



**Time Perspectives in IR:
Long-term and Short-term Time Perspectives
and their Effects on Theoretical Claims
and the Political Practice of Peace Processes**

by

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Author's Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.

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Abstract

This study is a meta-theoretical inquiry on how *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* articulated in both theory and political practice shape understandings and practices of international politics. Pursuit of this inquiry was motivated by a dissatisfaction with the existing International Relations (IR) literature's limited understanding of the significant roles *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* play in shaping theoretical claims and political practices. This dissatisfaction is addressed in this study in three ways. First, it conceptualises and differentiates articulated time perspectives into five distinct categories: *long-term historical*, *short-term historical*, *short-term present*, *short-term future*, and *long-term future*. Second, this study uncovers and details the salient functions of each distinct time perspective and their potential effects on theoretical claims or political practices. Finally, this study provides analyses of illustrative examples pulled from two unconnected case studies, one theoretical and one practical, to show how time-related aspects (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) attributed to claims or practices by different time perspectives delimit what a theory can convey or a political practice can achieve. As a consequence, this study is intended to provide readers with new analytical tools and insights that are necessary to unpack the complex relationship between theories and practices of international politics and time.

To make this study and its resultant contributions possible, an analytical framework and language of time perspectives were developed predominantly from the fields of Organisational Management, Organisational Behaviour, and History. This new analytical framework and language was used to examine time perspectives and their effects within two case studies, one theoretical (i.e. Morgenthau's theory of international politics) and one practical (i.e. the Oslo Accords). Illustrative examples of each of the five time perspectives and their effects were pulled from each case study and analysed to highlight the co-existence of multiple time perspectives within each case, the ubiquity of time perspectives in IR, and how they collectively shape claims and political practices.

To Elizabeth, always and forever.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The following study is a meta-theoretical inquiry on *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects on the understandings and practices of international politics. In this study time perspectives are understood as constructs of time having both temporal depth and temporal focus with respect to the past, present, and the future that can attribute time-related aspects to claims and practices.¹ They can be either *long-term* or *short-term*, however, their distinctions are not pre-determined independent of the context in which they appear.² Thus, this study understands time perspectives as being amorphous, context dependent, and potentially open-ended. Specifically, this study aims to present a twofold argument. One part of my argument is that embedded within a theory of international politics and the political practice of a peace process there are multiple *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* that uniquely shape claims and practices articulated within or derived from a theory or a peace process.³ The second part of my argument is that each embedded time perspective can be categorised into one of five distinct time perspectives with each category of time perspective performing a particular set of salient functions in both theory and practice. The five time perspectives analysed and discussed in detail in this study include the following time perspectives: *long-term historical*, *short-term historical*, *short-term present*, *short-term future*, and *long-term future*.⁴

The differentiation of these five time perspectives is not intended to make a claim regarding the normative value of differentiation, as differentiation may not always be

¹ Each part of the construct (e.g. temporal depth, temporal focus) is detailed in Chapter 3, sections 1 - 2. Chapter 4 addresses each time-related aspect (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) that a time perspective can attribute to a claim or practice.

² Chapter 3, section 3.3 addresses ways of distinguishing between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*.

³ Each time perspective provides what Nietzsche refers to as 'different eyes we can use to observe' international politics and develop corresponding claims. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1969), 19.

⁴ The following words are italicised throughout this study of time perspectives to indicate to the reader when particular time perspectives are being addressed: *long-term time perspective(s)*, *short-term time perspective(s)*, *long-term historical time perspective(s)*, *short-term historical time perspective(s)*, *short-term present time perspective(s)*, *long-term present time perspective(s)*, *medium-term time perspective(s)*, *short-term future time perspective(s)*, *long-term future time perspective(s)*, *historical time perspective(s)*, *present time perspective(s)*, and *future time perspective(s)*.

necessary or warranted.⁵ A normative claim that is advanced in this study is that readers, theorists, and policy makers should reflect upon the time perspectives articulated within a theory or practice in relation to the five time perspectives addressed in this study. The value of this reflection is that the aforementioned groups will improve their understanding of the effects time perspectives have on IR theory and practice. Therefore, differentiation among time perspectives has analytical value, a point that will be illustrated in detail throughout this study.

To discern these differentiations and highlight their analytical value, this study adopted an unorthodox approach. This approach involved using unconnected theoretical and empirical case studies for illustrative purposes. This approach was instrumental in narrowing down the salient functions performed by time perspectives of a particular category, as well as helpful in strengthening support of my argument that salient functions for each category of time perspectives were shared across theory and practice.⁶ Consequently, this study did not attempt to discover or address any direct connections between time perspectives embedded within a theory and those embedded within a practice.⁷ Furthermore, this study does not seek to discover if or how one case study influenced another. Alternatively, this study takes the preceding step to clearly illustrate to the reader that particular types of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their corresponding functions 1) are persuasive within articulations

⁵ For example, a *short-term historical time perspective* might be excluded from a peace process because it unnecessarily embeds into a peace process historical hostilities that have largely been resolved in everyday society or are being addressed more effectively by other means.

⁶ If theoretical and empirical case studies were connected to one another, then it would be reasonable to conclude that salient functions of a particular category of time perspectives would be similar. Conversely, the usage of unconnected case studies, as found in this study, does not immediately suggest any similarities of salient functions performed by a particular category of time perspectives.

⁷ For more on IR discussions regarding the direct connections between theory and practice see Michel Foucault, Paul Rabinow, and Nikolas S. Rose, *The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984* (New York: New Press, 2003), 170-7; Friedrich Kratochwil, "Reflections on Theory and Practice," (working paper presented at the Degree Conferring Ceremony of the European University Institute, October 3, 2003), 1-11; Joseph Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance," *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 43-62; David Mutimer, "Practically Theoretical: Reading State Policy as IR Theory" in *Theory in Practice: Critical Reflections on Global Policy — Selected Proceedings of the 10th Annual YCISS Conference*, Kyle Grayson and Cristina Masters eds., (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 2003), 9-13; Steve Smith, "International Relations and International Relations: The Links between Theory and Practice in World Politics," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 6, no. 3 (September 2003): 233-39; Stephen M. M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, no. 1 (June 2005): 23-48; Marysia Zalewski, "All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up': theory, theorists, theorising," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340-53.

relating to international politics and 2) uniquely shape understandings and practices of international politics.

As will be illustrated and explained throughout this study, the time perspectives addressed are able to shape understandings and practices articulated within a theory or peace process because they contribute to the attribution of particular aspects to claims and practices made within a theory or peace process. The significance of these attributions is that they act as internal preferences and biases within a theory or peace process. As internal preferences and biases, they shape what claims about and practices of international politics are made within a theory or a peace process, as well as how these claims and practices are understood and interpreted by readers. Consequently, what can or cannot be conveyed about international politics or what processes can or cannot be executed in the practice of international politics are delimited by embedded time perspectives. Therefore, the analysis presented in this study helps to explain the connections between time perspectives and their delimiting effects within a theory or peace process. Furthermore, the forms time perspectives can take (e.g. *long-term* and *short-term*) and what their potential effects can be within a theory or a peace process (e.g. pre-emptively assigning meaning to international political phenomena in the future) were also included in this study. By exploring and unpacking this relationship and related details, my study contributes to advancing the discipline's own understanding of how the usage of particular time perspectives within a theory or peace process shape the study and practice of international politics.⁸ Considered in a broader context, my study also contributes insights to the relationship between international politics and time.

The four ways this study moves beyond existing IR scholarship are as follows.⁹ First, my study questions the usefulness of IR scholars maintaining taken-for-granted understandings of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*, their roles, and their effects within a theory or peace process. Second, my study takes the discipline of IR to task for its limited awareness of and reflection upon the multitude of *long-term* and

⁸ Mira Moshe, "Temporary versus Permanent: Time Framing in the Israeli Political Arena," *Time & Society* 18, no. 1 (March 2009), 159; Luigi Muzzetto, "Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz," *Time & Society* 15, no. 1 (March 2006): 5-31.

⁹ Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); Andrew Hom, Christopher McIntosh, Alasdair Mackay, and Liam Stockdale, eds., *Time, Temporality and Global Politics* (Bristol: e-IR, 2016).

short-term time perspectives that exist within an individual theory or peace process and their corresponding effects. Third, this study provides IR scholars with a means for discovering the presence and/or absence of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* within a theory or peace process; texts regarding Morgenthau's theoretical commitments in relation to international politics and the Oslo Accords' peace process serve as the two illustrative case studies in this thesis.¹⁰ Finally, my study supplants the existing understandings and language of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* with more informed and detailed understandings and language.¹¹ The development of these understandings and language enables scholars to newly identify, articulate, and assess how different *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* shape understandings of and practices in international politics. This ability to augment the understandings of and language used to articulate time perspectives and their effects was made possible through my reconceptualisation of existing understandings of time perspectives into the five distinct time perspectives presented in this study.

The advantages of this reconceptualisation of time perspectives are threefold. First, this reconceptualisation is more reflective of theoretical and practical differentiations with respect to the past, the present, and the future.¹² Moving beyond the typical monolithic segmentation of perspectives of time into 'the past', 'the present', and 'the future' found in the IR literature, my reconceptualisation acknowledges the variety of nuanced time dimensions in theory and practice that exist within each segment of time. Second, without using a reconceptualisation of time perspectives, the presence or absence of particular *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* shaping a theory or peace process would go unnoticed and limit the depth of analysis possible regarding the relationship between time perspectives and their effects. In comparison to existing underdeveloped conceptualisations of time perspectives within IR, my reconceptualisation of time perspectives provides a more panoptic research lens through which time perspectives (present or absent) and their effects become easier to identify

¹⁰ References to the 'Accords' or 'Oslo Accords' appearing throughout this thesis collectively refer to both Oslo I and Oslo II peace agreements made between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). When necessary, however, specific references to either Oslo I or Oslo II will be noted and cited separately.

¹¹ Barbara Adam, "Modern Times: The Technology Connection and its Implications for Social Theory," *Time and Society* 1, no. 2 (May 1992), 175.

¹² Together these three segments of time is how time is normatively conceptualised and discussed within IR literature.

and study.¹³ Third, my reconceptualisation is not intended to do any of the following: place initial value judgements on individual time perspectives, indicate that there is a hierarchy existing among the five time perspectives,¹⁴ suggest which time perspectives should or should not appear in a theory or peace process to elicit particular understandings or outcomes, or suggest that including all five time perspectives make a theory or peace process more superior to another containing fewer time perspectives.¹⁵ Consequently, my research enables scholars to assess which time perspectives a theory or peace process prioritises and deemphasises on a theory's or peace process's own terms. This is in contrast to scholars imposing their own subjective valuations of time perspectives or relying on predefined, external valuations from another discipline or scholar, both of which might alter research outcomes.¹⁶

The aforementioned advantages of reconceptualising time perspectives collectively relate to this study's unpacking of the relationship between time perspectives and their effects within a theory or peace process. The unpacking of this relationship articulated in my study was necessary to generate insights into this relationship and its effects on the study and practice of international politics. The awareness cultivated in the following study prompts readers to reflect upon the unique framing and interpretative functions *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* (present or absent) perform. As illustrated in this study, insights gained from such a reflection help to draw attention to the potential distortive effects present and absent time perspectives have on a reader's and disciplinary understandings of international politics. Consequently, my study encourages readers to think about whether similar

¹³ Awareness of other aspects of time, such as its speed, rhythm, or ordering function in society, also become evident via these research lens, but these notions are not addressed in this study. Examples of discussions regarding these other aspects include: Hartmut Rosa, *Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity*, trans. Jonathan Trejo-Mathys (Columbia University Press, 2013); Ty Solomon and Brent J. Steele, "Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (June 2017): 267–91; Tarja Väyrynen, "Rethinking National Temporal Orders: the Subaltern Presence and Enactment of the Political," *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 4 (2016): 597–612.

¹⁴ For an example illustrating that hierarchy can exist among time perspectives, see Klaus H. Goetz, "Time and Power in the European Commission," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 80, no. 3 (September 2014), 591.

¹⁵ Regarding the last point, it is easy to see how the inclusion of *historical time perspectives* within the Oslo Accords can retain historical hostilities within present-day relations between Israel and the Palestinians. This retention does not create a contemporary environment conducive for the peace process to be succeed.

¹⁶ Goetz, "Time and Power in the European Commission," 578; Niklas Luhmann, *Politische Planung: Aufsätze zur Soziologie von Politik und Verwaltung* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), 143–64.

long-term and *short-term time perspectives* and their corresponding effects are present or absent within the theories or peace processes they use or study. Furthermore, as my study moves the reader through the reflection process, the reader can gain an understanding of the limitations of what a theory or peace process is potentially able to and unable to explain or deliver. By explaining the delimiting effects time perspectives have, my research contributes new insights to the discipline's own understanding of how *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* 1) work within theories of international politics or peace processes and 2) shape the study and practice of international politics. To demonstrate the potential insights the unpacking of the relationship between time perspectives and their effects can yield, Morgenthau's theory of international politics and the Oslo Accords' peace process were selected for analysis as illustrative case studies for my thesis.

1.1 Why the foci on time perspectives and their effects?

My interest in analysing *long-term/short-term time perspectives* and their effects initially stemmed from my educational and professional experiences. During these experiences, observations were made about the role time -- in the forms of deadlines, timed processes, and individual, organisational, and governmental time perspectives -- played in politics.¹⁷ Reflecting upon these observations, I questioned whether time also had a role to play within an IR theory or peace process.¹⁸ By exploring this relationship, my thought was that the subsequent findings might lead to insights about my observations regarding the role time appeared to play in the study and practice of international politics.¹⁹ However, attempting such an ambitious research endeavour on time, while worthwhile, was not pursued. There were two practical reasons for not

¹⁷ Prior to starting my PhD, I worked over a decade at various universities in the United States with diverse groupings of student, community, academic, and government stakeholders. Outside of higher education, my professional experience also includes working at the Oregon State Senate as a member of the Senate's administrative and parliamentary staff and with the World United Nations Association in New York on a global project.

¹⁸ In this study a theory is understood to be closely related to the study of international politics, while a peace process is understood to be representative of a practice of international politics.

¹⁹ Such a thought was not unfounded as work regarding how Western standardised time came to play a dominant role in thinking about and the execution of international politics has shown. As example see: Andrew R. Hom, "Hegemonic Metronome: The Ascendancy of Western Standard Time," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010): 1145-170; Eviatar Zerubavel, "The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective," *American Journal of Sociology* 88, no. 1 (1982): 1-23.

pursuing such a comprehensive study; IR literature constraints and word limit. Regarding the first, as indicated by the absence of or limited discussions and understandings about non-Western calendar/local clock-time,²⁰ ‘deep time’ in relation to addressing global environmental issues,²¹ and the sense of suspended time experienced by refugees, migrants, and displaced persons,²² IR literature on time has not been comprehensive nor exhausted. In relation to the second point, the enormity and complexity of the concept of time, with all its various facets (e.g. speed, rhythm, nature), within the context of international politics would quickly exceed the word limit imposed upon this thesis.²³ Any attempt to stay within the word limit would at best offer only a limited understanding and interpretation of time with respect to international politics.²⁴ Consequently, my research aims were scaled down to a more manageable level which both continued to address my general interest in the relationship between time and international politics, as well as make a meaningful contribution to IR’s understanding of that relationship.

To make this study feasible, my research focus was narrowed down to analysing particular perspectives of time. The perspectives selected for analysis were *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, the present, and the future. With regards to *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*, they were chosen for practical and substantive reasons. As a collective, the *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* discussed in this study represent just one among many ‘other aspects of time and temporality that should also be of interest to students of the international, as they are

²⁰ Via a review of work done by other IR scholars on time and through Nobert Elias’s sociological work on time, Hom helps to highlight that notions of time are the results of subjective timing practices which suggests an implied understanding within IR that non-Western calendar/local clock-times exist. For further details see Andrew R Hom, “Timing is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 1: 69–79. For a sampling of other measurements, depictions, and experiences of time which have effected international politics but remains understudied see Kristen Lippincott and National Maritime Museum, *The Story of Time* (London: Merrell Holberton in Association with National Maritime Museum, 1999).

²¹ David Farrier, “What Does Deep Time Mean?,” *The Atlantic*, October 31, 2016, <https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/aeon-deep-time/505922/> (accessed October 5, 2017). For an earlier articulation of the concept of ‘deep time’ see: James Hutton, *Theory of the Earth* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2000).

²² Marita Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research,” *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 20, no. 2 (June 2007): 248–264.

²³ For a sample of the various facets of time that have been discussed in IR see: Andrew Hom, Christopher McIntosh, Alasdair Mackay, and Liam Stockdale, eds., *Time, Temporality and Global Politics*.

²⁴ Even noteworthy attempts to discuss time with respect to international politics have acknowledged that their work by no means is comprehensive nor offers the final word on the topic; for an example see Kimberly Hutchings, “Time and the Study of World Politics,” *Millennium* 46, no. 3 (June 2018), 255–57.

elsewhere in the social sciences and humanities [(and natural sciences)].²⁵ By focusing on just *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* rather than everything related to time found within a theory or peace process, my research scope was significantly reduced without compromising the contributions my research could make to the discipline. Aside from my aforementioned intuition, research from the fields of Organisational Management and Organisational Behaviour suggests that there is a relationship between time perspectives and the claims made within a theory or embedded within a practice that is worth exploring. Furthermore, the same research supports the idea that time perspectives can be used to recover an awareness of and analyse how understandings and practices of international politics are shaped.²⁶ In other words, the use of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and the analysis of their effects is not without precedent in other disciplines, as is the case within IR.²⁷

Furthermore, the decision to select *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* as the focus of my study rather than time-related aspects such as rhythm, speed, or cyclical tendencies was threefold. First, these time perspectives were more discernible in both my theoretical and empirical case studies than the aforementioned time-related aspects. Second, the effects of the five time perspectives addressed in this thesis were consistently evident across my analysis of the texts articulating Morgenthau's theory and the Oslo Accords' peace process; the aforementioned time-related aspects were not always evident. Third, *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* were helpful in recovering awareness of other time-related aspects found within my case studies.²⁸ In the end, my

²⁵ Tim Stevens, *Cyber Security and the Politics of Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 37.

²⁶ Jennifer M. George and Gareth R. Jones, "The Role of Time in Theory and Theory Building," *Journal of Management* 26, no. 4 (August 2000): 657–84; Deborah Ancona, Paul S. Goodman, Barbara S. Lawrence, and Michael L. Tushman, "Time: A New Research Lens," *The Academy of Management Review* 26, no. 4 (October 2001): 645–63; Deborah G. Ancona, Gerardo A. Okhuysen, and Leslie A. Perlow, "Taking Time to Integrate Temporal Research," *The Academy of Management Review* 26, no. 4 (October 2001): 512–29.

²⁷ As a point of clarification, this statement is not meant to undervalue the insightful connections that have been made in IR literature between notions of the past, present, and future *and* theoretical claims about international politics; for an excellent example see Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, eds., *Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the Present, Forging Radical Alternatives* (London: Routledge, 2016). The statement is intended to highlight that my study is distinct within existing IR literature.

²⁸ The other time-related aspects, such as speed or rhythm, were detectable within the context of the different time perspectives analysed, but not elaborated on in this study. Conversely, time perspectives were not necessarily detectable within the context of other time-related aspects. In the case of the former statement, to detect a rhythm in international political history, it is necessary to demarcate the historical period within which a rhythm is to be sought. In the case of the latter statement, the speed of a political action as moving either quickly or slowly cannot be known without separately knowing the long-term or short-term historical, contemporary, or future context in which the action takes place.

selection of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* was made because collectively they alluded to the variety of time-related aspects that could potentially be found within a theory or peace process, as well as captured the multitude of minor, nuanced effects a particular articulation of time (e.g. *long-term historical time perspective*) can have on a theory or peace process. Therefore, the insights about time perspectives contained in this study are intended to provide entry points which various readers can use to begin to develop an understanding of what time is and how it operates within a theory or political practice, the discipline, and the international political sphere.

To further narrow down the scope of my study, my study focused namely on the effects time perspectives have within a theory or peace process. In particular, my interest was in how time perspectives shape a theory or peace process via its claims. Claims were chosen as points for analysis for three reasons beyond what has been alluded to in the previous two paragraphs. First, claims can be found within every theory of international politics or peace process. Their ubiquity guarantees at least one part within a theory or peace process where the effects of time perspectives should be evident and an analysis can begin. Identifying claims as reliable parts within a theory or peace process where analysis of time perspectives and their effects can begin was necessary because there was no guarantee that each of the five time perspectives would be present or apparent within Morgenthau's theory or the Oslo Accords.²⁹ Second, analysing specific claims versus an entire theory or peace process concentrates my analysis on particulars as opposed to generalities. Although analysing a theory or peace process in the broad, abstract sense may help discover time perspectives and their broad effects, less dominant time perspectives and the nuanced or cumulative effects of various types of time perspectives on a theory or peace process remain obscured and unclear. Conversely, the advantage of focusing my analysis on claims is that claims provide defined aspects within a theory or peace process upon which to conduct an analysis that is both relevant to a theory or peace process as a whole, as well as able to capture minute details about various effects different time perspectives have that might otherwise be missed by a broad analysis across multiple theories or peace processes. Finally, claims are sites within a theory and

²⁹ Although no claim was found in my research to be without at least one time perspective associated with it, the possibility of such a claim existing in another theory or peace process cannot be conclusively ruled out by my research. Nevertheless, my research suggests the possibility is highly unlikely as such a claim without any time perspective attached to it would by default be considered timeless.

peace process where connections between time perspectives and a theory or peace process can be found. Insights gained from an understanding of these connections enables readers to augment their understanding of where and how the relationship between time perspectives and claims shape a theory's explanations of international politics or peace process's outcomes.³⁰ Furthermore, these insights help to trace and explain residual effects of this relationship found elsewhere within a theory or peace process.³¹ For the aforementioned reasons, claims within Morgenthau's theory and the Oslo Accords were used in this study's analyses.

1.2 Why one theory and why one peace process?

To analyse and illustrate the relationship between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects on shaping a theory of international politics or peace process, one theory and one peace process were chosen to serve as case studies for this thesis. The three reasons for choosing a single theory and a single peace process were as follows. First, analysing one theory of international politics and one peace process rather than multiple theories or peace processes provided more opportunities to recover, analyse, and discuss nuanced and detailed insights about the *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects within one specific theoretical context and one specific empirical context.³² Limiting my research to one illustrative theoretical case study and one illustrative empirical case study made the evolution of the arguments and ideas presented in this study easier to follow for the reader.

The second reason for choosing to analyse one theory and one peace process relates to the three secondary, yet important intentions of my study. Those three intentions are: 1) to illustrate that multiple *long-term and short-term time perspectives* can co-exist within a single theory or peace process, 2) to draw the awareness of the reader to the complex ways multiple *long-term and short-term time perspectives* interact

³⁰ The insights shared in chapters 5-9 indicate that claims are unique in that they are rudimentary sites within a theory and a peace process where notions of time and perceptions of reality interact.

