

**Discourses on Wars and Conflicts: The Discursive Construction of Iraq in the
US Press**


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ABSTRACT

This study examines the discourses of US newspapers during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq to see how the themes: i.e., *Saddam, Iraqi people, Shiites, Halabja/the use of chemical weapons* are discursively represented in these two wars. The research also examines whether there is a shift in the US press stance in its reporting by comparing the treatment of the themes during the two wars in question. To operationalise an interdisciplinary framework for this investigation the study employs corpus linguistics tools: frequency, collocates and concordances, in combination with the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to CDA.


The investigation reveals that during the Iraq-Iran war, the US press covered the conflicting official statements of all countries involved in the war, while there was an over-reliance on the opinions and statements of US officials during the US-led invasion, with Saddam's voice being muted. In the same vein, although Saddam is portrayed negatively in the Iraq-Iran war, he is much more sharply vilified, Hilterlised and demonised in the US-led invasion, and constructed as a threat that needs to be faced and eliminated.

With regard to the Iraqis/Shiites, there is also a shift in reporting in the two wars. In the 2003 US-led invasion they appear as worthy victims, a portrayal that fits in within the propaganda that the war had a humanitarian motive. However, the Iraqis/Shiites are never represented in this way during the Iraq-Iran war. In a similar way, whereas the US press coverage of Halabja and chemical weapons (in 1988) consists mainly of reports of the conflicting opinions and statements of Iraqi, Iranian and US officials during the Iran-Iraq war, this is not the case during the 2003 US-led invasion, when the history of the Halabja gassing and the use of chemical weapons by Iraq is brought back to the surface to serve the aims of demonising and criminalising Saddam in particular and Iraq in general: these events are used to support the claim that Iraq possessed WMDs and that there was a real threat that Saddam would use them.

It is hoped that this thesis makes a multifaceted contribution to the field: first, in revealing the US press selective nature of human rights violations with regard to Iraqi social groups and showing how this was in line with US foreign policy; secondly, by contributing to our understanding of the quality of journalistic practices in the US during times of conflict and the way they may function to form the overall characteristics of US press discourses during

international conflicts, especially conflicts in the Middle East. The study also highlights the mechanisms through which the US press discourses incorporate the official state voices in the processes of legitimising and persuading the public of the necessity for a war.

DEDICATION



**This work is dedicated to the memory of
my late father, mother, sister and brother
with love and eternal appreciation**



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

There have been many people who have walked alongside me during the last four years. They have guided me and made many opportunities available to me. First, I am immensely grateful to my supervisors, Dr Majid KhosraviNik, Dr Florian Zollmann for their unwavering guidance and patience from the beginning of this project to its completion. I would like to give a special thank you to Dr Majid for his continuous support and the fruitful and illuminating discussions and recommendations I had with him even before he becomes my official supervisor that helped the research to take shape and eventually come through. Also, I am very much indebted to Florian, who provided me with insightful feedback and encouraging comments throughout my journey. I also would like to thank my third supervisor Dr Peter Sercombe for his kind support and for giving me the learning opportunity to work with him as a teaching assistant in one of his modules.

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List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DHA	The Discourse-Historical Approach
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
USAS	Semantic Analysis System
CWs	Chemical Weapons
CL	Corpus Linguistics

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Iraq has gone through various wars and conflicts in the past few decades. These include the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the first Gulf War (1990-1991), the US-led invasion (2003), sectarian violence (2006- 2007) and recently, the conflict with ISIS (see Chapter 2 for context). The stance of the US and the degree of its involvement in these wars has varied from one war to another. For instance, in the Iraq-Iran war the US was tilted towards Iraq through lifting the restrictions imposed on Iraqi exports and providing intelligence information during the war. Although it did not supply arms to Iraq directly, it supported France in providing military equipment. On the other hand, it rejected all Iran's requests for providing it with the required military parts and equipment (El-Azhary, 2011, p. 95).

However, this stance had changed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, an action which was condemned unanimously by the UN. After a series of unsuccessful negotiations and Iraq's refusal to withdraw following a deadline set by the UN, a coalition force led by the US launched a massive attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait, liberating Kuwait. This anti-Iraq stance became even more dramatically obvious after the 9/11 attacks, when the US administration accused Iraq of having a link with al-Qaeda and of harbouring and training al-Qaeda members. This was in addition to the constructed Iraqi threat of WMD (Cox and Stokes, 2018). These claims formed the justification for the US-led invasion of Iraq.

Alongside this development of the US stance, Iraq's image in general and Saddam's image in particular in the media also changed during this long periods of wars. For instance, immediately after the Iraq-Iran war (1989), Iraq's army was described as "the fourth largest in the world", and as being "1 million-strong". Similarly, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam was represented as the "butcher of Baghdad", the "new Hitler", and as the "Monster Saddam". This demonised depiction of Saddam remained constant in the press even in the newspapers known for their criticisms of the attacks conducted by US in 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2003 (Keeble, 2004).

The overall aim of this study is to examine the discourses of the major American newspapers in terms of their coverage of the Iraq-Iran war and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq to determine

how the main themes: Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Shiites, the Iraqi people, Halabja gassing (see section 2.6) and the use of chemical weapons, are constructed in these two wars, and also to see whether there are any changes or development in the US press stance in reporting these themes, through tracing the historical changes in the US press coverage of these themes.

In light of this, the main guiding questions developed for my research are:

1. How are the main themes: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and Iraq's use of chemical weapons, discursively constructed during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988)?
2. How are the main themes: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and Iraq's use of chemical weapons, discursively constructed during the 2003 US-led invasion?
3. What are the main differences in the reporting of these two wars with regard to the coverage of the five themes: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and Iraq's use of chemical weapons?

Iraqi people comprise diverse religious and ethnic groups, such as Sunni, Shiites, Kurds, Yazidis, Christians, etc. (see section 2.2.). The rationale for creating a theme for Iraqi Shiites that is separate from Iraqi people or mentioning some of Iraqi population as Kurds and Sunnis in the analysis chapters is that this is how they were reported and categorized in the US press and by US politicians. Moreover, only some partitions of the Iraqi population were reported repeatedly and extensively in the US press and speeches made by US politicians, rather than others, during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. The reporting of partitions of the Iraqi population by the US press was to provide a context on the role of these ethnic and religious groups in the war. However, US press coverage of these groups is not always innocent and has ideological and political motives that reflect US political propaganda; for example, the victimisation of Iraqi Shiites and Kurds who were used as a pretext to invade Iraq in 2003. This will be detailed in the analysis chapters. Therefore, the data for the query words for the Iraqi Shiites and Iraqi people were collected in the two wars to see how they were talked about in different wars.

1.2 Objectives and rationale

One of the main news values is that of proximity and relevance. Those events that are most closely related culturally to the news gatherers become more meaningful than others (John, 1982, p. 77). He adds that events that take place in far-off countries are not considered

newsworthy unless they are relevant to the news collector's home culture or the news that are viewed as a threat to the home country. The wars in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan were seen by the media to be of popular interest because of the US involvement in those wars. However, it appears that only wars in which a sense is generated of their being 'our' wars, in which 'we' are involved or interested, are seen as being worthy of coverage by the mainstream media in the West, and 'their' wars as in the case of Iraq-Iran war, that happen in different parts of the world, do not matter very much. Therefore, one of the rationales of this study is to investigate how the Iraq-Iran war and 2003 US-led invasion, two conflicts in which both the US stance and the US involvement were different, are reported.

Another concern in this research is the way an unequal access to the news may give rise to power abuse and dominance. In times of war, "journalists are exposed to propaganda from all sides, most notably from organisations and institutions with a stake in the killing" (Richardson, 2007a, pp. 180-181). Thus, journalists become more "shaped and driven" by the propaganda. Richardson adds that "[p]owerful institutions, in this case governments, the military and the rest of the security state, want to use journalism to promote their version of the war to the world and hence shape the behaviour of the public in their favour". Therefore, another aim of this research is to show how these voices are distributed and whether the Iraqi themes in question are given a voice and access to the news discourse.

It was also thought that conducting this type of research could contribute to "discovering inconsistencies, self contradictions", inequalities and misuse of power in the media and to unearthing the practices that are employed to draw a representation of social actors (Wodak and Meyer, 2015).

Furthermore, another rationale for conducting this research is that it is hoped to contribute to the literature in understanding the media behaviour in times of war. Also, the contribution made by this research lies in its critical analysis of the construction of Saddam, the Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and Halabja in the major US press during the periods of these two conflicts, using a corpus-based critical discourse analysis. The amount of news corpus in the Iraq-Iran war is (7,937,701) million words and (9,223,117) million words in the US-led invasion. To the best of my knowledge, no research has so far been conducted either on the press and media texts for the two wars in general, or on the representation in these texts of these five themes in particular (see section 1.3). Therefore, this study could act as a springboard for further exploration by

future researchers. Furthermore, it is hoped that my investigation of the construction of these themes helps to provide a clearer picture of the practices of the US press and the news media in times of war and conflict.

1.3 Iraq wars in the media

Iraq wars have attracted scholars' attention across different disciplines e.g. politics, economy, history, and international relationship along with many other studies. However, since the focus of this research is media discourse, this section will only provide a survey of media studies on Iraq wars. Many treatments on the war reporting on Iraq examined newspapers' discourse (e.g. Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005; Dirks, 2006; Maslog *et al.*, 2006; Høyer, 2008; Steuter and Wills, 2009) have highlighted the over-reliance of the press on US official and military sources, the framing of information as well as the social actors constructions. Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) investigated the framing of the 2003 Iraq war in the elite Swedish and US newspapers: *Dagens Nyheter* and *The New York Times* respectively. Dirks (2006) examine the discourse of British and German quality press in regards to the US admin claims of Iraq's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Saddam's link to al Qaeda. Steuter and Wills (2009) examined the headlines of the Canadian newspapers on the way the enemy (Iraq and Afghanistan) constructed and demonised in the press. Robertson (2004) examined Scotland's two national broadsheets discourse for the overrepresentation of the government and military voice and the underrepresentation of the other's voice.

Many other treatments have examined the governmental language or those who are in power. e.g. Miller and Johnson (2009) have examined the congressional positioning on the war in Iraq, Paul Bayley and Bevitori (2009) examined the language used by the British government in the House of Commons in 2003 in relation to Iraq invasion. Rashidi and Souzandehfar (2010) examined the debates between republicans and democrats over the continuation of war in Iraq in 2008. Van Dijk (2005) examined the speeches by Prime Minister José María Aznar in the Spanish parliament in which he justified his support for the US to invade Iraq. Furthermore, Oddo (2011) examined four speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt and George W. Bush. that 'call-to-arms' two of which are related to Iraq; the first President Bush's State of the Union address – 20 September 2001 and the second is President Bush's Cincinnati address – 7 October 2002.

Other scholars (Clark, 2009; Lombardo, 2009; Riccio, 2009) have focused mainly on TV discourse through looking on the evaluation of the reporters'/writers' attitudes towards or

stances on the topic they talked about when reporting. Clark (2009), for instance, investigated the discourse of BBC and CBS reporters (Embedded Reporters (ERs) and War Zone Correspondents (WZs)) and on how they portrayed their voices. Lombardo (2009) analysed the stance and positioning of the Anchor on CBS and the News Presenter on BBC through comparing their discourse during a month of reporting.

Other scholars have investigated the use of visuals in the media and their role in framing the news (e.g. Griffin, 2004; Zelizer, 2004; Machin, 2007; Schwalbe *et al.*, 2008; Parry, 2011; Mhamdi, 2017). For instance, Parry (2011) investigated the role played by press photography in the UK newspapers during the invasion, particularly those photographs that had humanitarian implications. Griffin (2004) examined the photo coverage of the ‘War on Terrorism’ in two US magazines during the war in Afghanistan and during the invasion of Iraq. Machin (2007) conducted a multimodal and social actors analysis on photographs of the Iraq invasion that occurred in press in 2005–2006. Schwalbe *et al.* (2008) examined the way visuals framed in the early period of the US-led invasion.

Other scholars have adopted Herman and Chomsky (1988) propaganda module in their studies as (DiMaggio, 2009; Zollmann, 2017). Zollmann (2017) investigated US, UK and German elite news in cases that involved human rights violation in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2004), Libya (2011), Syria (2012) and Egypt (2013). Similarly, part of DiMaggio (2009) study was investigating the human rights violation in the U.S. media coverage in allied and enemy states taking Iraqi and Turkey Kurds as a case study.

Other accounts have examined the construction of Saddam, for instance, Lakoff (2003) how the war fought in terms of a metaphor, so Saddam was seen as “a nation in person” and the fight was seen as being against one person rather than against a group (Lakoff, 2003). Griffin and Lee (1995) also showed how the war was depicted as being between George Bush and Saddam Hussein. Many other studies have shown how Saddam was represented as the personification of evil (Dennis, 1991; Boyer, 1992; Katz, 1992; Taylor, 1992).

It could be clearly seen that although there have been abundant studies on reporting the Iraq wars, none of them have examined the major US press using such a large scale corpus of data, nor have Saddam, the Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and Halabja been examined diachronically during all the weeks of the war. The construction of these themes in the US press

has received little attention, especially the construction of Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and Halabja. Equally important, it is hoped that, by means of the comparison made between the reporting of the five themes (see Figure 1) in the major US press in two different wars - the first of these, the Iraq-Iran war, being one where the US was not directly involved, and the second being one in which the US was directly involved – this research will contribute to a deeper understanding of the major US press and its practices which is another research gap that have been overlooked in the previous studies.




Figure 1 The construction of themes in both wars

1.4 Why Iraq-Iran war (190-1988) vs 2003 US-led Invasion?

The main reasons for examining the US press discourse of the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 is because of the different treatments the US government made in relation to the themes in question in these two wars and to see if the US press is influenced by the US government stance in reporting these themes in the two wars. In regards to the US stance in the two wars, the Iraqi Shiites, along with the Iraqi people, were consistently referred to at Bush press conference on March 7, 2003, as being victimised and as suffering under Saddam’s regime, and this was one of the arguments on which the US administration called for an intervention. However, the fact that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi people died as a result of the Iraq-Iran war but they were not paid attention to. The Iraqi people only were portrayed as worthy victims who needed to be saved and liberated from Saddam in 2003 war build-up and

the US-led invasion. Furthermore, the gassing of Halabja and the use of the CWs between 1984- 1988 by Iraq forces against Iranian forces happened during the Iraq-Iran war. But the history of the uses of CWs , together with the Halabja gassing were brought to the surface by Bush and other US officials to help justify the war, on the grounds that the effect of the conflict would be to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

1.5 Thesis overview

The current chapter has shed some light on the motivation and rationale behind this research and the research questions have been presented. Some of the existing literature on the construction of Iraq in the US press during the two conflicts in question has also been discussed to indicate the need for research into the chosen topic and to identify the research gap. The second chapter presents the socio-political and historical context to the research subject. A brief sketch of the recent history of wars in and involving Iraq is provided, with particular attention being given to the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion, since these formed the background for the subject of the study. The insights obtained from the socio-political history not only help in expanding the discussion beyond a mere description of the discourse used; they also account for why such discourse was used and how it was produced (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 5) The socio-political history thus sets the scene for the linguistics analysis that is conducted in the subsequent chapters. Thus, Chapter Two provides a historical account of the main wars Iraq has been through: the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the US-led invasion of 2003. The ethnic groups and the role each of them played in the wars are also described in this chapter.

Chapter Three provides a theoretical account of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), including a brief discussion of its historical background and of the seminal figures involved in the field, together with an explanation of the main aims and principles of CDA. Also, the relationship between Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), the main framework for conducting this research, and CDA is discussed. This is followed by a description of the relationship between and the role of discourse in relation to other aspects that were important in conducting this study: for instance, ideology, and the notions of domination, representation and power. Finally, in the last sections of this chapter the concepts of the news values through which stereotypes are created and misrepresentations can occur in the process of including, excluding, foregrounding or backgrounding news, are discussed. The chapter also sheds some light on the

practices of war reporting in times of war and how they might be affected by the war in terms of restrictions on reporting, bias, journalists' relationships with soldiers etc.

In Chapter Four the methods of data collection and analysis and a detailed description of the methodological framework used for the study are presented. The chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section the theoretical framework of DHA, together with the methodological tools used to analyse the datasets, are discussed. The second section provides an overview of corpus linguistics and of the main related tools, followed by a discussion of the main methodologies used in combining CDA and CL. The third section focuses on the integration of CL into CDA in which I argue for the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and how integrating the two approaches can be useful in reducing the risk of subjectivity and a lack of generalisability. This is followed by a discussion of some of the limitations of corpus linguistics.

In the four subsequent chapters – Five, Six, Seven and Eight - the results of the detailed analyses of the data obtained from an exploration of the discursive construction of the main themes: Saddam, Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, Halabja and Iraq's use of chemical weapons, in the Iraq-Iran war and the 2003 US-led invasion, in the major US newspapers are presented. Chapter Five shows how these five themes were constructed during the Iraq-Iran war. In Chapters Six, Seven and Eight this is compared with the way in which the same themes were constructed during the US-led invasion. The reason why the US-led invasion war has three chapters covering the five themes is that this period has more corpus data, coverage and consequently more analysis themes and sub- themes when compared with their counterparts in the Iraq-Iran war. Finally, in Chapter Nine, I present a summary of my findings, limitations, contributions, and indicate opportunities for future research.

Chapter 2: IRAQ'S SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY

2.1 Introduction

In order to analyse and understand the construction of the five themes in question: Saddam, Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja, CWs in Iraq, the diachronic and synchronic axis of the social context should be taken into account (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 9). The wider socio-political and historical context, one of the context's four dimensions in the main DHA framework this study informed by, is therefore provided. The aim of which is to understand how meaning is (re)produced and to "attempt to establish how (micro) linguistic mechanisms at the textual analysis feed into (or fit into) a prejudiced macro-structure while explicating the effects of the control over the topics" (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 61-62).

Therefore, this chapter highlights the political history of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990) and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as providing background information on some of the Iraqi ethnic and religious groups. Similarly, some historical accounts on the social groups/ events involved in this research as Halabja and Iraqi Shiites are also provided. Iraq: ethnic and religious groups

2.2 Iraq: ethnic and religious groups

The vast majority of Iraqis are Arabs, who constitute between 75 and 80 per cent of the population. They are followed by the Kurds, who make up 15 and 20 per cent of the total population. Turkomans, Assyrians and other ethnic groups represent the remaining 5 per cent. The vast majority of Iraqis speak Arabic, while Kurds speak Kurdish. Although some Kurds speak Arabic, language is still a barrier for many (Hunt, 2005, p. 5). The Kurds speak an Indo-European language which is similar to Persian (Marr, 2012, p. 16). Even within the Kurdish area there are two main dialects: Sorani and Kurmanji, and there are significant cultural and political divisions between the speakers of each dialect (Hunt, 2005, p. 7).

Furthermore, to speak of an Iraqi identity is to speak about religious sects: Arab Shiite Muslims, Arab Sunni Muslims and Christians. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims. These religious sects play a crucial role in Iraqi society that should not be underestimated (Hunt, 2005, p. 5). These divisions have led to some internal sectarian conflicts, particularly after the 2003

invasion; for example, in the 2006 there was a sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites in some areas of Iraq, the ISIS terrorist group also used the Sunni- Shiites division in some parts of Iraq to seize three major cities (2014- 2018) and lastly, the skirmishes over Kirkuk in 2017 between the Iraqi central government forces with Kurdistan, the autonomous region in the north of Iraq.




Figure 2 Iraqi Ethnoreligious Groups (from Marsh, 2015)

The Shiite¹-Sunni² dispute has been 1,400 years in the making. Technically the religious/historical is over who should succeed the Prophet Mohammed, who died in 632 AD, and over whether to bestow the leadership on one of the prophet companions who is ‘qualified and pious’, or on a successor through the Prophet’s bloodline (Blanchard, 2009, p. 1). Shiites hold the view that only descendants of the Prophet can hold the caliphate, and therefore they took the side of the fourth Caliph, Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, arguing that the leadership should have been awarded to him because he is the descendant and heir of the Prophet. Sunnis, on the other hand, hold that a Caliph should be elected (Vanhala, 2011, p. 234; Marr, 2012, p. 14). The Shiites also hold that Ali was named as the Prophet’s successor by the Prophet Mohammed

¹ The word Shia comes from ‘Shi’at Ali’ which means ‘helpers of Ali’ or ‘Supporters’ (Vanhala, 2011, p. 234), or “the partisans of Ali” (Salmoni *et al.*, 2010, p. 285).

² The other branch of Islam, whose followers accepted the caliphate’s legitimacy while objecting to political succession in line with the Prophet’s lineage. Over time, this was referred to as “Sunni,” which is defined as “followers of [the Prophet’s] customs [sunna]” (Blanchard, 2009, p. 1).

himself. The Shiites' doctrinal belief is that Ali is the legitimate Caliph, and this was verified by the Prophet Hadith, who is called Hadith of the pond of Khumm after the place (Ghadir Khumm) where the prophet gave the power to Ali (Guidère, 2017, p. 230)

The Muslim community leaders named Abu Bakr as the first Caliph to be the successor of the Prophet. This decision had led to uneasiness for the followers of Ali. They did not accept this decision since they believed that the claims of Caliph Abu Bakr, and Umar and Uthman, the two subsequent Caliphs, were illegitimate. Ali succeeded the third Caliph Uthman, who was assassinated in 656 AD. Imam Ali was also murdered in 661 AD, as were Hassan (his son), who was killed in 670 AD and his other son Hussein, who was killed in an uneven battle with the Sunni Caliph in 680 AD (Blanchard, 2009, p. 2). Hussein's death and the day he was killed are still nowadays commemorated by the Shiites.

Shiites make up approximately 10-15% of Muslims in the world (Lane and Redissi, 2016, p. 181). Large populations of Shiite Muslims live in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan (Marshall, 2013, p. 77). Moreover, large numbers of Shiite groups reside in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Syria. Sunni Muslims, on the other hand, comprise the majority of Muslims worldwide (Malbouisson, 2007, p. 11). Although Arab Sunnis are the minority in Iraq, they have been politically dominant and powerful. Their power is derived from the time of the Ottoman Empire, when the Ottomans supported the Sunnis, who have since retained this power (Marr, 2012, pp. 15- 6). Geographically, Arab Sunnis are mainly concentrated in northern Iraq; in addition to the tribes and villages located on the western steppe, they also occupy the towns and cities of the central and Northern provinces. They also live in some cities in Basra in the south of Iraq (Marr, 2012, pp. 15- 6). The Shiites, on the other hand, who constitute the majority of the population of the country (60-65%), live mainly in the south of Iraq.




Figure 3 Sunni and Shiite Muslim Populations (taken from Durden (2016))

The Kurds’ true origin remains the subject of a historical dispute. McDowall (2004, p. 8) says that it is believed that they moved across Iran, being descended from the waves of Indo-European tribes, possibly around the middle of the second millennium BCE. Marr (2012, p. 16) states that most Kurdish scholars believe that they are descended from the ancient Medes³. However, he adds that their origins remain in dispute, as there is no written Kurdish literature until the tenth century. Kurds are Sunni Muslims. More importantly, they have developed a sense of a national identity based on language, shared history, tribal ties and costumes, which have inspired many Kurdish nationalist movements. They live in the north of Iraq and have always sought separation and independence from Iraq (Marr, 2012, p. 16). The last attempt to achieve this aim was the independence referendum held on 25 September 2017, which was rejected by the federal government of Iraq.

³ Medes and Media resided in the Iranian mountains and the East and the North of Mesopotamia. These people were of Indo-Iranian descent, with a close relation to Persia. More prominence is given to Medes in Assyrian writing (Skolnik and Berenbaum, 2007, p. 717).

In addition to the three major groups, there are many other smaller religious and ethnic groups. The Turkmans, who make up to 3 per cent of the total population, are a Turkish-speaking minority who inhabited the towns and cities in northern Iraq along the old trade route through the foothills that link Anatolia to Zagros and Baghdad. They are more concentrated in Erbil and Kirkuk and they are mainly Sunni Muslims. They are believed to be the remnants of the Turkish tribes from the era of Seljuk and the Turkman tribal dynasties (Marr, 2012, p. 17).

Other non-Muslim minorities constitute 6 per cent of the population. The largest group are Jews, whose origin can be traced to the Babylonian captivity in the sixth century. The Jews lived mainly in Baghdad and they were able and prosperous. However, this situation did not continue and everything changed with the establishment of Israel in 1948. Their exodus to Israel meant that by 1951 only a few of them were left in Iraq, and they later disappeared (Marr, 2012, p. 19; Marr, 2017). Similarly, the number of Christians, who composed 3 per cent of the total, diminished after 2005. The Yazidis live near Mosul and they are “racially and linguistically Kurdish”. Their religious practice is a form of Zoroastrianism. The other group, called Sabians or Mandeans, are, according to (Marr, 2017, p. 19), “a sect of ancient origin and diverse elements” who live in the south of Iraq. Their “faith stresses baptism and contains elements of Manicheanism”.

2.3 The Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988)

The Iraq-Iran relationship has been marked by periods of alliance, rivalry and friction, which ended with a devastating war that broke out in 1980 and ended in 1988 (Bakhash, 2004, p. 11). This rivalry, for some historians, can be traced back to the rivalry in the pre-Islamic period between the Babylonian Empire and the Achaemenids, to the destruction of the Sassanid Empire by Arab Muslims and to the competition and dispute between the Turkish Ottoman empire and the Persian empire over boundaries and interference in each other’s affairs, when Iraq become a battlefield for their war (Karsh, 2009, p. 5). Although the above are one possible reason for the rivalry between the two countries, to comprehend the reason this war broke out, it is essential to explain the proximate motifs: i.e., the ideological and political situation, as well as the nature of the leadership in these two countries at the time. The two countries had fought on many fronts before they really met on the battlefield.

The Iraq-Iran war resulted from the power vacuum Britain caused when it announced its withdrawal from the 'Persian Gulf' in the late 1960s. Britain had exercised hegemony over the strategic Gulf location for a long period, as it feared that hostile forces might take over the Gulf and invade India. This control, according to Pelletiere (1992), led the Shah of Iran to assume that he should take over policing the Gulf area from the UK. The fact that the Shah had made his hatred of the Arab nationalist regimes public and explicit was perceived as a threat by the neighbouring countries, including Iraq, and thus interfered with the relationship between Iran and those countries.

From 1968 onwards, the Shah worked on establishing undisputed hegemony over the Gulf region, and in 1969 he unilaterally abrogated the treaty between Iraq and Iran concerning the Shatt al Arab River that Britain had brokered. This treaty gave Iraq exclusive control of the waterway (Pelletiere, 1992; Hauss, 2009, p. 411). The Shah claimed half of the waterway's main channel when he abrogated the treaty. Iraq reacted by expelling some Iranians from Iraq and also giving aid to Iranian opposition (Hauss, 2009, p. 418).

The tension between the two countries continued to build. In 1970, the Shah sponsored a coup against the Ba'athists, but it was foiled (Hiro, 2003, p. 5). Consequently, a large number of Iranian expatriates residing in the Shiite-dominated areas were expelled. In 1971, three islands that were on dispute between UAE and Iran were claimed by the Shah; although the Shah's move was not directly aimed at the Ba'athists, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran (Hauss, 2009, p. 418)

Much more threatening to Iraq was Iran's continuous support for the Iraqi Kurds' uprisings, and this became a source of tension that led to a series of skirmishes on the border. By 1975, while the Shah's forces were helping the Kurdish rebels on the borders, either indirectly or by providing direct assistance to keep them going, clashes had begun to take place between them and the Iraqi forces (Pelletiere, 1992, p. 8). In 1975, a truce was declared at Algiers, stipulating that the Shah should close his border to the Kurds and that Saddam must agree to have only a portion of the waterway of Shatt al Arab and abandon his claim of sovereignty over the entire river (Stockman-Shomron, 1984, p. 87). However, this truce did not last, since the Ba'athists felt that they had been forced to agree to it by the Shah, the CIA and the Israelis, and that they had complete rights over the Shatt al Arab, leading them to reclaim it and reopen the matter after rebuilding their strength (Pelletiere, 1992, p. 8).

By 1979, relations between the two countries had taken a turn for the worse, with the Shah being overthrown and a new Islamic Republic being established. The accession to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini after the fall of the Shah triggered a return to the cold war between Iraq and Iran. The Islamic revolution was represented as an ideological challenge to the *status quo* in the region, as it introduced “a new ideological factor, pitting a radical, universalist, pan-Islamic, religious regime in Iran against a secular, socialist, nationalist regime in Iraq” (Jassim, 1984, p. 178). The fact that, in 1978, the Ba’athists expelled Khomeini from Iraq, the country where he had lived for 14 years with the Shah’s agreement, complicated the matter still further. It created a personal antipathy against the government in Iraq on the part of Khomeini. Khomeini’s opposition to the status quo and his call for a restructuring of the pan-Islamic regime under his political as well as spiritual leadership were seen as a threat to Iraq. This ideological vision was articulated by Khomeini in a speech given in 1980 (Jassim, 1984, pp. 178-80), in which he declared that “we will export our revolution⁴ to the four corners of the world” (ibid.).

Although Iraqi suspicions had continued after they had begun to fear the Shah’s long-term objectives in the Gulf, the advent of Khomeini to power caused more uneasiness and uncertainty in Iraq, particularly after the series of turmoils in Iran. The incompatible ideologies of the two regimes led to a confrontational discourse. (Jassim, 1984, pp. 182-83). The confrontational discourse continued to engulf the two countries as a result of the ideological clash, and relations between them deteriorated as a result of the mutual accusations. Iraq accused Iran of reviving and supporting the Kurds’ rebellion in Iraq by providing them with weapons and a radio station that transmitted anti-Saddam and anti-Ba’athist propaganda, as well as supporting the Shi’i al-Da’awa opposition in Iraq, in an attempt to increase the pressure on the Iraqi government. Iran also accused Iraq of changing the names of historical and geographical cities in Iran such as Khurramshahr, which is called Mohammarah by Iraq, and Ahvaz, which Iraqis call al-Ahwaz, and Khusestan Khistan, which the Iraqis call Arabistan. Furthermore, Iran accused Iraq of giving asylum to the pro-Shah forces (Jassim, 1984, p. 188).

⁴ Ramazani’s (1985) states that the Islamic Revolution export represents far more than a calling card of revolution. Rather, it is fundamental foundation of Iran’s foreign policy. The conception of an “Islamic world order” is rooted in the ideal of a world order within the Imami or Twelvers’ Shiite cultural tradition as interpreted by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. From his perspective, the existing world order is imperfect, but it will be perfected on the appearance of the Twelfth Imam, variously called Messiah (Mahdi), or “master of the Age” (sahib-I zaman). The messiah will create justice and equality in the world” (p.5). Khomeini’s ideology had an impact on the Shiites in the Gulf; however, he wanted it to be ‘universalist’ by calling all oppressed Muslims to rise against all forms of injustice and the domination of the superpowers (Marschall, 2003, p. 26; Hinnebusch, 2003, p. 194).

The tension escalated even further when a failed attempt to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, on April 1980, took place on the Mustansirriyyah university campus, causing the deaths of two students. The assailants were said to be Iraqis of Iranian origin and the victims' funeral procession was attacked as it passed an Iranian school in Baghdad (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 26). These incidents marked a critical turning point in the Iraq-Iran relationship. Seven thousand Iranians of Iraqi and Iranian descent were expelled from Iraq (Pelletiere, 1992). Thousands of Shiites in Karbala, Thawra town in Baghdad and Najaf were arrested. The death penalty was the fate of the members of the Al-Da'wa party and expulsion from Iraq for anyone who had connections with Iran, even if these were remote (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 27). Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, a famous Iraqi Shiite scholar and theologian who was said to have links with Iran, and his sister were also executed by the Iraqi government, which caused more tension when Iran declared three days of mourning in Iran. The confrontational discourse continued until war broke out when Iraq launched an all-out invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. The war lasted for eight years and ended in 1988.

2.4 US Involvement in the Iraq-Iran War

In the early months of 1982, the advances of the Iranian military on the battlefield caused the United States some disquiet. Consequently, as a way of supporting Iraq, Iraq was deleted from the register of nations condoning and funding terrorist activity, without holding any discussion with Congress, on the basis that Iraq had withdrawn its support for terrorists (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 193; Tarock, 1998, p. 83; Willett, 2004, p. 34). However, the real reason for the shift toward Iraq was not made explicit. The fear of an Iranian victory and of Iran carrying the war into Iraq, according to Tarock (1998, p. 83), was overtly expressed in the US officials statements as that US was ready to

[I]ntervene militarily in the Iraq-Iran war to prevent an Iranian victory... we do not want to see the government in Baghdad destabilized. We want to see a stable and internally secure Iraq. We see it as the first line of defense against Iranian expansionism, whether Shiite expansionism or Iranian imperialism.

The US administration worked on maintaining the *status quo* in the region through the neutrality policy, claiming that a "victory by either side is neither militarily achievable nor strategically desirable" (Hurst, 2009, p. 37).

The US-Iraq relationship had developed with the increase in trade between the two countries, with Iraq purchasing American technology, transport planes and helicopters that could be used

for the defence effort (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 193). In a statement in 1995 (cited in Joyner, 2016, p. 16), Howard Teicher, former director of Political Military Affairs for National Security, stated:

[T]he United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required. The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat (Joyner, 2016, p. 16).

In 1984, Iraq also received intelligence information on Iranian military activities from the United States, which was very effective in changing the course of action on the battlefield, and responded successfully to predicted Iranian moves and attacks. This is exemplified by the Iranian defeat across the Howeiz marshes in 1985. However, Iraq failed to tackle the Iranian onslaughts in 1986 and 1987, and blamed the US for ‘misleading’ Iraq on these occasions (Chubin and Tripp, 1988, p. 194).

On January 12, 1987, a detailed report published by *The New York Times* (cited in Fayazmanesh, 2008, p. 45) on the information and misinformation which were delivered to Iraq and Iran stated that these nations were in receipt of incorrect or manipulated information from US intelligence agencies with a view to progressing the objectives of the Reagan government in the region. Furthermore, this data was imparted to prevent victory for either Iran or Iraq, some of which was doctored in order to mislead.

2.5 The Iraq-Iran war and the Iraqi Shi’ites

Although Shiites make up the majority (about 60%- 65%) of the Iraqi population, they are ruled by the “Sunni and clan-oriented minority” (Cordesman, 1994, p. 141). This religious group has for a long time been seen as being marginalised: for instance, under the Ottomans, who feared the Shiites’ links to the Persians, and under the British, who favoured the Sunnis and wanted someone who is loyal to King Faisal. A similar approach was adopted by Saddam when the Shiites started to form political groups who opposed the Ba’ath party, some of whom were known to have links to Iran (Holden, 2012, p. 353).

Iraqi Shiites caused the Iraqi regime the most anxiety during the Islamic revolution in Iran, when Iran openly announced its intention to export its revolution to Iraq. There was already unrest among the Shiites, and this announcement, along with the calls for the Iraqi Shiites to

revolt and overthrow Saddam, stirred up the situation. These public expressions of intent finally materialised in the failed assassination attempt on Tariq Aziz. This attempt was one of Saddam's major justifications for attacking Iran (Marr, 2012, p. 181). As a result, a major deportation of Iraqis of Iranian origin started in 1980, and continued after Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr was executed. These actions by the Ba'ath regime muted the Shiite opposition, who began working mainly in Iran. The total number of deported people had reached 200,000 by the end of the war. This large group of alienated Iraqis formed "an ideal resource to be organised by the Iranians and the exiled leadership of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition" (Marr, 2012, p. 196).

The loyalty of the Shiites was tested during the Iraq-Iran war by whether they revolted against the regime and supported Iran or went the opposite way. They fought the war in a similar way to the Sunnis against Iran, and no massive defections were reported on the frontline (Marr, 2012, p. 195). Despite the heavy Iranian propaganda directed at them, urging them to rise up against Saddam, they made up the majority of the Iraqi troops and fought loyally. Some of the Shiites viewed Saddam as less of a threat besides they benefited from the government's aids, while others were put off by the superior security services operating in Iraq (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 99). On the other hand, Shiite families, such as the family of the Hakim, who opposed the Iraqi regime and who were based in Iran, supported Iran, obtaining training, military equipment and funds, as well as using the Iranian facilities in Iran (Cordesman, 1994, p. 141).

Also, Cordesman and Hashim (1997, p. 99) argue that:

Iraq Shi'ites could hardly fail to notice the Islamic republic's failures: political upheavals, large-scale executions, failure to implement socioeconomic programs, and international isolation. Above all, Iran's fanatical insistence on continuing the war after 1982 alienated Iraqi Shi'ites who saw Iran prolonging an irrational war that was killing Iraqi Shi'ite soldiers and was devastating the south with its artillery

Also, by employing the discourse of Arabism, Islamism and Iraqi patriotism, Saddam succeeded in cultivating the majority of Iraqi Arabs, the majority of whom were Shiites, and also the majority of the non-Arabs, the Kurdish population. The way Saddam dealt with the Shiites in the Iraq-Iran war was described as a carrot and stick policy. On the plus side, he involved the Shiites in government by giving them political positions. However, they were not integrated or put in sensitive positions where important decisions were made. This limited political integration was accompanied by funding projects in the south, for facilities such as housing, hospitals, water and sewage projects, and even included the improvement and

embellishment of the mosques. Shiites were allowed to engage in religious practices such as celebrating the birthday of Imam Ali, which was made a national holiday. However, Shiite opposition or any other anti-regime group or movement still faced persecution (Marr, 2012, p. 195).

2.6 Halabja Genocide

Halabja is located in the northern Iraqi region of Kurdistan about ten miles from the Iranian border. The total population was 40,000 in 1988; however, this number was increased by the influx of 20,000 displaced Kurds from neighbouring villages fleeing the war (Kelly, 2008, p. 33). The region has been controlled by the Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) for almost thirty years, along with some active parties: e.g., socialists, communists and others. In addition to these, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani and the pro-Iranian Islamic Movement Party both had local strength in the area (Watch, 1993, pp. 102-103). In 1987, Halabja was targeted by the Iraqi government, which bulldozed parts of the town in response to its support of the Peshmerga. The strategic importance of Halabja lies in its location, which is about seven miles east of the Darbandikhan Dam, which controls the water supply for the Iraqi capital, Baghdad (Marr, 2012, p. 199; Yildiz, 2007, pp. 27- 28). By seizing Halabja, the Iranians were attempting to put pressure on the Iraqi government by gaining control of the two largest hydroelectric dams that supplied Iraq with a significant proportion of its electricity (Razoux, 2015, p. 437).

During the Iraq-Iran war, Iranian troops made secret reconnaissance visits to Halabja. In early March, Iraqi intelligence reported that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Peshmerga had begun to assemble near Halabja in a build-up for a full-scale attack, with Iranian forces shelling the town of Sayed Sadeq. On March 13, Iran officially announced the launch of a new joint offensive with the PUK, Peshmerga and Pasdaran (Watch, 1993, p. 103). The next day, a second attack was also coordinated, and Iran claimed that it had seized twelve miles of Sulaymaniyah. On March 16, Iran announced that its forces had advanced to the Darbandikhan Lake, and now controlled 800 square km of land inside Iraq as well as seizing Halabja. During the three days of the offensive, Halabja had been shelled heavily from the hills by the Iranian forces leading the Iraqi military to pull back from their posts, which fell one after another.

In the early morning of March 16, 1988, the Iraqi counterattack began, first with conventional air strikes and artillery shelling. Trying to protect themselves, most families in Halabja built

shelters close to their homes. Some went into the government shelters (Razoux, 2015, pp. 438-9). The attack involved the use of napalm and phosphorus, which caused huge walls of fire in the some parts of the city. Soon, a lethal cocktail of chemicals had spread over the city. This was followed by continuous shelling for several hours. Some of the people made it to the Iranian border. Others who had been directly exposed to the gas either died or suffered from the symptoms (Watch, 1993, pp. 102-103). The massacre's toll is estimated at between 3,000 and 5,000 dead and about 10,000 wounded (Razoux, 2015, pp. 438-9).

Iraq claimed that it was the Iranian forces which had launched the chemical attack on Halabja, and not the Iraqi forces under General Ali al-Majid, who later became known as Chemical Ali for gassing Halabja. It was reported that Iraqi forces were dispatched to Halabja to remove the any evidence that Iraq from the area as unexploded projectiles. However, a British columnist, Christopher Hitchens, found evidence that the attack was indeed carried out by Iraqi forces and took a picture of himself sitting next to in the basement of a destroyed house alongside unexploded bombs emblazoned with the markings of the Iraqi air force (Kelly, 2008, p. 36)

2.7 Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

Iraq emerged after the war against Iran exhausted by the loss of human lives and materials, and found itself burdened with heavy debts to the neighbouring Gulf countries, particularly to Kuwait, to an estimated value of \$80 billion (Al-Ebraheem, 1991, p. 96; Paiaman and Moghadasi, 2009, p. 5). The impact of this disastrous war on Iraq had been to turn it from a country that possessed over \$30 billion in foreign exchange reserves in 1980 to a country about \$100 billion in debt, as well as needing to recover from the destruction caused by the war to the nation's infrastructure, the cost of which was estimated as being twice this amount (Finlan, 2003, p. 1).

For Iraq to sell its oil at desirable prices was the only way it could offset the social and economic consequences of that war. The recovery of Iraq's economy was seen to be totally dependent on its being able to sell its oil at high prices on the international market; however, a surplus of oil globally had depressed the prices, which had aggravated Iraq's economic situation. The OPEC policy of continuing to sell oil despite the overproduction had dashed Iraq's hopes of being able to set higher prices. Kuwait and the UAE, whose production capacity was higher than their export quotas, wanted to maintain the existing prices, whereas Iraq was trying to press for a

higher price. Consequently, Iraq lobbied the Gulf States in the early 1990s to push oil prices up from \$18 to \$20 per barrel, as well as to reduce their oil production (Hassan, 1999, p. 21). In 1991, the financial crisis had reached a breaking point and all Saddam's requests to the Gulf States had been ignored (Finlan, 2003, p. 3).

Iraq directed a series of accusations at the Kuwaiti government, accusing it of stealing oil from Iraq near the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border through slant drilling; the value of the stolen oil was estimated at over \$2 billion, which Iraq said should be paid immediately. Secondly, Iraq accused Kuwait of taking Iraqi territory while Iraq was distracted in the war with Iran (Finlan, 2003, p. 10). The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait included Iraq's claims that Kuwait was an Iraqi possession since it used to be part of Basra under the Ottoman Empire (Stork and Lesch, 1990). The third accusation was that Kuwait had overproduced oil, which had caused Iraq to lose \$4 billion in oil revenue. The Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, said, "We started to realize realise that there was a conspiracy against Iraq, a deliberate conspiracy against Iraq by Kuwait, organised and devised by the United States". He added, "Each dollar less in price means [a loss of] one billion [dollars] in revenue in a year for us. If you do not intend to wage a war against Iraq, please stop it" (Frontline, 1997).

The language of the Iraqi leadership became increasingly inflammatory in the summer of 1990 in a series of speeches delivered by Saddam Hussein. In these speeches, although Kuwait was the main object of the conflict, references to Kuwait actually only appeared a few times – in the speeches Saddam gave on February 24, April 1, May 28 and July 17 in 1990 – as part of Iraq's preparations for the invasion of Kuwait. The rest of the time, the focus was on expressing anger and frustration with the *status quo* and using an anti-United States and anti-Israel discourse through the use of religious themes (Hassan, 1999, p. 24).

By the same token, the speeches of Iraqi officials and statements were centered around the main subject matter of the conflict: Kuwait. The United States appeared 216 times in speeches, either alone or along with references to Zionism and Israel, whereas Kuwait only appeared 26 times, and in two of these occurrences it was referred to as the nineteenth province of Iraq (Hassan, 1999, p. 24). Saddam's territorial claims on Kuwait (the claim that Kuwait is part of Iraq) were not present until a few days before the invasion. After that the rulers of Kuwait were perceived by Saddam to be a threat to Iraqi security and to the national interests of the entire Arab region (Hassan, 1999, p. 24).

On the 22nd anniversary of the Ba'ath Party coming into power, Saddam accused the 'Gulf rulers' of arranging, along with the US, to overproduce the oil to keep the oil prices low. He said (quoted in Springborg, 1990, p. 222), "if words fail to protect Iraqis something effective must be done to return things to their natural course and return usurped rights to their owners". Tariq Aziz sent a letter the next day to the Arab league, accusing both Kuwait and the UAE of executing an external agenda for the 'imperialist-Zionist plan'. One week later, 30,000 Iraqi troops were moved to the Kuwaiti border (Springborg, 1990, p. 222).

The Kuwaiti administration had until then considered all the military build-up, manoeuvres and political diplomatic efforts as not serious and as being merely an attempt by Saddam to improve his negotiation position. The Arab League in return sent Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's president, to mediate between the two countries and try to find a solution to the imminent crisis. When Hosni visited Saddam, the latter left him with the impression that he would not invade Kuwait and that he was willing to engage in more face-to-face negotiations (Finlan, 2003, p. 12).

The diplomatic efforts came to an end in Jeddah on July 31, when Iraq requested \$10 billion for the loss of the oil from the Rumaila oilfield. With the failure to fulfil this demand, Iraqi forces were given the green light by Saddam to attack Kuwait on August 2, 1990. (Frontline, 1997).

2.8 First Gulf War

Iraq invasion of Kuwait have received a world- wide condemnations and have resulted the UN Security council to impose economic sanctions against Iraq (Scannell-Desch and Doherty, 2012, p. 15) started on August 6, 1990 four days after the invasion and remained in action until the 2003 US-led invasion. The Gulf war was a reaction to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The first objective of this war was to defend Saudi Arabia and its oil fields amid fear of a possible attack from Iraq (Tucker, 2010, p. 598).

Bush called Saddam Hussein for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Saddam's response was he announced in the second day for the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq (Cipkowski, 1992, p. 72). Within days, an international coalition was formed according to the United Nations Security Council. The United States began to build military alliances gradually in the Gulf. On August 7, in a televised address, Bush announced the deployment of airborne division to Saudi Arabia. The collation build- up was called the Operation Desert Shield which was the largest deployment of the US troops overseas since the Gulf War (Cipkowski, 1992, p.

72) whereas the actual war launched to liberate Kuwait called the Operation Desert Storm (Scannell-Desch and Doherty, 2012, p. 15). Foreign forces started arriving in the Gulf and some Arab countries participated in it. Egypt was the first Arab country to commit troops to join the US and Saudi forces, and then several countries followed suit (Cipkowski, 1992, p. 73).

UN Security Council had issued a number of resolution in regards to Iraq invasion. The most momentous one of which was Resolution 678, issued on November 29, 1990 according to which Iraq was given until 15 January 1991 as deadline to withdraw from Kuwait and according to this Resolution if Iraq failed to comply the use of force is authorised to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660" (Riley, 2010, p. 198).

With Saddam refusal to withdraw and having the Resolution 678 set, the next day the coalition forces launched the Operation Desert Storm with a campaign of a large scale aerial bombing with the aim of degrading the Iraqi defence system i.e. air force, radars, air defence (Riley, 2010, p. 204) which was the priority and then attacking the Iraqi command and communication system. In response to the coalition attack, Iraq had launched 40 missile against Israel and 48 against Saudi Arabia hours after the aerial campaign (Tucker, 2010, p. 1085). The aerial campaign was followed by the ground campaign consisted of four thrust that succeeded to liberate Kuwait and cause a big damage for the Iraqi army.

2.9 The Shiite Uprising after the Gulf War 1991

There are several factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Shiite uprising (*Intifada*). The first of these was the vacuum that had been created in the south following the Iraqi military defeat in the Desert Storm; everything there was in disarray: the transportation networks had been destroyed by coalition force strikes, the Iraq-Iran border was unguarded and there were no military services, all of which motivated the rebels to revolt. The second was the fact that the tacit 'social contract' between the authoritarian Iraqi system and the populace was accepted by the latter on the basis that the former provided economic development and other services. However, the Iraqis had suffered in the two wars Iraq had gone through, with many people being killed, and also from the fact that the bankrupt Iraqi government was unable to meet the population's needs. Third, the Shiites' deep-seated sense of grievance at being marginalised and excluded, as well as their misrepresentation in the government compared with their Sunni compatriots, was another factor contributing to the uprisings (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p.

