speakers displayed a much harder time in detecting counterfactualities in a sentence due to the absence of entification process i.e. converting an empirical experience into a theoretical entity in the Chinese linguistic system,

[408] Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West: an inquiry concerning world understanding*, 315.
[409] Ibid.

accordingly argues that the process of entification is an essential aspect of the English language to construct a counterfactual argument.[410]

In the early 1970s, in an attempt to measure the levels of abstraction in their political thinking, Bloom conducted a study on Chinese-speaking residents in Hong Kong.[411] He prepared a questionnaire where the respondents were asked a series of counterfactual questions, such as "If the Hong Kong government were to pass a law requiring that all citizens born outside of Hong Kong make weekly report of their activities to the police, how would you react?", or "If the Hong Kong government had passed such a law, how would you have reacted?". Very much to his surprise, the majority of the subjects responded to those questions with "But the government hasn't", "They can't", or "They won't".[412] Moreover, after his attempt to explain to the subjects that the questions were purely hypothetical, the subjects responded with comments such as "We don't think that way", "It's unnatural", or "It's unChinese".[413]

Intrigued by the unexpected outcomes, Bloom decided to conduct a different study which was specifically designed to measure the difference in the level of counterfactual thinking between English and Chinese speakers. He prepared a series of short stories that were written in the form of "X was not the case, but if X had been the case, then Y would have been the case, and Z would not have been the case, and W would have been the case"[414]—in other words, counterfactual expressions. At the end of each story, there was a series of corresponding questions where the participants were expected to demonstrate whether or not they had managed to interpret its counterfactual nature. One of the stories was as follows:

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[410] Bloom, *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought: a study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West*, 36.
[411] Alfred H. Bloom, "Two dimensions of moral reasoning: social principledness and social humanism in cross-cultural perspective", *Journal of Social Psychology*, 101 (1977): 29-44; Alfred H. Bloom, "A cognitive dimension of social control: the Hong Kong Chinese in cross-cultural perspective". In Wilson, A. Amy, Greenblatt, L. Sidney, and Wilson, W. Richard, (eds.), *Deviance and Social Control in Chinese Society* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977): 67-81.
[412] Bloom, *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought: a study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West*, 13.
[413] Ibid.
[414] Ibid., 22.

> In ancient times there was a Greek philosopher who didn't know any Chinese, by the name of Decos. If he had known Chinese, because at the time China and Greece had a trading relationship, he would have been influenced by Chinese culture. He would have found out that the best points of Greek and Chinese logic and integrated the Greek logic and Chinese logic of that time to create a new advanced logic which would have made a very large contribution to the development of both Greek and Chinese philosophy.[415]

The original English version of the story was presented to a group of college students at Swarthmore College in the United States. The Chinese translation was distributed to two groups of people in Taiwan respectively: college students at Taiwan National University who had relatively frequent exposure to English, and hotel workers in Taiwan who had zero to little exposure to English.[416] The results of the study turned out to be rather fascinating. Among the American students who were presented with the original English version, 89% consistently tested positive for their interpretations of the counterfactual nature of those stories. The results for the Chinese speakers, however, demonstrated a polarising effect: among the college students who had some exposure to English, 69% managed to understand the counterfactual expressions; and yet, among the hotel workers who had little to no exposure to English, the response rate dropped dramatically to 17%.[417] Moreover, in a later interview where the Chinese participants were asked why they missed the counterfactual expressions, a large majority of the subjects indicated that, in terms of the story of the Greek philosopher, they had remembered that the philosopher could not speak Chinese, but if they were to acknowledge this negative premise, it would contradict the statements in the rest of the story. Their reasoning, according to Bloom, was that if X was false, then there was no reason to write about Y, Z, and W in the first place. Therefore, X, Y, Z, and W must all be true.

Bloom accordingly argues that the lack of a grammatical cue for counterfactual expression in the Chinese linguistic system was the major reason for the Chinese speakers' inability to grasp the counterfactual nature of the stories.[418] Indeed, the original English version was written with the counterfactual grammar, i.e. the "would haves", which helped the English speakers to be conscious of its counterfactual nature. The

[415] Ibid., 93.
[416] Ibid., 20-21.
[417] Ibid., 23-24.
[418] Ibid.

Chinese translation, on the other hand, requires more deciphering, mainly because Chinese grammar does not have the equivalent expression to the English "would have". If one back translates the Chinese translation of the Greek philosopher story, it should sound as follows in English:

> In ancient times there was a Greek philosopher who didn't know any Chinese, by the name of Decos. If he had known Chinese, because at the time China and Greece had a trading relationship, he was influenced by Chinese culture. He found out the best points of Greek and Chinese logic and integrated the Greek logic and Chinese logic of that time to create a new advanced logic which made a very large contribution to the development of both Greek and Chinese philosophy. [my emphasis]

The above back translation shows that because there is no counterfactual expression in Chinese grammatical structure, the three past subjunctives i.e. "would haves" in the text were translated into the past tense, which made the last three events sound as if they had actually happened. However, the second sentence started with an "if", which indicates that the first event i.e. Decos knowing Chinese was in fact counterfactual. The Chinese translation of the text, in other words, displays a logical fallacy. From a Chinese perspective, this means that in order for the last three sentences to make sense, one has to assume that the first event is not hypothetical but actually factual. It seems that the logical fallacy exhibited in the Chinese translation did lead to the participants' realisation that something in the text was askew—but it was not enough to trigger their counterfactual mode of thinking.

Upon its publication, Bloom's study received some extreme scepticisms and criticisms from other cognitive scientists and psychologists, and several research projects were conducted in an attempt to subvert Bloom's overly Whorfian argument. For example, after a close examination of Bloom's Chinese translation of the Greek philosopher's story, Terry Au argued that Bloom's Chinese text was too unidiomatic for native Chinese speakers to understand.[419] He accordingly replicated Bloom's study with a slightly more idiomatic translation and a new counterfactual story. The result of Au's study suggested that Bloom's hypothesis was not supported, and that Chinese speakers, monolinguals or

[419] Terry Kit-Fong Au, "Chinese and English counterfactuals: the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis revisited", *Cognition*, 15 (1983): 155-187.

bilinguals, had no problem conducting counterfactual thinking.[420] A similar study was also conducted by Lisa G. Liu, who agreed with Au's thesis and argued against the overly Whorfian nature of Bloom's theory.[421]

It might indeed be true that Bloom's Chinese translations were slightly unidiomatic, as they were not entirely grammatically correct from a Chinese standpoint. It might also be true that Bloom's hypothesis is overly linguistically deterministic and that a much bigger sample might be needed to have a more conclusive hypothesis (In the above study, Bloom only had 28 American students, 54 Taiwanese college students, and 36 hotel workers as his sample population). However, Bloom also states explicitly in his study that the study was not meant to imply that Chinese speakers cannot speak or think counterfactually.[422] In fact, Bloom discovers that Chinese speakers are able to think counterfactually—but under certain conditions. As he says,

> …to be sure that the sentence is counterfactual, the Chinese speaker must either be aware of the situational facts that negate its premise or be able to infer them, for there is no mark within the sentence which signals it as such. And to interpret the sentence as counterfactual, the Chinese speaker…must perform an act of cognitive integration, integrating his knowledge of the facts of the situation with the stated premise...[423]

Basically, in order for a Chinese speaker to correctly interpret a counterfactual expression, he or she first needs to know the *situational facts* indicated in the sentence. For instance, the sentence "If you had warned them earlier, perhaps the accident would have been avoided" is a clear counterfactual sentence if one reads it in English.[424] However, since the Chinese language does not convey its counterfactuality, its Chinese translation would be something that resembles "If you had warned them earlier, perhaps the accident was avoided." In this case, according to Bloom, Chinese speakers would be

[420] Au, "Chinese and English counterfactuals: the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis revisited"; Terry Kit-Fong Au, "Counterfactuals: in reply to Alfred Bloom", *Cognition*, 17 (1984): 289-302.
[421] Lisa Garbern Liu, "Reasoning counterfactually in Chinese: are there any obstacles?", *Cognition*, 21 (1985): 239-270.
[422] Bloom, *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought: a study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West*, 21.
[423] Ibid.
[424] Ibid.

able to understand the counterfactuality of the sentence only if they were aware of the situational fact, that is, whether "you" had warned them or not. This is because only by integrating the negative facts they know (you did not warn them) with the stated implication (if you did, the accident was avoided), Chinese speakers could be sure that the sentence was in fact counterfactual. To use Bloom's words,

> [f]or the English speakers, the counterfactuality of a sentence constitutes, as it were, one of the elementary components on the basis of which he constructs his interpretation of the sentence heard, while for the Chinese speakers, it constitutes one of the *results* of his interpretative act. [my emphasis][425]

After a somewhat lengthy discussion of the Chinese language's limited capacity for abstract and counterfactual thinking, it is necessary to explain how this fits in with the present study. The first half of this section has argued that the Chinese language has a tendency to express abstract ideas by giving concrete and tangible common-sense-like examples; the second half has discussed how in order to understand a counterfactual sentence, Chinese speakers need to know the situational facts prior to triggering their counterfactual mode of thinking. What, then, can be concluded from these two observations is that when it comes to knowledge production, *anything that is thought, expressed, or conveyed in Chinese seems to be almost always grounded in the empirical world*. Unlike in the Western thinking where one can easily depict what a "theoretical kangaroo" means, the Chinese way of thinking is simply not possible without having some kind of a commitment to the actual world, whether it is a metaphor of a pine tree or the situational facts about a particular incident.

This, however, can cause some major problems when it comes to translating texts that are written in Indo-European languages into Chinese—especially the ones that are highly theoretical, such as *Theory of International Politics*; what the act of translating a theoretical text from English to Chinese essentially does, to use Frege's analogy of a telescope mentioned in the first section, is pointing a telescope which can only see the empirical world towards a theoretical world. The Chinese translation of Waltz's text, in

[425] Ibid.

this sense, is basically the reflection of the original theory that is projected on the side mirror of the telescope—the readers believe what they read is Waltz's theory, but in reality, it is only a part of the theory that can be captured by the telescope of Chinese empiricism. With reference to the translations of the selected concepts discussed in the previous chapter, the final section of this chapter will therefore illustrate how such empiricism embedded in the Chinese language has re-shaped Waltz's argument.

4.3 The Linguistic Reshaping of *Theory of International Politics*: the decrease of the explanatory power and the collapse of Waltzian epistemology

The main purpose of the present thesis, just to reiterate, is to examine how meanings embedded in the language of IR become transplanted in a different linguistic context. The previous chapter has answered this question at the conceptual level, arguing that the Chinese translations of *anarchy, power,* and *great power* have resulted in the loss of the original conceptualities of those concepts. A further examination of these three concepts in relation to the linguistic limitations of the Chinese language discussed in this chapter then reveals that it is not only the conceptualities of those concepts that have been transformed, but also their ontological status. The previous section has mentioned that one of the key linguistic features that facilitates abstract and counterfactual thinking in English is entification, an act of converting an empirical experience into a conceptual entity; in this process, the ontological status of an experience changes from an empirical one to a theoretical one and as a result it becomes possible to be talked about in a hypothetical manner. The Chinese language does not facilitate such cognitive process and one consequence that follows from this, as discussed in the previous section, is that it has to rely on physical forms and concrete real-life examples to indicate any abstract ideas.

This is certainly the case with great power. The most common translation for *great power*, as shown in the spreadsheet, is 大国 (da guo), meaning "big country". To a certain extent, this translation is not entirely wrong as firstly the term "power" here indeed refers to the idea of a state; and secondly, in the book, Waltz outlines a set of five criteria to

determine a great power and territorial size is one of them.[426] The Chinese translation, it can be argued, does not necessarily change the meaning that Waltz intended for the concept of great power. What it does change, however, is its ontological status. As argued in Chapter 2, *great power*, along with the other five concepts, are the key components for understanding Waltz's theory of international politics; the full meaning of a concept is only invoked within Waltz's conceptual paradigm. This means that even though these terms may not have been intended to be used as concepts, they have become conceptualised in the process of Waltz's theorisation. Moreover, since they are concepts, by definition, they are formed in the conceptual realm, which makes the ontological status of *great power* a conceptual one.

This ontological status of *great power*, however, changes the moment it becomes "big country". Compared to the original English version where *great power* refers to a theoretical entity that connotes the status of a state in the international system, the Chinese translation of *great power* as "big country" seems to convey a sense of concreteness. What happened in the process of transmitting the idea of *great power* to the Chinese thinking is that because both "great" and "power" are semantically broad and abstract terms, the Chinese translation had to find a more concrete and tangible way to express them. The most effective way to do it, then, is to descend the level of abstraction in both terms—"great" to "big" and "power" to "country"—and in so doing ground the concept in the empirical world that can be captured via the Chinese language. In short, the Chinese translation of *great power* moved down the concept from the conceptual realm to an empirical one, and consequently changed its ontological status.

There are two consequences that follow from this concretisation of *great power*. The first one is the diminishing of generality in the original concept. During the Meiji Enlightenment, debate concerning whether or not Japan should give up on Chinese learning entirely so that China would not pose an "old world" obstacle to Japan's growing modernisation reached its zenith. One of the most vocal opponents of Chinese learning, Ariga Nagao, then described the most fundamental problem with the Chinese language as

[426] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131.

"replying inappropriately on physical metaphors to reach that which has no form: motives, relations, and so on", and thus it "could not generalise a unified rule". [427] The original concept of *great power*, when read in English, can refer to both, for instance, France in the 19th century and China in the 21st century. This is because as a concept, as Koselleck would argue, *great power* already encapsulates all the historical contexts and meanings of the term and different meanings are automatically invoked according to different contexts. The Chinese translation of "big country", however, does not possess this level of generality; not only is it de-conceptualised and therefore lost all the meanings that were inherent in the English *great power*; by translating it into "big country", the Chinese translation has also diminished the historical dimension of the original concept. That is to say, if one were to use the Chinese translation of *great power* to analyse contemporary international politics, the term "big country" would automatically indicate countries with the largest territorial size; and yet if one were to analyse international politics back in the 19th century using the same concept, one then would have to provide more historical contexts in terms of why it is France, instead of China, that was the "big country" during that period.