³¹ In section 5.8, residual effects of this relationship within the context of Morgenthau's theory will be addressed in greater detail. For example, the reasons for Morgenthau's underdeveloped of *long-term future time perspectives* is the result of his interpretation of the long-term effects nuclear weapons have on his ideas of immortality.

³² Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Role of History in International Relations," *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (December 2008), 362.

with one another and in relation to claims made within a theory or peace process, and 3) to begin to identify the salient functions each type of time perspective performs within international politics. Had multiple theories and peace processes been used to illustrate evidence supporting my arguments, then the complex dynamics among *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their relations to claims within a single theory or peace process might have been less prominent. For example, *historical time perspectives* and their effects on claims can overshadow the presence and effects of *future time perspectives*.³³ In other words, examples from one theory and one peace process provided sufficient evidence to support the arguments made throughout my study.

Finally, one theory and one peace process was chosen for analysis because a theory's and peace process's time perspectives are not always explicit and therefore requires a familiarity with a theory's or peace process's unique way of articulating time perspectives to recover them and their corresponding effects.³⁴ This familiarity (developed in chapters 5-7 in regards to Morgenthau's theoretical commitments and chapters 8-9 in regards to the Oslo Accords' peace process) was necessary for this study in order to recover and recognise time perspectives and their relationships with each other and to claims. Conversely, including overviews of the different terms and concepts used by various theories and peace processes to articulate time perspectives, their relations, and their effects on each theory and peace process would create unnecessary confusion in my analysis and hinder the advancement of my arguments.

1.3 Why Morgenthau's theory as a theoretical example?

For the purposes of illustrating *long-term and short-term time perspectives* and their effects within a theory of international politics, Morgenthau's theory of international politics served as the illustrative theoretical case study from which examples were drawn for my analysis. Thus, this study is not aimed at developing an understanding of Morgenthau himself, but aimed at developing an understanding of

³³ Paul W. Schroeder, "History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997), 64; Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, "The Conduct of History in International Relations: Rethinking Philosophy of History in IR Theory," *International Theory* 9, no. 2 (July 2017), 209; Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Politics Past and Present," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (December 2008), 366.

³⁴ The same can be said about a theory's or peace process's implicit articulation of the relationship between time perspectives and claims.

how time perspectives are articulated within a theory and what their effects might be. The advantages of using Morgenthau's theory as an illustrative case study are manifold. Throughout texts articulating parts of Morgenthau's theory, Morgenthau maintains an awareness of time and its relationship with international politics that is consistent and coherent across his texts, even when that awareness is not always explicitly stated.³⁵ Contained within this time-conscious context were numerous examples of each of the five time perspectives and their effects on claims made within his theory as detailed later in chapters 5-7. Therefore, this time-rich context was ideal and conducive for achieving the aims of my research project. Furthermore, as a founding theory of international politics, Morgenthau's theory contains one of the first widely adopted theoretical contexts within the discipline where all five time perspectives and their effects on claims were explicitly and implicitly expressed.³⁶ In recognition of the fact that early theories of international politics prepared and laid the foundation for ways of thinking about international politics which later theories built upon or responded to as the discipline matured, a conscious effort was made to select an early theory within the discipline. Consequently, Morgenthau's theory was chosen as an initial case study to begin to explore how time perspectives shape a theory's explanations and understandings of international politics.³⁷ Finally, in relation to the previous point, subsequent theories of international politics have adopted and built upon some specific knowledge claims derived from Morgenthau's theory (e.g. notions of power in relation to national interest, balance of power, and contingency). Therefore, the insights gained from my analysis may also provide preliminary understandings about corresponding relationships found

³⁵ Despite how prolific Morgenthau was in writing about international politics, no separate treatise regarding his thoughts on time or notions of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* has been found among his known published and unpublished works.

³⁶ Among the early theories within the discipline, Liberalism and Marxism were also considered for use in my thesis as theoretical case studies. However, these other early theories were not selected for analysis because a main or dominant text articulating either theory of international politics that was edited and updated by the original author(s) over an extended period of time could not be found. Conversely, Morgenthau's 1956 *Politics among Nations* (2nd edn.) provided a main text that was dominant in the discipline over several decades, edited and updated by the original author, Morgenthau, until his death in 1980. Such a text made it possible to analyse potential changes in time perspectives within a theory's articulation over an extended period of time. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956).

³⁷ 'If our discipline [i.e. US international relations] has any founding father, it is Morgenthau,' quoted in Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, no.3 (Summer 1977), 44.

in other theories such as neorealism and constructivism.³⁸ Consequently, as Morgenthau's theory and corresponding texts were formative for the discipline, insights gained from my analysis are not limited to his theory but may also contribute to a broader understanding of how time perspectives affect understandings and interpretations throughout the discipline of IR.

1.4 Why the Oslo Accords' peace process as an empirical example?

To illustrate the presence and absence of time perspectives and their effects in political practice, the Oslo Accords were selected as the empirical case study.³⁹ Like Morgenthau's theory, an explicit and implicit awareness of time and its relationship with international politics was evident within the Accords. Despite the Accords' dominant focus on the future, examples of all five time perspectives and their effects on claims made within the peace process outlined in the Accords could be found. The presence of all five time perspectives within the Accords allowed me to illustrate that salient functions and effects that time perspectives play in a theory (as noted in my analysis of Morgenthau's theory) also appear in a peace process. In addition to containing all five time perspectives, the Accords also provided an opportunity to compare time perspectives at various implementation stages of a peace process (e.g. Oslo I time perspectives vs. Oslo II time perspectives). This ability to compare time perspectives enabled my study to identify what time perspectives were retained between agreements and what time perspectives were added or altered between agreements. The aforementioned features are not unique to the Accords' peace process, however, and thus suggest that insights gained from my analysis of the Accords' time perspectives and effects may not be limited to the peace process outlined within the Accords.

³⁸ For an example of links between Morgenthau and a neorealist thinker see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), 25-26. For a persuasive argument linking realism and constructivism see Michael C. Williams, "Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 58, no. 4 (Fall 2004), 654-59.

³⁹ "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I)," conclusion date: September 13, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guide to Mideast Peace Process, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx> (accessed December 28, 2018); "The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II)," conclusion date: September 28, 1995, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guide to Mideast Peace Process, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeli-palestinian%20interim%20agreement.aspx> (accessed December 28, 2018).

What set the Accords apart from other peace processes (historical and contemporary), as well as other political processes and practices (e.g. parliamentary processes, diplomatic negotiations) that could have been included in this study were four features that the Accords collectively exhibited.⁴⁰ First, the Israeli-Palestinian relations (that the Accords were designed to improve) continue to be confrontational. Consequently, using the Accords as an illustrative case study allowed the time perspective recommendations for future peace processes presented in chapter 9 to be read as potential ways of addressing an ongoing concern within international politics rather than purely speculative comments on periodic or passed historical concerns. Furthermore, these recommendations illustrate that increased differentiation of time perspectives might hinder the prospects of peace.⁴¹ Second, because of the clear linkages between liberal and democratic peace theories and the peace process as articulated within the Accords, my study was able to draw attention to (though not develop in detail) the effects that the time perspectives shaping a particular theory can have on the practice of international politics. Third, each of the five time perspectives and their intended corresponding effects were clearly articulated throughout the Accords. These clear articulations made the Accords an ideal case study that allowed the identification of time perspectives and their effects to be traced over time in the context of a particular political practice. Finally, the Accords has been and continues to be referenced in the IR literature on Israeli-Palestinian relations, (post-)liberal peace processes, and peace studies after 20+ years as a seminal historical example that scholars and policymakers repeatedly use to help guide the research and future development of peace processes.⁴² Therefore, the effects of insights shared in my study are not limited to time-related IR literature, but have a potentially broader relevance and effect in multiple IR sub-fields

⁴⁰ While I recognise that other peace processes and political processes and practices might exhibit one or more of these four features, the Accords offered a practical example exhibiting all four features that I was already familiar with.

⁴¹ An example of the differentiation of time perspectives as being problematic to the prospect of peace can be seen in the Accords' differentiation of the past. The *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* included within the Accords embeds long-term and short-term historical hostilities within the peace process which might not be the most relevant or pressing hostilities in the present. Thus, increased differentiation of the past only adds to the hostilities in the present. Further discussion regarding the differentiation of time perspectives within the Accords is covered in chapters 8 and 9.

⁴² Erika Weinthal, "Water as a Basic Human Right within the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *American Diplomacy* (October 2017): 1-5; Moshe Yaalon, "How to Build Middle East Peace: Why Bottom-Up is Better than Top-Down," *Foreign Affairs*, 96, no. 1 (January 2017), 73, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2016-12-12/how-build-middle-east-peace> (accessed September 27, 2018).

(e.g. policy studies, peace studies).

1.5 How was my analysis conducted?

Close readings of texts articulating Morgenthau's theoretical commitments and the Oslo Accords' peace process were conducted to recover evidence of embedded time perspectives and their effects within the texts. Thus, my reading of these texts is instrumental and done for illustrative purposes rather than an exploration into how these texts and their time perspectives have been used in the discipline. Because the time perspectives and their effects can differ in regards to the textual context(s) within which they are articulated and my study was analysing relationships underexplored in IR, this study required a close reading of both case study texts and the use of a conceptual framework new to IR. The latter was primarily derived from Organisational Management and Organisational Behaviour literature on time perspectives, with further adjustments originating from History, Psychology, and IR.⁴³ Collectively they provided a reading lens through which time perspectives and their effects could be identified and analysed. Thus, the case study texts were viewed as areas in which to look for and mine time perspectives and their effects, much in the same way that historians view historical accounts as areas in which to look for and mine contingencies and their residual effects.

To recover and analyse the *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects within the analysed texts, a two-pronged approach was used. One part of my approach employed various concepts of time and time-related language drawn from both IR and non-IR literatures to help broadly conceptualise, identify, distinguish, and articulate the time perspectives and their effects recovered in my analyses of the two unconnected case studies. The second part of my approach utilised a hermeneutic framework from social theory when reviewing key texts relevant to each case study.⁴⁴ This framework, influenced by Judith Shklar's work on hermeneutics, was instrumental in rendering new insights about time perspectives and their effects explicitly and implicitly embedded within Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process, as well

⁴³ Within IR, there is a well-established practice of importing ideas and methods from cognate disciplines to help develop and augment the existing explanations IR has to offer in regards to international politics. Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, "The End of International Relations Theory?," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 2013), 413.

⁴⁴ This framework is detailed in section 2.2.

as time perspective recommendations to consider in the development of future peace processes.⁴⁵ As will be detailed further in chapters 2-4, the aforementioned parts collectively constituted a methodology that was useful for the purposes of my study and also helped to mitigate the subjectivity which hermeneutic frameworks can be susceptible to.

1.6 Thesis structure

Following this introductory chapter, the remainder of my study unfolds in three parts, across nine chapters, as follows.⁴⁶ Part I begins with Chapter 2's review of the various IR and non-IR literatures consulted for this study, as well as a methodological description regarding the hermeneutic approach used to recover time perspectives and their effects from selected case study texts. My review covered four broad areas of literature: international politics and time, discussions of time in non-IR disciplines, work on and by Morgenthau and in relation to his theory of international politics, and the Oslo Accords. The primary aims of my review are threefold. First, my review draws attention to the absences and under-theorisations of time perspectives and their effects existing within the IR literature. Second, my review highlights why and what insights regarding time perspectives and their effects on theories and practices studied in other disciplines were used in this study to help develop and articulate understandings of how time perspectives shape a theory of international politics or peace process. Finally, my review of the IR time-related literatures and those relevant to each case study provided the contexts necessary to conduct my analysis and to understand where my study's insights made contributions to the existing literatures.

Following my literature review is Chapter 3 which primarily focuses on ways of conceptualising, identifying, and distinguishing between the five time perspectives analysed and discussed within each of the two unconnected case studies. Additionally, the chapter covers those time perspectives that are not extensively addressed in this study (e.g. *long-term present time perspectives*) to address the limits of my study. Within

⁴⁵ Judith Shklar, "Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle," *Social Research* 53, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 449-473.

⁴⁶ Part I (i.e. chapter 2-4) provides the context, concepts, and methodology used to in this study to conduct my analysis of the selected case studies. Part II (i.e. chapters 5-7) details my analysis of the selected theoretical case study (i.e. Morgenthau's theory). Part III (chapters 8-9) details my analysis of the selected empirical case study (i.e. the Accords' Peace Process).

this chapter, readers are introduced to a novel understanding of time perspectives as constructs of time that have both temporal focus and temporal depth with respect to the past, present, or the future. Additionally, this chapter's discussions regarding anchor points, the aggregation of periodisations, and comparisons between time perspectives offer readers new ways in which time perspectives can be identified and distinguished within a theory or peace process. Collectively, the details and distinctions presented in this chapter help the reader to grasp how each of the five time perspectives recovered and analysed in the case study chapters 5-9 were differentiated from one another, as well as from other time-related constructs (e.g. time horizons). Furthermore, the conceptualisation of time perspectives and means of distinguishing them presented in Chapter 3 enable readers to pursue research interests regarding time perspectives within other theories and peace processes that have either previously appeared too daunting or not possible. In other words, the contents of this chapter open up new areas of research which contribute to the discipline's broader understanding of how time is articulated within international politics.

In Chapter 4, although brief, three key time-related aspects used in this study are presented. The three aspects addressed in the chapter include perennial, ephemeral, and contingent. These aspects were highlighted because they are key time-related aspects that time perspectives can attribute to claims and practices. Attribution of these aspects yield particular effects on individual claims and practices, as well as in aggregate on a theory or a peace process. Therefore, the discussions of these three aspects within this chapter were essential to articulate because they provide the reader with a general awareness and understanding of what time-related aspects are embedded and articulated via time perspectives. Furthermore, this awareness and understanding aided in the identification and tracing of the effects time perspectives have within each of the case studies. To generate a general awareness and understanding of these aspects, different sections within the chapter address 1) how each aspect is understood within this study individually, 2) in relation to time perspectives which attribute them to claims and practices within as a theory or peace process, and 3) in relation to one another. In the course of these articulations, the first hints of how a theory or peace process is significantly shaped and delimited by its time perspectives are illustrated.

Chapter 5 marks a crucial point in my thesis (and the beginning of Part II) where my study begins its use of case studies to illustrate and detail the application of methods and concepts addressed in chapters 3 and 4, as well as the time perspectives and corresponding effects these methods and concepts helped recover from each case study. Opening this portion of my study is my analysis of how *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* were articulated and conceptualised within Morgenthau's theory of international politics, as well as their individual and collective effects on claims made within his theory. From my analysis insights are gained about the different salient functions and effects that *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* have on Morgenthau's theoretical commitments. For example, *long-term historical time perspectives* were found to have effects on how understandings and explanations of the past get extended and reified in the future. In the case of *short-term historical time perspectives*, they were found to provide novel insights about how various claims of different perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics interact and fit together on a sub-macro level which are difficult to ascertain from Morgenthau's accounts of the past as a whole.⁴⁷ The chapter ends by illustrating how insights obtained from my analysis of *historical time perspectives* can be used to develop new understandings of how notions of the future within Morgenthau's theory were shaped. As a whole, the chapter's detailed account of the various *historical time perspectives* and their effects within Morgenthau's theory helps to illustrate how an enhanced understanding of a theory's articulations of the past can support and delimit theoretical explanations of international politics.

My analysis of time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau's theory continues in Chapter 6 with a focus on the *short-term present time perspectives* and their corresponding effects. The chapter begins with a discussion of the ubiquitous presence of these perspectives across theories of international politics. Indications as to why *short-term present time perspectives* are so pervasive were gained from my analysis of the functions they perform within Morgenthau's theory and their effects. For example, international politics is initially problematised within Morgenthau's theory via his

⁴⁷ Hobson and Lawson make similar distinctions between different levels of generality of the past with the highest being mega-macro and the lowest being micro. In my distinction of a sub-macro level, this level is lower than the mega-macro but higher than the micro which I interpret as at the level of an individual person. John M. Hobson and George Lawson, "What Is History in International Relations?," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (December 2008), 420.

theory's *short-term present time perspectives*. The chapter continues on to analyse and discuss how these time perspectives characterise the present within Morgenthau's theory. This helps to explain the relations between his theory's present and its articulated past and future, and date-stamp his theory and the claims made within it, as well as their effects. Similar to the final section in Chapter 5, this chapter's final section demonstrates how insights obtained from my analysis of *short-term present time perspectives* help to explain how these time perspectives shaped notions of the future within Morgenthau's theory. Collectively, the insights recovered from my analysis of *short-term present time perspectives* highlight and suggest that no theory of international politics can exist without including at least one articulation of this particular time perspective.

Concluding my analysis of time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau's theory is Chapter 7 which addresses his theory's *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives*. The first part of the chapter focuses on *short-term future time perspectives* and their effects. In addition to providing predictions or approximations about the immediate future, my analysis reveals that these *future time perspectives* also extend a theory's explanations and explanatory power beyond the known/knowable world. This awareness led to insights about how particular unknowns of the near future become known and certainty gets attached to near future predictions. The second part of the chapter addresses the *long-term future time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory and their effects. The insights gained from my analysis of these particular *future time perspectives* indicate that these time perspectives help 1) define the duration of the future validity of each theoretical claim, 2) determine the applicability of claims in familiar and unfamiliar international political contexts, 3) articulate what known aspects of international politics are retained in the distant future, and 4) introduce new claims about the distant future into a theory. The final part of the chapter considers the cumulative effects these *future time perspectives* have on Morgenthau's theory to suggest that the neglected analysis of *future time perspectives* and their effects limits disciplinary understandings of a theory and its claims.

Chapter 8 marks the beginning of Part III where my second case study is introduced. The second case study analyses the manifestations of and shaping effects that time perspectives have on a peace process, specifically the peace process articulated

in the Oslo Accords. Similar to my analysis of Morgenthau's theory, my analysis of the Accords' peace process illustrates and details the application of methods and aspects addressed in chapters 3 and 4, as well as the time perspectives and corresponding effects these methods and aspects helped recover from the Accords. Furthermore, my analysis of the Accords also capitalises on the explanations and discussions from chapters 5-7 to articulate unacknowledged understandings of time perspectives and their effects within the Accords' peace process. My analysis of the Accords begins in Chapter 8 which consists of three parts. The first part outlines what a peace process is understood to be within this study and the connections between the Accords' peace process and theories of liberal and democratic peace. The second part provides an overview of the Accords' historical contexts regarding 1) the primary issues the Accords were intended to address and 2) what circumstances made drafting the Accords necessary and possible. The final part describes how the time perspectives within the Accords' peace process were demarcated via the extreme anchor points articulated within the Accords. Together, all three parts provide the necessary basis which made my analysis of time perspectives and their effects within the Accords possible. Furthermore, this basis also contributed to the formulation of the recommendations made in regards to the development and evaluation of future peace processes detailed in Chapter 9.

In Chapter 9, each of the five time perspectives and their effects within the Accords are analysed and discussed. Noteworthy insights recovered in the analysis of the Accords' *historical time perspectives* include the following: the key roles *long-term historical time perspectives* played in suggesting that Israeli-Palestinian relations were perennially confrontational and how *short-term historical time perspectives* were used to legitimise the Accords' peace process. In regards to my analysis of the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives*, the recovered insights suggest that these time perspectives provided an incomplete contemporary context of the situation which potentially limited the extent of the peace that the Accords' peace process could achieve. Finally, key insights from my analysis of the Accords' *future time perspectives* indicated that the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* delimited the peace process's immediate future to such an extent that the peace process was unable to adjust to near future realities as they arose and that the *long-term future time perspectives* were the least developed among all the time perspectives found within the Accords. In addition

to drawing attention to the salient functions and effects of each time perspectives within the Accords, each section of this chapter also included recommendations as to how the insights gained from my analysis could be used to improve the success of future peace processes addressing Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Following my analysis of the aforementioned empirical case study (i.e. the Accords), is the final chapter of my thesis. The aims of this concluding chapter are twofold. The first aim is to pull together the acquired understandings of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects obtained from both case studies into a brief summary that provides readers with key insights that may be useful in recovering time perspectives and their effects found within other theories and peace processes. The second aim of the concluding chapter is to highlight two future areas of research which insights from this thesis can be used to explore further. These two future areas of research include further investigations into manifestations of *long-term present time perspectives* within international politics and the conceptualisation of notions of time (e.g. block time vs. growing block time) used in the articulation, study, and practice of international politics. Both aims help to emphasise three main points raised throughout this thesis: 1) time perspectives and their effects can appear in a multitude of forms, 2) various manifestations of time perspectives and their effects can profoundly shape and delimit corresponding explanations and practices of international politics, and 3) that the insights shared in this thesis can be and should be further developed to augment disciplinary understandings within IR regarding the relationship between theory and the practice of international politics and time.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Identifying and recovering *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects found within texts articulating Morgenthau's theoretical commitments and the Accords' peace process was made feasible via a review of multiple bodies of literature (particularly related to time) from different disciplines and the usage of a hermeneutic framework when reading through the case study texts analysed for time perspectives. Consequently, this chapter provides an overview of the various literatures consulted for this study and the contributions they made which led to my insights about time perspectives and their effects detailed in latter chapters. The chapter begins with two sections that address how the literatures consulted came to be so diverse and detail the hermeneutic framework used to recover time perspectives and their effects from the case study texts selected for analysis. The remaining sections of the chapter address the various literatures consulted in this study in more detail. Literatures reviewed for this study and covered in this chapter include, but are not limited to, IR literature on time, by and on Morgenthau, and regarding the Accords' peace process, as well as time-related literature from non-IR disciplines such as Organisational Management, Organisational Behaviour, History, Philosophy, Physics, and Sociology. As will be detailed in this chapter, the consultation of literatures outside of IR was necessary to address the research questions posed in this study because the existing IR literature on time was found to only partially address my research questions. Given the diversity of literatures consulted in this study, addressing them separately within the aforementioned groupings would be counterproductive as it would detract from how they might complement or relate one another. Consequently, the literatures were grouped into three broad categories under the following headings: International Politics and Time, Non-IR Literature on Time, and Case Study Literatures related to Morgenthau's theory and the Oslo Accords. Within each of the three aforementioned categories are subcategories of literature which serve as sub-section headings in this chapter.

In the first section, the IR literature on time is reviewed to provide a glimpse of how time is or is not understood and discussed within existing IR literature and where gaps in the literature lay and are in need of attention. Particular attention is given to contemporary discussions of time within IR to indicate how this study relates and contributes to those discussions. The second section covers non-IR literature on time

that was consulted to address understandings of time perspectives and their effects found to be under-theorised in or missing from the consulted IR literature regarding time. The third section is broken into two substantive parts: literature relevant to my theoretical case study on Morgenthau's theory and literature relevant to my empirical case study on the Oslo Accords' peace process. The first part includes a review of literature written by Morgenthau on his theory of international politics or relevant to his theoretical commitments and literature written on Morgenthau. The literature by Morgenthau, particularly *Politics among Nations*, was essential to this study as it provided examples illustrating how time perspectives shape individual theoretical claims.⁴⁸ The literature on Morgenthau helped indicate how an awareness of time perspectives within a theory draws attention to the problems with some of the critiques levelled against Morgenthau's theory and suggests what other critiques along similar lines may have greater merit. The second part of my case study literatures section addresses literature on the Oslo Accords. This literature helped provide historical, conceptual, and theoretical backgrounds necessary to conduct an analysis of time perspectives and their effects within this study's chosen empirical case study, the Oslo Accords. Collectively, these three sections constitute my review of the literature consulted for this study.