100). Finally, the repeated calls of the Americans to overthrow Saddam made the rebels believe they would receive assistance from the US (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001).

The first sign of the *Intifada* occurred in Zubair and Abu'l Khasib, two Sunni towns located in the south of Basra about 60-70 kilometers, three days before the formal Iraqi surrender at Safwan. It then spread to other cities in the south: Basra, Nasiriyya, Najaf, Karbala, Amara, Hila and Kut, as well as to some cities in the north of Iraq (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 228; Cordesman and Hashim, 1997; Marr, 2012). Following the revolt of the two Sunni towns, the angry retreating military personnel took up arms, followed by the equally angry civilians. In the words of an armoured vehicle driver, "the Iraqi army cannot bear the responsibility of the defeat because it did not fight. Saddam is responsible" (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 107). The situation was similarly described by an officer as follows:

We were anxious to withdraw, to end the mad adventure, when Saddam announced withdrawal within 24 hours - though without any formal agreement with the allies to ensure the safety of the retreating forces. We understood that he wanted the allies to wipe us out: he had already withdrawn the Republican Guard to safety. We had to desert our tank and vehicles to avoid aerial attacks. We walked 100 kilometres towards the Iraqi territories; hungry, thirsty and exhausted. In Zubair we decided put an end to Saddam and his regime. We shot at his posters. Hundreds of retreating soldiers came to the city and joined the revolt: by the afternoon, there were thousands of us. Civilians supported us and demonstrations started. We attacked the party building and the security service headquarters. Within a few hours, the uprising spread to Basra, at exactly three o'clock on the morning of the first of March (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 107)

The general picture of the revolt was masses of people gathering in the streets and denouncing Saddam and the Ba'ath party, marching to seize the main governmental buildings and institutions such as the mayor's office, Ba'ath party headquarters and prisons, as well as pulling down and shooting posters of Saddam. The Basra uprising triggered the Iraqi uprising in many cities in Iraq. However, this revolt was spontaneous and it lacked an integrated organisation, a well forged leadership or any programme, and no plan was drawn up to move on the capital, Baghdad (al-Jabbar, 1994). The rebels benefited from the presence of the coalition forces in the south which prevented the Iraqi forces from acting, and a coalition statement made it clear that the use of any aircraft or chemical weapons would not be tolerated. Furthermore, elements of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic revolution (SAIRE), who were Iraqi Shiites in origin, were allowed to infiltrate Iraq by Iran to support the rebels.

However, this revolt was an explosion of rage and anger by a devastated people and soldiers, characterised by "an orgy of looting and destruction" with no organisation from the protestors

(Cordesman and Hashim 1997, 101). Thus, it did not make it to the end, and failed to take root and spread all over Iraq and overthrow Saddam. The uprising acquired an ideological nature when it continued and became more organised as it was led by religious Shiite leaders, opposition parties and infiltrators from Iran. Many of whom raised the green banner of Islam (that represents Shiites), carrying with them portraits of Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim, and Ayatollah Khomeini (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 103; Marr, 2012, p. 229). Those who carried such portraits actually contributed to the failure of the *Intifada*, and by focusing on Najaf and Karbala narrowed the scope of the uprising, which in reality included elements of the Sunni military and even Ba'athists (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 112).

The slogans raised in the uprising in the south caused much concern. One Shiite dissident related the story of his Sunni relations seeking refuge in his home in fear of the possibility of random revenge attacks following the uprising. These fears were commonplace and were undoubtedly a factor in Saddam's consolidation of power, particularly in cities that were predominately Sunni (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 112)

Other slogans that were bandied by the rebels in Basra included "Maku wali ilia 'Ali" and "La hakim ilia Ja'fari", which mean "There is no authority except 'Ali" and "No ruler other than Ja'fari (Shi'i)" (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001, p. 193). These slogans gave rise to fears of sectarianism and interference by Iran, as well as giving the revolt a narrow ideological slant of being a purely Shiite revolt, which worried the coalition as well as Saudi Arabia, which was an ally of the United States (Marr, 2012, p. 229).

The vacuum left by the military proved to be temporary and the rebels paid the price. The Iraqi military along with the Republican Guards fought back with the use of helicopter gunships in the cities. Lacking political organisation and coordination the towns the rebels had taken fell one by one and they were all silenced. In March 1991 the Iraqi government announced that the rebellion was over (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997, p. 103)

Other factors which caused the failure of the revolt was the way both the Arab and Western media portrayed the Shiites and some of the inflammatory statements the Shiites themselves made. Also, the mass execution of Ba'athists in the north and south of the country sent a message to those in the rest of Iraq and to those in Baghdad that they were also wanted dead or alive, which helped Saddam, causing his party to rally round him and resist to the end. The

uprising was put down in blood and many mass executions were carried out of the rebel Shi'ites (al-Jabbar, 1994, p. 112).

The violence the uprising created in some areas in the south aroused concern in the rest of the world, as well as among the moderate Shiite groups. There were many instances of bloody massacres: for instance, in Kut, Najaf and Karbala, where officials were cut into pieces, dragged through the streets and sometimes even burned to death. Members of al-Tawwabin brigades, Iraqi POWs who decided to join Iran and refused to return to Iraq, al- Badr (opposition from Iraqi origins), and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were involved in these incidents (Khadduri and Ghareeb, 2001, p. 193).

2.10 Second Gulf War (US-led Invasion)

Although, the second Gulf War and the crisis that began in 2002 is seen as being linked to the trauma caused by what happened to the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11 but in reality it was a pretext for invading Iraq through linking Saddam to al Qaeda (Hogue, 2016). Furthermore, it was mooted to be a continuation of the aim of Bush's predecessor to remove Saddam, and to allow the US, which had been merely biding its time, to complete its unfinished confrontation with Saddam (Schwab, 2009, p. 102). According to Paul O'Neill, Bush's Treasury Secretary, the plan of invading Iraq was already in mind and was reviewed on January 30, 2001 at the first meeting of the president's senior staff. Also, it was believed by many that Bush's aim in going to war with Saddam was to take revenge for the assassination attempt on the elder Bush in Kuwait in 1993 (Fawn, 2006, p. 1). Woodward (2002, p. 42) argues that Rumsfeld made this point clear:

Before the attacks, the Pentagon had been working for months on developing a military option for Iraq...Any serious, full-scale war against terrorism would have to make Iraq a target – eventually. Rumsfeld was raising the possibility that they could take advantage of the opportunity offered by the terrorist attacks to go after Saddam immediately.

Therefore, Bush sought to seize the opportunity provided by the September 11 event by declaring the so-called 'war on terror', to move public opinion to support him in waging a war against Iraq (Aruri, 2003, p. 35). This war was seen to be waged against all US opponents who were constructed to have "the will and the means to launch terrorist attacks like those of 11 September" (Tripp, 271). Also this tragedy provided the US with the political capital it needed to achieve a long awaited and established goal of rooting out terrorists, a goal which had first

been formulated in Afghanistan in December 2001 when the Taliban were ousted by the US for harbouring the al-Qaeda terrorists who were responsible for the September 11 incident.

After the quick defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, plans to occupy Iraq were processed and rapidly implemented. On January 29, 2002 Bush delivered his famous 'Axis of Evil' speech. This speech is seen by many as a continuation of the 'war on terror', in which he listed Iraq among other countries like Iran and North Korea as being part of the 'axis of evil', claiming that they posed a direct threat to the USA (Mral, 2006, p. 27). This axis, he claimed, contained "the world's most destructive regimes" that poses a direct threat to the US.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (CNN, 2002).

Bush and his advisors attempted to draw the world's attention to the fact that Saddam was a threat and that he was actively developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), an allegation that was later proven to be false (Tucker, 2010, p. 1), and as a result sought to gain the approval of the congressmen and convince the international community of the veracity of these allegations. On 7 October, Saddam was accused by Bush of providing training to al-Qaeda operatives. This preparation of the public perception for war was further developed when Bush announced his doctrine of preemptive war, in an argument that the US might strike Iraq to avoid a potential threat from Iraq. On 11 October, Congress decided to authorise Bush to attack when necessary (Fawn, 2006, p. 1).

Persuaded by Colin Powell and Tony Blair, Bush sought the agreement of the UN to invade Iraq by making the case that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). On 12 September 2002, he described Iraq as being in "flagrant violation" of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC), and he further indicated that the US would act unilaterally if the UN did not support US policy . Germany, however, objected to this manipulation of UN authority with Gerhard Schroder referring to the intended invasion as a US "adventure" in Iraq. France and Russia were similarly unconvinced by the justifications that had been presented for the war (Fawn, 2006, p. 2).

Comprising between those countries who were unconvinced of the threat posed by Iraq and the US, a key watershed was reached unanimously passing of 1441 UNSC on 8 November allowing

Iraq to prove that it did not possess WMD. With the ongoing inspection, only little information were declared by Hans Blix. On December 19 Mohamed El- Baradei stated, “We still need much more cooperation from Iraq in terms of providing evidence to demonstrate that it is clean of weapons of mass destruction” (Fawn, 2006, p. 3). Although the UN inspection teams had access to the suspected weapons sites, and had searched 150 sites, with 13 different sites being searched in surprise visits, nothing was found. The US, however, insisted that Iraq was in material breach of Resolution 1441. Similarly, Rumsfeld stated emphatically that “any country on this earth with an active intelligence programme knows that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction” (Fawn, 2006, p. 3).

At the same time, in the second half of 2002, the deployment and build-up of the US military continued. On 9 January 2003, Hans Blix announced that there was no “smoking gun”(Reinold, 2012). However, the US and Britain warned against taking action against Iraq without a second UN resolution. Saddam with his two sons were offered the opportunity to leave Iraq with immunity from prosecution to avoid the war. The accusation that Saddam had links with al-Qaeda kept resurfacing in Bush’s addresses, and finally, on 28 January 2003, he declared that he had learned that Saddam had “recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa”, intelligence which was proved to be unfounded after the war, and which had been used to justify an invasion without UN authorisation (Fawn, 2006, p. 4).

It was neither of the UN two conditions that authorise the use of force internationally were acknowledged in the UN because “the United States was not directly threatened by Iraq (Article 51); nor could the United States and its allied obtain UNSC agreement for military action (Article 42)”. Therefore, under the UN Charter, the US invasion on Iraq was illegal (Lynch *et al.*, 2013, p. 390). It was after this that Operation Iraqi Freedom started, as British and US troops entered southern Iraq from Kuwait, accompanied by an air campaign to cause the Iraqi forces to collapse. They were resisted by the Shiites, who they had expected would collaborate with them and rise up to overthrow Saddam. In the north, with the help of Kurdish forces, US troops advanced, seizing many cities, and driving on to the capital where the resistance also collapsed. The official fall of Baghdad was represented symbolically when the statue of Saddam was brought down by some Iraqi people with the help of the US troops’ military equipment (Fawn, 2006, p. 7).

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter has provided some socio-political and historical background on the some of the wars Iraq has gone through, with particular focus on the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. Most of the social groups who were involved in these wars and who are relevant to the research questions, such as the Iraqi Shiites, and their position during the wars, as well as the Halabja genocide were also described in this chapter.

In the next chapter the theoretical background to the research, the main aspects of the theoretical framework, and other principles and aspects by which this research was informed are presented and discussed.

Chapter 3: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a brief survey of CDA with some of the influential figures in the field is presented, along with the main tenets and principles of CDA. The main framework used to conduct this research project, Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), with its main principles and features, is also discussed. In addition, I discuss the role of discourse in (re)producing ideology, and in constructing and representing things, and show how groups can be dominated, controlled and discriminated against through the use of discourse.

The role of the news media industry is also looked at in this study because of its acknowledged influence on (re)producing ideology. The processes of selecting, framing and gatekeeping the news, deciding the news values, the access of the media to various sources of information and their relationship with the state-government, among other factors, all influence the way the news discourse is produced. Therefore, an overview of all the above concepts: news values, news selection, gatekeeping and framing is presented in relation to their role, whether separately or in conjunction, in influencing what will become the final news product and in creating ideology.

3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Spearheaded by prominent figures such as Gunther Kress, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, and others, critical discourse analysis has been an influential school⁵ of discourse analysis since the late 1980s. The linguistic and philosophical bases of CDA can be traced to social theory, earlier discourse analysis, and sociolinguistic and text linguistics (Tenorio, 2011, p. 188). CDA advocates are influenced by the Western Marxist approach to language in which cultural aspects of social life are taken into account and that considers both “domination and

⁵ There are various views on whether to call CDA a school or a programme or a movement. Blommaert (2005, p. 21) says describing CDA as a school is like standing on ‘thin ice’, as members of the school do not view themselves as such. Ruth Wodak (Wodak, 2011), on the other hand, suggests using ‘school’ or ‘programme’ to describe CDA. Van Dijk (1995, p. 17) argues that CDA “does not characterize a school, a field or a subdiscipline of discourse analysis, but rather an explicitly critical approach, position or stance of studying text and talk”. He adds (2001, p. 353) that it is “a different ‘mode’ or ‘perspective’ of theorizing, analysis, and application throughout the whole field”.

exploitation as established and maintained culturally and ideologically” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 232). They are influenced by Marx’s critique of capitalism, as well as by notion that language is a “product, producer, and reproducer of social consciousness” (Fairclough and Graham, 2002, p. 201). Similarly, Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist scholar, viewed capitalism as a combination of ‘political society’, which represents the domain of coercion, and ‘civil society’, which is the domain of hegemony (Fairclough, 2001, p. 232). This view has influenced many CDA scholars, who believe that coercion, exploitation and domination are not the only ways to exercise power – it can also be done through persuasive discourse (Tenorio, 2011, p. 188).

The ideas of the French philosopher, Louis Althusser are also drawn upon in the discussion. Althusser emphasised, (quoted in Wang (2017, p. 23), the fact that “Ideologies are not pure illusions, but bodies of representations existing in institutions and practice”.

He adds that:

All the State Apparatuses function both by repression and by ideology, with the difference that the (Repressive) State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by repression, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology.

In the late 1970s, the term ‘Critical Linguistics’ was applied and advanced by a number of Hallidayan linguists at the University of East Anglia (See e.g. Fowler *et al.*, 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979). Kress and Hodges (1979) assumed the presence of a solid association between social and linguistic structures arguing that the social meaning is vital to the existence of a discourse, and without it, discourse cannot exist (Wodak, 2011, p. 53). Halliday’s methodology is still considered as an important methodology for analysing the relation between social meaning and discourse on account of its clarity and its extremely thorough linguistic categories (see e.g. Hodge and Kress, 1988; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).

Since 1979, the approach of critical linguistics has gone through changes, refinement and re-application by various linguists who come from various backgrounds with the belief in the society –language relationship. The existence of this relationship means that all critical linguistics research is interdisciplinary in nature: scholars from different research traditions have contributed to the development and spread of critical linguistics, to include domains such as racism, ethnicity, gender studies, mass media, politics, history etc. (Wodak, 2011, p. 53).

The concept of ‘critical’ in CDA originated from the German Frankfurt School of thought, which was one of the main contributors to the formation of ‘Western’ critique of culture

production. The Frankfurt School was known for its opposition to the reduction of culture to “an epiphenomenal reflection of economy”, pointing out that “cultural processes have their own effects on social life, and constitute a domain of struggle” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 233).

More recently, Jürgen Habermas, the German social theorist who is frequently cited by CDA scholars, developed a theory of communication, which offers the basis for critique by drawing on the criteria of the language in use and rejecting the necessity for suffering and discrimination. In this regard, Habermas argues (quoted in Meyer and Wodak, 2009, p. 10), that “language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations of organised power. Insofar as the legitimisations of power relations... are not articulated... language is also ideological”.

Many of the central principles of CDA can be traced to the critical theory of the Frankfurt School particularly in the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) (see section 3.3). The aim of critical theory, and thus of CDA, is to critique and transform the status quo of society, rather than merely describing and explaining it as traditional discourse analysis did. Critical theory is “directed at the totality of society in its historical specificity” and it also aims to improve “the understanding of society by integrating all the major social sciences” (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 6)

A strong strand of CDA has also emerged from Halliday’s linguistics, which has come as a reaction to the Chomskyan linguistics which placed an emphasis on grammar and excluded social and cultural dimensions; in other words, it came as a counter response to the ‘asocial’ or ‘uncritical’ paradigms (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). With regard to the terminology, ‘critical linguistics’ and ‘critical discourse analysis’ have regularly been used in an interchangeable way. As a matter of fact, the latter has become the favoured term for use by researchers since it accurately describes “the theory formerly identified as CL” (Wodak, 2001, p. 1).

One of the main focuses of CDA is power, and especially the production and reproduction of institutional power. CDA’s main objective is to examine the “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Meyer and Wodak, 2009, p. 10). It also “studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). Therefore, the main aim of CDA analysts is to understand, expose and resist all forms of social inequalities and by doing so engaging the

feeble, offering voice to the voiceless, uncovering power misuse, and preparing individuals to cure social wrongs (Blommaert, 2005, p. 25). CDA goes further than this, however, with the aim of producing as well as conveying the knowledge people require to enable them to self-reflect to become liberated from oppression: i.e., illumination and freedom. In other words, the aim of CDA is not limited to description and providing an analysis of the problem but is also to uproot false beliefs and the delusions that occur as a result of power abuse (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Wodak and Meyer, 2015, p. 7).

Discourse and society are dialectally related and they are mutually constitutive. They work to re/shape each other. KhosraviNik (2015, p. 48) argues that this relationship is at work at both the micro level, where discourse goes through a process of formation, modification and interpretation, and the macro level, at which discourse acts as a form of social practice: i.e., when discourse becomes a feature of the hegemonic processes as well as of the ideological effects of these processes; as a result, inequality and power abuse might be expressed or legitimised through the use of language. For example, at the micro level, talking about racism in parliament is a discourse used for interacting in a particular situation; however, at the macro level, this type of discourse may act to reproduce racism (van Dijk, 2001, p. 354). Fairclough and Wodak (1997, p. 258) state that discourse is viewed as being

[S]ocially constitutive as well as socially conditioned - it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects - that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations.

CDA is problem-oriented and focuses on issues of dominance and inequality; thus, it is driven by current social problems (van Dijk, 1993, p. 252), which makes it different from other approaches to discourse analysis. Furthermore, contributing to a particular school, paradigm or programme is not a primary aim of CDA; rather, the aim of CDA is to acquire a deeper understanding of social issues by means of an analysis of discourse.

CDA is eclectic in its critical theorisation and analytical methodologies (KhosraviNik, 2010, p. 55). Wodak (2011, p. 50) argues that it is never the aim of CDA to provide a single theory or a specific methodology. Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 5) argue that to offer a particular/single theory or to adopt a certain methodology has never been the aim of the CDA research

programme. Quite the opposite, it is multifarious, with a variety of theoretical backgrounds contributing to it.

3.3 Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA)

Developed at Vienna University by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues, DHA is an influential way of studying the self and other representations in discourse. It was utilised initially for studying (semi-)public discourse in order to examine the constitution of anti-Semitism stereotypes during Kurt Waldheim's campaign to be elected President of Austria in 1986 (see Wodak *et al.*, 1990). Since then, DHA has become concerned with not only the historical dimension of discourses but also with subjects such as discourse and discrimination, language barriers in various social institutions, discourse and politics, discourse and identity, discourse in the media and organisational communication (Martin, 2017, p. 48).

In line with insights from Frankfurt School DHA aims were formulated to be pro emancipation, autonomy and social acknowledgement. The motivation for this arose from the possibly idealistic notion that poor social conditions must be transformed to eradicate dysfunction and inequality (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 34). DHA adheres to the sociophilosophical approach of critical theory. Reisigl and Wodak (2001, pp. 32-33) hold that there are three related levels of critique

1. The aim of '*text or discourse immanent critique*' is to discover discrepancies and contradictions and any issues in the text- internal.
2. The aim of '*sociodiagnostic critique*' is to discover and demystify the manipulative or other problematic issues that are manifest or latent in the discursive practices. It further works on uncovering the intentions that are masked, inconsistent, hesitant or 'polyphonic' of speakers, whether in a written or spoken form, which are also inferable from the contextual, political, or social knowledge background.

In sociodiagnostic critique, CDA analysts do not only rely on the internal structure of the text or discourse: historical, contextual, political and social background knowledge is also taken into consideration in order to look into the wider context. Therefore, social practices is viewed to include the discursive practices as one of its forms (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 33-34).

3. The aim of '*prospective critique*' is to help provide practical solutions to social problems. This type of critique was practised by CDA analysts in Vienna in an attempt to improve communication in the institutions and to set guidelines for breaking down language barriers in schools, hospitals, courts etc., as well as for avoiding inappropriate use of language, such as sexist language (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 33-34).

One of the DHA's distinctive features is that it places emphasis on the historical dimension of the issues under investigation. It is concerned with the way discourse is formed and developed over time. Likewise, to provide an explanation of the way the discourse is produced, distributed and interpreted, DHA engages with "the cognitive relationship between existing diachronic and synchronic discourse and discourse topics" (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 68).

3.4 Discourse and Ideology

Discourse operates as "a site of ideology" (Blommaert, 2005, p. 158), in that ideology is built and embedded in the different forms/meaning of discursive practices through which reality is constructed and signified. Such discursive practices, in their turn, serve to have the relations of domination produced, reproduced or transformed (Fairclough, 1992, p. 87). In line with this position, Thompson (1987, p. 519) suggests that 'symbolic forms' as well as other usages of language can be ideological, especially those that establish the relations of domination. Thompson (1984, p. 131) adds that studying ideology involves investigating how meaning fuels dominant relationships.

Ideologies, according to van Dijk (2006, p. 116), are acquired gradually, not all of the sudden. A 'racist', for instance, does not become one overnight. People need to go through necessary experiences and discourses that will change their ideologies. Conversely, ideologies gradually disintegrate when members of a group stop believing in them and decide to leave the group to join another group.

In relation to media effects on the public, Blommaert (2005, p. 163) maintains that ideologies cannot be understood without taking into the consideration the distribution of the message, discourse and image and how they are mediated by the media. He adds that the mere idea does not have an ideological effect by itself; however, an idea may turn out to do so once it is chosen by 'power- regulating' establishments, like the media, and injected into the system of ideological (re)production. Thus, unimportant and trivial events are turned into events of

massive significance by mass media. Ideologies operate by controlling the attitude of particular groups, and by the fact that journalists have control over the activities of news making, such as news selection, writing, editing as well as finalising the final version of the report (see Gatekeeping 3.8.4 and Framing 3.8.5). Therefore, media has some form of power through selecting, formulating and delivering a particular desired message to the audience. Such power could also be further used by the political and economic groups to speak on their behalf or to communicate what they want to tell to the public. These journalists are in turn controlled by the ongoing context: i.e., the social and the political situation (van Dijk, 2009, p. 195).

An example of how media can misrepresent events/ people and participate in (re)producing ideologies as well as drawing the lines between the in-group and out-group is provided by Bell (1991, pp. 216-22) who examines how news ‘misinterprets’ or ‘misrepresents’ events related to climate change. The stories published in news were sent to those (sources) who had been cited to check the stories’ credibility and accuracy. A five- point scale was used to measure the stories accuracy ranged from 1 ‘absolutely accurate’ to 5 ‘extremely inaccurate’. The results revealed that only 29 per cent of the events published were absolutely accurate, 55 per cent were slightly inaccurate, while the remaining 16 per cent of the stories were marked as in the level of higher inaccuracy.

3.5 Discourse and Representation

Through language people make sense of things, construct meaning and create a culture of mutual understanding that enables them to arrive at roughly the same interpretation, because language works “as a representational system in which signs and symbols are used to represent people’s ideas, feelings and concepts” (Hall, 1997, p. 1). Hall (1997) further identifies two systems of representation:

The first enables us to give meaning to the world by constructing a set of correspondences or a chain of equivalences between things - people, objects, events, abstract ideas, etc. – and our system of concepts, our conceptual maps. The second depends on constructing a set of correspondences between our conceptual map and a set of signs, arranged or organized into various languages which stand for or represent those concepts (p. 19)

People within the same culture share the same signs and symbols, which are ‘cultural codes’. The meanings attributed to words are shared within the same culture (Macdonald, 2003, p. 9). Richardson (2007a, pp. 50-51) highlights how significantly the way people are named and

referred to impacts the way they are viewed. He provided a few examples from (Clark, 1986) who looked at the way sexual violence stories, in particular rape, are reported in *The Sun* newspaper. He argues that in this type of incident there is always someone to hold responsible or to be blamed and this is evident from the way they are named in the newspaper. For instance, when the man is the person to blame then he is referred to as 'monster', a 'fiend', a 'beast' or other references that indicate "sub-humanity, depravity and animalistic abandon". When the woman is the person to blame, on the other hand she is referred to as having 'led the man on' or as being a 'Lolita' or 'an unmarried mum', or by using adjectives that describe her physical appearance such as 'busty', 'blond' etc.

Such words are related to wider social and cultural practices which have a significant part in shaping and constructing the way people think. These words do not have meaning in themselves but they act as a medium for carrying meaning, operating as symbols to represent the things we intend to communicate (Hall, 1997, p. 5). This process is similar to our choice of clothes we decide to wear in the morning. Although sometimes we may think that we appear different and idiosyncratic, in reality we are following a particular cultural dress practice (Macdonald, 2003, p. 10).

According to Foucault, (cited in Macdonald, 2003, p. 11), reality cannot be captured in our interaction. It is through discourse that ideas and concepts can be exchanged about reality. Also, position taking is involved in everything we know and talk about, which in turn works to construct the concept we are talking about.

Therefore, concepts like representation, along with metaphors of 'distorting lenses' and 'selective filters', have been used by media critics to replace those of 'clear mirrors' and "translucent windows" as they argued that media do not offer a real life reflection (Macdonald, 2003, p. 12). Macdonald (2003, pp. 13-14) argues that the media are not only representing ideas and concepts of the real world but are also working to construct them. 'Race', for instance, is an ideological construct. Although it has no scientific basis in reality it is widely used when discussing racial stereotypes, as though they are real racial categories. On the idea of representation and construction in the media, Hall (1981, p. 82) states that the product of media is an exact portrayal of society, whereby we can understand how the world works. There is also an ideological construction the media help to produce in regards to different concepts in life, for instance, it provides a definition of race, its problems and its associated imagery that influences the public's understanding of what race is.

The notion of construction, according to Macdonald (2003), suggests an interaction between what the media do to frame and the way we understand things in the real world.

3.6 Discourse and Reproduction

It is argued that ideologies are reproduced/perpetuated through discourse as well as other social practices. Generally, reproduction, according to van Dijk (1998, p. 228), gives the sense of the ideology as continual or made to continue. The word – ‘production’ – implies “an active, human dimension: It is what people do, make happen, while also making something new, creating something”, whereas the first part of the word ‘re’, implies the repetitiveness of the process of production, because discourse is a social practice and the acts of production are part of everyday life (van Dijk, 1998, p. 228).

Ideologies are reproduced by acquiring new users either by socialisation or other forms of sharing representation through “imitation, observation, teaching, training, preaching, propaganda”. Ideologies are continually being reproduced (van Dijk, 1998, p. 228). Groups can maintain their authority only if they possess the resources to reproduce it economically, socially, culturally and, most importantly, ideologically (van Dijk, 1991b, p. 32).

A system or a group is said to be reproduced historically if it remains unchanged or changes very little, as in the case of the press, the English language and racism. The English language, for instance, continues to exist because it is reproduced by millions of users who read, write and use it in their daily life. The same applies for the press, which continues to be reproduced as a cultural or socio-economic institution as long as there are journalists, newsmakers, readers and editors (van Dijk, 1991b, p. 33). So is the case for the racism in which its continuation depends on the repetitive practices of discriminatory discourse in everyday life, which is also influenced to a great extent by the political, social, and other historical contextual elements.

van Dijk (1991b, p. 33) argues that “by ‘reproduction’ we mean the dialectical interaction of general principle and actual practices that underlie the historical continuity of a social system”. Similarly, Fairclough (1992, p. 65) states that there is a dialectical relationship between the discourse and the social structures. The former has an important influence on the latter and contributes to instigating social change or social continuity. Discourse assumes its importance because of its effect on the power relations and power struggle. This is because control over the

discourse by societal and institutional power-holders means to maintain their own influence and power (Fairclough, 1989, p. 39).

The reproduction involves people drawing on orders of discourses and other aspects of social structures that they have in mind when they wish to produce or interpret discourse. Fairclough (1989, p. 39) adds that:

Through being drawn upon, these structures are constantly being created anew in discourse and practice generally. Discourse, and practice in general, in this sense are both the products of structures and the producers of structures. It is this process of being produced anew (reproduced) through being drawn upon that I refer to as reproduction. But structures may be produced anew with virtually no change [...]. Reproduction may be basically conservative, sustaining continuity, or basically transformatory, effecting changes.

It is the power relations between the social forces and how such relationships develop in the social struggle are the determinant factors of the transformatory or conservative nature of the reproduction in the discourse. Fairclough (1989, p. 40) adds that discourse orders can carry an ideological assumption that can either legitimise or sustain existing relationships of power. Therefore, it is expected that there is a transformation of orders of discourse if there is a social struggle manifested by the power relations. When there is no struggle or there is a relative stability of power relations, this could lead to a conservative reproduction.

Racism, as an ideology, can be learned, let's say, by white people through accepting statements, such as 'Black women are welfare queens', in their everyday conversation, or by reading stories in the media in which such phrases are used repeatedly to portray black people, or through telling and sharing stories and circulating them among the group's members, allowing inferences and suggestions to be made by the co-participants. Thus, the reproduction process "implies socialization, learning, inculcation or adaptation by young or new members, of the socially shared representations of a group" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 229). Furthermore, if an individual can learn to draw an inference in one context, he or she will be able to do the same in another. In other words, the process of reproduction implies a process of generalisation. People build mental models and generalise negative attitude schemata about different outgroups. However, this type of generalisation from daily experiences or other social representations can lead to unacceptable over-generalisation (prejudice).

The context of the discourse, alongside the social situation, act as a site in which ideologies are enacted in social practices. In this regard, van Dijk (1998, p. 230) states that "speech participants identify with or willingly or unwillingly (have to) represent the groups and

institutions of which they are members, they thus by definition contribute to the use and the reproduction of the ideologies associated with these social formations”.

3.7 Discourse and Access

One channel through which power, (re)production and dominance can be exercised is the access to ‘valued social resources’; for instance, that of media discourse. This access is the privilege of some rather than of all (van Dijk, 1996, p. 85). In everyday conversations, individuals usually have access to many types of talk, like those of immediate family, friends, acquaintances and other relatives. However, access to contexts like those of officials, doctors, managers and the media is more constrained. Although people can read news reports, they have no direct impact on the way such reports are written or produced (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 12). Access might be based on different criteria, such as age, education or class. For instance, men have more access than women and whites have more access than blacks, which is a way of discriminating and a form of dominance (van Dijk, 1996, p. 86).

Media discourse is no different, in that it is unequally accessed by everyone, but it is restricted by certain patterns of access, as van Dijk (1996) argues that it is those who have are interviewed, quoted or have access to the news have the ability to influence the audience (p. 86). Access to the media creates a dominance which in turn can influence the public as it is only those who have access who get their voice heard and as a result influence public opinion (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 12). Access to discourse and events of communication can be decided by different patterns of access and can be controlled by powerful social actors through “setting or selecting time and place, participants, audiences, possible speech acts (such as commands or requests), agendas, topics, choice of language, style, strategies of politeness or deference, and many other properties of text and talk” (van Dijk, 1995b, p. 12). These factors determine who writes to whom and under which circumstances, where and why.

Controlling patterns of access to discourse “will be geared towards the control of the minds of participants, recipients or the audience at large, in such a way that the resulting mental changes are those preferred by those in power, and generally in their interest” (van Dijk, 2008, p. 70). As (Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996, p. 88) point out, “control is much more effective if the minds of the audience can also be successfully ‘accessed’”.

For example, the access of the minorities to the mass media can be restricted and can be seen as a mode of domination by the white elite (van Dijk, 1996, p. 93). This lack of access of minority groups is a result of the fact that only a few members of minority groups work as journalists for the major high quality newspapers or television stations. On the other hand, those who have a major impact on news production can access sources and write the stories. This difference in accessing media organisations between the minority and the majority makes a huge difference to the way news reports are produced. The selection of news, giving prominence to issues and topics of a stereotypical nature, as well as providing a negative representation of the minorities who lack access to the media, can define the minorities (by 'define' I mean that the attributes that are assigned to them will be believed by the public and will not be challenged), which ultimately serves the interests of the white elites and their institutions. Furthermore, the minority tend to be quoted less than the majority owing to this lack of access, and even if they are quoted, only moderate quotations that are in accord with the majority points of view and opinions are taken. Or the media tend to quote the extremists, radicals or those with bad characteristics among the out-group in an attempt to trivialise and ridicule the whole out-group.

3.8 Media Discourse and War Reporting and Practices

3.8.1 War Reporting

A journalist's attempt to remain unaffected by, or to distance him or herself from the horrific realities of war "tends to go out the window" quickly, especially when it is the journalist's own country that goes to war, when the moralities of journalism are put to a hard test (Allan and Zelizer, 2004, p. 3).

There are many factors - military, technological, political, among others - by which reporters are shaped and which might thus impact on the reporting process in drastic ways (Allan and Zelizer, 2004, p. 5). For instance, a journalist's movement in the conflict zones could be restricted, undermined or prevented. Similarly, the sources may refuse to give information, and even journalists' patriotism is sometimes called into question. Furthermore, journalists constantly encounter a situation where they need to position themselves in an either with or against dichotomy and based on decision journalists make their role is determined, which in turn has implications for the way people understand and perceive the war (ibid). There are many other factors that could constrain the journalistic behaviour, such as hierarchical structures and chains of command, monetary substances, routine methods, time imperatives, news values and

other constraints as those caused by government and business which could make more pressure on the side of journalism (Zollmann, 2017, p. 22).

Another important factor is the owners. According to Harcup (2015, p. 18), the owners set their policy for their organisations which in turn put more pressure on the journalists. Herman and Chomsky (1988) placed media proprietors at the top of the list of five categories that can be deployed to filter appropriate news, limit opposition and ensure the government and powerful private entities can convey their message to the public (p. 88). These filters are:

1. the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms;
2. advertising as the primary income source of the mass media;
3. the reliance of the media on information provided by the government, business, and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power;
4. “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and
5. “anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism.

In the context of war in particular, the overreliance on the politicians’ statements, the third filter of Herman and Chomsky (1988), could influence the journalism behaviour as the . “feedback loop” between the politicians and the journalism, according to Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, p. 218), serve to create facts as the officials tend to states statements with the intention to have journalists reported them. This is where, according to Hackett (2007, p. 2), the journalist becomes an unwitting participant in the conflict.

3.8.2 Press- state relationship

Graber and Dunaway (2017, p. 103) argue that the view that most of the news sources of everyday reports are coming from the officials in US government has become well established. As a result, the diversity of voices in news stories becomes restricted by journalists deciding who to cover and what should go in the news. They add that the media are subjected to manipulation because they depend for the most part on information provided by political leaders, who may flood the news with self-serving stories, owing to the presumption that they have access to precise information that ordinary people do not have (Baker and McEnery, 2005, p. 199). A study conducted by Graber and Dunaway (2017, p. 101) reveals that private individuals are rarely used as a source of information whether at home or abroad. The study also shows that government officials make up the highest percentage of the sources of the main stories reported. This dependence on a narrow spectrum of sources inevitably leads to biased reporting.

In this regard, Bennett (1990, pp. 103 - 6) has also put forward a theory, which states that “[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to “index” the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic”. According to this hypothesis, the non-official voice, i.e., that of the ‘other’ is only included in a news story when that voice reflects the official story. In this regard, Herman and Chomsky (1988) argue that

... the “societal purpose” of the media is to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state. The media serves this purpose in many ways: through selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping the bounds of debates within actable premises. (p. 298)

However, Bennett (1990, p. 122) argues that indexing may differ from one matter to another. Therefore, the indexing could be more relaxed to permit different voices to go into the stories when the consequences will have less impact on the “corporate economic order” and “normative vigilance”. However, these voices could be muted and indexing may be high in operations when important decisions are involved, especially military operations or those related to foreign affairs, as such factors influence not only corporate economics but state power as well.

The state-government relationship has also been expressed through the CNN effect⁶ which in contrast to the deep-rooted view that the government has enormous power in influencing media analysis, the media also has an influence in changing the foreign policy (Robinson, 2005).. Shaw (1996) states that press reporting of the Kurds escaping Saddam’s regime ensured a safe haven for the Kurdish in Iraq and that it brought about the humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

Members of policy-making groups have also expressed their views on the CNN effect, and confirmed the belief that the media have from time to time played a role in bringing about Western and humanitarian interventions. For instance, the ex-British Prime Minister Tony Blair, during the air war against Serbia in 1999, implied that if the media went unchecked it had the power to lead governments to intervene (Robinson, 2005, p. 11). By contrast, Wheeler (2000, p. 300) argues that the CNN effect has a limit and that the coverage of humanitarian issues in both northern Iraq and Somalia was not a decisive or determining factor in causing the

⁶ The CNN effect is a theory that assumes that the media play a major role in formulating a country’s foreign policy and have an influence on decision making (John, 2014).

intervention; it was, rather, an enabling one that made the intervention possible through preparing and building public opinion. Similarly, Robinson (2005, p. 12) says that the implication of this is that the policy maker could intervene without the help of the media, but that media coverage can build public support.

Robinson (2005, p. 13) proffered two methods of consent manufacturing. First, the 'executive' method that highlights the way the content of the news media conforms to the agenda followed by government officials. This is exemplified in Entman's (1991) study, in which he looked at the way two tragic events involving the shooting down of two airline flights were framed by the US media. The first was a Korean Air Lines flight (KAL) which was shot down by a Soviet fighter in 1983, and the second was the Iranian Airbus (Iran Air flight 655) shot down by a US navy ship in 1988. 269 passengers and crew were killed in the former and 290 passengers and crew were killed in the latter. Entman (1991) found that in both cases, the news was consistent with US policy and no criticism or challenge was directed at the US government. The KAL incident was portrayed and given more weight, more importance and heightened media attention and time than the Iran Air tragedy. The information on the Iran Air incident was de-emphasised by "reducing its salience and making it harder to discern in the onrush of news" (Entman, 2006, p. 23). The second version is the 'elite' version, according to which the coverage of news media in general comes in line with the powerful political elites interest regardless of the position they held (Robinson, 2005, p. 13).

3.8.3 News Values and Selectivity

News values are the characteristics by which journalists and news organisations decide the newsworthiness of events and considerations of what to include, exclude, prioritise or focus on. They are the "distillation of what an identified audience is interested in reading or watching" (Richardson, 2007a, p. 91). According to Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009, p. 71), the way the news is selected, processed and constructed is perhaps is more significant than what actually take place.

News selection is another route to potential stereotyping and ideology, whereby a journalist or news organisation tends to select a particular event, and magnify or reduce some aspects as a way of representing the event. According to Ndlela (2005, p. 73), "media representations reduce, shrink, condense, and select/ reject aspects of intricate social relations in order to represent them as fixed, natural, obvious and ready to consume" (Chinball, 1981, p 76). Chinbal

adds that news are neither tidy nor ready to pick as if they are fallen apples. It is the journalist's job "to translate untidy reality into neat stories with beginnings, middles, and denouements", which of course is accompanied simultaneously by a process of filtering the unexpected and disturbing details. It is worth mentioning that different journalists deal with different aspects of the same event, and even write different stories about the same aspect (ibid).

Bell (1991, p. 156) lists some news values on which ideologies could be constructed and prioritised in relation to a particular society. Only those that are more related to my work are explained:

1. Negativity: This is where the negative happenings become the focus of the news and of which the news are made. Instances of negative concepts are wars, conflicts, damages, disasters, political events (Bell, 1991, p. 156). For instance, the alleged Iraq's possession of WMDs, the link of Iraq to al Qaeda and the constructed threat of Iraq are considered negative news to the US audience as it was constructed as directly related to their security.
2. Relevance: the more relevant and close the news is to the audience's own life the more newsworthy it becomes (Bell, 1991, p. 157). In "Out of sight, out of mind", Sonwalkar (2004, p. 25) draws attention to the wars/conflicts/insurgencies the media have turned a blind eye to, nationally or internationally. He says that conflicts are put in focus, given coverage and "deemed worthy of sustained coverage by the news superpowers" only when such conflicts are perceived by journalists as something to do with 'Us', as being 'Our' conflict, because 'We' are involved in it, quite unlike the situation when the conflict is about 'them' and therefore does not affect the interests of Western powers, in which case it may not receive any coverage at all. A conflict/war that does not attract much attention, or is considered less important to Western interests, is therefore unimportant. While the media beat the war drums when the US decided to go to war against Iraq, the tension between the US and North Korea was more serious than that between the US and Iraq, and the evidence of North Korea's capability of building a nuclear weapon was more compelling. Yet the focus was on Iraq and the reporting of North Korea was overshadowed by it (Boyd-Barrett, 2004, p. 26).
3. Eliteness: This is where reference is made to elite groups of people, as in the case of politicians, decision makers, celebrities etc. (Bell, 1991, p. 157), while ordinary people

are ignored. Equally important, references to elite nations are also one of the factors that influence newsworthiness; for instance, stories about conflicts and elections, especially where elite nations are involved, will be reported extensively whereas some wars go unnoticed (John, 1982, p. 78).

3.8.4 News Gatekeeping and Ideology

Gatekeeping is defined, according to Shoemaker *et al.* (2001, p. 233) as “the process by which the vast array of potential news messages are winnowed, shaped, and prodded into those few that are actually transmitted by the news media”. Confirming this view, David Manning, cited in Fourie (2008, p. 237), highlighted the fact that news flows through a series of channels that contains gates through which decisions are made that impact the way it is perceived and reconstructed. He also pointed out that the news does not go freely or unhampered from one gate to another but that it undergoes several influences that decide the final outcome (cited in Fourie, 2008, p. 237). Shoemaker *et al.* (2001, p. 233) describe such gates as ‘decision points’. As long ago as the 1950s, McNelly (1959, pp. 102-103) pointed out that there many gatekeepers who stand between the real event and the audience where the news can be either selected or rejected and shaped before going to the next gatekeeper.

According to Fourie (2008, p. 237), when the international news is being covered, events are reported through a correspondent who sends his report to a regional bureau where it undergoes a process of change, being shortened before being passed back to the central bureau agency. It could also be altered or even merged with another story before it is sent to the country’s national bureau, where further changes are to be made. The readers or listeners could also act in their turn as gatekeepers through taking some bits of the news and circulating them among other people.

The people in the news organisation possess the power to select and (re)shape the news as reporters, editors and sub-editors. News gatekeeping depends on likes and dislikes, news values, socialisation and approaches to problems, and all these factors influence the decision-making strategies regarding what to select and how to shape the news (Fourie, 2008, p. 238). Shoemaker *et al.* (2001, p. 233) state that gatekeeping is not merely a process of ‘in’ and ‘out’ choices but rather it is a process by which social realities are constructed.

Gatekeeping could have ideological drives where it works on establishing unequal power relations through controlling the discourse access by allowing some discourses and blocking others (Wodak, 2001, p. 88). van Dijk (1996, pp. 84- 85) argues that the control could be practiced by controlling the actions and the minds of one group by other group and thus influencing their knowledge and ideologies. He adds that in the democratic modern societies the power abuse and control is not limited to the use of force, threat, or other coercive forces but through the persuasive and manipulative power through the control of the discourse access (see 3.7). Here, discourse become an essential factor in consent manufacturing (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) and it is the role of CDA to unearth such hidden ideologies and power abuse.

3.8.5 Framing in Media Discourse

Although there is no universal accepted definition for framing, it can be defined in its broader sense as the ways through which events and issues are organised in the mass media. Entman (2007, p. 164) defines framing as the process of placing some elements of a particular event to the foreground on the expense of other elements and building a preferable narrative around it to promote a specific understanding. Entman (1993, p. 52) also states that framing involves choice and influence; whereby text is communicated in a specific way to highlight particular issues by defining them which as a results need evaluation and remedies. With regard to this definition, Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005, p. 405) say that the first part highlights the importance of the issue through placing more focus on a particular “aspect at the expense of others”, which makes it similar to agenda-setting theory. The second part of the definition, on the other hand, makes it different from agenda setting in its ability subtly to create realities that impact audience interpretation and opinions on a specific public matter. Tankard (2001) states that:

Much of the power of framing comes from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realizing it is taking place. Media framing can be linked to the magician’s sleight of hand - attention is directed to one point so that people do not notice the manipulation that is going on at another point. (p. 97)

The framing strategy works according to a three level agenda. The first function through which the framing can be performed successfully is *agenda setting*. At this level, the problem is to be defined, which is to attract both the public and the government; it could thus be a world event, a local happening or anything else of interest. The second level of agenda setting is highlighting the reasons of the problem so that treatments and required policies are to be taken. The final level is priming, which is the final goal: i.e., ‘the intended effect’ (Entman, 2007, pp. 164- 65).

The frames work through highlighting the issue which is intended to be the goal or subject of the communication to make it memorable and meaningful for the audience by giving it a salience through repetition, placement or by linking it to familiar cultural symbols, allowing the receivers to process it (Entman, 1993, p. 53). The aspect of placing emphasis and making some of the elements salient at the expenses of others in framing is similar to van Dijk (1998: 267) 'ideological square' in which choices are made where the favourable elements are 'foregrounded' or emphasised and the unfavourable elements are 'backgrounded' (de-emphasised). This is usually used to characterise the positive self-presentation where 'our' positive characteristics are foregrounded whereas 'our' negative characteristics are 'backgrounded'. On the contrary, their negative characteristics are foregrounded and their positive characteristics are backgrounded. Such discriminatory practices, that can include referential, predicational and argumentative strategies (see 4.3.1- 4.3.3), are carried out by means of the speakers' involvement (see also perspectivization). The selection and giving salience is an involvement on the part of the speaker or writer of the discourse. Wodak and Reisigl (2001, p. 83) argue that

One way of expressing involvement – as well as detachment – is discourse representation. One can represent, for example, racist, nationalist or ethnicist discourse by means of direct quotation, indirect quotation and free indirect speech. As already noted, indirect speech is, for the most part, an indicator of distance. In comparison, direct speech and free indirect speech often express the speakers' and evoke the hearers' involvement.

The national context has a great influence on the way news is framed by journalists. For instance, the coverage of international events is seen to be 'localised' by targeting the audience in the specific country it is being broadcast in (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005, p. 405). Clausen (2003) showed how the news coverage of the 9/11 incident around the world was 'domesticated' or 'localised' to suit national audiences. Thus, when it came to stories of victims, for instance, these were not universal but depended on the origins of the victims: i.e., each country reported stories about their own nationals, as in the case of the coverage of Japanese victims in Japan.

3.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have highlighted the main theoretical background of CDA principles and concepts that are relevant to the current study, and shed some light on the historical background of the influential figures in and origins of CDA. The main framework, DHA, by which my study was informed, was also presented. A short account of some important aspects of news reporting, such as news values, gatekeeping, war reporting, news access and the influence they have, whether separately or jointly, on producing ideology, and their effect on the news outcome was also provided in this chapter. Similarly, it has been shown how some of the CDA concepts as discourse access is similar to gatekeeping in the media studies and framing is similar to perspectivization or the ideological square in CDA through which power, control and ideologies can be exercised.

Chapter 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a detailed description of the methodological framework is presented. The chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section the theoretical framework of the DHA along with the DHA methodological strategies that were used to analyse the datasets are discussed. In the second section an overview of corpus linguistics is provided, along with the main related tools. This is followed by a discussion of the main methodologies used in combining CDA and CL, and some of the previous literature on combining these two approaches is presented, in conjunction with an assessment of such combinations. The focus of the third section is on the integration of CL into CDA; in this section I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and how an integration of the two could be very useful in reducing the risk of subjectivity and unrepresentativeness. The chapter concludes with a presentation of some of the corpus linguistics software used in this study.