This leads to the second issue, that is, a decrease in the explanatory power of Waltz's theory. As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, Waltz's theorisation is essentially based on "a circumscribed part of a reality whose true dimensions we can never be sure";[428] because, as Waltz himself says, only "by moving away from 'reality', not by staying close to it" can a theory obtain what he calls "the explanatory and predictive powers". [429] This is because "reality" is filled with infinity of data and a good theory should "isolate one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually".[430] Yet by empirically grounding the concept of great power, the Chinese translation actually moves the concept closer to "reality" instead of moving away from it. Such congruence with the actual world, according to Waltz's understanding, is what makes a theory less effective and useful because "to isolate a realm is a precondition to developing a theory that will

[427] Ariga Nagao, cited in Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan,* 52.
[428] Kenneth N. *Waltz*, "Evaluating Theories." *American Political Science Review*, 91(1997): 913
[429] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 7-8.
[430] Ibid., 8.

explain what goes on with it".[431] Following Waltz's logic, it can be argued that by changing the ontological status of the concept of great power, the Chinese translation has diminished the explanatory and predictive powers of Waltz's original theory.

This decrease in the explanatory power in the Chinese version of Waltz's argument is further aggravated via the translations of *power*. As discussed in the previous chapter, unlike *anarchy* and *great power* where the original concepts are de-conceptualised and become descriptive, the meanings of *power* are contextualised and multiplied— mostly because of the precision in the Chinese language to express different types of power under different circumstances. Yet from the case of *great power*, what can also be argued is that it is precisely because of the Chinese language's limited capacity to conceptualise a theoretical notion that can encapsulate all the meanings that it ends up creating different lexical terms to signify different meanings that are embedded in the concept of power. In the early seventeenth century, for example, when the concept of "logic" was introduced to the Chinese intellectual community by the Jesuit missionaries as part of the European science, Chinese scholarly elites came up with eleven different translations in an attempt to capture the exact meanings of the concept.[432] By the early twentieth century, the number of Chinese lexical terms that were utilised to indicate the meanings of "logic" had reached 59, with different terms designated to capture the different nuances and aspects of "logic".[433] Yet when those Chinese lexicons were translated back into the Western intellectual discourse, Kurtz observes, they were all translated by the same term, namely "logic".[434]

The same principle of translation can also be observed in the case of *power*; although the variations of its translations are not as many as the above example of "logic", the fact that more than ten different translation of *power* were utilised in the Chinese editions of Waltz's book demonstrates the Chinese language's need for contextualising a theoretical notion and compartmentalising its meanings in the absence of a conceptual equivalence. The problem, however, with such variations of translation is that *for* Waltz, an effective

[431] Ibid.
[432] Joachim Kurtz, "Coming to Terms with Logic: the naturalisation of an occidental notion in China", in Lackner, Michael, Amelung, Iwo, and Kurtz, Joachim (eds.), *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China* (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 147-175.
[433] Ibid.
[434] Ibid., 173.

theory should function like a mathematical equation, with minimal variables that need to be taken into consideration; because the purpose of a theory is to seek "explanation through simplification not accurate reproduction through exhaustive description".[435] In other words, the more variables there are in the equation, the more unstable and less useful a theory becomes. In the case of *power*, the contextualisation and multiplication of the original concept in the Chinese editions as a result of the translation led to an increased number of variables in the Chinese version of Waltz's argument. Such increased complexity consequently destabilises the entire formula of Waltzian theorisation of international politics which is supposed to be built on a radical simplification of "reality" with very few variables.

Finally, *anarchy*—arguably the most problematic translation of all the four concepts. Apart from the tendency to concretise abstract ideas, another important trait that is inherent in the Chinese language and the Chinese way of thinking is its limited capacity for counterfactual thinking. In order to apprehend the counterfactuality that is embedded in a sentence, the last section has mentioned, Chinese speakers first need to possess the situational facts of the incident to which the counterfactual sentence is referring. What was not mentioned in the last section, however, is that, when a Chinese speaker encounters an entified or a counterfactual notion, he or she has to engage in another cognitive process in order to make it more comprehensible in Chinese, that is, de-entification.

In a different study designed to test Chinese speakers' ability to convey counterfactual information in their native language, Bloom discovered that when Chinese speakers were asked to capture an entified or a counterfactual statement using Chinese expressions, they often made use of straightforward descriptive statements. For example, when they were asked to translate the counterfactual sentence "If Bier had been able to speak Chinese, he would have done X, Y, and Z", the Chinese participants translated it as "Bier couldn't speak Chinese and therefore he didn't do X, Y, and Z."[436] Moreover, when it comes to

[435] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 10.
[436] Bloom, *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought: a study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West*, 41.

entified information, what Bloom found out was that the Chinese participants would try to de-entify the sentence and turn it into a descriptive statement: instead of "Mary's sincerity", for instance, the Chinese speakers would say "Mary is sincere". Similarly, when translating the sentence, "John's discovery of that restaurant makes me happy", the participants used the expression "John discovered that restaurant. [It] makes me happy"; also, rather than "The acceptance of that measure depends on the approval of the subcommittee's report", the Chinese speakers would say, "Whether or not that measure is accepted depends on whether or not the subcommittee's report is approved."[437]

In Bloom's study, the reason for Chinese speakers using descriptive expressions in order to capture the counterfactual nature of a particular statement was because the Chinese language did not contain a grammatical structure which allowed its speakers to express a counterfactual statement or an entified form. This is similar to the case of *anarchy*. There was no conceptual equivalence for anarchy in the Chinese lexicon; in order to accurately convey the meaning of the concept, therefore, the Chinese translation used the semantic description of the concept of *anarchy*, which is, "state with no government". The consequence that follows from this is that on the cognitive level, by de-conceptualising a concept into its semantic description, as it is the same with great power, the translation has moved down the concept of anarchy from a purely theoretical realm to a description of an experience or a condition in the real world. On the ontological level, this means that the ontological status of *anarchy* has changed from a conceptual one to an empirical one. This is problematic because *anarchy*, in Waltz's original argument, is an unverifiable assumption that is not congruent with "reality", whereas in the Chinese translation, the change of the ontological status from a theoretical one to an empirical one has imbued it with a sense of *factuality*. Anarchy, in other words, is no longer an assumption in the Chinese translation of *Theory of International Politics*. Rather, it has become an empirical observation.

The change of the ontological nature of *anarchy* from a theoretical one to an empirical one, it can be argued, has an immense effect on the re-shaping of Waltz's argument. As

[437] Ibid.

mentioned earlier, arguments proposed in *Theory of International Politics* are largely deductive and demand abstract and theoretical thinking*:* from an assumption that the international system is an *anarchy*, Waltz deducts that the international system is essentially about *self-help*; from the *self-help* nature of the system he then deducts that the goal of every state is its own *security*; from the goal of *security* he then infers that every state has to maximise its *power*; from *power* maximisation he then deducts the rise of *great powers*; and from the rise of *great powers* he deducts the act of *balance of power* among states. This cascade of deductions is feasible because in the English version, *anarchy* serves as a general premise for Waltz to reach a specific conclusion, that is, international politics is essentially about states seeking survival via power maximisation.

In the Chinese version in which anarchy became an empirical observation, this deduction becomes no longer tenable, as a deductive reasoning has to begin with a general premise or a universal principle and gradually move down to more specific phenomena. With *anarchy* as an empirical observation, Waltz's cascade of deductions no long works as the next two steps in his chain of deductions after *anarchy*, that is, *self-help* and *security*, are supposed to be the conclusions that one reaches after buying in into the assumption of *anarchy*. In simple terms, the logical chain between *anarchy* and the succeeding premises was broken due to the Chinese translation. This also implies that the deductive epistemology Waltz utilises in his theorisation is no longer valid in the Chinese renditions.

What is interesting here is that the increase of empiricism in the Chinese version of Waltz's argument might have facilitated the possibility of a different mode of reasoning. In fact, it is often argued that Chinese speakers have inductive inclination in communication; in 1995, scholars of inter-cultural studies Ron and Suzanne Scollon famously argued that inductive and deductive rhetorical strategies characterised the Chinese and the Western cultures respectively.[438] Unlike in deductive reasoning where a theory is presented first and the cascade of deductions gets to unfold through confirming a series of hypotheses, inductive reasoning starts with empirical observations—which is the

[438] Ron Scollon and Suzanne W. Scollon*, Intercultural Communication: a discourse approach* (Oxford: Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1995): 84.

case with the Chinese translation of Waltz's argument. Yet an empirical observation is not a sufficient condition for one to conclude that it is an inductive epistemology that has emerged from the Chinese edition, as abductive reasoning also begins with an observation.[439] Or, it could be a completely different mode of reasoning that is only accessible via the Chinese language, as the concepts and categorisation of deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning itself is fairly Western-centric. What can be argued, nonetheless, is that there is something new that has been created in the Chinese version of Waltz's argument, for better or worse, and further research is in need to both understand and uncover what it is.

4.4 Conclusion

The present thesis is aware that the argument presented in this chapter may come across as slightly linguistically deterministic and that it seems to be supportive of the Whorfian hypothesis. It, too, is aware that the discussions on the differences between the English and the Chinese language could easily fall into the trap of cultural relativism and that it could potentially be used to justify Hegel's Eurocentrism. Neither of these, however, is the intension nor the aim of this chapter. The main purpose of this chapter is simply to highlight the undeniable effect languages can have on shaping what one can understand intellectually, socially, and politically. The Chinese language has its inherent limitations when it comes to facilitating theoretical thinking—and this thesis asserts that it is of high importance to acknowledge this issue as it is so that we can understand what might be the sustaining vector of value differences between the Western and the Chinese world. This is because, if there is one thing that has been made clear in this chapter, it is that when it comes to translating Western knowledge claims into Chinese, the difficulties exhibited by the Chinese language in capturing and conveying the exact nuances and meanings of an English concept is directly in line with Chinese speakers' continuous struggles to understand abstract Western values in spite of the decades of globalisation and integration with the international community. Does this make the Chinese language of any less value

[439] For more on abductive reasoning, see: Charles Sanders Peirce, "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis", *Popular Science Monthly*, 13 (1878): 470–82.; Charles Sanders Peirce, "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", *Hibbert Journal*, 7 (1908): 90–112.; Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, (eds.), *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes 5-6* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

than English? Certainly not—but it is a reminder that the language one speaks does to a great extent influence one's thoughts and more scholarly attention should be paid to the subject matter.

So far this thesis has discussed the synchronic changes in the Chinese translations of *Theory of International Politics*. In other words, it has mainly compared and contrasted the translations with the original English version. Yet the findings presented in chapter three suggest that there were some differences in the ways the selected concepts are translated between the first and second translations. And if the change in the use of language is often a reflection of the changes in the broader structures of society as Koselleck argues, then this means that something occurred between the two publication dates has induced the changes in the use of language within the Chinese IR scholarship. In relation to the social, political, and intellectual environments of that particular time period, the next and final chapter of this thesis will therefore examine the diachronic transformations of Waltz's argument in its Chinese translations.

Chapter 5. Political Change and Linguistic Intervention: Chinese Styles of Thought in the Translations of *Theory of International Politics*

> …Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people…The Chinese who have had a European or American education realize that a new element is needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies.[440]
> —Bertrand Russell

When Bertrand Russell paid his first visit to China in the winter of 1920, he was determined to challenge the then popular Orientalist myth about China that had dominated European writings for over a century. During his stay, Russell actively conversed with Chinese intellectuals, made friends with urban elites and writers, and toured Chinese cities and countryside while giving lectures at various universities.[441] When he returned to England in the following year, he wasted no time in writing about his experience in a series of essays which were published in 1922 under the title *The Problem of China*. In one essay on the subject of Chinese characters, Russell began his debunking of Orientalist myth as follows:

> There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable... It may be that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not wholly unintelligent.[442]

The above two passages seem to be in stark contrast to the quote by Hegel that was mentioned at the beginning of the previous chapter. Unlike Hegel who held a dismissive attitudes towards the non-Western world and claimed that there was a lack of potential for

[440] Bertrand Russell, "Some Traits in the Chinese Character", *Atlantic Monthly*, 128.6 (1921): 775.
[441] Lydia, H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900-1937* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995): 45.
[442] Russell, "Some Traits in the Chinese Character", 771.

progress in Chinese culture, Russell did not only write about China with great enthusiasm and affection, but in response to the argument regarding the traditional values of the Orient vis-à-vis the progressive values of the West, he stated that "we in the West make a fetish of 'progress' which is the ethical camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes".[443] Juxtaposing the two images of China depicted by the two philosophers respectively, one cannot help but wonder which one is the more accurate depiction of China and, more importantly, how, in the span of less than a century, China had transformed—in the eyes of Western intellectuals at least—from a society with no concept of progress into a welcoming nation where "the best hope lies".