In addition to the aforementioned reasons for reviewing the literature included in this study, this review is also directed toward satisfying six broad aims. The first aim includes locating this study within the existing IR literature addressing: 1) notions of time in relation to international politics, 2) Morgenthau and classical realism, and 3) the Oslo Accords, peace, and peace processes. Furthermore, this review also helps to locate this study (and IR's handling of time perspectives) in relation to non-IR disciplines. The second aim of this review is to address the rationale for selecting and emphasizing

⁴⁸ Although all five editions of *Politics among Nations* published during his lifetime (plus the 1985 sixth edition following his death in 1980) were reviewed for this study, the second edition published in 1956 served as the main edition cited in throughout this thesis for three reasons. First, as noted in the preface to the second edition, the second edition was an attempt by Morgenthau to clarify his original arguments made in the first edition (1948) and incorporate new developments and conditions in international politics (e.g. containment policy) which had yet to fully manifest at the time of the first edition's publication. Second, editions subsequent to the second edition contained no significant differences apart from a few updated examples illustrating points made in 1956. Even the sixth edition published in 1985 remained substantively similar to the second edition published in 1956. Finally, the second edition was representative of his 'original' articulation of a theory of international politics that went on to shape readers' understanding of international politics for decades.

particular works used within this study. The third aim is to identify key ideas, concepts, authors, and ways of thinking that shape[d] IR discourses relevant to this study. The fourth aim this review seeks to meet is to delimit where the gaps of knowledge exist within the IR literature as it relates to time perspectives and their effects within a theory or peace process. The fifth aim is to illustrate how non-IR literature can be used to help fill in some of the aforementioned gaps in IR. The final aim is to highlight the value and necessity of looking at literature from within IR and across various disciplines to gain a more panoramic and deeper awareness and understanding of time perspectives and their effects within the field of IR.

2.1 Selection of literature

Prior to beginning my review of the literature consulted for this study, three comments need to be addressed in regards to how the literature came to be so diverse and how the case study texts (e.g. *Politics among Nations* and the Accords) were read. First, the diversity of literatures consulted emerged organically as a result of the limitations of the consulted IR literature and in an effort to sufficiently address the questions posed in this study. For example, as the 2018 *Millennium* special conference issue on time in relation to international politics illustrates, recent research that aims to unpack the complexities of temporalities of and within international politics has revealed novel insights about temporality, but these insights are limited.⁴⁹ Such literature offers limited discussion about the *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future which attribute particular aspects to claims necessary for certain notions of temporality to be perceived.⁵⁰ Had I not been familiar with non-IR literature addressing time-related issues relevant to this study prior to beginning my research, the limitations within the IR literature would have been less evident. Allowing these gaps in the consulted IR literature to guide the selection of the non-IR literature consulted for this study was essential to delimiting what time-related literature was

⁴⁹ Sarah Bertrand, Kerry Goettlich, and Christopher Murray, eds., "The Politics of Time in International Relations," Special conference issue, *Millennium* 46, no. 3 (June 2018): 251-52.

⁵⁰ For recent exception see Scott Hamilton, "Foucault's End of History: The Temporality of Governmentality and Its End in the Anthropocene," Special conference issue, *Millennium* 46, no. 3 (June 2018): 371-95.

consulted for this study.⁵¹ Without this delimitation, locating the time-related literature relevant to this study among the vast amount of literature on time found within disciplines such as History or Physics would have been far more difficult and impractical. Admittedly, however, this process of selecting literature means that some literature relevant to this study was missed. Nevertheless, the literature that was captured by this process was sufficient to address the questions posed in this study and offer novel insights about time perspectives and their effects.

The second reason helping to explain the diversity of literature related to how this study was set-up. The broad aim of the study was to separately unpack the relationship between time perspectives and a theory or peace process by analysing the effects time perspectives have within each case study. Because this study includes both a theoretical case study and an empirical case study to illustrate how time perspectives and their effects manifest in each case study separately, this study had to draw on specific literature that was relevant to just one of the case studies. For example, a review of United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) Resolutions 242⁵² and 338⁵³ was motivated by the potential insights they might reveal about *historical* and *future time perspectives* and their effects within the Oslo Accords rather than any potential insights they might reveal within Morgenthau's theory. Consequently, this led to a selection of literature that was more diverse and at times less applicable across both case studies than would have otherwise been the case. For example, if the empirical example chosen in this study was a peace process that had been authored by Morgenthau and put into practice, then literature used in regards to the theoretical case study on Morgenthau's theory would have also likely had relevance to the empirical example. By calling attention to the set-up of the study as a contributing factor to the diversity of literature consulted in this study, the reader is also made aware of the delimiting effects the set-up of this study has had on the selection of literature reviewed.

⁵¹ As a consequence of this selection process, classical time-related literature was not used in this study. Examples of such literature include Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) and Henri Bergson, *Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein's Theory* (1922), trans. Leon Jacobson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

⁵² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Twenty-second year, "Middle East," S/RES/242, November 22, 1967, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/242\(1967\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/242(1967)) (accessed December 28, 2018).

⁵³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Twenty-eighth year, "Cease-fire in Middle East," S/RES/338, August 15, 1973, [https://undocs.org/S/RES/338\(1973\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/338(1973)) (accessed December 28, 2018).

2.2 Methodological considerations and explanations

To recover and analyse the *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their corresponding effects embedded within Morgenthau's theoretical commitments and the Accords' peace process, a hermeneutic framework was used.⁵⁴ In this study, hermeneutics is understood as requiring a close reading and examination of texts in an attempt to interpret and understand their contents.⁵⁵ The hermeneutic framework used in this study was based upon Judith Shklar's application of W.G. Runciman's work on social theory to hermeneutics.⁵⁶ Essentially, Runciman outlines a hermeneutic framework consisting of 3+1 sequential stages: 1) reportage (i.e. raw data), 2) explanation (i.e. why did something occur), 3) description (i.e. interpretation, call for social action), and 4) evaluation.⁵⁷ Runciman's hermeneutic framework was specifically selected for this study for three reasons. First, the framework enabled me to simultaneously conduct an analysis of and draw attention to various aspects of time perspectives and their effects within the selected case studies, as well as present evaluations and recommendations derived from insights gained via my analysis. Second, the framework outlined the sequential stages that helped to make the hermeneutic approach used for my analysis clear to readers of this study so they can differentiate it from other hermeneutic approaches. Finally, the framework enabled various notions of hermeneutics to be brought together under one umbrella, notions which added substance to the framework.

Among the various notions, five in particular are worth noting as they help readers understand how hermeneutics is understood in this study. First, hermeneutics is an exchange between the interpreter and the text.⁵⁸ Second, interpretations play emancipatory roles of mainstream critiques or prompt calls to action.⁵⁹ Third, the distance between the hermeneutics of faith (i.e. Gadamer) and doubt (i.e. Habermas)

⁵⁴ Included in this recovery are the anchor points, aggregations, relations among time perspectives, and time-related aspects (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, contingent) that time perspectives attach to claims and practices, all of which are addressed further in chapters 3 and 4.

⁵⁵ For the purposes of this research, the word "text" only refers to written texts.

⁵⁶ Shklar, "Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle"; W. G. Runciman, *A Treatise on Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁵⁷ Runciman, *A Treatise on Social Theory*; Shklar, "Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle," 465-70.

⁵⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1975), 331.

⁵⁹ Jürgen Habermas, "The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality," in *The Hermeneutic Tradition*, eds. Gayle Omiston and Alan Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990): 245-272.

can be reconciled.⁶⁰ Fourth, distinct meanings of words, sentences, and paragraphs within the text limit the extent of their possible interpretations and consequently give them an objective-like quality.⁶¹ Finally, consulting texts beyond the specific text under examination may help recover, confirm, or refine meanings and understandings of the texts being examined.⁶² This latter notion was particularly helpful in my analysis because it led to the consultation of multiple texts by Morgenthau or referenced within the Accords which yielded an awareness of Morgenthau's general theoretical context regarding international politics and the international political context surrounding the Accords' peace process.⁶³ An awareness of these contexts were crucial in this study for two reasons: 1) to maintain coherent interpretations of time perspectives and their effects found within Morgenthau's theory or the Accords' peace process and 2) to provide the necessary scaffolding from which to read (i.e. see) where time perspectives and their effects appeared in texts articulating Morgenthau's theoretical commitments or details of the Accords' peace process. In other words, the other literature provided a check on my subjectivity which affected my resulting interpretations.

The aforementioned hermeneutic framework was applied to two different groupings of texts: one grouping of texts articulating Morgenthau's theoretical commitments and another grouping of texts articulating the Accords' peace process. Each grouping of texts were read and analysed separately ensuring that the hermeneutic process for each remained uncontaminated by the other. Consequently, the manifestations of time perspectives and their effects for each case study were derived separately from each corresponding grouping of texts, rather than from one another or some other external source. Therefore, the purpose of using a hermeneutic framework was not to yield comprehensive interpretations of all the functions and effects of time perspectives within Morgenthau's theory or the Oslo Accords nor to recover

⁶⁰ Anshuman Prasad, "The Contest over Meaning: Hermeneutics as an Interpretive Methodology for Understanding Texts," *Organization Research Methods* 5, no.1 (January 2002), 23; Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, trans. J. B. Thompson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 144; Gayle Omiston and Alan Schrift, eds., *The Hermeneutic Tradition* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 22.

⁶¹ Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," *Review of Metaphysics* 25, no. 1 (September 1971), 23-26.

⁶² Quentin Skinner, "Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts," *New Literary History* 3, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 393-408; Quentin Skinner, "Hermeneutics and the Role of History," *New Literary History* 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1975): 209-232.

⁶³ Texts pertaining to his works on domestic politics were excluded from this study as domestic politics are not part of the scope of this thesis.

Morgenthau's personal time perspectives or the origins of the Accords' time perspectives from the texts. The purpose was more modest; to use hermeneutics as a means of rendering understandings and interpretations of the examined texts that helped conceptualise undertheorised contemporary understandings of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects.

2.3 International politics and time

To begin to develop understandings of time perspectives and their effects in relation to Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process, the broader relationship between international politics and time must first be reflected upon. The relationship between international politics and time has been, is, and will be ever-present and perennial as there is no record of an international political phenomena existing outside of time. This characterisation suggests that international politics cannot be fully understood or interpreted without accounting for time in the same way that certain laws of physics cannot be fully understood or interpreted without accounting for time.⁶⁴ In light of this intimate relationship, it is surprising how undertheorised concepts of time are within IR in comparison to other disciplines such as History⁶⁵ or Philosophy⁶⁶ which also have intimate relationships with time but have made extensive efforts to theorise and develop deep understandings of time.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, this study is not the first to call attention to this deficit within the IR literature.⁶⁸ Occasional, yet notable efforts to explicitly unpack this relationship made within IR highlight the ripeness of investigating this relationship further and allude to the profundity of potential insights to be gained from such an investigation. A few examples of the concepts and ideas emerging from such efforts include understandings of time with

⁶⁴ For examples from Physics see Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes* (London: Bantam, 2011); Carlo Rovelli, *The Order of Time*, trans. Erica Segre and Simon Carnell (Allen Lane: Penguin, 2018).

⁶⁵ Time is central to the discipline of History as its primary focus is on one segment of time, the past and its relations to various other segments of time past, present, or future.

⁶⁶ For an example of Philosophy's interest in developing notions of time see Emily Thomas, *Absolute Time: Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁶⁷ These two disciplines were singled out as IR literature heavily draws on both to develop and support international political claims.

⁶⁸ See Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*; Christopher McIntosh, "Theory across Time: The Privileging of Time-less Theory in International Relations," *International Theory* 7, no. 3 (November 2015): 464-500.

respect to international politics as an event,⁶⁹ as subjective and constructed,⁷⁰ as progressive,⁷¹ as linear, cyclical, and measureable,⁷² and as a product of timing^{73,74}

While these efforts might be considered as attempts at developing grand theories explaining the relationship between international politics and time, this study does not interpret these efforts in this way. The understanding proposed here suggests rather to understand these efforts as representing limited perspectives and explanations of particular aspects of the relationship between international politics and time. Similarly, this study also intends to provide limited insights and explanations about particular aspects of this relationship, namely focusing on claims within a theory or peace process. This study, however, differs markedly from the aforementioned efforts in that it brings them all together under a specific set of categories, foremost *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*. In other words, this study helps to recover various notions of time (e.g. as an event, as linear, as progressive) in articulations of international politics via an examination of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects within a theory or peace process and to illustrate how they interrelate to one another. Consequently, the insights and explanations shared in this study complement previous efforts of making sense of time within IR, as well as they add previously unrecognised perspectives of the relationship between international politics and time to the existing body of IR literature. Furthermore, the insights and explanations shared in this study move understandings of the relationship between international politics and time closer to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship. This can be helpful in the potential development of broader conceptualisations of time with respect to international politics.⁷⁵ Furthermore, enhancing the comprehensiveness of

⁶⁹ Tom Lundborg, *Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming* (London; New York: Routledge, 2012).

⁷⁰ Lee Jarvis, *Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Ty Solomon, "Time and Subjectivity in World Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (December 2014): 671-81.

⁷¹ Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (December 2003): 491-542.

⁷² Barbara Adam, *Time and Social Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Wai Chee Dimock, "Non-Newtonian Time: Robert Lowell, Roman History, and Vietnam War," *American Literature* 74, no. 4 (December 2002): 911-31; Elman and Elman, "Role of History," 359.

⁷³ Andrew R. Hom, "Timing Is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 1 (March 2018): 69-79.

⁷⁴ For a brief overview of how time has been addressed within IR, see McIntosh, "Theory across Time."

⁷⁵ Nobel Prize recipient Wilczek's discussion regarding appearance of dodecahedron in nature and theory illustrates how the development of understandings of one key aspect of nature can greatly advance toward a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of a wide range of phenomena occurring in nature.

contemporary understandings of this relationship also has the potential to simultaneously support and challenge pre-existing understandings; points that will be illustrated in the analyses found in chapters 5-9.

2.4 Narrowing the focus

Among the IR literature with respect to time reviewed, there are a few works in particular that were instrumental in directing and narrowing my study's focus on time perspectives and their effects within a theory or peace process. To begin with, Christopher McIntosh's work on the relationship between temporality and IR theories presented three points which were instrumental in shaping my study.⁷⁶ First, his work argues that '[h]ow IR understands and represents time inextricably shapes the knowledge claims it produces'.⁷⁷ In other words, perspectives of time affect international political claims.⁷⁸ The notion that particular aspects of time can affect claims led to the generation of research questions addressed throughout my study. These questions included: What particular aspects of time, rather than time in general, affect claims? What do the manifestations of these effects look like? Second, McIntosh argues that assumptions about time are embedded in the work done on and in IR and suggests that these assumptions are not always consistent within the discipline.⁷⁹ This inconsistency can result in creating distinct notions of time that may or may not correspond with other notions of time articulated elsewhere within the IR literature or beyond. Questions that I developed from this argument and addressed in my study include: How are assumptions about time embedded into a theory or peace process? What can explain the inconsistencies among the embedded assumptions? The final point McIntosh suggests is that pursuing various lines of inquiry regarding individual aspects of time present opportunities to gain an awareness of the flaws and accuracies within historical and contemporary understandings of international politics.⁸⁰ The consequences of this awareness are threefold. This awareness can potentially 1) help IR scholars refine existing

Frank Wilczek, *A Beautiful Question: Finding Nature's Deep Design* (London: Penguin Books, 2016), 295-302.

⁷⁶ McIntosh, "Theory across Time".

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 465.

⁷⁸ For an example of perspectives of time affecting claims, see Hamilton, "Foucault's End of History".

⁷⁹ McIntosh, "Theory across Time," 467, 471.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 467.

understandings of international politics, 2) indicate how best to avoid generating flawed interpretations in the future, and 3) encourage scholars to take time more seriously in their study and conceptualisation of international politics. Remaining mindful of these consequences prompted and supported the narrow focus on *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* taken in this study.

Helping to narrow the focus of my study and ground it further in the IR literature was Kimberley Hutchings's *Time and World Politics*. In her book, Hutchings describes how assumptions about time within theories of international politics shape the study of international politics. These assumptions and their effects on theories can be partially understood, according to Hutchings, by examining two notions of time, *chronos* (i.e. a *long-term time perspective*) and *kairos* (i.e. a *short-term time perspective*) and how they interact with one another. The relevance of her work to my study is threefold. First, by arguing that assumptions about different perspectives of time found within a theory affect theoretical interpretations,⁸¹ her work supports my study's argument that relationships exist between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and a theory or peace process. Second, Hutchings's work suggests that time is not singular within nor isolated from international politics but heterotemporal and inherently a part of international politics.⁸² The notion that time is heterotemporal is crucial to my study because it suggests that time is multifaceted and there is a multiplicity of times. Understanding time as multifaceted was essential to explaining how *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future can co-exist and relate to each other within a theory or a peace process.

The notion that time is multifaceted also prompted my study's deeper analysis of the co-existence among multiple time perspectives within a theory or peace process, as well as comparison among multiple time perspectives and their effects.⁸³ This analysis and comparison led to a recovery of distinctions among/within types of time perspectives and their effects on claims made within a theory or peace process which Hutchings does not detail. For example, the *kairos* Hutchings refers to is just one type

⁸¹ Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 3, 36-7, 43-6, 73, 170-1.

⁸² Hutchings's argument that time is an inherent part of international politics is shared by McIntosh who draws on Hutchings work. Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 166-73.

⁸³ These comparisons are among the five time perspectives analysed and discussed in my case study chapters 5-9.

of *short-term time perspective* that is unique to the present; my study, however, also recovers other *short-term time perspectives* in the past and the future. The third relevance of Hutchings's work to my study is her characterisations regarding *chronos* and *kairos*, as being *long-term* and *short-term* respectively, when discussing time in its entirety. The usage of these characterisations suggests that they are useful ways of distinguishing between time perspectives. The extent of their usefulness, however, is not fully explored by Hutchings. My study picks up from where Hutchings's work ends to help recover and develop deeper understandings about the diversity of time perspectives and their effects which manifest at the level of an individual theory or practice of international politics.

While Hutchings's work was instrumental in providing ways of thinking broadly about notions of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their relations/effects, it was not sufficient. Literature regarding history and historical perspectives with respect to international politics offered additional insights on how to think locally (i.e. within one segment of time) about similar distinctions and relationships within a particular segment of time found in a theory or peace process (e.g. the past, the present, and the future).⁸⁴ For example, work on the four modes of history in IR (e.g. history within historicism, historicist historical sociology, traditional history, and radical historicism) was useful for thinking about how awareness of both the macro and micro levels of history (i.e. the general vs. the particular) can be captured within notions of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*. Together these different time perspectives provide a wider scope of detail and understanding of international politics in the past, as well as in the present and future.⁸⁵ Likewise, Davenport's work on how the constructions and limitations of historical narratives shape what can be known (and not known) about the 'international' is helpful in explaining the delimiting effects subjective time perspectives can have on claims and practices.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Work by Chakrabarty regarding the interaction of 'local' histories offers insights about how to think about multiple time perspectives within a particular segment of time. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 71, 94-5.

⁸⁵ Hobson and Lawson, "What Is History in International Relations?," 420-30.

⁸⁶ Andrew Davenport, "The International and the Limits of History," *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 2 (April 2016), 248-49; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hobson and Lawson, "What is History in IR?," 428-9.

Collectively, this historical literature enabled my study to recover a deeper, nuanced understanding of the delimiting effects time perspectives within a particular segment of time (i.e. the past) have on a theory or peace process. The aforementioned understandings from the IR literature on history complement the broader understandings of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*, their relations, and their effects derived from Hutchings's research. Consequently, my study was able to approach my analysis of time perspectives, their relations, and their effects at macro and micro levels. The understandings of time perspectives and their effects recovered from the consulted historical literature, however, is limited in the sense that it applies largely to *historical time perspectives* and their effects. To apply the insights gained about *historical time perspectives* more broadly to time perspectives of the present and future would suggest that all time perspectives and their effects are the same; they are not. Similar literature delving into the complexities of time perspectives of the present and the future is presently absent in IR, but present in other disciplines. This observation is surprising considering the amount of literature in IR that is devoted to contemporary and future international political issues and contexts. My study aims to address this absence by developing understandings within IR of *present* and *future time perspectives* and their effects. These understandings will accompany work that has already been done with respect to *historical time perspectives*, as well as enable new avenues of research that will lead to insights into how *present* and *future time perspectives* shape theory and practice.

Also markedly missing from or found to be underdeveloped within the IR literature related to time were three issues which my study aims to address. First, a review of the IR literature suggests that no consistent and clear criteria and methods for identifying and distinguishing between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*, particularly *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* within a single segment of time (e.g. the past, present, and future), and their effects as they are articulated within a theory or peace process.⁸⁷ Second, the consulted IR literature lacks a useful definition of what a time perspective is. Finally, the reviewed IR literature on time suggests a lack of awareness and understanding of the diversity of time perspectives and corresponding

⁸⁷ The inconsistencies and lack of clarity of criteria can be attributed to timing differences and perceptions of what time is. For an exemplary discussion regarding both points see Hom, "Timing is Everything".

effects that exists within IR and how these time perspectives and their effects interact with one another. To address these issues, concepts and language relevant to time found within non-IR literature were incorporated into my study. These incorporations made my analyses of time perspectives and their effects or extent of effects within a theory and peace process possible at both the macro and micro level. The following section covers the non-IR literature and corresponding notions relevant to my study.

2.5 Non-IR literature on time

To address the aforementioned concerns, relevant time-related concepts and language from non-IR literature were introduced into my study. This non-IR literature was consulted because other disciplines were found to have provided relevant lines of inquiry that recovered insights which filled in some of the gaps found in the IR literature. In particular, the insights obtained from the consulted non-IR literature helped provide ways of conceptualising and articulating key concepts and aspects used in this study such as what time perspectives are and what relations exist between time perspectives and a theory or peace process. Beginning with the concept of time perspective, concepts used to define and differentiate between multiple time perspectives in my study were drawn heavily from the Business sub-fields of Organisational Management and Organisational Behaviour, both of which I had familiarity with prior to this study.⁸⁸ These concepts include classifications of time perspectives (e.g. discontinuous vs. incremental; *short-term* vs. *medium-term* vs. *long-term*) and means of identifying each (e.g. activity mapping; rates of change).⁸⁹ Of particular usefulness were three temporal

⁸⁸ Although not used in my study, work done by Zimbardo on time perspectives suggests potential ways in which IR scholars studying the role of emotions within international politics might begin to think about and articulate relations between emotions and time perspectives. For an example of the application of Zimbardo's work on time perspectives in an international context see Anna Sircova, Fons J. R., Evgeny Osin, Taciano L. Milfont, Nicolas Fieulaine, Altinay Kislali-Erginbilgic, Philip G. Zimbardo, et al., "A Global Look at Time: A 24-Country Study of the Equivalence of the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory," *SAGE Open* 4, no. 1 (January 2014): 1-12. For a more extensive discussion of Zimbardo's work on time perspectives see Philip G. Zimbardo and John N. Boyd, *The Time Paradox: The New Psychology of Time that will change your Life* (New York: Free Press, 2008); Maciej Stolarski, Nicolas Fieulaine, and Wessel van Beek, eds., *Time Perspective Theory; Review, Research and Application: Essays in Honor of Philip G. Zimbardo* (Cham: Springer, 2015).