4.2 Methodological framework and methods of analysis

Various methods have been used and proposed within the field of CDA to analyse the representation of different social groups and the representation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ based on race, religion, nationality, gender etc. The choice of methods is strongly influenced by the type of data, the political features of the context from which the data were obtained, and by the research topic, that might require emphasis to be placed on the “sociological, cognitive, political or discursal aspects of analysis” (KhosraviNik, 2015, p. 105). In this research, the main conceptual framework for analysing the discursive construction of Iraq was drawn from the Discourse Historical Approach (henceforth DHA) to CDA, which guided my methodological approach to conducting the empirical analysis. The main studies where the DHA has been developed, described and presented in detail are those of Wodak (2001), Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Reisigl and Wodak (2009) and Wodak and Meyer (2016). However, the current study was also informed by various theoretical and methodological studies on the media in general and on newspapers in particular (e.g. Van Dijk, 1991a; van Dijk, 1992; Fairclough, 1995; van Dijk, 1995b; Richardson, 2007a; KhosraviNik, 2015). I also drew on several studies on corpus linguistics, such as that of Baker (2006), and on the integration of corpus linguistics and CDA e.g., Baker *et al.* (2013); Baker *et al.* (2008).

The research design follows the principle of interdisciplinarity, according to which different theories, methodologies and methods are combined as a way of integration which is aimed at reaching an understanding of the research (Wodak and Meyer, 2015, p. 31).

These theories, methodologies and methods of analysis are interrelated and they influence each other. The type of data and the way they are interpreted are dependent on the theoretical perspective. Theory is not only important in forming research questions, which in turn guide data selection, collection, analysis and interpretation; it should also be dependent on “prior interpretation and empirical analyses” (Wodak and Meyer, 2015, p. 14). The relationship is “circular and recursive-abductive”, as it moves in a recursive way between the theory and the empirical data and the same procedures are repeated many times (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 95), as shown in Figure 4. This method of triangulation can inform the process of conceptualisation and the researcher’s assumptions. It also informs the process of examining assumptions at the interpretation stage, which in turn helps the researcher to conceptualise the next phase of the study. Methodological triangulation also helps to minimise a researcher’s bias, since the aim is to examine texts from different perspectives. A similar effect can be achieved by the triangulation of data and theory.




Figure 4 The circular process of empirical research (in Meyer and Wodak (2009, p. 24)

4.3 Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)

On the level of operationalisation, according to Wodak and Meyer (2015, p. 93), DHA is a three-dimensional discourse-analytical approach. The first dimension is the discourse topic, this is followed by the second dimension: the five discursive strategies and finally is the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realisations (as tokens).

4.3.1 Linguistic Triangulation I: Identify the specific contents or topics of the discourse

The aim of this macro analysis in the current study was to identify the topics and arguments of discourse on Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, CWs and Halabja employed by the US press during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. The identification of topics was accomplished with the aid of corpus linguistics tools such as collocation, frequencies and concordances.

4.3.2 Linguistic Triangulation II: Investigate Discursive Strategies

In order to investigate the discursive strategies by which social actors/events/objects were represented in particular ways, I followed the five questions proposed by Wodak and Meyer (2016):

1. How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions named and referred to linguistically?

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Nomination	Discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/events and processes/actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc. • Tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches pars pro toto, totum pro parte • Verbs and nouns used to denote processes, actions etc.

Table 1: Referential strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33)

Writing about how people are named or referred to in a discriminatory discourse involves the use of categorisation devices that serve to mark people as being either in-group or out-group, and in which some features are selected and foregrounded in metaphorical or metonymic terms that involve a negative evaluation, particularly in the case of the out-group or ‘other’ (Blackledge, 2005, p. 21). Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 33) identify some of the devices that one may expect to be used and through which the nomination/referential strategy is carried out, as indicated in Table 1. The basic form of discriminating against persons or a group of persons is by “naming them derogatorily, debasingly or vituperatively” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 45). The way people/social actors are viewed in real life is influenced to a great extent by the way the news media name them. Choosing one name over another involves an exclusion or inclusion from other categories (Richardson, 2007a, p. 49), in doing so the namer could have an interest or a purpose that could be political, social or psychological (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 47). Other forms of referential strategy are those adapted from (van Leeuwen, 1996)

analytical categories: ‘inclusion’, ‘suppression’, ‘exclusion’, ‘categorisation’, ‘passivation’, ‘genericisation’, ‘impersonalisation’, ‘specification’, ‘backgrounding’, ‘collectivisation’, ‘aggregation’, ‘assimilation’, ‘abstraction’ and ‘objectivation’. This list is not exhaustive. While some strategies may be more valid in a particular context, others may be more appropriate in another (KhosraviNik, 2010).

2. What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?

The second important aspect of the self- and other-representation is the predicational strategies by which persons, animal, objects, events, actions and social phenomenon are linguistically assigned particular qualities. The predicational strategies can be used to label social actors in an ideological, evaluative and stereotypical way either in a positive or a negative way through the use of positive or negative traits whether implicitly or explicitly. (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 45).

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Predication	Discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events/processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g., in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups) • Explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns • Collocations • Explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms) • Allusions, evocations, presuppositions/implicatures etc.

Table 2: Predicational strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33)

4.3.3 Linguistic Analysis III: Examine the Linguistic Means and Linguistic Realisations

3. What arguments are employed in the discourse in question?

Following on from the above brief discussion of referential and predicational strategies, it is worth mentioning here that both can be incorporated and integrated into argumentation to serve the aims of persuasion (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 34). According to many scholars, argumentation is integrated, either orally or in a written form, into our daily lives (Boukala, 2016, p. 251). Thus (Van Eemeren *et al.*, 1996) define argumentation as

a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.

Wodak and Meyer (2016, p. 35) argue that the purpose of argumentation is persuasion (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 35). Therefore, argumentation can be used to persuade an audience by representing ‘self’ as positive and the ‘other’ as negative and by drawing a line between ‘us’ and ‘them’. For this particular reason, argumentation is considered one of the five DHA strategies, which is manifested mainly through the use of topoi. The interest of Discourse Historical analysts in argumentation can be traced back to the second half of the 1980s (Reisigl, 2014, p. 68). A crucial feature of the DHA analysis of argumentation strategies is ‘topoi’

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Argumentation	Justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Topoi (formal or more content-related) • Fallacies

Table 3: Argumentation strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33)

4.3.3.1 Topoi

The concept of topoi has not only been of interest for researchers conducting rhetorical and argumentation studies, it has also been the centre of attraction for many discourse studies scholars (Boukala, 2016, p. 249). “[T]opoi were meant by Aristotle (1960, 1991) to be a means for locating and building argument” (Zompetti, 2006, p. 16). In the same vein, Kienpointner (1997, p. 226) argues that by means of topoi arguments can be located because topoi help the one where and how to search for arguments; it is a ‘search formulas’. Kienpointner (2001, pp. 17-18) further distinguishes two functions of the Aristotelian topoi: the first is the selective function, in which they serve primarily to locate and find, within a range of probable arguments, a relevant argument; the second function is that of being the “probative formulas which grant the plausibility of the step from the argument to the conclusion” (Kienpointner, 2001, pp. 17-18).

In DHA, the researcher seeks to establish an integrative framework through connecting the formal, functional and content-related elements of argumentation. The analysis of the content of argumentation schemes is the main focus of DHA (Reisigl, 2014, p. 69). The functional approach includes, according to Toulmin’s functional model (cited in Reisigl, 2014, p. 75),

three main elements: argument, the claim/thesis and the conclusion rule/warrant. According to Reisigl (2014, p. 75), the ‘*argument*’ is either in favour of or in opposition to the claim or thesis, the ‘*conclusion*’ is the link between the argument and the claim, and finally, the ‘*claim*’ denotes the disagreement, or the subject of the debate, which will be either proved or rebutted.

It is worth noting that it is not always the case that topoi are articulated explicitly; however, they sometimes come in the form of a causal, or conditional clause, such as “if x, then y” or “y, because x” (Reisigl, 2014, p. 75). Nor, as argued by Reisigl (2014, p. 75), are topoi considered to be merely an “abstract, general and formal warrant or conclusion”; they are content-related. Reisigl argues that in analysing discourse, more can be revealed through the content-related topoi than through formal or functional analysis, since the topoi can uncover stances, ideologies and controversies and formal or functional analysis cannot. According to Wodak and Reisigl (2001, pp. 77- 80) the analysis of content-related arguments or schemes can be represented by any one of the following schemes or topoi, although this list is by no means exhaustive:

NO	Topos	Warrant
1	The topos of advantage or usefulness	If an action under a specific relevant point of view will be useful, then one should perform it.
2	The topos of definition	If an action, a thing or a person (group of persons) is named/designated (as) X, the action, thing or person (group of persons) carries or should carry the qualities/traits/attributes contained in the (literal) meaning of X.
3	The topos of danger or topos of threat	If a political action or decision bears specific dangerous, threatening consequences, one should not perform or do it.
4	The topos of humanitarianism	If a political action or decision does or does not conform with human rights or humanitarian convictions and values, one should or should not perform or make it.
5	The topos of burdening or weighing down	If a person, an institution or a ‘country’ is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens.
6	The topos of finances	If a specific situation or action costs too much money or causes a loss of revenue, one should perform actions that diminish the costs or help to avoid the loss.
7	The topos of reality	Because reality is as it is, a specific action/decision should be performed/made.
8	The topos of numbers	If the numbers prove a specific topos, a specific action should be performed/not be carried out.
9	The topos of law or topos of right	If a law or an otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative action, the action has to be performed or omitted.
10	The topos of authority	X is right or X has to be done or X has to be omitted because A (= an authority) says that it is right or that is has to be done or that it has to be omitted.
11	The topos of history	Because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform or omit a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.
12	The topos of culture	Because the culture of a specific group of people is as it is, specific problems arise in specific situations.

Table 4 Topoi (compiled from Wodak and Reisigl, 2001)

Zompetti (2006, p. 20) argues that topoi serve as a ‘decoding system’ that enables a researcher to pin down the particular argument that a person is engaged in. Having the classification of the topoi as illustrated in the above table in mind can help any person to identify the topoi in any arguments; without a knowledge of this type of classification, the topoi may go unnoticed.

4. From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Perspectivization, framing or discourse representation	Positioning a speaker’s or writer’s point of view and expressing involvement or distance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diectics • Direct, indirect or free indirect speech • Quotation marks, discourse markers, particles • Metaphors • Animating prosody etc. • Diminutives or augmentatives

Table 5: Perspectivization, framing or discourse representation strategies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33)

By means of the perspectivization, framing or discourse representation strategies, discourse analysts first examine speakers’ involvement in or detachment from discourse and then go on to examine their position, or stance, from the discriminatory discourse they report, quote, describe (Reisigl and Wodak, 2005, p. 45). Involvement and detachment are expressed by the use of free speech and by the use of quotation, either direct or indirect. While indirect speech is considered an indicator of distance, direct speech and free indirect speech express the “speaker’s and evoke the hearers’ involvement” (ibid., p. 83). KhosraviNik (2010, p. 58) argues that perspectivization also includes language choice where a discourse producer decides what to choose in a particular situation. However, only the strategic choice is what interests CDA analysts not all forms of language where a word choice, on the micro- level, could reinforce a particular ideology and vice versa.

5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, intensified or mitigated?

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Modal) particles, tag questions, subjective, hesitations, vague expressions etc. • Hyperboles, litotes • Indirect speech acts (e.g., question instead of assertion) • Verbs of saying, feeling, thinking etc.

Table 6: Intensification, mitigation (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 33)

Intensification and mitigation strategies play an influential role in discriminatory discourse, since they work either to sharpen the discourse or to tone it down through the use of illocutionary force.

In the previous sections, the overall methodological apparatus of the DHA has been explained. However, in the current study, the focus was on the construction of the main Iraqi themes, and the selection of which devices and strategies to use was decided by the research questions and the type of data obtained.

4.3.4 Level of Context

In DHA, as well as other approaches in CDA, when analysing any textual data, great emphasis is placed on the context. Meyer and Wodak (2009) identified four dimensions of context. The first of these is the immediate text-internal (intra-textual); linguistic choices and other pragmatic uses of language within the same text are examined in order to determine how they affect the interpretation of references (anaphoric or cataphoric elements) (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67). The second level of context is the inter-textual, which is mainly concerned with the relations between texts: i.e., intertextual and between discourses - interdiscursive elements. The finding explicated by the text analysis contributes to the dialogicality among texts, genres and discourses as well as to the understanding of discursive strategies (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67). The next level of context is the institutional context (extra-linguistics), or what is also referred to as the ‘context of situation’. This level works on explicating “‘discourses in place’ in a given society, and account for historical development of certain discourse topics and public memories on specific areas” (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67). The context of situation could include the place, time, formality, communicative events, ideology, sex or gender, and the political and interactive roles of the interactants, education, ethnicity, region, nationality (Blackledge, 2005, p. 18). The last and broadest of the four levels is the socio-political context in which the discursive practices are embedded. This level works on forming “socio-cultural public cognition and the society’s collective ‘old knowledge’” (KhosraviNik, 2010, pp. 66-67).

It is concerned with the history of a particular event along with the history of all discourses that are associated to this event (Blackledge, 2005, p. 18).

It must be noted that it is not always the case that discourse analytical study is systematic or restricted in terms of order. Linguistic and contextual levels of analysis may move up and down and the dialogic relationships operating among the levels are maintained simultaneously.

The context affects texts at different levels. For example, the reporting of the 2003 war propaganda concerning Iraq in the US media was widespread. Thus, on the socio-political level, Iraq became a topic for the media to talk about. The media (institutional context) in one country might take a particular political or ideological stance and control access to the news and as a result represent Iraq negatively, but this might be different from the way the media in another country report Iraq (intertextuality). Also, with regard to the immediate text-internal, Iraq was referred to in various ways as a ‘threat’, an ‘axis of evil’ etc. However, to understand the 2003 US-led invasion war in Iraq it is important to understand the socio-political and historical context of other previous wars e.g. e.g., 9/11, Desert Storm, the Iraq-Iran war etc. It is therefore important to emphasise salient aspects within the levels of context, since they contribute to the results of the research.

Kristeva (1986) observed that intertextuality suggests “the insertion of history (society) into texts”, and vice versa. Fairclough (1992, p. 102) subsequently interpreted this “insertion of history into a text” as meaning that texts are influenced and structured to a great extent by texts that were written in the past, since they are considered as main constituent of history making. While ‘the insertion of text into history’ implies that texts respond to, place emphasis on, or even modify and rewrite the texts in the past which in turn contribute to the process of history making and “contributes to wider processes of change, as well as anticipating and trying to shape subsequent texts”. He adds that such inherent historicity character of texts enable them in taking major roles in making cultural and social change in the contemporary society

Fairclough (1992, p. 102) also states that all utterances are made of constituents and ‘snatches’ of other utterances said by others. Bakhtin (1986, cited in Fairclough, p. 102) argues that:

Our speech... is filled with others’ words, varying degrees of otherness and varying degrees of “our-own-ness”, varying degrees of awareness and detachment. These words of others carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, rework, and reaccentuate.

In the case of news articles, intertextuality is in operation as the reproduction and reframing of the discourses of those in power is constantly taking place.

Re-contextualisation occurs when an element is transferred to a new context and as a result to some extent acquires a new meaning. De-contextualisation happens when elements are taken out of their context. This can be seen in the reporting of political speeches in different newspapers: extracts from the speeches are used to serve the journalistic purpose of the newspaper in question. Each extract will be re- and de-contextualised according to the new frames and to some extent may acquire a new meaning (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009, p. 90).

Interdiscursivity is used to deal with the links between discourses by conceiving them as topic-related; for instance, discourses on the Iraq wars and conflicts frequently refer to topics and sub-topics of other discourses on previous wars, such as recalling Halabja, which happened in 1988, when referring to the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

4.4 Corpus linguistics: an overview

Corpus linguistics is a methodology that contains methods designed to study language in use (Lindquist, 2009, p. 1). Corpus linguistics, according to McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 1), is “the study of language based on examples of real life language use”. Corpus linguistics is a methodology that can be incorporated into different areas of linguistics. Linguistically, a corpus is a collection of language texts, usually thousands or millions of words, that are sorted electronically (Baker *et al.*, 2006, p. 48). Electronically encoded texts help researchers to carry out complex calculations that uncover language patterns that would otherwise require a lengthy manual process (Baker, 2006, p. 2).

CL is not viewed as a monolithic field; rather it is a set of different methods implemented on naturally occurring data that are saved in an electronic form. While many of the corpus linguistics methods are quantitative in nature, in that they take the form of statistical tests carried out by means of computer software, a qualitative analysis, where human input is required, is also a crucial part of any corpus-based analysis (Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 274).

Originally used solely as an approach in English grammar studies, corpus linguistics has undergone a thorough renaissance and the scope of corpus linguistics has been broadened considerably. Although ‘corpus linguistics’ is a relatively modern term, the field had a history before it was properly established and known by its current name. Many studies, according to McEnery and Wilson (2001, pp. 2-3), have not been categorised or identified under the umbrella of corpus linguistics; however, linguists such as Boas (1940), who had structuralist backgrounds, used a methodology that could be classified nowadays as corpus-based. In a

reference to an early use of corpus linguistics, Harris (1993, p. 27) describes the approach used at that time as using a number of recorded utterances as a corpus.

According to McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 3), the corpus-based description harks back to the nineteenth as well as the early twentieth century, when diaries of children's language were used in language acquisition research as primitive corpora (roughly 1876-1926, Preyer, 1889; Stern, 1924). Studies on language acquisition have gone beyond studying diaries to include large corpora and longitudinal studies (e.g., Bloom, 1970). McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 4) add that Fries and Traves (1940) were among those linguists who used corpus in second language pedagogy research. In this regard, vocabulary lists (Kennedy, 1992) and word counts (Thorndike, 1921) were derived from the corpus for foreign learners. However, the number of corpus-based studies remained very limited until 1970, when Brown corpus was the first computer corpus that had actually been created ten years earlier. The corpus had been created in 1960, at a time when generative grammar dominated linguistics studies and any other approaches, such as those that used corpora, were not seen as acceptable, so the idea of using a machine-readable corpus was not warmly accepted by many linguists (Meyer, 2002, p. 1). McEnery and Wilson (2001, p. 24) argue that corpus linguistics has gone through periods of neglects and was abandoned in the 1950s owing to a series of criticisms. It was not until the 1980s onwards that corpus linguistics really started to bloom, with many arguments being put forward in its favour and on the side of using corpus linguistics in research.

The use of corpus linguistics methods in (critical) discourse analysis is relatively new (Baker *et al.*, 2008). The first to use it were researchers such as Stubbs and Gerbig (1993), Hardt-Mautner (1995) and Krishnamurthy (1996). However, according to Mautner (2009, p. 36) it was Stubbs's (1996) *Text and Corpus Analysis* that really took corpus linguistics into a position of prominence. Since then, the awareness of its potential usefulness as a research application has grown, many studies were conducted that demonstrated the contribution of CL to CDA, and more and more analytical concepts and tools were developed. In addition, more software was introduced, such as Wordsmith, Antconc, Sketch engine Wmatrix etc. The people who developed the combination of CL and CDA research were those with a corpus linguistics background, rather than CDA practitioners (Mautner, 2009, p. 36).

On the discourse analysis side, de Beaugrande (1997) made early references to corpus linguistics in two edited volumes. However, Mautner (2009) argues that the appreciation of the use of corpus linguistics as a methodology in critical discourse analysis took some time to materialise. For instance, whereas CL was not present in the first edition of Wodak's (2001)

Methods of critical discourse analysis, a whole chapter on it was included in the second edition (2009). Since the 2000s, there has been a considerable number of studies that have used corpus linguistics methods; for instance, Fairclough (2000) *New Labour, New Language*, and Oripn's (2005) *Corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis: Examining the ideology of sleaze*; studies in the fields of education (Mulderigg, 2003), grammar (O'Halloran and Coffin, 2004), reader positioning (Coffin and O'Halloran, 2005), metaphor (O'Halloran, 2007; Koller *et al.*, 2008; Taylor, 2008; Cesiri and Colaci, 2011; Semino *et al.*, 2017), newspapers (Johnson *et al.*, 2003; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Bednarek, 2006) and politics (Partington, 2003; Sotillo and Wang-Gempp, 2004) among many other studies.

4.4.1 Combining CDA and CL

One of the main criticisms of CDA concerns the risk of subjectivity when researchers are choosing texts, or the possibility that they will select unrepresentative texts to prove a point. Researchers might have preconceptions about the topics they are investigating. It has been noted by Wilson (2003, p. 411), observing a number of studies, that researchers already have judgments before they start their analysis which in turn could influence the results.

The corpus-based approach, by contrast, provides a 'high degree of objectivity', since it reduces researcher bias by using many statistical measures and by dealing with huge amounts of data, and texts are approached either without, or with relatively few, preconceived notions about the content (Baker *et al.*, 2008). However, researcher bias cannot be removed completely, since although computers work on sorting the patterns, collocates, frequencies and concordance lines, and although the results are based on statistical tests, researcher input is still involved (Baker, 2006). This is because corpus-based analysts depend on qualitative as well as quantitative analysis. The analyst works with hundreds of concordance lines that are sorted by a concordance programme by which the analyst is informed, and he or she decides where to cut off the lines and how to make sense of the concordances; it is the analyst who finds interesting patterns and decides which texts or words should be included in the analysis, and also which tools of analysis are to be used. Sometimes the analyst needs to expand the concordance lines to see the whole context in order to be able to make an interpretation, or he or she may need to consult other theories. Researchers might need to use sampling methods to reduce the number of concordance lines. Furthermore, many practical studies in corpus linguistics have proved that different corpus methods can produce different results (see section 4.4.2).

CDA practitioners have also been accused of selecting a limited amount of texts or of conducting a small-scale analysis. Sometimes it is difficult to suggest the presence or absence

of a discourse by single words, phrases and constructions. The construction of a specific discourse can best be seen by the cumulative effect of collecting numerous instances of that discourse, because “[e]very word is primed for use in discourse as a result of the cumulative effect of an individual’s encounters with the word” (Hoey, 2005, p. 13). This is where corpus linguistics comes into its own: in enabling the researcher to discover the association between words that occur repetitively that might reveal discourses of ideological nature.

Another useful application of corpus linguistics is that it shows the continually changing position of discourse by means of examining the changing frequencies of a particular word under investigation diachronically, or by comparing different corpora in different time spans. This also makes it possible to see whether a particular word is used more in one context than in another and whether the meaning of the word has changed over time (Baker, 2006, p. 15).

Furthermore, when quantifying the discourses in a large corpus, the tools of corpus linguistics make it easier to sort and identify many of the CDA notions. Also, the CDA theory can help in interpreting the findings. For instance, many CDA notions such as topoi and topics, referential and predicational strategies, can be identified by means of collocates, concordances and keywords.

4.4.2 Assessing Methodologies used in Corpus-based CDA Studies

It should be noted that there are many different ways of combining CL and CDA, and in the numerous studies that have done so one can find a different balance between the two methods. Some CDA studies avoid quantitative analysis altogether and focus on the (interpretive) analysis of concordance lines. Others derive collocates from the concordance lines manually, sorting the concordance lines without using any statistical measures which might miss many significant collocates or include those that are insignificant. Some other researchers who preferred to conduct a more comprehensive qualitative CDA analysis have used key words and collocation as a way of reducing the number of concordance lines. The method selected also largely depends on the type of the study and the availability of the data: for instance, a huge amount of data might need to be downsized by using collocates and key words. With a small amount of data, on the other hand, it may be better to investigate it through studying each individual concordance line, because applying collocation tools might not produce many collocates, and as a result the findings might not be representative.

Researchers have attempted to see whether the findings are consistent when corpus-based discourse analysis is employed by different analysts and also by different analysts using

different methods. For instance, Marchi and Taylor (2009) study involved researchers who were working independently on newspaper article corpora in an attempt to answer the question “How do journalists talk about themselves/each other and their profession in a corpus of British media texts?” While the results showed that the findings of some researchers were incompatible with each other, it also showed that some were complementary and confirmed one another. Similarly, Baker (2015) compared five corpus analysts who were working separately on a study the aim of which was to uncover the representation of foreign doctors in newspaper articles. The findings showed that three of the analysts have shared quarter of the findings especially those with the most mentioned constructions of the foreign doctors as having poor English skills, not competent etc. However, the majority of the results were only revealed by single analysts because they are these results were related to phenomena that are not frequent in the corpus and therefore they went unnoticed when using corpus analysis. In these studies, Baker suggests two useful strategies that could be employed in the analysis. The first was to carry out a thorough search of concordance lines of a particular word and read all the concordance lines, instead of taking just an example of the concordances. The other strategy was to triangulate different methods.

Similar to Marchi and Taylor (2009), Baker and Levon (2015) conducted a study in which two authors worked independently on a similar set of data to answer the same question “How are different types of men represented in the British press?” The first author (Baker) used a corpus-based approach on a large corpus of approximately 44.1 million words, while the other (Levon) conducted a qualitative analysis on a down-sampled set of 51 articles of the same corpus. The main aim of conducting such a study was to see whether the large corpus acted against cherry picking and to determine whether the two methods of analysis produced different findings. Unlike Marchi and Taylor (2009), the findings showed that they were either “complementary (different but contributing towards a wider picture)” or they shared the same findings and no uncovered or contradictory findings were reported in either approach.

In another study, Baker and Egbert (2016) attempted to assess ten corpus linguistics methods⁷ used by researchers who worked independently on a 400.000 word corpus created for this purpose on a question + Answer forum discourse of online web pages in four world English varieties UK, US, India and the Philippines and three topic areas to answer a two-part question “[i]n what ways does language use in online Q+A forum responses differ across four world

⁷ The methods are: lexical bundles, collocational networks, semantic annotation, keywords, variations analysis, multi-dimensional analysis, pragmatic features, gendered discourses, qualitative analysis of stance and stylistics perception analysis.

English Varieties (India, Philippines, UK, and US)? The results showed that the findings of the analysis of the ten methods were not the same for all the methods. The findings were complementary, whereas some of the findings were agreed on by multiple methods there was also a disagreement on others as there is some findings that are only unique to a particular method. Baker and Egbert (2016) concluded that using one method alone can cause a researcher to overlook a huge amount of information about a particular discourse. They added that “it seems that we are only finding a few pieces of a large puzzle with each method”. Therefore, in order to discover more pieces of the puzzle it is effective to triangulate a few different methods when approaching the same data.

The important conclusion drawn by such studies, as argued by Baker and Egbert (2016), is that different research questions and language corpora may require different corpus methods. Of equal importance is the fact that researchers should choose the right corpus to answer a particular research question. Furthermore, the methods selected should be well suited to answering the research question.

4.4.3 Data selection, collection and description: building a corpus

The collection and selection of data for the current study were based on four criteria: availability, coverage, specific discourse concentration, and periods of time. The availability criterion was determined by the availability of US newspapers in the LexisNexis⁸ database. LexisNexis is an online searchable database of news articles that provides access to a large archive of newspaper texts. This online database imposes some access restrictions: e.g., the number of the articles returned from each search query should not exceed 3,000 articles per hit, and only the texts are permitted to be extracted from the original articles; in other words, no visuals are available or downloadable. With regard to the coverage criterion, the ‘Major US Newspapers’ (see Table 7) were chosen. The reason behind this selection is that the ‘Major US Newspapers’ shown in Table 7 are already categorised and named under such label in LexisNexis which makes it easy to access and download. Furthermore, according to LexisNexis such newspapers are among the top 50 newspapers in circulation in US⁹

⁸ www.nexis.com

⁹ <https://www.nexis.com/results/shared/sourceInfo.do?csi=307574>

No	Major US Newspapers
1	Daily News (New York)
2	Journal of Commerce
3	Los Angeles Times
4	Newsday (New York)
5	Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
6	St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)
7	Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN)
8	Tampa Bay Times
9	The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
10	The Baltimore Sun
11	The Buffalo News (New York)
12	The Christian Science Monitor
13	The Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK)
14	The Denver Post
15	The Hartford Courant
16	The New York Post
17	The New York Times
18	The Orange County Register
19	The Philadelphia Daily News (PA)
20	The Philadelphia Inquirer
21	The Tampa Tribune (Florida)
22	The Washington Post
23	USA Today

Table 7: The major US newspapers

The concentration of discourse on Iraq in specific wars was to be collected, in particular the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion in 2003. In order to avoid irrelevant documents when compiling different corpora from different wars/conflicts, different query words were developed for each war, as shown in Table 8.

War/Conflict	Key words used
Iraq-Iran	Iraq! OR Saddam Hussein OR Saddam AND Iran! OR Khomeini
US-led Invasion	Iraq! OR Saddam Hussein OR Saddam AND US OR America! OR United States

Table 8: Query words

The exclamation mark (!) acts as a wildcard for searching the word variation, because it finds the root of words and all the letters that are added to it. For instance, searching for *Iraq!* will retrieve all the articles that contain *Iraq, Iraqi and Iraqis*. The AND connector is used to look for words that are far apart from one another in the same article, whereas OR is used to find documents that have either or both of the words linked by the connector OR.

With the needs of the research questions in mind and using the query words, two large corpora were produced, the Iraq-Iran corpus and the US-led invasion corpus.

Table 9 shows the number of articles retrieved from the query words specified for each period for the US corpora and sub-corpora.

War/Conflict	Period	Major US Newspapers Corpora
Iran-Iraq War	22/09/1980 TO 08/08/1988	11160 articles
US-led invasion	12/03/2003 TO 01/05/2003	11264 articles

Table 9: The number of articles retrieved from the UK and US newspapers

4.4.4 Data limitations

There are a number of limitations that need to be considered when combining a quantitative analysis using CL and a qualitative analysis using CDA. First, many newspapers were produced only in a hard copy form, and only a few were archived in a digitalised form; it is only recently that the majority of newspapers have started to have an online archive. For instance, when compiling the Iraq-Iran war corpus of the major US newspapers, for 1980 only *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* articles were found online; it was not until 1986 that the *Journal of Commerce* appeared in the data and the *Tampa Bay Times* was not added until 1987 and 1988. The list of digitalised major US newspapers had increased in 2003 to include *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, *The New York Post*, *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri)*, *Daily News (New York)*, *Tampa Bay Times*, *USA Today*, *The Denver Post*, *Journal of Commerce*, *The Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK)* and the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*. The list had become even longer by 2014 with the rise of ISIS terrorist group. However, the number of articles and their coverage differed from one newspaper to another; for instance, the number of articles was 1, 6 and 261 in the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, *Journal of Commerce* and *The New York Times* respectively.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the online articles can only be retrieved in the form of texts without pictures or videos. In this regard, Moore *et al.* (2008, p. 4) demonstrated how important visuals are in a study when they conducted a content analysis on a sample of British press about British Muslims from 2000 to 2008. They found that visuals are used to capitalize on the differences between the culture and religion of Muslims and non-Muslims (Moore *et al.*, 2008, p. 4). Pictures and videos are part of any story, in that they can reveal much detail as well as making sense for the audience.

Downloading the relevant data can also impose a limitation, since there is no single way or rule for retrieving the relevant articles. This process depends largely on the researcher's knowledge of and familiarity with the topic under investigation that enable him or her to come up with some query words that will access the relevant articles and rule out the irrelevant ones. Word variations and different names for the same thing also need to be taken into consideration: for

instance, Baghdad, Falujah, Basra, Mosul and other Iraqi cities can refer to Iraq itself, especially when they became well known to the US media audience, having been mentioned many times in relation to particular events. Therefore, the name Iraq or the name of the capital city Baghdad are not always used to refer to the country – sometimes another place in the country is used, in which case articles can go un-retrieved. The same thing can be said for individuals and other government principles such as Saddam Hussein. Even if careful attention is paid to all these possible pitfalls, however, there is no 100% guarantee that the derived articles will refer to the Iraq war and conflicts. For instance, Iran and Iraq may appear in the same article but in reference to their national football teams or their oil exports, without any mention of a war.

4.4.5 Key Concepts in Corpus Linguistics

4.4.6 Frequency

The frequency is basically a list that shows all the words in the corpus with their number of occurrences (Baker, 2006, p. 51). Frequency is regarded as one of the main and basic concepts in corpus linguistics. It can be the starting point of any analysis and can help to identify a thought-provoking phenomenon in the corpus. Frequencies can direct the researcher where to look for or where to put more emphasis on an investigative pattern. The frequency list of a particular corpus can provide a great deal of information on the way the ‘sociological profile’ of a particular word is used in the corpus in a particular context (Baker, 2006, p. 47).

In the context of the current study, the frequency list could shed light on where Saddam, Halabja, Iraqi people, CWs and Iraqi Shiites were used the most or the least in US press corpus and in which period. Knowing where they were reported the most or the least or whether the frequencies fluctuated could highlight a pattern for further investigation. In Figure 5, for instance, the data show that there was an enormous difference in the frequency of how the word Saddam was used during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion, which was owing to the high level of reporting during the period of the 2003 invasion. Such a difference could bring to the attention an interesting finding and in this case reveal how the frequency of reporting Saddam changed over the period of the wars; it could also explicate why Saddam had become important in this period.




Figure 5 Frequency comparison of Saddam in Iraq-Iran War and US-led Invasion

In this respect, Baker accentuates the importance of frequency to discourse analysis, stating that “language is not a random affair”, since people have a choice when selecting words, and the choice of particular words over others can reveal the intentions of the speakers; this is why frequency is so important (Baker, 2006, pp. 47- 48).

4.4.7 Concordances

A concordance is the list that shows the lines where the word under investigation in a corpus occurs. The search word appears in the middle of a concordance; it is usually known as a node, and is surrounded by words to the right and to the left revealing by that a bit of context¹⁰. The search word is usually defined as a ‘key word in context’ (KWIC). The search word can take the form of a single word or multiword phrases and can sometimes be accompanied by tags or wildcards. Furthermore, concordances can be alphabetically sorted one or more places to the right or the left, allowing more linguistic patterns to be revealed (Baker *et al.*, 2006, pp. 42-43). The alphabetical sorting can bring to the attention similar patterns before and after the search word that could go unnoticed when only human observation is used, especially in a very large corpus. The main purpose of concordances is to find patterns of interest to the researcher in the language used in the corpus. Such patterns could be established through repetitions around the key word in the context in the whole corpus, whether using similar words or synonyms, or quasi-synonymous words or phrases.

¹⁰ The context can be further expanded in different ways depending on the software used. For instance in WordSmith the whole context can be accessed through double clicking the concordance line, or by pressing F8 to obtain a fatter context or even by pulling down the line of interest to give a wider or fatter context.

4.4.8 Collocation

Important aspects of a word's meaning can be identified through its association with words with which it tends to co-occur frequently, when these aspects are not contained within the word itself (McEnery and Hardie, 2012, p. 123). As Firth (1957) puts it, "you shall know a lot about a word from the company it keeps" (cited in Baker, 2006). When a word tends to occur near other words regularly, such co-occurrence is called collocation.

In many instances, the patterns in the concordances are not clear. For instance, when concordances are sorted one place to the right or left, collocates might appear close to the node. However, sorting words two, three, four, or five places to the right or left can reveal more collocates that are near each other. Different spans can produce different collocates. The relationship between the words should be statistically significant. Therefore, different statistical tests have been devised. The first of these is the Mutual Information (MI) test, which examines "all of the places where two potential collocates occur in a text or corpus"; the higher the MI scores are the stronger the collocation. However, in this type of test, high scores are given to words of a relatively low frequency (Baker 2006: 102). Therefore, other statistical tests have been proposed: for instance, z-score, MI3, log-log and log-likelihood. Each of these tests has a different focus. Whereas in Log-likelihood and MI3 the main focus is on the grammatical words, log-log places the emphasis on the lexical words, although, as in the MI test, low-frequency words are given the importance. The use of statistical techniques is dependent on the interests of the researcher and the purpose of the study: "high frequency function words (Rank by frequency, low frequency content words (MI, Z-score, log-log, observed/expected), or a mixture of both (MI3, log-likelihood) (Baker 2006: 102).

4.4.9 Software Review

The choice of suitable CL software is mainly dependent on the aims of the study and the tools required to achieve these aims. Different software can serve different purposes, as illustrated in the following sections. Furthermore, there are many factors that can limit the choices of the researcher, such as the size of the corpus, tasks, functionality, availability, guidance and language.

4.4.10 WordSmith Tools

The WordSmith Tools software was used in this study for the reason that I am more familiar with it and its functionality than with other tools, and because it allows more searches on different words to be carried out in more than one window. It is described by its developer,

Mike Scott, as a “suite of software” and as “a Swiss army knife with its various components...[that] offers a number of different tools for different jobs” (Scott, 2001, p. 47).

Furthermore, WordSmith Tools is “organic software!” (Scott, 2010, p. 4) in the sense that it changes over time. There have been many versions; since the first Version 1.0 launched in 1996. Its developer, Mike Scott, continued changing it to accommodate the needs of users through adding more features and improvements. The current Version is 7.0 . Along with the ongoing updates for this software there is an online step-by-step screenshots guide for each tool with its usage. Together with this guide, there is access to Q & A platforms designed by the developer on Facebook¹¹ and Google⁺¹² open platforms called WordSmith Tools that allow users to interact or ask the developer or other online users questions.

The main reason for using it, however, is, the fact that when I tried other software applications such as Antconc and Wmatrix, owing to the huge amount of data used in this research, they crashed and froze. These applications only really work for corpus files no larger than one million words each (Laviosa *et al.*, 2017). Since my research was using corpora containing millions of words each, WordSmith Tools was the obvious choice, since it can handle up to 20 million words easily.

4.4.11 UCREL Semantic Analysis System (USAS)

When semantic annotation and semantic tagging is required, it is better to use Wmatrix, in which a Semantic Analysis System (USAS) that annotates the words automatically is integrated. WordSmith does not have this feature, so the grammatical and semantic tagging had to be done separately before conducting the analysis (Laviosa *et al.*, 2017). After deriving the collocates of the search word in question, the collocates are then compiled in a text document to be made ready for automatic semantic tagging. To achieve this purpose, Wmatrix3¹³, an online software tool that allows corpus analysis and comparisons to be made, was used. USAS semantic tagging categorises words into one of 21 major discourse fields, as shown in Table 10, expanding into 232 category labels. These fields in turn are subdivided into more fine-grained subdivisions (Archer *et al.*, 2002, pp. 1-2).

¹¹ <https://www.facebook.com/groups/wordsmithtools/>

¹² <https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups#!forum/wordsmithtools>

¹³ Wmatirx3 does not run more than 1,000,000 words. For this reason, only the collocates were derived through WordSmith for the research work; these were then compiled in a text file to be run through USAS in Wmatrix3.

A general and abstract terms	B the body and the individual	C arts and crafts	E emotion
F food and farming	G government and public	H architecture, housing and the home	I money and commerce in industry
K entertainment, sports and games	L life and living things	M movement, location, travel and transport	N numbers and measurement
O substances, materials, objects and equipment	P education	Q language and communication	S social actions, states and processes
T Time	W world and environment	X psychological actions, states and processes	Y science and technology
Z names and grammar			

Table 10: USAS Category System (from Archer *et al.*, 2002, pp. 1-2)

4.4.12 Sketch Engine

In this online corpus linguistics software application, the word sketch is used to give an overall idea of the whole corpus. This sketch provides a summary of one page of the collocational and grammatical behaviour of the search word. In this summary, the collocates are categorised according to their grammatical relationship with the search word. For instance, the search word can act as a subject or object of the verb as a modifier of the word, or it can come with a conjunction, preposition etc. (Kilgarriff *et al.*, 2014, p. 2). According to Kilgarriff *et al.* (2014, p. 2), “A word sketch negates the need for reviewing hundreds and thousands of examples found in the corpus one by one. Everything is displayed in a compact time-saving format”, as shown in Table 11, below.

Saddam (noun)

Invasion freq = 16,431 (1,515.96 per million)

modifiers of "Saddam"	nouns modified by "Saddam"	verbs with "Saddam" as object	verbs with "Saddam" as subject
fedayeen 53 10.90 the Fedayeen Saddam	hussein + 5,092 13.42 Saddam Hussein	go 69 9.58 Saddam is gone	survive 33 8.77 Saddam survived
down 8 8.54	airport + 110 8.88 Saddam International Airport ,	oust 41 9.56 to oust Saddam	do 64 7.72 Saddam did
ashbal 7 8.43	loyalist 77 8.55 Saddam loyalists	topple 38 9.26 to topple Saddam	be + 790 7.61 Saddam is
chance 7 8.38	city + 137 8.50 Saddam City ,	remove 37 9.11 to remove Saddam	hide 14 7.56 Saddam was hiding
fedayee 6 8.02	regime 76 8.31 of the Saddam Hussein regime	believe 51 8.96 believe Saddam	have + 321 7.55 Saddam has
tyrant 5 7.93	statue 50 7.94 Saddam statue	kill 74 8.67 to kill Saddam	give 22 7.43 Saddam gave
hour 6 7.72	hospital 52 7.79 Saddam Hospital in	overthrow 20 8.62 to overthrow Saddam	crush 12 7.42 use 22 7.40 Saddam used
case 6 7.71	fedayeen 23 6.90 the Saddam Fedayeen	hate 20 8.53 hate Saddam	destroy 14 7.40 remain 22 7.40 Saddam remains
real 14 7.70 the real Saddam	canal 16 6.37 the Saddam Canal	disarm 21 8.44 to disarm Saddam	

Table 11: Word Sketch for Saddam

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the main methodological framework adopted for this study, DHA, was described, along with the main strategies of this method. This was followed by highlighting the procedures of selecting the corpora and a description of the corpora used in the research. The last section provided an overview of corpus linguistics with its main tools and the software employed in this study. The next chapter will provide the first analysis chapter of the five themes under question in the Iraq-Iran war which make up the basis for making comparison with their counterparts in the other subsequent chapters.

Chapter 5: DISCOURSE ON IRAQ-IRAN WAR 1980-1988

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the discursive construction, in major US newspapers, of the main themes in question in the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran: namely, Saddam, the Iraqi people, the Iraqi Shiites, Halabja and the CWs, with the aim of answering the first research question: How are these themes discursively constructed during the Iraq-Iran war? Furthermore, this chapter along with the subsequent chapters 6, 7 and 8 aim to contribute to revealing the differences between the reporting of the Iraq-Iran war and the reporting of the US-led invasion in the US major newspapers in relation to the above themes.

In order to explore the construction of the main themes in the war, an integrative combination of CL and DHA to CDA has been employed. Through the CL techniques, the collocates¹⁴ were derived for each of the query words: Saddam, Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiite, Halabja and Iraq's use of CWs. These were then categorised according to their semantic meaning to pinpoint the main thematic patterns so that a further examination, designed to highlight the predicational and nominational strategies used around the query words (nodes), could be carried out. This is followed by presenting the main recurring predicational and nominational themes, which demonstrate how the five themes are used and constructed in the US press corpus.

5.2 'Saddam's' themes

Before examining the way Saddam was reported and constructed in the US press, the word frequency of Saddam in the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) period was derived. The frequency list is a helpful starting point for getting an idea about the word distribution in the whole corpus. The word frequency highlights where the words are used the most or the least during the war period. Thus, if the frequency is proportionally increased, this probably tells us more about it than those with a lower frequency, the increase in frequency could reveal something of importance in the press data, for instance if there is an increase of the query word like Saddam in a particular period rather than other it is possible that it tells us that the coverage of Saddam in this period has increased as a result of the increased reporting on Saddam. This increase could be an event or something of importance that led to this coverage. Thus, in Figure 6, below,

¹⁴ Sometimes there are only small frequencies of the search word. Therefore, deriving the collocates will not be effective as there will be very few collocates derived. In this case, only concordances lines for the search word are examined.

which shows the frequency of Saddam between 1980- 1988, the fluctuation in the frequency of the query word is apparent.




Figure 6 The frequency of Saddam in the Iraq-Iran War

It is interesting to note from the line graph above that the frequency of Saddam was at its highest level in 1980. The rise, having examined the concordances lines of Saddam, was due to reporting the confrontational discourse between Iraq and Iran and to some border skirmishes between the two countries which was developed into a full-scale war, with the Iraqi army attacking Iran. The frequency plummeted in 1981 to rise again in 1982, the year when the Iranian army entered Iraqi soil with the intention of overthrowing Saddam. The frequency then went up and down over the next few years, during which the US press reported the Iranian calls to remove Saddam regime which continued throughout the war period and at some points these calls were toned down by the Iranian side. Another notable change also occurred in 1987 and 1988, when the second largest increase can be found which is owing to the use of the collocates in relation to Saddam's removal.

Having calculated the frequency, the collocates of Saddam were then derived in the whole corpus. To achieve this, following Baker *et al.* (2013, p. 37), a statistical measure¹⁵ of a significance threshold was considered that combines a mutual information score (MI) ≥ 3 with a log-likelihood score, which should be at least ≥ 6.63 . The window span is restricted to +/-5 around the node (the query word).

After deriving the collocates in the whole corpora, they were then categorised according to their semantic fields based on the most salient meanings they expressed in the context: for instance, religious-related collocates of Saddam such as 'atheist', 'infidel' and 'nonbeliever' were grouped together and put under the Religion label as shown in Table 12 . This categorisation was done automatically by loading the collocates into a Wmatrix3, web-based corpus analysis

¹⁵ The reason for using this combination of statistical measures, according to Baker *et al.* (2013, p. 37), is that it works on "extracting collocations that are both lexically interesting and statistically significant"

tool used to carry out the semantic tagging with 21 major discourse fields (see section 4.4.11). Semantic tagging helps to highlight the broad themes and topics as well as the overused semantic meanings in the corpus as shown in Table 12.

Semantic categories	Saddam's Collocates
In power	overthrow, overthrown, strongman, overthrowing, leader , ordered, dictator, king, ruler, leadership, victory, autocratic, power, supervised, presided, depose, ousted, deposed, toppled, topple, toppling, topples, fall, removal, removed, uproot, ousting, ouster
Speech acts	referring, vowed, proclaimed, announced, reference, persuading, apologized, wooed, welcomed, quoted, demanded, declared, urging , sworn, suggested
Violent/Angry	feud , threatens, outraged, threatened
Warfare, defence and the army; weapons	war, army, embattled, aggressor, invaded, launched
Social Actions, States And Processes	visiting, rallying, visited, nurtured,
Formal/Unfriendly	foe, unfriendly
Danger	gamble
Law and order	abrogated, rule, punish, punishment
Religion	infidel, Sunni, atheist, secular, godless, Yazid, cult, holy
Disease	crazy
Government	president, government, regime
Crime	crimes
Wanted	wants, urged, ambitions
Arts and crafts	pictures, posters, portrait, portraits, arch
Help	support, supporting
Time: Beginning	initiated
Politics	socialist
Miscalculation	misjudged, miscalculated
Speech: Communicative	speech, reiterating, appeal, reiterated

Table 12 Semantic categories of Saddam's collocates in the whole period

However, a disclaimer needs to be made here: sometimes words that belong to the same semantic meaning were labelled differently when they were loaded into the WMatrix online software. For instance, words such as ‘overthrow’ were tagged as being *In power* label, whereas ‘deposed’ and ‘ousted’ are labelled as *Giving; possession*. However, they can be placed in the same category according to the context to mean overthrowing Saddam. Therefore, the researcher’s input is present in this categorisation. Similarly, sometimes two different words that do not belong to the same semantic meaning could form a semantic theme. The categorisation of the collocates according to their semantic meaning is largely dependent on the context. Therefore, it is important to expand the concordance line for each collocates. These categorised collocates will be studied according to their themes, for instance, overthrow/

overthrown, topple/toppled/ toppling, ouster /ousted, depose/ deposed can constitute a theme as shown in section 5.2.1.

Figure 7 shows the main discourses on Saddam based on the collocates categorisation and their expanded concordances lines.




Figure 7 The encapsulation of widespread discourses on Saddam in Iraq-Iran

5.2.1 The theme of Saddam's overthrow

From Table 12 above, it can be clearly seen how collocates such as *overthrow*, *depose*, *topple*, *removal* and *oust* are used frequently with their spelling variation across all the years in the corpus. The frequency of these collocates varies in different years, referring to different topics in relation to the construction of the figure of Saddam. Thus, before the invasion of Iraq and during the war, such collocates were used to signal Khomeini's attempts to export his revolution through calls for the Iraqi people in general and the Shiites in particular to revolt against the Ba'athist regime and overthrow Saddam as shown in the concordance lines in Table 13.