The answer to that question can be found in the years of publication of each author's book. Hegel's *The Philosophy of History* was published in 1837, two years before the outbreak of the first Opium War, which implies that his writing on China was most likely based on what historians call "pre-modern China".[444] In the field of sinology, it is often said that one of the defining characteristics of pre-modern China is that it is essentially "a static society, in which political and military events periodically shuffled the cards without changing the game".[445] This is because before the encounter with the Europeans in the nineteenth century, China had a long history of absorbing foreign culture into its own cultural orbit; "barbarians" who came to reign over the Chinese heartland, such as Mongols and Manchus, had all been assimilated into the mainstream Chinese culture.[446] The lack of outside challenges also means that for centuries, the cosmological framework of the Chinese society had remained intact—to the extent that even the change of dynasties was regarded as part of the routine management, as it almost always began with peasant uprisings and ended with the establishment of a differently named dynasty by the same class of rulers, operating under the same assumptions.[447] To use Howard Trivers'

[443] Ibid., 772.
[444] Historians often regard the First Opium War as the starting point of modern China, as it highlights the beginning of the use of Western military force as well as the first successful attempt made by the West to penetrate China's self-sufficient economy. For more on the First Opium War, see e.g.: Hsin-Pao Chang, *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War* (Cambridge: Norton, 1970); Kim, S. Samuel, and Dittmer, Lowell, 'Whither China's Quest for National Identity?', in Dittmer, Lowell, and Kim, Samuel S., (eds.), *China's Quest for National Identity* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993): 237-290.
[445] Dominik Declercq, *Writing Against the State: Political Rhetorics in Third and Fourth Century China* (Leiden: Brill, 1998): 7.
[446] Gerald Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: a framework for analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999): 57.
[447] Declercq, Writing Against the State: Political Rhetorics in Third and Fourth Century China, 7.

phrase, for over two thousand years, the Chinese society had had its own "rhythm of being" which was cyclical, invariant, and highly structured.[448]

The arrival of the Europeans, however, disrupted China's rhythm. The Chinese absorption did not work with the Europeans, as they were simply too rich and militarily too advanced. In his *Liberal Barbarism*, Erik Ringmar explains how the destruction of the Chinese gardens by the British and the French during the second Opium War signifies the Western intolerance of the Chinese way of living:

> …gardens are a perfect place to relax. In their inefficiency and deliberate otherworldliness, gardens provide an escape from all means-ends relationships, and yet as such they only confirm how intrinsic to life in modern society means-ends relationships really are. In modern society, gardens make sense only to the extent that they provide the rational means of rejuvenating human spirits worn out by the imperatives of rationality. What no longer makes sense is the garden as an end in itself.[449]

The Chinese civilisation, in the eyes of the Europeans, was like a garden—it represented tranquillity and leisure, but also laziness, changelessness, and abundance. By burning down the Chinese gardens, therefore, the Europeans were trying to convey the idea of modernity to the Chinese, telling them to grow up, to be "free", and to progress. As Ringmar says, "Before 1860, the Chinese could just be themselves, but after 1860 they were forced to become either pro- or anti-European, pro- or anti-modern".[450] The change of power dynamics between the Chinese and the Europeans eventually forced China not only to be open to a world capitalist market, but also to become more modern, more enlightened, and more European: in 1912, the peasant uprising overthrew the Qing Dynasty, ending China's millennia-long imperial rule. In the same year, the Republic of China was founded and for the first time in Chinese history, the country adopted a foreign—more specifically, Western—style of governance, symbolising not only the nation's acceptance of the Western ideal of modernity, but also its determination for progress. Russell's visit occurred eight years after the founding of the republic—which

[448] Howard Trivers, *The Rhythm of Being: A Study of Temporality* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1985).
[449] Erik Ringmar, *Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 14.
[450] Ibid., 11.

means that what he experienced was no longer the closed-off and static China Hegel once observed, but rather the modern(ised) China that had conformed to the Western liberal norms.

The above comparison between Hegel's and Russell's accounts on China has revealed two things: firstly, both Hegel and Russell were correct in their depictions of the China *they observed*. Maybe attitude-wise, Hegel was indeed dismissive towards Chinese culture; and maybe Russell's limited first-hand experience was not sufficient for him to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the then Chinese society. Nevertheless, both philosophers in their own ways captured the essences of two different Chinas respectively—Hegel diagnosed the central problem of pre-modern China just as trenchantly as Russell identifying the emerging hope in modern China. The only issue here is that Russell's account may not necessarily serve as a convincing challenge to Hegel's Eurocentric view as the two philosophers did not experience the same China upon which their writings were based.

Secondly, and more importantly, the two different writings on China from two different time periods show that the changes in the use of language is often a reflection of the changes in the broader structure of society. With reference to Koselleck's work, Chapter 2 has discussed that in Europe, the Enlightenment resulted in the replacement of *Historie*, which assumes that historical events are rooted in "nature" and embedded in biological pre-givens, with *Geschichte* which conceptualises history as one clear linear progression. The new conception of history as a constantly progressing collective singular then endowed political language with a sense of movement: whilst before the Enlightenment, terms such as monarchy, democracy and aristocracy had been grounded in experience, the change of the temporal structure of the society had resulted in the creations of new political concepts such as republicanism and socialism that were based on expectations. Applying Koselleck's argument to the case of Hegel's and Russell's writings on China, one can observe that what modern China to pre-modern China is just like what *Geschichte* to *Historie*: the violent encounter with the Europeans not only disrupted the millennia-long Chinese temporal structure that was based on traditions and natural chronology, but also led to the creation of a new temporal structure within the Chinese

society that was based on the Western idea of modernity and progress. This change in the structure of society then led to the two different perceptions of China by scholars of two different times. It can be argued that the change in the use of language between Hegel and Russell was in fact a linguistic reflection of the then changing social and political conditions in China.

The present chapter attempts to examine such a linguistic reflection of social changes in the context of the Chinese translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. More specifically, it will analyse the diachronic transformation of Waltz's argument between the first and the second Chinese edition. The previous chapter has examined these translations from a synchronic perspective; it has argued that when translating Waltz's text from English into Chinese, the inherent empiricism of the Chinese language has altered the ontological status of the selected concepts, which has in turn destabilised the theoretical framework of the original argument, diminishing its explanatory power, and eventually led to the collapse of the epistemological framework within which Waltz's entire theorisation is situated. Yet the findings presented in Chapter 3 suggest that there were some major changes in the ways in which the selected concepts were translated in the second Chinese translation: for instance, while *anarchy* was consistently translated as "state with no government" in the first translation, in the second translation, two different translations were adopted for the concept. Similarly, compared to the first translation where *great power* was consistently translated as "big country", there were five different variations of translations for great power in the second edition—as if the translators were aware that there was a lack of abstraction in the expression "big country". The purpose of this chapter, hence, is to examine what exactly has induced these changes.

The main proposition of this chapter is that the diachronic changes in the translations of the selected concepts in the second Chinese edition manifest a certain politics of translation which was caused by the changing style of thought in Chinese IR scholarship. The argument will proceed in two parts: building on discussions presented in Chapter 3 and 4, the first section of this chapter will analyse the changes in the translations of *anarchy*, *power*, and *great power* between the first and the second Chinese editions of Waltz's book. It will argue that the strategic translations of *power* and *great power* reveal

the translators' deliberate attempt to reconstruct Waltz's argument and in so doing delineate its ideological aspect. The second section will then examine how such a politics of translation has come about. Drawing on insights from Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as discussed in Chapter 2, it will argue that the development of IR study in China reveals that from the late 1990s, there has been a shift in the dominant style of thought in Chinese IR scholarship from "Western learning", which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, to "Chinese IR", which became prominent from the early 2000s. "Chinese IR" as a new style of thought then presented a distinct way of thinking among Chinese IR scholars which manifested linguistically in their attempt to manipulate the translations of the selected concepts.

5.1 From Translation to Reconstruction: a politics of translating *Theory of International Politics*

Borrowing insights from psycholinguistics, the previous chapter has argued that the most important linguistic feature in the English language that helps its speakers facilitate theoretical thinking is entification, a cognitive process of converting an empirical experience into a theoretical entity. The Chinese language does not have these feature, and therefore, when Chinese speakers encounter an entified expression, they often have to engage in the reverse cognitive process, that is, de-entification, in order for them to understand the concept or the sentence in the Chinese language. The last chapter has also discussed that when it comes to the 1992 translation of *Theory of International Politics*, this process of de-entification was particularly evident in the translations of *anarchy*, where the Chinese translation has been reduced to the semantic description of the original concept: "state with no government". What is more, there were altogether 21 occurrences of *anarchy* in Waltz's text, and they were all translated to "state with no government" in the 1992 edition.

The 2004 edition, however, has two different translations for the concept of anarchy: "state with no government" and "no government". Although there were fifteen occurrences of "state with no government" versus only six occurrences of "no government", the breaking away from the consistent translation demonstrates that the

translators were aware of the potential problem in translating *anarchy* to "state with no government". Semantically speaking, given its lack of a Chinese equivalence, translating *anarchy* to "state with no government" is not necessarily wrong. However, because this is a very descriptive translation, certain problem may occur when the emphasis of a sentence is clearly placed on the conceptual aspect of the term. The most telling example of this is probably the sentence from page 89 of Waltz's text, which says, "If structure is an organisational concept, the terms such as 'structure' and 'anarchy' seem to be in contradiction." The context of this sentence indicates that the words inside the quotation marks are supposed to be concepts that are used as part of the argument on the nature of their conceptualities. The term "structure" has a Chinese conceptual equivalence, and the last chapter has already argued that the ontological status of "state with no government" is of an empirical one; this means that if *anarchy* here were to be translated as "state with no government", it would render "structure" and "anarchy" to be of different ontological status and consequently discredit the entire sentence.

What the 2004 Chinese edition accordingly did was deleting the "state" and using "no government" as an independent term. In any other situations, this translation would be deemed unidiomatic as in the modern Chinese language, "无政府 (wu zhengfu)", that is, "no government" is rarely used independently as a noun. Historically speaking, the term "no government" was first coined in 1901 by Liang Qichao, one of China's most influential thinker in the nineteenth century, as part of the translation for the English term "anarchism" which was translated to 无政府主义 (wu zhengfu zhuyi), literally meaning "no government-ism".[451] Since then, whenever the term "no government" is in use, it is usually combined with a different word where it functions as an adjective. A good example of this is "state with no government", whose literal translation is "no government state" where "no government" is used to describe the noun "state". Similarly, in the 2004 translation of Waltz's text, it can be observed that on the other five occasions where *anarchy* was translated to "no government", the "anarchy" in the original English sentence is often not the subject of that particular sentence: For instance, the sentence from page 116 states, "Hierarchic elements within international structures limit and

[451] Liang Qichao, "Nanhu Weimin Shangzhe (On the Difficulty of Being a Ruler)" *Qingyibao* (21 October 1901): 18.

restrain the exercise of sovereignty but only in ways strongly conditioned by the anarchy of the larger system." The preposition "of" in the phrase "the anarchy of the larger system" suggests that "the larger system" is the subject of this phrase, rather than the "anarchy". The Chinese translation thus used the expression "larger no government system" where "no government" is used to describe the "system". A very similar translation can also be found in another sentence from the same page, "The anarchy of that order strongly affects the likelihood of cooperation, the extent of arms agreements, and the jurisdiction of international organisations", where "the anarchy of that order" was translated to "that no government order", again, using "no government" as a describing word. "No government", in other words, is a grammatically invalid expression in the Chinese language and this is also why in the 1992 translation, the expression "no government" was never used.

However, there is one occasion where "no government" can be used as an independent term—that is, when it is not embedded in a sentence. In 2008, the Chinese translation of Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974) was published and the "anarchy" in the title was translated as "no government" (instead of "state with no government").[452] The use of "no government" is not unidiomatic here because the book title is essentially a list of three words with no syntactic structure and therefore "no government" in this case is not grammatically constrained to be combined with another term to make sense. This is also what happened in the sentence, "If structure is an organisational concept, the terms such as 'structure' and 'anarchy' seem to be in contradiction." The quotation marks in this sentence suggest that the words inside the quotation marks are semantically and grammatically independent of the rest of the sentence. To put it differently, the quotation marks have helped negate any grammatical mistakes of the terms inside them. The Chinese translation of *anarchy* to "no government" in this case has become a grammatically valid one and thus become *a term* of its own. To explain it more clearly, translating the concept of anarchy to "no government" in Chinese in this particular context would be equivalent to translating "anarchy" into "the anarchic" in English; by adding the definite article, the translation ascends descriptive language into a theoretical

[452] Robert Nozick, *Wu Zhengfu, Guojia, he Wutuobang (Anarchy, State and Utopia)*. Translated by D. Yao. (Beijing: Zhongguoshehuikexue Chubanshe, 2008).

entity. Although in the Chinese language, there is no equivalent grammatical feature to English articles, the quotation marks in this sentence have contributed to the same effect. In other words, by cleverly utilising the distinct grammatical feature of that particular sentence, the 2004 translation has in fact managed to (re)conceptualise *anarchy* in this particular sentence.

A similar process of re-conceptualisation can also be seen in the translation of *great power*—however this time with a negative implication. In the last chapter, it has also been argued that the empirical nature of the Chinese language has a tendency to reduce the level of abstraction in a concept by imbuing it with a sense of concreteness. In the first Chinese edition of Waltz's text, this is particularly evident in the case of *great power*, a concept that was consistently translated—as well as de-entified—to "big country". As it was the case with *anarchy*, the translation was not necessarily wrong at the semantic level; however, as stated earlier, by descending the level of abstraction and in so doing grounding the concept in the empirical world, the Chinese translation has diminished all the social, political, and historical dimensions that were encapsulated in the original concept of great power.

This changed in the 2004 translation. Not only was there a big decrease in the number of occurrences of "big country", but five different expressions were used to translation *great power*: "big country", "strong country", "super big country" (the same as the translation for "superpower"), "pole", and "imperial power". Such variations of translating *great power* remind of the discussion from the last chapter on *power*, where it has been argued that the different Chinese translations for the concept are in fact a demonstration of both the Chinese language's inability to create a concept that can encapsulate all the meanings that are inherent in the English concepts of power, and its precision in describing different nuances and aspects of the term. In the case of *great power*, as argued in the last chapter, although the translation of "great" to "big" might not necessarily change the meanings of the original concept, the decrease in the level of abstraction has also negated the situations where a "great power" may not be a nation with the biggest territorial size. By using five different translations, the second Chinese edition does not only capture the

different nuances and acknowledge the conceptual nature of *great power*, but also illustrate the wealth of meanings that are embedded in the original concept.

Yet the most intriguing discovery about the translations of *great power* in the 2004 version is not the contextualisation of their meanings, but rather what lexical terms were used to contextualise those meanings, as well as on what occasions translations other than "big country" were adopted. Amongst all the five translations, "big country" and "strong country" were most frequently used to translate *great power*, with "big country" occurring 101 and "strong country" occurring 33 out of 145 times. Although "big country" still remains to be the dominant translation, compared to the first edition where literally every *great power* was translated to "big country", it seems that the translators of the 2004 edition decided that on certain occasions, "big country" was not the best translation. Following Howland's argument that "the meaning of words is produced not in a dictionary but in usage",[453] the study has accordingly reviewed all the contexts where *great power* was translated to "strong country" in an attempt to find out what might be the reasons for this translation.