⁸⁹ Jennifer M. George and Gareth R. Jones, "The Role of Time in Theory and Theory Building," *Journal of Management* 26, no. 4 (August 2000): 657-84; Abbie J. Shipp, Jeffrey R. Edwards, and Lisa Schurer Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus: The Subjective Experience of the Past, Present, and Future," *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 110, no. 1 (September 2009): 1-22; Sabine Sonnentag, "Time in Organizational Research: Catching up on a Long Neglected Topic in

constructs borrowed from Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert: temporal depth, temporal focus, and time perspective.⁹⁰ As will be detailed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, these three constructs contributed to the conceptualisation of time perspectives used in this study, a conceptualisation which remains ill-defined within IR literature.

In addition to helping conceptualise and differentiate time perspectives in my study, this literature also indicated novel ways of thinking about and articulating the relationship between time perspectives and a theory or political practice. For example, work by Orlikowski and Yates highlights how the structuring of time and the (re)production of that structure delimit practices within organisations,⁹¹ while work by George and Jones make similar observations within respect to a theory.⁹² Elias's work in sociology with respect to time parallels the aforementioned structuring of time, but emphasises the subjectivity of the structuring and reproduction process.⁹³ Together, both works indicate that the ways notions of time are structured within a theory or a practice affect the study and understanding of phenomena. This awareness that the structure and notions of time have and continue to affect the study and understanding of phenomena is not new in IR. For example, work by Agathangelou and Killian on post colonialism and Chakrabarty on the subaltern illustrate how post-colonial temporalities and conceptualisations of the past can bias or open up the study and understandings of international political phenomena.⁹⁴ The work by non-IR scholars mentioned earlier in this paragraph, however, enabled my study to call attention to similar effects of time raised in the IR literature, as well as other effects, from a different angle via general notions of time perspectives which are not linked to any particular theory or school of thought. The advantage of flagging up relations between a theory or peace process and time perspectives and their effects via time perspectives is that they allow scholars from different (if not opposing) theoretical backgrounds to participate in the emancipatory work done within IR by critical theorists. In other words, the work by George and Jones

Order to Improve Theory," *Organizational Psychology Review* 2, no. 4 (2012): 361-68; Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, "Taking Time to Integrate."

⁹⁰ Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus."

⁹¹ Wanda J. Orlikowski and JoAnne Yates, "It's About Time: An Enacted View of Time in Organizations," *Organization Science* 13, no. 6 (November 2002): 684-700.

⁹² George and Jones, "Role of Time in Theory."

⁹³ Norbert Elias, *An Essay on Time*, revised ed., complete English ed. The Collected Works of Norbert Elias; v. 9 (Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin Press, 2007).

⁹⁴ Agathangelou and Killian, *Time, Temporality and Violence*; Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*.

helps create a neutral space for others to analyse and discuss relations between a theory and time perspectives within a single discipline, as well as across disciplines; this study aims to create similar space within IR.

In addition to providing this study with ways of conceptualising time perspectives, their relations with a theory or practice, and their effects, the non-IR literature consulted for this study also contributed to the framing and answering of broad and nuanced research questions addressed in my study. For example, the questions and insights included within work by George and Jones on the role of time in theory and theory building inspired my study to look for, recover, and examine distinctions between aggregations of time and the perennial and ephemeral effects of particular aspects of a claim among *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* within a theory or peace process.⁹⁵ While their work had broad implications throughout my study, the contributions of other non-IR works in this study were more limited but essential to addressing particular questions or issues raised when analysing particular time perspectives and its effects. Illustrative examples include Hartog's work (in history) regarding the dominance of *present time perspectives* in shaping perceptions of the past and future⁹⁶ and the relevance of Wilczek's discussion of strong and weak forces at the sub-atomic level (in physics) to thinking about interactions between perennial and ephemeral aspects of a claim.⁹⁷ Without consulting this non-IR literature, the lines of inquiry pursued in my study, as well as the insights they helped recover, would have been limited in comparison to relying on IR literature alone.

Although the non-IR literature cited in my study draws from a number of different disciplines, the selection of non-IR literature included in my study is limited in regards to its scope. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the selection was driven by absences or underdevelopments identified within the consulted IR literature. Consequently, the non-IR literature included in my study is not intended to be representative of any universal, interdisciplinary understandings of notions of time, their relationships to a theory or process, or their effects. For example, understandings

⁹⁵ George and Jones, "Role of Time in Theory."

⁹⁶ François Hartog, "Time and Heritage," *Museum International*. 57, no. 3 (September 2005), 14; François Hartog and Saskia Brown, *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

⁹⁷ Wilczek, *A Beautiful Question*, 243-73, 304.

of notions of time in Philosophy rely less on mathematical calculations than understandings of notions of time found in Physics. Furthermore, the questions and insights borrowed from the selected non-IR literature are not necessarily representative of a particular discipline's primary research focus or understanding. For example, the strong and weak forces addressed by Wilczek explain some phenomena studied in Quantum Physics but feature less prominently in explanations of phenomena studied in classical mechanics.⁹⁸ As a result, volumes of non-IR literature regarding notions of time, their relationships to theory and practice, and their effects not consulted in this study may be of use in future studies of time with respect to international politics.⁹⁹

2.6 Case study literatures

The broad theoretical and conceptual framework shared in the previous two sections constitute the first half of this chapter's review of the literature relevant to my study. The remaining sections of this chapter provide overviews of the literatures consulted for the two case studies included in my study. The first section addresses the primary literature by Morgenthau on or in relation to his theory of international politics and the secondary literature on Morgenthau's theory. The second section covers the primary and secondary literature relevant to my study of the Oslo Accords. In addition to providing the limitations of the scopes of the reviews and foundations for each of these case studies, these reviews also help to flag up time-related issues that have either remained unaddressed or undertheorised within each case study's corresponding literature. The identification of these issues in this chapter helps to frame and indicate how my study contributes to existing literatures relevant to each case study. Greater detail of the issues and suggestions mentioned in these sections are presented in the analyses and discussions articulated in chapters 5-7 regarding Morgenthau's theory and chapters 8-9 regarding the Oslo Accords.

⁹⁸ Jessica Wilson, "Newtonian Forces," *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 58, no. 2 (June 2007), 179.

⁹⁹ For example, Albert Einstein's work on special relativity could provide some insights into how the automation of international political processes reduces the time lag between political decision and political action to the point where the absence of a time lag can become problematic in times of natural disasters, humanitarian crises, or war. Albert Einstein, *The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Volume 2: The Swiss Years: Writing 1900-1909*, trans. Anna Beck, consultant Peter Havas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 140-71.

2.6.1 *Relevant works by Morgenthau*

Morgenthau's work on international politics and his related theory was the central focus and concern of my theoretical case study. Consequently, Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* serves as the main text in my analysis and discussion of time perspectives and their effects within a theory.¹⁰⁰ Among the various works Morgenthau wrote over his lifetime, this book was chosen as the main text to work from for two reasons. First, the book is a substantive articulation of Morgenthau's theoretical commitments and their application in international politics that offers multiple illustrations of all five time perspectives and their effects.¹⁰¹ Second, the majority of his other works on international politics and theory, including those written prior to and after his arrival in the U.S., relate back to concepts and explanations that can be found within this book.¹⁰² This book alone, however, was not enough to conduct a thorough analysis of or develop an understanding of the time perspectives and their effects contained within Morgenthau's theory. Therefore, his other works on international law, morality, and power for example, have also been included in my analyses and discussions. Review and inclusion of these additional works was necessary to clarify and recover particular understandings and explanations of the time perspectives and their effects found within his theory of international politics.¹⁰³

While Morgenthau wrote extensively on international politics and related topics, to date, no specific treatise on time perspectives or their effects as they relate to either his theory of international or domestic politics has been found.¹⁰⁴ This absence is noteworthy considering the frequent and consistent references to time Morgenthau made

¹⁰⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰² Beyond 1947, Morgenthau's works in English were essentially rearticulations and refinements of his earlier European works. Christoph Frei, *Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001); Oliver Jütersonke, "The Image of Law in Politics among Nations," in *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Morgenthau in International Relations*, Michael C. Williams, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93-117; William E. Scheuerman, *Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2009), 24.

¹⁰³ Included in these additional works that were particularly helpful in clarifying Morgenthau's articulation of time perspectives were: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (1946; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?* (New York: New American Library, 1972); Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social Planning," *Ethics* 54, no. 3 (April 1944): 174-85.

¹⁰⁴ The reasons as to why Morgenthau was not compelled to write such a treatise is not addressed in my study.

across his body of work on politics (domestic and international) and related topics.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, these references to time found throughout his oeuvre illustrate that time was of great concern to him and suggest that they were not made in passing but included within his work as a result of careful consideration.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, the references to time made in his work regarding international politics and its theory were considered in my study to be worthy of analysis. Additionally, they were interpreted as sufficient places within his texts to begin to identify and understand the time perspectives embedded within his theory and their effects on claims about international politics made within his theory. Therefore, in the absence of a specific treatise written by Morgenthau on time perspectives and their effects on his theory, my study offers a limited substitute with insights that contribute to enhanced understandings of Morgenthau's theory.

While a thorough analysis of the entire body of Morgenthau's work might have been one approach to distilling Morgenthau's time perspectives in relation to international politics, this was not necessary for my study for the following reasons. First, the scope of my case study regarding Morgenthau's work is focused only on time perspectives articulated in this work as they relate to international politics and not domestic politics. Therefore, the texts that deal exclusively with domestic politics were not addressed in detail in my study.¹⁰⁷ Second, some of his early work while living in Germany, Spain, and Switzerland – particularly on law, morality, and politics -- were either not as fully developed as some of his later works on the same topics that were produced after his immigration to the U.S. or already incorporated into his work done in the U.S.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, these later works produced during his time in the U.S. will be referenced more frequently than his earlier works. However, where unique insights into his time perspectives are found in his early German works (which cannot be found

¹⁰⁵ Evidence of the importance of time perspectives in Morgenthau's work on topic related to politics (e.g. love and evil) can be seen in following examples: Hans J. Morgenthau, "Love and Power," *Commentary* 33, no. 3 (March 1962): 247-51; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil," *Ethics* 56, no. 1 (October 1945), 1, 14.

¹⁰⁶ Morgenthau "weighed the individual words on a precise scale, both for their substantive suitability and their aesthetic quality," quoted from Frei, *Morgenthau: An Intellectual History*, 28.

¹⁰⁷ Certainly some of his time perspectives in relation to his thoughts on international politics may be similar to those found in relation to his thoughts on domestic politics, but this assumption should not be made without a closer examination of his work on domestic politics. For instance, Morgenthau's time perspectives with regards to domestic politics exclusively are subject to different time contingencies (e.g. annual local municipal election/nomination cycles) that are not present nor relevant to the international political arena.

¹⁰⁸ Frei, *Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography*, 6; Jütersonke, "The Image of Law," 110; Scheurman, *Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, 24.

in later English works or editions), appropriate attention was given.¹⁰⁹ Finally, much of his newspaper commentaries, praises and critiques of others, and transcribed lectures, offer little if any insight into his theory's time perspectives or their effects that cannot already be found in the texts most frequently cited throughout my study.¹¹⁰

2.6.2 *Regarding Morgenthau and his theory*

The previous section articulated the limitations of scope of my review of Morgenthau's work and the value my study contributes to understanding time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau's theory. Along similar lines, this section aims to articulate the limitations of the scope of my review of work done with respect to Morgenthau and his theory, as well as how my study relates to that existing literature. Having been a central figure in the study of international politics post-World War II and a formative contributor to a theory of international politics (i.e. classical realism) that has been fundamental to the evolution of the discipline, Morgenthau and his work have received considerable, ongoing attention over the decades.¹¹¹ A sampling of the foci of literature on Morgenthau and his theory include: his critiques of liberalism, international law, and positivism; intellectual influences on his work; how his concept of 'interest defined as power' effects his and others' interpretations and understandings of international politics; the strengths and weaknesses of claims made within

¹⁰⁹ Much of his Spanish work was lost upon his hastened flee from Spain during the Spanish Civil War and consequently is not referenced in this thesis.

¹¹⁰ Any absence of references to time in such commentaries and texts, however, should not suggest that the role time plays within IR theory is any less significant for him, but suggest that the focus of these pieces did not require him to discuss time explicitly.

¹¹¹ The following listing of references is not exhaustive, but intended to illustrate an ongoing engagement with Morgenthau's work over decades: Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," *World Politics* 4, no. 1 (October 1951), 42-3; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Ghazi A. R. Alghosaibi, "The Theory of International Relations: Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics," *Background* 8, no. 4 (February 1965): 221-56; John A. Vasquez, "Colouring It Morgenthau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis on Quantitative International Politics," *British Journal of International Studies* 5, no. 3 (1979): 210-28; Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 204-36; Judith Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," *Millennium* 17, no. 3 (December 1988): 429-40; Hans-Karl Pichler, "The Godfathers of 'Truth': Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau's Theory of Power Politics," *Review of International Studies*, 24, no. 2 (April 1998), 185-200; Murielle Cozette, "Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the Ethics of Scholarship," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (January 2008): 5-27; Alison McQueen, *Political Realism in Apocalyptic Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 147-91.

Morgenthau's theory; and how his theory has been misread, misunderstood, and misused.¹¹² This broad literature was necessary to consult for two reasons.

First, consulting this literature filled in key knowledge gaps regarding Morgenthau and his theory that enriched my understanding of Morgenthau's background, concepts and claims within his theory of international politics, and how his work has been (mis)understood and (mis)used.¹¹³ Without this enhanced understanding, the time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau's theory would have been more difficult to identify, unpack or trace, and explain during my analysis. Second, the consulted literature helped to identify a marked absence in the Morgenthauian literature of detailed analyses and discussions of time, time perspectives, and their effects within Morgenthau's theory; a notable exception is work by Hom and Steele regarding Morgenthau's notion of indeterminate, open time.¹¹⁴ Given the considerable attention Morgenthau gives to time in his theory, it is surprising that not more literature on Morgenthau has addressed time-related topics. The analyses and insights shared in my study suggest that understandings of time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau's theory have been taken for granted or interpreted as irrelevant among scholars working on Morgenthau's theory. Furthermore, my study introduces novel understandings of claims made within Morgenthau's theory, time perspectives articulated within his theory, and the effects of those time perspectives on claims that are more reflective of Morgenthau's own text which help fill in the aforementioned absence in the existing literature, as well as delimit the ways in which Morgenthau's theory can be read and interpreted.

¹¹² Frei, *Morgenthau: An Intellectual History*; Daniel J. Levine, "Why Hans Morgenthau Was Not a Critical Theorist (and Why Contemporary IR Realists Should Care)," *International Relations* 27, no. 1 (March 2013): 95–118; Vassilios Paipais, "Between Politics and the Political: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau's Double Critique of Depoliticisation," *Millennium* 42, no. 2 (January 2014): 354–75; Michael C. Williams, *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 82–127; Michael C. Williams, ed., *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Scheuerman, *Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*.

¹¹³ Hartmut Behr and Amelia Heath, "Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and Neo-Realism," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (April 2009): 327–49.

¹¹⁴ Andrew R. Hom and Brent J. Steele, "Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive Realism," *International Studies Review* 12, no. 2 (June 2010): 271–300.

2.6.3 *The Oslo Accords and relevant works*

The second case study included in my study regarded the time perspectives and their effects on the peace process articulated within the Oslo Accords. This prompted a review of literature regarding the Oslo Accords, the history of relations between Israel and the Palestinians over the contested territories, and the study of peace and peace processes in general. Consequently, the literature reviewed in this section is largely unrelated to that which was addressed in the previous section regarding Morgenthau's theory.¹¹⁵ My review of literature for this case study began with the texts of both Oslo I and Oslo II. Together, the two texts constitute the Oslo Accords and served as the primary texts analysed for my empirical case study. After reviewing the texts, it was apparent that the Accords were written as a timing document for a liberal democratic peace process. Furthermore, it was apparent that the peace process was constructed as a series of time-indexed steps and stages progressing in a linear fashion toward a particular end (i.e. peace). This made tracing the effects of time perspectives within the peace process easier to follow during my analysis.¹¹⁶ Consequently, as a timing document, the Accords were naturally conducive to conduct my study on time perspectives and their effects on a peace process.

Included in my review of the text of the Accords, were reviews of other texts mentioned within the Accords. These other reviewed texts included UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the three letters exchanged between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat, and Norway's Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst¹¹⁷, and various peace

¹¹⁵ Although Morgenthau did write on relations between Israel and the Palestinians in the contested area, these pieces were not included in my review of literature regarding the history of relations between Israel and Palestine as they would be create connections between the two case studies which are not addressed in this thesis. For a sampling of Morgenthau's views regarding Israel and the Palestinians see M. Ben Mollov, "Responsible Power, Irresponsible Power: Israel and Vietnam According to Hans J. Morgenthau," *Israel Affairs* 7, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 25-48.

¹¹⁶ On these points, literature regarding process tracing was helpful. For more see: Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 2 (February 2007): 170-95; Michael Howlett and Klaus H. Goetz, "Introduction: Time, Temporality and Timescapes in Administration and Policy," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 80, no. 3 (September 2014): 477-92; Tasha Fairfield and Andrew E. Charman, "Explicit Bayesian Analysis for Process Tracing: Guidelines, Opportunities, and Caveats," *Political Analysis* 25, no. 3 (July 2017): 363-80.

¹¹⁷ Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, September 9, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-plo%20recognition%20%20exchange%20of%20letters%20betwe.aspx> (accessed September 2, 2018); Yasser Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister John Jorgen Holst, September 9, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/>

agreements. These peace agreements included the Gaza-Jericho Agreement¹¹⁸, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement¹¹⁹, and the Further Transfer Protocol¹²⁰.¹²¹ Reviewing these other texts that were mentioned within the Accords was necessary for my study because they either directly embedded particular time perspectives into the Accords (e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 embedded historical time perspectives) or were instrumental in identifying and developing understandings of the Accords' time perspectives and their effects on the peace process. Although these other texts specifically mentioned in the Accords, along with the text of the Accords themselves, provided the bulk of the content from which the Accords' time perspectives and their effects on the peace process were able to be identified and traced, they alone were not sufficient to recover all the time perspectives embedded within the Accords nor their effects.

My review of the Accords and other texts explicitly mentioned within them indicated that there were time perspectives and effects that could not be understood or explained via these texts alone. To help address these issues, my review was expanded to include literature on the history of the contested territory, historical and contemporary relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and notions of liberal and democratic peace. In regards to the history on the contested territory and Israeli-Palestinian relations, my review of the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 was helpful in recovering awareness and understanding of *long-term historical* and *long-term future*

mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-plo%20recognition%20-%20exchange%20of%20letters%20between.aspx (accessed September 2, 2018); Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Yasser Arafat, September 9, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-plo%20recognition%20-%20exchange%20of%20letters%20between.aspx> (accessed September 2, 2018).

¹¹⁸ "Gaza-Jericho Agreement," conclusion date: May, 4, 1994, Economic Cooperation Foundation – The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/618 (accessed August 3, 2018).

¹¹⁹ "Preparatory Transfer Agreement," conclusion date: August 29, 1994, United Nations Peacemaker – Peace Agreements Database, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IsraelOPT_940829_AgreementPreparatoryTransferPowersResponsibilities.pdf (accessed August 3, 2018).

¹²⁰ "Further Transfer Protocol," conclusion date: August 27, 1995, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guide to Mideast Peace Process. <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/further%20transfer%20of%20powers%20and%20responsibilities.aspx> (accessed August 3, 2018).

¹²¹ Discrepancies between the time perspectives articulated within the Accords and those found within either of the three agreements were not explicitly addressed in my study for two reasons. First, such an analysis lay outside the scope of my study. Second, the final paragraph of the Preamble in Oslo II explicitly stated that the content of Oslo II superseded these three agreements, thus making the discrepancies among time perspectives a non-issue for my study.

time perspectives implicitly embedded into the Accords.¹²² Furthermore, Resolution 181, along with works by Dowty and Milton-Edwards provided the historical and contemporary contexts regarding the contested lands and Israeli-Palestinian relations necessary to understand why the Accords was needed, why it was supported, and what its aims were.¹²³ Helping to understand the aims of the Accords' peace process (i.e. the manifestation of an everlasting liberal and democratic peace), as well as the type of peace process the Accords was modelled after, literature on liberal and democratic peace by Maoz and Russett, Doyle, Richmond and Franks, and Baumgart-Ochse was consulted.¹²⁴

In addition to the literature aforementioned, my review of literature relevant to my case study on time perspectives and their effects on the Accords' peace process also included literature that was critical of the liberal and democratic peace process, offered assessments of the Accords' peace process after its failure to deliver lasting peace, and regarding general notions of peace. This grouping of literatures was instrumental in developing recommendations as to how time perspectives within future peace processes might be configured to improve their odds of success. In regards to literature critical of liberal and democratic peace processes, works by Darby and Mac Ginty, Mac Ginty, and Richmond provided insights that guided my recommendations on how time perspectives within future peace processes could be used to avoid or minimise the issues time perspectives created within the Accords' peace process that led to its failure.¹²⁵

¹²² United Nations General Assembly, Second year, "Future Government of Palestine," A/RES/181(II)A-B, November 29, 1947, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181\(II\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181(II)) (accessed August 8, 2018).

¹²³ Alan Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, England: Polity, 2012); Beverley Milton-Edwards, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A people's war* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009).

¹²⁴ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro, and Michael Doyle, "The Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (April 1995): 164-84; Michael W. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace," *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 3 (August 2005): 463-66; Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205-235; Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 323-353; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779-801; Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, "Democratization in Israel, Politicized Religion and the Failure of the Oslo Peace Process," *Democratization* 16, no. 6 (November 2009): 1115-142.

¹²⁵ John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Roger Mac Ginty, *No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Roger Mac

Likewise, accounts of the failures of the Accords' peace process and the subsequent context of Israeli-Palestinian relations by Said and Reinhart were helpful in thinking about what time perspectives will be needed in future peace processes.¹²⁶ Finally, literature regarding notions of peace was consulted to provide a general understanding of the various types of peace that time perspectives within a peace process can help to create and sustain, as well as how time perspectives can be used to limit the scope of the peace a future peace process is intended to generate.¹²⁷

2.7 Chapter summary

This chapter's intention was to provide the reader with the broad and diverse scope of the literature used throughout my study, as well as a description of the methodology used to read through the selected case study texts analysed for time perspectives. This review included general IR literature on time, as well as specialised IR literature relating to each of the selected case studies. Helping to enhance underdeveloped or missing understandings and notions of time recovered from my review of the aforementioned IR literatures were concepts and insights borrowed from non-IR literature in areas such as Organisational Management, Organisational Behaviour, History, and Physics. The literature covered in the aforementioned sections was consulted namely for two reasons. First, it provided crucial theoretical and practical links that made my study feasible. Second, it helped identify and introduce notions of time that were necessary to recognise, unpack, and articulate time perspectives and their

Ginty, *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Oliver P. Richmond, *A Post-liberal Peace* (London: Routledge, 2011).