Khomeini began calling on the Shiites in Iraq, [...], to	overthrow	President Saddam
Khomeini's persistent calls for the	overthrow	of Saddam Hussein
Iraqi Dissidents Form 'Supreme Council' [...]to work for the	overthrow	of Iraq's President,
At the start of the invasion, Tehran radio broadcast an appeal by Khomeini in Arabic to Iraq's Shiites to join the Iranian forces and	overthrow	Saddam
Khomeini appealed strongly to Iraqis to join forces with the invading Iranians and.	overthrow	Saddam Hussein
Al Dawa [...] received strong support from Iran and was dedicated to the	overthrow	of Saddam Hussein

Table 13 Concordances of overthrow

Prior and at the beginning of the war, the period was portrayed in the US press as one of confrontational discourse between the two countries, who had gone to war through words before the real war began. For example, according to *The New York Times*, October 7, 1980, Iraqi officials described the Iranian rulers as 'a clique of ignorant vile liars', 'racist Persian tyrants'

and ‘Zionist stooges’. The views on Iraqi officials expressed on Iranian radio and television were similar, where they were described as ‘the enemies of God and Islam’ and ‘a bunch of atheist charlatans’, as well as Saddam’s invasion being described as an attempt to defend ‘the throne of the Iraqi Shah, the Zionist American stooge, Saddam Hussein’. In these examples, each party resorted to attack the ethos of his rival to construct him as bad character through attaching negative attributes to the enemy. It is worth mentioning that the common discourse between Iraq and Iran in their conformational discourse was the focus on the words of religious and historical nature as will be shown in the subsequent sections (5.2.2 and 5.2.3) . Looking at the above predications as well as drawing on the analysis in 5.4, ‘Persian’, used by Iraqi politicians, is an ideologically prejudiced loaded word that conjure up collective memories of centuries of historical and religious enmity that is circulated and continuously fed in the minds of many Arab. Similarly, Iran saw to disassociate Saddam from being a Muslim and attributing an atheist- like words to Saddam as will be seen in subsequent sections.

As the war continued, the ousting of Saddam became one of Iran’s repeated demands, along with the call for him to pay war reparations and to return all the occupied territories, as well as for him to be named as the aggressor, this being one of Iran’s conditions for a cease-fire. However, in the last years of the war the demand for the overthrow of Saddam was reported by the US press as having been toned down or even disappeared by Iranian officials as shown in the table bellow.

Iran was no longer seeking the	overthrow	of Saddam Hussein as a condition for making peace
Tehran did not insist on the	overthrow	of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as a condition

Table 14 Overthrowing Saddam as a condition

5.2.1.1 The topoi of the threat of Iranian- style government

Through these collocates a fear of toppling Saddam and of a hypothetical Iranian victory was explicated and constructed in the US press. The possibility of a spread of the Iranian fundamentalism or the Shiism that would destabilise the Middle East, coupled with the fear that other Iranian-style governments would be installed in Iraq or other countries, was viewed as a threat to both US interests and those of the Gulf countries as illustrated in Table 15.

Predicational strategies of Saddam

<p>Predication of overthrow/ overthrown, depose, ousted, , toppled, topple, toppling, topples</p>	<p>Iranian- style government</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the installation of an Islamic fundamentalist government similar to the one in Iran led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini - install a carbon-copy Islamic republic in Baghdad. - establish a government in Baghdad sympathetic to his Islamic revolution <p>threat to the Gulf and US</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - could endanger pro-western Arab sheikdoms along the gulf - the border between the Arab world and the Islamic but non-Arab East would effectively disappear. - could threaten the stability of the Persian Gulf region and have far reaching consequences for the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations. <p>threat of Shiism expansion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The revolutionary impulses of the Shia branch of Islam would sweep again down the western shore of the Persian Gulf and into the Levant. Even before the Iranian thrust across the Shatt al Arab
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Table 15 Predicational strategy representing the fear of overthrowing Saddam by Iran

In predicational terms, Iran victory was discursively constructed negatively because it was seen as a ‘fundamentalist government’, a danger to the ‘pro- western Arab Sheikdoms’, a ‘non-Arab’ country that could establish an Iranian- like government next door to Arab countries and as a result threaten their stability by spreading Shiism into the Gulf countries.

5.2.1.2 *Topos of Threat of an Iranian or Iraqi Victory*

In addition to the constructed fear of an Iranian victory in section 5.2.1.1 neither an Iraqi nor an Iranian victory was desired by the US in this war. Any victory had been constructed to be a threat and danger for the entire region. However, an Iranian victory was viewed being as far more dangerous to U.S. interests and that of the Arab countries, and to the stability of the region than an Iraqi victory. Although the notion of an Iraqi victory was seen to be far-fetched and impractical, Iraq was viewed as representing a conventional strategic threat and playing the role of local bully for the Gulf States. Furthermore, it was seen to be a threat to Israel, whose fears stemmed from the fact that an Iraqi victory would give it a stronger voice among the Arab countries, enabling it to form alliances among them and uniting them against Israel.

1. **Israeli concern stems from general fears that an Iraqi victory over Iran would give it a stronger voice in Arab councils**, pulling such moderates as Jordan and Saudi Arabia toward less flexible policies. In addition, an Israeli diplomat said, closer Jordanian-Iraqi ties raise the possibility of Iraqi troops being stationed in neighboring Jordan or perhaps even an Iranian attack on Jordanian targets near the frontier with Israeli-occupied territory.

The Washington Post, October 10, 1980

2. **Most of the smaller Gulf sheikdoms have bad enough memories of Iraqi bullying** and subversive tactics in the '60s and '70s to stifle any desire for an Iraqi victory.

The Washington Post, July 24, 1988

On the other hand, an Iranian victory was constructed as an ideological threat that could upset the whole Gulf region, because it would spread the fundamentalist religion that could 'sweep' the Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as destabilising the region by inciting the Shiites of other Gulf States, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, to revolt. Therefore, the victory of 'Khomeinism' is represented in the news as 'contagious', and as a 'tide' that could 'open the floodgates' and unleash a 'surge' of Islamic fundamentalism in the Gulf.

3. France was not alone in fearing that an Iranian victory over Iraq would **send a shock wave down the gulf.**

The New York Times, July 22, 1987

4. An Iranian victory could **spread Khomeini's fundamentalist revolution all along the Arab side of the gulf**, toppling friendly, stable regimes as far as Saudi Arabia and placing more than half the world's oil reserves in potentially hostile hands. As a victor, Iraq would probably be the local bully, but an Iranian victory could upset the strategic balance in the Middle East. And it's Iran, not Iraq, that is closer to winning.

St. Petersburg Times (Florida), July 5, 1987

5. The Americans have been worried that an **Iranian victory could cause trouble for the Persian Gulf oil producers such as Saudi Arabia**, which have supported Iraq. "A victory by a radical Iran would be a major setback for U.S. interests in the region," Mr. Murphy said in Congressional testimony on Aug. 15.

The New York Times, August 26, 1986

5.2.2 The theme of Arabisation and Islamisation of the war

One of the main recurring referential themes in the discourse on the Iraq-Iran war in the US press is the portrayal of the way the two adversaries constructed each other through the use of topoi of history to serve their own propaganda through propagating the names of early Islamic and Arabic events and figures, as well as other related terminologies. The line in Iraq is presented as being nationalistic and religious, playing upon the historic enmity between Arabs and Persians and dwelling unceasingly on the leadership of Saddam. By contrast, the theme in Iran is completely religious. The battle is portrayed as being for Islam and against an irreligious government. These ideological factors and the vitriolic propaganda were viewed in the US press as being used by each side against the other to achieve their war purposes. Figure 8 represents the main discourses on Arabisation and Islamisation which was derived from Saddam's

collocates *infidel*, *Yazid*, *holy* and *Qadisiyya* and through a more in depth examination of their concordances lines.




Figure 8 Discourses on Arabisation and Islamisation

The US press also portrayed each side as demonising the other and that the main legitimising force in the war for both sides has been drawing on Islam and de-legitimising of the other as non-believer. For Iran such claims were seen as a continuation of Khomeini’s successful revolution against the Shah and therefore, Saddam and his regime were referred to as ‘Infidel, the atheist Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, *The New York Times*, October 20, 1980, shows how the war of words in the two countries was taken to another level, moving to mosques in Tehran and Baghdad, where Muslim clergymen, broadcasted live and condemned Khomeini in Baghdad. The clergymen were quoted as calling Khomeini ‘an imposter who is seeking to lead the Moslem people of Iran astray’. At the same time, in the Iranian capital, the worshippers, quoted in the press, repeated after an ayatollah a prayer asking God to ‘strike down this infidel, Saddam Hussein, and send him to the burning fires of hell’.

Thus, when the war broke out it had already been viewed and presented by Iran as not mere a self-defence of territorial or material things but rather as a spiritual conflict - as a war between Islam and blasphemy. This was articulated in the reporting of Khomeini’s speech:

6. You are fighting to protect Islam and he is fighting to destroy Islam. At the moment, Islam is completely confronted by *blasphemy*, and you should protect and support Islam. You should resist. Defense is something which is obligatory to all. Every person should defend Islam according to his ability. **They have attacked Islam and we have to defend Islam.** There is absolutely no question of peace or compromise and we shall never have any discussions with them, because they are corrupt and perpetrators of corruption and we will not have any discussions with such people. Otherwise, so long as they have weapons in their hands, our weapon is faith, our armory

The New York Times, October 1, 1980

According to this extract, Iran shows that Islam is represented by Iran. Thus, invading Iran is not just invading a geographical place: it is an attack on Islam, and since Saddam invaded Iran he is therefore an infidel and represents blasphemy. For Iran, the war is constructed as being between the good (Iranians) who have to 'protect', 'support' and 'defend' Islam against the evil (Saddam) who wants to 'destroy' Islam and has 'attacked' it. Also, the Iraqis are portrayed as being 'corrupt and perpetrators of corruption'; therefore no 'peace', 'compromise' or 'discussions' are to be had with them.

For Saddam Hussein, it seemed more convincing to throw the same accusations of being un-Islamic back at Iran than to prove his fidelity. Therefore, many references were made focusing on the ethnic strain between Arabs and Persians and evoking the glory of early Islam, symbolised by the Qadisiyya battle. Thus, the war was called 'Saddam's Qadisiyya', in reference to the battle in 636 A.D in which Arabs, under the flag of Islam and led by Sa'd bin Abi Waqqas, defeated the Sasanian Empire and conquered the Persians, led by Rostam b. Farrokh-Hormzod, the Iranian commander. From then on, according to Lewental (2014), Qadisiyya came "to represent a synecdoche for the conquest of Iran as a whole" (p. 892).

7. the Iraqi leader personalized the struggle, calling it "Saddam's Qadisiyya" after a 7th century Arab victory over the Persians at a battle near Baghdad.

The New York Times, July 15, 1982

The discourse of Islamism and Arabism was also exploited by Saddam and other Iraqis, and Iraq radio, through what Wodak and Reisigl (2001, p. 50) term as 'ethnification', 'linguification' and 'religionisation' i.e. Self- Othering strategy via Arabic language and the religion of Islam, disassociating Iran from both Islam and Arabism. The religionisation was done through Saddam's denouncement of Khomeini's regime as 'a non-Islamic revolution' stripping him from being Muslim. The 'linguification' and 'ethnification' strategy was represented in Saddam's statement, quoted in The New York Times September 28, 1980 edition, that 'the Koran was written in Arabic and God destined the Arabs to play a vanguard role in Islam', where he emphasised Iraq's pan-Arabism by showing that the Koran is written in Arabic rather than the Persian language, and rebuts Khomeini's pretensions to world Islamic leadership. It is worth mentioning that similar results were found by KhosraviNik and Sarkhoh (2017) study on the self- other representation of the perceived Arabic identity and a Persian one on social media which showed that both Arabic language and Islam were pivotal constituents of the Arab collective identity of legitimacy. On the Iran side, KhosraviNik and Zia (2014) showed how the Persian identity, nationalism and the anti- Arab discourse were employed in Iranian Facebook

discourse in relation to legitimising the name of Persian Gulf vs the claims of Arab use as Arab Gulf.

In the same vein, Saddam referred to the Iranian in racial stereotypically names, according to *The Washington Post, September 28, 1980*, as "al ajem". '[a]l ajem', which is according to Adib-Moghaddam (2007, p. 66) a term that is often used in a pejorative sense, and often used to describe non-Arab nationalities, in particular the Iranians, to mean 'illiterate', and which then acquires another connotation, in distinguishing ethnically and geographically the Iranians from Arabs, as well as giving Arabs superiority over the Iranians within the domain of Islam.

Similarly, the US press shows that the war was referred to as 'jihad' or a 'holy war' by both countries to legitimise the self and to question the legitimacy of the other religious orientation. The press viewed Saddam as portraying himself as waging a holy war and thereby constructing himself as the true upholder of Islam and the defender of the Arab counties. This move was viewed as an attempt to rally the Iraqi people as well as the public opinion in the Arab countries around him. On the other hand, Khomeini viewed Saddam as a Sunni leader who 'was not a true believer' and thus Iran had launched the holy war into Iraq 'to enforce Islamic law' as seen in example 8 below. Table 16 shows the predicational strategies representing Saddam as utilising the discourse of Islamisation through the use of collocates *holy war*

Predicational Strategies of holy war representing Saddam	
Holy war	<p>Legitimation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - was intended to legitimize the conflict and to portray Iraq as the true defender of Islam, thus challenging the authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah <p>Populism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to bolster public opinion at home and to cultivate new allies in the Arab world <p>Islamism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - by proclaiming the conflict a Moslem holy war, or jihad , to reimpose true Islam [<i>sic</i>] on the "herjetic" mullahs who rule Iran. - against the Iranians because of their alleged transgression from what he has interpreted as the "true" word of Islam's founder, the Prophet Mohammed. - Hussein proclaimed [...] to restore true Islamic practice in the land of the revolutionary ayatollahs. - to question the legitimacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who is a leader of the smaller Shiite faction of Islam - to "defend the ideals" of the Prophet Mohammed.

Table 16 the predicational strategies representing Saddam through the use of collocates holy war

8. Iran's chief justice said his country has launched a *holy war* into Iraq *to enforce Islamic law* and called on the Iraqis to "annihilate" the government of President Saddam Hussein, the Islamic Republic News Agency reported. "*We are Moslems and we want*

to enforce the decrees of the Koran,” Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili said in a sermon at Tehran University.

The Washington Post July 24, 1982

On the other hand, the US press has also showed how Iran also capitalised on the religion through drawing on Shiites history through the use of the story of Karbala¹⁶ which is believed to touch the heart of Iranian faith. A strategy used by Khomeini to mobilise and encourage his population to fight. Such stories “remained at the heart of the Shiites collective consciousness, to be reinvented for any number of immediate political ends” (cited in Mitchell, 2012, p. 56). This story is viewed by one scholar as the “[S]ymbol of [J]ustice [V]ersus [T]yranny in the ideological makeup of the devout Shi’i” (Ram, 1996, p. 70).

9. Iranian Shiites who sacrifice themselves on the battlefield believe **they are following in the footsteps of Hussein, grandson of the prophet Mohammed. It was at Karbala in A.D. 680 that Hussein, his infant son, and 72 companions** were massacred by vastly superior forces supporting a rival claimant to the caliphate. Hussein’s legend helps instill a potent religious motivation among Iran's Revolutionary Guards that is not found in the secular Iraqi Army. The Revolutionary Guards believe they must right the injustices done to Hussein and his father Ali by “liberating” the holy Shiite cities in Iraq and overthrowing the “godless” regime of President Saddam Hussein. Iranian attacks on Iraq in September and October were codenamed **Karbala I, II and III**. Iranian tanks are daubed with the slogan **“to Karbala”**.

The Washington Post, October 29, 1986

The Karbala paradigm has become a living reality which happened once in the dawn of Islam and continued in the consciousness of Shiites to influence their destinies: “it is not symbolic but rather a direct expression of reality” (Ram, 1996, p. 70). As an Iranian scholar puts it: “What happened to Hussein thirteen centuries ago is repeated today whenever and wherever Shiites live and find themselves oppressed” (Chelkowski, 1989). There is also a well-known saying among the Shiites that “every place is Karbala and every day is Ashura” (Campo, 2009, p. 423). This is why some of the battles were codenamed Karbala I, II and III. Therefore, the Karbala paradigm is pictured as a struggle between the injured self and the oppressive other, a fight between oppressed Hussein who is on the God side and, a tyrannical Yazid who is on the dark side.

¹⁶ The place where the third Imam, Hussein bin Ali, and his followers were martyred during an uneven battle that took place on the tenth day of Muharram (the Muslim month) in 680 AD. The Imam’s suffering at the hands of the Ummayyad caliph Yazid ibn Mu’awiya had come to be a symbol of injustice that was committed against the grandson of the prophet Mohammed (PBUH) (Ram, 1996, p. 69) (See also 0) .

In continuation with the religious construction, the US press also highlighted another way of Iran portraying Saddam through likening him with one of the most hated figures in the Shiites history, Yazid as shown in Table 17, who is regarded by Shiite Muslims as the leader of the false Caliphate that slew Imam Hussein, the rightful successor to the Prophet, in the desert at Karbala. Khomeini's Saddam-Yazid metaphor is an attempt to represent Saddam negatively through making an association by guild with Yazid who is already well known in the mind of Shiites.

Iranian diatribes compare Iraq's President Saddam Hussein to	Yazid,	a general in the forces that became leaders of the mainstream Sunni branch of Islam.
In the struggle to succeed the prophet Mohammed, the hated General	Yazid	slew Mohammed's descendant, Hussein, who thus became the most important Shiite martyr. In recent
Iran's enemy in the Gulf war, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, is often portrayed in Iranian rhetoric as	Yazid	, the general of the Sunni army at Karbala
In Iranian propaganda, Iraq's President Hussein is often portrayed as	Yazid,	the general of the Sunni army at Karbala.
At the Friday prayers in this besieged city, the worshipers have added a new coda to the traditional Moslem liturgy wishing good health to the Prophet Mohammed and his family. "Margh bar Saddam	Yazid	Kohfer!" the men, bearded, many with rifles beside them, cried. "Death to Saddam Yazid , the Infidel!"

Table 17 Saddam- Yazid concordances

5.2.3 The theme of Saddam's Pan-Arabism/ Nationalism

It has been shown in the above section of this chapter how the war was portrayed as being religious by both sides of the conflict. According to the press, Saddam had also always appeared determined to become 'a military voice' and power in the region. This was realised through Saddam's collocates *as ambition/s, leader, leadership* as shown in the following concordances Table 18.

Although Saddam Hussein has yet to achieve the sort of clear-cut battlefield victory in Iran he sought to enhance his	ambitions	to make Iraq a major Arab military force,
the border war between Iraq and Iran appears to have as much to do with President Saddam Hussein's.	ambitions	to be the leader of the Arab world as it does with the few miles of disputed territory
Its 280,000-man military force - the principal base of President Saddam Hussein's	ambitions	for regional leadership - is the largest in the Persian Gulf.
another major factor is Saddam Hussein's own	ambitions	to establish his nation of 12.5 million people as the major power in the Persian Gulf region -- once dominated by the late shah of Iran

Table 18 Saddam's ambition

Similarly, Saddam was viewed by the US press as having ambitions for regional leadership or Pan-Arabism. This was done through references to the pan-Arab Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president, showing Saddam as being 'a longtime admirer' of Gamal, or to the fact that Saddam 'has long coveted' his (Nasser's) role and through claims that he 'dreams of being the successor of Nasser' and 'regards himself as the new Nasser'.

10. Behind that goal, however, **lay the naked ambition of Saddam**, as the 42-year-old ex-gunman and lawyer is popularly known. He is determined **to wrench the pendulum of Arab political power away from Cairo toward Baghdad by offering a modern version of Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arab crusade.**

The Washington Post, September 28, 1980

Furthermore, for Saddam to become a pan- Arab was a move that was constructed to be at the expense of the Egyptian leader, Anwar Sadat, when the Arab countries decided to isolate Egypt over Sadat's peace agreement with Israel at Camp David in 1978¹⁷, which shocked all the Arab world and caused strains in the inter- Arab countries relationship as Israel is seen by Arab countries as an occupier of an Arab country Palestine. Therefore, any settlement with Israel was seen to be at the cost of Palestine. The press showed that his accord boosted Saddam and gave him a more influential role in inter-Arab politics and in calling for an Arab summit in Baghdad as well as he was portrayed to be utilising the anti- Israel discourse to achieve his ambition as regional power

11. After the 1978 Camp David peace agreement he called Arab League leaders to Baghdad to condemn the accords, and thereby to underscore Iraq's ideological purity in the "rejectionist" front opposing ending the Arab-Israeli conflict short of Israel's virtual capitulation.

The New York Times, September 28, 1980

12. The attack has brought reality to Saddam's attempt to project Iraq as the Arab world's dominant military power now that Egypt has taken itself out of the war with Israel by signing the Camp David accords.

The Washington Post, September 28, 1980

Furthermore, the US press viewed Saddam as ambitious to be military voice in the Gulf through appearing to be calling for a solution to Arab issues as well as getting close to the Arab countries to create alliances and demanding that Iran return the three islands to UAE, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs, claimed by Iran in 1971 under the Shah's rule

13. He helped to end the conflict between the two Yemens. He took charge of Arab preparations for last fall's Havana conference of countries that call themselves nonaligned and was chosen to succeed Fidel Castro as head of the movement when it meets in Baghdad in 1982.

The New York Times, September 28

14. In addition, Iraqi diplomats have been telling various foreign governments that the return of the islands -- Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs -- are among three key conditions for the end to the fighting. The other two were reported as Iranian recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over the vital Shatt-al-Arab waterway and over other disputed border areas.

¹⁷ Camp David accords are the agreements brokered by the US president Jimmy Carter that were signed by the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin held on September 17, 1978 (Quandt, 1986). According to Telhami (1992) this accord ended the hostility between the two countries that lasted for three decades who have fought four wars and established the peace foundation between the two countries.

The Washington Post, September 25, 1980

Saddam's ambition was also portrayed through showing Saddam's alleged determination to become the Shah's successor as the strongman in the Gulf. This was done through the use of phrases like 'to succeed the late Shah', to play the 'Persian Gulf policeman', 'to be the Shah's successor as policeman of the Persian Gulf'

15. He also *seems determined to succeed the late Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi as the region's strongman*. The Shah, with plentiful oil and United States backing, forced Iraq into a secondary role.

The New York Times, September 28, 1980

16. ...another major factor is Saddam Hussein's own ambitions to establish his nation of 12.5 million people as the major power in the Persian Gulf region -- *once dominated by the late shah of Iran* -- as well as to project himself as the leader of the Arab world as a whole.

The Washington Post, October 7, 1980

5.2.4 Saddam's personality cult theme

Personality cult is defined, according to Pao-min Chang (cited in Pisch, 2017, p. 63), as an elevation of a person's status artificially through building, circulating and propagating his godlike image. On the other hand, from the point of view of religion, personality cult is viewed, according to Árpád von Klimó (cited in Pisch, 2017, p. 63) as "a sum of symbolic actions and texts which express and ritualised the particular meanings ascribed to a particular person in order to incorporate an imagined community". In the same vein, a more widely acknowledged definition of personality cult put by Heller and Plamper (2004, pp. 22-23) as the excessive glorification in a godlike manner of a political figure through the use of media. The common characteristics among these definitions is the manufactured image of a particular person through elevation, glorification, and rituals. Figure 9 shows the main discourse representing the personality cults. These discourses were highlighted through Saddam's collocates *cult, pictures, posters, portrait, portraits* along with their concordances which explicated and highlighted more related discourses.




Figure 9 Discourses on Saddam's personal cult

The elevation and the creation of god-like image of Saddam was portrayed in the US press as incorporating the pre- Islamic ancient Mesopotamian history in creating and building his personality cult. Therefore, he was seen as aspiring to be viewed as Nebuchadnezzar through drawing comparisons between the ancient Mesopotamian leader and himself. This was realised through huge posters and banners that, according to The New York Times, February 4, 1988, “shows King Nebuchadnezzar offering tribute to Mr. Hussein and promising to fight on his side”.

Another notable argument used by the US press to construct Saddam’s personality cult is through what Wodak and Reisigl (2001) name as ‘religionisation’ or ‘religionyms’ which were realised through the predication linguistic means of portraying Saddam playing on the historical and religion enmity and figures, as mentioned earlier, as well as through identifying himself with the war through naming it with his personal name as seen in the Table 19.

Predicational strategies of Saddam in relation to Saddam’s Qadisiyah

- depicted the war as his personal Qadisiyah,
- the war is Hussein's own personal crusade
- has made the war his greatest claim to Iraqi, and Arab, fame and leadership, so much so that it has been officially dubbed "Saddam's Qadisiyah," a reference to the decisive
- the new war is called "Saddam's Qadisiya" to suggest that President Saddam Hussein is headed for an equally epochal victory over Iraq's enemies in what is today the Islamic Republic of Iran
- the Iraqi leader personalized the struggle, calling it "Saddam's Qadisiya" after a 7th century Arab victory over the Persians at a battle near Baghdad.

Table 19 Predicational strategies of Saddam in relation to Saddam’s Qadisiyah

Saddam’s personality cult is also represented in the US press through the collocates *pictures, portraits and posters*. The predicational strategies of these collocates were constructed negatively (see Table 20) through the use of body meronyms referring to Saddam’s specific body fragmentation as ‘mustache and toothy grin’, the use of spatialisation as in ‘everywhere’ or ‘inescapable’, ‘his portrait on everything’, ‘scarcely possible [...] without encountering a photograph’ in a reference that such pictures/ posters are unavoidable. The negative representation has even included telling jokes as illustrated in the following table:

Predicational Strategies representing Saddam personal cult through pictures/ portraits

- poses are plastered **everywhere**
- President's penchant for plastering his portrait **on everything** has become a joke: Question: "What's the population of Iraq?" Answer: "**Twenty- eight million. Fourteen million Iraqis and 14 million pictures of Saddam.**"
- His mustache and toothy grin are **inescapable**
- Yet **no aspect of Iraqi life is too insignificant for his attention**
- It is **scarcely possible** to walk the streets here for more than 20 feet without encountering a photograph or larger-than-life poster of Saddam
- His photos are **everywhere**, showing him kissing babies, checking on public services.
- his visage adorns **nearly every vertical surface** in a variety of guises
- There **is no escape from Mr. Hussein's picture**, which adorns construction fences, offices, hotel lobbies, immigration booths at the airport, gas stations, buses and shop windows. Twelve-foot-high cutouts stand before some ministries.

Table 20 Predicational Strategies representing Saddam personal cult through pictures/ portraits

Saddam's personality cult were seen also through the government-controlled television station and in the press, where 'No word of criticism' was allowed, or their not allowing 'any rivals to emerge':

17. At least half of every evening news show is taken up with film of Saddam Hussein-greeting gold donors, grimly surveying battle sites or receiving foreign visitors.

The Washington Post, August 2, 1983

18. His other protection is that by skillfully using the media, he has projected an overwhelming image of himself and **not allowed any rivals to emerge**.

The Washington Post August 2, 1983

19. **No word of criticism of the** "leader President," as Mr. Hussein is often called, creeps into the state-controlled press [...] Mr. Hussein's image dominates television, greeting visitors, talking with children and exhorting troops, and vocal groups appear most evenings to sing rhythmic ditties praising his prowess.

The New York Times, November 23, 1983

Saddam's personality cult was also shown in the US press as being practiced through a series of coercive procedures followed by his party or other security circles who arrested anyone who spoke critically of Saddam. Also, people were encouraged to join the party to show their loyalty, and if they did, they obtained privileges.

20. The president's principal source of power is the Mukhabarat or secret police, which is led by his half-brother, Barzan Tikriti. The police have an extensive network of informers, and private citizens who have spoken critically of the government have been arrested at night and disappeared, according to responsible sources living here.

The Washington Post November 23, 1982, Tuesday

Furthermore, as part of his personality cult Saddam was seen in a variety of apparel: he sometimes appeared dressed in the Bedouin costumes, Kurdish clothing, the traditional clothes

of the Iraqi peasant, ‘wearing an Arab headdress or smoking a cigar’, ‘in the formal regalia of a field marshal’, or wearing ‘a red-checked turban’. He was also constructed to portray himself as a religious man through praying ‘a Shiite mosque’. This variation is seen as deliberately balanced, aimed at mobilising a strong consensus among the disparate elements of Iraq’s social structure.

What is more, Saddam’s personality cult was compared to the North Korean Kim Il Sung and to Stalin’s one and his rival Khomeini.

Predicational Strategies of Saddam’s personality cult

-
- President Hussein, whose **personality cult** is second only to that of North Korea’s Kim Il Sung.
 - President Hussein, whose **personality cult rivals Stalin’s**
 - built around himself a personality **cult** that approaches the one surrounding his mortal enemy, **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader**.
 - Posters showing him in uniform, holding a baby, smoking a cigar, grave in a business suit are everywhere. **This is a cult of personality Stalin might have envied**

Table 21 Predicational Strategies of Saddam’s personality cult

5.2.5 The theme of Zionism and imperialism collusion

Both countries are viewed in the US press to use anti- Semitism words accusing each other of their cooperation with Zionists or acting as a tool in the hand of Zionists or America. The US press showed how the Iranian officials viewed Saddam as being incited by the superpowers. This is perceived through phrases such as ‘the Zionist American stooge, Saddam Hussein’, ‘the puppet and mercenary Iraqi Government’, ‘an American puppet’, ‘puppet Baathist regime of the infidel Saddam’, ‘a puppet Satan of the great Satan’ and ‘puppet of the Great Satan’. Through the use of these phrases, the press shows how Iran employed this discourse to mobilise the Iranian people through portraying Saddam and the USA/ Zionism as being in the same front that wants to attack Islam. The religious discourse was also employed as a way of mobilising the Iraqi Shiites to revolt and overthrow Saddam.

21. we shall continue the fight against the world criminals, led by America, as firmly as possible. When the **puppet Baathist regime** of the infidel Saddam has, at the incitement of the superpowers, imposed an aggressive war on the Moslem nation of Iran, we regard it our duty to go to the assistance of the proud fighters and valiant youth and actively participate in the field to teach a lesson to all **America’s puppets**.

The New York Times, November 4, 1980

22. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who has variously described President Hussein as “**an atheist**” and “**a puppet satan of the great satan,**” meaning the United States, has been calling on the Shiite majority in Iraq to rise up and overthrow their leader.

On the metaphorical use of ‘great Satan’ in example 22, Dabashi (2015) explains “[t]here is scarcely a phrase more pointed and piercing than “the Great Satan” when Iranian authorities - beginning with the late Ayatollah Khomeini and now Ayatollah Khamenei - use it as a code-name for the United States”. He adds that this is first used by Khomeini after the Iranian Revolution (1977-1979) and since then it has become a “cornerstone of the ruling ideology” in Iran which was later reiterated on many occasions. “As an absolute metaphor of the enemy, ‘The Great Satan’ is embedded in the Islamic Republic”. According to Dabashi, this metaphor is explained by Khomeini as being a way of showing that Iblis is the chief of all other Satans in the entire world and that what Iblis does is seduce people and ‘beguile’ them. The US not only seduces but also murders people. This metaphor, according to Dabashi (2015), since it was first employed by Khomeini, “has had a domestic function: to denounce and repress the forceful temptation of seductions “within” the Islamic Republic - forces that want and plot to open up to the US [...]”.

By the same token, the press showed how Iran viewed Saddam was viewed by Iran as doing an ‘imperialist service’ to the Americans; backing Iraq was also seen as part of an international conspiracy against the revolutionary Islamic government. In addition, the US support of Iraq was viewed by Iranian officials as ‘an effort to force the hostages’ release’, ‘an effort to force the captive Americans’ release’, ‘to gain the hostages’ release.’¹⁸

23. He reiterated oft-expressed Iranian charges that the “superpowers” were *backing Iraq* in an attempt to overthrow Iran’s Islamic Government. Mr. Bani-Sadr

The New York Times, January 10, 1981

5.3 The theme of Iraq’s Shiites

In an earlier section, it was shown that the war was attributed partially to religious causes. This was partly in reference to the Iraqi Shiites when they were called by Iran to revolt. As shown in Figure 10, the total number of references to the Iraqi Shiites/Shiites of Iraq is relatively small; therefore, all concordance lines were investigated, rather than just the collocates, in order to discover the main topic and the themes and how they were talked about.

¹⁸ The Iranian hostage crisis broke out in 1979 when some Iranian students attacked the American embassy in Tehran, taking 60 embassy staff hostage with the support of the revolutionary government. The hostages were released in 1981 (Hodge and Nolan, 2007, p. 363).




Figure 10 The frequency of Iraqi Shiites in the Iraq-Iran War

In predicational terms, Iraq’s Shiites were constructed in the US press in terms of their prosperity and of their political representation in the Iraqi government in comparison to the Sunnis. This comparison was usually accompanied by numbers/percentages showing the ratio of Shiites to Sunnis among the population, in order to demonstrate how Shiites are underrepresented in the government: for instance, concerning the fact that although Shiites make up the ‘majority’ or ‘60 percent’ of the population, they are ‘impoverished’, ‘less influential’, identified with ‘the plight of the poor and the oppressed’, ‘hold little power’, ‘have long resented being ruled by Sunni’, and have ‘little representation’. On the contrary, Sunnis are depicted as being ‘more prosperous and politically powerful’, or as ‘leading members’ of society. Shiites are generally viewed as a disadvantaged group in contrast to the Sunni Muslims as shown in Table 22.

Discursive Strategy	Categories
	<p>Underrepresented</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While Shiites are over half of Iraq's population, they have traditionally been powerless. - The country's Shiite Moslem majority, ruled by an elite of minority Sunni heritage and secular ideology, offers equal ambiguities. - Between 55 and 60 percent of its population is Shiite, yet the rulers are of the Sunni minority. The Shiite majority has long resented the economic, political and social domination of the Sunnis. - The Shiites are by no means barred from top positions in government, and Saddam Hussein--perhaps anticipating the Iranian invasion and a possible threat - Although half of Iraq's population is Shiite Moslem, President Hussein and top leaders in his regime are Sunni Moslems.

Table 22 The marginalisation of Shiites

Furthermore, the predication of Iraq’s Shiites shows that Iran had targeted them as a potential group that could be mobilised to overthrow Saddam. At war, or even before war broke out, both countries were pouring a steady stream of speeches at their people – and across each other’s borders - over the state-run radio and television stations, aiming to mobilise them. Since Iraq’s

Shiites constitute the majority of the population in Iraq, Khomeini was counting heavily on an eventual uprising in the predominantly Shiite areas of southern Iraq to bring down Saddam.

Discursive Strategy	Categories
	<p>Target of calls</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Iran's official radio, meanwhile, broadcast the appeal by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, apparently aimed at fellow Shiite Moslems in Sunni-dominated - Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has repeatedly threatened to "export" his Shiite Islamic revolution into neighboring Iraq, where the government is led by Sunni Moslems. - Ayatollah Khomeini began calling on the Shiites in Iraq, - Iraq, with a Shiite majority controlled by President Saddam Hussein's secular Baathist regime, has been a prime target for the export of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. - At the start of the invasion, Tehran radio broadcast an appeal by Khomeini in Arabic to Iraq's Shiites to join the Iranian forces and overthrow Saddam Hussein's secular Baathist government.

Table 23 Appeals to the Iraqi Shiites

However, the Shiites were constructed as being ‘unmoved’, or it was argued that they showed ‘no signs of unrest’, and this behaviour was attributed to reasons such as they were ‘more motivated by Iraqi and Arab nationalism’, or felt ‘more Arab and Iraqi than Shiite, more a part of Iraq than Iran’ as seen in the following table:

Discursive Strategy	Objective Categories
	<p>Shiites alignment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While the Iraqi Shiites consider themselves Arabs and do not identify with the Iranians, - . Many Iraqi Shiites seem repelled by the excesses of Khomeini's Islamic rule and have responded to the war more as Arab nationalists than as the Iranians' fellow believers. - "I think the Iraqi Shiites feel more Arab and Iraqi than Shiite, more a part of Iraq than Iran," said an Asian diplomat - So far, however, the Shiites have shown no signs of unrest, U.S. officials say. These officials and other specialists say that Iraq's Shiites are motivated by Iraqi and Arab nationalism as much as by sentiments of Shiite solidarity. Persian Iran is a historic enemy of the Arabs - While the Iraqi Shiites consider themselves Arabs and do not identify with the Iranians, - They say they are fighting Iran to head off what they said is Ayatollah Khomeini's effort to export his fundamentalist Shiite revolution to Iraq and neighboring Arab nations, which have Sunni majorities

Table 24 Shiites national and religious alignment

In contrast to this, the predications of the Shiites in the US press also suggest that the Shiite silence might be ‘due to a government crackdown’.

5.4 The theme of Iraqi People

In a similar way to the Iraqi Shiites, the Iraqi people were constructed as a key player in the war from the Iraqi side as well as the Iranian side, as the two countries were racing their discourse toward the Iraqi people. On Saddam's side, Saddam used national, historical and religious discourse to urge them to continue fighting against Iran. On Iran's side, the discourse was a religious one.

Figure 11 shows the frequency of the 'people of Iraq' and 'Iraqi people' in the eight-year war corpus. Owing to the low frequency of query words, the concordance lines were examined for main topics and themes, as shown below.




Figure 11 The frequency of Iraqi people in the Iraq-Iran War

The Iraqi people were constantly being encouraged through Iran radio broadcasts to rise up and oust Saddam.

24. Ayatollah Khomeini urged the **Iraqi people** to “rise up” against the “blasphemous regime” of President Hussein. Additional Iranian radio broadcasts said hundreds of Iraqi soldiers had surrendered.

The New York Times, July 15, 1982

On the other hand, *The New York Times* quoted some of Saddam's speech on the day of Prophet Mohammed's migration (Hijrat) from Mecca to Medina to show how he linked Khomeini with his pre-Islamic 7th century Persian ancestors who resisted the proselytising Arabs. Saddam viewed the struggle in the good and evil dichotomy: the good (Iraqis) who fight for their 'freedom', 'humanity' and 'justice and peace' on the behalf of the earth against the evil (Iran) that represents 'treachery and injustice'. Furthermore, the press shows how Saddam pictured the struggle as being historical, not new, and that it goes in time to the prophet claiming that it is inherited. In addition, 'we [Iraqis] are the legal heirs of our great forefathers who migrated with their great prophet to defend the ideals of the message of Islam', and therefore, the Iraqi people as well as the Iraqi forces are fighting 'against a clique linked by inheritance, thoughts and activity to the Persian Empire that was destroyed by Islam'.

5.5 The theme of Halabja

One of the main and frequently used patterns with which Iraq is collocated is that of the Iranian accusation that Iraq used chemical weapons in Halabja. This theme is pictured through the use of collocates such as *accuse, accusations, assert, charges, said, say, claims* and *reported*. In contrast to the accusations, Iraq's response to the accusations of Iranian and US officials varied from not commenting, denial and admitting it, to justifying the chemical attack.

25. Iraq said last week that its forces had long ago **abandoned Halabja** and did not consider the area important.

26. Iraq has **denied all previous charges** that it has used chemical weapons.

The New York Times March 24, 1988, Thursday

27. Baghdad has **offered no formal comment** on the latest accusation.

The New York Times March 24, 1988, Thursday

28. Iraq **admitted publicly for the first time** today that it has used chemical weapons against Iran in the Persian Gulf war, but it claimed that Iran used them first.

The Washington Post. July 2, 1988, Saturday

29. Iraqi officials **no longer deny using such** weapons

The Washington Post, March 24, 1988, Thursday

30. Tariq Aziz, said Iraq would not hesitate to use every weapon in its arsenal to combat Iranian invasions.

The New York Times April 2, 1988, Saturday

In the following instances, the US press does not express its stance towards Iraq's use of chemical weapons in Halabja and its role is limited to reporting, however, illustrating and listing sources and details that back up and support the story of Iraq's use of the weapons helps to give more weight to the Iranian version and the claims regarding the story. Therefore, reporting Iran's invitations to the UN to investigate the situation, taking Western correspondents to Halabja to see the casualties, sending casualties to European and American hospitals to prove the charges, as well as citing Iraqi prisoners' and survivors' testimonies give credibility to Iran and confirm Iraq's use of such weapons.

31. Meanwhile, Iranian War Ministry officials **presented 28 Iraqi Army officers** in a separate news conference, including **two officers** who said they had **witnessed Iraqi warplanes drop chemical bombs on Halabja** on March 16. Brig. Gen.

The Washington Post March 25, 1988, Friday

32. **Western correspondents** taken to Halabja by the Iranians last week reported seeing hundreds of dead civilians unmarked by wounds.

The Washington Post March 30, 1988, Wednesday

33. according to Iranian officials, a half-dozen Kurdish victims of Iraqi chemical attacks, to land at John F. Kennedy International Airport. The victims were to be taken to St. John's Episcopal Hospital in Queens, according to an adviser at the U.S. mission for Iranian affairs.]

The Washington Post March 30, 1988, Wednesday

34. **Halabja survivors said in interviews that they were certain the gas attack was launched from an Iraqi warplane**

The Washington Post March 24, 1988, Thursday

In addition, Iraq's use of chemical weapons is explained in terms of Iraq defending itself against Iranian offensives when capturing Iraqi cities or strategic locations in Iraq. This pattern is constructed using phrases such as 'to prevent a further advance', 'an effort to halt the Iranian advance', 'to blunt Iranian assaults on Arab lands' and 'to repel a thrust along the southern front by Iranian forces'.

35. The motives behind Iraq's action seem to have been to **prevent a further advance** on an important hydroelectric plant near Iraq's major oil fields and to **issue a blunt warning** to Iraq's 3.5 million Kurds of what they might expect if they joined forces with Iran.

The New York Times, April 10, 1988

36. Iraqi officials no longer deny using such weapons and argue privately that they are used to **blunt Iranian assaults on Arab lands**. In 1984, Iraq used mustard gas extensively **to repel a thrust along the southern front by Iranian forces** who threatened to cut a strategic road between Baghdad and the southern port city of Basra

The Washington Post, March 24, 1988

37. Evidence is plentiful that the Iraqi Army was here in strength. The gas attack came during a large military offensive by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Kurdish guerrillas, who have penetrated 30 miles into Iraq and are now dug in along the shore of Lake Darbandi Khan, where a dam serves as a major hydroelectric power source for northeastern Iraq

The Washington Post, March 24, 1988

Another prominent pattern by which Iraq's use of chemical weapons was reported and viewed is that of the stances of the US and the UN toward such use. Therefore, the event is 'denounced', 'decried' and 'condemned' by the US, and is reported as appearing 'to be a particularly grave violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against Chemical Warfare'.

38. The Reagan administration yesterday *condemned as a “particularly grave violation”* of international law the recent Iraqi use of chemical weapons that reportedly killed hundreds of civilians and soldiers in northern Iraq last week

The Washington Post, March 24, 1988

39. The United Nations *has accused Iraq of using chemical* weapons in the past, and Mr. Kerr said the recent course of the Iran-Iraq war suggested that *toxic gas had been used in the land conflict with Iran* when it seemed that Teheran's forces were on the point of major successes.

The New York Times, March 24, 1988

40. The administration has *sought to head off their use by applying diplomatic pressure to the Iraqi government in private and supporting three U.N. resolutions of censure.*

The Washington Post, March 24, 1988

41. State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman *said the reported gas attack by Iraq against its Iranian-occupied city of Halabja “appears to be a particularly grave violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol Against Chemical Warfare”.*

The Washington Post, March 24, 1988

Having looked at examples 38- 41, it is clear that although the US press reported its government stance on the use of chemical weapons (CWs) against the Kurds in Halabja and against the Iranian forces, neither the US press nor the government adopted a strong stance or negative references, predications or other argumentative strategies to demonise/criminalise Iraq in general, or Saddam in particular, to stop such uses of CW. However, the use of CWs was drawn on heavily and capitalised both in terms of frequency and negativity/demonisation in later wars with Iraq, such as the 2003 US-led invasion, by the US press and the US officials who argued for an intervention to disarm Saddam of the WMDs (see Chapter 7). CWs or WMDs were one of the main pretexts for the invasion of Iraq along with Saddam’s human rights violations.

5.6 The theme of Chemical Weapons (CWs)

One of the important themes that is always referred back to in the later Iraq’s wars and conflicts is Iraq’s use and possession of CWs in the Iraq-Iran war. Thus, to see how the CWs are talked about in this period, the frequency of the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ was calculated in each year of the conflict as shown in Figure 12 which shows that the first appearance of the phrase was in 1983 and its usage then increased in number dramatically in 1984 and then the reporting of CWs continues till 1988 when CWs were actually used in Halabja.



Figure 12 The Frequency of Chemical Weapons in the Iraq-Iran war

However, the frequency calculates all the mentions of CWs in the US press whether they are related to Iraq or other countries as seen in Table 25 which shows the main topics in relation to CWs. Since I am interested in Iraq's use of CWs only the concordances lines of *Iraq, Iraq's, Iraqis, Iraq's* where they are collocates to CWs are investigated.

Year	Main topic
1983	Soviet Union used CW against Laotians and Cambodians
1984	Accusing Iraq of using CWs, US seek a worldwide ban on CW, Regan's proposal for an international CW treaty on CWs ban, control of the export to Iran and Iraq of certain compounds that could be used I the manufacture of CWs, Iranian threaten to manufacture CWs if Iraq repeat used CWs again, Iraq deny the accusation, US condemnation of Iraq's us of CWs, conversation with Iraq to dissuade Iraq from using CWs, Iraq used CWs in Majnoon Island against Iran
1985	Iraq used CWs, US provided evidence that Iraq used CWs, US condemned Iraq use, US concern of the spread of CWs in the world nations, Middle Eastern countries as well as countries are believed to possess CWs or trying to acquire it as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Thailand, Burma, China, Taiwan, North Korea, Vietnam, Iran seeks to develop CWs, Egypt received Soviet chemical weapon training.
1986	Syria and CWs development, US efforts and talks to ban CWs, Middle East countries develop CWs, US controls on eight compunds used to manufacture CWs to Syria, the concern of the spread of CWs, Iraq accuse Iran of using CWs against its soldiers.
1987	Iraq use of chemical weapons, US efforts to ban CWs, fear of spread
1988	Halabja gassing, seeking a worldwide ban on CWs

Table 25 Main topic on CWs in the US press

Having examined the concordances lines of *Iraq, Iraqis, Iraq's*, they showed that in general, the US press's reporting of chemical weapons is characterised by citing different and competing opinions of accusation, denial and confirmation by officials/institutions of third party states, as well as by those who were involved in the conflict. However, the press's stance can also be seen in its weighting of one story over another through citing the comments of professionals in one story to validate a certain version of events or give it more credence. Although the media do not explicitly state whether Iraq used CW in some instances, there are, however, many indications that suggest so. The Iranian charges of Iraq's use of chemical weapons were given credence in the US press by showing Iran's insistence on flying the casualties to hospitals in different parts of Europe for medical treatment and by doctors who had been treating some of the stricken Iranian soldiers and who confirmed that they had been subjected to gas.

42. Thirty-three Iranian soldiers were treated in Western Europe yesterday for lung ailments and severe skin burns **apparently caused by chemical weapons used by Iraq**

in last week's fierce battles on the marshlands of the Persian Gulf war's southern battlefield. Medical specialists in West Germany told Reuter that the Iranian soldiers appeared to be victims of mustard gas, which was used widely in World War I and has been banned by the Geneva Conventions on warfare. Iran's ambassador to Austria, Mohammed Kiriariishi, told news agencies in Vienna that the injuries **were caused by rockets fired by Iraqi planes** in air raids east of the Tigris River last Friday.

The Washington Post, March 23, 1985

Looking at the above example, the word 'apparently', according to Collins dictionary, is used "to refer to something that seems to be true, although you are not sure whether it is or not", which gives more weight to the Iranian story's version of the event. This is further backed by the medical specialists' confirmation of the use of CW and the Iranian ambassador's description of how the incident happened and who was behind it. This forms a complete story indicating one doer, which is Iraq, with the Iraqi voice missing. In this regard, Johnson-Cartee (2004, p. 162) states that "in their efforts to define the situation, select a news frame, and then build upon that news frame, reporters seek evidence whether in the form of expert testimony, written reports, public records, or eye witness accounts, that affirms their approach to the story". In addition, framing the news involves a process of selection and giving salience to aspects that define the problem, as well as promoting a particular interpretation of events (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

Furthermore, the US press's stance is also realised through the construction of the Iraqi response to Iraq's CWs attacks as seen in the following Table 26. Implicitly, the term "deny", for instance, means, according to the online Cambridge Dictionary, "to refuse to admit that you have any connection with something or someone" which appears to imply that the claim of the use of CWs is in fact true giving by that a credence to Iranian story. The act of denial was also constructed to be done "repeatedly" questioning Iraq's credibility. Similarly, the US press shows Iraq's incredibility in relation to the use of CWs through directing the reader to draw inference that Iraq used the CWs without saying it explicitly as in: 'Iraq neither confirms nor denies' and Iraq 'frequently rejected the accusations without denying them' in which the phrase rejected could be neutral whereas adding 'without denying them' is an indirect way of saying that Iraq used these weapons. Similar words are 'avoid' and 'did not contradict the claim' all infer that Iraq used such weapons.