The study has then discovered that, although in most cases the translations did not exhibit any particular patterns regarding the preference of "strong country" to "big country", "strong country" appeared to be more likely to be adopted in cases where Waltz was clearly talking about European great powers during the First and the Second World War. For example, the sentence from page 166 of Waltz's book states that, "In the end Hitler's acts determined that all of the great powers save Italy and Japan would unite against him." In this context, the term "great powers" was clearly not used as a theoretical notion but rather referring to specific European countries during the Second World War. Similarly, the "great powers" in the sentence, "Like some earlier great powers, we can identify the presumed duty of the rich and powerful to help others with our own beliefs about what a better world would look like" was also translated to "strong country" as the following two sentences in that paragraph concern England's and France's performances as great powers back in the day. In the above two cases, Waltz was not using the concept

[453] Howland, *Translating the West: Language and Political Reason in Nineteenth-Century Japan*, 7.

of great power to theorise international politics in a general sense, but rather referring to the specific great powers under specific historical contexts. The last section of the previous chapter has argued that when *great power* was translated to "big country", the concept lost its historical dimension and became difficult to be used in any contexts where a great power was not a nation with the largest territorial size. Translating *great power* to "strong country", then, has solved this problem as unlike the word "big" which only connotes a nation's geographical size, the term "strong" can encompasses a wider range of meanings from a nation's military strength to its economic capability (both of which are part of Waltz's criteria for a great power).[454] It can be argued that although "strong country" might still sound descriptive and is not really yet a "concept", the level of abstraction in the translation has definitely increased compared to the 1992 Chinese edition of Waltz's text.

That being said, there was one occasion where *great power* was indeed (re)conceptualised in the 2004 edition; that is in the sentence, "Politics among the European great powers tended toward the model of a zero-sum game" where *great powers* was translated to "imperial powers". The Chinese expression for "imperial powers" is written as "列强 (lie qiang)", and in Chinese intellectual discourse, it is often used to refer specifically to the Western imperial powers during the nineteenth century. "列强 (lie qiang)" i.e. "imperial powers" was first used (in China) by Li Dazhao, a Chinese intellectual who co-founded the Communist Party back in 1921.[455] In 1922, in an attempt to criticise the Western capitalist aggression in China, Li published an article titled "Guoji Ziben Zhuyi Xiade Zhongguo (China under International Capitalism)", where he first used the term "列强 (lie qiang)", that is, "imperial powers" to refer to the Western capitalist nations. As he wrote:

> The imperial powers' management of China can be divided into two terms: The first term can be called "the old international co-management", and the second "the new international co-

[454] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131.
[455] Li was the first Chinese person who used the term; however, it is often said that the term was actually a loan word from Japanese as Li used to study abroad in Japan and had a tendency to use a lot of Japanese loan words in his writings. For more on Li Dazhao and his background, see: Germaine A. Hoston, "A 'Theology' of Liberation? Socialist Revolution and Spiritual Regeneration in Chinese and Japanese Marxism" in Cohen A. Paul and Goldman, Merle (eds.), *Ideas Across Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought in Honor of Benjamin I. Schwartz* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Centre, 1990): 165-222.

> management". The old international co-management was set up in 1908 by a group of banks in Britain, Germany and France. Its purpose was to control China via capital lending. The United States joined the co-management later. The six hundred mission pounds lent to China in 1911 in the name of railway construction was the doing of these four countries.[456] [my translation]

Since then, the term "列强 (lie qiang)" i.e. "imperial powers" has been imbued with a strong, negative connotation that is associated with Western capitalist oppression in China. In 1962, for example, Chinese novelist Jun Qing wrote, "…every time I think about the imperial powers dividing up China with their unequal treaties, it makes me burst into tears [my translation]", highlighting the association between the term "imperial powers" and the European aggressions in China during the nineteenth century.[457] "Imperial powers", it can be argued, is a concept in the Chinese language, whose meanings are inextricably linked to the historical encounters between China and the European powers in the nineteenth century. By translating *great power* specifically to "imperial powers" in this context, the Chinese translation did not only try to conceptualise the concept, but also attempt to invoke a negative association between the Western style of power politics and China's humiliating encounter with the European powers back in the nineteenth century. This also explains why in contexts where *great power* is used by Waltz to theorise international politics in a general sense, it is often translated as "big country"—because talking about international politics among "big countries" would automatically include China as one of the key players and it is probably safe to say that China would not want to label themselves as an "imperial power". These strategic translations of *great power*, it seems, reveal the existence of a politics of translation in the 2004 Chinese edition of Waltz's text.

The study then discovered that a similar translation strategy was also used in the re-conceptualisation of *power*. In both Chapter 3 and 4, it has been mentioned that unlike *anarchy* and *great power*, both of which were de-conceptualised due to the lack of conceptual equivalences, the meanings of *power* were contextualised and multiplied in

[456] Li Dazhao, "Guoji Ziben Zhuyi Xiade Zhongguo (China under International Capitalism)", *Chenbaofukan* (1 December 1922): 1.
[457] Jun Qing, "Ji Weihai (On Weihai)", *Douban Xiaozu* (9 October 2016) [online] (https://www.douban.com/group/topic/91679656/?type=rec) [Accessed 10 June 2018].

the Chinese editions. This is not only because the Chinese language's precision in conveying different types of "power", but also its inability to conceptualise a term that can encapsulate all the meanings that are inherent in the English concept of power. In the 1992 translation of Waltz's text, there were twelve different translations for *power*. In the 2004 edition, the number remains the same; only some translations from the 1992 edition were replaced with other similar but differently expressed phrases in the 2004 editions, such as "powerful" to "strong", and "regime" to "in power". Overall, it can be said that these changes did not much affect the meanings of the sentence where each *power* was embedded.

There was one change in the 2004 edition, however, that is worth some discussions; that is, the increase in the number of occurrences of "pouvoir". In the first edition, the most frequently adopted translations were "pouvoir" and "puissance", with the former occurring 120 and the latter occurring 28 times out of 219. Despite the discrepancy in their numbers of occurrences, it can be said that there was still a considerable number of times that *power* was translated as "puissance". In the 2004 edition, the number of "pouvoir" used for the translation of *power* reached 132 and that of "puissance" dropped to only seven, and it has been found that majority of the occasions where *power* was previously translated to "puissance" have now been changed to "pouvoir". This is both interesting and problematic in a way that, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Chinese term for "puissance" has a much more positive connotation to that of "pouvoir". A close examination of those contexts has then revealed that almost all contexts where the previous "puissance" was replaced by "pouvoir" contained one of the two phrases that are arguably key ideas in Waltz's theory of international politics, that is, "the distribution of power" or "the configuration of power".

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, one of Waltz's central arguments is that the structure of the international system is mainly based on the distribution of power among states. Different distribution of power would lead to different structures such as bipolarity, multipolarity or hegemony. This implies that, in Waltz's theory, the distribution of power in the international system is not something fixed and it is constantly changing. The Chinese expression "the distribution of pouvoir", however, means something slightly

different. When written in Chinese, "the configuration of pouvoir" is expressed as "权力配置 (quanli peizhi)", and "the distribution of pouvoir" is "权力分配 (quanli fenpei)". When used in Chinese political language, these two phrases are essentially interchangeable and they are also concepts endowed with specific social and historical meanings. The two terms were first used extensively by Deng Xiaoping during the economic reform in the late 70s.[458] The term "权力配置 (quanli peizhi)" i.e "the configuration of pouvoir" especially was advocated as an alternative idea to the checks and balances system which is the principle form of governance in the United States.[459] Deng stated that "China should not just follow and copy the Western system of governance [my translation]" and that it should have its own principle that is more suited for its national conditions.[460] Although the checks and balances system is effective when used by the capitalist class against a feudal autocracy, Deng argued, it also comes with a high political cost as it can be used as a tool for political gridlock.[461] In 1986 during his meeting with Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Polish United Worker's Party, Deng accordingly outlined three principles of the Chinese "configuration of pouvoir": 1) to consolidate the socialist system and learn from the failure of the Soviet system; 2) to improve the efficiency of social productivity without falling into the trap of Stalinist style of bureaucracy; and 3) to give more power to the working class and let them partake in the process of political supervision.[462]

It can be argued that the Chinese "configuration/distribution of pouvoir" is an ideological concept where "power"—or "pouvoir" in the Chinese sense—is seen as something that can be managed. This means by translating the "power" in "the configuration/distribution of power" to "pouvoir", the Chinese translation has depicted a picture of the international system where the distribution of power is not fluid (as it is the case with Waltz's original theory) but rather it can be structurally managed and administrated by a governing body.

[458] Li Youguo, "Deng Xiaoping Quanli Peizhi Sixiang Chutan (A Primary Investigation into Deng Xiaoping's thought of 'the Configuration of Pouvior'", *Mao Zedong Sixiang Yanjiu*, 24 (2007): 71-73.
[459] Ibid., 72.
[460] Deng Xiaoping, "Guanyu Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Wenti (On the Reform of Our Political System)", in Zhongguo Zhongyang Wenxian Bianji Weiyuanhui (ed.), *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993): 178.
[461] Li, "Deng Xiaoping Quanli Peizhi Sixiang Chutan (A Primary Investigation into Deng Xiaoping's thought of 'the Configuration of Pouvior'", 72.
[462] Deng, "Guanyu Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Wenti (On the Reform of Our Political System)", 214.

If this was in the English version of Waltz's theory, it would make Waltz's theory sound self-contradictory as the idea of distribution of power is supposed to work along with *anarchy* as the two determinants of the structure of the international system. However, since in the Chinese translation, *anarchy* has become an empirical observation (apart from that one occasion in the 2004 translation which was conceptualised via the quotation marks), it would render the Chinese concept of "configuration of power" to be the logical conclusion of "state with no government" i.e. anarchy. In other words, when written in Chinese, Waltz's theory in the 2004 edition would invoke the following line of reasoning: *because* the international system *is* a state with no government, there needs to be a configuration/distribution of power. And since the Chinese "configuration/distribution of power" implies the existence of a governing body, it means that in the international system, there is always going to be a hegemonic power that is dictating the structure of the system—which, in the context of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, would be the United States (as he says, "However one measures, the United States is the leading country.")[463] This also explains why the only time *great power* was translated to "super big country" i.e. the same translation for "superpower", was when Waltz was using the concept to specifically refer to the United States. (The sentence was, "To give that meaning to interdependence indicates that we are a great power and not simply one of the parts of an interdependent world.") It seems that Waltz's theory was not just translated in the 2004 Chinese edition, but also *reconstructed* in a way that it can be used as an ideological tool for the United States. In other words, by re-conceptualising not just the concept of power, but also the phrase "configuration/distribution of power", the Chinese translation has managed to delineate the ideological aspect of Waltz's theory which was not part of the original argument.

This section has so far argued that, unlike in the 1992 Chinese translation where *anarchy, power,* and *great power* have all lost their conceptualities, the 2004 edition has managed to re-conceptualise all of them in one way or another. Although in the case of *anarchy*, it was only one occasion, it still demonstrates the translators' awareness in both the conceptual nature of *anarchy* and the Chinese language's limited capacity to convey its conceptuality. However, the strategic translations of *power* and *great power*, this chapter

[463] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 179.

has argued, have also demonstrated a certain politics of translation in the 2004 version *of* Waltz's text: the translators of the 2004 edition were not only translating Waltz's argument, but they were also trying to translate in a particular way. And if the change in the use of language is a reflection of the changes in broader structure of society as Koselleck argues, then this means that something occurred between 1992 and 2004 has induced those changes in the use of language by the translators, who are, as mentioned earlier in the introduction, two IR scholars. With reference to the development of IR study in China, the next section will therefore examine the possible driving force behind this politics of translation.

5.2 From "Western Learning" to "Chinese IR": a tale of two styles of thought in Chinese IR scholarship

This chapter does not attempt to argue that the changing social, political and intellectual conditions are the *only* driving forces behind the changes in the translations of the selected concepts. As stated in Chapter 2, the epistemological stance of this thesis is that it sees human thought and experience to be closely related to the social settings from which they emerged. Chapter 3 has mentioned that the differences between the 1992 and the 2004 editions do not only lie in the actual translations, but also in their paratexts such as the design of the book, prefaces, and bibliographies. The 1992 edition did not have any of those paratextual elements, while the 2004 version included all the relevant paratexts. In other words, it was not only the level of abstraction that has increased in the 2004 edition, but also the level of professional, social and intellectual awareness demonstrated by the translators.

Chapter 2 has also mentioned the first Chinese edition was translated by two professional translators while the second edition by two IR scholars at Fudan University in Shanghai. An interview I had with one of the two translators of the second Chinese edition revealed that the decision to commission the second translation was mostly based on the fact that the two translators, who were both renowned IR scholars in China, felt that the first

translation was not good enough.[464] By then, most of the academic publishing had not been done by Gong'an Publishing which was a state-owned publisher that commissioned the first Chinese edition, but rather by other commercial press, most of which were professionally trained. Shanghai Century was the publisher that commissioned the second edition and it is one of the biggest publishers in China in terms of academic publishing. Apart from Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, they have also published the Chinese translations of other major IR texts in the West, such as Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* and Robert O. Keohane's *After Hegemony*. This change of publisher to some extent explains why the second Chinese edition of Waltz's book exhibits a much higher level of professional awareness as the commercial press was obviously more experienced than the state-owned company. However, it still does not explain why Waltz's text was not only re-translated, but also re-translated *in a particular way*. In order to gain a better understanding of the reasons behind the diachronic changes that happened in the translations of those concepts, a thorough investigation into the historical-social conditions under which each Chinese edition was released becomes highly crucial. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to examine those changing conditions.

5.2.1 "Western Learning" as A Style of Thought

It is necessary to address first that to date, there is yet a consensus among Chinese scholars as to when IR was first introduced to the country. IR scholar Gerald Chan claims in his *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography* that IR studies were introduced to China about a century ago.[465] Other scholars such as Michael Yahuda, Song Xinning, and Qin Yaqing believe that IR study was not really established in China before 1949.[466] The conventional understanding is that IR in the West came to be studied as a distinctive subject in the aftermath of World War I, with a strong normative orientation of preventing future wars and ensuring a safer world for the coming generations.[467] After

[464] Due to the wish of the interviewee, the present thesis could not release either the name of the interviewee or the transcript of the actual interview.
[465] Chan, 10.
[466] Michael Yahuda, "International Relations Scholarship in the People's Republic of China", *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 16 (1987): 319.; Song Xinning, "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics", *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10 (2001): 61.; Qin Yaqing, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 185.
[467] William Olson, *The Growth of a Discipline: International Politics 1919-1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Peu Ghosh, *International Relations* (Dehli: PHI Learning Private Ltd., 2013).