¹²⁶ Edwards W. Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and after*, 2nd ed. (London: Granta, 2002); Tanya Reinhart, *The Road Map to Nowhere: Israel/Palestine since 2003* (London: Verso, 2006).

¹²⁷ Kyle Beardsley, "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (October 2008): 723-40; Johan Galtung, "On the Meaning of Nonviolence," *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 3 (1965): 228-57; Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-91; Johan Galtung, "Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses," *Journal of Peace Research* 22, no. 2 (June 1985): 141-158; Nils Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle, and Håvard Strand, "Peace Research - Just the Study of War?," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (March 2014): 145-158; Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, "Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-settlement Societies," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (2010): 367-90; Heikki Patomäki, "The Challenge of Critical Theories: Peace Research at the Start of the New Century," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 6 (November 2001): 723-37; Oliver P. Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," *Conflict, Security and Development* 6, no. 3 (October 2006): 291-314; Oliver P. Richmond, *Peace in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Herman Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics," *Journal of Peace Research* 5, no. 3 (September 1968): 217-32.

effects addressed in this study. Considered together, these literatures enabled the analyses and discussions of time perspectives and their effects articulated in my study to recover insights that 1) complement existing IR research on time, 2) enhance disciplinary understandings of time perspectives and their effects, and 3) challenge how orthodox and alternative claims about and practices of international politics are perceived. Furthermore, this review helps to situate my study within the IR literature on time in general, as well as illustrate how my study relates to the specialised literatures within IR regarding Morgenthau's theory of international politics and the Oslo Accords.¹²⁸

In the next chapter, the first instances of how the insights gained from the aforementioned literature review were used in my study are demonstrated. In that chapter I address how time perspectives were defined and distinguished among one another throughout my study via anchor points, the aggregation of time, and in relation to one another. The resulting definitions and distinctions derived from my synthesis of both IR and non-IR literatures exemplify the added value that the non-IR literatures have brought to my study. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates how the reviewed non-IR literature helped my study introduce new understandings of time perspectives within IR and contributes to moving existing time-related research within IR in new directions. These new directions of research help to recover novel insights about the significant shaping effects different *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* have within a theory or a peace process. While some of the broader effects are mentioned in the following chapter because of their usefulness in distinguishing among time perspectives, the more nuanced effects will be detailed in the case study chapters 5-9. Hence, the next chapter serves as a fundamental part of the foundation upon which the arguments and claims made throughout my study rest.

¹²⁸ This point is emphasised to suggest the diverse appeal my study might have to various audiences within IR.

Part I: Analytical Tools

Chapter 3: Defining Time Perspectives

Ascertaining an awareness and understanding of the relationships between and effects of distinct time perspectives are difficult tasks. Among the factors contributing to this difficulty, three include: 1) the obscurity of time perspectives within a theory or peace process, 2) the lack of awareness and understanding among scholars of relations between time perspectives and a theory or peace process, and 3) the thinking of time perspectives as limited to three segments of time (i.e. the past, the present, and the future).¹²⁹ However, these difficulties can be overcome by reconceptualising what time perspectives are, learning how to differentiate them from one another, and recovering an awareness of their presence or absence within a theory or peace process. The following chapter addresses these three points at length with the intention of providing a foundational understanding of time perspectives upon which the analyses found in the subsequent chapters 5-9 are built.

The chapter begins by clarifying what is meant by the term ‘time perspective’. This clarification involved the development of a clear conceptualisation of what a time perspective is as one was not readily available within the existing IR literature. To help clarify what time perspectives are, I imported various time-related concepts from the fields of Organisational Management and Organisational Behaviour to IR. These concepts include temporal depth, temporal focus, *long-term*, and *short-term*. The resulting reconceptualisation of time perspectives used in this study (see Table 3.1 below) moves IR scholars beyond thinking of time perspectives as akin to one dimensional and homogenous segments of time, such as the past, the present, and the future. What lies beyond this narrow thinking in regards to time perspectives is thinking of time perspectives as being multifaceted with both temporal depth and temporal focus. Thus, the ideas presented in this chapter are intended to be initial steps that lead to deepening and enriching the reader’s current thoughts about time perspectives within

¹²⁹ Regarding the first point, the obscurity is primarily the result of time perspectives not consistently being articulated in explicit language within a theory or peace process. Often references to time perspectives are implicit and requires extra effort and a basic understanding of time perspectives to recover their presence or absence within a theory or a peace process. I am not the first to call for more explicit articulations of time perspectives to be made. For a recent example see, MacKay and LaRoche, “Conduct of History,” 229.

Table 3.1: Conceptualisations of Time Perspectives

		Temporal Focus		
		Past	Present	Future
Temporal Depth	Long-term	<i>Long-term historical</i>	<i>Long-term present</i> ¹³⁰	<i>Long-term future</i>
	Short-term	<i>Short-term historical</i>	<i>Short-term present</i>	<i>Short-term future</i>

the context of international politics. These initial steps toward the reconceptualisation of time perspectives were necessary to recover an awareness and understanding of the shaping roles time perspectives play within a theory or a peace process which an analysis using one dimensional and homogeneous conceptualisations of time perspectives would miss or struggle to capture. Consequently, the reconceptualisation of time perspectives presented in this chapter enable readers to retrieve existing and new insights about the relationships between time perspectives and a theory or peace process and their effects that might otherwise be missed and difficult to obtain.¹³¹

After outlining how time perspectives are conceived of in this study, the next section of the chapter addresses the means used for determining how to identify and distinguish between time perspectives, as being either *long-term* or *short-term*. These means include the identification of anchor points, determining how periodisations are aggregated, and having an awareness of how time perspectives compare to one another. In other words, the temporal depth and temporal focus of a time perspective are identifiable through the aforementioned means. The benefit the using the methods outlined later in section 3.3 is their broad utility and applicability across various theories and peace processes. This claim of the broad utility and application of these methods is supported by the design of the methods which can be used to identify and differentiate time perspectives with or without the use of (nor availability of) numbers or dates. In other words, as long as time is mentioned or implied within a theory or peace process,

¹³⁰ Theories of international politics and peace processes do not typically articulate the present as being long-term, however, the *long-term present time perspective* appears in the table because it can be useful to describing certain phenomena (e.g. the daily life experiences of refugees awaiting review of their official status or how Australia's aboriginal populations think about the present).

¹³¹ The insights regarding development obtained from the analysis in Chapter 5, Section 3.4 of *short-term historical time perspectives* is an illustration of this point.

these methods can help recover different time perspectives. The identification and differentiation of time perspectives within a theory or peace process is significant because they are necessary initial steps to recovering an awareness and understanding of the particular ways in which time perspectives affect how claims and processes articulated within a theory or peace process are understood and function. These methods grew out of a recognition that pre-defined lengths of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* brought in from outside a theory or peace process would have little to no relevance to the time perspectives articulated within a theory or peace process. In other words, time perspectives are uniquely determined by each individual theory or peace process. Therefore, the methods were intentionally developed to enable the reader to apply them across different theories or peace processes to study *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects. Using these methods, the reader is able to differentiate between the various time perspectives addressed throughout this thesis: *long-term historical, short-term historical, short-term present, short-term future, and long-term future*.¹³²

Concluding the chapter is a discussion of outlier time perspectives not fully explored in this thesis. The outlier time perspectives discussed include *medium-term* and *long-term present time perspectives*. Although these particular time perspectives are not fully explored in this study, they are mentioned in this chapter for four reasons. The first reason for mentioning them is to acknowledge their existence, which helps to emphasise the multiplicity of time perspectives within international politics beyond the multiplicity that is addressed in this study. The second reason is to indicate that they represent future lines of inquiry readers might want to pursue with respect to these time perspectives as they appear in international political phenomena. The third reason is to provide explanations as to why they are not fully explored in any of the subsequent chapters. Finally, addressing these outlier time perspectives explicitly at this point in the thesis helps to further narrow the reader's attention on the five time perspectives analysed and discussed throughout this thesis.

¹³² Further details regarding each time perspective are elaborated in chapters 5-9.

3.1 Constructing time perspectives

The concept of a time perspective as understood and applied within my study borrows from a combination of temporal constructs identified by Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert with respect to organizational management and behaviour.¹³³ Each temporal construct these authors highlight is useful in helping to identify and articulate different, implicit aspects of time mentioned within a theory or peace process. Although the constructs are used by Shipp, Edwards, and Lamberts to study individuals' behaviours with respects to time within the contexts of organizations (e.g. companies), the constructs are also applicable within the context of international politics. Just as the collective behaviours of individual employees manifest in organisations in the latter's processes, beliefs, and justifications for pursuing various goals or making certain decisions, so to do the collective behaviours of individual actors (e.g. policymakers, states, diplomats) manifest in international politics in the processes, beliefs, and justifications for political actions and decisions. Among the multiple constructs identified by Shipp, Edwards, and Lamberts, those constructs relating to and describing strictly affective or behavioural aspects of time within a theory were excluded from my conceptualisation of a time perspective. These aspects were excluded because their significance was only evident after grasping the significance of three particular constructs: temporal depth, temporal focus, and time perspectives.¹³⁴ As a result, the aforementioned three constructs regarding temporal depth, temporal focus, and time perspectives were included within my understanding of time perspectives and are addressed in the following paragraphs.

3.1.1 *Temporal depth*

First, temporal depth refers to what extent or how much of the past and future are taken into consideration from a present situation.¹³⁵ Therefore, the temporal depths of the time perspectives articulated within a theory or peace process are linked to how far back in history (e.g. 100 years) or how far forward into the future (e.g. 10-20 years)

¹³³ Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus," 3-4.

¹³⁴ Constructs such time attitude, temporal orientation, hurriedness, pacing style, and preferred polychronicity related more to effects and behavioural elements that were beyond the scope of this research project. Ibid., 3-4.

¹³⁵ Allen C. Bluedorn, *The Human Organization of Time: Temporal Realities and Experience* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 114.

references are made within a theory or peace process. For example, in the case of Morgenthau's theory, the historical temporal depth goes back thousands of years to ancient civilizations in Greece, India, and China when examining the historical examples he cites throughout his work.¹³⁶ In the Accords' peace process, the historical temporal depth only extends back decades to the mid-20th century.¹³⁷ Regarding the temporal depth of the future, Morgenthau offers limited insights conveying an awareness of a future extending into infinity but not forever because of the existence of nuclear weapons.¹³⁸ The temporal depth of the future with respect to the peace process outlined in Accords extends over years to the end of the permanent status negotiations.¹³⁹ As these examples illustrate, temporal depths do not necessarily have to be symmetrical between the past and the future within a theory or peace process nor are depths similar when comparing like depths between a theory and a peace process.¹⁴⁰ This lack of symmetry and similarity, however, is not insignificant as it can inform scholars about where the historical and future attention of a theory or emphasis of a peace process may lie.¹⁴¹ In addition to helping recognise the asymmetry of or dissimilarities between the historical and future temporal depths, surveying these temporal depths within a theory or peace process together gives scholars an indication of the scope of a theory or peace process and the timespan within which claims and processes are considered to be valid or have relevance.¹⁴² As examples, the scope of Morgenthau's theory covers several millennia while the scope of the Accords' peace process is limited to decades. While the existing definition of temporal depth provided by Shipp and her colleagues is useful, it can be augmented further.

The above definition is limited in two ways. First, the definition refers only to the temporal depths of the past or the future in its entirety. This definition does not make reference to the temporal depths that exist simultaneously within the past or the future. In other words, my study of time perspectives did not begin with the predisposition that

¹³⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4.

¹³⁷ Oslo I, preamble and art. I.

¹³⁸ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 144-53.

¹³⁹ An end date for the permanent status negotiations is not explicitly defined in the Accords.

¹⁴⁰ Bluehorn, *The Human Organization of Time*, 116-17.

¹⁴¹ Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus," 3.

¹⁴² Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, "The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 3 (November 1998), 797; Hobson and Lawson, "What is History in International Relations?," 422; MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 213; McIntosh, "Theory Across Time," 492.

the past or the future as articulated within a theory or peace process is making reference to one historical depth or one depth in relation to the future. Consequently, the concept of temporal depth has been augmented in this study to also refer to the time-related lengths of various periodisations of the past or the future as articulated within a theory or peace process.¹⁴³ Morgenthau's references to the Napoleonic War and World Wars I and II are examples of different periodisations with dissimilar lengths that co-exist within the whole of the past he articulates within his theory.¹⁴⁴ Although how a periodisation's temporal depth is classified (as either long-term or short-term) will be discussed later in this chapter in section 3.3, the reasons as to why temporal depths of periodisations warrant examination in the first place must be made clear. Examining the temporal depths of periodisations can inform readers about how a theory or peace process structures the following: 1) the scope (in relation to time) of its arguments, 2) evidence supporting claims, or 3) the flow of phenomena or processes.¹⁴⁵ For example, using both long-term and short-term periodisations, the Accords was able to define the issue its peace process was attempting to solve (i.e. scope), what type of peace was sought (i.e. claims), and the durations of various steps or stages included in the peace process (i.e. flow). Therefore, the inclusion of periodisations with varying lengths within a theory or process suggests these variations are necessary to convey significant aspects of a theory or peace process.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, they suggest an awareness among the author(s) of a theory or peace process of distinctions between temporal depths. Thus, by augmenting the definition of temporal depth to also apply to periodisations within the past or the future and not just the past or the future as a whole, enables readers to gain an awareness of the effects different temporal depths of periodisations have on claims and processes.

¹⁴³ Helge Jordheim, "Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities," *History and Theory* 51, no. 2 (May 2012), 157; Reinhart Koselleck, *Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 9.

¹⁴⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, "World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century," *The Review of Politics* 10, no. 2 (April 1948), 157.

¹⁴⁵ Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *International Order and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Sketch of Post-War International Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 117; George Lawson, "The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations," *International Studies Review* 8, no. 3 (September 2006), 415-16; McIntosh, "Theory Across Time," 488-89; Russett, Layne, Spiro, and Doyle, "The Democratic Peace," 169-70.

¹⁴⁶ Hartog and Brown, *Regimes of Historicity*, 25.

The second limitation of the definition Shipp and her colleagues provide in relation to temporal depth regards a lack of discussion about the temporal depth(s) of the present. This omission is significant because it suggests the temporal depth of the present either does not exist or does not matter. However, articulations about the present in relation to the past and future within Morgenthau's theory of international politics or within the Accords' peace process contradict this interpretation and suggest otherwise.¹⁴⁷ Acknowledging the temporal depth(s) of the present has significance for two reasons. First, theories of international politics and peace processes at times segment time into the past, the present, and the future as illustrated within my two cases studies. Each segment is articulated as distinct from the other even though they are connected and effect one another as the final sections in chapters 5-9 illustrate. Part of their distinctions among the segments of time stem from their temporal depths. Therefore, if the present did not have temporal depth, then no gap would be distinguishable between the past and the future.¹⁴⁸ Relating to the aforementioned reason, the second reason acknowledging the temporal depth of the present is significant is because the temporal depth of the present is distinct from that of the past or the future; it is either shorter than the past or the future or longer if the present is perceived as an all-encompassing present.¹⁴⁹ Regardless of whether the temporal depth of the present is interpreted as long, short, or close to zero within a theory or peace process, that depth will never be equal to the temporal depths of a past or a future.¹⁵⁰ This distinction of the temporal depth of the present matters, as will be addressed in later chapters, because it enables readers to see more clearly how claims and processes are bound by the context of time perspectives present or absence and it reinforces the uniqueness of *present time perspectives*. For the aforementioned reasons, therefore, the notion that *present time perspectives* within a theory or peace process have temporal depths was accepted and addressed in this study.

¹⁴⁷ Examples found in Morgenthau's theory and the Accord's peace process are provided in chapters 5 and 9 respectively.

¹⁴⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin, 1993), 3, 9; Hartog and Brown, *Regimes of Historicity*, 88.

¹⁴⁹ Hartog and Brown, *Regimes of Historicity*, 33-4.

¹⁵⁰ In theory, the temporal depth of the past and the future of a theory or peace process could be equal, for example plus and minus 50 years from the present. In this example, however, the temporal depth of the present could never be 50 years; it might be defined as something less than 50 years as in a 'today' or as infinity if the present was thought of as all-encompassing. Saint Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Book 10-11.

3.1.2 *Temporal focus*

In addition to temporal depth, time perspectives were also understood in this study to have temporal focus. Temporal focus (i.e. emphasis) regards where the attention of a time perspective rests or centres on with respect to the past, the present, and the future.¹⁵¹ Temporal focus in essence indicates the emphasis of a time perspective. Although the intensity of the focus may vary, it need not be singular in focus. For example, a theory may maintain multiple foci as Morgenthau's references to segments of time in terms of the past, present, and future illustrate.¹⁵² Temporal focus can also include a focus on the temporal depth (i.e. long-term and short-term) within the past, present, and future. For example, references within the Accords' peace process to its long-term and short-term steps and stages focus on those of the past, present and the future. Furthermore, considering the temporal foci of time perspectives within a theory or peace process in the aggregate can be helpful to understanding what the overall temporal focus of a theory or peace process is. For example, considering collectively the temporal foci of the time perspectives within Morgenthau's theory indicates that the overall temporal focus of his theory was on the past and the present, not on the future; the Accords' overall temporal focus was on the future, in particular the short-term future. Identifying the overall temporal focus within a theory or peace process can also offer some insights as to why certain claims were or were not made within a theory or why certain time perspectives appear more or less prominent within a peace process. For example, the Accords' overall temporal focus on the future helps explain why *historical time perspectives* appear less prominent in the texts of the peace process beyond the preambles of Oslo I and Oslo II. Therefore, for any of the aforementioned reasons, including temporal focus as part of my construct of time perspectives enabled me to recover various insights about time perspectives and their effects within

¹⁵¹ Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus," 3-4; Efrén O. Perez and Margit Tavits, "Language Shapes People's Time Perspective and Support for Future-Oriented Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 3 (January 2017): 715-27; Philip G. Zimbardo, John N. Boyd, "Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual-Differences Metric," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77, no. 6 (December 1999): 1271-288.

¹⁵² The multiple foci found in Morgenthau's theory are unpacked in chapters 5-7.

Morgenthau's theory or the Accords' peace process that temporal depth alone would not have allowed.

To bring both temporal depth and temporal focus together, the construct of a time perspective was brought into this study from the Organizational Management and Organisational Behaviour literature. The construct of a time perspective describes an overarching view of time that includes the constructs of time mentioned above, as well as others.¹⁵³ In essence, a time perspective provides a broad, umbrella category under which multiple constructs of time (e.g. temporal depth and temporal focus) can be bundled together to help make sense of a theory's or peace process's articulations of time. Within the IR literature, this bundling of constructs within a time perspective is namely done on the macro-level rather than on sub-macro levels which also offer overarching insights into the theory (e.g. *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* within the past or the future).¹⁵⁴ Essentially, a macro-level time perspective bundles constructs of time within a time perspective of the past as a whole, a time perspective of the present as a whole, or a time perspective of the future as a whole. Conversely, a sub-macro level time perspective bundles constructs of time within a time perspective that is part of a whole as in a *long-term* or *short-term time perspective* of the past. While macro-level time perspectives are addressed in my study, I also concentrate on recovering insights about sub-macro level time perspectives. This additional concentration on sub-macro level time perspectives 1) broadens the notion of time perspectives currently found within IR, 2) enables time perspective analysis to move beyond macro-level analysis, and 3) provides deeper insights into a theory's or peace process's articulations of time.

¹⁵³ The other constructs not discussed in my research include temporal orientation, time attitude, preferred polychronicity, hurriedness, and pacing style. While these other constructs are important, their significance are best understood and interpreted within a known or identified context of time that includes the temporal focus, temporal depth, and time perspectives. For details see Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus"; Susan Mohammed and David Harrison, "Diversity in temporal portfolios: How time-based individual differences can affect team performance" (paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference, Philadelphia, PA, August 3-8, 2007): n.a.

¹⁵⁴ George Lawson, "The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 18, no. 2 (September 2010), 211; William Robinson, *Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change, and Globalization* (London: Verso, 2003), 2; Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, "Theorizing Emotions in World Politics," *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (November 2014), 496-97; Solomon and Steele, "Micro-moves in International Relations theory," 274.

3.2 The segmenting and naming of time perspectives

As a result of the combination of the aforementioned constructs, the following conceptualisation of time perspectives was developed. Time perspectives are a theory's or peace process's constructs of time having both focus and depth with respect to the past, present, and the future. This conceptualisation of time perspectives was subsequently applied to my time perspective analysis of Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process. Embedded within this conceptualisation is the idea of time being segmented into three parts: the past, the present, and the future. The root of this segmentation of time is derived from Saint Augustine¹⁵⁵ and prevalent within IR.¹⁵⁶ The significance of this segmentation of time and its inclusion in my conceptualisation of time perspectives is threefold. First, Morgenthau's theory and the Accords both share Augustinian notions of time where the past is followed by the present, which in turn is followed by the future; in essence time is linear. Second, a segment of time identified as the 'past', 'present', or 'future' denotes the temporal focus of the time perspective (e.g. focus on the past over the present and the future). Finally, this segmentation of time lays out the three basic time perspectives that *could* possibly exist or be recognised within a theory or peace process: a *historical time perspective*, a *present time perspective*, and a *future time perspective*. The emphasis placed on 'could' is to acknowledge that a theory or peace process does not have to possess or recognise all of the three basic time perspectives. Consequently, this conceptualisation of time perspectives does not inhibit its applicability to theories or peace processes that may exclusively acknowledge only one or two segments of time.

Studying time perspectives only in regards to the past, present, and future (i.e. temporal foci), as mentioned earlier, offers limited, one dimensional insights into a theory's or peace process's time perspectives and their effects. To gain further insights into the temporal depths of time perspectives and their effects, notions of *long-term* and *short-term* were introduced and analysed in my research. The idea that *long-term* and *short-term* denoted the temporal depths of time perspectives and that *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* could affect both a theory of international politics and a

¹⁵⁵ Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, 234-243.