Iraqi responses

1984	Iraq has repeatedly denied using chemical weapons in the war,
1984	Iraqi leaders, from President Saddam Hussein down, have frequently rejected the accusations without denying them
1984	Iraqi officials have generally avoided direct denials of the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons.

- 1984 the Iraqi defense minister **did not contradict the claim but turned the charge around**, accusing the United States of hypocrisy because it employed napalm and
- 1984 Iraq's Defense Minister denounced the United States today for charging that Iraqi forces had used "lethal chemical weapons"
Iraq **has denied that it is using** chemical weapons and offered to cooperate in any investigation
Iraq **no longer denies using chemical weapons**, and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, who is in New York this week, has twice **this year acknowledged Iraq's policy** of employing them.
Iraq **neither confirms nor denies using chemical weapons**, and it defends the relocation of Kurds, claiming it is necessary to protect civilians from military activities near the border

Table 26 Iraq's responses to CWs attacks

The conviction that Iraq was using chemical weapons is also constructed through the citation of reports and other sources accusing or confirming Iraq's use of such weapons through verbs like *confirmed*, *used* or *resorted*, which are sometimes accompanied by phrases that reveal their certainty about the statements: for instance, 'overwhelming evidence', 'incontrovertible evidence', 'evidence was strong', 'available evidence', 'reports' and 'a study'. Furthermore, such statements usually come from sources that enjoy credibility in the global community, like the United Nations, the United States, American intelligence, or other individuals who give credence to the statement, using terms like 'Western European physicians', 'doctors', and 'experts':

Year	Predicational strategies of CWs representing Iraq
	The United States has announced that it has evidence of Iraqi use Administration was also quite confident that it had evidence to support recent charges of Iraqi use of chemical weapons. The United States said " available evidence "
1985	American officials conclude that Iraq is once again using chemical
1985	the United States had received confirmation of such use from Western European physicians who treated Iranian victims.
1986	A team of experts appointed by the United Nations reported today that Iraq had used chemical weapons
1985	The United States has concluded that Iraq again used chemical weapons
1985	A State Department spokesman said the administration reached its conclusion on the basis of reports issued by doctors who examined Iranians sent recently to West German hospitals and on "other indications available to us" that he refused to disclose. "Based on this preliminary evidence, we conclude that Iraq used CW,
1986	Administration experts said intelligence reports showed that Iraq had recently used mustard gas.
1986	The administration, basing its opinion on eyewitness reports and intercepted Iraqi military messages , had condemned Iraq for allegedly using chemical weapons to settle scores with the Kurds for their siding with Iran.
1985	The United States had received confirmation of such use from <i>Western European physicians</i> who treated Iranian victims.

Table 27 Predicational strategies of CWs representing Iraq in the Iraq-Iran war

Sometimes the citation of the sources of Iraq's use of chemical weapons shows the frequency of the number of times Iraq used such weapons; for instance, through the use of the present perfect '*Iraq has continued*', which expresses the notion that the action started in the past and

continues in the present (a repeated action), or through phrases such as ‘*at least three occasions last year*, ‘*on many occasions*’, ‘*on some occasions*’ or ‘*again*’.

43. Department spokesman Alan Romberg said the United States has received reports that Iraq ***has continued to use chemical weapons*** since the U.S. announcement.

The Washington Post, March 28, 1984

44. A team of experts appointed by the United Nations reported today that Iraq had used chemical weapons “***on many occasions***” against Iranian forces in the Persian Gulf war. Mustard gas was the agent most commonly used by the Iraqis, but nerve gas was also used “***on some occasions***,” according to the report, written by the experts and published today under the name of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

The New York Times, March 15, 1986

It is equally important to note that, although the press shows that the US and UN condemned the use of CWs, there were also many reports in which the press is critical of the US and the UN responses to Iraq’s use of CWs. The press accuses both the US and the UN of being lenient and ‘sympathetic’ towards Iraq, acknowledging the use of CWs in the Iraq-Iran war but without naming Iraq as being the user, or even suppressing proposals of formal condemnation, at least in the first years of the chemical attacks. The Reagan administration was also accused of following a ‘zigzag, and contradictory, policy’ toward the imposition of sanctions. The press also criticised Regan’s policies in response to the crisis for being ambivalent as well as for opposing any proposal for condemning Iraq use of CWs.

45. Instead of its wishy-washy position, the Reagan Administration should take the moral high ground, roundly denouncing Iraq for this violation of its obligations and using every legal means at its disposal to put a halt to it

The New York Times, April 5, 1984

46. U.S. officials were muted yesterday in their reaction to Iran's latest charge, saying they had no evidence Iraq had used chemical weapons in the recent fighting and repeating a blanket denunciation of their use ***without naming Iraq***.

The Washington Post, March 23, 1985

47. It was the third United Nations investigation of chemical warfare in the five-and-a-half-year-old Iran-Iraq war and the first time that Iraq was named for using chemical weapons.

48. The United States intervened twice at the United Nations, **first to prevent an emergency meeting to end the war of the cities and later to oppose a formal condemnation of Iraq for its use of chemical weapons.**

The Washington Post, April 24, 1988

In line with this, it was shown in the press through quoting official statements that Iran had also resorted to the use of CWs. However, a distinction was made between Iraq and Iran in regard to their use of CWs: whereas Iraq was said to have used them in the early years of the war, it was 'no earlier than 1987' when Iran used them. There were also instances where the press contradicted the official statements with regard to Iran's use of CWs by providing conflicting evidence or by stating other opinions: for instance, showing that although CWs were used by Iran, this was not to the same extent in comparison to when such weapons were used by Iraq.

49. U.S. and U.N. investigative teams have concluded that Iraq was first to use chemical weapons, perhaps as early as 1982. U.S. reports say Iran's first use came no earlier than 1987.

The Washington Post, July 2, 1988

50. [State Department officials] acknowledge that there is considerable evidence that Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurdish civilians in Halabja, but quickly add that Iran is now using such arms as well, **although Iran's use is not believed to be anywhere near the scope of Iraq's.**

The New York Times, June 22, 1988

51. U.S. officials say Iran may have first used such weapons against Iraqi forces in Tehran's early 1987 "Karbala-5" offensive.

The Washington Post, April 5, 1988

52. They assert that Iran fired chemical artillery shells during the battle for the Iraqi border town March 15-17. "There is ample reason to believe both had a hand in it," one Pentagon official said. "It wasn't a one-way show." Iran has denied repeatedly that it used chemical weapons at Halabja. Reporters who visited the town a few days after use of chemicals **there gave no indication that Iran had also resorted to them.** Iran does acknowledge a chemical warfare capability, however, and there are reports that its Revolutionary Guards are pressing the government to use it.

The Washington Post, April 5, 1988

53. He added, "There are indications that Iran may also have used chemical artillery shells in this fighting." **It was not clear what "indications" the United States had obtained of Iranian use of such shells and Redman would not elaborate.** A U.S. official said the evidence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies of purported **Iranian chemical warfare was far less convincing** than the startling evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks provided by television cameras that filmed scores of dead Iraqi Kurds in the northern Iraqi border town of Halabja.

- Topoi of threat/ danger of CWs spread

The threat of the spread of the CWs was one of the main topoi constructed in the US press whether through reporting what officials says or through the press expressing their own views in this regards. The threat was a combination of criticising the US tilt towards Iraq and expressing the concern of the spread of CWs in the region as a result of this silence. The US tilt

toward Iraq was seen to be on the expenses of CWs spread that was metaphorically likened with the statement: "the genie is out of the bottle . . . arms control is down the drain."

54. State Department sources say that the Administration has held conversations at a high level since late 1983 in a fruitless effort to dissuade Iraq from using chemical weapons. They conceded that the issue is difficult for them, for the Administration has sought to shore up Iraq against the possibility that Iran might win the war, with far-reaching implications throughout the Persian Gulf. But an even larger issue is at stake. As a thoughtful official warned last week, if full-scale chemical war develops, **"the genie is out of the bottle . . . arms control is down the drain."**

The New York Times April 5, 1984, Thursday

55. The report came amid growing international concern that the **use of chemical weapons** in the Iran-Iraq war may **become widespread**.

The New York Times April 2, 1988, Saturday

56. The deafening silence of governments on Iraq's use of chemical weapons has provoked serious concern among defense experts. A major thesis that emerged from the annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies here last weekend was that wars in the third world are not likely to diminish if the East-West conflict wanes, **but increase in scope and intensity as sophisticated weaponry spreads.**

The New York Times September 14, 1988, Wednesday

The topoi of threat, represented through the use of CWs, the threat of becoming "widespread" or the "genie" out of the bottle, the fear of other countries to acquire CWs, Israel's fear of a potential future chemical attack, is further merged with the topoi of responsibility where it is seen that it is the US and the world community responsibility to halt or authorise an international ban on such weapons.

57. Rabin has met with other top administration officials, including Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, to discuss what Israeli leaders now regard as the new primary threat to their security -- the possibility Arab states will use missiles carrying chemical warheads against Israel in a possible future conflict. Rabin said that because Iran and Iraq have used missiles against each other's cities indiscriminately during their war, there is a "growing change of attitude" about using missiles in the area and Middle East nations are engaged in an arms race to obtain surface-to-surface missiles. **In addition, the failure of the world community to halt the repeated use by Iraq of chemical weapons has led to the "international legitimization"** of chemical use in modern Middle East warfare, Rabin said.

The Washington Post June 29, 1988, Wednesday

58. The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war should intensify efforts to establish a global ban on gas weapons, according to a resolution introduced in the Senate on Tuesday. The threat of widespread chemical war increases as additional countries acquire a chemical capability, said Sen. George Mitchell, chief sponsor of the resolution. **The United States should exert every effort to halt the spread of chemical technology** and should step up its efforts to negotiate an international an on chemical weapons,

5.7 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to examine the ways in which Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, the Iraqi people, CWs and Halabja were constructed in the US press in the Iraq-Iran war. The investigation of Saddam has shown that the press reported the confrontational discourse of Saddam and Khomeini and the way they constructed each other, it also showed how through such discourses the two parties positioned themselves as well as the course of events in the war. Therefore, Saddam was constructed as engaging in a 'holy' war through playing on the historical enmity between the Arabs and the Iranian to move his own people as well as those in other Arab countries, and identifying himself with Islamic and other historical figures. In addition, he was constructed as an ambitious leader who had been for a long time seeking to play the role of the Pan-Arab Gamal Abdel Nasser, and become a political and military voice in the region. Furthermore, in the Iraq-Iran war Saddam was never dehumanised or criminalized with strong evaluative attributes and wordings as in the later wars as well as he was not linked, as a person, with the use of CWs used in Halabja or against Iran.

With regard to the Iraqi Shiites, they were constructed as marginalised and underrepresented in the Iraqi government, and as disadvantaged, although they represent the majority of the Iraqi population, in comparison with the Iraqi Sunnis. Furthermore, they were consistently viewed as being an important card in the war. Khomeini, for example, wanted the Iraqi Shiites to be the Trojan horse that would overthrow Saddam. Saddam was also constructed as inciting them through religious and Arabist themes to be able to continue the war. Similarly, the Iraqi people were also targeted to be mobilised by both parties using the same strategies targeted the Shiites through the focus on the historical and religious enmity between the two countries.

In relation to the use of CWs, the reporting varied from reporting the first years of use of these weapons, to accusations and claims regarding their use, to taking an implicit stance through weighting the Iranian version of stories by citing statements by Iranian officials that were packed with the testimonies of casualties, experts, reporters and other people who would have a high level of credibility in the eyes of the public. In addition, the press is also critical of the US and UN stance, particularly in the first years of the CW attack, accusing them of following a zigzag policy and being overly sympathetic towards Iraq.

Furthermore, a victory by neither country was welcomed, as any victory was constructed as being a threat to US interests and the region. This was particularly the case with Iran: an Iranian

victory was constructed as having the potential to destabilise the Arabian Gulf countries and their allies through spreading the Iranian revolution. Furthermore, the continuous use CWs by Iraq amid the silence of the US is constructed to be a threat that could cause the spread of the CWs in the Gulf region.

The results obtained from the analysis by applying the CDA and corpus linguistics theories have explicated and highlighted the US press practices during the Iraq-Iran war when the US government was not involved directly in the war. In this case, the press tended to give all parties involved in the war a voice and access to the press and allows conflicting and opposing opinions in its reporting, as this is not a case of an 'Us-them' war but it was their war. However, Iraq in general and Saddam in particular was an ally to the US in the Iraqi-Iran war, which explains the way the US press constructed Saddam and other themes. Although Saddam Hussein was constructed negatively he was not demonised or criminalised with strong evaluative attributes and wordings as in the later wars. He was also not linked and associated, as a person, with the use of CWs used in Halabja or against Iran. This construction comes in line with Keeble's (2004) argument that it is only after the Iraq-Iran war that Saddam was demonised. Moreover, the suffering and the victimisation of Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were backgrounded and paid no or little attention and this was not problematized.

Chapter 6: US-LED INVASION: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SADDAM

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided an account of the discursive construction of several themes. These themes included Saddam, the Iraqi people, Iraqi Shiites, CWs and Halabja during the Iraq-Iran war. The purpose was to set the scene for this and the subsequent chapters. Each theme would be compared with its counterpart during the US-led invasion to see how it was reported in each period and whether there were any differences in the reporting. The aim of this chapter is, therefore, twofold: first, to explore the discursive construction of Saddam in the US-led invasion, and then to compare it with the construction during the Iraq-Iran war to show the reporting differences between the two conflicts.

In section 6.2 the methods used to obtain and examine the themes relating to Saddam are presented. This is followed by a discussion of the Saddam themes themselves: vilification in section 6.2.1, criminalisation and Hitlerisation in section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 respectively, the link to al Qaeda in section 6.2.4 and the threat of Saddam in section 6.2.5. The differences in the reporting of these themes in the two periods are discussed in section 6.3.

6.2 Saddam's themes

In order to see how the word frequency for 'Saddam' was distributed over the seven weeks (Week 0 - Week 7)¹⁹, the number of times the word appears was calculated (see Figure 13). From Figure 13, it can be clearly seen that the discourse on Saddam increased in size in Week 0, reaching a peak in Week 1. Another increase can be seen in Week 4, in which the highest frequency of all weeks is recorded. In this section the main increases and decreases in the frequency of 'Saddam' are explained by means of collocates as will be seen in this section.

¹⁹ Week 0-Week 7 is the period from 12/03/2003 to 01/05/2003. I numbered the first week '0' to indicate that the war had not yet started, while Week 7 is when Bush announced that the mission had been accomplished.




Figure 13 Frequency of the use of ‘Saddam’ during the US-led invasion

In view of the large number of collocates that occurred, in order to see how Saddam was talked about in those weeks, only those collocates with five frequencies and above were selected. The collocates were derived for each week and had their concordance lines checked for more context to identify the main semantic topics, with the exception of week 7, as there were no collocates of statistical significance in this particular week, as shown in Table 28

Week	Saddam’s Collocates
Week 0	Saddam, anti, cling, comply, confrontation, defiant, disarm, disarmed, disarming, Hussein, oust, ousting, poses, pro, refuses, remove, removing, rid, sons, strongman, ultimatum, unconditional
Week 1	wage, undermine, ultimatum, topple, survived, strongman, sons, ruthless, rid, removing, remove, removal, regime, pro, president, possesses, overthrown, overthrow, ousting, oust, numbered, minions, loyal, lieutenants, leave, leader, inner, importance, Hussein, henchmen, footage, expired, exile, elite, doomsday, disarming, disarm, dictator, depose, defiant, deadline, anti
Week 2	Saddam, dictator, Fedayeen, grip, Hussein, loyal, loyalists, oust, ousting, overthrow, overthrown, paramilitary, portrait, president, pro, regime, reign, removing, rid, scrawled, topple, uprising
Week 3	Saddam, airport, alive, anti, ashbal, attributed, canal, consists, cousin, Fedayeen, Hussein, loyal, loyalists, Majeed, militia, oust, overthrow, palace, palaces, posters, pro, regime, rid, sons, topple, toppled
Week 4	Saddam, ace, alive, ancestral, anti, belonged, birthplace, bronze, chanted, collapse, collapsed, crumble, crushed, dead, deposed, dictator, dictatorship, downfall, enclave, escaping, fall, Fedayeen, Firdos, foot, giant, glad, gleefully, gone, hate, hates, henchmen, hey, hiding, hometown, husayn, Hussein, likeness, loyal, loyalist, loyalists, mural, murdered, murderous, nightmare, oust, ousted, ousting, overthrow, overthrowing, persecuted, portrait, post, posters, pro, prop, purportedly, Qusai, Qusay, regime, reign, remnants, repression, rid, routed, rule, slum, slums, smacked, sons, spades, statue, statues, statute, stronghold, strongman, tearing, thug, Tikrit, Tikriti, topple, toppled, toppling, tore, tyrant, Uday, whereabouts
Week 5	Saddam, Hussein, statue, ousted, toppled, deposed, toppling, spades, slum, henchmen

Table 28 Collocates of Saddam in US-led invasion

An examination of the collocates and their concordance lines in Weeks 0 and 1 revealed that the discourse was mainly about the build-up to the war and the war itself. In Week 0 Saddam was depicted as posing a threat, possessing WMD and not complying with UN resolutions. He was given a final opportunity to comply when the UN passed a new resolution demanding immediate and unconditional disarmament and when he was issued with an ultimatum by Bush: get out of Iraq or face war. The main focus in week 1, on the other hand, is on the launch of the US invasion. As shown by the collocates, the facts of the build-up to the war and the war itself explain the increase in the frequency in weeks 0 and 1, when there were many mentions of and references to Saddam.

In week 3, the spotlight was on the battle for Saddam's international airport, which ended with the US capturing it, and speculations regarding Saddam's fate and whether he had survived the bombings, as well as the search for his whereabouts and his palaces. Week 4, in which the highest frequencies were found, has been seen as the turning point in the war, with the symbolic toppling of the forty-foot high bronze statue of Saddam in Baghdad, an historic event which indicated an end to his tenure. Weeks 5 and 6 also contain reports about the toppling of Saddam and the search for his whereabouts.

Figure 14 shows the main discourses on Saddam, from one week prior to the US-led invasion until the moment Bush announced 'mission accomplished' in week 7. The categorisation of the discourse themes (see sections 6.2.1- 6.2.5) was accomplished by categorising the collocates automatically and manually using Wmatrix, according to their semantic meaning in context: for instance, all the collocates that had a crime-related meaning were put under the theme of criminalisation (see section 6.2.2) and similarly for the rest of the themes. Owing to space limitations, only some of the themes in Figure 14 are explained.




Figure 14 Encapsulation of the widespread discourses on Saddam in the US-led invasion

6.2.1 The Theme of the Vilification of Saddam

One of the strategies to justify the war on Iraq employed by the US press was to present the war as a binary event involving opposites. This was done by dividing the world into two camps, i.e. “[T]he placement of one thought or thing in terms of its opposite” (Burke, 1969, p. 403). The use of such binaries, according to many studies, functions to “engender and reinforce unequal relations among objects”; the two positions do not have a “peaceful coexistence”, but operate as a “violent hierarchy” (Derrida, 1981, p. 41) or as a “struggle for predominance”. The two positions are juxtaposed – one is the right position, the other is the wrong one (Carr and Zanetti, 1999, p. 324) .

Therefore, one of the ways in which Saddam was vilified is through the good/evil binary. The ‘(e)vilification’ of Saddam was carried out through an ‘outcasting’ process, by which “individuals and/or groups are systematically marked and set aside as outcasts - based on the dichotomisation and mutual antagonism of out-groups (‘them’) and in-groups (‘us’)", (Lazar and Lazar, 2004, p. 227). Such a dichotomy “promotes ‘satanisation’ of the enemy...and a legitimisation of unlimited escalations of violence to the point of extermination of the evil Other” (Cited in Cherry *et al.*, 2015, p. 32). Through this strategy, the enemy’s moral order is deconstructed and stripped of everything good until it becomes an ethical responsibility to put an end to such an evil.

Once a binary discourse had been established through linking both Iraq and Saddam to ‘terror states’ and categorising them as evil, the usage of this discourse of vilification increased and

was deployed in a memorable way, maximising the wrongdoing of the 'other' and ensuring a successful social circulation among the people. The vilification was accomplished through a lexical reiteration of the word evil itself or other words of same nature, or through defining evil through a series of criminal actions committed by Saddam:

59. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and catalogues what happens to **Saddam's** enemies: "electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and rape. If this is not **evil**, then **evil** has no meaning."

Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday

60. But Saddam Hussein represents a marriage of **evil** with technology. He has already used poison gas. He has developed biological weapons. He once was developing a nuclear weapons programme and maybe still is.

The Washington Post, March 20, 2003 Thursday

Similarly, in extract 61 below, the world has been divided into two camps. There is the good American camp, whose aim is to liberate the Iraqi people and make humanitarian efforts, and the evil camp, represented by Saddam's savage rule, under which the Iraqi people have suffered and been terrorised. This method creates a collective illusion: audiences are guided to think in a particular way by the realities that are constructed for them in the press. They are given little opportunity to develop and arrive at their own conclusions. In this regard, Edelman (1971, p. 65) says that in times of uncertainty, confusion and anxiety people become impatient to be provided with explanation and political order that explains the nature of the threat and polices that encounter such a threat.

61. In Iraq, the lines between **good** and **evil** are clear. Americans should have no doubts about this undertaking. This war is **one of history's great humanitarian efforts**. We are in the process of **freeing an entire country from one of the world's most savage regimes**. That will become even more apparent when Iraqis see that it is safe to **hail the Americans as their liberators without fear of being shot in the back by Saddamites**.

Daily News (New York) April 7, 2003, Monday

The justness of America is also shown in the deployment of binaries on the 'sunny' side in contrast to the dark side, with Americans obviously being on the side of right, which is the sunny side and implying that Iraq is on the dark side as shown in example 62.

62. A lot of people feel guilty for enjoying the war. After all, some terrible things are happening. But worse things would happen if America failed to rid the world of Saddam. **This time, right and might are on the same side. And there is something undeniably enjoyable about being on the sunny side of an uneven struggle between good and evil.**

Daily News (New York) March 30, 2003, Sunday

Furthermore, the war was not constructed as being a religious war - the '**Crusaders and Jews** against a **Muslim ruler**', as Saddam and Osama bin Laden wanted to depict it. It was constructed a war solely against Saddam, because of his wrongdoings and the threat he posed to the international community by possessing WMDs. It could be argued that the distinction between Islam, Arabs and Saddam was made in order to isolate Saddam and to ensure that any Muslim or Arab sympathisers were not given a religious cause to rally round or any reason to see the war as a holy undertaking.

63. Also, we mustn't forget that some of the countries supporting us against Saddam Hussein are, indeed, Arab and Muslim. Fanatics like Osama bin Laden would love nothing better than to be able to cast the campaign against Hussein as a religious war, the '**Crusaders and Jews**' *against a Muslim ruler*. This, they must not be allowed to do: Hussein's religion (or lack of it) has nothing to do with his reign of terror or his accumulation of weapons of mass destruction. Our quarrel with Saddam Hussein is because he is simply an evil and dangerous man **who threatens the peace and security of the world - especially his predominately Muslim neighbors in the Middle East**.

The Denver Post March 20, 2003 Thursday

Some 'Arabs and Muslims' were classified as being supportive of US actions against this evil, and this gave additional weight to the idea that the war was being fought against Saddam alone. All the differences between Arabs, Muslims and the US were erased in order to show that they formed a united front and were facing the same enemy who was threatening his "Muslim neighbors".

6.2.2 The Theme of Criminalisation: An 'Other' Saddam

One important theme that emerged from the predicational strategy employed in the US press is the criminalisation of Saddam by reporting his constructed past and present political wrongdoings. This sort of criminalisation, according to Lazar and Lazar (2004, p. 231), triggers and ensure a moral responsibility on the part of the world leading countries to act against the wrongdoings of the perpetrator.

The simplest way of criminalising Saddam was through the use of crime-related lexicals, as reflected in the US press's use of collocates such as 'genocidal', 'murderer', 'murderous', 'thug', 'brutality', 'torture', 'savagery', 'his many crimes', 'his gang', 'his two murderous sons', 'exterminated by Saddam', 'slaughtered by Saddam', 'persecuted by Saddam', 'atrocities committed by Saddam'.

The criminalisation was also realised through what Fowler (1991, p. 85) calls an ‘over-lexicalisation’ strategy, in which the excessive use of quasi-synonymous words is employed. The criminal actions attributed to Saddam were therefore referred to repeatedly in the press discourse, with synonymous or near-synonymous lexicals, whether in the form of verbs, nouns or adjectives, being used. These collocates can either be found appearing one after another in a single sentence, paragraph or article, or in different articles in different newspapers – this has a cumulative effect, creating an association between Saddam and criminal or demonic acts in the reader’s mind.

64. The men **had been jailed, beaten and had their houses burned** to the ground under Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's **brutal** regime.

The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday

65. The whole family was **horribly persecuted** by Saddam Hussein, with many members **murdered or disappeared**.

The Philadelphia Inquirer April 2, 2003 Wednesday

Another criminalisation technique is to refer to actions from a range of time frames in order to suggest that the threat is continuing. In our context, the first of these was Saddam’s past actions:

66. This man Saddam Hussein **has tortured and brutalized his people for a long**, long time. We had reports the other day of a dissident who **had his tongue cut out** and was **tied to the stake in the town square, and he just bled to death**.

The New York Times March 28, 2003 Friday

The second method is to imply that the actions or wrongdoings are habitual:

67. "It's not personal," one Bush aide says. Rather, the president's passion is motivated by his loathing for **Saddam's brutality**, aides say. He talks often about his revulsion for **Saddam's use of torture, rape and executions**. He is convinced that the Iraqi leader is literally insane and **would gladly give terrorists weapons to use to launch another attack** on the United States.

USA TODAY April 2, 2003, Wednesday

68. His **brutal regime** has reduced a country with a long and proud history to an international pariah that **oppresses its citizens, started two wars of aggression against its neighbours and still poses a grave threat to the security of its region and the world**.

The Washington Post March 17, 2003 Monday

Lastly, projected actions are referred to:

69. The world must face facts: It's not in the cards. His **cruel power** is based on his access to **chemical, biological** and - he hopes - nuclear materials. He **has used poison gas with no compunction**. And **he's friendly with a world of America-hating terrorists aching to get their hands on those evil weapons**. From Iraq. From North Korea. From whoever will sell them, along with what's left of their souls. The **brutal reign** of Saddam Hussein must end.

Daily News (New York) March 18, 2003, Tuesday

70. The goal is to end Saddam's **brutal reign** and dismantle Baghdad's **weapons of mass destruction** programs before chemical, biological or nuclear weapons **could be used against** the United States or its allies

USA TODAY March 17, 2003, Monday

The criminal actions were also depicted through the narration of horrific stories about civilians, in a strategy that van van Dijk (1995a, p. 156) refers to as 'concretization' where the enemy wrongdoings are accentuated by describing such dreadful acts in concrete, and in detail, visualisable and memorisable words (see example 71-72). By means of this strategy, the audience can be linked to the experience of the victims. Some stories by exiled Iraqis who had fled from the Saddam regime were cited, some were by Iraqi civilians who had suffered under the regime, and some were stories about those who did not make it and consequently were murdered. The stories were about children, woman and old men as well as young people. Many such stories appeared in the press both before and after the invasion to construct a narrative describing Saddam's cruelty and atrocities against his own people as well as to drum up public support for the build-up and the invasion phases of the war.

71. Kubba, [...] can tell harrowing stories about his treatment at the hands of Hussein's secret police: **electric shock torture, daily beatings, cigarette burns**. "To force confessions, Saddam's henchmen torture children in front of their parents," Kubba said. **"They rape wives in front of their husbands. They dip people in acid."** Kubba says his family was targeted because they were politically opposed to Hussein, who became Iraq's ruler in the 1970s. He said his father died of brain damage from torture and that some friends were executed. He escaped the country in 1979 only because a government clerk mistakenly stamped his passport.

St. Petersburg Times (Florida) March 24, 2003 Monday

72. "It looks a bit too much like Nazi Germany to me," said Capt. Pete McAleer, commander of Echo Company of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, whose patrol found the small compound. Across Iraq, coalition troops are finding glimpses of past horrors - suspected torture chambers, secret police headquarters, Iraqis who reveal scars that record the cruelty of Saddam Hussein's rule. At a prison in Basra, Iraqis showed journalists a white stone jail known as the "White Lion" where they claim Saddam's secret police for decades tortured inmates with beatings, mutilations,

electric shocks and chemical baths. "They did unthinkable things - electrocution, immersion in a bath of chemicals and ripping off people's finger- and toenails," resident Hamed Fattil told British reporters. Outside the jail, a man showed Associated Press Television News his mangled ears - he said Iraqi police cut them off.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) April 10, 2003 Thursday

The criminalisation of Saddam was also constructed by linking him to the actions of other individuals. Saddam was seen as being responsible for things those around him had done. This is what Wodak and Reisigl (2001, p. 53) term 'relationalisation' and 'sociativisation', i.e. the construction of individuals based on their relations/association to each other. Example terms include; 'militia', 'paramilitary', 'forces', 'Paramilitaries', 'squads', 'thugs', 'loyalist(s)', 'jihadists', 'mujahid', 'bodyguards', 'followers', 'sympathisers', 'his brutal regime', 'his most brutal henchman', 'a brutal cousin of Saddam Hussein', 'Saddam's brutal loyalists the Fedayeen', 'his thug sons Uday and Qusay', 'his thugs', 'Saddam's henchmen torture children', 'his cousin' and 'chemical Ali'²⁰.

Some of these collocates have an obviously negative, crime-related meaning when their literal meaning is examined. 'Thugs', for instance, is defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as "a man who acts violently, especially to commit a crime", and 'henchman' is defined as "someone who does unpleasant or illegal things for a powerful person". Some of the other words used in this case can only be defined from their context. The term, 'Jihadists', on the other hand, has acquired a negative representation in general, and in Saddam's case the term jihadists had already been framed negatively in relation to those who attacked the World Trade Centre on 9/11; it therefore followed that jihadists (specifically Saddam's jihadists) were plotting to attack the United States as can be seen in examples 73 and 74 below.

73. A search of an abandoned training site in Hindiyah, east of Karbala, turned up what was described as an unusually large amount of chemical protection gear. The site appears to have been used to train Palestinians and other non-Iraqis seeking to join **Saddam's jihadists**. At a nearby agricultural compound, coalition forces found several 55-gallon barrels, which tested positive for nerve agents, including sarin and tabun, as well as blistering mustard gas.

The New York Post April 8, 2003, Tuesday

74. The Irish Times Dublin There is no answer to the reality that the United States and Britain have won their war on **Saddam Hussein and his "jihadists."** Deplorable

²⁰ **Chemical Ali** is a nickname used for Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin, who used chemical weapons (CW) in Halabja against the Kurdish population. He was captured by the coalition forces in August 2003 and presented for trial over the use of CWs (Garrett, 2017, p. 49).

though it was, and doubtful its legitimacy, in the crude calculus of war casualties the death and destruction is far less than envisaged.

The New York Times April 11, 2003 Friday

Relational identification was also used through a referential strategy that named any individual or group of individuals who resisted the invasion a ‘Saddamite’ or ‘Saddamites’ - derivative adjectives of the noun Saddam – those who believed in a ‘Saddamism²¹’ ideology. These referential strategies came to stand for everything negative, and all the constructed criminal acts and Saddam’s wrongdoings could be reduced to just these words. They acquired even more ideological connotations after the fall of Saddam Hussein and came to be used frequently by ordinary people or politicians to exclude, mute and accuse other people, rivals and politicians simply because they opposed their views. They even accused protestors who were asking for changes in the government of being ‘Saddamist’ as a way of silencing them.

75. No **Saddamite** sleeper cells have sprung into action.

Daily News (New York) March 26, 2003, Wednesday

76. That explains why Syria has recently opened its border to **Saddamite** recruits heading for the front and why it has been acting as a conduit for Iraqi military resupply.

Daily News (New York) April 2, 2003, Wednesday

Furthermore, the differentiation between ‘We’ and the other-within was made. To that end, the US was lionised as a liberator of the Iraqi people which had the humanitarian aim of freeing the Iraqis from a ‘savage regime’. The other-within distinction was made by categorising the Iraqi people into those who needed to be liberated on the one hand, and ‘Saddamites’ on the other; the latter were demonised by describing them as ‘shooting people in the back’ - the inference being that they were cowardly and not prepared to fight face to face.

77. This war is one of history's great humanitarian efforts. We are in the process of freeing an entire country from one of the world's most savage regimes. That will become even more apparent when Iraqis see that it is safe to hail the Americans as their liberators without fear of being shot in the back by **Saddamites**.

Daily News (New York) April 7, 2003, Monday

21 **Saddamism or (Saddamiyaa)** is a political ideology that developed after Saddam Hussein assumed power in 1973. It was a different form of Ba’athism that called for an Iraq-centred Arab world united under Saddamist Ba’athism and eschewing the old Nasserism (Bengio, 1998)

In the same vein, it was shown how the Iraqi people had suffered under the Saddamite ideology, referred to as 'Saddamite Stalinism':

78. After more than 30 years of **Saddamite Stalinism**, the people of Iraq are like battered children. They have been taught blind obedience to an abusive father and to love the hand that beats them.

Daily News (New York) April 6, 2003, Sunday

Moreover, the objective of the war was viewed as being not just the removal of Saddam, but the dismantling of all manifestations of Saddamism. This was reflected in the calls for the replacement of the old Iraqi currency that carried pictures of Saddam, and some of the institutions of the Iraqi state.

79. "Whatever it is, it will not be a currency that has Saddam Hussein's picture on it," a senior official said. "We want to make the point that this is not going to be **Saddamism** without Saddam. You have to visibly **kill some institutions**."

The New York Times March 15, 2003 Saturday

80. "This war was a challenge to the entire Arab system, which is why so many Arabs opposed it. The war to liberate Kuwait from Iraq in 1991 was outpatient surgery. This war was open-heart surgery." But this open-heart surgery will succeed in toppling both Saddam and **Saddamism** only if we are successful in creating a healthy Iraq -- an Arab state where people can find dignity, not just by saying no to the West, but by building a decent, tolerant, modernizing society that they can be proud of, an Arab state where people can speak the truth and that other Arabs would want to emulate.

The New York Times April 13, 2003 Sunday

6.2.3 The Theme of Hitlerisation

The Saddam-Hitler metaphor was used during both the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. At first, this analogy was used to signify the brutality of the Iraqi regime in invading another country and annexing it. This was reported as being just what Hitler did when he invaded Czechoslovakia. This metaphor was subsequently used more emphatically in 2003 to describe the Iraqi regime and its brutality against its own people. It was also part of a shift from depicting Iraq as a local bully threatening its neighbours, to a pariah state and WMD carrier that posed a grave danger to the US and the entire world (Berman, 2004, p. 106).

One of the functions of this metaphor is to personalise the struggle by drawing a distinction between the enemy leader of the country and the (neutral) people of that country. Lakoff and Johnson (2008) say that people and places can become symbols for actions and policy positions.

Hitler, therefore according to Reynolds (2015) has become synonymous, to much of the world, to totalitarian dictatorship, evil and symbol of oppression and racism.. Through the ‘Hitlerisation’²² of an enemy leader, the conflict is not only “personalized and the individual demonised, but it also introduces the concept of 1930s appeasement”. Action becomes required in the face of an aggressive and dictatorial protagonist. The war in such cases becomes reduced to a fight against a single individual. As Lakoff (2013, p. 3) states, the “nation” is then “a person”: the fight is constructed as being against a person rather than against a group or a country or a particular people.

In the first Gulf War, for instance, as Popp and Mendelson (2010, p. 207) point out, Bush and Saddam were represented as duellists facing off against each other, and Saddam was depicted as ‘the personification of evil’. In terms of the visual discourse, the images of Saddam were also manipulated to make him look more Hitler-like by shortening his moustache. Saddam’s appearance as Hitler served both ideological and propaganda purposes, as Hitler had already been transformed into a symbol of evil and threat. Using such labels serves to direct negative emotions towards the individual in question (Keeble, 1998, p. 73). The same can be said about Stalin, who also became an icon of evil.

The analogy between Saddam and Hitler or Stalin was discursively built up in several ways in the US press. The simplest method of doing this was by quoting people who had referred to Saddam as ‘the Hitler of the 21st century’, or as ‘a modern-day Hitler’, and made comments such as ‘he is as dangerous as Hitler was’, ‘We are dealing with Hitler revisited’ and ‘Hitler No. 2’.

Another way of building up the analogy with Hitler and therefore adding to the negative image of Saddam was to compare his actions to Hitler’s tactics in the Second World War: for instance, Saddam’s creation of an army of children known as ‘Ashbal Saddam’ or ‘Saddam’s Lion Cubs’ by taking youngsters from their families and forcing them to join training camps where they killed animals and were taught to use firearms.

81. **The Lion Cubs are cohesive and well-trained,**” said Peter Singer, a military analyst at the Brookings Institution. “[...]. “My guess is that we will see them **follow the model of the Hitler Youth in '45,**” he said.

The New York Post March 28, 2003, Friday

82. But experts said U.S. forces can expect more organized and dogged **resistance from the Cubs, similar to the Hitler Youth** in the waning days of World War II.

²² I used the term Hitlerisation to refer to the is strategies used to demonize a person though making an association of that person with Hitler’s wrongdoings, evil or any other bad characteristics.

"Ambushes, sniping, hit-and-run tactics are the most likely things we'll see," Singer said..

Daily News (New York) April 3, 2003, Thursday

The cruelty and brutality of Saddam's actions and behaviour were frequently compared with those of Hitler and Stalin:

83. I watch TV clips of this guy **Saddam and I see a Hitler**, but one who hasn't the knack to fire up his people like the head Nazi did.

Daily News (New York) March 23, 2003, Sunday

84. "You have a man who is an unsufferable dictator, **who has a human rights record only eclipsed by Hitler or Stalin**. All those facts haven't changed."

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 18, 2003 Tuesday

85. **As with Stalin and Hitler, the very brutality of the Iraqi leader has helped create a bizarre mystique** -- a culture that mixes fear and adulation.

The Washington Post March 28, 2003 Friday

Furthermore, Saddam's probable end was compared to the deaths of other dictators like Mussolini who was captured and killed by anti-fascist partisans. Comparisons were also made with Hitler's end by reporting that Saddam had ended up running away and hiding in bunkers. This put Saddam in the position Hitler found himself in when he committed suicide and therefore Saddam was expected to do the same.

86. **Mr. Hussein appeared to set the stage for a situation similar to that which confronted Hitler in 1945**, when the might of the Soviet Army bore down on the German dictator in a bunker near the Reichstag in Berlin, **provoking his suicide**.

The New York Times March 19, 2003 Wednesday

Saddam was also likened to Stalin, Mussolini and even Mao through establishing associations and connections based on their charisma and their totalitarian systems of government. It was also alleged that Saddam had a great admiration for Stalin, as shown in the fact that he had apparently read many of Stalin's books, or by describing Saddam's criminal record and comparing it with that of Stalin:

87. the clock would run down for Mr. Hussein and the totalitarian system of government he has built here **on a model he took from Stalin** .

The New York Times March 20, 2003 Thursday

88. Already those forces have been bombarded with hours of allied radio broadcasts and by millions of leaflets proclaiming the futility of fighting for Saddam Hussein, **whose charisma, like that of his hero Stalin, is his cruelty**.

The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday

89. Known **to admire Josef Stalin**, Saddam has tortured thousands and his wars have killed more than 1 million.

The New York Post March 20, 2003, Thursday

The attitude of the Iraqi population under Saddam was also compared with that of the Germans under Hitler and the Russians under Stalin, which was 'one of complete, unquestioning subservience'; these people were described as being 'cowed by their charismatic leaders'. The Iraqi army and other forces were also constructed in the same way as the armed forces of Hitler and Stalin; they were used to drive other forces into the battlefield and ensure that any unauthorised retreat or surrender faced serious reprisals.

90. The Iraqi system is reminiscent of the political commissars Joseph Stalin used to **intimidate and galvanize the Soviet army** during World War II, with political troops often taking positions behind the regular army in battle and shooting any laggards. Hitler **used a similar system**, with SS and other Nazi Party units stiffening the will of a professional military that had increasing doubts about the war.

The Washington Post March 28, 2003 Friday

Other historical references to World War II were made through comparing the battle of Baghdad to the battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943). The city was besieged by the German army and the battle fought for the city resulted in the Germans being defeated with enormous human losses - some 1.5 million soldiers and civilians died (Hinton, 2009, p. 48). A fear that Baghdad could turn out to be a 'Mesopotamian Stalingrad' or a 'modern Stalingrad', a 'Baghdograd' was expressed in the press. There was an expectation that Saddam would use tactics similar to those that Stalin used against the Nazis and that American forces could encounter resistance from thousands of volunteers willing to fight to death for Saddam; it was argued that this could cause thousands of civilians to die.

91. The other major fear is that U.S. forces could be bogged down in an urban battle that could turn Baghdad into a **modern Stalingrad**

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

92. That would create what one military analyst warned could become a "**Mesopotamian Stalingrad**" -- referring to the World War II battle in which Soviet defenders fought heavily armed German invaders to a stalemate in the streets of Stalingrad and turned the course of the war.

USA TODAY March 13, 2003, Thursday

The toppling of the statue of Saddam in Firdoos Square in Baghdad was constructed as a historic moment and a turning point for the Iraqi people, which was then compared to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Omaar (2004, p. 193) states that the statue had no importance in itself, that it had only been erected a year previously and that the toppling had no direct connection to

Saddam's ousting from power. The removal of the statue became a key reference point, however, partly because it happened in front of the TV cameras. The event was immediately classified as an historic moment, but this classification needed an explanation: why was such a seemingly simple activity classed as historic? To that end, a direct association was made with the Berlin Wall:

“[T]he imagery of the fall of the Wall is, [...], a specific reference point or snapshot of history, that in this case comes to stand for liberation. And it is not strictly that it operates as a signifier of liberation that can be applied to other events as a lens that colours in a specific way” (Manghani, 2008, p. 60)

93. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld compared the collapse of Mr. Hussein's regime to the **fall of the Berlin Wall** and said Mr. Hussein had taken his place "in the pantheon of failed dictators."

The New York Times April 10, 2003 Thursday

94. Several equated the incident with another significant moment in history. "One can't help but **think of the fall of the Berlin Wall when looking at the images of Baghdad**," House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) said in a statement.

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 10, 2003 Thursday

95. Then a scene reminiscent of the fall of the Berlin Wall began to unspool - and the Iraqis, like the East Germans before them, found some courage. Somebody produced a sledgehammer and pounded at the massive marble pediment. Somebody else tossed a rope around Saddam's neck to bring him down. Everybody cheered.

Daily News (New York) April 10, 2003, Thursday

In this regard, there has been an abundance of critics writing on the visual framing of the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue²³. Some accounts, such as that of Fisk (2003), refer to this moment as “the most staged photo-opportunity since Iwo Jima”. Similarly, Rall (2003, p. 228) states that the image of toppling the statue is fake. He adds that US military staged the toppling for the advantage of the journalists who were staying in Baghdad's Palestine Hotel across the street where the fall of the statue took place. He adds that the TV have exaggerated the size of the crowds. In the same vein, John Loengard, a critic and photo editor quoted in (Friend, 2007, p. 299) was sceptical about this event. He states, “we remember the war by what took place in front of the hotel in Baghdad where all the press was hunkered down”. Other

²³ On April 9th, 2003, following the entry of US troops into the Iraqi capital of Baghdad and after Saddam lost his grip on the capital, a crowd of people gathered around the statue of Saddam in Firdoos Square and attempted to pull it down using sledgehammers, but they failed. After those futile attempts, a group of US marines succeeded in bringing it down with the assistance of a crane amid the crowd's chants and jubilation. Onlookers started throwing stones, shoes and other objects at the statue before it fell completely. After it fell, a crowd of people stepped onto the statue and dragged the head and other parts into the streets, slapping them with their shoes. Although this was a brief occurrence, it has been a very controversial moment for many analysts and critics.

accounts noted that the photos were taken from close range or that they were cropped tightly to avoid showing the real numbers in the jubilant Iraqi crowd. The intention was to show the world that the Americans were liberators and how the Iraqis cooperated with the American soldiers, which was interpreted as a sign of welcome to those American troops.

6.2.4 The Theme of the Link with Al Qaeda

The construct of social identity was evident in the media discourse both in the build-up to and during the war, with sharp differences being drawn between ‘Us’ (positive self-representation) and ‘Them’ (negative other-representation). As Bucholtz and Hall (2004, p. 383) state, in self-representation “salient differences are set aside in favour of perceived or asserted similarities that are taken to be more situationally relevant”. In the context of this research, the differences within the same nation-states/political parties/allies were either put into the background or ignored, and unity and understanding were brought to the fore; by contrast, the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were brought to the foreground and emphasised. This strategy works on an ideological level, because when the differences are erased, they render “some persons or activities... invisible” (ibid.). Furthermore, realities that are “inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or get explained away” (ibid.). As a result, social identities end up being created through language (ibid.). Identity in this case “is a process not merely of discovering or acknowledging a similarity that precedes” certain situation, but also a matter of “inventing similarity and downplaying difference” (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004, p. 371).

Erasing the differences between Iraq/Saddam and al Qaeda and attempts to link them by highlighting their wrongdoings, their presumed similarities, and the hypothetical connections between them was one of the important strategies used in the US press. Iraq/Saddam and al Qaeda were painted in a single brushstroke and constructed as being a united enemy of the US. This hypothetical connection was one of the main justifications for the US invasion. Linking Iraq to the war on terror against al Qaeda that was already in progress meant that there was no need to present further argument in favour of attacking Iraq.

Table 29 shows the number of times Saddam and Iraq occur as strong collocates with the following entries: *Qaeda*, *Osama*, *terrorists*, *terrorist*, *terrorism*, *terror*.

Word	Collocates with Saddam	Collocate with Iraq	Occurrence in the whole corpora
Qaeda	30	45	1091
Osama	36	9	447
Terrorists	20	47	1209
Terrorist	26	105	2584
Terrorism	36	130	2434
Terror	28	56	1218

Table 29: The Collocates of the Link to Al Qaeda

Equation of the enemy is realised by 1) showing that both Saddam and al Qaeda share the same goals, such as attacking the United States, 2) using a discourse where the wrongdoings committed by Saddam are linked to similar wrongdoings by al Qaeda, and (3) constructing Iraq as being a threat through harbouring and training al Qaeda members.

96. [Al Qaeda leader] Osama bin Laden and [**Iraqi President**] **Saddam Hussein both are threats** to our country and threats to our world. We have to treat them **the same way.**"

The Washington Post March 21, 2003 Friday

97. **Several links** between **al Qaeda and Iraq** have been reported previously. * In northern Iraq, an al Qaeda-affiliated group called Ansar al Islam is allegedly plotting suicide attacks on U.S. forces and has allegedly experimented with chemical weapons. Two members of an Afghanistan-based al Qaeda cell were killed this week in a shootout between U.S.

The New York Post March 28, 2003, Friday

In the above examples Osama bin Laden and Saddam are both positioned in the same conceptual category and are given equal status with regard to the threat they posed. The use of the connectors ‘and’, ‘both’ and ‘the same way’ have erased all differences between the two entities and both are viewed as posing the same degree of threat to the US and the rest of the world.

98. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and **his terrorist allies** could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest.