World War II, the discipline started to flourish in the United States, mainly due to America's increasingly hegemonic position in world affairs.[468] The receptive political, intellectual, and institutional environments in the U.S. shaped trajectory of IR study in the West as well as American domination of it. As a result, the theoretical development of the discipline was largely skewed towards the policy concerns of the U.S. as well as to ensure that any theories being studied can fit into American definitions of social science.[469] The American hegemony has not only narrowed the scope of the study and thus prevented the creation of an inclusive discipline, but also made the development of IR elsewhere outside the U.S., especially in non-Western countries, much more ambiguous and complex.

As mentioned briefly in the introduction, IR was not recognised as a separate discipline in Chinese academia until the late 1970s.[470] This, however, does not mean that there was no study of international relations prior to that. During the May Fourth period (1920s and 1930s), for example, there was an upsurge in liberal thinking among Chinese intellectuals; several IR-related books were published including *Chinese International Relations* (1933) and *The Diplomatic History of the Republic of China* (1936).[471] In the 1950s immediately after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Department of Diplomatic Studies was founded in the People's University of China, which was soon expanded and was re-established as a separate institution named the Foreign Affairs College. Its main mission was to train translators and diplomats to do research on IR.[472] The reorganisation of Chinese higher education in 1952 led to the abolition of political science altogether in the country, mainly because the Soviet education model did not allow a separate study of the field. As a result, the study of IR was assigned to history departments and remained so till the economic reform in the 70s.[473]

[468] Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations", *Discoveries and Interpretations: Studies in Contemporary Scholarship*, 103 (1977): 41.
[469] Haywood R. Alker and Thomas J. Biersteker, "The dialectics of world order: notes for a future archaeologist of international savoir faire", *International Studies Quarterly*, 28 (1984): 121.
[470] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 190.
[471] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 12.
[472] Qin Yaqing, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?", 315.
[473] Bernstein, "Political Science", 130-139.

The arbitrary and unsystematic characterisation of the discipline seems to imply that it is not that Chinese scholars have yet to reach agreement on when IR was first introduced, but rather that they have yet to define what exactly they mean by "International Relations" in China. Curricula of IR courses at main Chinese universities reveal that there is neither a clear scope of the subject nor of a specific methodological or epistemological approach by which it should be studied. Peking University, whose political science has consistently been ranked best in the country, does not have a degree in International Relations; rather, there is a Masters in International Studies comprised of 256 courses ranging from Human Rights and International Relations to International Monetary Relations and American Foreign Policy.[474] Fudan University, on the other hand, separates degrees in International Politics from those of Political Theory; the former contains courses such as IR history, International Law, and Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, while modules such as Comparative Political Thought and Comparative Political Systems are taught in the latter.[475] There is no specific degree in IR, in spite of the fact that the department itself is named Department of International Relations and Public Affairs. It seems that International Relations, unlike in Western academia where the subject often refers to the study of relations among states, is associated with something different in China—something like the study *of* "international" and China's relations *with* "international".

The reason behind this Chinese approach to IR can be traced back to the country's foreign relations with the European powers in the mid-nineteenth century. According to Gerald Chan, China had never encountered anything resembling "international" prior to the late Qing period. Although from the perspective of transnational relations, the history of Chinese inter-national relations can be dated much earlier back to the Spring Autumn period (722-481 B.C.) when the country was divided into more than 100 small, self-contained states, it was not until the outbreak of the Opium War in 1839 that China experienced the challenge posed by the Westphalian state system which was built upon

[474] International Studies Course Listing, *Peking University* (1 September 2015) [online] (http://english.pku.edu.cn/Admission/Graduate/GraduateCourse_Listing.html?id=00024). [Accessed 10 October 2015].
[475] International Politics Undergraduate Degree Course Listing, *Fudan University* (10 September 2015) [online] (http://www.sirpa.fudan.edu.cn/?cat=71). [Accessed 10 October 2015].

the Western idea of sovereignty.[476] To use Chan's exact words, "China was being forced to play a new game, a game of power politics in a Western style."[477] The West's scientific advancement and its overwhelmingly superior military force eventually led Chinese intellectuals to conclude that the only way for them to defend their country against the encroachment of foreign domination is to learn from them, as their Japanese counterparts did.[478] As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, this was also the beginning of China's "Western learning".[479]

In Chapter 2, it has been argued that one of the most important concepts in Mannheim's study of the sociology of knowledge is "style of thought", which refers to a series of socially constructed arguments that can be traced back to a specific social group and reflect that group's particular way of interpreting reality. "Western learning", in this sense, can be regarded as a distinct style of thought which emerged in the mid-nineteenth century among Chinese intellectuals in an attempt to defend their country against foreign encroachment. It is essentially a mode of thinking which entails "a radical restructuring of their [Chinese intellectuals] entire society, to produce knowledge along what were often identified as 'new' or 'Western' lines, rather than 'old' or 'Chinese' ones".[480] In Mannheim's study, the conservative style of thought is said to have emerged as a resistance to the then prevailing progressive style of thought. The emergence of "Western learning", it can be argued, was triggered by China's existential crisis in face of the European aggression. Moreover, according to Mannheim, every style of thought has a "form" which serves as its driving force. The form of the conservative style of thought, as explained in Chapter 2, is its drive "to preserve" what has been left behind by the progressive's perpetual drive "to progress".

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[476] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 10.
[477] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 9.
[478] The Japanese reacted much more quickly to the Western invasion than the Chinese. Shocked to see the country they had long respected as a cultural mentor being brought to its knee by foreign powers, the Japanese found themselves vulnerable. After Qing's defeat by the British, the Tokugawa bakufu (then Japanese government) instructed the Japanese elites to learn as much as possible about the West. Luckily, although Westerners had already arrived on Japan's shores, they were too preoccupied with other warfare to invade Japan. England, France, and Russia were fighting the Crimean War; the U.S., on the other side, was busy handling its own civil war. This bought Japan enough time to learn about the West and prevented them from Western encroachment. For more on Japan and its Wester learning, see: Kato, Shuichi and Maruyama, Masao, (eds.), *Honyaku no shiso, Nihon kindai shiso taikei (The principle of translation: a system of contemporary Japanese thought)* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988)
[479]Leigh Jenco, *Changing Referents: learning across space and time in China and the West* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 2.
[480] Ibid.

"Western learning" also has a distinct form of its own—and it was not just "to learn (Western knowledge)", but more specifically, "to translate". As Wei Yuan, a historian of the late Qing Dynasty, wrote right after China's defeat at the first Opium War, "…whoever wishes to control the barbarians must first understand their reality and whoever wishes to understand their reality must first set up schools for translating their books. [my translation]"[481]

In 1839, an official from the Qing government named Lin Zexu instructed a number of scholars to translate texts on Western international law into Chinese. His intention was to use international law to ban Western merchants from importing opium into the country.[482] In 1862, an academy named *Tongwenguan* (College of Foreign Languages) was set up by the government in the aftermath of the Opium War, whose main purpose was to train translators to handle foreign affairs.[483] In 1864, Henry Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* was translated and distributed to the Chinese elite, and it later became a primary reference for their conduct of diplomacy.[484] The adoption of the international law allowed Chinese intellectuals not only to learn about the West and Western knowledge, but also to use it to defend themselves against the West. In 1842, following the defeat of the Qing dynasty in the first Opium War, Britain and China signed the treaty of Nanjing, opening the Chinese market for foreign trade. Although the Chinese officials were not happy with the high tariffs and extraterritorial jurisdiction listed on the treaty, it was not until thirty years later, in the 1870s, that the treaty was described as unequal and humiliating.[485] This was to a great extent due to the influence cast by Guo Songtao, China's first permanent diplomatic representative in Europe, who repeatedly protested that, "the West should treat China as *equal*" and that "Westerners in China should fall under the *jurisdiction* of the Chinese local authority [my emphasis]".[486] In 1878, Guo attended a professional meeting

[481] Wei Yuan, *Hai Guo Tu Zhi (Illustrated Treaties on the Maritime Kingdoms)* (Hunan: Yuelu Chubanshe, 1998 [1843]): 26.
[482] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 11.
[483] Ibid.
[484] Ibid., 12.
[485] Arnulf Becker Lorca, *Mestizo International Law: a global intellectual history 1842-1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 5.
[486] Dong Wang, *China's Unequal Treaties: narrating national history* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005): 24.

of international lawyers held in Frankfurt for the first time as a Chinese delegate.[487] He began his speech as follows:

> I am very desirous of attaining a knowledge of this science [international law], in the hope that it will be beneficial to my country. I think it my duty to express the high esteem which I entertain for this Association and my great pleasure in joining it, and hope that by this means the relations of China with other countries may be improved.[488]

Before the arrival of the Europeans, it was nearly unimaginable for the Chinese to say that they are "desirous" of attaining any knowledge from the outside world, since they firmly believed that China had everything and therefore there was no need to borrow things from a foreign culture.[489] Guo's speech in this sense was highly significant as it not only marked China's proactive transition of its knowledge production from Chinese to Western precedents, but also revealed the ultimate rationale behind such "Western learning", that is, to use Western knowledge to defend China from the West. This instrumentalism of "Western learning" was also demonstrated by Chinese intellectuals' strategic use of IR concepts when dealing with international relations. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the translation of Wheaton's *Elements of International Law* brought a few IR concepts to China, such as *sovereignty* and *balance of power*, and some of the concepts quickly took hold among a number of intellectuals who were advocating for "Western learning".[490] Li Hongzhang, arguably China's most influential diplomat in the nineteenth century, for example, was reported to have used the concept of balance of power on many occasions to conduct diplomacy on behalf of the Qing government.[491] Chan accordingly argues that the adoption of the international law was the beginning of IR study in China, not only because IR concepts were started to being used, but also because it was the first time China started to understand the concept of "international" at the intellectual level.[492]

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[487] Lorca, *Mestizo International Law: a global intellectual history 1842-1933*, 3.
[488] Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations Report of the Conference, *Report of the Sixth Annual Conference Held at Frankfurt-on-the-main, 20-23 August*, 1878 [online] (https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.ilarc/ilarc1878&div=1&src=home) [Accessed 1 October 2015].
[489] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 9.
[490] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 12.
[491] Ibid.
[492] Ibid., 11.

Chinese IR scholarship, in other words, was an intellectual by-product of China's "Western learning".

After the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, "Western learning" still dominated Chinese IR scholarship. During this period, a large number of Chinese students were sent on government scholarships to the West to study international law among other subjects. When they returned to China, they then published their own writings as a way to introduce Western knowledge on international law and relations, such as the League of Nations and Wilsonian idealism.[493] Institutionally, during the 1920s, Peking University and Wuhan University started to offer some rudimentary courses on IR. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, moreover, American political scientist Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago was invited by Tsinghua University to give lectures on international law. [494] Also, at the end of the First World War, those students who were sent abroad managed to bring a number of publications on international law and European diplomatic history back to China and donated them to university libraries, such as the works of British historian George P. Gooch and Harold W. V. Temperley.[495] It is probably fair to say that the spirit of "Western learning" reached its zenith in China during the May Fourth Period.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 brought forth a gush of national animosities towards the West and, more importantly, towards "Western learning". The strong political and ideological alliance with the Soviet Union led to the imposition of Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist thought as the officially designated paradigm within which any social science research was to be conducted.[496] In addition, a new discipline called "scientific socialism" started to emerge—which is the Chinese equivalence of the discipline of scientific communism in the Soviet Union—whose general aim was to study "the dynamics of socialist society, the process of proletarian revolution in capitalist society, and the transformation of socialism to communism".[497] Although the best years of Sino-Soviet friendship ended in 1956, many of Chinese

[493] Ibid., 12.
[494] Ibid., 13.
[495] Ibid.
[496] Ibid., 520.
[497] Ibid., 523.

universities still keep the Soviet-style administration and management up till now.[498] Also during the 1930s, some members of the Communist Party went to Moscow to study Marxism and IR theory.[499] Many of them returned to the country and joined the diplomatic service, some entered academia. Whilst it is difficult to gauge the exact number of the students educated in Moscow, as David Shambaugh says, it is a fact that "'the first generation' of China's international studies specialists were preponderantly Soviet-trained".[500]

As a result, the primary purpose of IR study during the 1950s was mainly to promote the superiority of socialism and the darkness of capitalism, especially its imperialist tendency.[501] Teaching and research centred mostly on the experiences of the USSR, the history of international communist movement, and the rigid two-camp thesis which divided the world into the "socialist camp" headed by the Soviet Union and the "imperialist camp" headed by the United States.[502] This attitude began to change slightly in the early 1960s when Mao stressed the importance of IR study by personally commissioning the document "On Strengthening the Research on Foreign Affairs in China", which, according to Chan, can be seen as a manifestation of China's attempt to free itself from the Soviet ideological control and the Stalinist conceptualisation of the world.[503] In the same year, a new research centre for international studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was set up to conduct research on foreign policy making, which was soon followed by three major universities establishing their respective departments of international politics: Peking University, the People's University of China, and Fudan University. Between these three institutions, there existed a clear division of labour: Peking University focused on the study of the Third World, the People's University for the study of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and Fudan University for West European and North American studies.[504] Up till 1979, most of the IR-related

[498] David Shambaugh, "The Soviet Influence on China's Worldview", *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 27 (1992): 151.
[499] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 32.
[500] Shambaugh, "The Soviet Influence on China's Worldview", 152.
[501] Wang, "China: between copying and constructing", 103.
[502] Muthiah Algappa, "International Relations studies in Asia: distinctive trajectories", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 11 (2011): 193.
[503] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 32.
[504] Qin, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?", 317

research was conducted in these three departments, with the main focus being the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist thinking. Scholarly writings often involved terms such as "revolutionary" and "counter-revolutionary" and Western thoughts were only studied as a way to understand Western political systems or as a target of criticism.[505]

It was not until the late 1970s that a sea change occurred in China's master narrative for IR study. In 1978, following Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping decided that economic development should be the priority of the nation as well as that of the Party.[506] This fundamental shift of national objective implied that instead of staying as a closed entity and isolated from the outside world, China now had to open up, reform, and integrate its economy into the global capitalist system. The adoption of the open-door policy also helped revive Chinese academia; universities that were forced to close during the Cultural Revolution began to re-open: in 1979, a number of lecturers from the Beijing Foreign Language Institute designed a module entitled "The Basic Theory of International Struggle" which became the first course on IR theory offered at Chinese universities.[507] In 1980, the National Association of the History of International Relations was established as the first national academic association for the study of IR.[508] Politically, in 1983, the Propaganda and the Organisational Departments of the CCP Central Committee started to organise a theory course on international politics as part of the training programme for Party members.[509] The course was soon deemed important not just for the Party, but also for the whole nation; two years later in 1985, the government implemented a nation-wide education reform and the Party chairman, Hu Yaobang, encouraged early career academic researchers to enrich their knowledge on international politics.[510] This was a milestone in the development of Chinese political science as, before 1985, political theory courses mainly focused on the relationships between China and socialism and very little attention was paid to the world outside the "socialist camp".