¹⁵⁶ Iver B. Neumann and Erik F. Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning: The Method of Perspectivist Scenario Building," *International Studies Perspectives* 5, no. 3 (August 2004), 267.

peace process were derived primarily from Organisational Management studies addressing similar notions of *long-term* and *short-term* and their effects on theory and organisational policy.¹⁵⁷ Although the terminology referring to time perspectives or elements of them such as temporal focus and temporal depth are often less explicit in a theory of international politics or a peace process than in commercial organisations and management policies, *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* nevertheless exist within a theory or peace process and shape one another.¹⁵⁸

In addition to helping establish linkages between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and a theory or process, the Organizational Management literature also provided conceptualisations of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* which were not too rigid as to limit their usage and applicability to this study. In other words, what is *long-term* and *short-term* is not set in the literature to specific lengths of time. In the literature *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* are presented as amorphous, context dependent, relational, and lacking specific quantification; in other words, indeterminacy and openness are defining attributes of time perspectives. The significance of continuing to think of time perspectives in this way makes time perspectives ubiquitous analytical tools that can be applied to any theory or peace process regardless of the units of time used or acknowledged within either.¹⁵⁹ Rather than imposing an arbitrary, fixed length in years, decades or centuries (i.e. temporal depth) of what constitutes long-term or short-term, each time perspective remains open to being (re)defined by a theory or peace process, as well as in relation to other time perspectives (e.g. long-term past in relation to short-term past). Three conclusions follow from this conceptualisation of time perspectives. First, there are limits to how *long-term* and *short-term* can be defined and standardised. Second, what defines *long-term* and *short-term* within a theory or peace process is context specific. Finally, *long-*

¹⁵⁷ For further detail about the effects of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* on organisations and management see Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman, "Time: A New Research Lens"; Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, "Taking Time to Integrate"; Orlikowski and Yates, "It's About Time"; Natalie Slawinski and Pratima Bansal, "A Matter of Time: The Temporal Perspectives of Organizational Responses to Climate Change," *Organization Studies* 33, no. 11 (November 2012): 1537–63; Sonnentag, "Time in Organizational Research".

¹⁵⁸ For a notable exception within the IR literature acknowledging the existence and importance of studying *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* see Ken R. Dark, *The Waves of Time: Long-term Change and International Relations* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 3-4.

¹⁵⁹ Examples of units of time found within a theory or a peace process include but are not limited to years, centuries, and general references to the distant past or near future.

term and *short-term time perspectives* found among various theories or peace processes may share similar characteristics and have similar shaping effects even though the factors (e.g. units of analysis, examples cited) (re)defining time perspectives and their durations may differ. While ideas of openness and non-quantification of time perspectives are maintained in my understanding and interpretation of *long-term* and *short-term*, further distinctions between the two were needed to enhance their utility as analytical tools in my research.

3.3: Distinguishing between long-term and short-term


3.3.1 Anchor points

To distinguish between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future within the context of any particular theory of international politics or peace process, I identified three factors necessary to take into account: anchor points, aggregation of periodisations, and comparison to one another.¹⁶⁰ Locating these factors required a close reading of the texts being analysed in relation to each case study. The first factor regards anchor points specifically related to time as referenced within the case study texts. Anchor points are those explicit and implicit references to events, periods, and notions associated with time (e.g. immortality) that indicate bracketed portions of the past, present, or future.¹⁶¹ Figure 3.1 below depicts how different anchor points bracket portions of time. Although the specific anchor points included within texts articulating Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process differ, as will be illustrated later in this study, the remarks about anchor points that follow are broadly applicable to the various types of anchor points found in both case study texts.

¹⁶⁰ George and Jones, "Role of Time in Theory," 661-62.

¹⁶¹ Nazli Choucri, "Forecasting in International Relations: Problems and Prospects," *International Interactions* 1, no. 2 (1974), 70; Gary King and Langche Zeng, "When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 1 (March 2007), 205; Elias, *An Essay on Time*, 59; McIntosh, "Theory Across Time," 478, 488, 190; Jonathan Matusitz and Eric Kramer, "A Critique of Bernstein's beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis," *Poiesis & Praxis* 7, no. 4 (June 2011), 293; Solomon, "Time and Subjectivity."

Figure 3.1: Anchor points partitioning time



This time line (not to scale) illustrates the various types of anchor points articulated within the case study texts that partition time within the texts. Such anchors can be used to identify and distinguish among *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future.

The initial anchor point to consider is the present.¹⁶² A present serves as an anchor point because it can be consistently identified within a theory or peace process even though when a present is may vary from theory to theory or peace process to peace process. For example, the present within *Politics among Nations* can be roughly linked to the book's publication year in 1956 while the present of the peace process detailed in Oslo I can be more precisely dated to September 13, 1993, the signing of Oslo I. The identification of the present is important because it can be used to identify a theory's or peace process's contemporary world. Identifying when the contemporary world is, as Chapter 9, section 5 regarding the presents of the Accords illustrates, matters when analysing the effects of similar time perspectives from the different presents.

Using a present as an anchor point is essential to a study of time perspectives and their effects because it provides a time reference within a theory or peace process where analyses of the time perspectives can consistently begin and comparisons of time perspectives between different theories and/or peace process can be made.¹⁶³ Regarding the first point of using a present as an anchor point to begin analyses of time perspectives, the advantage of using this particular anchor point is that it can mark the beginning or ending of some (but not all) time perspectives.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, with the

¹⁶² Lundborg, "The Becoming of the "Event": A Deleuzian Approach to Understanding the Production of Social and Political "Events"," *Theory & Event* 12, no. 1 (January 2009): n.a., <https://muse.jhu.edu/> (accessed February 1, 2017): n.a.; Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity*, xiv-xv.

¹⁶³ "Each actually present now creates a new time-point because it creates ... a new object point." Edmund G. Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)*, trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 68.

¹⁶⁴ Examples of time perspectives that do not have the present as an anchor include *short-term historical time perspectives* with anchors situated entirely in the past (e.g. the interwar period between WWI and WWII, the period of the Roman Empire).

identification of this present anchor point any references made to events or phenomena preceding or following it can be easily assigned to either the past or the future. Consequently, this way of sorting international political events and phenomena, enabled by this particular anchor point, is an initial step needed to begin to identify *historical* and *future time perspectives*.

Regarding the second point about enabling comparisons, a present provides a shared anchor point from which different time perspectives can be defined and compared. These comparisons may be internal or external comparisons among *historical* and *future time perspectives* within a theory or peace process where the present of the same theory or peace process is used as a common anchor point.¹⁶⁵ Such comparisons can draw attention to the (a)symmetry of time perspectives on either side of the present.¹⁶⁶ For example, the temporal depth of *short-term future time perspectives* found within Morgenthau's theory extend out for a few years while its *short-term historical time perspectives* extend back for decades and centuries.¹⁶⁷ In addition to providing a place from which analyses can begin and comparisons can be made, a present can also serve as a shared anchor point which helps to make sense of the internal structure of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past and the future and their arrangement within a theory or peace process. For example, the Accords' present serves as a shared anchor point for its *long-term* and *short-term future time perspectives* articulating the various steps and stages of the Accords' peace process; without an awareness of this shared point, distinguishing between the Accords' *future time perspectives* would be difficult.¹⁶⁸

In addition to the present, other equally important anchor points to consider include two extremes, one historical and one futural.¹⁶⁹ These two particular anchor

¹⁶⁵ Mei Wang, Marc Oliver Rieger, and Thorsten Hens, "How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 53 Countries," *Journal of Economic Psychology* 52 (February 2016): 115-35. *Present time perspectives* can also be compared as detailed in Chapter 6.

¹⁶⁶ Jordheim, "Against Periodization," 153.

¹⁶⁷ See Chapter 5 for examples.

¹⁶⁸ See Chapter 8, section 5 for clarification of this example.

¹⁶⁹ References made to time horizons in the IR literature are one type of extreme anchor points. Time horizons, however, typically only refer to future extreme anchor points rather than extreme anchor points of the past. For an example see Ronald R. Krebs and Aaron Rapport, "International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (September 2012): 530. For a broader definition of what a time horizon is from Sociology that has similarities to how time perspectives are defined in this thesis see Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods:

points mark the theoretical limits of the past and future mentioned within a theory or peace process. For example, references to ancient Greece within Morgenthau's theory and the sought-after peace of the Accords' peace process mark historical and futural extreme anchor points respectively. Unlike the anchor point referring to a present, extreme anchor points are subjectively chosen by those individuals constructing a theory or peace process.¹⁷⁰ These extreme anchor points identify the subjectively chosen limits of *long-term historical* and *long-term future time perspectives* that could be found within a theory or peace process. Likewise, these anchor points also mark the subjective extent or scope of a theory's explanatory power or peace process's remit;¹⁷¹ in essence, the whole of a theory's or peace process's timescape¹⁷² that cannot be easily overcome. Extending from the present, retrospectively and prospectively, to the extreme limits, all *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* can in part be defined within a theory or peace process in relation to their proximities to the present and the extreme limits of the past and future.¹⁷³

Having an awareness of extreme anchor points can also be useful in determining the focus or orientation of a time perspective toward or away from the present and the extremes. Consequently, determining the focus or orientation of a time perspective is another way of differentiating between a *long-term* and a *short-term time perspective*.¹⁷⁴ For example, within Morgenthau's theory one of the recurring *long-term historical time*

Causal and Narrative Approaches," *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 23, no. 4 (Fall 1990), 144; Bluedorn, *The Human Organization of Time*, 265.

¹⁷⁰ Because the author(s) of a theory or architects of a peace process cannot arbitrarily determine when the anchor point of the present is apart from the present itself, this particular anchor point is less subjective than the extreme anchor points.

¹⁷¹ Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries," *International Security* 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997), 15. Care should be taken not to interpret these extreme anchor points as the beginning and the end of a theory's explanatory power with the beginning in the past and the end in the future. A theory may interpret the present as the beginning and the end simultaneously, where *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past and the future derive from the present (i.e. the start) and are (re)evaluated in the present (i.e. the end). Discussions in organizational theory regarding 'fit narratives' provide good examples about how to think about the present as a beginning and an end; for sample discussions see Abbie Shipp and Karen Jansen, "Reinterpreting Time in Fit Theory: Crafting and Recrafting Narratives of Fit in Medias Res," *Academy of Management Review* 36, no. 1 (January 2011), 77; B. J. Cohler, "Personal narrative and life course," in *Life-span Development and Behaviors*, vol. 4, eds. P. B. Blates and Orville G. Brim (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 207; Sonnentag, "Time in Organizational Research," 365.

¹⁷² For details regarding timescapes see Barbara Adam, "Of Timescapes, Futurescapes and Timeprints," (paper presented at Lueneburg University, June 17, 2008), 1-9.

¹⁷³ See sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 for discussions regarding other ways of distinguishing between the two time perspectives within contexts provided by a theory or peace process.

¹⁷⁴ Laura L. Carstensen, Derek M. Isaacowitz, and Susan T. Charles, "Taking Time Seriously," *American Psychologist* 54, no. 3 (March 1999), 178.

perspectives extends from the present to Greek antiquity; conversely there is a *short-term historical time perspective* included within Morgenthau's discussion of the existence of states as international actors that extends from the Treaty of Westphalia to the present.¹⁷⁵ In the former, the focus is oriented toward antiquity, not the present; the latter has a focus toward to the present. The aforementioned example also demonstrates differences in the proximities between present and extreme anchor points. Consequently, without the identification of anchor points, distinguishing between time perspectives is more challenging.

3.3.2 Aggregation

The second factor necessary to distinguish between the two time perspectives relates to the subjective aggregations and scopes of time perspectives. In general, though not always, a *long-term time perspective* of the past or the future accounts for multiple periodisations defined and referenced throughout a theory or peace process.¹⁷⁶ For example, in articulations of Morgenthau's theoretical commitments *long-term historical time perspectives* collectively account for a number of periodisations of the past which illustrate examples that support the claims made within his theory. Each periodisation is essentially a *short-term time perspective* that relates to a particular era or timeframe, movement, duration of war or peace, vision, or strategy articulated within a theory or peace process. A *long-term time perspective* aggregates these periodisations into a series that consecutively follow one another and/or overlap with each other to create a broad overview of time as a whole (i.e. past, present, and future) or a segment of time (e.g. the past).¹⁷⁷ Although *short-term time perspectives* can aggregate multiple periodisations,


¹⁷⁵ The significance and reasons for Morgenthau making these distinctions are addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.

¹⁷⁶ For more on periodisations and different ways of interpreting what they are, see Kathleen Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Tom Lundborg, "The Limits of Historical Sociology: Temporal Borders and the Reproduction of the 'Modern' Political Present," *European Journal of International Relations* 22, no. 1 (March 2016), 103-4; Jordheim, "Against Periodization".

¹⁷⁷ Lawson, "The Promise of Historical Sociology," 415; Andre Gunder Frank, *ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Barry Gills, "World System Analysis, Historical Sociology, and International Relations: The Difference a Hyphen Makes," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, eds. Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 141-62; John M. Hobson, "Reconstructing International Relations Through World History: Oriental Globalization and the Global-Dialogic Conception of Inter-Civilizational Relations," *International Politics* 44, no. 4 (July 2007): 414-430.

they remain embedded within *long-term time perspectives* which aggregate far more periodisations. To illustrate, consider the Accords' various redeployment phases of Israeli military forces as individual *short-term future time perspectives* articulating distinct periodisations within the peace process. These periodisations are embedded and aggregated within a *long-term future time perspective* alongside additional periodisations (e.g. the future permanent settlement negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians) relevant to the peace process. Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of how different aggregations of periodisations can be useful in distinguishing between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*.

Figure 3.2: Aggregating phases of the Accords' redeployment of Israeli military forces



Anchor points and redeployment phases obtained from Oslo II, Appendix 1.

If the aforementioned aggregations are not apparent in a theory or peace process via specific dates or events, time perspectives may also aggregate time in more general terms.¹⁷⁸ For example, references to a 'distant past' or 'the past' as a whole in both Morgenthau's theory and the Accords aggregate time for *long-term time perspectives* without the mention of periodisations. Similarly, references to the 'recent past' or parts of the past aggregate time for *short-term time perspectives*. Aggregations of time with respect to the present and future can also be made through general terms. For example,

¹⁷⁸ The general terms mentioned in this paragraph bare resemblance to the 'time rules and temporal practices'; for more see Goetz, "Time and Power in the European Commission."

terms like ‘the present’, ‘now’, and ‘it is time’ aggregate time for *short-term present time perspectives*. In regards to aggregations of time in the future, terms like ‘near future’ or ‘immediate future’ can aggregate time for *short-term future time perspectives* while references to a ‘distant future’ or ‘unforeseeable future’ can aggregate time for *long-term future time perspectives*. This way of aggregating time perspectives, initially addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5, also creates scopes of time (either long or short) that do not necessarily require making reference to any other time perspectives. Consequently, a theory or peace process could have a *long-term historical time perspective* and a *short-term future time perspective* without also having to make reference to a *short-term historical time perspective* and a *long-term future time perspective* elsewhere. Although this issue does not arise in my study because both cases studies address all five time perspectives, it is worth mentioning to highlight the point that a theory or peace process need not articulate every time perspective that is analysed and discussed within this study. As will be addressed in later chapters, each time perspective present within or absent from a theory or peace process has specific shaping effects which delimit claims and processes in unique ways and thus warrants careful study.


3.3.3 In comparison to one another

The final criteria used to distinguish between time perspectives is in regards to how time perspectives compare to one another in terms of temporal depth, temporal focus, and salient functions within a theory or peace process, as well as across theories, across processes, or between a theory and a peace process.¹⁷⁹ Examining the comparisons between time perspectives, internally and externally, is useful in two of the following circumstances. First, internal comparisons are helpful under the following conditions: if a theory or peace process addresses both the past and the future in broad, generic terms that reference the whole of each segment of time, then comparing the amounts of time between the present and extreme anchor points of each segment of time within the theory can be helpful in determining which time perspectives are long and short. Similar

¹⁷⁹ Regarding the latter point, the comparisons made in this study between time perspectives found within each case study help to highlight similar functions performed by each type of time perspective or draw attention to their differences in terms of duration. The comparisons, however, are not made to indicate that the time perspectives within the Accords are influenced by the same time perspectives delimiting Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments.

to anchor points, time-indexed case studies and examples cited by a theory or peace process can also help establish a sense of the portions of time considered within various time perspectives. To illustrate this point, consider two time perspectives appearing within a theory or peace process, one relating to the past and another regarding the future. Both use generic language, but the specific historical examples articulated extend as far back as World War I from a present moment of analysis in 2019. Conversely, specific references or predictions regarding the future do not extend beyond 10 years. The comparison between the two time perspectives is illustrated in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Internal comparisons between time perspectives



Although not to scale, this depiction clearly shows that the *historical time perspective* ‘A’ is a *long-term time perspective* in comparison to the temporal depth of *future time perspective* ‘B’.

Based upon this example of an internal comparison of time perspectives within a single theory or peace process, the extent of time the *historical time perspective* draws upon is much more extensive than what the *future time perspective* takes into consideration. Consequently, in this example, a theory’s or peace process’s *historical time perspective* is *long-term* and its *future time perspective* is *short-term*.

Like internal comparisons, external comparisons can also be useful under particular circumstances (not found in this study) to further distinguish between time perspectives. For instance, determining the distinctions between time perspectives of the same classification (e.g. multiple *short-term time perspectives*) across multiple theories, peace processes, or between a theory and a peace process can be difficult. By comparing the time perspectives of one theory or peace process to an external source with its own grouping of time perspectives, the differences among time perspectives with similar classifications become starkly evident. For example, when a comparison of *long-term historical time perspectives* found within the Accords to *long-term historical time perspectives* embedded within Russett’s work supporting theories of democratic peace, the Accords’ *long-term historical time perspectives* are clearly shorter (e.g. 20th

Century) than those found in Russett's work.¹⁸⁰ Initially, both time perspectives were classified as *long-term time perspectives* within a limited context, but when placed in the broader disciplinary context of international politics, they are reclassified. Becoming aware of these external differences is important because it draws attention to how restrictive or comprehensive certain time perspectives are within a theory or peace process.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, insights gained from external comparisons can indicate where potential changes to time perspectives can be made to either improve the explanatory power of a theory or the comprehensiveness of a peace process in the future. For example, gaining an awareness that the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* are *short-term historical time perspectives* in comparison to the *long-term historical time perspectives* found within Morgenthau's theory suggests that the historical comprehensiveness of Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* are comparatively limited. As will be detailed in chapters 8 and 9, this limited comprehensiveness of the past accounted for within the Accords' misses key aspects of the Israel-Palestinian conflict and affects the potential comprehensiveness of the Accords' peace process. Thus, by extending the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* to account for a greater expanse of time covering centuries, a future peace process's efforts to build lasting peace may be more comprehensive and effective. As these examples briefly illustrate, external comparisons between time perspectives can also be useful in recognising the explanatory limitations or strengths of time perspectives embedded within a theory and a peace process, as well as how best to alter them to improve their objectives.

In addition to clarifying the distinctions between time perspectives, internal and external comparisons of time perspectives are also helpful in determining the overall

¹⁸⁰ The direct comparison between the Accords' time perspectives and those of Russett's theory of democratic peace are warranted here as the elements of democracy and liberalism integrated into the Accords' peace process appear to closely mirror those found in Russett's theory. For more on Russett's work on democratic peace theory see: Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 267-93; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace. The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," *World Politics* 52, no. 1 (1999): 1-37.

¹⁸¹ David A. Whetten, "What Constitutes a Theoretical Contribution?," *Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 4 (October 1989), 491-92.

temporal foci within a theory or peace process.¹⁸² Knowledge of one or more temporal foci emerges through internal and external comparisons of the various time perspectives present or absent within the theory or peace process being examined. For instance, Morgenthau's theory has well-developed articulations of the past that includes *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* and articulations of the present that includes *short-term present time perspectives*. Conversely, equally developed *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* with respect to the future are not found in Morgenthau's theory.¹⁸³ Thus, the temporal foci of his theory appears to be on the past and the present, rather than the future. This finding is consistent with Morgenthau's own claims that his theory was not designed to provide predictions about the future of international politics.¹⁸⁴ In regards to the temporal foci of the Accords' peace process, they are centred on the future, particularly the future in the short-term. As will be developed in later chapters, these temporal foci shape how a theory or peace process interprets and understands international politics. Therefore, the ability to assess and distinguish between theories or peace processes through comparisons of temporal foci can aid readers in selecting the most appropriate or relevant theories or peace processes to use in their research or policy pursuits.

3.4 Outlier time perspectives

The discussion thus far has been primarily concerned with distinguishing between *long-term* and *short-term perspectives* (of the past and the future), as well as among them. Little attention, however, has been given to other potentially relevant time perspectives, namely the *medium-term time perspectives* and the *long-term perspectives* of the present, which requires explanation. These time perspectives indicate two of the limits of my study of time perspectives. With regards to *medium-term time perspectives*, they have not been singled out or clarified in this study to the same extent as *long-term*

¹⁸² Temporal foci of a theory regards where the attention of a theory rests or centres on with respect to the past, the present, and the future. This definition is derived from the earlier discussion of temporal foci with respect to time perspectives addressed in section 3.1.2.

¹⁸³ The suggestion here is that the more differentiated a theory is in terms of time perspectives, the analytically more versatile it might be. However, it is not necessary to include multiple time perspectives if a theory is constructed to only offer limited insights into what is known about international politics rather than what cannot be known because it has not occurred. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4, 14, 18; Algozaibi, "Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics," 225-26.

¹⁸⁴ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 42.

and *short-term time perspectives* for three reasons. First, in contrast to *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*, *medium-term time perspectives* do not feature prominently in the explicit language used within theories and peace processes, or in discussions within academia or among policy makers.¹⁸⁵ Second, among the literatures reviewed for this study the Organizational Management literature mentions *medium-term time perspectives* the most, but only on rare occasions and only *medium-term time perspectives* with respect to the future.¹⁸⁶ Generally, the literature consulted for this study focuses on discussing the significance of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*. Finally, *medium-term time perspectives* can be re-characterised as either extended *short-term time perspectives* or reduced *long-term time perspectives* to fit within a theory's or peace process's existing *long-term* and *short-term time perspective* designations. The would-be *medium-term time perspectives* can also be classified as either a version of a *long-term* or *short-term time perspective* by examining the orientation of the would-be *medium-term time perspective* toward either the present or one of the extreme anchor points in the past or future. For the aforementioned reasons, time perspectives were not classified within my research as *medium-term* to avoid overemphasising their significance as a distinct category of time perspectives emphasised within IR and to recognize that such perspectives were already accounted for within the *long-term* and *short-term* classifications analysed and discussed throughout this study.

Similar to *medium-term time perspectives*, *long-term present time perspectives* have not been discussed in detail because the case studies included in this study do not include articulations of *long-term present time perspectives* and not all criteria (e.g. anchor points) used for distinguishing *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past and the future are applicable to making similar distinctions between *present time perspectives*. For example, unlike using the present as a central anchor point to determine *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past and the future, there is no central anchor point independent of the present from which to evaluate the time

¹⁸⁵ For an example of a rare incident where *medium-term time perspectives* are mentioned see Gerald Schneider, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Sabine Carey, "Forecasting in International Relations: One Quest, Three Approaches," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 1 (February 2011), 9-10.