The New York Times March 18, 2003 Tuesday

99. The United States launched airstrikes on the stronghold of vicious Islamic extremists with ties to al Qaeda in northern Iraq - aiming to sever the "**sinister axis**" between Saddam Hussein and international terrorists in the early hours of the war

The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday

Similarly, in examples 98 and 99 above phrases such as ‘his terrorist allies’ and ‘sinister axis’ construct the notion that there is a strong relationship between Saddam and the terrorists.

The link between al Qaeda and Iraq/Saddam was elaborated further through references to the role each played in complementing the other, as Hodges (2011, p. 79) states. Thus, whereas Saddam was seen to play the supporting role of ‘harbouring’, ‘supporting’, ‘contributing’, ‘giving intelligence’, or ‘training and sponsoring’, al Qaeda played the role of recipient or beneficiary of Saddam’s support, as seen in the following examples:

100. Bush says Saddam is **harboring** "Al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq."
Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday
101. Washington has accused Saddam of **supporting** terrorism.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 14, 2003 Friday
102. Conroy, 30, of Apalachin, N.Y., reminded the soldiers of what happened Sept. 11, 2001, and told them Saddam "**contributes** to terrorism directly and indirectly, and that's why we're here."
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 19, 2003 Wednesday
103. I believe that the many indirect links -- such as **intelligence contacts, and agreements and training** between Osama bin Laden's group and Saddam Hussein's government -- are too numerous to dismiss.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 23, 2003 Sunday
104. Finally, he said the United States must defend itself from the threat of Iraq-**sponsored** terrorism.
USA TODAY March 18, 2003, Tuesday
105. Bush said Iraq **has supported** terrorists, including the al-Qaeda network blamed for the Sept. 11 attacks, and will not disarm so long as Hussein retains power.
Philadelphia Inquirer March 18, 2003 Tuesday
106. Last week, the President said Saddam Hussein and his weapons "are a direct threat to this country, to our people and all free people." Bush added that Saddam **has "trained and financed . . . al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations."**
Philadelphia Inquirer March 12, 2003 Wednesday
107. "Over the years Iraq has provided **safe haven** to terrorists such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organisation carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans," Bush said.
The Washington Post April 16, 2003 Wednesday

The use of the present perfect tense in the last three examples (105-107): ‘has supported’, ‘has provided safe haven’, and ‘has trained and financed’, indicates that the actions refer to an ongoing process, without referring to a specific time frame. The implication is that such support has been continuous until the time of reporting. These arguments, analogies and characteristics were drawn from earlier situations on which judgment had already been passed and which had

become common knowledge in the minds of the public (Capps, 2001, 209). Establishing a link with Abu Nidal, whose name has already been closely correlated with terrorism, builds on a precedent and therefore strengthens the association of Saddam with terrorists.

6.2.5 The Theme of Threat

Throughout the corpora the word ‘threat’ is a collocate with ‘Iraq’ and ‘Saddam’. ‘Threat’ is mentioned 205 times, with Iraq and Saddam Hussein being depicted variously as an ‘urgent threat’, a ‘direct threat’, a ‘terrifying threat’, a ‘real and imminent danger’, and with arguments that they ‘posed an immediate threat’, as suggested in the following examples:

108. And Kristin Kelly, a senior, said: "A few weeks ago, I would have said that I was against the war. Most of all, I would have condemned the haste. But Saddam has one of the most disgusting records of human rights abuses. His use of chemical weapons is even more indiscriminate. **Saddam is a threat to his own country, and a terrifying threat to us.**"

The New York Times March 16, 2003 Sunday

109. He said that in going to war against Iraq -- what some have called America's first preventive war -- the country was responding to a **real and imminent danger, the threat that Saddam might deploy weapons of mass destruction at home, in the region, or in the cities of America.** "Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose is sure," Bush said.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 20, 2003 Thursday

The threat of Saddam was also constructed in the press as being actualised indirectly by a third party: namely, terrorists, who were being provided by Saddam/Iraq with a ‘safe haven’, ‘support and training’ or who were ‘plotting suicide attacks’ against the US.

110. The Bush administration has portrayed Ansar as **a link between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein**, saying the Iraqi president has provided support and training to the group.

Philadelphia Inquirer March 23, 2003 Sunday

This sense of the topos of threat serves to create, within the in-group, feelings of fear and insecurity, while at the same time vilifying the out-group. In this regard, van Dijk (2005, p. 85) states that the discourse on terror following the 9/11 event became the main argument for introducing more rigorous security policies, which in turn provide added legitimacy for going to war. Since Iraq had already been linked to international terrorism, no further justification seemed to be required. Both the US and Iraq/Saddam have been depicted as affecting the future of the world, but the way the danger of each is constructed is different. The ‘Other’ is

constructed as having a deliberate choice, as indicated by the notions ‘poses [...] danger’, ‘brutal states’, or ‘deliver catastrophe to our country and our world’. The US, on the other hand, is depicted as the agent that will prevent this catastrophe from happening to Iraq’s neighbours, the wider world and the USA itself.

Iraq and Saddam were also constructed as being a threat to the entire world, through the use of phrases like ‘is a threat to the whole’, ‘danger to the world’ and ‘world faced a dual threat’.

111. The similarities were not a coincidence. Bush says Iraq poses the same danger to **the world and the United States** as Osama bin Laden's network.

USA TODAY March 18, 2003, Tuesday

112. Holding Saddam Hussein accountable [or] may well lack the moral courage."
2: "The Bush administration has made great strides [but] more than anything the international community has shown it lacks the moral courage to confront a leader that is **a threat to the whole** world.

The Philadelphia Inquirer MARCH 13, 2003 Thursday

113. Blair said the world faced a dual threat from "brutal states like Iraq" and from terrorist groups. "My fear, deeply held, is that **these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our country and our world,**" he said.

Daily News (New York) March 21, 2003, Friday

What is most notable here is the concept that Iraq/Saddam poses a threat to neighbouring countries and to US citizens residing in those countries.

114. Bush said, "Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles -- **far enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other nations -- in a region where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live and work.**"

The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday

115. These weapons were deemed a **threat not only to Iraq's neighbors, but also to the United States, particularly if Mr. Hussein were to make them available to terrorists, as President Bush suggested in his State of the Union message.**

The New York Times April 18, 2003 Friday

The topoi of threat and fear were widely used in the 2003 war by both the US press and politicians to influence public opinion and affect the course of the war against Iraq. Many empirical researchers view this strategy, “as a kind of argument used to threaten a target audience with a fearful outcome (most typically that outcome is the likelihood of death) in order to get the audience to adopt a recommended response” (Walton, 1996b, p. 304; Walton, 2000, p. 1), or, as Witte puts it, as “a persuasive message that attempts to arouse the emotion of fear

by depicting a personally relevant and significant threat and then follows this description of the threat by outlining recommendations presented as effective and feasible in deterring the threat". According to Witte, Sampson and Liu (cited in Walton, 2000, p. 1), the threat usually consists of "some terrible consequence or harm that will befall the individual for not adopting the recommended response". The following extracts contain examples of how the sense of danger was used and implied in the US press:

116. We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year or five years the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now where it arises before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.

The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday

117. As he has argued repeatedly, Bush said the greatest danger of leaving Saddam in power is that he will make his weapons of mass destruction available to terrorists for attacks on the U.S. "Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a course toward safety," Bush vowed. "Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed."

Daily News (New York) March 18, 2003, Tuesday

In the above two arguments, Bush argues on the side of going to war by depicting Saddam and Iraq as a threat and positing that deciding not to take action, or 'inaction', as in example 116, or 'leaving Saddam in power', as in example 117, would have dire consequences. The strong possibility that Iraq could 'inflict harm', that it 'could choose the moment of deadly conflict', as in 116, or that its forces could 'appear suddenly in our skies and cities', or that Saddam could 'make his weapons of mass destruction available to terrorists for attacks on the US' as in 116 is emphasised. Action needed to be taken to ensure that these things did not happen, as shown in the phrases 'We are now acting', 'We choose to meet that threat now'.

In conjunction with the topos of threat, the topos of history was also used to legitimise the invasion. This is because history has popularly been claimed to provide 'guidance': people study examples from the past and emulate them in the present. From the perspective of discourse and representation, history is invariably used by people claiming to have learned lessons from the past, that it has given them guidance, and that history gives meaning to the contemporary events, actors and processes (Forchtner, 2014, p. 19). Events and personages from the past have consistently been used to justify actions and construct identities in the present.

One of the more widely used topoi of history as a teacher is called the ‘rhetoric of judging’ (Forchtner, 2014, p. 29), in which past wrongdoings committed by an out-group (them) are linked to present actions, with the claim that they are similar to the present and should therefore be avoided. This rhetoric involves excluding ‘Our’ past wrongdoings - or putting them in the background or silencing them - and problematising the ‘Other’ through their past so that their actions can be delegitimised.

118. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy [...] Our good faith has not been returned. The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapons inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraq regime have failed again and again because we are not dealing with peaceful men.

The New York Times March 18, 2003 Tuesday

119. Saddam Hussein has proven he is capable of any crime. We must not permit his crimes to reach across the world. Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder. He possesses the weapons of mass murder.

The New York Times March 17, 2003 Monday

In the above extracts, many linguistic means are utilised to represent the in-group and the out-group. With regard to nomination and predication strategies, the in-group is depicted through the use of the deictic expressions ‘we’ and ‘our’, as well as through the use of many good attributes, such as ‘patient’, ‘honorable’, ‘diplomacy’, ‘our good faith’, and ‘peaceful efforts’; the in-group is also represented as being victims of danger and the use of weapons. In contrast, the other is represented through negative ideological anthroponomy, whether explicitly or implicitly, in words such as ‘pledged to reveal and destroy’ weapons but he did not, ‘ploy’, ‘defied’, ‘threatened’, ‘bugged’, ‘deceived’, ‘we are not dealing with peaceful men’, ‘capable of any crimes’, and ‘mass murder’. In this case, history serves as a teacher that draws attention to mistakes made by the out-group in the past; the implication is that in order to avoid such mistakes being made in the future an intervention is required that will disarm Saddam and eliminate the threat.




Figure 15: Rhetoric of judging (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)

In contrast to the rhetoric of judging, where ‘Our’ wrong past is excluded and ‘their’ wrong past is emphasised and linked to the present, a self-critical rhetoric strategy is also utilised to achieve the same purpose: i.e., legitimising the war. This type of rhetoric is called the ‘rhetoric of failing’, in which the enemy - ‘them’ - is convicted by their wrong past in the present. However, the lesson to be learned in the present is no longer directed at the out-group but more at the in-group, to which it acts as a warning that the same actions should not be repeated.

120. Bush carefully reviewed the vote in Congress and several United Nations Security Council resolutions that he said formed the legal basis for an attack on Saddam's regime. **He expressed disappointment that the United Nations had failed to agree on a new resolution but concluded: 'The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities so we will rise to ours.'** At worst, the U.N.'s current paralysis risks reducing the modern international organization to the same impotence that its predecessor, the League of Nations, suffered after the 1935 Abyssinian crisis when Italian dictator Benito Mussolini attacked what was by then the only independent state in Africa. The League imposed only tepid economic sanctions against Italy, which Mussolini ignored. By the time that Adolf Hitler superceded the Duce as Europe's most fanatical aggressor, the League was a mere debating society. We would hate to see the same fate befall today's U.N., but the record is not good.

Actions linked to the League of Nations are here identified as lessons the United Nations should have learned. Notably, after Abyssinia was invaded by Mussolini in 1935, no real action was taken against this invasion by the League of Nations which only imposed economic sanctions against Italy following an appeal for help by the Abyssinians. The sanctions were not effective and did not contain materials that could be vital and influence Italy such as oil; if oil had been included this could have made major effect on Italy. Two members of the League - France and

Britain - did not want to have their naval power at risk in the Mediterranean by provoking Mussolini (Britain had two naval bases in the area). The French Prime Minister - Pierre Laval - and the British Foreign Secretary - Samuel Hoare - met to try to end the war and came up with a plan according to which two large areas of Abyssinia would be ceded to Italy and the 'corridor of camels' would be given to the Abyssinians. Furthermore, the southern part of the country was to be allocated to Italian businesses. This plan was accepted by Mussolini, but there was an outcry in Britain. The British government was believed to have betrayed the Abyssinian people, the Foreign Secretary had to resign and the plan was dropped. The plan had shown that two members of the major European powers were ready to appease and negotiate with Mussolini who invaded another country. With regard to the case under study here, in the above extract a reference is made to the United Nations' failure to agree on a new resolution to oppose Saddam Hussein's regime and, by repeating the mistakes made by the League of Nations in the past, its failure to live up to its responsibilities.




Figure 16: Rhetoric of judging (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)

6.3 Saddam in the two wars

A simple comparison of the numbers and frequencies of the occurrence of the word Saddam in the two wars (see Figure 17) reveals a significant difference between them, especially if we consider that the Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years whereas the US-led invasion lasted only around six weeks. The frequency of references to Saddam in the US-led invasion is significantly higher than that in the Iraq-Iran war. The reason for this difference may be attributed to the fact that Saddam was viewed as the focus of the struggle in the build-up phase as well as during the war in the 2003 US-led invasion. Therefore, Iraq as a state was represented by his person. Saddam was the focus of propaganda and he was demonised, represented as possessing WMD, and constructed as being a threat who therefore should be toppled. The discourse on Saddam continued even after he was overthrown and the US was trying to locate his whereabouts.

During the Iraq-Iran war, on the other hand, Saddam was not the focus in the American press discourses: the war was between two countries – as opposed to personalities - and the nature of US involvement was different from that in the US-led invasion. In general, the role of the press in that conflict was to report what each side - Iraq or Iran - said about the other.




Figure 17 Frequency of references to Saddam

In the Iraq-Iran war Saddam was represented as drawing mainly on national and religious identities in order to capitalise on the historic enmity between the Arabs and the Persians. This was done by making references to historical and religious figures to urge his people to continue fighting. He also encouraged the other Arab countries to support him in that war and began to build his personality cult. Furthermore, he was constructed as having ambitions for regional leadership and as being a supporter of pan-Arabism; he had also for a long time been seen as coveting the powerful role of Gamal Abdul Nasser in the Gulf. He also allegedly had a strong desire to succeed the Shah of Iran as the ‘policeman’ of the Gulf. Although Saddam was represented negatively in the Iraq-Iran war, this negative construction was even stronger during the US-led invasion

In 2003 US-led invasion Saddam was constructed differently by the US press: he was demonised and vilified during the build-up to the war. Before and during the actual war there were constant discussions in the press highlighting negative traits and wrongdoings, and stripping him of every good and godly quality in order to legitimise the intervention. This vilification is evident through a process of criminalisation, manifested in the words and references associated with him and that often suggest he was against his own people. Other references likened him to historical figures like Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini and Mao to establish guilt through negative association. Showing a similarity to these actors either by suggesting that

Saddam was emulating their wrongdoings or simply by suggesting he admired these people was a way of vilifying him. Furthermore, the press linked Saddam to al Qaeda and portrayed him as posing an equal threat to Osama bin Laden, erasing all the differences between the two and depicting them as one cohesive enemy. The intention was to show that each played a complementary role: Saddam harboured al Qaeda forces and providing them with training and other kinds of support and as a result he represented a threat to both neighbouring countries and the US.

Another difference in the reporting of Saddam in the two wars was revealed through examining the degree of access and how much voice Saddam was given in the US press: i.e., Saddam’s statements and claims, and the things he said during the build-up to the war and the war itself in the two conflicts under investigation. This was accomplished by sketching (see Footnote 24 below) words that act as a verb to the subject of Saddam: namely, saying verbs, and by using a sketch engine²⁴ to provide a summary of categorised collocation, as shown in Table 30.

Saying Verbs	Saddam (Iraq- Iran)	Khomeini (Iraq-Iran)	Saddam (Invasion)	Bush (Invasion)
	say (222), tell (21), proclaim (7),	speak (12), tell (16),		Say (1,096), tell (130), speak (89), ask (60),
	announce (25), urge (17), order (11), warn (12), declare (11), reiterate (9), call (17), express (9),	order (16), call (25), warn (14), urge (13), issue (12), announce (11), authorise (6),	refuse (12),	declare (53), call (87), announce (49), pledge (42), vow (39), address (38),
	accuse (8)			

Table 30 Saddam’s Saying Verbs during the Iraq-Iran war and US-led Invasion

From Table 30, is apparent that the US press gave Iran, Iraq, Saddam and Khomeini a voice during the Iraq-Iran war through reporting their actions and citing what they had said, told the press or announced to the public. In the 2003 US-led invasion this did not happen, meaning that Saddam and Iraq remained voiceless and muted. In contrast, Bush was quoted or reported in a vast number of ways, for instance, the verb ‘say’ is used 1,096 times in the corpus. The inequality of access to the US press of Saddam and Bush indicates considerable US press bias toward US politics.

Furthermore, as part of Saddam’s criminalisation during the US-led invasion, the US press tended to quote, report on and refer to those who had been killed or suffered or those who were in exile; their stories were integrated into the press discourse as part of the propaganda

²⁴ Sketch engine is online software that offers a grammatical and collocational one-page summary in which the collocates are categorised according to their grammatical relations: e.g., a word that acts as the subject of the verb or an object of the verb (Adam Kilgarriff *et al.*, 2014). It can be accessed through <https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/>

campaign. During the Iraq-Iran war this happened only very rarely. The aim during the 2003 conflict was to depict the invasion as a humanitarian intervention on the part of the US designed to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter the construction of Saddam during the US-led invasion has been examined, and the major reporting differences of this construction during the Iraq-Iran war and the 2003 US-led invasion have been highlighted. The results of the analysis of the data reveal that Saddam was constructed in a negative way during the US-led invasion, when he was depicted as being a threat to neighbouring countries, America and the rest of the world through his possession of WMD and his links to al Qaeda. He was further demonised and criminalised as part of the propaganda campaign as well as being compared with well known historical figures whose names had acquired negative connotations in the minds of people.

With regard to the differences in the construction of Saddam during the two wars, overall the frequency of references to Saddam and the number of collocates was much higher during the US-led invasion than during the Iraq-Iran war. Furthermore, generally speaking, the role of the press during the latter conflict in relation to Saddam was to report what each side - Iraq and Iraq - said about the other; this was done to show the nature of the war and how each side perceived it. The predicational and referential strategies used by the press in the Iraq-Iran war were negative: Saddam was represented as espousing the idea of Pan-Arabism as well as creating his own personality cult and using the Islamist and Arabist discourse to continue the war. However, these strategies are much less negative than those used during the US-led invasion and in the build-up period to this war, when Saddam was characterised by and associated with a discourse of demonisation and criminalisation as well as being seen as posing a threat that had to be confronted. The history of the Iraq-Iran war was also used during the 2003 conflict to show that Saddam had a history of attacking his neighbours.

Similarly, during the Iraq-Iran war Saddam was never collocated with the Halabja gassing; by contrast, fifteen years after the incident, during the reporting of the US-led invasion, Saddam was linked and collocated with Halabja. This type of reporting, together with the selective shaming campaign and the demonisation of Saddam, contributed to manufacturing general consent for organising and going to war against Iraq in 2003; this is indicative of the fact that the US press agenda was in line with that of the country's administration.

The predicational, referential and the argumentation strategies followed by the US press have all worked in line with the US politicians to demonise and personalise the war by criminalising Saddam to legitimise and facilitate the 2003 intervention. This explains the relationship between the state and the US press during the period of conflict. The state-press relationship has influenced press behaviour through overreliance on the US government's statement; thereby muting and blocking all voices of rivals and giving them little or no access to the press. The result was constituting and creating realities and executing the politicians' agenda. Saddam's construction has come exactly with Bennett's theory of indexing (1990), whereby the press tended to index the range of views expressed by the government. Moreover, the voice of the 'other' is not included in the news story when the enemy's voice does not reflect the US officials' story and only favoured victims stories were brought to the news that fit the propaganda. Whereas, during the Iraq-Iran war, it was seen that the indexing was more relaxed and different voices (Iraqi officials and Iranian officials) were allowed to delve in the story because it was perceived as having no direct influence on the US.

Chapter 7: US-LED INVASION: HALABJA AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter the discursive construction of the events at Halabja and the subject of chemical weapons (CWs) in the US press during the US-led invasion of Iraq are examined. These two constructions are then compared with their equivalents during the Iraq-Iran war described in Chapter 5.

The construction of Halabja and CWs were examined by means of their concordance lines and collocates through identifying recurring predicational and referential strategies as well as the main arguments used. These strategies were then categorised according to their semantic meaning in order to create themes. The theme of Halabja was then divided into sub-themes, which are described in sections 7.2.1- 7.2.3. The CWs theme also consists of sub-themes, and these are examined in sections 7.4.1-7.4.3. These themes then followed by their comparison with counterparts in the Iraq-Iran war7.5.

7.2 The Theme of Halabja

It is worth mentioning here that the events in Halabja were referred to in a variety of ways, not just through the use of the specific word ‘Halabja’. References include ‘killing 5000 Kurds’, ‘gassing Kurds’, using ‘chemical weapons against Kurds’ and referring to a ‘poison gas attack’ that killed thousands of Kurds. All these phrases refer to the actual incident of the Halabja gassing. The concordance lines of Halabja were therefore also examined in order to identify the predicational and referential strategies, and then classified according to their semantic themes, as shown in sections 7.2.1 - 7.2.3.

7.2.1 Halabja as a precedent

The history of Halabja was referred to on many occasions during the build-up to the 2003 US-led invasion along with other arguments – in particular those relating to WMD and the need for a humanitarian intervention – for the purpose of demonstrating that Saddam had a history of mass murder, having killed thousands of men, women and children, and that he is capable of any crime and that he would not hesitate to use such weapons against anyone - even his own

people. On these basis, Halabja gassing is used repeatedly as a precedent in the 2003 war build-up narrative. In this regards, Walton (1996a) argues that the precedence argument is a “species of case-based reasoning where citing a particular case is used to argue for changing an existing rule, or adding a new rule to supplement existing rules” (p. 94). Therefore, Halabja was used in this particular time to promote and aid in demonisation of Iraq in general and Saddam in particular.

121. During a 1988 revolt, **Hussein's forces attacked villagers from Halabja**, on the eastern side of the autonomous zone near the Iranian border, with chemical weapons. Thousands of people died.

The Washington Post March 29, 2003 Saturday

122. The war also showed how vicious the dictator could be when desperate: **In 1988 he allegedly ordered poison gas dumped on the Kurdish town of Halabja to punish militants** there who were helping Iran. At least 5,000 are said to have perished in the attack.

Philadelphia Inquirer March 20, 2003 Thursday

In the above US press accounts the Halabja genocide has been reduced to only Saddam gassing his own people killing more than 5,000 Kurdish civilians. However, many other relevant details of the context are omitted. The gassing of Halabja was a fact, as was the killing of thousands of innocent civilians. However, these facts were favourable aspects to capitalise and report since they suited the requirements of the war propaganda and they come in line with the demonisation of Saddam that was carried out before the 2003 US-led invasion was launched. The fact that Halabja was the scene of fighting between Iraqi forces on the one side and Iranian forces aided by Kurdish guerrillas who attempted to capture a strategic area inside Iraq on the other were unfavourable facts, unsuited to the war propaganda. Therefore, these facts were dropped off and the press only selected the facts that adds up to the criminalisation of Saddam²⁵. Below are more concordances lines, Table 31, that shows how the US press foregrounded this particular piece of context i.e. and constructing it as merely Saddam gassing his own people in this particular time of the US build- up to the war.

²⁵ Although there was no justification for Saddam’s action, the point I am making here is that the public were not given all the facts about the situation by the press.

used poison gas against	his own people	."He is a brutal dictator.
Hussein had used chemical weapons "against	his own people	,"adding, "He is down
used chemical weapons against	his own people	and executed thousands
used chemical weapons against	his own people	, professed a desire to
Hussein is a very, very bad guy who has gassed	his own people	and is a threat
Iraq's dictator A leader who has gassed	his own people	and used torture
dictator who invades his neighbors and gasses	his own people	.
"This person has used [chemical weapons] on	his own population	,has used it previously,

Table 31: The use of CWs in the past

7.2.2 Halabja at present

Halabja has suddenly become worthy to cover, draw lesson from and to have its victims interviewed 15 years after its happening with more negative construction attributed to Saddam. Halabja events and its after-effects, symptoms and defects were proliferated and linked to the present time.

123. Today the people of Halabja suffer from high rates of birth defects, cancer and blindness, and many have respiratory illnesses.

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

This example, as well as example 124, is an attempt to arouse people's feelings of pity in order to lay the ground for subsequent arguments in which the arguer reminds his or her audience of the incident by linking the past to the present. In examples 123- 125 from *The Washington Post*, the arguer uses an argument developed gradually, forming a series of small steps of reasoning. Rather than providing these steps with one big step, smaller items are introduced gradually in an attempt to persuade the audience to accept a particular conclusion (Walton, 1996a, p. 95). This conclusion is prefaced by a sequence of accepted preceding premises. Instead of arguing that it was necessary to go to war directly, the arguer starts with the fact that CWs have been used and killed thousands of innocent people, some of whom are still suffering the aftermath of psychological and physical effects that continue across generations – all of which is factually true but that has been brought into the limelight suddenly and deliberately at this point in time in the press discourses.

The arguer continues, in examples 124 and 125, with another step to appeal beyond proof to secure acceptance and to seek the involvement of the audience through the repeated use of 'we know' to mix the fact with the claims to reach to the desired conclusion i.e. taking action against Iraq. This move has been done through taking the audience from something they already know or a common knowledge as 'chemical weapons cause illness, disease and death' to claims asserting Saddam's own alleged admission, he possesses these weapons and has tested them

without specifying the period. This can be seen in phrases such as ‘Hussein has admitted’, ‘tested plague’, ‘has mustard gas’, unaccompanied by any details concerning when or where he admitted this, or whether it was before his co-operation with the UN inspection teams or before the war or after operation Desert Storm in 1990. Mixing untrue or unverified claims with some indisputably true statements the arguer hopes to persuade his or her audience to believe the claims. The arguer resorts to such methods as part of a propaganda technique designed to make it more likely that his or her audience will come to the desired conclusion.

124. So **we know** that chemical weapons cause illness, disease and death. **We also know** that biological weapons using anthrax and botulinum toxin, plague and Ebola cause severe illness and death. And **we know** that Hussein has admitted to having quantities of weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. He has also tested plague, typhus, cholera, camel pox and hemorrhagic fever. And **we know** he has mustard gas and the VX nerve agent. **We know** he has no compunction when it comes to killing people.

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

Also, the use of technical scientific jargon such as ‘anthrax and botulinum toxin, plague and Ebola’ can potentially deceive an audience by deliberately giving the argument a pseudo-scientific nature. By using this approach the speaker, according to Pirie (2015), might “induce an unearned respect for what is said” as well as give an indication of the strength of the argument. The fallacy of what Pirie (2015, p. 22) calls ‘blinding with science’ has been used widely in relation to the use of CWs terminologies or WMDs to direct the audience into assuming that the statements made were of a scientific nature and based on facts, since in the popular imagination science has considerable credibility: people believe scientific statements to be right, as opposed to mere judgement. At the same time these arguments were used to create fear among the public of the danger of using these weapons.

In example 125 below, the arguer pulls out all the stops to persuade his audience to come to the conclusion that there is only one solution to the problem by instilling the illusion that such weapons will be used. The arguer in this example says that there is no cure for the effects of the alleged CWs and that Saddam could cause mayhem if the fear of the weapons being used were to spread. In the ‘no cure’ argument, an analogy with HIV/AIDS was presented, diseases very well known to the public for the difficulty in curing them. It is also known that there is no effective cure in spite of research attempts and funds spent; a highly negative perception is therefore constructed in people’s minds. The use of the fear appeal based on just one possible scenario has the effect of turning a hypothetical situation into a complete certainty.

125. We know that there are no vaccines -- and sometimes no treatments -- for the disease and illness that would result from his use of many of these weapons. Scientists in the best research facilities in the world are constantly seeking vaccines and cures. But as we know from the search for a vaccine and a cure for HIV/AIDS, it is a very slow process.

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

7.2.3 Dramatisation of Victims' Stories

Everything that fall or serve the interest of making the justification to go to Iraq for a war have been foregrounded and drawn on. One of strategies that was viewed to serve the justification is recalling the accounts of victims of the Halabja genocide- either by quoting them or by interviewing people who had a close connection to the them. The victims accounts illustrated the horrific moments the victims went through in through retailing.

Johnson-Cartee (2004, p. 272) argues that such dramatic representations of individual stories attract audiences as they are very persuasive, and that it is believed that exemplars that "are vivid, emotionally engaging, and attention inviting will have superior accessibility or memorability"..

126. International human rights groups say more than 100,000 Kurds were killed by Iraqi government forces in the late 1980s. Most **notorious** was the 1988 nerve and mustard gas attack that killed more than 5,000 people in the Kurdish town of Halabja. **"My brother . . . my husband's brother," said Nasrin Dewana, 52, counting on her fingers the men missing from her family. "They've all been killed. "We've all been damaged by Saddam."**

The Washington Post April 10, 2003 Thursday

127. "The poor man was 28 years old," she says. Michael says she still suffers aftereffects from the gassing: trembling in her hands, damaged lungs that cause her to wake up gasping for air and -- worst of all, she says -- nightmares. **"I can't get rid of the pictures I have in my head."** That attack was merely an early, crude experiment. Over the next year, the Iraqi army learned to make its gas attacks more lethal.

The Washington Post April 9, 2003 Wednesday

128. Mr. Golestan won acclaim for his coverage of chemical attacks on Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988, in which 5,000 people were killed. **"It was life frozen, life that stopped, like watching a film and suddenly it hangs on one frame,"** the BBC quoted him as saying later. **"It was a new kind of death to me. You went into a room, say a kitchen, and you saw the body of a woman holding a knife where she had just been cutting carrots."** A young girl who had been gassed died in Mr. Golestan's arms on a helicopter ride out of Halabja, he recalled.

The New York Times April 3, 2003 Thursday

7.3 The Theme of CWs

One of the US administration's main justifications for going to war against Iraq was the allegation that Iraq possessed WMD. This was considered by US officials to be a threat to the international community and evidence of Iraq's non-compliance with the UN resolution that the country should disarm. This is in line with Fairclough (2005, p. 48) argument that "one important shift in the would-be hegemonic discourse in the period since September 11 is the constitution of a relation of equivalence between 'terrorism' and 'weapons of mass destruction' as members of the class of 'threats'". It is only those nations which are classified as belonging to the 'axis of evil' that are seen as possessing 'WMD', rather than 'nuclear weapons', and as a result as being perpetrators of terrorism, despite the fact that other nations own them (Bhatia, 2009, p. 279). Fairclough (2005, p. 6) argues that "weapons of mass destruction are only a threat in the hands of the 'bad guys' – 'our' weapons of mass destruction are not alluded to".

Weapons of mass destruction is a catch-all phrase to describe weapons with "varying levels of destructing [*sic*] power" (Millar and Ipe, 2007, p. 123). According to Korobko and Musa (2014, p. 212) In, a weapon of mass destruction is defined as a weapon

Weapon. of mass destruction (WMD) is a type of weapon with the capacity inflict death and destruction on such a massive scale and so indiscriminately that only its very presence in the hands of a hostile power can be considered as a grievous threat. Modern weapons of mass destruction can be either nuclear, biological, or chemical ones.

This definition includes many expressions of threat that denote not only the country's ability to produce this type of weapon but also the kind of arsenal the enemy has. The term WMD was used increasingly after 9/11 in both UK and US newspapers. In 1998, there were only thirteen articles on *The Guardian* website that included the phrase 'mass destruction weapon' and all of those had been written one month prior to the US 'Desert Storm' operation. The figure rose to 75, 204 and 2,070 in 1999, 2001 and 2003 respectively (Richardson, 2007b, p. 187). The term has become largely associated with Iraq and Saddam and it has been expanded to include a variety of expressions. These include WMD, doomsday, smoking gun/s, mushroom cloud/s, as well as chemical and biological agents and chemical weapons (CWs). In the current study, in order to answer the question concerning how CWs were represented during the US-led invasion and to compare that with the representation of CWs during the Iraq-Iran war, only the phrase 'chemical weapons' is investigated in the corpora. Figure 18 shows the total number of

occurrences of the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ throughout all the weeks of the conflict in the US press corpora.




Figure 18: Frequency of CWs during US-led Invasion

Figure 18 shows the distribution of use of the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ in the war period. It is interesting to see the fluctuation in the number of reports including the term: there is an obvious and dramatic rise between week 0 and week 1. The frequency reached its highest level in week 1, which is indicative of the fact that this period was the build-up to the war. This rise was then followed by a drop in week 2 and another rise in week 3, which was the second highest level of reporting of chemical weapons among all the weeks. The number of occurrences decreased dramatically between week 3 - when it fell from 273 to 3 in week 7.

In order to investigate how the phrase ‘chemical weapons’ was reported over these weeks and to obtain a clearer idea of the rise and falls in frequency, a collocation analysis was conducted. The concordance lines for the collocates were also expanded to provide more context in order to indicate the themes as well as the semantic topics. Table 32 shows the semantic topics for all weeks. A more comprehensive lists of collocates is provided in the Appendix C.

Period	Semantic topics
Week 0	History of using CWs, al-Qaeda, US soldiers protection of CWs, threat of Saddam, British set certain conditions for avoiding war, the Kurds’ fear of CW bombings
Week 1	History of using CWs, delivery of CWs, al-Qaeda link, suspected sites, the search for chemical items or elements, threat, possession, red lines for use of CWs
Week 2	
Week 3	Saddam’s Red line to use CWs, suspected sites, threat, investigation with POWs, history of using CWs, methods of delivering CWs, no CWs found, production of CWs
Week 4	The search for CWs, CWs not found, al-Qaeda, history of usage
Week 5	Iraq sends CWs to Syria, Syria provides refuge and CWs, Syria accused of possessing CWs
Week 6	Syria accused of possessing CWs
Week 7	Syria accused of possessing CWs

Table 32: Semantic topics of CWs in the US-led Invasion

Having calculated the frequencies of the CWs and the collocates along with their expanded concordances, the main discourses on CWs were identified. These are summarised in Figure 19.




Figure 19: The encapsulation of widespread discourses on CWs in the US-led invasion (2003)

7.4 The Threat

In this section the themes of the threat of CWs are highlighted. The threat, as will be seen, was constructed as being manifested in different ways both before the war broke out and during the war.

7.4.1 The threat of al Qaeda

One of the constructed themes concerning CWs is the threat of al Qaeda's access to such weapons through Saddam and the alleged link between Saddam and al Qaeda, which was later proved to be unfounded.

129. Iraq **has trained al Qaeda members** to make poisons and bombs while providing safe haven to violent extremists, says the CIA.

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

130. Hussein has used deadly gas against his own countrymen and started two wars. It is only a matter of time, Bush and his top lieutenants fear, before Hussein builds a nuclear weapon, fires a missile at an American target or **delivers biological or chemical weapons to terrorists**.

The Washington Post March 16, 2003 Sunday

In extract 129, the claim that 'Iraq has trained al Qaeda members to make poisons and bombs [...]' is portrayed as being an incontrovertible fact, since the information came from an expert or a valid authority - the 'CIA'. This gives the statement its credentials and makes it believable by the audience. This reference to authority does not make the claim true, however, as no supporting evidence was offered. In the case of our example 130 above, the arguer refers to the true historical facts that the gas has already been used in Halabja, and that Saddam has already started two wars – the Iraq-Iran war and the invasion of Kuwait. This is an example of what

Bennett (2012) refers to as the “hypnotic bait and switch” fallacy, in which incontrovertible facts are stated in sequence, followed by claims the arguer wants his audience to believe as facts. This is done in order to make the arguer’s subsequent claims – first, that Iraq possesses CWs and considered as a threat– appear accurate, so that the audience accept them. As mentioned in Chapter 6, mixing hypothetical claims with facts is a strategy used to make a statement appear to be a true. These two premises were introduced to create a strong impression of fear, and to lead the audience to conclude that there was a real danger that Saddam would target America directly, or indirectly by providing weapons to al Qaeda, who would then attack America – in other words, to persuade the audience to conclude that the threat was very real.

In example 131 below, by contrast, ties between al Qaeda and Saddam have been presented in the news as an established truth, rather than requiring a series of arguments to persuade the audience that this link exists. Saddam has been constructed as being in a ‘sinister axis’ relationship with al Qaeda, which is represented as an international organisation, and the air strikes have been organised to destroy these ties. The word ‘international’ suggests that Saddam can reach any country in the world indirectly through these terrorists. It is worth mentioning, however, that the north of Iraq is an autonomous region completely controlled by the Kurds and outside Saddam’s reach.

131. The United States launched airstrikes on the stronghold of vicious Islamic extremists with ties to al Qaeda in northern Iraq - aiming to sever the "sinister axis" between Saddam Hussein and international terrorists in the early hours of the war.

The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday

In example 132, the link with al Qaeda is constructed by showing al Qaeda support for and defence of Saddam by sending fighters from different regions to target US forces. The estimated number of al Qaeda fighters, as well as the specification of a particular place (Chechnya), is intended to give the impression of certainty and truth. The reference to an (unspecified) source is used to back up the allegations of the ‘ties’ between Saddam and al Qaeda. The unidentified source, according to Bennett (2017), may be used as “a way to fabricate, exaggerate, or misrepresent facts in order to deceive others into accepting” a claim. Walton (1996a) argues that the naming of the source is very important in indicating how credible or reliable the person is, and therefore not giving the name and the use of the opaque phrase tells us a great deal about the arguer and his or her intentions, as well as about the nature or reliability of the information (p. 62).

132. The Ansar al-Islam encampment has been a priority target for U.S. forces because of recent intelligence reports that hundreds of al Qaeda fighters have arrived from Chechnya and other regions to launch terrorist attacks on U.S. forces, sources told The Post.

The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday

The claim that Iraq possessed CWs and the consequent allegation that Iraq posed a real threat were further constructed and consolidated through integrating or quoting the claims of people of high societal status. Examples 133 and 134 are examples of the citation of 'Secretary of State Colin Powell', which serves to strengthen the argument, since the readers would consider him as being in a position of knowledge. This construction works on the basis that Powell has either knowledge of or access to information the press or audience do not have, and therefore more weight is given to his statements based on this presumption being true. The information provided contains very specific details of the type of chemical, group movements and the countries where al Qaeda members are active. It also shows the countries they have been to, which is not information that an ordinary person knows and therefore adds to credibility.

133. Powell charged that the group was producing ricin and other deadly chemical weapons for al Qaeda terror cells throughout the world and that Jordan-born master terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been operating there.

The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday

134. Powell told the United Nations that al-Zarqawi received medical treatment in Baghdad after escaping Afghanistan and formed a "Baghdad cell" responsible for the killing of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last year.

The New York Post March 23, 2003, Sunday

The continuous repetition of false arguments or premises in terms of Saddam's link to al Qaeda and their access to CWs in the US press with no useful information or evidence being provided served to construct a perceived reality or truth in the minds of the audience.

7.4.2 The threat of Iraq's possession of CWs

7.4.2.1 Attacking Saddam's ethos

One of the main strategies constructed in the US press to prove Saddam's possession of CWs - while failing to provide evidence - was attacking Saddam's credibility. For example, in extract 135, the argument of inconsistency and the ethotic argument were used by Bush in order to bring to light the issue of WMD by means of CWs and other naming. This involved questioning Saddam's commitment to UN obligations and his temporising regarding disarmament, and at the same time suggesting his lack of credibility using examples of breaches of 'longstanding

obligations'. The purpose was to present convincing arguments that would persuade the global community to distrust Saddam and encourage them to vote against him.

135. Saddam Hussein has a history of mass murder. He possesses the **weapons of mass murder**. He agrees -- he agreed to disarm Iraq of these weapons as a condition for ending the Gulf War over a decade ago. The United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1441 has declared Iraq in material breach of its longstanding obligations; demanded once again Iraq's full and immediate disarmament; and promised serious consequences if the regime refused to comply. That resolution was passed unanimously, and its logic is inescapable. The Iraqi regime will disarm itself or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the regime has not disarmed itself.

The New York Times March 17, 2003 Monday

In employing these strategies, according to Walton (1996a, p. 85), the "ethos (the character of the speaker) is used to transfer credibility (either positively or negatively) to the proposition advocated by the speaker". Since Saddam was constructed as a person with a negative ethos, represented by his lack of commitment to and manipulative attitude towards UN resolutions, an either-or position was presented. Saddam has the option either to 'disarm itself' or to 'be disarmed by force'. These two options were squeezed down even further into a single option by the statement: 'the regime has not disarmed itself', which effectively eliminates one of the two options and suggests that the only way to disarm Saddam is by using force.

7.4.2.2 Arguments based on 'Signs'

Another strategy used to persuade the public to accept the conclusion that Iraq possessed CWs was to publicise the fact that there had been 'signs' of such weapons. In example 136, the 'argument of sign'²⁶ is preceded by the sign 'reconnaissance image showed munitions being delivered'. The information is presented as coming from what is considered a high or credible authority that is presumed to have reliable information. This sign is followed by another sign that strengthens the suggestion that the munitions referred to were CWs - the allegation that these weapons were 'accompanied by chemical decontamination trucks'. All of these signs are intended to lead to a conclusion that there is a presence of CWs. These two signs, along with many other examples of signs, are constructed as accumulating evidence, each of these signs has a weight that is used to add more weight to or support the conclusion that Iraq possess WMDs.

136. "There are intelligence reports that Iraq has distributed **chemical weapons**, most likely VX [nerve gas] to the Republican Guard," including the Medina division, said Kenneth

²⁶ An argument of sign is an argument where a "a particular finding or observation x is taken as evidence of the existence of a property or event" (Walton, 1996a, p. 47). For instance, an observation of CWs protective suits, masks gear and antidotes were considered as signs of Iraq's possession of CWs and WMDs.

M. Pollack, a former CIA analyst of Middle Eastern militaries. When reconnaissance images showed munitions being delivered, he said, they were accompanied by chemical decontamination trucks.

The Washington Post March 25, 2003 Tuesday

137. A Pentagon official expressed concern that **chemical weapons**, most likely VX or mustard gas, are being transferred to Iraqi forces. "The indication we've gotten is that they've dispersed **chemical weapons** to some of their troops. We take this as a sign that they've got the capacity to use it," said the official,

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 20, 2003 Thursday

Saddam and Iraq were referred to as possessing CWs or WMD during the week following the outbreak of war, and this construction continued throughout all the weeks of the war up until the occupation of Baghdad. The claim was based on finding other signs i.e. Iraqi CW protection gear and an antidote for nerve agents in some places by the advancing US forces or on information allegedly provided by the Iraqi soldiers and officers who surrendered. It was also suggested by the statements and speculations of US officials about the possible whereabouts of CW plants. The presence of this equipment was constructed to suggest that Saddam had such weapons.

138. Some Iraqi troops had up-to-date chemical-weapons equipment when they surrendered - a warning sign that Saddam Hussein's forces are ready to use the dread arms, a new report says. They had old guns but 2002 gas masks, chemical decontamination kits and atropine - an antidote for nerve gas...

The New York Post March 25, 2003, Tuesday

7.4.2.3 Alleged Certainty

During the US advance and the seizing of some cities in Iraq there was a continuous search for suspected sites of CWs, since this was the basis for the invasion. Notably, nothing was found. US officials attempted to justify the decision to continue the war by continuing to insist that Iraq possessed CWs, despite the fact that no evidence had presented itself. As a result, excuses were made and statements were constantly being defined and redefined.

139. So far, allied troops haven't found any "smoking gun" chemical weapons - but **Pentagon officials insist it's only a matter of time.**

The New York Post March 25, 2003, Tuesday

140. **"I have no doubt** that we'll find weapons of mass destruction, but you shouldn't think it's going to happen tomorrow."

The New York Times March 24, 2003 Monday

141. Mr. Powell was asked by a skeptical European journalist why American and British armed forces had not yet found any evidence of nuclear, biological or

chemical weapons, which Mr. Bush made a reason for the war. "We will continue to search for weapons of mass destruction, and **I'm quite confident they will be found,**" Mr. Powell said.

The New York Times April 4, 2003 Friday

In above examples (139-141), officials are arguing from a position of alleged certainty for Iraqi possession of WMD without providing any evidence. This can be seen in the use of phrases such as 'no doubt', 'quite confident' or showing that 'it's only a matter of time' and 'you shouldn't think it's going to happen tomorrow'. Examples 142- 143, show how, in the light of the repeated failure to uncover WMD, US officials kept modifying their claims according to the situation in Iraq in order to sound certain and right despite the lack of any evidence, persisting in defending this wrong claim in the light of the failed repeated search is engaging in what is Carey (2011, pp. 120-21) refers to as *Ad Hoc rescue* in which he argues that

[T]his move is not intended to find new and better ways to test a claim nor even to provide grounds for modifying the claim. Rather, the aim of an ad hoc rescue is simply to save the claim in the face of mounting evidence that it is wrong

In addition, since nothing was being found in the seized areas, it was reported that the WMD were actually located in the capital, Baghdad a false claim to have the mission of invasion completed.

142. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told ABC's "This Week" yesterday that it's no surprise that U.S-led forces haven't yet found the actual chemical weapons because most of them are near Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit.

The New York Post March 31, 2003, Monday

143. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is hiding deadly biological and chemical weapons in sites around Baghdad that coalition forces have not captured, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said yesterday. "

Daily News (New York) March 31, 2003, Monday

7.4.3 The continuous threat of CWs

The fear and threat of CWs was continuous both before and after the invasion. The first threats were viewed through the Iraqi Kurds' fear of Saddam's deployment of CWs and through recalling the history of what had happened to them in Halabja in 1988.

144. Thousands of Kurds fled areas near Iraqi military forces in northern Iraq, fearing that Saddam would unleash chemical weapons similar to those he used in that region in 1988.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 18, 2003 Tuesday

Another constructed threat in relation to the use of CWs was the allegation that Saddam had delivered WMD to his on-the-ground officers to use when war broke out and that he had ordered them to use them. These allegations were constructed in the press through quoting 'Marine officers', 'intelligence' and 'U.S. officials'. Those individuals are expected to be in a position to know or are seen as experts who are presumed to have access to reliable information. These statements contributed to the establishment of the presupposition that Iraq did, in fact, possess CWs.

145. Marine officers said intelligence indicates President Saddam Hussein has given "release authority" to Iraq's regional military commanders and possibly down to corps commanders.

The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday

146. On the eve of all-but-certain war, U.S. officials warned of fresh threats that Saddam has given chemical weapons - VX, sarin or mustard gas - to some Republican Guard units. "There are indications that there is a high risk the Iraqi regime will use chemical weapons at some point in any conflict," said a U.S. official.

The New York Post March 18, 2003, Tuesday

Another strategy used to persuade the public that the threat of Saddam continued to be very real was to recall the tactics used by Iraq in the war against Iran. In that conflict Saddam's forces had resorted to using artillery shells to deliver CWs, showing that he had the capacity to use different ways of delivering the alleged weapons.

147. Artillery shells and rockets Iraq made extensive use of artillery shells filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars also can be used for chemical weapons. Iraq is known to have tested shells and rockets to deliver biological agents.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 18, 2003 Tuesday

Furthermore, Baghdad was constructed as being the 'red line' for the CWs to be unleashed when the allied forces approached it.

they are crossing what commanders call a	"red line"	beyond which Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is most likely to use chemical or biological
worries that Saddam Hussein has drawn a	"red line"	around Baghdad - and will order the use
Iraqi commanders may have drawn a	"red line"	around Baghdad, which, if crossed by U.S. forces, could trigger the use of chemical weapons
Saddam has drawn a	"red line"	around Baghdad and has ordered that if American troops cross the line, he'll unleash chemical
such weapons would be used once a	"red line"	around Baghdad had been crossed
the U.S. advance has crossed the so-called	red line,	the boundary inside which a desperate Iraqi regime could unleash its full fury, including chemical
Once the allies pass his	"red line,"	he'll unleash his chemicals
"There is some	red line	in his psyche, probably not necessarily physical
A U.S. intelligence official said Iraqi commanders may have drawn a	"red line"	around Baghdad, which, if crossed by U.S. forces, could trigger the use of chemical weapons

Table 33: Baghdad as a red line

7.5 Halabja and CWs in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and the US-led Invasion in 2003

In this section the question of whether there is a shift in the reporting of the Halabja genocide, that took place in 1988, during the Iraq-Iran war and the references made to it in the build-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and during that invasion is discussed. Also, the question of whether there is a shift in the way the CWs were reported during the Iraq-Iran war and the way they were referred to during the US-led invasion is also examined.