[505] Ibid.
[506] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", 231.
[507] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 54.
[508] Qin, "Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?", 317.
[509] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 56.
[510] Ibid.

The revival of academia also brought about a new wave of "Western learning" among Chinese intellectuals. From the early 1980s, Chinese students began to be able to go abroad to study, with most of them going to the United States. Some studied IR and decided to introduce Western IR theories by translating key textbooks into Chinese.[511] In 1986, the Foreign Affairs College introduced a course entitled "An Appraisal of Western IR Theories", which marked the official introduction of Western IR theories into Chinese curricula.[512] The embrace of intellectual pluralism in higher education also led to the organisation of the first nation-wide academic conference: In August 1987, 80 IR scholars from around the country gathered in Shanghai to discuss the future of Chinese IR study, in which debates within the panel on Western IR theories were reported to be the most heated.[513] Several months later, the first textbook that sought to introduce American IR theory, *当代美国国际关系理论流派文选* (Selected Works of Contemporary American International Relations Theory) was published, which included translated chapters by Hans J. Morgenthau, Karl Deutsch, Kenneth Waltz, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye.[514] By the end of 1988, there were more than 50 institutions and centres specialised in international studies, and the number of academic journals on the subject totaled over 20.[515] More and more academics began to resist the ideological influences of earlier periods and embrace the idea of "Western learning"in Chinese IR scholarship.

The early 1990s then marked the first wave of translating Western IR classics and moreover, there appeared to be a special preference for translating realist works.[516] The translation of Hans J. Morgenthau's seminal work, *Politics among Nations* (1948), came out in 1990 and it was the first Chinese translation of a Western IR text. Immediately afterwards, the translations of Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War* (1959) and *Theory of International Politics* (1979), and Robert Gilpin's *War and Change in World Politics* (1981) were published in 1991, 1992, and 1994 respectively.[517] By the mid-

[511] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", 236.
[512] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 20.
[513] Ibid., 21.
[514] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 187.
[515] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 22.
[516] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", 236.
[517] Ibid.

1990s, the number of translated IR textbooks associated with the realist school tripled and realism quickly ranked the most widely used research paradigm by Chinese IR scholars, surpassing orthodox Marxism-Leninism approach which was dominant between 1979 and 1989.[518] According to Qin, the dominance of realism in the discourse of Chinese IR even generated a misperception among students and academics then that realism was the one and only Western IR theory.[519]

The next question is: why realism? It is true that Morgenthau is generally considered as the founding father of Western IR; however, by the time China decided to import Western IR theories, there had been quite a few theoretical frameworks from which they could choose to translate. In fact, according to Wang, the English School, the Copenhagen School, dependency theory and the Australian IR studies were all introduced to China around the same time as realist theories; and yet none of them produced strong echoes among Chinese IR scholars as realism did.[520] Although the exact reason for the preference of translating the works of the realist school remains unclear, it can be argued that it was most likely to do with the resurgence of "Western learning" in the 1980s. As mentioned before, the first generation of IR scholars who helped translate Western texts into Chinese went to study in the United States during the 1980s, which was also the time when the Waltzianisation of IR began to dominate in the U.S. Chinese students studying IR in American universities then were led to believe that Waltz's theory and the realist camp he represented were the most up-to-date and conclusive analytical framework. And when these students returned to China and entered academia, eager to introduce the most advanced knowledge from the West to their own country, they chose to reproduce those "important" theories first. In other words, realism became popular in China because it was popular in the United States, and the translation of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* was one of the intellectual outputs resulted from the dominance of this "Western learning" of realism in Chinese IR scholarship.

[518] Ibid, 237.
[519] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 190.
[520] Wang, "China: between copying and constructing", 110.

5.2.2 "Chinese IR" as A Style of Thought

Such dominance of realism started to shift in the late 1990s. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping embarked on his tour to the south of China and delivered a series of speeches which confirmed China's positive attitude about joining multilateral international organisations. Thereafter, China began to fully embrace a market economy and globalisation.[521] With Chinese national interests becoming increasingly linked to international regimes, a debate also emerged among political scientists around the question of how China should seek to achieve its national goal of becoming a prosperous and powerful country: through power and competition or through something else. Thus, in the late 1990s a series of liberal works began to be translated, among which were Robert O. Keohane's *After Hegemony* (1984) and *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (1993), and James N. Rosenau's *Governance without Government* (1992).[522] The introduction of liberalism also divided Chinese IR scholarship into two camps, with the realist camp proposing that the only way to maintain national security was to maximise the country's political and military capabilities, and the liberals arguing that in the era of globalisation, transnational threats and global insecurity outweighed traditional national security.[523] By 2000, this debate between realists and liberals, with the former stressing the importance of power and the latter advocating international cooperation, had become a focal point of Chinese IR.[524] The introduction of constructivism in the early 2000s then further diversified Chinese IR scholarship. The publication of the translation Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) in 2000 soon led to an upsurge in constructivist thinking among Chinese intellectuals.[525] In 2001, 15 journal articles using constructivist approaches were published and constructivism became the third biggest school to guide theory-related research; in 2003, it surpassed both realism and liberalism, boasting the publication of 34 articles, and became the most influential IR theory of the year.[526] A tripartite configuration of realism, liberalism, and constructivism began to dominate Chinese IR scholarship.

[521] Ibid.
[522] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 185.
[523] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China: progress through debates", 234.
[524] Ibid.
[525] Ibid.
[526] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 188.

Ironically, the embrace of globalisation and intellectual pluralism has also led to the beginning of the end of "Western learning" in Chinese IR scholarship. In the late 1990s, China's rapid economic growth as a result of the embrace of globalisation gave rise to the so-called "China threat" theory in the West, and it was particularly popular among journalists and academics in the United States[527]. Richard Shelby, the chairman of the U.S. Senate intelligence committee, for example, explicitly pointed out that no other country posed "such risks, such opportunities and such dilemmas for United States foreign and security policy" as China.[528] Initially, China did not react to those threat theories. In analysing Denny Roy's "China threat" thesis, Wang Yunxiang, a Chinese political commentator, identified three reasons why the United States saw China as a threat; those are: traditional threats, practical threats, and potential threats. Traditional threats refer to China's geopolitical position; since China shares borders with some 20 countries, Wang believes that the U.S. sees the potential conflicts between China and neighbour countries as inevitable. Practical threats refer to the potential increase in economic, military, and environmental sources resulted from China's fast economic growth. Potential threats imply the possibility of China taking aggressive actions to prevent possible food and energy shortages as a result of the increased consumptions.[529] Towards the end of the article, he concluded that the so-called "China threat" theory was no more than a new Cold War strategy adopted by the United States to put pressure on China—a strategy that aimed to attack China's human rights issues, the Tibet problem, the violation of intellectual property rights, and so forth.[530]

It was not until 1999 when NATO accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade that Chinese intellectuals began to take the whole "China threat" theory seriously. China refused to accept NATO's explanation that the bombing was a result of faulty intelligence

[527] For examples on "China threat" theory, see: Richard Berstein and Ross H. Munro, "The coming conflict with America", *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1997): 18-32.; Denny Roy, "The 'China threat' issue: major arguments", *Asian Survey*, 36 (1996): 758-771.; Stuart Harris and Garry Klintworth, (eds.), *China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region*. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1995); Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a conservative power", *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (1997): 33-44.
[528] Richard Shelby, "United States-China Summit", *Congressional Record* (23 October 1997) [online] (https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/1997/10/23/senate-section/article/S11022-3) [Accessed 10 October 2015].
[529] Wang Yunxiang, "'Zhongguo Weixie Lun' Xi (An Analysis of the "China Threat Theory")", *Guoji Guancha,* 3 (1996): 35.
[530] Ibid.

and firmly believed that NATO was exercising their "new security concept of active intervention" in order to impose order outside the West.[531] Also, in 2000, the United States publicly opposed Beijing's bid to host the Olympic Games; the opposition was soon followed by the Clinton Administration ordering the U.S. Navy to search a Chinese merchant ship which was allegedly carrying chemical weapons to the Middle East.[532] These events, plus the prevalence of the "China threat" theory, worsened China's relation with the United States; state leaders kept advocating the strengthening of the "great wall" of national defence and among ordinary citizens, their scepticism towards the West was also deepened. [533] In academic circles, IR scholars began to realise that the reason why China was not receiving enough respect from the rest of the world was due to China's peripheral status in the international society dominated by Western liberal norms and practices.[534] As such, at the dawn of the new millennium, "Western learning" as a feasible style of thought started to receive extreme scepticism from Chinese intellectuals and issues regarding China's rightful position in the international system began to dominate debates within the Chinese IR community.

Debates on the feasibility of "Western learning" accordingly resulted in another important development in Chinese IR scholarship: the construction of the so-called "Chinese school". Discussions on the creation of Chinese IR have in fact been going on since 1987, when the first national conference on IR study was held in Shanghai.[535] Although there were quite a few articles published on the issue afterwards, it was often overshadowed by other "more important" debates and therefore never became the centre of research among IR scholars.[536] Another reason why the topic did not receive enough attention then was because it was not entirely clear what exactly was meant by "Chinese school". At the Shanghai conference, Zhang Mingqian, director of the Research Department of the Centre for International Studies, described his view on the definition of "Chinese IR" as follows:

[531] Hu et al., *China's International Relations in the 21st century: dynamics of paradigm shifts*, 58.
[532] Ibid.
[533] Ibid.
[534] Hung-Jen Wang, *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship* (New Yok: Lexington Books, 2013): 31.
[535] Chan, *International Studies in China: an annotated bibliography*, 22.
[536] Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, 32.

> It is not Soviet theory, nor American theory. And it is probably not a theory that could be easily accepted by the whole world. But it must be the Chinese opinions of international affairs and the culmination of Chinese understandings of the international law and relations. [my translation][537]

Basically, the so-called "Chinese IR" must come from "us" Chinese, not "them" foreigners, whatever such self/other relation entails. The above statement also begs the question of what is "China"—as in, China as a civilizational state with more than two thousand years of history or the Communist China after 1949. If it was the latter, Song argues, then the so-called "Chinese IR" would not get very far theoretically because contemporary Chinese understanding of the world is largely constrained by the state ideology.[538] As such, at the beginning stage of its development, "Chinese IR" was only deemed as a conceptual alternative to the dominance of Western IR, but there were no discussions regarding what exactly this concept should/could/would entail.

From the early 2000s, however, triggered by the prevailing "China threat" discourse, "Chinese IR" began to emerge as a distinct style of thought and took over the previous "Western learning" as the guiding mode of thinking for the development of IR study in China. In 2001, China's worsened relation with the United States as well as the ongoing struggle over its rightful position in the world led Chinese intellectuals to conclude that in order to convince the international community that China will not act as a hegemonic force, it might be necessary to construct China's own school of IR to counterbalance the dominance of Western IR.[539] In 2002, acknowledging the difficulty and ambiguity in defining "Chinese IR", Wang Yiwei and Ni Shixiong published an article in which they argued that, in order to effectively develop "Chinese IR", scholars must first establish the nation's self-identity; specifically, they need to examine the sources of traditional Chinese values, foreign policy practices, China's diplomatic experiences, as well as the consumption of Western theories, and in so doing develop a system of IR theory with

[537] Zhang Mingqiang, "Guoji guanxi lilun yanjiu de mudi, duixiang zhi tantao (On the Ends and Objects of the Study of IR Theory)", in Shanghai Society of International Relations (ed.), *Guoji Guanxi Lilun Chutan* (Shanghai: Shanghai Waiyu Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1991): 68.
[538] Song, "Building International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics", 67.
[539] Hu et al., *China's International Relations in the 21st century: dynamics of paradigm shifts*, 59.

distinct Chinese features.[540] In other words, the construction of Chinese IR theory starts with the theorisation of China itself.

Discussions began with the question: how to present China as a great power without falling into the Western "China threat" discourse. Chinese political leaders and academics have always been resistant to China being acknowledged as a "great power", the main reason being in Western realist discourse, the idea of great power often involves the state's hegemonic potential. For most of Chinese IR scholars, particularly the liberal ones, great nationhood does not necessarily have to be accompanied by the state's hegemonic activities; however, it does entail certain normative obligations and responsibilities.[541] How to develop a Chinese IR theory which portrays China as a great nation without implying that it is an emerging threat to the West therefore became the first task for IR scholars. Hu Liping, for instance, tries to replace the term great power with "great nation", a concept which does not only imply a nation's geographic size and its high defence spending, but also a type of "意识 (yishi)", meaning "consciousness", that entails not only the political status of the country, but also the corresponding responsibilities and obligations that a great nation has to fulfil.[542] The concept of great nation in this sense is a suitable choice as it portrays China as a big political nation without connotation the image of China being a threat to the West.[543] Hu is also one of the few Chinese scholars who believe that as long as Chinese people are conscious of their country's interests and responsibilities, they can exert some form of influence and possibly control over the nation's behaviour within the international system.[544]

Also during this period, IR scholars began to collectively question whether Western IR is a value-free instrument or an ideological tool.[545] In 2003, referencing William

[540] Thuy-T Do, "China's Rise and the 'Chinese Dream' in International Relations Theory", *Global Change, Peace, and Security*, 27 (2015): 21.
[541] Yu Xintian, "China's National Interests from the Cultural Perspectives", *China International Studies*, 2 (2006): 102.
[542] Hu Liping, "Lun Guoji Huanjing Bianhua Yu Zhongguo de Waijiao Zhengce Quxiang: jianlun daguo yishi de peiyang (On Changing International Environment and Chinese Foreign Policy Orientation: on the great national consciousness)", *Qianyan*, 9 (2002): 121.
[543] Ibid.
[544] Wang, *The Rise of China and Chinese International Relations Scholarship*: 31.
[545] Wang, "China: between copying and constructing", 110.