¹⁸⁶ For examples see Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, "Taking Time to Integrate," 525; Mary Anne Devanna, Charles Fombrun, and Noel Tichy, "Human Resources Management: A Strategic Perspective," *Organizational Dynamics* 9, no. 3 (Winter 1981): 53, 55, and 61.

perspectives within the present. Furthermore, the extreme anchor points of the present and their proximity to one another cannot be determined in a way that the extreme anchor points for *historical* and *future time perspectives* can be. In addition to the difficulty of determining anchor points, analysing how different *present time perspectives* are aggregated would be challenging. Examining the aggregation of a *present long-term* or *short-term time perspective* would require two different conceptualisations of what constitutes the present. These conceptualisations might include distinguishing between the present as an *is* and the present as *always becoming*, whether the former is longer than the latter, or it might include notions of the present as all-encompassing of the past and the future, temporary, or permanent.¹⁸⁷ However, these ways of aggregating *present time perspectives* are not typically articulated within a theory or peace process and would be at odds with how Western IR theories and peace processes have historically made references to the present (i.e. the present as a segment of time in relation to the past and the future).

Stemming from unstudied and undertheorized notions of the present, Western IR theories conceptualise the *present time perspective* as one dimensional and having a shorter finite nature in comparison (internally and externally) to *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past and the future. Consequently, a *present time perspective* is frequently classified as a *short-term time perspective*. However, novel notions of *long-term time perspectives* of the present deserve acknowledgement as they may be useful in discussing *present time perspectives* within particular contexts found within the international political sphere.¹⁸⁸ One example relates to notions of maintaining a status quo of international politics in the present. This maintenance implies that change in the present has not occurred and suggests a *long-term time perspective* of the present is possible. Another example refers to the period of time experienced by refugees when they are waiting to be ‘processed’ after fleeing systematic

¹⁸⁷ Tom Lundborg, "The Becoming of the "Event"; Moshe, "Temporary versus Permanent".

¹⁸⁸ Here discussions regarding block universe theory (B-theory) of time from philosophy and physics were not included, but offer other ways of thinking about *long-term present time perspectives* that may be useful in the future as IR develops knowledge of time perspectives. For more information see Dan Falk, "A Debate Over the Physics of Time," *Quanta Magazine*, July 19, 2016, <https://www.quantamagazine.org/a-debate-over-the-physics-of-time-20160719/> (accessed October 5, 2016); Lisa Leininger, review of *Objective Becoming: In Search of A-ness*, *Analysis* 78, no. 1 (January 2018): 108–117; John Ellis McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," *Mind* 17, no. 68 (October 1908): 457–74; Emily Paul, review of *Objective Becoming*, by Bradford Skow, *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 67, no. 4 (December 2016): 1201–1205; Bradford Skow, *Objective Becoming* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).

persecution or war-torn regions and arrive on the foreign shores of unprepared countries. For these refugees, this period of waiting in the present is considered never ending as their futures are unknown to them and their daily situation seems to not change; in essence the present becomes an experienced long-term present for these refugees.¹⁸⁹ While both examples suggest *long-term time perspectives* of the present are possible, the literature, theories, and peace processes regarding international politics has yet to address them in detail and continues to discuss a time perspective in the present as short-term and one dimensional. Similarly, my research engages little with the notion of a *long-term present time perspective* because both Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process classify the *present time perspectives* as exclusively *short-term*.

Thus far this section has provided explanations as to why these particular outlier time perspectives were not addressed within this study and indicated the limits of this study. The final purpose of this section is to draw attention to a preference of time perspective articulation that exists within a theory or peace process. As my analyses of time perspectives will later illustrate, there is a preference within IR toward articulating *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future over articulating *medium-term time perspectives* and *long-term present time perspectives*. The noticeable absences of articulations of both *medium-term time perspectives* and *long-term present time perspectives* suggest that these time perspectives are not as vital to articulate within a theory or peace process as *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future. Acknowledging this preference is helpful to understanding why variances in articulated time perspectives exists across theories and peace processes. In other words, time perspectives within a theory or peace process are expressions of preferences.¹⁹⁰ Thus, the time perspectives that were recovered from my analyses of time perspectives and their effects within my illustrative case studies are of significance and not random.

¹⁸⁹ Eastmond, "Stories as Lived Experience," 251-54.

¹⁹⁰ Whether these preferences are rooted in how international politics is thought about, as my cases studies suggests, and/or originate from elsewhere is beyond the scope of this study.

3.5 Chapter summary

Throughout this chapter, efforts were made to clarify how time perspectives were understood in this study, outline what methods were used to identify and distinguish between different time perspectives, and articulate the limits of the scope of this study. In regards to clarifying how time perspectives were understood in this study, this clarification was provided because without it this study would not have been possible. Because a clear conceptualisation of how a time perspective is understood within IR was not available within the existing IR literature, one was developed. Key concepts borrowed from non-IR literatures such as temporal depth, temporal focus, time perspective, long-term and short-term, periodisations, and segments of time were used to develop the understanding of time perspectives found within this study. Pooling these concepts together led to an understanding of time perspectives as constructs of time within a theory or peace process that have both temporal focus and temporal depth with respect to the past, present, and future. While this understanding was useful in this study, it also introduces a novel conceptualisation of time perspectives into IR that enables readers to address old and new questions regarding the effects time perspectives have on the study, understanding and interpretations, and practice of international politics.

In addition to providing clarification of how time perspectives are understood in this study, this chapter also outlined various methods of identifying and distinguishing them from one another. These methods included looking at the time-related anchor points and aggregations of the periodisations articulated within a theory or peace process, as well as making internal and external comparisons between time perspectives. Using these methods, along with the aforementioned conceptualisation of a time perspectives, enabled me to identify and distinguish between the five different time perspectives found in my illustrative case studies. Those five time perspectives were *long-term historical*, *short-term historical*, *short-term present*, *short-term future* and *long-term future*. Although passing references to the aforementioned *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* appear within existing IR literature, the methods used to identify them and distinctions between them are not always made clear in the literature. Thus, my intentions for outlining the methods appearing in this chapter were threefold. First, to provide a clear articulation of the methods used in my study to identify and

distinguish between the five time perspectives found and analysed in the two case studies. Without a clear articulation of my methods, the distinctions made within this study between time perspectives would have appeared random or subjective. The second reason for outlining these methods was to provide readers with methods that could be used across multiple theories and peace processes. In other words, these methods were created as a general standard by which time perspectives could be classified. Finally, these methods were designed to make the process of identifying and distinguishing time perspectives within a theory or peace process possible without the use of dates or explicitly referring to a time perspective as either *long-term* or *short-term*.

The final section of this chapter addressed outlier time perspectives that were not covered in this study. These outlier time perspectives were *medium-term* and *long-term present time perspectives*. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of these time perspectives was included in this chapter for four reasons. First, to highlight particular limits of my study with respect to time perspectives. Second, to acknowledge the potential existence of these outlier time perspectives within international politics and why I think these time perspectives might warrant analysis in future studies of time perspectives. Third, to draw attention to the preferred articulations of time perspectives within a theory or peace process. Finally, addressing these outlier time perspectives early on in this study and why they are not addressed later helps to centre the reader's attention onto the five time perspectives which are featured throughout the remaining chapters: *long-term historical*, *short-term historical*, *short-term present*, *short-term future*, and *long-term future*. Thus, going forward, these outlier time perspectives will not be mentioned later in this study apart from a brief mention made in the conclusion regarding future avenues of time perspectives research.


Based upon the foundation laid in this chapter, five distinct time perspectives from Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process were able to be recovered for analysis. As noted earlier in the chapter, however, identification of a time perspective is only an initial step toward developing an understanding and interpretation of its effects within a theory or peace process. Consequently, the next chapter delves into the purpose for locating and making distinctions between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*; to recover insights about time-related aspects of international politics articulated within a theory or peace process. These insights are important to recover

because they indicate what contributions and delimitations time perspectives make within a theory or peace process. In particular, these insights help highlight the profound effects time perspectives have on claims and practices. To fully appreciate the profoundness of these effects, the following chapter addresses three key time-related aspects in detail. These aspects are perennial, ephemeral, and contingent. From the subsequent chapter's explanations of each aspect, the reader will gain an awareness of what insights can be gained about the time-related aspects of claims and practices via a study of distinct time perspectives and their effects articulated within a theory or peace process.

Chapter 4: Time-related Aspects: Perennial, Ephemeral, and Contingent

Recovering insights about the time-related aspects of international politics articulated within a theory or peace process relies on two things. First, dependable methods for identifying and differentiating between time perspectives. Second, a general awareness of what time-related aspects might look like and how they might be articulated by a time perspective. While the former has already been addressed in the previous chapter, this chapter aims to focus on the latter. Consequently, this chapter presents three time-related aspects (perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) that time perspectives can attribute (i.e. attach) to a claim or practice. The purpose of attributing these aspects is to clarify the duration of a claim's or practice's manifestation in international politics over time. The following discussion of these aspects is important because it illustrates how international politics in relation to time is articulated within a theory or peace process. In this chapter I have distilled the language and time-related aspects of international politics articulated within Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process into three generic forms that are both accessible to the reader and relevant to the aims of this study. These three aspects are useful analytical tools to analyse which time-related aspects each time perspective is attributing to and what effects these aspects (and by extension time perspectives) have on how a claim or practice is interpreted and functions. Helping to illustrate the relationships between time perspectives, time-related aspects they can attribute, and the subsequent effects these attributions have on a theory or peace process, Figure 4.1 below has been provided.

Figure 4.1: Observing and attributing time-related aspects via time perspectives



Observing Phenomenon A_o via *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* enabled the observer to see time-related aspects X and Y exhibited within a specific timeframe. These observations led to the attribution of time-related aspects of a claim about the observed phenomenon that clarified the claim with respect to time. While the resulting claim is not untrue, it remains incomplete. Without the addition of another time perspective (e.g. *short-term present time perspective*), aspect Z remains unknown.

The structure of the chapter is designed to highlight the value of the three selected aspects and to differentiate them from each other, as well as suggest that both *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* can be used to attribute any one of these aspects to a claim or practice. The chapter begins with explanations of how perennial, ephemeral, and contingent came to be the three time-related aspects selected for this study and how each aspect is understood in relation to international politics as

articulated within Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process. These explanations are followed by a discussion regarding the relations between the three selected aspects and time perspectives. Building upon distinctions made between the three aspects and *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*, the final section addresses the distinction among the three aspects themselves. Considered collectively, the sections detail each time-related aspect individually, what other time-related aspects these three aspects can potentially help to recover, and what their relationship is to ideas of *long-term* and *short-term*. Within each section examples are provided of how these time-related aspects and their subsequent effects appear within Morgenthau's theory and the Accords' peace process. By the chapter's end, the ways that time perspectives affect a theory or peace process via their attribution of time-related aspects will be made clear. Furthermore, the language and insights acquired by the chapter's end provide the general awareness of time-related aspects associated with articulations of international politics needed to carry out my study. As in the previous chapter, by keeping the aspects of time and the language used to discuss them concise yet broadly applicable, the methods and insights presented in this study remain accessible to various readers and of potential use in other studies pursuing similar inquiries.

4.1 Three time-related aspects

To arrive at the selection of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent as an elementary set of time-related aspects that can be attributed by time perspectives, various claims within Morgenthau's theory and the Accords were analysed in relation to time. My review included both prominent and inconspicuous claims such as claims regarding power and immortality found in Morgenthau's theory and, separately, claims regarding peace and regional cooperation found in the Accords. Separate reviews of each were necessary to become familiar with the articulations of time-related aspects used in each case study. This familiarity led to a general sense of what time-related aspects could be associated with claims and practices mentioned in each illustrative case study. For example, interest was understood within Morgenthau's theory as a permanent aspect of international politics while the historical and contemporary manifestations of interest

were understood as impermanent aspects of international politics.¹⁹¹ The time-related aspects associated with the aforementioned examples individually highlight two fundamental time distinctions that emerged from my separate analyses, aspects that are perennial and aspects that are ephemeral.

My discussion of the three aspects begins with those aspects that are referred to in this study as perennial.¹⁹² In a general sense, perennial aspects of international politics are considered to be continuous, sustained, and consistently present over long periods of time, even infinite in existence (e.g. the idea that there is consistently an 'other').¹⁹³ Their presences can remain influential (to varying degrees) within international politics in the past, present, and future; essentially without identifiable beginnings and/or endings.¹⁹⁴ For example, the struggle for power and peace are perennial aspects of international politics within Morgenthau's theory, while peace within the Accords is a perennial aim of its peace process. Regarding the ephemeral aspects of international politics, they are finite in their duration and fail to be sustained over extended periods of time.¹⁹⁵ The effects of ephemeral aspects on the international political sphere are impermanent in comparison to the effects of perennial aspects. Examples of ephemeral aspects include references within Morgenthau's theory to the short-term historical dominance of states as international political actors and the Accords' articulation of the implementation of the steps and stages of its peace process within specific timeframes. Both aspects are articulated throughout Morgenthau's theory and the Accords and effect how claims are understood and interpreted within each as will be detailed later in the Part II (chapters 5-7) and Part III (chapters 8-9).

¹⁹¹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 5-9; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 1, *The Decline of Democratic Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 90; Peter Gellman, "Hans J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism," *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 4 (1988), 254-55.

¹⁹² My original familiarity with the word 'perennial' came from my interest in gardening where plants that live more than two years are referred to as 'perennial' as opposed to those plant with a shorter lifespan are referred to as 'annuals'. It was only later did I become aware of the usage of 'perennial' could also be found IR literature, including works by Morgenthau.

¹⁹³ Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (June 1996): 139-74.

¹⁹⁴ Examples of two different types of perennial effects from Morgenthau's theory include the influence of power and nuclear weapons. The influence of the former has no identifiable beginning or end while the influence of the latter has a clear beginning with the advent of nuclear weapons but apparent no end.

¹⁹⁵ Douglas B. Klusmeyer, "Contesting Thucydides' Legacy: Comparing Hannah Arendt and Hans Morgenthau on Imperialism, History and Theory," *The International History Review* 33, no. 1 (March 2011): 9-10; Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, 9; Moshe, "Temporary versus Permanent".

The two aforementioned distinctions, perennial and ephemeral, are significant because they delimit the time parameters of different time-related aspects that can potentially be attributed via time perspectives, not unlike how Hutchings delimits time in relation to world politics using *kairos* and *chronos* where time is either classified as normal (*chronotic*) or exceptional (*kairotic*).¹⁹⁶ In other words, each time-related aspect that a time perspective can potentially attribute must be either perennial or ephemeral.¹⁹⁷ This binary principle, however, does not preclude a perennial aspect and an ephemeral aspect from being simultaneously attributed to a single claim by multiple time perspectives.¹⁹⁸ For example, as will be detailed in Chapter 9, the claim of peace within the Accords is attributed with perennial aspects by the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* while its *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* suggest that peace is ephemeral. The latter part of this example regarding the *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* also helps to highlight that similar aspects can be attributed by multiple time perspectives. Multiple time perspectives attributing the same aspects to a claim or practice can also confirm seemingly inherent aspects of a claim or practice. Although these two time distinctions are helpful to explaining things such as the durations of the validity or effects of a claim or practice, their usefulness has limits. Namely, they do not explain how perennial and ephemeral claims or practices interact with each other nor do they indicate that perennial and ephemeral aspects can change. These interactions and changes are explained by a third idea gained from my review, the idea that aspects of international politics are contingent.

From my analyses, insights were gained about how claims and/or practices interact with one another or change in known or foreseeable ways, as well as unknown and unforeseeable ways. An example of these interactions can be found in the Accords' articulation of various claims regarding how particular steps and stages within the peace process will sequentially unfold within specific timeframes in the short-term future.¹⁹⁹ Illustrating an example that aspects of a claim can change is the Accords' articulation of the nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations changing from one of historical confrontation

¹⁹⁶ Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 5.

¹⁹⁷ The explicit mentioning of the terms 'perennial' and 'ephemeral' appear on rare occasions in Morgenthau's theory, but not within the Accords.

¹⁹⁸ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 16, 22.

¹⁹⁹ An example of not knowing or foreseeing the ways that claims interact with each other can be found in Morgenthau's theory regarding discussions of using theory to predict the future of international politics.

to one of peace in the future. Recognising that these interactions are inevitable within a theory or peace process and acknowledging that aspects may change over time are necessary to providing comprehensive explanations of international politics or how a peace process works. The interactions and aspect changes found within my review confirm the previous statement, as well as suggest that international politics is fundamentally dynamic in both the context of a theory or a peace process. In other words, international politics within these contexts is in a constant state of flux.²⁰⁰

As will be detailed in my analyses found in chapters 5-9, this sense that international politics is in a constant state of flux is the result of the changes of and interactions between perennial and ephemeral aspects within a claim or practice and their effects among different claims and practices articulated within a theory or peace process. Capturing this sense of dynamism is the idea of that claims and practices are contingent; an idea which is explicitly addressed within Morgenthau's theory but also apparent within the Accords which tries to mitigate the emergence and effects contingencies have throughout the peace process. Consequently, this idea of contingency was selected as the third time-related aspect needed in this study. Contingent, along with perennial and ephemeral, aptly capture three key aspects of time found in both illustrative case studies. Understanding these three aspects as they appear within each case study is central of examining time perspectives and their effects within each case study.

The identification and singling out of these three aspects found in both case studies suggest that these three aspects may have been derived from a common source. The most obvious common source would be observed manifestations of international politics. Considering that both a theory and peace process have to account for and contend with actual manifestations of international politics, it is not surprising that perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects appear within Morgenthau's theory and

²⁰⁰ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* 2nd ed., introd. Margaret Canovan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 190-91; Hom and Steele, "Open Horizons," 280; Anthony F. Lang Jr., *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 12; Maruyama Masao, "Auf Der Suche Nach Einer Methode Der Ideengeschichte — Eine Erinnerung," *Leviathan*. 17, no. 2 (1989), 193; Felix Rösch and Atsuko Watanabe, "Approaching the Unsynthesizable in International Politics: Giving Substance to Security Discourses through Basso Ostinato?," *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 3 (September 2017), 612.

the Accords' peace process.²⁰¹ Consequently, the aspects of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent are not included in Morgenthau's theory or the Accords' peace process for arbitrary reasons. These three aspects are included intentionally in both as reflections of what are perceived as real aspects of international politics. For example, Morgenthau's understanding of the state as an ephemeral political entity acting within the international political sphere and that the struggle for a balance of power is perennial or an understanding within the Accords that an ephemeral liberal democratic peace process leads to a perennial peace between two democracies are reflections of what manifestations of international politics are perceived to be by each.²⁰² The interactions referred to in the aforementioned examples suggest that international politics in both is contingent. Therefore, these three aspects should not be considered as unique to Morgenthau's theory or the Accords' peace process or to this study of time perspectives, but representative of time-related aspects which have broader applicability to other theories, peace processes, and studies of time perspectives within IR. What is unique to a theory or peace process, however, is how these aspects are specifically attributed and articulated within a theory or peace process.

4.2 The three aspects in relation to time perspectives

The attribution of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects are not random as mentioned earlier, but intended to reflect perceived realities of international politics. To help make sense of the perceived realities and capture their various aspects, authors of theories and peace processes contextualise these realities within a particular moment or span of time, if not both via time perspectives.²⁰³ This process is a subjective process whereby time perspectives which appear to best capture and contextualise the perceived realities are deliberately or implicitly embedded within a theory or peace process. For example, the *long-term historical time perspective* extending back to Greek antiquity rather than to the Treaty of Westphalia within Morgenthau's theory helps contextualise the state as an ephemeral international political actor in history and thus attributes

²⁰¹ Raymond Aron, "What Is a Theory of International Relations?," *Journal of International Affairs* 21, no. 2 (1967), 192, 196-97; Charles A. McClelland, "The Function of Theory in International Relations," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 3 (September 1960), 304.

²⁰² Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 9.

²⁰³ Tom Lundborg, "The *Becoming* of the "Event".

ephemeral aspects to the existence of the state.²⁰⁴ The consequences of this process are twofold. First, the subjective selection and construction of time perspectives ends up attributing certain perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects to a claim or practice. Second, the time perspective(s) used to capture particular, perceived prominent aspects of international politics can also end up excluding or deemphasising other aspects.²⁰⁵ Thus, the selection and construction of time perspectives have effects on what aspects of international politics are and are not conveyed within a theory or peace process. In other words, time perspectives within a theory or peace process delimit how reflective a theory or peace process can be of the realities of international politics.²⁰⁶ In part, this subjectivity explains why perceptions of the same phenomena observed within international politics might not be universal and how different understandings and interpretations of international politics emerge.

The relationship between time perspectives and these three aspects is important to acknowledge because this relationship is what makes tracing the effects time perspectives have within a theory or peace process possible.²⁰⁷ Essentially, the aspects of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent are understood within this study as the initial effects of the articulation of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* within a theory or peace process. For example, the *short-term historical*, *short-term present*, and *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory attribute perennial aspects to claims regarding the nuclear condition.²⁰⁸ These initial effects lead to additional effects. Using the aforementioned example again, the perennial aspects of the nuclear condition suggests that humanity is perennially under threat and could be eliminated at any point in the future, thus making the notion of immortality an impossibility within Morgenthau's theory.²⁰⁹ What this example illustrates is that through the identification of these initial effects and their relationship with specific time

²⁰⁴ For a critique of the ways in which the state has been 'imagined and discussed as if it were an effectively timeless entity', see Rob B.J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept of the Political," in *International Relations Theory Today*, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 206–227.

²⁰⁵ Andrew R. Hom, "Patriots All Around: Inter/national Timing, Round Numbers, and the Politics of Commemorative Critique," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 63, no. 3 (September 2017), 452.

²⁰⁶ Jordheim, "Against Periodization," 166.

²⁰⁷ Steve Yetiv, "History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches: Thinking about Greater Interdisciplinarity," *International Studies Perspectives* 12, no. 2 (May 2011), 106.

²⁰⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Death in a Nuclear Age," *Commentary* 32 (September 1961): 231–34.

²⁰⁹ Alison McQueen, "Salutary Fear? Hans Morgenthau and the Politics of Existential Crisis," *American Political Thought* 6, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 78–105; Scheuerman, *Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, 146–52.

perspectives, additional effects of time perspectives can be traced, recovered, and interpreted. Without an awareness of this relationship, the breadth of effects time perspectives have within a theory or peace process remains limited.²¹⁰ Furthermore, the tracing of the multiple effects of time perspectives from an awareness of only the initial effects without identifying the time perspectives also yields limited insights as to the breadth of effects time perspectives have on claims and practices, as well as on other time perspectives.²¹¹

The relationship articulated above is complex. It requires that both sides of the relationship (time perspectives and their effects) need to be identified to begin to figure out the range of effects time perspectives have within a theory or peace process. Having only an awareness of the three aforementioned aspects without an awareness of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* limits how well the effects of time perspectives can be understood and interpreted. For example, having an awareness that relations between Israel and the Palestinians has been perennially confrontational does not indicate which time perspective(s) enabled this observation to be made nor its effects. Whether the effects are limited to the *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, the past and the present, the present and the future, or just the future cannot be determined. In other words, any number of different time perspectives could potentially emphasise that the aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations are perennially confrontational. Consequently, having only an awareness of what is perennial, ephemeral, or contingent within a theory or peace process limits the insights that can be gained about the effects time perspectives have on a theory or peace process to those of the effects alone. Conversely, as stated at the end of the previous chapter, only having an awareness of time perspectives also limits the insights that can be obtained. Recognition of the limits of each part of the relationship highlights and reinforces the complexity of the relationship between time perspectives and the three aspects, as well as why this study places importance on the accounting of both time perspectives and the three aspects of time embedded within each illustrative case study.