7.5.1 Halabja

When the corpora from the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion in 2003 were compared, some differences were found in the data with regard to the reporting of Halabja. One difference is that in the Iraq-Iran war, more references and context were provided for the Halabja gassing, showing that CWs were used during a fight between Iraq and Iran when Iranian forces were trying to capture a strategic area inside Iraq with the aid of Kurdish guerrillas causing many Kurdish civilians to die as a result of this attack. In the US-led invasion, by contrast, such references were either omitted or were extremely rare. There were no mentions of such offensives and no attempts to show that there was a fight inside Iraqi soil. Without the background of the military offensives being provided, the chemical gas attack was constructed as an attack carried out on only civilians, villagers and residents of Halabja. The Halabja gassing was highlighted by the US press when Iraq became an enemy state to fit the needs of propaganda, as well as contributing to manufacturing the war by communicating what the officials said. By demonstrating Saddam's cruelty in violating human rights by killing his own

people and the threat he posed to the rest of the world, this subsequently became a justification for an intervention. Similarly, in 2003, fifteen years after Halabja gassing stories of survivors surfaced and victims of the chemical massacre were interviewed, describing their bitter experience and the pain they had gone through when they were subjected to the chemical gas. The victimisation and dramatisation of such stories had not previously been used to criminalise Saddam in the Iraq-Iran war. Also, following the analysis in the Iraq-Iran war (see section 5.5) the US and UN stance in relation to Halabja was constructed in the US press as denouncing, decrying and condemning the act of gassing as well as it was seen to be 'grave violation of the 1925 Geneva protocol' but never expressed as a threat to the neighbour, world, or the US as the way it constructed in the US press in 2003 US-led invasion.

In the Iraq-Iran war, the role of the US press was that of a third party observer reporting what each side - Iraq and Iran - said about each other, including accusations, assertions, claims, denials and confessions. The US press also, in some instances, took the Iranian side by weighting the Iranian version of events through listing and packing the stories of survivors, witnesses and experts that would add more credibility to the stories. During the US-led invasion, the scenario was different. The Halabja incident was used by the US press, and by US officials and non-officials, all attempting to convince the UN and the public of the threatening nature of Iraq, its WMD and its history of using such weapons on its own people, as well as its possession of CWs.

In the Iraq-Iran conflict, the accusations and other reporting of the use of CWs in Halabja were constructed around and attributed to Iraqi officials and the Iraqi Army, but not to Saddam Hussein: e.g., 'Iraq admitted', 'Iraqi officials no longer deny using such weapons', 'Iraqi warplanes drop chemicals'. In the US-led invasion, on the other hand, every incident was attributed and linked to Saddam: for instance, 'Hussein's forces attacked villagers from Halabja', 'he [Saddam] allegedly ordered poison gas', 'Today is the 15th anniversary of Saddam Hussein's horrific chemical attack'. Furthermore, the theme of Halabja was used and developed in arguments as well as used as historical justification for invading an Iraq allegedly in possession of WMD.

7.5.2 The use of CWs

Generally, US press reporting of the use of CWs in the Iraq-Iran war is characterised by citing the conflicting views of different parties who commented on the incidents in terms of accusations, denials, confirmations and expressions of concern. By contrast, during the US-led

invasion, the US press adopted the US official stance toward the intervention, the reporting being in one direction and only US officials being given a voice in the news discourse, with conflicting ideas or opinions from other parties being muted or quoted only rarely. The reporting was limited to what officials said and thought about Saddam and Iraq, which shows a clear bias in terms of reporting the build-up or invasion phase.

In many instances in the Iraq-Iran war, although the press did not take a stance, it took a side through providing indications or providing more details from the Iranian side to indicate Iran's credibility, or by giving the Iranian side more weight. Reports gave little or no weight to the Iraqi side and offered support for the Iranian version of events. This was achieved by showing that Iran has interviewed casualties, survivors and witnesses and POWs. In the US-led invasion, in addition to widespread reporting of statements by US officials that effectively demonised Iraq and Saddam, the press cited many stories of the victims of previous wars and conflicts, projecting them onto the present war and the build-up to the war. The intention was to represent Saddam and Iraq negatively and to justify the proposed invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it would free the Iraqi people. Furthermore, the data sets reveal that during the Iraq-Iran war, in many instances the US press was critical of the US and UN responses to Iraq and its use of CWs. This is particularly noticeable in the use of terms like 'sympathetic' and 'lenient' to describe the attitude of the US and the UN when they refused to name Iraq as the user of the CWs or the aggressor or suppressing any calls to punish Iraq or impose sanctions on Iraq. Likewise, the US sliding toward Iraq use of CWs against Iran in the Iraq-Iran war was constructed to be a threat that could lead to the widespread of the CWs in the whole gulf region.

It is worth mentioning that although CWs were used on many occasions during the Iraq-Iran war, they were never referred to as weapons of mass destruction. This is in obvious contrast to the way CWs were referred to (as weapons of mass destruction) both in the build-up to and during the 2003 US-led invasion. Furthermore, Saddam is never collocated with the use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war corpus. Instead, Iraq, Iraq's and Iraqi were frequent collocates for the CWs. By contrast, when examining the collocates of CWs in the US-led invasion it was found that Saddam appeared forty-eight times as a collocate with CWs and Saddam's occurred seven times. This shows how the war was personalised, with the state being presented as a person, during the US-led invasion: the focus was on the person in particular and on Iraq on general, while the Iraq-Iran war was seen to be a conflict between two countries.

7.6 Conclusion

The analysis of the reporting of Halabja and the use of CWs presented in this chapter has shown how different the treatments of these two themes are in the two wars Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion. It shows how journalist practices were not maintained in the US press in the two wars in a way that it facilitated directly or indirectly in propagating and communicating what the US officials wanted to say to the public and as a result facilitating the 2003 US-led invasion. This is done through the emphasis on the crimes, violence and the human rights violation committed by Saddam's regime during Iraq-Iran war 15 years after its happening which was not reported and given such importance then. The aim of recalling Halabja history and the use CWs was for the sake of investing and using these events in the present time was to demonise Saddam and to mobilise the public and as a result justify the invasion. In fact, these events were even more negatively constructed during the build-up to the 2003 US-led invasion than they had been at the time they took place. Similarly, the use of the victim accounts were only acted as a tool to reach an end i.e. the invasion rather than an end itself. What is more, the construction of CWs was not the same in the two wars: although Iraq used CWs on many occasions against Iran and the Kurds in the Iraq-Iran war, these weapons were never referred to as weapons of mass destruction and never collocated with Saddam which was quite the opposite in the US-led invasion when the CWs were referred to as WMDs and Saddam was collocated with WMDs and CWs. This shows the fact that the use of terminology is deliberate with an ideological nature that comes in line with US admin propaganda.

The reporting of the use of CWs on Halabja and the killing on thousands of Kurds was not deemed important in coverage of the Iraq-Iran war. When a country is a client of the US, the victims in that country are implicitly regarded as insignificant. Whereas, when the same country becomes an enemy to the US, the people abused gain importance and will be subject to more intense and indignant coverage, as was the case in 2003. The same can be said about the use of CWs during the two wars. Iraq's use of CWs was not criminalised when Iraq was allied to the US; however, when Iraq was constructed as an enemy state in 2003, the use of CWs was considered a threat. This strategy remains in place and is applied to many countries that are constructed as the enemy of the US; for example the nuclear programme in Iran and North Korea.

The next chapter (8) sheds light on how the media contributed even further to the negative construction of Iraq and Saddam by presenting the war as a humanitarian intervention. This is done through an analysis of the construction of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Shiites.

Chapter 8: US-LED INVASION: IRAQI PEOPLE/SHIITES

8.1 Introduction

One of the justifications for the US going to war with Iraq was the US political leadership's employment of the humanitarian narrative that included claims of the repression and suffering of the Iraqi people and the need to liberate them from Saddam. The aim of this chapter is therefore to examine how first the Iraqi Shiites and secondly the Iraqi people were constructed in the US press during the US-led invasion. These constructions are then compared with the corresponding constructions during the Iraq-Iran war in order to highlight the salient reporting differences between the two wars.

8.2 Iraqi Shiites

In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the way Shiites were mentioned in the US press in the 7 weeks of US-led invasion in 2003, the frequency of Shiites was calculated to see when they were reported the most and when they were reported the least, as shown in Figure 20.



Figure 20 The frequency of Iraqi Shiites in the US-led invasion

From the above line graph, it can clearly be seen that there was a gradual increase between week 0 and week 6, with the exception of week 3, in which the figure decreased slightly. The reporting of Shiites was at its highest level in week 6, when the figure reached 245, only to plummet in the last week of the corpus.

In order to discover the main semantic topics in the whole corpus, the concordance lines of Iraq Shiites were examined and then categorised according to their semantic topic (see Table 34).

Week	Main semantic topics of Shiites
Week 0	Iran's fear of the establishment of a democratic Iraq, atrocities against Shiites, Shiites and Kurds uprising in 1991
Week 1	Saddam's killing of Kurds and Shiites in 1991, the fear of conflict breaking out between Sunni, Shiites and Kurds, US failure to help Shiites in 1991
Week 2	Reasons given for Shiites' reluctance to revolt against Saddam, attributing Shiites' lack of retaliation to a fear of Iranian expansion, proportion of

	population compared with government representation, recalling their revolt in 1991
Week 4	Suppressed, welcoming
Week 5	Freedom to practise religious rituals, opposition to US presence in Iraq, Shiites vying for power and control
Week 6	Shiites vying for power and control, Shiite demonstrations against US presence in Iraq, the difference between Iraqi Shiites and Iranian Shiites, population and representation in the government, concerns over Iran's interference in Iraq or the installation of an Iran-style theocracy in Iraq.
Week 7	demonstrations against US presence in Iraq

Table 34 Main semantic topics of Shiites

Having checked the concordance lines for the queries under question and Having them semantically categorised, the most frequently occurring themes related to Shiites were identified. These are examined in the following sections (8.2.1- 8.2.4)

8.2.1 The theme of the victimisation of Shiites

In predicational terms, Iraqi Shiites were constructed as being victimised and oppressed in the reporting during the week before the war as well as in the first week of the war. The victimisation and marginalisation were put in the foreground and the press purposefully highlighted this issue through comparing the percentage of Shiites in the total population to their representation in the government. Thus, although they constituted '60 per cent' of the population, they were marginalised in the government, being viewed as having 'little or no say', as being 'oppressed', or 'long repressed', and as having lived for a long time as 'second-class citizens' under the rule of a Sunni Muslim minority.

148. Although the **Shiites represent an estimated 55 percent to 65 percent** of the population in Iraq [...] **they have been politically marginalized** by Hussein's regime

The Washington Post March 22, 2003 Saturday

149. Shiite majority **has waited decades for equal rights.**

USA TODAY March 20, 2003, Thursday

150. Shiites make up about **60 percent** of Iraqis but **have historically been politically repressed and economically impoverished**

The New York Times March 21, 2003 Friday

151. Shiites, **who make up 60 percent of the Iraqi population** of 24 million, for generations **have had little or no say in its government and were oppressed**

The Washington Post April 26, 2003 Saturday

The Shiite population and their marginalisation in government was generally compared with the situation of the Sunni minority who were, on the other hand, viewed by the US press as constituting '20' or '37' per cent of the total population and thus as being the 'minority' group; however, they were portrayed as dominating the majority Shiites and the government was run by them. In addition, Sunnis were not only viewed in the US press as dominating but also as persecuting and repressing the Shiites.

152. Sunni Muslims, about 37 percent of the population, **dominate the government** and have **persecuted the majority Shiites**, especially in southern Iraq.

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 16, 2003 Sunday

153. The Baath Party, whose leadership is **dominated by Hussein's clan and loyal Sunni Muslim tribes, has waged a withering war against Shiite political groups, from bloody crackdowns to the forced exile** of tens of thousands to neighboring Iran.

The Washington Post March 15, 2003 Saturday

154. Shiite Muslims, **victims of discrimination** in Iraq, which is dominated by the Sunni minority, make up most of the rest.

USA TODAY March 20, 2003, Thursday

155. The real wild card in Iraq is the Shiite Muslim **underclass, which has been savagely repressed by the Sunni minority that dominated** Saddam Hussein's military and secret police.

The Washington Post April 15, 2003 Tuesday

The minority/majority dichotomy was used in the US media to portray how discriminatory practices were employed by Saddam in relation to the ethnic and religious groups, i.e., Sunni, Shiites and Kurds. This strategy was used by the US press to separate and differentiate between these groups by drawing a line between the minority Sunni and majority Shiites, directing the readers' attention that there was a difference between the treatment of these ethnic and religious groups and that these groups did not have equal rights, representing Shiites and Kurds as victims of Sunnis.

The victimisation and marginalisation of Shiites were used to accentuate and problematise the issues that concerned the minority Sunni, devaluing the Sunni by assigning them negative traits, describing them as 'persecuting' and 'dominating' the Shiites, as waging 'a withering war against Shiites' or savagely repressing the Shiites, as well as linking the Sunni to Saddam.

The oppression and the marginalisation of Shiites is a fact. However, the portrayal of the Sunnis as a single entity that killed or persecuted Shiites is an oversimplified image based on a stereotypical generalisation that paints them all indiscriminately with the same brush as having

privileged access to the government. Cordesman and Davies (2008, p. 50) say that although most of Iraq's elite ruling were from Sunni the top elite Sunni are the small portion that have ties to Saddam family or other families in Tikrit, the city where he was born in, as Majid family and al-Bu Nasir tribe. But "the vast majority of Sunnis got little special benefit from Saddam's rule, and many Sunnis suffered from his oppression in the same way as other Iraqis". Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the first sign of revolt against Saddam in 1991 which was called Shiites revolt occurred first in two Sunni towns, Abu'l Khasib and Zubair, and then spread to the south of Iraq (al-Jabbar, 1994) (see section 2.9.). The criminalisation of Sunnis was accomplished in relation to Saddam's acts, in what Bennett (2017, p. 21) calls guilt by association, in that they were portrayed negatively because of the constructed association between them and Saddam, who had already been presented and constructed in a negative way.

Targeting the Iraqis according to their religious background, population and/or their ethnic background through the 'divide and rule' strategy aimed to break up the power structure of Iraqi society, weakening them and preventing them from linking up. Therefore, the Shiites were seen as worthy victims who could be used to accomplish the war and propaganda purpose of portraying the war as a humanitarian intervention. The portrayal of the Shiites as worthy victims was also an attempt to convince the Shiites to align themselves with the Western powers and not put up any resistance to the invasion as well as encourage them to revolt against Saddam since they make up the majority of Iraqi army. This portrayal also served to demonise Saddam through illustrating Saddam's criminal record in his violation of human rights and constructing him as brutal as well as building the case for the cause of the war around freeing/saving the Iraqi Shiites. Therefore, the voices of Shiite victims or those of other Iraqis who were in exile were integrated into the news; in particular, those who had suffered from the oppression and the crimes were invited to contribute to the news by telling their own stories and by testifying or describing what they had experienced, as well as the consequences of the experiences they had gone through on their future and their families. According to Walton *et al.* (2008, p. 108), the use of victimisation stories gives support to phatic arguments regarding the Shiites' distress and need for help through emotional appeals. Through these appeals, hearers (or readers in this case) find themselves involved in the problem through a process of reasoning, the aim of which is not only to provide solutions to the problems but also to make the problems as relevant as possible to the audience. Recounting the stories of the victims in detail is designed to enable audiences to imagine themselves in such situations, thus appealing to their sense of compassion.

156. Horror stories detailing the extent of his villainy abound; most are impossible to verify. By one published account, **he tossed a Shiite dissident into a tub of acid and watched him dissolve.**

Philadelphia Inquirer March 20, 2003 Thursday

157. In Delran: “Our holocaust that has lasted for 34 years is about to come to an end,” said Aziz Altaee, an Iraqi who owns an electronics store in Northeast Philadelphia. Altaee’s political persuasion was born of personal history. He fled Iraq 20 years ago, after, he said, Saddam Hussein had his cousin killed, the mutilated body later sent to his family. A Shiite who refused to join Hussein's political party, Altaee said he feared that he, too, would be targeted.

Philadelphia Inquirer March 23, 2003 Sunday

158. Although the Shiites are a majority in Iraq, under Mr. Hussein, a Sunni Muslim, **they were subjected to years of oppression. The mosque bears the scars of that past. Its brickwork is marked with bullet holes, and only the base of the minaret survives.** The rest was blasted to rubble during the 1991 uprising. “**So many people were killed,**” said another man outside the mosque, who gave his name only as Hammad and said he was an English teacher.

The New York Times April 12, 2003 Saturday

In the above examples, victims are quoted to validate the claims that the Shiites were victimised. This is done through keynoting by giving sources labels: for instance, identifying them by name, by a qualification, or sometimes by a combination of these two labels, as in examples 157 and 158 respectively: ‘said Aziz Altaee, an Iraqi who owns an electronics store in Northeast Philadelphia’; ‘said another man outside the mosque, who gave his name only as Hammad and said he was an English teacher’. This type of labelling encourages the audience to believe in the veracity of the statement. Morley and Brunson (1999) argue that this kind of labelling is used for “clueing the audience in as to the identity of extra-programme participants or interviewees; establishing their “status” (expert, eyewitness, etc.) and their right competence to speak on the topic in question - thus establishing their proposed degree of credibility/authority within the discourse” (p. 79).

8.2.2 The theme of Shiites’ reluctance to revolt

One of the argument to invade Iraq was to liberate the Iraqis from the oppression and it was constructed that the Iraqis will welcome the invading forces and revolt against Saddam. However, Iraqi people in general and the Shiites in particular did not revolt a move that if happened would prove the US causes of invasion and would be in the US favour. Thus, for the US to maintain its war justifications it was constructed in the US press that Shiites were cautious

and reluctant to revolt against Saddam. The reluctance was reported in the second and the third week of the invasion. This reluctance was attributed, according to the US press, to the Shiites' distrust of the US based on its past actions: specifically, the earlier failure of the US to help the Shiites and Kurds in the 1991 Gulf War, when they revolted and seized some cities in northern and southern Iraq at the urging of George H.W. Bush. However, the US aid never materialised, leaving the Shiites vulnerable to the Iraqi forces, many of them being killed and many others fleeing to other countries for refuge. Therefore, the reasons for the Iraqi Shiites' failure to rise in revolt on this occasion were constructed to be the lessons they had learned from the February 1991 Shiite uprising.

159. The United States, through its past acts, **is largely to blame for the failure of Iraq's Shiite majority to rise in revolt against Saddam Hussein**, a senior American military commander at Central Command said here today. **"We bear a certain responsibility for what we didn't do in 1991,"** the officer said.

The New York Times April 2, 2003 Wednesday

160. The Shiites, Iraq's majority Muslim strain, **are still aggrieved over** then-President George H. W. Bush's encouragement of an uprising in 1991 and his subsequent refusal to support it.

The Washington Post March 27, 2003 Thursday

161. the Shiites, a majority in southern Iraq, **have adopted a more cautious attitude this time around.**

The New York Post March 26, 2003, Wednesday

162. In interviews, **many Shiites in southern Iraq recalled the 1991 Persian Gulf War**, when they revolted against Hussein but were given no aid by American forces, who stood by as Hussein's forces crushed the rebellion.

Philadelphia Inquirer March 26, 2003 Wednesday

The attribution of Shiites reluctance to have learned the 1991 lesson serve first to show to the public opinion that Shiites still dislike Saddam and are in favour of the US-led invasion to liberate them but their reluctance to revolt was due to past failure. Secondly, to show that it is the US commitment to finish what it failed to accomplish in 1991 by letting Shiite to get killed and that they learned from that 'mistake'. To apply Forchtner (2014) analytical perspective here, the use of rhetoric of US failing through linking 'Our' past wrongdoing with the present through a more self-critical form where the conclusion of such event is directed to the in-group i.e. US and the coalition countries as well as to the out-group Shiites that the US will not repeat

the same mistakes and to have learned such lessons from the past. Therefore, the argument could be formulated as in the following figure.




Figure 21: Rhetoric of Failure (adapted from Forchtner, 2014)

Furthermore, the US was not constructed in a negative way in terms of its failure to help the Shiites; although the use of verbs such as ‘failed’ and phrases like ‘largely to blame’ were indicative of the fact that the US should be held responsible for not saving the Shiites, no other words that might have criminalised or constructed the US in a negative way were used. Even the words and phrases that were used to describe the Shiites – for instance, ‘aggrieved’, ‘have adopted a more cautious attitude this time around’, ‘recalled the 1991 war’, - were not strong enough to convict or construct the US in a negative way, but rather showed the Shiites as being cautious and sad about what happened in the past.

8.2.3 The theme of the Iranian threat

Although Saddam’s removal had been seen as a necessity by the US, because he had been constructed as being an imminent threat to the US and the world, even after his removal the threat remained. This was because the Iranian influence on Iraqi Shiites in general was seen as an emerging threat to both Iraq and the US in reshaping the post-Saddam government. This was explicated by the US press through Iran’s officials’ concern about and rejection of a ‘pro-American government’, and of an ‘American puppet regime on its borders’:

163. On Monday, The Associated Press quoted Iran's foreign minister as declaring, in a TV interview, that “**the government led by Americans in Iraq**” would not be acceptable to Iran or to some groups in Iraq.

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 22, 2003 Tuesday

The Iranian influence was also not only conceived through the Iranian officials' rejection of a US-led Iraqi government; it was also realised by physical interference, for instance, in allowing Shiites to move through Iranian land to places in Iraq, which was viewed in the press as an attempt to influence and reshape the post-Saddam government. This influence was constructed as sought after by Iran as a way of expanding its influence by helping Iraqi Shiites.

164. Shiite-dominated Iran has reportedly allowed Shiites from southern Iraq to pass through Iranian territory into northern Iraq, which could be an attempt by Tehran, which fought a war against Iraq in the 1980s, **to extend its influence** in a post-Saddam Iraq. **Iran may also seek to diminish any American puppet regime on its borders.**

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution March 16, 2003 Sunday

165. The war also created provocative opportunities for Iran, historically mistrusted by the Arab states, to expand its influence through support of some Iraqi Shiites.

The New York Times April 27, 2003 Sunday

The United States' rejection of an Iranian-style government in Iraq, a country that had many minorities, such as Sunni, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians and Yazidis, was presented in the US press by representing the Iranian government as the negative 'Other', constructing it as a theocratic and undemocratic government that did not represent the whole society and was made up of only a few Shiite clerics who governed the whole country. On the other hand, the rejection of this type of government not only implied a positive view of a US-style government; a democratic government that would include all the Iraqi minorities and majorities, and that was quite the opposite of the Iranian style government, it also suggested that what Iran wanted was quite different from what the US thought it should have.

166. In an interview with the Associated Press in his Pentagon conference room, Rumsfeld said the United States **would not allow an Iran-style theocracy in Iraq.** "If you're suggesting, how would we feel about **an Iranian-type government** with a few clerics running everything in the country, the answer is: That isn't going to happen," he said.

The Philadelphia Inquirer April 25, 2003 Friday

167. **Some U.S. officials worry that the Islamic government in Iran,** which is predominantly Shiite, may seek to influence Iraq's reshaping.

The Philadelphia Inquirer April 25, 2003 Friday

The sudden muscularity of the Iraqi Shiites is constructed as evident in their organising and assuming roles in society and securing the important service institutions, was constructed as a threat for the US that feared a Shiite-dominated government, which was represented negatively through comparing it to the Iranian-style government.

168. Iraqi Shiites are organizing local committees, doling out funds to pay salaries, collecting looted property and sending militias to secure hospitals and electric plants.

They have raised concerns **that some may try to install a theocracy like the one next door, in Shiite-dominated Iran.**

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) April 24, 2003 Thursday

Furthermore, the possibility that the Shiites might come to dominate the government was constructed as a threat not only to the US but also to other Arab countries in general and to those countries that had Shiite majorities or minorities causing ethnic and religious divisions in particular. The fear of a Shiite-dominated government was seen as having the potential to be infectious and to cause a ‘domino effect’ that could destabilise the entire region. Thus, Saudi Arabia, for instance, was described as being concerned that the rise of a post-Saddam, Shiite-dominated government in Iraq could align itself with their-co-religionists Shiites in Iran, a country where Shiite Islam is the official religion. The possibility of such an outcome was constructed to have caused a deep anxiety for the Saudis, who were afraid that their own minority Shiites would then become restive. The possibility of Shiites coming to power in Iraq was seen as a cause for anxiety since it could lead to empowering Shiites in other countries.

169. The Saudi leadership has worried openly about the possibility that Iraq might shatter along ethnic and religious lines as a result of a war, **with a push for power by the Iraqi Shiite Muslim majority. Such an outcome could directly aggravate Saudi Arabia's own brittle relations with its Shiite minority.**

The New York Times March 16, 2003 Sunday

170. Iran and Iraq fought a bitter war in 1980-88, and Iraqi nationalism is strong among Shiites as well as Sunnis. **But there could be a domino effect if Shiites take power in Iraq, strengthening calls for empowerment of Shiites in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain.**

USA TODAY April 16, 2003 Wednesday

The Iranian threat was also constructed in the press by its references to the issuing of edicts, to ‘receiving significant directions’, as well as the incitement of Iran to fill the post-Saddam gap in the government institutions and other significant positions which had resulted in a lack of security in the cities. The threat was also represented through references to Iran’s ‘orchestrating’ the Iraqi Shiites to demonstrate against the US presence in Iraq.

171. A religious edict issued in Iran and distributed to Shiite mullahs in Iraq calls on them “to seize the first possible opportunity to fill the power vacuum in the administration of Iraqi cities.” The edict, or fatwa, issued on April 8 by Kadhem al-Husseini al-Haeri, an Iraqi-born cleric based in the Iranian holy city of Qum, suggests that **Shiite clerics in Iraq are receiving significant direction from Iran as they try to assert the power of Iraq’s long-oppressed religious majority.**

The New York Times April 26, 2003 Saturday

172. But already, Shiite clerics in Iraq are calling for the United States to leave, and the **most active among them are turning toward Iran for support.**

The New York Times April 28, 2003 Monday

173. The anti-U.S. demonstrations by Iraqi Shiites in recent days **have been orchestrated in part by Iran.**

The Washington Post April 27, 2003 Sunday

Not only was Iran perceived as indirectly inciting and orchestrating the Iraqi Shiites, but also as being directly involved by sending Iranian agents across the border ‘to destabilize the Shiite’, and ‘promote friendly Shiite clerics’.

174. The United States **has warned Iran not to meddle in Iraqi affairs, suggesting this week that Iranian agents have crossed into Iraq to destabilize the Shiite population.**

The New York Times April 26, 2003 Saturday

175. **The United States has said that Iranian agents have crossed into Iraq to promote friendly Shiite clerics in Basra, Karbala and Najaf and advance Iran’s interests.** The agents are said to be members of the Iraqi Badr Brigade and Iran’s hard-line Revolutionary Guards.

The New York Times April 25, 2003 Friday

176. According to The Times’s Douglas Jehl, **Iranian-trained operatives have crossed into southern Iraq to help the Shiites** who are demanding a state like Iran’s.

The New York Times April 23, 2003 Wednesday

8.2.4 The theme of Shiites being free to practise their rituals

Another major thematic predicational construction of the Iraqi Shiites post- Saddam phase was representing the Shiites as being free to practise their religious rituals²⁷ in honour of Imam Hussein, rituals that had for a long time been outlawed under Saddam’s regime. They were represented as being ‘free to honor martyr [*sic*] for the first time in 30 years’, and as having a ‘long pent-up religious fervor’. There were references to Saddam’s oppression of Shiites ‘The mass pilgrimage, banned under Saddam Hussein’, and to ‘a crowd unheard of under Saddam

²⁷ This is a collective mourning ritual in which enormous significance is given to the martyrdom of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, by Shiites, involving a pilgrimage on foot to Karbala where the Imam Hussein is buried. It is also known as Marad al-Ras (the return of the head), since after the Battle of Karbala the head of Imam Hussein was taken on a spear to the caliph at Damascus and after that was reunited with his body in Karbala after the the release of his family from prison and their return to Karbala. Hussein and another 72 fellow Muslims were slaughtered by the Yazid army on the tenth day of the Muslim month of Islam(which month?)?. This event is also commemorated at the fortieth day to honor his memory and attracts many visitors from Shiites from different parts of the world (Christia *et al.*, 2016) .

Hussein'. This construction contributed to the United States' self-legitimisation in the war and to the broadly propagated representation of Shiites as being victimised, as well as contributing to one of the war causes, which was to liberate the Iraqi Shiites and the Iraqi people and to install a democratic government.

177. For the first time in three decades, **Iraq's Shiites were free to mark their holiest festival** [...] With Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein no longer able to torment them, millions of Shiite Muslims flooded into the holy city of Karbala and eagerly tormented themselves in a remarkable explosion of long pent-up religious fervor.

Daily News (New York) April 23, 2003, Wednesday

178. In an extraordinary display of the raw power of Iraq's Shiites, **the country's long repressed yet dominant Islamic sect**, hundreds of thousands converged on this holy city today to perform one of the most important rituals in the Shiite calendar for the first time in a quarter of a century.

The New York Times April 22, 2003 Tuesday

179. "Now, they can perform the rituals as they please," Jaferia member Shabbir Moosvi said of Iraqi Shiites, who before the war could have been imprisoned for public displays of such rituals as chest pounding and self-flagellation. "They are free to do them in the way we are here."

The Washington Post April 26, 2003 Saturday

8.3 The theme of Iraqi people

Another feature of the US press discourse surrounding the build-up to the war and the invasion period is that of humanising the war through the use of the humanitarian discourse. The discourses of humanitarian and human rights were used to justify the case for the invasion, emphasising the moral basis of the intervention along with the themes of WMD and the threat of Saddam. This goal was achieved through the frequent use of the Iraqi people as shown in Figure 22.




Figure 22 The Frequency of Iraqi people

The line graph (Figure 22) shows the frequencies of Iraqi people in the US press in the whole corpus. It can be seen clearly from the graph that there was a high frequency of Iraqi people in the whole corpora with a total of 1593, which shows that they were the focus of the US press reporting in this period. It also shows that there was a gradual and significant increase in the frequency between week 1 and week 2, which then dropped slightly in week 3, only to shoot up dramatically in week 4, when it reached its highest peak. This was then followed by a sharp fall in week 5, and the frequency continued to decrease until it reached its lowest in week 7.

In order to identify the major semantic topics in these weeks and to determine how they were reported during this period, the concordance lines were examined in detail. The main semantic topics are presented in Table 35 below.

Week	Semantic topic
Week 0	Suffering, better future for Iraqi people; liberate Iraqi people, benefited from sources of wealth, humanitarian needs, empowerment, calling on Iraqi army not to use WMD against Iraqi people.
Week 1	Liberate, free Iraqi people, suffering, humanitarian assistance, empowerment, beneficiaries, help Iraqi people.
Week 2	Humanitarian mission, troops were not welcomed, long-suffering, calls for Iraqi people to get rid of Saddam, freedom.
Week 3	Long-repressed, edict to call on Iraqi people to resist US, empowerment of Iraqi people, beneficiaries, humanitarian assistance, liberation, welcoming the US troops
Week 4	Iraqi people are to run/govern Iraq, liberation, suffering, benefit for Iraqi people, assuring Iraqi people that US is to liberate, the resources are from Iraqi people
Week 5	Help, Iraqi people are free/liberated, happy, Iraqi people are to govern/rule themselves, protecting their wealth, looting, helping Iraqi people to build a representative government, beneficiaries
Week 6	Concern about an Iran-like theocracy, looting, representative government, wealth is for Iraqi people, help them to build better nation
Week 7	Iraqi people to govern themselves

Table 35 Semantic topics of Iraqi people

Owing to the large number of collocates of Iraqi people; only those with at least 10 occurrences or more in the whole corpus are listed in Table 36. A comprehensive list of all collocates with MI scores of 3 and LL of 6.63 is given in Appendix A. The concordance lines for these collocates were then examined and categorised according to their semantic meaning for the predicational and referential themes, as shown in sections 8.3.1- 8.3.4.

Week	Collocates
Week 0- Week 7	against, all, anyone, assistance, being, believe, belong, belongs, benefit, better, build, capable, choose, day, decades, decide, democracy, destruction, exterminate, fight, free, freedom, future, gift, give, good, government, great, happy, have, hearts, help, helping, heroic, hope, humanitarian, know, liberate, liberated, liberating, liberation, life, long, medicine, message, minds, must, need, needs, political, possible, quickly, regime, Rumsfeld, Saddam, should, show, suffered, suffering, support, sure, tell, their, themselves, trying, want, wealth, welcome

Table 36 Collocates with at least 10 occurrences in all weeks

8.3.1 The Theme of Victimisation

The Iraqi people in general and the Shiites in particular were seen as worthy victims, which helped to legitimise the war against Iraq. The Iraqi people were reported extensively in the build-up phase as well as after the invasion, as shown in Figure 22. In this regard, Herman and Chomsky (1988) attributed such attention to people in times of conflict as being part of the propaganda system, through depicting “people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with equal or greater severity by its own government or clients will be unworthy” (p. 34). In the same vein, Johnson-Cartee (2004) maintains that “for the average person, simply the appearance in the news of a person, object, or public act is enough to lead to the conclusion that the person, object, or public act must be important” (p. 234). This explains the frequent use of the phrases Iraqi people and people of Iraq in the press, as well as the interviewing of Iraqi victims who were in exile or reiterating their stories.

Therefore, they are expressed in predicational terms as being victimised, and detailed and dramatic accounts of the suffering inflicted on the them were provided, accusing the Iraqi regime of killing, and torturing his people, including the use of biological and chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja and the repression of the Shiite uprising after the 1991 Gulf War. This victimisation strategy was manifested through the use of collocates such as suffer, killed, executed, exterminated and crushed.

180. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and catalogues what happens to Saddam’s enemies: **“electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.”**

Daily News (New York) March 20, 2003, Thursday

181. It will also free the **long-suffering Iraqi people, who have endured one of the cruelest and most murderous dictatorships of the past half-century.**

8.3.2 The theme of liberation

From the day the United States decided to engage in a war with Iraq, the violation of the human rights of the enemy state (Iraq) became one of the war objectives, along with the threat of Saddam, through his supposed possession of WMD and his links to al Qaeda, and the Iraqi people became worthy victims. Therefore, the damage, suffering and abuse inflicted on the victims were highlighted by US officials and by the press reliance on the elite sources they had in the government. In this regard, Zollmann (2017, p. 67) argues that when the Western elite decides to intervene in the affairs of another state, this is first advocated and communicated through the media by journalists, human rights activists, or by policy makers. The media then acts as an instrument for shaming the enemy states by using the statements of government spokesmen or those of other allied groups to shame them. Therefore, the news press published stories that portrayed the victimisation of the Iraqi people and that criminalised the Saddam regime, both in reporting the accounts of officials or those of the victims.

182. In his State of the Union speech, Bush promises to liberate the Iraqi people and catalogues what happens to Saddam's enemies: "electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning."

Having capitalised on the crimes committed against the worthy victims, the need for taking an action comes into play towards such human rights violations where an indignation is usually produced by the news press which could include, as elaborated by Zollmann (2017, p. 69), statements suggesting military policies, sanctions, investigations and/or criminal proceedings as well as outrage, concern and mourning. Therefore, the liberation of the Iraqi people was articulated in the US press, whether by officials and non-officials, as being one of the war objectives.

183. "We have chosen to confront terror and tyranny," said U.S. Rep. Todd Akin, R-Town and Country, one of several speakers. "**We have chosen** to give the greatest gift of **freedom to the Iraqi people.**"

St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) March 29, 2003 Saturday

184. **of course our aim** is to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and make our world more secure, the justice of our cause lies in the **liberation of the Iraqi people.** And to them we say: We will **liberate you.** The day of your freedom draws near.

The New York Times March 28, 2003 Friday

185. “**Our goal is** to defend the American people, and to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and to **liberate the Iraqi people,**” Mr. Rumsfeld said during a Pentagon news briefing and defining the overall goal of the war.

The New York Times March 22, 2003 Saturday

Furthermore, the war was presented, in relation to liberation, as a ‘black and white’ affair, in that an ‘either/or’ position was presented, whereas in reality there were more than two options that could exist. Pirie (2015, p. 19) calls this the “fallacy of bifurcation”. In this fallacy, only restricted choices are to be made, and it is used to squeeze out other options. Thus, in the example below, Iraqi soldiers and officers were given only two options: either survive or die; be on the wrong side and ‘die fighting for a doomed regime’ or be on the righteous side, stand with the liberators and survive and help their own people.

186. “The Iraqi soldiers and officers must ask themselves if they want to die fighting for a doomed regime or do they want to survive, help the Iraqi people in the liberation of their country and play a role in a new, free Iraq,” he said. The Bush administration has been urging Saddam's generals for months to overthrow him, offering amnesty for war crimes if they lay down their arms.

Daily News (New York) March 21, 2003, Friday

On the other hand, in example 187 the US soldiers were pictured as heroes who cared about the Iraqi people and were prepared to sacrifice their own lives to liberate and save them. If the fate of the Iraqi soldiers is compared with that of the American soldiers, it appears that if an Iraqi soldier dies, he died ‘fighting for a doomed regime’, whereas the American soldiers who went to their deaths ‘didn’t die in vain’, and in fact their names will go down in history because they liberated the Iraqi people.

187. Rincon, a native of Colombia, has just been awarded U.S. citizenship in posthumous gratitude for his sacrifice. **He and other soldiers gave their most precious possession to give the Iraqi people and the people of the United States an enormous opportunity.**

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 10, 2003 Thursday

188. Brown was one of three soldiers who died along with two reporters last week when an Iraqi missile slammed into the Tactical Operations Center of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team south of Baghdad. “**He didn't die in vain. He didn't die without a purpose. He died for the liberation of the Iraqi people,**” said Capt. Ron Cooper, task force chaplain.

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution April 12, 2003 Saturday

In addition, the press portrayed the American soldiers as caring and humane, in that even during the course of the war they were benevolent and treated the Iraqi people respectfully. In the following extract this can be seen in the use of the word ‘fixate’, as well as in the reference to the sandwich which was given to the boy by another soldier, representing them in a good way.

189. Mrs. Miller, who regards the war as a “moral and just” effort to protect American national security and liberate the Iraqi people, **fixates on a little boy who was eating a sandwich** -- she imagined it to be peanut butter and jelly -- **given him by a soldier**. “His face,” she said, “was just rapturous.” Mrs. Miller has a long history with the military.

The New York Times April 5, 2003 Saturday

The construction of the American soldiers as heroes, in the above examples, conforms to Hankings’ (Browne and Fishwick, 1983, pp. 269-270) archetype of heroism. The first criterion is that the hero must come from “outside the society in which he operates”. The above extracts show that the American soldiers are operating in a distant country for the sake of liberating and freeing the Iraqi people from suffering. The second criterion is that the hero must show asceticism and morality, as in the case of the American soldiers, who are constructed as not looking for wealth or material gain, but are ready to sacrifice themselves. This is evident in the following example: ‘He and other soldiers gave their most precious possession to give the Iraqi people and the people of the United States an enormous opportunity’. Furthermore, as seen in example 189, the fourth criterion is that “the hero exhibits compassion for the society of which he is not really a part” (Hankins, 1983, p. 269). Lastly, they must be fighting evil; in the case of the American soldiers, they are depicted as being motivated by the inherent desire to do good.

One aspect of the liberation theme is the continuity of the positive representation of ‘Our’ side and the negative representation of ‘their’ side, through drawing on the differences between ‘The West’ on the one hand, constructing Westerners as civilisers, and the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular on the other, constructing them as uncivilised and lacking in freedom and democracy. Therefore, in examples 190 and 191 America is constructed as a free country while Iraq is not, and the purpose of the invasion is seen as being to give the Iraqi people some of the freedom American people have that the Iraqis had only dreamed of.

190. “It’s about time,” said Irving Levine, 71, who lived in Battery Park City for 21 years and spent a year displaced from his home. “We’ve been ready for it for a while. I think our soldiers are prepared, **we’ll go in quickly and give the Iraqi people maybe some of the freedom that we have,**” he said.

The New York Post March 20, 2003, Thursday

191. “This is about giving the Iraqi people **the kind of freedom they can only dream of,**” said Ann Yarko, a 19-year-old FSU student from Orlando.

St. Petersburg Times (Florida) March 21, 2003 Friday

Another objective of the US-led invasion was also constructed as being to establish Iraq as a model of democracy for all of the Middle East countries.

192. “Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty, and when the dictator has departed, **they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.**”

The Washington Post March 18, 2003 Tuesday

193. The United States and the coalition are on the verge of destroying the regime of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, **liberating the Iraqi people and constructing the foundation of a new era of freedom and prosperity in the Middle East.**

Daily News (New York) April 6, 2003, Sunday

8.3.3 The theme of beneficiaries

In addition to constructing Iraq as a beneficiary of the ‘liberation’, the Iraqi people were also constructed as being beneficiaries of the help in a more concrete way, in that the wealth of the country was to be used for their benefit through the use of the Iraqi oil, resources, assets, welfare for the benefit of the Iraqi people, using collocates such as ‘belong’, ‘belongs’, ‘asset’, ‘assets’, ‘interests’, ‘resource’, ‘resources’, ‘wealth’, ‘welfare’ and ‘treasures’ as shown in the Table 37.

Iraq’s <i>natural resources</i> are used for the <i>benefit</i> of their owners,	<i>the Iraqi people.</i>
U.S. officials say <i>the reserves</i> will be used to <i>benefit</i>	<i>the Iraqi people.</i>
an additional \$600 million in <i>Iraqi assets</i> for a fund for “ <i>the benefit and welfare</i> of	<i>the Iraqi people.”</i>
Bush has pledged that <i>Iraq’s oil</i> would be used solely for the benefit of	<i>“the Iraqi people.”</i>
by proposing for the first time that <i>Iraq’s oil revenues</i> be placed in a U.N.-supervised trust fund during the conflict <i>for the benefit</i> of	<i>the Iraqi people.”</i>
the United States and allies have clear authority “to use and enjoy the profits of <i>property owned</i> by Iraq” for the benefit of	<i>the Iraqi people.</i>
repeatedly pledged that <i>Iraq’s oil wealth</i> will be used exclusively to benefit	<i>the Iraqi people.</i>
officials have said they plan to use any seized <i>assets</i> “ <i>for the benefit</i> and welfare of	<i>the Iraqi people.”</i>
additional \$600 million in <i>frozen Iraqi assets</i> and turn it over to a new American-controlled fund intended for “the benefit and <i>welfare</i> of	<i>the Iraqi people.”</i>
“The <i>oil revenues</i> of Iraq, now, for the first time in decades will be dedicated to the <i>welfare</i> of	<i>the Iraqi people</i>
we have secured the southern <i>oil fields</i> and <i>facilities</i> , and so protected <i>that resource and wealth</i> for	<i>the Iraqi people</i>
Military forces also will “secure <i>Iraq’s oil fields</i> and <i>resources</i> , which belong to	<i>the Iraqi people,</i>
any U.S. occupation force would serve only as a temporary guardian protecting the <i>interests</i> of	<i>the Iraqi people --</i>
to try to do it as quickly as possible and with minimum destruction to <i>infrastructure</i> , to <i>the resources and assets</i> of the Iraqi people and with an emphasis on protecting the <i>assets</i>	<i>of the Iraqi people.”</i>

Table 37 Concordance lines of Iraqi people as beneficiaries

8.3.4 The theme of empowerment

Another salient pattern that was apparent in the data was that of empowering the Iraqi people in the post-Saddam government, with promises being given that the people would have a role to play and a certain amount of choice in deciding on the type of government they would have, using collocates such as *administer, choose, chosen, decide, determine, govern, governed,*

government, running, secure, sovereignty, rule and run. Some of these collocates are shown in the table below.

It will be <i>run</i> by you,	<i>the people of Iraq.</i> "	
Iraqis, not U.S., to <i>rule</i>	<i>The people of Iraq</i>	will <i>choose</i> their future government
Soon, the good and gifted	<i>people of Iraq</i>	will be free to <i>choose</i> their leaders
remains unchanged. "	<i>The Iraqi people</i>	will <i>administer</i> Iraq."
"As freedom takes hold in Iraq,	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	will <i>choose</i> their own leaders and their government,"
service until a permanent government can be <i>chosen</i> by	<i>the Iraqi people.</i>	
	<i>The Iraqi people</i>	will <i>decide</i> who's on the Iraqi -- the interim authority.
would not promote any potential leader but would let	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	<i>decide.</i>
Schroeder said, "That will only be the case if	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	can <i>decide</i> , themselves, on political and economic
Britain to support it and guide it - but not control it.	<i>The Iraqi people</i>	will <i>determine</i> their own future.
"The overriding objective must be to enable the	<i>Iraqi people</i>	to take charge of their own destiny,"
humanitarian relief and create conditions that would	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	to " <i>govern</i> themselves."
enable		
We're saying the future of Iraq should be governed by the	<i>Iraqi people."</i>	
"The key is that Iraq, in the end, should be <i>governed</i> by	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	," Blair said
come when the coalition has "set up the conditions where	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	can <i>establish</i> their own government
helping to construct a democratic government by and for	<i>the Iraqi people.</i>	
"Forget it. From day one, we have said	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	are capable of <i>running</i> their own country."
United States will move as "soon as possible" after	<i>the Iraqi people</i>	
toppling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein "to secure		
<i>sovereignty</i> for		

Table 38 The empowerment Iraqi people

8.4 Reporting Differences in the two wars

In this section, the differences between the reporting of the two themes: the Iraqi Shiites and Iraqi people, in the Iraq-Iran war and the subsequent US-led invasion are discussed.

8.4.1 The Iraqi Shiites

The differences between the two wars in terms of the reporting of the Iraqi Shiites lies in the frequency of the references and in the topics covered. The first reporting difference between the two wars that can be seen from the Figure 23 is in the frequency of use of the phrase Iraqi Shiites. Although the Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years, Iraqi Shiites were mentioned only 95 times. By contrast, in the corpus of data from the US-led invasion (which lasted only 7 weeks),

Iraqi Shiites were mentioned 908 times which about 9 times of the number in Iraq-Iran war, which shows that the Iraqi Shiites had become worthy subjects and were talked about in the US press both before and after the invasion.




Figure 23 Shiites frequency in Iraq-Iran war and US-led Invasion

In both wars, Iraqi Shiites were constructed as being marginalised and disadvantaged in their political representation in the Iraqi government. However, the predications chosen were more negative in the 2003 conflict both in terms of number and portrayal. This was done by comparing the percentage of Shiites in the total population with their representation in government. They were seen, for instance, as a majority or as constituting 60 per cent of the total population, yet they held little power, and had for a long time been repressed. By contrast, the Sunni were described as being the minority group; however, they dominated/ran the government. Furthermore, in the US-led invasion in 2003, the portrayal of the Sunni as suppressing and killing Shiites and their association with Saddam was emphasised. A portrayal which was part of the propaganda campaign to demonstrate the need for the humanitarian intervention. During the Iraq-Iran war, only the percentage of Shiites population and their representation in the government, showing them as marginalised, in comparison to Sunni was given. The portrayal of Sunni persecuting the Shiites were not present.

In both wars, the Iraqi Shiites were used as a winning card by both the countries engaged in the conflict. In the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi Shiites were targeted by the Iranian officials as well as by the state radio, urging them to topple Saddam, since the Shiites constituted the majority in both countries and they shared religious practices, aspects on which Khomeini was counting heavily. In the 2003 US-led invasion, the Iraqi Shiites were also targeted by the US to revolt and stand by the side of the US. Also, the history of Shiites being repressed, killed and marginalised by Saddam was used largely through portraying the Shiites as victims and accusing Saddam of violating the human rights of his people a pretext used to invade Iraq and it wasn't an honest call for the humanitarian intervention. The use of the human rights violation

was overshadowed in the Iraq-Iran war, however, in terms of the frequency of references to it and also by listing all the wrongdoings done by Saddam to the Shiites.