Wohlforth's *The Stability of a Unipolar World*, Wang Yiwei, for instance, argues that there is a clear political and intellectual motivation underlying Western IR theory.[546] Others, such as Wang Yi, Wang Jun, and Zhang Jiming, cited Robert Cox's famous line, "theory is always for someone and for some purpose", to suggest that American IR theories are a combined effort to legitimise a Western-centric international system, and to reduce all non-Western countries to "like-units"—a concept Waltz uses to refer to states that have the same functions in the international system and also have similar internal makeups.[547] By 2003, there was a consensus among Chinese intellectuals that it was necessary to break away from the dominance of Western IR theory and construct China's own IR, and discussions on the construction of an indigenous "Chinese IR" had completely shifted from "whether" or not to construct Chinese school to "how" to construct Chinese school.[548]

Moreover, in 2004, Qin Yaqing from the Foreign Affairs College and Zhang Yuyuan from the Chinese Academy Social Sciences were invited to give a joint lecture to the members of the Communist Party.[549] Within Chinese IR communities, this event was regarded as a milestone for their intellectual achievement as it was the first time top Chinese political leaders displayed a willingness to learn from academics. The gesture also encouraged IR scholars to assume the role of a guide to Chinese diplomatic practice.[550] As a result, the construction of Chinese school was accelerated and more research funding was allocated by the state to IR departments dealing with the creation of indigenous Chinese IR. Fudan University, where the two translators of the second Chinese edition were based, was one of the universities that received such a governmental funding.[551] This was also the same year the second translation of Waltz's *Theory of*

[546] Wang Yiwei, "Guoji Guanxi Lilun de Guojiaxing (National Identity of IR Theory)", *Meiguo Yanjiu*, 17 (2003): 22.
[547] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 74.; Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: beyond international relations theory", *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 10 (1981): 126.; Wang Yi, "Guoji Xingshi de Bianhua Qushi yu Zhongguo de Guoji Guanxi Lilun Jianshe (Changing Trends in International Situation and China's IR Theory Building)", *Waijiao Xueyuan Xuebao*, 3 (2000): 1.; Wang Jun, "Zhongguo de Guoji Guanxi Lilun: yizhong zhutixing shijiao (On Chinese IR Theory: a subjective perspective)", *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi*, 2 (2004): 26.; Zhang Jiming, "Dui Xifang Guoji Guanxi Lilun de Zhexue Sikao: jianyi zhongguo guoji guanxi lilun de goujian (Philosophical Reflection on Western IR: Explorative Thoughts on China's IR Building", *Waijiao Pinglun*, 82 (2005): 72.
[548] Qin, "Development of International Relations Theory in China", 187.
[549] Wang, "China: between copying and constructing", 118.
[550] Ibid.
[551] Ibid.

International Politics was published—12 years after the publication of the first edition. It can be argued that, although the state may not have directly steered the creation of the translations, the change in the declared interests of the Chinese state from "needing Western theory" to "needing indigenous Chinese theory" was one of the driving forces behind the re-translation of Waltz's text in 2008.

Before moving on to discuss how such a shift in the dominant style of thought can be related to the diachronic changes in the Chinese translations of the selected concepts, it is essential to stress here that the focus of the present thesis is on the translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, and therefore would not dedicate any room to discussing the translations of other important IR textbooks mentioned so far in this chapter, such as Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* and Wendt's *Social Theory of International Relations*. The problem, however, with such a focus on the translation of Waltz's text is that there is a possibility that the diachronic changes that occurred between the two Chinese editions could simply be an idiosyncratic event and therefore do not necessarily reflect the changes in the styles of thought in Chinese IR scholarship. The present thesis is aware that in order to fully test the argument on the shift of styles of thought as an explanation for the diachronic changes that happened, some comparisons between the changes in the translations of Waltz's book and those in the Chinese translations of other IR texts might be necessary. However, in order to be able to conduct such a comparative study, I have to first examine the feasibility as well as the applicability of the analytical framework to be deployed on the research. In other words, the present thesis is not only a study of the Chinese translations of Waltz's book but also a test on the applicability of the established analytical framework. Any comparative studies using the established analytical framework, therefore, are only the next step in the research.

This section has so far traced the development of Chinese IR scholarship back to the mid-nineteenth century up to the early 2000s when the second Chinese translation of Waltz's book was published. Its purpose was to illustrate how the two translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* were published under the influences of two different styles of thought. From what has been outlined, it can be seen that from the late 1990s and the early 2000s, there was a clear shift in the dominant style of thought in Chinese IR

scholarship: while before 2000, “Western learning” was the main style of thought guiding the development of IR study in China, from the late 1990s and especially the early 2000s, the dominant mode of thinking in Chinese IR scholarship has been in line with the desire for the construction of the so-called “Chinese IR”.

The next question is how this changing style of thought is related to the politics of translation that has been discussed in the previous section. Chapter 2 has mentioned that according to Mannheim, a style of thought has two morphological features: “form” and “content”. Earlier in this section, it has been discussed the “form” is the driving force behind a particular style of thought, and that the “form” of “Western learning” is its drive “to learn” and “to translate” Western knowledge. The “content”, on the other hand, is the distinct way of experiencing and thinking about the world that is inherent in a style of thought. The “content” of the conservative style of thought, according to Mannheim, is its preference of prioritising concrete and existing features of things, as opposed to the progressive’s preference of prioritising abstract values. Applying this morphological analysis to “Chinese IR”, it can be seen that just as in Mannheim’s study of conservatism, the conservative style of thought emerged in reaction to the prevailing progressive style of thought, “Chinese IR” emerged in reaction to the prevailing “China threat” discourse in the late 90s. The “form” of conservativism is its drive “to preserve” what has been left behind by the progressive; the “form” of “Chinese IR”, then, is its drive “to be recognised” as a valid voice within the international society. In terms of “content”, from the development of “Chinese IR” as well as the journal articles written by Chinese IR scholars on the promotion of Chinese school, it can be observed that “Chinese IR” as a style of thought entails a distinct way of thinking that is characterised by two features: a need to present China as a non-threatening great power, and a deep-seated scepticism towards Western IR—both of which are visible in the 2004 translations of *Theory of International Politics*.

Take the examples of *great power* and *power* to illustrate such a connection between the diachronic changes in the translations and the change in the Chinese style of thought: the previous section has already argued that, in the second Chinese translation of Waltz’s

book, while the ideologically driven Chinese concept of imperial powers i.e. “列强 (lie qiang)” was specifically used to refer to European great powers, “big country” was still adopted on occasions where China is part of the theorisation—as “big country” does not sound as threatening as “imperial powers”. This agenda of trying to portray European powers as imperialist and China as simply an objectively big country is particularly evident if we compare the translations of two sentences on page 70 of Waltz’s text, both of which contain the term “great power”. The first sentence reads, “So long as European states were the world’s great power, unity among them could only be dreamt of”, and the second one is, two paragraphs after the first one, “politics among the European great powers tended towards the model of a zero-sum game”. What is interesting about these two sentences is that, in the 1992 Chinese translation, *great power* was translated to “big country” in both cases. However, in the 2004 edition, while the first one was still translated to “big country”, the “great power” in the second sentence was changed to “列强 (lie qiang)” i.e. “imperial powers”. Juxtaposing the two contexts, the main difference between them is that, the “great power” in the first sentence was used to refer to all the great powers in the world, while it was more specifically referring to European powers in the second one. By keeping the translation of *great power* as “big country” in the first sentence and changing it to “imperial powers” in the second, therefore, the 2004 translation essentially managed to acknowledge China’s status as a world’s great power while labeling European states as imperialist. This is a clear manifestation of a choice of words being influenced by “Chinese IR” as a dominant style of thought.

The same argument can also be applied to the case of *power*; in Chapter 3, it has been discussed that the Chinese expression of “权力(quan li)” i.e. “pouvoir”, connotates a negative form of political power—as opposed to “力量 (li liang)” i.e. “puissance”, which is a more positive form of political power. The previous section has then argued that, compared to the first edition, the number of times where *power* was translated to “pouvoir” has increased dramatically in the 2004 Chinese translation. For instance, the “power” in the sentence, “States are differently placed by their power”, was translated to “puissance” in the 1992 edition but changed to “pouvoir” in the second edition. Similarly,

the translation of the "power" in the sentence, "The more powerful the clients and the more the power of each of them appears as a threat to the others, the greater the power ledged in the center must be" was also changed from "puissance" to "pouvoir" in the second edition. Such a high increase in the usage of "pouvoir"—which, just to reiterate, refers to a negative form of political power—seems to suggest that the 2004 Chinese translation was deliberately trying to delineate a negative image of Waltz's theory of international politics, carving out an ideological dimension that was not part of the original argument. This implies the translators had a sense of scepticism, or at least bias, towards Waltz's theory to the extent that they wanted to make its ideological aspect more explicit via translation. It seems that in the cases of both *great power* and *power*, the ways the translators translated the two key concepts have revealed the way of thinking that is inherent in "Chinese IR" as a style of thought. The politics of translation in the *2004 edition of Theory of International Politics*, it therefore can be argued, is a linguistic manifestation of the changing style of thought in Chinese IR scholarship.

5.3 Conclusion

Translation theorist Andre Lefevere argues that, "Translation is…a rewriting of an original text. All rewritings..reflect a certain ideology and a poetics and as such manipulate literature to function in a given society in a given way."[552] Since for Mannheim, ideologies can be analysed as evolving styles of thoughts, this means that behind every translation, there reflects a certain evolving style of thought. This was certainly the case with the Chinese translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. The investigation into the diachronic changes in the translations of *power*, *anarchy*, and *great power* has revealed that the translators of the 2004 edition were not only translating Waltz's text, but also trying to translate it in a particular way. Such a politics of translation, moreover, was caused by the changing style of thought in Chinese IR scholarship: while "Western learning" has been the dominant style of thought that characterised the development of Chinese IR scholarship from the mid-nineteenth century up to the early 1990s, the prevailing "China threat" theory in the late 1990s has given rise to the emergence of another style of thought called "Chinese IR". This new style of thought was driven by its desire for recognition and its inherent way of thinking entails a

[552] Lefevere, *Translating, Rewriting, and the Manipulation of Literary Frame*, ii.

deep-seated scepticism towards Western IR. These two defining features of this style of thought were then reflected in the ways in which the key concepts in Waltz's argument were translated. Translation, in other words, has been used to serve a political purpose in the second Chinese translation of Waltz's text.

The previous chapter has argued that when an English political concept gets translated into Chinese, it tends to become less abstract and more grounded in the empirical world in the absence of a conceptual equivalence. This is mostly because of the inherent empiricism in the Chinese language which makes it difficult to convey the level of abstraction that is embedded in the concept when written in English. This chapter has then argued that the translation of a political concept is constrained not only by the unique trait of a particular linguistic system, but also by the changing social, political, and intellectual environments under which the translation is conducted. These double constraints from both the synchronic and the diachronic aspects of language accordingly make the process of translating any knowledge claims much more complex and confusing. However, such an undeniable complexity also means that when it comes to the translations of any knowledge claims, we cannot simply assume that a different language will unproblematically absorb an assortment of foreign intellectual discourse and their meanings will remain constant. A study based on this assumption will not only produce an unsatisfying conclusion, but also lead to a bad scholarship where the unexpected meanings and connotations that the translated knowledge claims have acquired in the target language are ignored. In this sense, the present thesis is also a reminder of such a nonlinear and sometimes even messy process of translation in the domain of political science.

Conclusion: language and/in International Relations

> Even if the American, Russian, and Indian could speak to one another, they would speak with different tongues, and if they uttered the same words, those words would signify different objects, values, and aspirations to each of them. So it is with concepts such as democracy, freedom, and security. The disillusion of differently constituted minds communicating the same words, which embody their most firmly held convictions, deepest emotions, and most ardent aspirations, without finding the expected sympathetic responses, has driven the members of different nations further apart rather than united them.[553]
>
> —Hans J. Morgenthau

"Language", Locke wrote, is what gives us "the improvement of knowledge and bond of society".[554] By this he meant that language is what makes us the moral and political animals that we are. Yet as creatures of different cultures and nations, we often do not speak the same language and this is why we need translation to help us understand and communicate with each other. The purpose of this thesis was to examine this process of translating a foreign idea into a different linguistic context, and it has principally focused on the Chinese translation of Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. It has argued that when an IR concept in English is translated into Chinese, the transmission of its meaning is often subjected to double linguistic constraints: the Chinese language's limited capacity for conveying its conceptual nature, and the social, political, and intellectual conditions under which the translation takes place.

The arguments were accordingly developed from two aspects of linguistic analysis: synchrony and diachrony. Synchronically, it has discovered that among the six concepts this study has selected for investigation, that is, *anarchy, security, self-help, power, great power*, and *balance of power*, only *security, self-help*, and *balance of power* have retained their original meanings in the Chinese translations, while the remaining three concepts, *anarchy, great power*, and *power*, have either lost meanings (in the cases of *anarchy* and *great power*), or gained extra meanings (in the case of *power*). It has argued that this change in the meanings of the key concepts destabilised Waltz's original theorisation of

[553] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948): 202.
[554] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 364.

international politics and consequently led to the collapse of the deductive epistemology he deploys in his argument. Diachronically, it has explained how the changes in the translations of the selected concepts between 1992 and 2004 demonstrated a certain politics of translation existing in the second Chinese translation of Waltz's book. It has also argued how such a politics of translation was in fact a linguistic manifestation of the changes in broader social, political, and intellectual conditions of China which gave rise to a new style of thought within Chinese IR scholarship.

In their study of the marginalisation of Scandinavian intellectual community in Europe, Stefan Nygård and Johan Strang argue that European intellectual history demonstrates a strong "logic of conceptual universalisation".[555] By this they refer to the inherent power structure that is embedded in the production of any knowledge claims in the field of European intellectual history: when Scandinavian intellectuals question the applicability of the English or the French conceptualisations of liberalism to the Scandinavian context, Nygård and Strang argue, their interpretations of the concept are often marginalised by their English and French counterparts who tend to claim the universal validity in their interpretations of the concept of liberalism. In other words, the English and the French are trying to use their conception of liberalism as if it were valid in all places at all times. This is what they mean by "conceptual universalisation".

While conducting my research, I came to a realisation that it is not only the study of European intellectual history that manifests such a tendency of conceptual universalisation, but also contemporary IR scholarship. At the beginning of every chapter of this thesis, an evocative quote on language has been used to frame the analysis of that particular chapter. Those quotes did not only come from luminary philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Thomas Kuhn, John Locke, Bertrand Russell, and Masao Maruyama, but also from an eminent IR scholar Hans J. Morgenthau and a prominent poet John Ciardi. It can be noticed that all of those quotes are of relative vintage, spanning the period from the nineteenth century to the end of the Second World War. Their inclusion was not the result of a narrow historical focus on my part. The fact

[555] Stefan Nygård and Johan Strang, "Conceptual Universalization and the Role of the Peripheries", *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 12 (2017): 55.

is that it was almost impossible to find similar concerns expressed by contemporary IR scholars. This lack of interest in the issue regarding the role of language in contributing to our understanding of international relations is probably most vividly demonstrated through the discussion in Chapter 1 where it shows that there have only been three studies (one of which was not even a study but an interview) on Chinese translations of IR concepts. What this lack of research outputs shows is that there seems to exist a universal assumption among both the Chinese and the Anglophone scholars that the meaning of an IR concept would remain the same when it is translated from English into Chinese. And the present study has shown that that is simply not the case.

Readers may also notice that this thesis has drawn on insights from various disciplines ranging from sinology to philosophy, and from linguistics to psychology. The present thesis is aware that such a cross-disciplinary research bears certain intellectual risks, and yet it was not the intention nor the aim of this study to overcomplicate the arguments by writing across such a wide range of disciplines. Rather, it should be seen as a manifestation of the lack of scholarly attention to the issue of trans-lingual circulation of ideas in the discipline of IR. In this regard, the present thesis is also an expression of my disappointment with the decreased academic interest in investigating the importance of language in shaping what we can understand socially, politically, intellectually, and even morally.

Despite the lack of intellectual endeavours in the role of language in contributing to our understanding of international relations, the history of transnational relations shows that the importance of being well versed in a foreign language has always been addressed as a concomitant of an effective foreign policy. Chapter 2 has mentioned a quote from Matteo Ricci, the founding father of the Jesuit China Mission, where he related to the success of converting China into a Christian society with the Jesuits' ability to speak and understand the Chinese language. Similarly, in response to the unequal treaty signed between Britain and China in the 1850s, Feng Guifen, one of the most vocal proponents of "Western learning" then, complained to the Chinese authorities that,

> [t]rade is one of the aspects of the present policy. Since it is impossible not to have contacts with foreigners, it is necessary to know their intentions, to know their desires, to distinguish what is true and what is false in their behaviour and in their thoughts…Since trade began twenty years ago,

> many of them [Westerners] have studied our language and our writing and the best have even managed to read the classics and the histories…But none of our functionaries and dignitaries is capable of that. Instead, we have to rely on the so-called "linguists" when we interact with them. These linguists have become a curse of our relations with the West. [my translation][556]

Feng's frustration with the Chinese dependency on linguists to communicate with foreigners did not arise for no reason. After the Opium War, following the footsteps of the Protestant missionaries who had been undertaking a systematic study of the Chinese language, many Westerners began to learn the Chinese language and culture, which, according to Italian linguist Federico Masini, was what gave rise to modern sinology.[557] The increased number of foreigners speaking Chinese plus the lack of Chinese talents in Western languages forced the imperial court to have no choice but to hire Westerners to teach Chinese intellectuals Western languages and knowledge.[558] In Chapter 5, it has been mentioned that a school named *Tongwenguan* was established in 1862 right after the second Opium War in an attempt to train translators to deal with foreign affairs. The fact is by "dealing with foreign affairs", what the Qing government really meant was to teach Chinese scholars foreign languages. The very first English and the French lessons in Chinese history were accordingly given by a British and a Dutch missionary respectively in *Tongwenguan*. The popularity of the language lessons eventually led to the school providing courses on other subjects such as the international law—which, as argued in Chapter 5, marked the beginning of Chinese IR scholarship.[559] Chapter 5 has also argued that Chinese IR scholarship was an intellectual by-product of China's "Western learning"; but to a great extent, the genesis of Chinese IR scholarship actually began with the study of foreign languages.

Thus, the argument I would like to put forward here is this: the problem of language should be studied as a central issue in both the realm of international relations and that of International Relations. Since the publication of "Why is there Non-Western International Relations Theory?" by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan in 2007, scholars concerned with the inherent Western-centrism of IR have been engaged in a heated debate regarding

[556] Feng Guifen, *Jiaobinlu Kangji (Protest from the Jiaobin Studio)* (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe): 211.
[557] Masini, "The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898", 44.
[558] Ibid.
[559] Ibid.

the incorporation of non-Western traditions and perspectives into the disciplinary development.[560] Ole Waever and Arlene Tickner, for example, argue that IR scholars must understand the centre-periphery relation that exists in the disciplinary study by examining academic practices of IR in the less influential parts of the world.[561] From the perspective of post-colonialism, Robbie Shilliam then suggests that the incorporation of non-Western voices should begin by recognising the "co-constitution of the archives of Western and non-Western thought through (the threat of) relations of colonial domination".[562] With reference to the ancient Chinese philosophy of Daoism, Lily Ling proposes the concept of "worldism" as an alternative way to understand international relations.[563] Last year, a decade after the publication of "Why is there Non-Western International Relations Theory?", Acharya and Buzan then revisited their initial proposition and this time argued for the development of the so-called "Global IR" as a conceptual framework to challenge the Western-centric nature of IR study.[564]

Although all the above theoretical discussions sound promising, they still seem to not have answered the question regarding how, *in practice*, the non-Western perspectives and voices can actually be recognised and incorporated into the disciplinary debate. The irony here is that if we re-read Acharya and Buzan's article from 2007, they have already identified then the central problem regarding the academic practices of contemporary IR scholarship:

> [E]ven in Europe, there are distinct local language IR debates in Germany, France, and elsewhere that are only partially, and often quite weakly, linked to the English language debates…Those who engaged in the English language debates have more than enough to read within that, and often lack the language skills to investigate beyond it… It is also easy for those in the Anglo-Saxon IR core to assume that English as a *lingua franca* must make access easier for all.[565]

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[560] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7 (2007): 287-312.
[561] Ole Waever and Arlene B. Tickner, "Introduction", in Ticker, B. Arlene, and Waever, Ole, (eds.), *International Relations Scholarship around the World* (London: Routledge, 2009): 2.
[562] Robbie Shilliam, "The Perilous and but unavoidable terrain of the non-West", in Shilliam, Robbie (ed.), *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, colonialism, and investigations of global modernity* (London: Routledge, 2011): 18.
[563] L. H. M. Ling, *The Dao of World Politics: towards a Post-Westphalian, Worldist International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014).
[564] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on", *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17 (2017): 341-370.
[565] Acharya and Buzan, "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory?", 295.

Since the beginning of the debate, IR scholars have been obsessed with coming up with a (theoretical) solution to incorporate the so-called non-Western voices. However, for some reason, it never seems to have occurred to them that the very first thing one can do to incorporate others' voices is simply to listen to them—when they speak, in their own languages. Instead of going up to different intellectual communities and engage with local debates, scholars researching on the development of non-Western IR often take a top-down, and sometimes even patronising, approach by trying to give the non-Western voices a theoretical platform in hopes that they will incorporate themselves. However, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak argues in her famous essay, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", once the subaltern enter a dominant discourse to have themselves heard, they are no longer speaking from the subaltern position.[566] If the reason for the non-Western voices being hidden is largely linguistic as Acharya and Buzan observed, then having them enter the English language debate in the name of incorporating their voices only seems to pull them further away from the linguistically marginalised position from which they are supposed to speak. Such an approach to non-Western IR is only going to further reinforce the dominant role of the English language in contemporary IR scholarship, and not contributing to the creation of a truly inclusive discipline as the way it is being advocated.

The present thesis hence proposes that the first step to construct a truly inclusive IR is to examine how key concepts used in disciplinary debates have been translated and understood in different linguistic contexts. This is because, as Hill observes, when it comes to the translations of social and political concepts,

> …as concepts moved further away from their origin, along multiple paths, the first source may have become irrelevant because it was no longer the means through which people encountered the concepts.[567]

This was certainly the case with the Chinese translations of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. The translations of the concept of power, especially, have demonstrated the ways in which the Chinese and the English languages can generate different understandings of *power*—arguably one of the most important concepts in the

[566] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak" in, Nelson Carly, and Grossberg, Lawrence, (eds.), *Marxism* and the *Interpretation* of *Culture* (Urbanaand, Chi: University of Illinois Press, 1988): 271-313.
[567] Hill, "Conceptual Universalisation in the Transnational Nineteenth Century", 147.

study of IR. What this understanding of how a key IR concept is translated in a different language does, then, is to make us realise about the inherent *particularity* in some of the English language debates in contemporary IR scholarship. For example, if we translate Guzzini's book chapter on the concept of power in international politics into Chinese, we would quickly come to realise that the translated article does not make much sense and that Guzzini's argument was only possible under the condition that *power* is a semantically ambiguous concept imbued with multiple meanings. However, as shown in Chapter 3, the Chinese language already has different lexical terms to indicate different aspects of power. This means that when understood in Chinese, as long as it is clear which type of power is being talked about i.e. which lexical term is being used, it is unlikely that there will be any contentions surrounding the meaning of *power* in Chinese discourse. It therefore can be argued that scholarly debates on the meaning of the concept of power are in fact very *particular* to the English IR scholarship. This awareness of the particularity, then, enables us to allow for the emergence of different interpretations of a specific concept, thus creating a more inclusive discipline.

The second reason why IR scholarship should pay more attention to foreign translations of key disciplinary concepts is that it can help us examine the distinct worldviews that are embedded in different linguistic systems and in so doing understand what might be the sustaining vector in value differences between different linguistic groups. The present thesis is aware that this argument is overly linguistically deterministic and highly controversial. To some extent, it may even be deemed regressive. However, from what has been discussed in Chapter 4, it has become clear that there is a fundamental difference in the ways in which knowledge is constructed between the Chinese and the Indo-European linguistic systems. The unique linguistic feature of the Chinese language enables anything that is thought, expressed, or conveyed in Chinese to be grounded in the empirical world. This level of empiricism in turn lead to the differences between the Chinese and Western ways of thinking *theoretically*. And a truly inclusive IR scholarship, it can be argued, should encourage and stress such a diversity of the ways of thinking represented by different linguistic groups.

Another reason that we should examine the ways in which key concepts are translated by other intellectual communities is that it makes us more vigilant about the types of knowledge contemporary IR scholarship is exporting into the rest of the world. For instance, Chapter 5 has argued that in the 2004 Chinese translation of Waltz's text, the translators have attempted to delineate the ideological aspect of Waltz's argument that was not part of the original theory by re-conceptualising the concept of power. Also, in his study of the expansion of the international society in East Asia during the nineteenth century, Shogo Suzuki argues that Japan's invasion of China soon after becoming a member of the international society indicates that Japan did not only accept the Western standards regarding what means to be a "civilised" state, but also accepted the idea about how they should *act* as a "civilised" state.[568] That is to say, during their socialisation process in the international society, Japan emulated the "civilising" mode of action conducted by the Europeans by invading China. In the above two cases, both the Chinese translators and the Japanese intellectuals managed to appropriate the original Western concepts in an attempt to suit their own understandings and political agendas. It hence can be said that by studying how a key concept is received and translated by other intellectual communities, we can identify the politics of knowledge (re)production in the discipline of IR.

The final question is how this particular study can *practically* help future research on the translations of IR concepts. Analytically, readers may notice that throughout the thesis, I have kept using a pair of terms to inform the general direction of my research: synchrony and diachrony. The present thesis asserts that any translation of a concept in the discipline of IR can be explained from these two linguistic perspectives. Moreover, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 2, the study has demonstrated that when it comes to the study of trans-lingual circulation of knowledge claims, translation study alone was simply not sufficient in explaining how the meanings embedded in a specific concept became transplanted into a different linguistic context. This is because most of the translation-focused studies have difficulty deciding on the difference between a word and a concept. This difference, however, becomes evident when using Koselleck's study of conceptual history. For

[568] Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society* (London: Routledge, 2009), 144.

example, Chapter 4 has argued how the translation of *great power* to "big country" has lost its original conceptuality and meanings when it was translated to "big country" in the Chinese language. However, such a loss of meanings could only be detected when the term was analysed as a concept in the first place. This thesis, it can be argued, has shown that the trans-lingual circulation of political knowledge is most effectively analysed as a form of conceptual history.

Methodologically speaking, as mentioned in Chapter 2, research on the history of ideas or conceptual history often do not present a clear methodological framework, while this study has provided a detailed account in terms of what methods have been employed in its analysis to reach the results. Following the teaching of Linguistic Society of America that says linguistic is a form of science, the methodological framework in this study was designed in a way that it is replicable.[569] This does not only mean that anyone else who repeats the procedure presented in this thesis shall reach the same empirical results as I did, but also implies that the methodological framework of this study is applicable to any similar type of research to be conducted in the future.

[569] Linguistic Society of America, "The Science of Linguistics", *Linguistic Society of America: Advancing the Scientific Study of Language* (2012) [online] (https://www.linguisticsociety.org/resource/science-linguistics) [Accessed 8 August 2017].

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