The Shiites' reluctance to revolt at the call of the Iranian officials and radio stations in the Iraq-Iran war and at the call of the US during the US-led invasion in 2003 was evident in the reporting of the Iraqi Shiites in both wars. However, this reluctance to revolt was constructed differently in the two wars. In the Iraq-Iran war it was attributed to the notion that the Iraqi Shiites were feeling 'more Arab and Iraqi than Shiite' and that they were 'more motivated by Iraqi and Arab nationalism'. The reluctance was also attributed in the press to the Iraqi government's suppression and crackdowns. In the 2003 US-led invasion, by contrast, their reluctance was attributed to that the Iraqi Shiites distrusted the US because of America's past actions - when the US had failed them when they had previously revolted against Saddam (see section 8.2.2).

8.4.2 *The Iraqi people/ People of Iraq*

From the chart below, it is apparent that there is a big difference in the frequencies of *Iraqi people* in the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion; the Iraqi people phrase was used far more during the US-led invasion than in the Iraq-Iran war, despite the fact that the Iraq-Iran war lasted for eight years, compared with the seven weeks of the US-led invasion. More importantly, the revealed semantic motifs of the Iraqi people was employed differently in the two wars, and that depended on the stance of the US press in relation to the war as well as on the US involvement in the wars.




Figure 24: The frequency of Iraqi people in two wars

Therefore, during the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi people and People of Iraq were viewed as key players, and the historical and religious enmity was used by Iraq to urge them to continue the fight against Iran, which also used the religious theme exclusively to urge the Iraqi people to

revolt and overthrow Saddam. Iraqi people were constructed differently in the US-led invasion, however, and they were one of the main motifs through which the war was humanised to justify the US intervention against Iraq. Therefore, the semantic motifs constructed were that of victimisation, in that the Iraqi people had suffered or been killed under Saddam's rule; accordingly, the invasion was viewed as a liberation from Saddam's regime and the Iraqi people as being beneficiaries of this liberation and of empowerment under the post-Saddam government.

8.5 Conclusion

The aim of the present chapter was first to examine the construction of the Shiites and the Iraqi people in the US-led invasion and, second, to demonstrate the differences in the reporting of these two social groups during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion in 2003. Thus, with regard to their construction, the investigation has revealed that the Shiites were portrayed as victimised, marginalised and suppressed by Saddam and the Sunnis during the US-led invasion. Furthermore, the reluctance of the Shiites to revolt against Saddam was perceived as being a lesson learned from the 1991 Gulf War, when they had revolted and were failed by the US. Furthermore, the Iraqi Shiites were regarded as being free to practice their religious rituals, which had been outlawed during Saddam's regime. The Shiites' sudden post-Saddam masculinity was constructed as a threat to Iraq's democracy post-Saddam. The US rejected the Iranian-style government, which was portrayed as being run by a few clerics. Conversely, no attention was paid to the coverage of the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites regarding victimisation strategies in the Iraq-Iran war. The role of the media in regards to reporting these social groups were limited to reporting. However, no negative representation was attributed to Saddam as a victimiser of these social actors.

Similarly, the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were also seen as being worthy victims, in order to serve the propaganda purpose of giving the war a cause prior to the US-led invasion. Therefore, they were regarded as people who had been victimised and had suffered and therefore required liberation. They were also constructed as being beneficiaries of the liberation and the resources and wealth of Iraq after the liberation.

One of the primary principles of CDA is to discover the inconsistencies and contradictions in the internal texts structures and shed light on the issues that could cause inequality, power relations or abuse through the use of discourse. Thus, having examined the DHA strategies in

the US press in regards to the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites, it has been revealed that the strategies used work in combination to legitimise the US intervention. Politically, this bias favours and is advantageous to US policy makers for highlighting and capitalising on the victimization of Iraqi people and Shiites during a war in which the US is involved, while ignoring the same people who were suppressed in an earlier war when the US was allied with Iraq and Saddam. More importantly, many of the human rights violations occurred during the Iraq-Iran war went unchecked and were not highlighted by the US press. The predictions of the Herman and Chomsky propaganda model (1988) are validated here when the case of Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were examined. Therefore, in the US-led invasion, the crimes and damage inflicted on the Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites were reiterated in full accounts. This is followed by the demands for justice and stressing on indignation, expressing outrage towards the damages inflicted on the people and consequently holding Saddam responsible for such damage and victimisation; thereby ending these actions by liberating people and invading Iraq. The dangerous aspect of the selective shaming of countries and individuals in the media can play an important role in preparing the ground for any military intervention and bringing about a humanitarian intervention if they go unchecked in the age of militarism, where the US can bomb or intervene militarily in any country constructed as an enemy.

Chapter 9: CONCLUSION

The aim throughout this thesis has been to examine the discursive construction of Iraq in the US press during the Iraq-Iran war and the US-led invasion, and to compare the reporting in these two war periods. This was accomplished by focusing on the representation of Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people, Halabja and CWs in the US press during the two wars in question and to identify the differences in the reporting of these themes during the two periods. Therefore, in this final chapter I would first like to put together some of the findings as they appear in the analysis. I then conclude the chapter by presenting some of the contributions of the theoretical and methodological frameworks as well as the study's contributions to our understanding of war reporting and journalism in the Middle East and during international conflicts. The limitations of the study are also outlined and suggestions are made for future research.

9.1 Summary of findings

9.1.1 The construction of Saddam

In general, the US press represented Saddam negatively in its discourse on the Iraq-Iran war. This was done by showing him to be utilising the historical and religious enmity between the Arabs and the Persians to achieve his war purpose and to urge his people, as well as the Arabs, to rally round him by constructing the war as being religious. Even more negative was the portrayal of Saddam as having for a long time desired to be a military voice and power in the Gulf, and to take over the role of the Gamal Abdul Nassir and the late Shah of Iran. Along with this negative construction, he is further portrayed as creating a personality cult comparable to the personality cults of Stalin and Kim II, figures who had already been negatively constructed in history.

During the US-led invasion, the negative representation and devaluation of Saddam in the US press became even stronger, in terms of the frequency of his name and the strength of the negative attributes. This is despite the short period (seven weeks) of the conflict compared to the Iraq-Iran war, which lasted eight years. Saddam was the focus in the build-up to the war as well as during the invasion. He was consistently constructed as representing the evil camp in the good-evil binary. He was criminalised in the press, which recalled his past wrongdoings, assigning him negative attributes. The vilification included comparing Saddam with well-known brutal figures such as Hitler, Stalin and Mao, who had already acquired a bad reputation

in the minds of the public. Justifications for the analogy included the claims that Saddam had read books about these figures, alleged similarities between the crimes they had committed, and similarities in their appearance and charisma. Moreover, the history of Saddam's wrongdoings was brought back to the surface to serve the propaganda purpose, and his past was linked to the present to show that he was still a real threat that needed to be confronted. Saddam was also constructed as being an imminent threat to the neighbouring countries, America and the rest of the world because of his alleged possession of WMDs, and because of his connection with al Qaeda, constructing him as harbouring, training and supporting al Qaeda members.

The fact that the frequency of references to Saddam in the US-led invasion was far higher than during the Iraq-Iran war could be explained by the fact that in the US-led invasion the focus was on Saddam himself as the target of the war; thus, the press accentuated the need to disarm and overthrow him. In the Iran-Iraq war, on the other hand, the focus was not on Saddam as an individual: the conflict was portrayed as being between two countries rather than between individuals.

The other significant difference that is apparent from the data is Saddam's access to the US press. Thus, whereas during the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war the US press gave both Saddam and Khomeini a voice, by quoting them or reporting what they said, in the US-led invasion, Saddam's voice was muted and he was not quoted, while Bush was quoted frequently both before and after the invasion.

9.1.2 Iraqi people and Iraqi Shiites

The Shiites and the Iraqi people were also constructed differently in the US press during the two war periods in terms of the number of frequencies to them in the corpus and in terms of the topics covered. Both groups were used to fulfil the purpose of the war propaganda by portraying them as worthy victims who needed to be liberated. Thus, the US-led invasion in 2003 was constructed as being a humanitarian intervention. During the Iraq-Iran war, by contrast, this was not the case, as only a small percentage of the references were to these two groups. With regard to the Shiites, they were viewed in both wars as being marginalised in the Iraq's administration in spite of the fact that they make up the majority of the population; this was in comparison with the Sunni population, who were consistently portrayed as being dominant and prosecuting the Shiites. The Shiite-Sunni comparison was employed and highlighted even more in the build-up to the 2003 conflict and during the invasion. The Shiites were seen as being persecuted and repressed by the Sunni minority, who were linked to Saddam by guilt. This construction was employed not only to show the global community the suffering of the Shiites

and to present the invasion as a humanitarian intervention; it was also used to urge the Shiites to revolt against Saddam and align themselves with the US-led invading forces.

Similarly, there were few mentions of the Iraqi people during the Iraq-Iran war, and in these few mentions they were constructed as being targeted by both Saddam and Khomeini: the Khomeini encouraging them to revolt and overthrow Saddam, and Saddam encouraging them to fight against Iran by playing on the historical enmity between the two countries. On the other hand, the Iraqi people were mainly reported as having been victimised and abused and as having suffered under Saddam's regime. Detailed stories of killing and torturing were cited and the victims were interviewed. The Iraqi people were also constructed as being beneficiaries of the liberation, since they would benefit from the assets, belongings, resources and treasures of Iraq after the liberation. The invasion was also constructed as an intervention that would empower the Iraqi people by enabling them to choose, run and govern the post-Saddam government.

9.1.3 Halabja and CWs

In the Iraq-Iran war, the reporting of Halabja and CWs was characterised by accounts of the competing opinions and of what each side in the war said about the other: accusations, denials and confirmations with regard to the use of CWs. Furthermore, when no action was taken against the use of CWs, and when neither the US nor the UN was willing to name Iraq either as the user of the weapons or as the aggressor in the war, there were many instances of the US press being critical of US policy in its tilting towards and sympathy with Iraq. This tilt was constructed as being at the expense of the security of the region, since it would increase the threat of the spread of the use of CWs. Having said all this, however, the US press did not explicitly use negatively loaded words or negative attributes or traits towards Iraq; rather, it was a process of weighting stories to emphasise particular events.

Fifteen years later, in 2003, when the US wanted to invade Iraq, the history of the Halabja gassing was resurfaced many times and was invested in the US press with an even more negative construction and evaluation of Saddam than had been the case at the time of the incident: in 2003, Saddam was linked directly to the Halabja gassing attack, while during the Iraq-Iran war the attack was linked to and associated with Iraq as a nation and with the Iraqi armed forces. In the same vein, some details of the context were omitted from the context of the occurrence in the US press during the 2003 US-led invasion, in order to portray the gassing as an attack by Saddam on his own people.

With regard to the CWs, during the Iraq-Iran war, these were never referred to as weapons of mass destruction; by contrast, during the US-led invasion they were indiscriminately referred to as such, and Iraq was constructed as having used these WMD in the Iraq-Iran war. The over-reliance on US officials and experts meant that the claims regarding Iraq's possession of CWs and the threat this posed were constructed as being present throughout the course of the war.

9.2 Contribution to the Knowledge

The current study makes many contributions to knowledge in the field with regard to the construction of the five themes examined, in terms of methodology, theory, and as a general contribution to the literature.

9.2.1 Methodological contribution

1. **Data:** the data obtained for the study are completely new and original and were obtained to achieve the purposes of this research by selecting specific query words that would retrieve all the relevant articles in each time span (war period) to answer the research questions of this study.
2. **Scale:** In this research the immense corpus of available news articles on the LexisNexis online archive (7,937,701 million words in the Iraq-Iran war and 9,223,117 million words in the US-led invasion on the five themes in question) were collected and examined. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to examine the construction of these five themes in the US press in the two wars.
3. **CL tools:** With a corpus of over 16 million words, it would have been impossible to examine the data manually. In this study, various corpus linguistics tools were used as a method of triangulation to achieve better results. The frequency analysis was used to direct the researcher's attention to particular peaks or plunges in the data that might lead to something of interest. This was followed by the examination of the collocations of the words in question. The concordance lines of these words were then expanded to enable me to examine the whole context. These three tools served to reduce subjectivity as well as to allow more patterns of interest to be marked up. Another contribution of the research lies in its use of a variety of corpus linguistics software as a method of triangulation. Each software programme had its own particular properties, capacity and purpose that served the purposes of this research in a particular way. Wmatrix facilitated the categorisation of the collocates according to their semantic meaning. Wordsmith was used to do the major work of deriving the collocates,

frequencies and the concordances. Sketch engine was used to obtain a clearer idea of the nature of the corpus.

4. **Time Span:** Furthermore, in this study the query words in question were examined in the US press in two different war periods: the first when the US government was tilted towards Iraq, during the Iraq-Iran war, and the second when the US government stance was against Iraq, when it invaded Iraq in 2003. The diachronic and historical changes of these words in these two periods in the US press were also taken into consideration in this research. Therefore, a comparison is made of the stance of the US press when the nation is at peace and when it is at war.

9.2.2 Contribution to the literature

The motivation for the current research was derived from an observation of gaps in the existing empirical literature. Thus, it provides many contributions with regard to the construction of the five themes in question. First, it takes the construction of the Iraq war in the US press to another level by investigating the US newspapers and by shedding light on the behaviour of the US newspapers when the nation goes to war and when it is at peace.

Second, at the moment of writing this thesis, there are many conflicts and wars, such as those in Yemen, Syria and Myanmar, where mass killing is taking place and human rights are being violated; however, they have been rendered invisible and receive little attention by the US press. By contrast, some of the older conflicts, such as those in Iraq (1990, 2003), Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), have been very popular in the news media pages. This is best explained in terms of the concept that some wars are ‘Our’ wars that ‘We’ are involved in, or conflicts that affect ‘Our’ interests, whereas other wars and conflicts are ‘their’ wars, they do not affect ‘Our’ interests, and therefore they are not worth covering. Thus, this research makes contributions in line with those of researchers such as Herman and Chomsky (1988), Zollmann (2017) and Keeble (2004) among others, in shedding light on how the news media communicate and facilitate the aim of the US elites to justify a military intervention, in particular when the country is constructed as being an enemy of the Western elites. It has been shown in this research how the US press became involved in a selective process of shaming, and how it assisted the intervention by manufacturing and re-constructing the facts; this was done by adopting and relying on the views of officials, and any other pro-American interest, with regard to the crimes committed against the Iraqi people, the Shiites and the Kurds, and by demonising Saddam during the US-led invasion.

Furthermore, in line with Herman and Chomsky (1988), with regard to the aspect of “worthy and unworthy victims”, this study has shown how the Iraqi people, the Shiites and the Kurds became worthy victims when Iraq became an enemy state to the US, since this view fit well with the propaganda model. By contrast, during the Iraq-Iran war, their suffering, the abuses they were subjected to, and the mass murders that took place were paid no attention. Equally important, the human rights violations, that were accorded little importance during the Iraq-Iran war or the Desert Storm, were resurfaced in the 2003 conflict, with more negative and stronger attributes added.

Another important contribution of this study is that it reveals how some good journalistic practices were put to a severe test when the journalists’ nation went to war and how the journalists were in fact unable to sustain these practices. The findings also reveal that the press went beyond simple war reporting in the 2003 US-led invasion: by adopting and relying on the views of those in power.

This aim of this study is also aligned with Wodak and Meyer’s (2016) definition of the main principle of CDA, which is to “produce and convey critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self- reflection”, and as a result to produce “enlightenment and emancipation”. Therefore, exposing the inconsistencies, manipulation and propaganda in the US press could provide a basis for other scholars researching the field as well as to extend the scope of their research.

9.2.3 Theoretical contribution

With regard to the theoretical contribution made by this research, although the CDA and CL combination is not a new practice in the field and many studies have adopted this approach, in this study it has been re-contextualised and applied in a new context (that of the Iraqi wars and news coverage of these wars) using existing techniques, strategies and the DHA framework. Furthermore, the study highlights the fact that neither corpus linguistics nor DHA is a single, indivisible method of answering a research question: there are many tools and software in CL and there is no single way of using combinations of these tools. Each tool, or an integration of a group of tools, can be used to answer a particular question. Similarly, DHA has various strategies that can be employed to answer different research questions. In this study I began by using the CL as a quantitative method, since I was dealing with a corpus of enormous size; as the research progressed the approach became qualitative. It started with frequency lists,

collocates, concordance lines (the quantitative part) and semantic categorisation, investigating the intertextuality of the query words under question in the contexts in which they appeared in to see how the themes are referred to and talked about according to DHA strategies (qualitative part).

9.3 Implications

The findings of the current study have significant implications for the understanding of how the US press promoted a military intervention in the age of ‘new militarism’ interventions in other countries’ affairs without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. Under the ‘new militarism’, the US has become more involved in proxy wars, imposing economic sanctions, and using bombing in what Keeble (2004) refers to as a Low Intensity Conflict Strategy to avoid direct criticism by the public. In the essence of this strategy are the media-hyped operations which the US has conducted. There are many conflicts and issues in the world in general and in the Middle East in particular which are dealt with differently by the mainstream media. Keel (cited in Zollmann, 2017) argues that the bombing of Yemen by Saudi Arabia, for instance, and the continuous killing taking place there, have created famine and poverty. However, Saudi Arabia is supported by the UK and the US, who approved the sales of billions of dollars of weapons to Saudi Arabia that are still being used to attack civilians and hospitals; the Saudi princes, however, are not demonised in the way Saddam was demonised, nor has any action been taken against these violations of human rights. Similarly, Israel’s violation of human rights by killing Palestinians in Gaza was not criminalised. By contrast we can see the process of demonisation being conducted in the case of the North Korean president, the Syrian president and Iran, all being portrayed as constituting a threat. These are all examples of the selective shaming the media employ to demonise and problematise issues in order to suggest the necessity for a particular solution or remedy that is in the interests of and desirable to the powers that be.

With regard to the justification of the interventions on humanitarian grounds described in this research, this study reveals the double standards and the inconsistencies of the US press in reporting the same social actors in two different wars; the first war, in which the US was tilted towards Iraq, and the second, when the US opposed Iraq. The human rights violations, the killings, and the death toll during the Iraq-Iran war were glossed over by the US press. This was also the case during the Desert Storm, when thousands of Iraqi people and Shiites died when they revolted against Saddam at the urging of Bush, but were let down by the Americans, and

as a result crushed by the Iraqi forces. Furthermore, many died as a result of the economic embargo imposed on Iraq by the US in 1991 and which continued until 2003. When the US decided to go to war against Iraq, this all changed the Iraqi people were seen to be worthy victims in order to serve the purposes of the propaganda that would justify the intervention on humanitarian grounds.

9.4 Limitations of the study

Although the research achieved its aims, there were some unavoidable limitations, which the study was unable to compensate for. First, because of the time limit, the construction of the Kurds, the US and other Iranian social actors lay beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, owing to practical constraints, this study could not provide a review of the construction of Saddam, the Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi people Halabja and CWs in all the wars Iraq has been through: for instance, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Operation Desert Fox, sectarian violence and the ISIS (Daesh) have not been covered in this research.

There are many academic works that have examined the power of the media in general and newspapers in particular to influence public opinion (see van Dijk, 1991). It was, however, beyond the scope of this research to examine this influence, as only the US press discourse and content in regard to the themes in question were investigated.

It is also important to point out that a newspaper's political affiliation (conservative or liberal) was not taken into consideration when the corpus for this research was created, and all the newspapers were put together in a single corpus for each war. Therefore, despite the negative representation of Saddam in the US press, especially in 2003, not all newspapers were in favour of the invasion. Equally important, this study did not take into consideration the individual journalists or columnists who might be well known for their negative representation of Iraq. Baker (2008) argues that columnists or commentators could be employed by newspapers to write about particular topics in a way which might not necessarily represent the newspaper's stance; such writers have more freedom than staff journalists, and as a result could be more opinionated. Similarly, there could be email messages, other messages and stories that were supplied by readers commenting on particular issues, and these could be negative construction of Iraq. In this study these texts were treated in the same way as news discourse, with no distinction made between journalists' reports, readers' comments, or those of commentators.

Baker (2008, p. 12) argues that such texts “have the power and the potential to influence others”. Therefore, such texts were all included in the corpus.

Some limitations pertaining to data collection should also be noted here. Among these is the accessibility of some newspapers in the 1980s, since at that time not all newspapers were archived in a digitalised form, in contrast to the present, when all newspapers are archived electronically. Furthermore, this study is a corpus-based study, in which only texts are dealt with, and all the images or videos have been stripped from the data.

In the same vein, while the findings showed that overall, the image of Saddam that emerged from the analysis of the corpus of the US press was negative, it would be a mistake to consider the entire US press as a monolith, and it would be an oversimplification to attribute this negative representation to the whole body of US newspapers, if we take into consideration their availability at a particular time, since some of the newspapers were not previously available in digital form. For instance, there were only five newspapers in the Iraq-Iran war that were available in a digital form that reported on this war. These were The New York Times, The Washington Post, Information Bank Abstracts, the Journal of Commerce and the Tampa Bay Times, and it was only in 1987 and 1988 that the last two papers could be found in the LexisNexis. Similarly, the number of articles retrieved from each newspaper in both periods was not the same, and sometimes there was a huge difference between newspapers in this respect. For instance, in the US-led invasion period, the total number of articles in *The New York Times* during the whole period was 2,672, whereas *The Daily Oklahoman* only carried two articles. Therefore, it would be unfair to generalise the findings to cover all US newspapers as they have different weights. It is also important to say that despite the negative representation of Saddam in some newspapers but that does not mean that these newspapers were part of propaganda machine because not all the newspapers were in favour of the invasion as well as they have different ideologies and some are critical of the US government.

9.5 Recommendations for further research work

In terms of directions for future research, a fascinating project would be to study individually or in conjunction the changes over time in the reporting of Shiites/Iraqi people/Saddam/Kurds/Halabja or the use of CWs in the various conflicts and wars Iraq has been involved in: for instance, the Iraq-Iran war, the Desert Storm, the US-led invasion, the Sectarian Divide and the ISIS war. The aim would be to see how these themes were represented in

different time spans, taking into account the US involvement (direct or indirect) in these wars and conflicts, and the effect of this involvement on the reporting. It would be interesting to investigate the historical changes in reporting in these wars and conflicts. To track the changes in the reporting of these themes over time would be interesting, since it could highlight the fluctuations in reporting and reveal the inconsistencies that reveal the aim of serving the purposes of political propaganda, if any.

Another possible area for future research would be to compare different newspapers in different countries to show the differences in reporting: for instance, to compare the UK, the German and the US press with each other in relation to the construction of Shiites/Iraqi people/Saddam/Kurds/Halabja and the use of CWs, or to study the press stances in times of conflict.

Another potential area of research is to examine how the way Iraq was constructed in the US press in the two wars might shape audience perceptions and beliefs: to be pro-invasion or anti-invasion. Nowadays, there are many platforms on which news articles and news can be published: e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Telegram and other social media, where audiences can engage and interact, leaving their opinion. Therefore, it would be interesting to examine the relation between the news and the audience commentary, or to study them separately. Similarly, journalists could be interviewed, or asked in a questionnaire how they report or why they report in the way they do. An evaluation of reporters'/writers'/ presenters' language in TV/radio broadcasts and other kinds of media could be an interesting and valuable study.

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Appendix A

COLLOCATES OF IRAQI PEOPLE (US LED INVASION)

ADDING	DANCING	GIFT	MESSAGE	SHOULD
ADDRESS	DAY	GIVE	MINDED	SHOW
ADDRESSED	DECADES	GOOD	MINDS	SIMMONS
ADMINISTER	DECIDE	GOVERN	MISCALCULATED	SIN
AEYOUAERE	DEFENDING	GOVERNED	MIX	SLAUGHTER
AGAINST	DEHUMANIZE	GOVERNMENT	MOISE	SOLEMN
AIDING	DEMOCRACY	GRAFFITI	MULTIPLIES	SOVEREIGNTY
AIMED	DENZEL	GREAT	MUSLIMS	SPELLED
ALBEIT	DESERVE	GREET	MUST	SPOKEN
ALIENATING	DESERVING	HAPPINESS	NASIF	SQUANDER
ALL	DESIRE	HAPPY	NEED	STAKE
ALLOWED	DESPERATELY	HARTGROVE	NEEDS	STANDPOINT
ALSWAIMANI	DESPOTIC	HATE	OBLIGATION	STANDS
ANYONE	DESTROYING	HAVE	ORDEAL	STOLE
ASADI	DESTRUCTION	HEARTS	POLITICAL	STOLEN
ASPIRATIONS	DETERMINATION	HELP	POSSIBLE	SUFFERED
ASSETS	DETERMINE	HELPING	PRESERVES	SUFFERING
ASSIST	DICTATORS	HEREBY	PROHIBITS	SUPPLIED
ASSISTANCE	DICTATORSHIP	HEROIC	PROPERLY	SUPPORT
ASSURING	DIGNITY	HOPE	PROTAGONISTS	SURE
ATTACHE	DIVERSITY	HORRIBLY	PROTECTS	SURVIVE
BEFRIENDED	DIZAEY	HUMANITARIAN	PROVIDING	SYMPATHY
BEHALF	DOMINIQUE	HUMANITY	QUICKLY	TALENTED
BEING	DOURI	ILLEGITIMATE	REASSURE	TELL
BELIEVE	ECHOING	INDICATES	RECEIVE	THEIR
BELIEVING	EDICT	INSTILLED	RECOVER	THEMSELVES
BELONG	ENJOYING	INSTITUTIONS	REGIME	THROATS
BELONGS	ENRAGE	INTENTIONS	RELIEVE	TOPPLING
BENEFIT	EXCLUSIVELY	INTERESTS	REPRESENT	TOTALITARIAN
BETTER	EXHORTED	INTERNATIONALLY	REPRESENTATIVE	TRAMPLES
BOON	EXPRESSED	INTERVIEWER	REPRESENTS	TRANSITION
BRINGING	EXTERMINATE	JASIEM	REPRESSION	TRULY
BROTHERLY	EYAIH	JOINTLY	RESISTING	TRYING
BRUTAL	FACING	KAREEM	RESOURCE	TYRANT
BUILD	FAIL	KILL	RESOURCES	UNIQUE
BURDEN	FIGHT	KNOW	RESPECTS	UPSIDE
CAPABLE	FLAIH	LEGITIMACY	RESTS	UPTON
CAPITULATION	FLOWERS	LIBERATE	RICH	UTILIZING
CELEBRATING	FOREMOST	LIBERATED	RICHES	WANT
CHOOSE	FORESEEABLE	LIBERATING	RID	WEALTH
CHOSEN	FREE	LIBERATION	RUMSFELD	WELCOME
CLAIBORNE	FREEDOM	LIBERATORS	RUNNING	WELCOMING
COMMUNIQUE	FREEING	LIFE	SADDAM	WELFARE
COMPETING	FREELY	LIFTED	SAHAF	WHATEVER
CONGRATULATIONS	FREER	LONG	SAKE	WIPE

CONQUERORS
CONVINCE
COURAGEOUS
CRONIES

FUTURE
GAIN
GENUINELY
GERE

LOOSENED
LOOSENING
LOOTER
MEDICINE

SAVE
SECURE
SELF
SETTLE

Appendix B SADDAM COLLOCATES IN US-LED INVASION

SADDAM	AVCI	BUILT	CLUTCHES	CULT	DESTROYED	DOWNFALL	EXPIATED	FORCES	GUARD
ABDICATE	AYAT	BUNKER	CODING	CURRENCY	DESTROYING	DRAG	EXPIRED	FORCIBLY	GUNNING
ABED	BAATH	BUNTZIE	COHORTS	DANCED	DETERMINE	DRAINED	EXTERMINATED	FORGET	GURFEIN
ABILITY	BAATHIST	BY	COLLAPSE	DEAD	DETEST	DRAPE	FADED	FORMERLY	GUY
ACCOUNT	BAGHDAD	BYE	COLLAPSED	DEADLINE	DIABOLICAL	EBAY	FALL	FROM	HALF
ACE	BANNED	CAMPAIGN	COLLAPSING	DECAPITATE	DICTATOR	EFFIGY	FALLEN	FUGITIVES	HAMPERING
ADEPT	BARZAN	CANAL	COLLIDING	DECAPITATION	DICTATORSHIP	ELDEST	FALLS	FUNCTIONARIES	HANGED
ADMIT	BASTARD	CAPABILITIES	COMMANDED	DECEIVED	DIE	ELIMINATE	FANATICAL	FUNNELED	HAQADER
ADVISER	BEARING	CAPITULATE	COMMISERATING	DECIDES	DIMINISHED	ELIMINATING	FANATICALLY	FUSSED	HARBORED
AGAINST	BEHEADING	CAPTURE	COMPLY	DECLARED	DINAR	ELITE	FASCIST	GALLOWS	HARBORING
AGED	BELIEVE	CAPTURED	COMPOUND	DEEPENED	DINARS	EMBARK	FATE	GARRISONS	HARDENED
AIDES	BELIEVED	CAPTURES	COMPULSORY	DEFACE	DIPLO	EMBARRASS	FATED	GASSED	HARSHER
AIMED	BELIEVES	CAPTURING	CONCEALING	DEFEAT	DISARM	ENCLAVE	FAYHEEN	GASSES	HARSHLY
AIRD	BELIEVING	CARDIAC	CONFIDED	DEFEATED	DISARMAMENT	END	FEARED	GASSING	HAS
AIRPORT	BELONGED	CATCHY	CONFRONTATION	DEFEATING	DISARMED	ENDLESSLY	FEARING	GAVE	HASAN
AL	BELOVED	CELEBRATED	CONFRONTING	DEFENSES	DISARMING	ENTOURAGE	FEARSOME	GENOCIDAL	HASSAN
ALIVE	BERET	CELEBRATING	CONSISTS	DEFIANCE	DISARMS	ENTRUST	FEDAYEEN	GIANT	HATE
ALREBAT	BIN	CENTERING	CONSTITUTES	DEFIANT	DISLIKE	EQUESTRIAN	FERAYDOON	GIVEN	HATED
AMERICANISM	BIOGRAPHY	CHANCE	CONTAINED	DEFIANTLY	DISLIKED	ERA	FEYADEEN	GIVES	HATEFUL
AMIR	BIRTHDAY	CHANT	CONTROL	DEGENERATE	DISLIKING	ESCAPE	FIERCELY	GIVING	HATES
ANCESTRAL	BIRTHPLACE	CHANTED	CONVINCED	DEMISE	DISLODGE	ESCAPES	FIGHT	GLAD	HATRED
APPARAT	BLAME	CHANTING	COOPERATE	DEMOLISHED	DISMANTLES	ESCAPING	FIGHTERS	GLEEFULLY	HAYS
APPARATUS	BODYGUARD	CHEERED	COUSIN	DEMOTED	DISMEMBERED	ET	FINISHED	GONE	HEARTLESS
APPEARED	BODYGUARDS	CHEERING	CREDENCE	DEPICTING	DISPLACING	EVIDENCE	FIRDOS	GONER	HEIGHTENING
ARABI	BRITTLE	CHEMICAL	CRISTYNE	DEPOSE	DISTRUSTS	EVIL	FIREBRAND	GOVERNATE	HENCHMAN
ARCHIVE	BROADCAST	CHEZ	CRONIES	DEPOSED	DNA	EVILS	FLED	GOVERNMENT	HENCHMEN
ASSOCIATING	BRONZE	CHOOSE	CRONY	DEPOSES	DOMAIN	EX	FLEE	GRANDCHILD	HEY
ATROCITIES	BROOKES	CINNAMINSON	CRUMBLE	DEPOSING	DOMINATED	EXCELLENCY	FLEEING	GRANDEST	HIDE

ATTACKING	BROTHER	CIRCLE	CRUMBLES	DESIRABILITY	DOOMED	EXECUTIONER	FLEES	GRANDIOSITY	HIDEAWAY
ATTEMPT	BRUTAL	CLAIMED	CRUMBLING	DESPERATE	DOOMSDAY	EXHORTED	FOLHA	GRATEFULLY	HIDEOUT
ATTEMPTS	BRUTALITY	CLING	CRUSH	DESPISE	DOPPELGANGERS	EXHORTING	FOLLOWERS	GREETING	HIDING
ATTRIBUTED	BRUTALIZED	CLIQUE	CRUSHED	DESPOT	DOUBLES	EXILE	FOOT	GRIP	HIKMAT
AUTOGRAPHED	BRUTALLY	CLOSEST	CUBS	DESTROY	DOWN	EXPELLED	FOOTAGE	GRUDGING	HIMSELF
INNER	LIEUTENANTS	MIGHT	NOTKNOW	PERSONALLY	PUENTE	RESTED	SECRETS	SQUADS	TAKING
INORDER	LIKENESS	MILITIA	NSC	PERSUADES	PURGE	RESURFACED	SEIZES	STAMPING	TALISMAN
INTELLIGENCE	LINK	MILITIAS	NUMBERED	PHENOMENA	PURPORTED	REALIATED	SEIZING	STASH	TAPE
INTERNATIONAL	LINKAGE	MINDED	NUTCASE	PICTURE	PURPORTEDLY	RETRIBUTION	SELF	STASHED	TARGET
INTERROGATORS	LINKED	MINIONS	OBSESSION	PICTURES	QADIR	REVAK	SHATTERING	STATUE	TARGETING
INVADED	LINKS	MISATTRIBUTED	ODAI	PLACED	QAEDA	REVILED	SHELTERING	STATUES	TEAR
IRAQ	LOANED	MONSTER	ONCE	POROUS	QUASHED	REVOLT	SHIITE	STATUTE	TEARING
IRAQI	LOATHSOME	MORTALLY	OPPOSED	PORTRAIT	QUASI	RID	SHIITES	STILL	TELEvised
IRAQIS	LONGER	MOSAIC	OPPRESSED	PORTRAITS	QUSAI	RIDDANCE	SHOUTED	STOOGES	TELEVISION
IS	LOOMED	MOUTHPIECE	OPPRESSIVE	POSED	QUSAY	RIDDING	SHOUTING	STRANGLE	TEMPERING
ISLAMISM	LOSING	MUJAHID	OPULENT	POSES	RAIDED	ROGUES	SHOWDOWN	STRIKE	THIRDS
ITCHING	LOVE	MURAL	OR	POSSESS	RAWI	ROTATES	SHOWED	STROLLING	THREAT
IYAD	LOVEFEST	MURALS	ORNATE	POSSESSED	READ	ROUT	SICKO	STRONGHOLD	THUG
JABAR	LOYAL	MURDERED	OSAMA	POSSESSES	REBELLED	ROUTED	SIDEKICK	STRONGMAN	THUGS
JIHADISTS	LOYALIST	MURDERER	OUST	POSSIBLY	REDEEM	RULE	SIGHTINGS	STUMPING	TICKS
JOVIAL	LOYALISTS	MURDEROUS	OUSTED	POST	REFUSES	RULER	SIZED	SUBMISSION	TIGHTENS
JUNTA	LOYALTY	MUSAHIM	OUSTER	POSTER	REGIME	RULING	SLAMS	SUCCESSSES	TIKRIT
KILL	MAGNIFIED	MUSED	OUSTING	POSTERS	REIGN	RUMORS	SLEDGEHAMMER	SUFFERED	TIKRITI
KILLED	MAILS	MUST	OUTFLUNG	POSTHUMOUSLY	REMAINED	RUSHAMIYA	SLIM	SUGGESTING	TILED
KILLING	MAJEED	MUSUMECI	OVEREAGER	POWER	REMNANTS	RUTHLESS	SLUM	SUNNI	TINTED
KNOWN	MAJID	MUZAFFER	OVERNIGHTING	PRE	REMOVAL	SABOTAGES	SLUMS	SUPERNATURAL	TIP
KOWTOWED	MAMMOTH	MUZZLED	OVERPROMISED	PREORDAINED	REMOVE	SACRIFICE	SMACKED	SUPPLANTING	TIPPED
LADEN	MAN	MYSTERY	OVERTHROW	PRERECORDED	REMOVED	SADDAMISM	SMASHING	SUPPORTER	TO
LAMPREYS	MANIAC	NAB	OVERTHROWING	PRESIDENT	REMOVING	SADDREN	SMILING	SUPPORTERS	TOOLING

LATEGANO	MARTS	NABBED	OVERTHROWN	PRESIDENTIAL	RENAMED	SAJIDA	SNUFFING	SUPPORTING	TOP
LAURELS	MARTYRS	NAILING	PALACE	PRESIDING	RENAMES	SAO	SON	SURVIVED	TOPPLE
LEADEN	MARVELING	NAJIM	PALACES	PRO	REPLAYED	SAVAGERY	SONS	SURVIVING	TOPPLED
LEADER	MASS	NASAR	PARAMILITARIES	PROFILER	REPRESSED	SCIMITARS	SOOTY	SWEAR	TOPPLING
LEADERSHIP	MEANT	NATHEM	PARAMILITARY	PROOF	REPRESSION	SCRAWLED	SOULS	SYMBOLS	TORCH
LEAVE	MENACE	NEIGHBORHOOD	PATHOLOGICAL	PROP	REPRESSIVE	SCUFFLE	SPADES	SYMPATHIZERS	TORCHED
LED	MESSAGE	NEUTRALIZE	PAULO	PROPAGANDA	REPUBLICAN	SCULPTURES	SPECULATED	SYMPATHIZES	TORCHING
LEGACY	METAPHORICALLY	NIGHTMARE	PAWN	PROTESTOR	RESIDENCE	SEAT	SPECULATION	SYMPATHY	TORE
LIAR	MHUTAR	NO	PERSECUTED	PROVE	RESIST	SEBASTIANO	SPRAWLING	TAKEDOWN	TORN
VIDEOTAPE	VIDEOTAPED	VIDEOTAPES	VIOLATORS	VISAGE	VOLUNTARILY	VOWED	VOWING	WAGE	WALDO
WEED	WHERE	WHEREABOUTS	WHETHER	WHITHER	WHITTLED	WIELDING	WILL	WIZARD	WORTHLESS

Appendix C CWS COLLOCATES IN US-LED INVASION

BIOLOGICAL	GOOEY	BEEN	EX
CHEMICAL-WEAPONS	TONS	SITES	DAMS
USE	HARDER	PROTECTIVE	DESCENDED
USED	THAT	PRODUCING	DEPLOY
SYRIA	MASKS	DANGER	AMY
AGAINST	DONNING	CONTRAVENTION	SUPPRESS
DEVELOPING	NICKNAME	CHROMATOGRAPH	LABORATORIES
KURDS	SHELTERING	SEARCHING	TESTED
USING	EMPLOY	REBELLIOUS	DISPERSED
FOUND	COULD	BEDROOMS	TEST
SUITS	SMITHSON	DESTROYED	RESORT
OR	SHELLS	ALI	DEVELOP
EVIDENCE	DEVELOPMENT	GASES	TEMPERATURES
ATTACK	CACHES	CONCLUDED	PROTECTION
FACTORY	FORCES	DIRECTING	SUBSTANCE
POSSIBLE	STOCKPILES	UNFOUNDED	HUNT
NERVE	SADDAM	SCIENTISTS	BE
POSSESSING	BANNED	FINDING	WORKED
CONVENTION	POSSESS	UNLEASHING	RUDIMENTARY
IRAQI	STORAGE	IDENTIFYING	NARD
VX	ATTACKED	LABORATORY	TURNED
ALLEGED	CACHE	MAY	POSSESSION
PLANT	CAPABLE	LIKELIHOOD	SMOKING
MIGHT	EXPOSURE	PROGRAMS	HEATED
NUCLEAR	ARTILLERY	NO	IRAQ
DISCOVERY	MUNITIONS	THREAT	TUCKER
MISSILES	HAVE	LOCATES	CHARGED
POSSIBLY	PASTE	HUSSEIN	CRUDE
USES	PRECAUTION	PROOF	JAFFAR
POSSESSES	LIKELY	DELIVER	HARBORED
PROGRAM	SAMPLES	PROSPECT	ARMED
FUGITIVES	UNCOVERING	UNLEASHES	PRESENT
DEADLY	CONTAIN	BURWELL	RAIDED
FACILITIES	OVERSAW	PARAPHERNALIA	HEADED
AGENTS	TESTS	MUTHANNA	SUDAN
SUSPECTED	ORDERING	EMPLOYED	TOXINS
UNLEASH	STORING	SPONSORING	IF
SEARCH	PRACTICED	LOADED	DOCUMENT
SITE	OF	ANTI	EXISTENCE
GAS	INSPECTOR	SUGGESTING	DISCOVERED
ACCUSED	FORSWEAR	BELIEVED	BELIEVES
DETECT	STOCKPILE	GEAR	ATTACKS
ARSENAL	WITH	SIGNATORIES	EXPERTISE
HIDDEN	HAS	NEAR	TRAINING
KILL	CONTAMINATE	VALIDATE	PIERCE
HARBORING	PRODUCED	ANY	MAXIMUM
TROOPS	AND	DEPOT	ELIMINATED
EXPERTS	EQUIPMENT	TEAM	DRUMS
EXPERT	MUSTARD	SAFEGUARD	KURDISH
ANI	SCUD	SARIN	RETALIATE
DEADLIEST	WARFARE	SAADI	ACTIVE

VILLAGES	RADIOLOGICAL	TREATIES	YET
EQUIPPED	MANUFACTURE	MOBILE	DITCH
FALLUJAH	DELIVERING	RATIFIED	ANALYZE
WISELY	FIND	PIGEONS	ORDERED
ENDGAME	CONTAINING	ORDERS	INDICATE
ACCUSES	STOCKPILING	TABUN	INEFFECTIVE
NEUTRALIZE	BARRELS	TANGIBLE	UNCONVENTIONAL
RELATING	AMBIGUOUS	HAD	COUNTERATTACK
PROTECT	VULNERABILITY	INVOLVING	INSTALLATION
LEONARD	SAMPLE	DEPLOYING	DESTRUCTION
KINDS	THWART	PERHAPS	TREATY
RESPONSE	PLANNING	SCARE	UNLEASHED
WEAPONS	AGENT	BOOTS	MATERIALS
TIPPED	CONCERTED	FACILITY	
SCIENTIST	DECONTAMINATION	TREAT	
DISPERSE	GERM	EXAMPLE	
COMMANDING	PREMATURE	STRETCHES	
TESTING	CONTAINED	COMPONENTS	
PRODUCTION	TOXIC	RAPIDLY	
CHEMICAL	IRANIAN	DESPERATE	
FRUSTRATING	QUANTITIES	ACQUIRE	
HALABJA	SCRAMBLING	CONCERN	
HENRY	DETECTION	GROWS	
TERRORISM	ELUSIVE	ACCURACY	
MEDIUM	CONCLUDE	INVOLVEMENT	

Appendix D SADDAM REFERENTIAL STRATEGIES

<i>Discursive Strategy</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Categorization</i>
Referential/ Nomination	Discursive construction of Saddam	<p>Collectivization His his doomsday weapons , his programs, his weapons of mass destruction, his terrorist allies, his inner circle, his many crimes, his top aides, his main defenses, his troops, his regime, his diehard special Republican Guard, His brutal regime, his defiance, his behavior, his ugly weapons, his military ambitions, his ruling Baath Party, his illegal arsenal, his loyalists, his diabolical regime, his gang, his army, his two ruthless sons, his two murderous sons, his hateful regime, his fanatical followers, his secular regime,</p> <hr/> <p>Negative Ideologisation Fascist, Hitler, Baathist, Stalin</p> <hr/> <p>Religionisation / Religionyms a Sunni Muslim, preordained, Saddam Hussein and his "jihadists, secular Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein,</p> <hr/> <p>Ideological anthroponyms tyrannical bully, butcher of Baghdad, Saddam: King of Terror, Fanatical, wizard, bad man, wicked, "evil", dangerous, the ace of spades, heartless, defeated, vanquished, disarmed, hateful, doomed, rogues, degenerate, liar, diabolical, loathsome, bastard, retaliatory-minded, pathological, sicko, worthless, maniac, wald, deposed, nightmare, expired, inhuman, toppling both Saddam and Saddamism, Iraqi dictator Saddam</p> <hr/> <p>Criminalisation/ criminonyms Brutal, brutality, thug, torture, atrocities, ruthless, savagery, monster, genocidal, murderer, murderous, repressive, oppressive, despot, dictator, dictatorship, tyranny, tyrant,</p> <hr/> <p>Militarisation/ Militarionyms hunt for Saddam, war with Saddam, war against Saddam, military action against, disarmament of Saddam, war on Saddam, Saddam Hussein's weapons, the Fedayeen Saddam, Saddam Hussein's military, showdown with Saddam, paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam, strike against Saddam, defeat of Saddam, Saddam Hussein's thugs, victory over Saddam, revolt against Saddam, attack on Saddam, fight for Saddam, gunning for Saddam</p> <hr/> <p>Negative metaphorical anthroponyms mural of Saddam, Saddam Hussein's downfall, downfall of Saddam, Iraq under Saddam, a final ultimatum, on the run, fall of Saddam, statue of Saddam, deadline for Saddam, statues of Saddam, toppling of Saddam, portrait of Saddam, removal of Saddam, overthrow of Saddam, end of Saddam, campaign against Saddam, ouster of Saddam, ousted president Saddam, death to Saddam,</p> <hr/> <p>Temporalisation post Saddam Iraq, after Saddam Hussein, after the fall, Iraq after Saddam, post Saddam Hussein, post Saddam government, after president Saddam, after the war,</p> <hr/> <p>Political actionalisation his terrorist, Saddam Hussein's agents, Saddam loyalists, armed members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party, Fedayeen Saddam militia, elite republican guard, allies of Saddam, Saddam Hussein's forces, government of Saddam, Hussein's Baath party, Hussein's republican guard, Saddam Hussein's thugs, and his "jihadists, supporter, Baathist, ashbal, Fedayeen, forces, lieutenants, militia, militias, paramilitaries, paramilitary, squads, henchmen, inhuman, sympathizers, loyal, loyalist, loyalists, followers, sons, cousin, bodyguards, regime, operatives, apparatus, Baath, circle, elite, Iraqis, supporters, youngsters</p>

Appendix E SADDAM'S PREDICATIONAL STRATEGIES

<i>Discursive Strategy</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Categorization</i>
<i>Predicational</i>	<i>Discursive construction of Saddam</i>	<p>Saddam (Authoritarian)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - they see in Saddam Hussein the kind of despot they know too well. - Saddam Hussein is a dictator, and he needed to be taken down. - Saddam Hussein is a murderous tyrant. - Saddam is the oppressor."
		<p>Saddam (Hitler, Stalin, fascist)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - I watch TV clips of this guy Saddam and I see a Hitler - Will we learn first-hand of the last days of Saddam in his Hitlerian bunker? - read books on Hitler and Stalin. He modeled his entire regime after that of Hitler and his ruthlessness after that of Stalin - "It's because Saddam is really a fascist regime," - Known to admire Josef Stalin, Saddam has tortured thousands and his wars have killed more than 1 million
		<p>Saddam (Criminal, violent, brutal, oppressor)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Perez called Iraqi President Saddam Hussein a "brutal dictator," - has tortured and brutalized his people for a long, long time. - "(Saddam) is a heartless, cold-blooded killer, - Saddam was gassing, killing and displacing hundreds of thousands of Kurds and Turkmen - His brutal regime has reduced a country with a long and proud history to an international pariah that oppresses its citizens - Saddam has one of the most disgusting records of human rights abuses - Saddam is an international outlaw who must be permanently contained or ousted
		<p>Saddam (Threat, Link with al-Qaeda)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - has "trained and financed... al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations - has aided a local Islamist group in Iraqi Kurdistan with al-Qaeda links - poses to our nation and the world - is a supporter - rhetorically, morally and financially - of radical Islamic terrorism - is a threat to his own country, and a terrifying threat to us." - is a danger, and he must be removed
		<p>Saddam (non-compliance)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - has refused to disarm. - has had 12 years to give up his weapons - had no intention of leaving the country - had not cooperated more - has defied previous U.N. resolutions demanding that he disarm - has shown little willingness to give up his illegal weapons. Instead, he has tried to wiggle out of obligations and stall for time
		<p>Saddam (negative traits of Saddam)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - is a fool. - is a monster - is a bad man - is a pathological dictator, - is the vile pharaoh. - 's desperate to hold onto his power - is the sicko - is a mad dog, - is a terrorist threat - is a horrible man - is a dog, the son of a dog, - "Saddam 's a bad guy. It's time for him to go."