²¹⁰ Jacob M. Montgomery, Florian M. Hollenbach, and Michael D. Ward, "Improving Predictions Using Ensemble Bayesian Model Averaging," *Political Analysis* 20, no. 3 (Summer 2012), 272.

²¹¹ Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," 178; Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods," 175, 183.

In discussing the relationship between time perspectives and aspects of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent, a few points of clarification need to be made to reduce some potential confusion that may arise later in this study as my analyses unfold. First, a claim's perennial aspect does not imply that an aspect is *long-term* nor does a claim's ephemeral aspect imply that an aspect is *short-term*. For example, the Interim government mentioned in the Accords was a perennial aspect of Palestinian governance over a short-term period but it cannot be considered a perennial form of government in light of the other time perspectives articulated within the Accords.²¹² Therefore, any one of the three aspects may or may not be attributed to a claim and is relative to the time perspective(s) through which that claim is addressed or viewed.²¹³ The second point, in relation to the first point, is that *long-term time perspectives* should not be assumed to predominately highlight perennial aspects over ephemeral. Likewise, *short-term time perspectives* should not be assumed to namely emphasise ephemeral or contingent aspects. Any one of the five time perspectives mentioned throughout this study can be used to subjectively attribute all or any one of the three aspects to a claim or practice. Furthermore, the presence as well as the absence of any of these three aspects adds significance and meaning to a claim or practice, a point which will be illustrated throughout the later analyses found in chapters 5-9.

A final point of clarification needing raised is that while any one of the three aspects can be attributed via a specific time perspective, the three aspects can also be used to assess and characterise aspects of a claim or practice across an aggregation of time perspectives.²¹⁴ For example, the historical examples of the balance of power between international political actors as articulated within Morgenthau's theory via *short-term historical time perspectives*, when aggregated, help to recover that a balance of power is ephemeral in its longevity, contingent upon the make-up of the actors in existence, their interests, and their capability to exercise power, and a perennial pursuit of international political actors. In other words, the aggregation of aspects of claims regarding the balance of power across multiple time perspectives ends up attributing ephemeral, contingent, and perennial aspects to the balance of power concept found

²¹² Oslo I, art. I, para. 1.

²¹³ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 19.

²¹⁴ For more on the advantages and disadvantages of aggregating aspects derived from different time perspectives see Schneider, Gleditsch, and Carey, "Forecasting in International Relations," 10.

within Morgenthau's theory.²¹⁵ This use of these three aspects to characterise a specific claim across multiple time perspectives can suggest what general aspects can be attributed to a claim or practice and perhaps allude to potential aspects of a claim or practice that are relevant beyond the confines of a specific theory or peace process.

4.3 Relations between the three aspects

Moving on from addressing relations between time perspectives and time-related aspects, the following section addresses how the three aspects relate to one another and their corresponding effects. As mentioned earlier in section 4.1, an individual time perspective can potentially attribute either a perennial or ephemeral aspect to a claim or practice, but not both simultaneously. Multiple aspects, however, can be attributed to a single claim or practice via considering that claim or practice through different time perspectives. Considered collectively, the various attributed perennial and ephemeral aspects provide a picture of the many facets of a single claim or practice. Although these aspects are attributed separately, they must relate to one another or fit together. For example, within the Accords claims regarding peace between Israel and the Palestinians are attributed with ephemeral aspects by the Accords' *historical time perspectives* which articulate the absence of peace in the past and with perennial aspects by the Accords' *future time perspectives* which articulate the enduring presence of peace in the future.²¹⁶ When aspects of different types do not relate to one another within a claim or practice, they can potentially create contradictions within or lead to misinterpretations of a theory or peace process. Based on my study, however, these problematic issues are largely avoided by nesting the attributed aspects of a claim or practice in relation to one another across time.²¹⁷ In other words, time-bounding each aspect enables each one to be co-associated with a single claim or practice.²¹⁸ Consequently, where such

²¹⁵ Morgenthau, "World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century," 156-173; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 155-201.

²¹⁶ Oslo I, introduction; Oslo II, preamble, para. 2-4.

²¹⁷ Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, "Nested and overlapping regimes in the transatlantic banana trade dispute," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no. 3 (April 2006), 363, 365; John P. Willerton, Michael O Slobodchikoff, and Gary Goertz, "Treaty Networks, Nesting, and Interstate Cooperation: Russia, the FSU, and the CIS," *International Area Studies Review* 15, no. 1 (March 2012), 60, 69.

²¹⁸ Hartmut Behr and Liam Devereux, "The Melodrama of Modernity in Karl Mannheim's Political Theory," in *The Anthem Companion to Karl Mannheim*, eds. David Kettler and Volker Meja (London: Anthem Press, 2018), 124-25; Hubert Knoblauch, "Relativism, Meaning and the New Sociology of Knowledge," in *The*

problematic issues arise, this can indicate that either an aspect has been attributed arbitrarily and is independent of a time perspective or that a time perspective for a particular claim or practice is missing.

In addition to addressing the relations among these three aspects across time, they also relate to one another in terms of what they convey about the state of existence of a claim or practice.²¹⁹ Therefore, having an awareness of the relations between these three aspects is helpful in developing an understanding of the various states of existence of claims and practices. Each of the three aspects conveys one aspect about a state of existence of a claim or practice within a particular time perspective. A state of existence might be permanent (i.e. perennial), temporary (i.e. ephemeral), or dependent upon particular circumstances (i.e. contingent). For example, according to Morgenthau's theory interest is a perennial feature of international politics across time; in essence, Morgenthau is claiming that the existence and relevance of interest to international politics has been, is, and will be perpetual.²²⁰ The consequences of such a claim within Morgenthau's theory is that a situation in which international politics does not involve interest becomes difficult to imagine and leads to an understanding of international politics as contingent upon interest either in its manifestation or pursuit which are themselves ephemeral. This example illustrates how identifying one state of existence of a claim or practice can lead to an awareness of a claim's or practice's other states of existence. Furthermore, this example suggests that there are residual effects when these three aspects are attributed to a claim or practice.

Residual effects, as illustrated in the previous example, are both the results of an individual aspect as well as various combinations and interactions between different aspects of multiple claims and practices.²²¹ Examples of basic combinations and interactions among perennial and ephemeral aspects include perennial and perennial, perennial and ephemeral, and ephemeral and ephemeral, all of which are illustrated

Problem of Relativism in the Sociology of Knowledge, eds. Richard Schantz and Markus Seidel (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 134.

²¹⁹ Andrew Abbott, "Transcending General Linear Reality," *Sociological Theory* 6, no. 2 (Autumn 1988), 171.

²²⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 5.

²²¹ Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter, and Christopher Jon Zorn, "Temporal dynamics and heterogeneity in the quantitative study of international conflict," in *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate*, eds. Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 274-75; Väyrynen, "Rethinking National Temporal Orders," 606, 609.

throughout the analyses found in chapters 5-9. The combinations and interactions of these aspects are always contingent upon how aspects are attributed to claims and practices. Consequently, the residual effects of combinations of aspects attributed to claims about the roots of political problems found in Morgenthau's theory in contrast to those articulated in the Accords are quite different. In the former, the roots of political problems are perennial and can never fully be eliminated. Conversely, in the latter, the roots are ephemeral and can be addressed. As noted in the following example, the residual effects of these combinations and interactions can either be perennial or ephemeral. For example, within the Accords combinations of a series of ephemeral steps and stages of the peace process were intended to build up confidence (i.e. a residual effect) between Israel and the Palestinians so that a perennial peace could be established.²²² As the demise of the Accords illustrates, however, the residual effects cannot always be determined or guaranteed in advance. This is because it is not always possible for a peace process (or a theory) to account for every unforeseen factor that may arise in the future. Regardless of whether or not the residual effects can be determined in advance, it is important to recognise that their effects extend throughout a theory or peace process.

The idea that these three aspects, when attributed, have residual effects throughout a theory or peace process is important to recognise in this study for two reasons. First, if there are residual effects of attributing a perennial, ephemeral, or contingent aspect to a claim or practice, then it suggests that aspects attributed to a claim or practice can have effects on other claims and practices, as well as broader understandings of international politics within a theory or peace process. For example, the residual effects of claiming within Morgenthau's theory that the nuclear condition is perennial (since the late 1940s) and that every present is novel (i.e. ephemeral) is that humanity can never be certain that immortality will ever be a possibility.²²³ A second reason for acknowledging that attributed aspects have residual effects is that it helps to provide an explanation as to how international politics manifests in the past, present, and future.²²⁴ For this reason to make sense it is necessary to think of attributed aspects

²²² Oslo II, art. X, para. 1 and 2, and art. XIII, para. 8.

²²³ Morgenthau, "Death in a Nuclear Age," 233; McQueen, "Salutary Fear?," 89. For more on the notion of immortality within Morgenthau's theory, see section 7.3.

²²⁴ Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl eds., *War and Peace in Transition: Changing Roles of External Actors* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2009), 174-75; Benjamin Miller, "When and How Regions Become

of a claim or practice as the preconditions from which international politics manifests. For example, the initial interim Palestinian government (i.e. ephemeral) outlined in the Accords was a necessary precondition for developing a future democratic Palestinian government and implementation of the Accords' liberal democratic peace process. Both of the above reasons also suggest that the connection between the initial effects of attributed aspects and their residual effects are traceable.

The ability to trace the initial and residual effects of aspects attributed is helpful to not only recover the extent of the effects a single time perspective can have on claims or practices, but also to gain unique insights about the relations that might exist between perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects.²²⁵ For example, within Morgenthau's theory historical, contemporary, and future manifestations of international political problems are understood as ephemeral manifestations of perennial international political problems which never get fully addressed or resolved.²²⁶ This interpretation is made possible by tracing the apparent initial and residual effects of aspects attributed to claims via different time perspectives across the whole span of time covered by Morgenthau's theory. Through this process of tracing the effects of the attributed aspects across time, the similarities among the different political problems mentioned throughout the theory become evident and lead to a recognition that the ephemeral manifestations are not residual effects of the attributed aspects. The ephemeral manifestations are moments or periods in time when perennial aspects of a claim within Morgenthau's theory momentarily manifest. Conversely, when perennial aspects are not evident, they may still exist but are in a state of hibernation or dormancy until contingent circumstances arise again to enable their ephemeral manifestations.²²⁷ While the aforementioned relations between aspects of perennial and ephemeral might not be

Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace" *International Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (June 2005), 251-52; Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," *The American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (June 1962), 305, 307; Anthony Wanis-St. John, "Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows," *Negotiation Journal* 22, no. 2 (April 2006), 125-26.

²²⁵ The literature on process-tracing was helpful in this regard. For examples see: Fairfield and Charman, "Explicit Bayesian Analysis for Process Tracing"; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (October 1994): 5-49; Russett, Layne, Spiro, and Doyle, "The Democratic Peace," 164-7, 82; Jack S. Levy, "Counterfactuals, Casual Inference, and Historical Analysis," *Security Studies* 24, no. 3 (September 2015), 385-86.

²²⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, "What Is the National Interest of the United States?," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 282 (July 1952), 4; Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 216; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 80.

²²⁷ Dormancy and hibernation are understood here in the horticultural sense where perennial plants grow, flower, and dieback periodically provided the right conditions exist.

recoverable in every theory or peace process, the example nevertheless highlights how tracing the effects of aspects attributed to claims and practices within a theory or peace process can be used to avoid a misreading of particular effects.

From the previous paragraphs, the relations between perennial, ephemeral, and contingent are made apparent. Essentially, the perennial and ephemeral aspects attributed to claims and practices appear to be what make international politics contingent. The idea that international politics is contingent is captured and articulated in similar ways within Morgenthau's theory and the Accords. For example, within Morgenthau's theory perennial and ephemeral aspects attributed to claims govern how claims freely function among and interact with each other to generate explanations of a contingent international political sphere. In other words, perennial and ephemeral aspects afford claims with a delimited freedom that makes it difficult to predict from the claims how international politics will manifest and leaves manifestations of international politics open and contingent.²²⁸ In the case of the Accords, the perennial and ephemeral aspects attributed to its claims try to mitigate the effects of contingencies in the world so that the Accords' peace process can be implemented successfully within a contingent international political sphere. Both examples illustrate that perennial and ephemeral aspects attributed to claims can be thought of as essentially contingent forces shaping how international politics works according to a theory or peace process. These forces and their effects, however, are not necessarily equal at all times.²²⁹

The inequality among attributed perennial and ephemeral aspects and their effects is important to acknowledge because it helps to explain why international politics may be conceived of as contingent within a particular theory or peace process. This idea is not easily grasped and requires further unpacking to fully appreciate. Beginning with relations among perennial and ephemeral aspects, the inequality suggested here is not meant to imply that perennial aspects attributed to a claim or practice are generally or inherently stronger than its ephemeral aspects, nor the reverse.²³⁰ What is suggested is that the strength of either aspect is contingent upon various combinations and interactions of other aspects attributed to the same claim or practice and other claims

²²⁸ Hom and Steele, "Open Horizons".

²²⁹ Wilczek, *A Beautiful Question*, 304-08, 314-15.

²³⁰ In this study, relations between perennial and ephemeral aspects are analogous to relations among different forces addressed by quantum theories found in Physics. *Ibid.*, 225-77.

and practices during a particular period of time articulated within a theory or peace process. For example, within Morgenthau's theory, the strength of the perennial aspect attributed to power dominates the theory because other claims have been made subject to or must take account for this aspect of power. The resulting inequality of strengths among aspects is just one potential source of asymmetry that can lead to a contingent international political sphere. Within a theory or peace process the strength of an aspect alone, however, is not always sufficient to manifest a contingent world.

Although circumstances articulated within a theory or peace process may allow for aspects to be expressed or effects to manifest, those circumstances might not always favour the strongest aspect. For example, the Accords' articulation that the confrontational perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations of the long-term past suggests that it was a strong force.²³¹ The Accords also articulated that such a strong force could be overcome (via an ephemeral desire for peace and the implementation of incremental, ephemeral steps) to make peace a perennial aspect of their relations in the short-term and long-term future.²³² In this case, the circumstances that led to the signing of the Accords enabled ephemeral desires and ephemeral steps to be expressed and manifested to such an extent (i.e. strength) that they overcame a historically perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations and served as the seeds for a potentially new perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations defined by peace rather than confrontation.²³³ As this example illustrates, circumstances created within a theory or peace process contribute to unequal expressions or manifestations of attributed aspects. By highlighting the inequalities among attributed aspects and the effects in the aforementioned example, a suggestion is being made that relations between these perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects are not hierarchical.²³⁴ Furthermore, addressing these inequalities helps to reinforce the idea that these aspects and their effects within a theory or peace process cannot be wholly understood nor appreciated without an awareness of how they relate to each other.

²³¹ Oslo I, introduction; Oslo II, preamble, para. 2.

²³² Oslo I, introduction and art. 1; and Oslo II, preamble.

²³³ For a brief summary of the ephemeral circumstances, see Milton-Edwards, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 187-93.

²³⁴ Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 147.

4.4 Chapter summary

The primary aims of this chapter were to clarify how the aspects of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent were understood in this study individually, in relation to each other, their effects, and the time perspectives that attributed them to claims and practices within a theory or peace process. In pursuit of these aims, the chapter was divided into three parts: an explanation of and a justification for the selection of the three aspects (section 4.1); relations between time perspectives and the three aspects (section 4.2); and relations among the three aspects (section 4.3). The chapter began with an explanation as to how and why these three particular aspects were used and highlighted in this study. The explanation detailed that these three aspects were selected because of their prevalence across both case studies and their relationships with time perspectives. Included within this explanation were definitions for each aspect that were applicable to this thesis.²³⁵ Consequently, such an explanation provided a basis for the language and aspects used in my subsequent analyses of the selected illustrative case studies detailed in the remaining chapters of this thesis. Providing this basis was necessary in this study to follow the arguments made and to appreciate the insights shared.

The second section of the chapter focused on the relationships between time perspectives and the three aspects. Essentially, time perspectives are used to attribute any one of these three aspects to claims or practices articulated within a theory or peace process. The purpose of the attributions of these three aspects is to try to capture aspects of a perceived reality of international politics and embed them into a theory or peace process. This process of attribution, however, is highly subjective and indicates that time perspectives within a theory or peace process subjectively delimit how reflective a theory or peace process can be of the realities of international politics. The discussion in this chapter of this relationship goes on to highlight that each of one of these aspects represents initial effects time perspectives can have. The uniqueness of the relationship suggests that awareness of these initial effects is essential to tracing the extent of the effects time perspectives have on a single claim or practice and other claims and

²³⁵ In the development of these definitions, however, a conscious effort was made to articulate them in such a way so that they might also be useful in other studies regarding time and IR.

practices articulated within a theory or peace process. The section ends with a few points of clarification that help to both address problematic assumptions that may arise when identifying these three aspects, as well as how these aspects can be used to assess and characterise aspects of claims and practices across multiple time perspectives.

In the chapter's final section, several relations among the three aspects were addressed. The section began with a discussion regarding the relations among the three aspects when attributed to a single claim or practice and how they fit together. The discussion moved on to addressing how each aspect can be used to articulate different states of existence of a claim or practice. Because neither claims nor practices exist in isolation from one another within a theory or peace process, they interact and combine with one another and lead to residual effects throughout a theory or peace process.²³⁶ These connections between the initial effects of attributed aspects and their residual effects were raised in this section to suggest that the effects of time perspectives are traceable. Identifying and addressing this ability to trace the effects of time perspectives provided this study with a means of recovering the extent of the effects various individual time perspectives have within a theory or peace process as a whole. In the process of unpacking the residual effects of attributed aspects, this section highlighted that residual effects do not always remain localised to a particular claim or practice, or to a period of time within a theory or peace process, but can manifest in foreseen and unforeseen ways. To help explain this phenomena, this section suggested that perennial and ephemeral aspects should be thought of as essentially contingent forces shaping how international politics works according to a theory or peace process. These forces and their effects, however, are not necessarily equal at all times as the end of the section indicated.

By the chapter's end, relations and distinctions among the three aspects, their effects, and time perspectives were made clear. This clarity was necessary as it laid a foundation of understandings and language that enables the complexity of relations and distinctions analysed and discussed in the remaining chapters to be unpacked and articulated in a manner that can be followed by the reader. In the subsequent chapters of this study, numerous manifestations of each of these three aspects are analysed and discussed. While not every manifestation of these aspects found within each case study

²³⁶ Elman and Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory," 11.

is mentioned, those that are mentioned provide solid examples of why these three aspects were included in this study. The diversity among the manifestations of these three aspects across both illustrative case studies highlights the broad applicability and usefulness of these aspects when studying the effects of time perspectives within IR theory and practice. Furthermore, the diversity of manifestations of these aspects also draws attention to the different ways these aspects delimit understandings and interpretations of international politics within a theory or peace process. Thus, these aspects, along with the time perspectives that attribute them, restrict and shape what international politics is and how it works according to a theory or peace process. Detailed illustrations of how those restrictions can appear within and effect a theory or peace process begin in the following chapter with an analysis of the *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* and their effects within Morgenthau's theory.

Part II: Theoretical Case Study

Chapter 5: Long-term and Short-term Historical Time Perspectives

This chapter marks the beginning of the second part of this study (Part II), where the conceptualisations of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and the aspects they attribute are used to analyse time perspectives and their effects within a specific theory. In particular, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of how the past, via *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives*, can be articulated, conceptualised, and mobilised within a theory to provide and support particular understandings and interpretations of claims about international politics. The following analysis has four foci: 1) to illustrate the different types of *historical time perspectives* that can potentially exist within a theory, 2) to identify and reflect upon the functions and effects of each *historical time perspective* in isolation, 3) to articulate the relations between the two *historical time perspectives*, and 4) to explain the relations between *historical time perspectives* and claims as they appear in a theory.²³⁷ For my theoretical case study, Morgenthau's theory was selected as the theory from which illustrative examples of *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives'* manifestations, functions, and effects will be drawn. From my analysis of the illustrative examples, similarities and distinctions between the two types of *historical time perspectives* will be made clear. These similarities and distinctions will primarily be articulated in terms of the salient functions and corresponding effects each type of *historical time perspective* can potentially perform. Embedded within the previous statement are assumptions that the functions of these time perspectives are not negligible and that are they perceived as having effects on theoretical claims.²³⁸ Consequently, time perspectives and their effects are assumed to shape the understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims to varying degrees and in significant ways.²³⁹ By the end of the chapter, three

²³⁷ Similar foci in relation to *present* and *future time perspectives* found within a theory are addressed in chapters 6 and 7.

²³⁸ For literature supporting this assumption see Davenport, "The International and the Limits of History," 259-60 and Constantin Fasolt, *The Limits of History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), 16-20.

²³⁹ In many ways, insights presented in this chapter are similar to those that might have been recovered if a historiographical analysis had been conducted on Morgenthau's theory. Such an analysis, however, is predominantly focused on the past with limited analysis occasionally extending to the present or future but not all three simultaneously. Conversely, my analysis considers *historical time perspectives* and their corresponding effects in equal measure to those time perspectives of the present and the future. Therefore, my analysis of *historical time perspectives* and their effects within Morgenthau's theory goes beyond a historical analysis because it remains connected to and is understood in relation to analyses of a theory's

points will be made clear: the potential variety of *historical time perspectives* that may be found within a single theory, the functions they serve within a theory, and their effects on theoretical claims. This clarity makes new contributions to an existing awareness among readers as to how the study of and understanding of international politics has been shaped by *historical time perspectives* within a theory of international politics.

To help recover an awareness of the effects *historical time perspectives* have within a theory, the following questions were used to guide my analysis. What distinguishing features do *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* possess? Why include either *historical time perspective* within a theory? How does the presence or absence of a particular *historical time perspective* effect how theoretical claims are understood and interpreted? How do these *historical time perspectives* help scholars make better sense of international politics? While these questions were directed at Morgenthau's theory to illustrate their usefulness in recovering time perspectives within a specific theory, their generic wording suggests that they could be directed toward other theories of international politics and useful in future studies of time perspectives and their effects. To address each question, illuminating examples of *historical time perspectives* were drawn from Morgenthau's theory and analysed. As illustrative examples, they are not meant to provide comprehensive insights applicable to all *historical time perspectives* across all theories of international politics. The insights gained from the analysis, however, suggest particular features and effects readers are likely to find when analysing *historical time perspectives* and their effects on claims within other theories of international politics used in IR.

The chapter is divided into three sections covering *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* and their effects. The chapter begins by addressing the three salient functions which distinguish *long-term historical time perspectives* from other time perspectives found within Morgenthau's theory. These functions include providing a macro-level scope of the past, structuring and aggregating the past, and creating timescapes (if not also a trajectory) within a theory. The second section of the chapter

narrations of international politics of the present and the future. Likewise, the insights gained regarding *historical time perspectives* and their effects within Morgenthau's theory are also understood in relation to the insights gained about *present* and *future time perspectives* shared in chapters 6 and 7.

examines the functions *short-term historical time perspectives* can perform within a theory. Among the various functions *short-term historical time perspectives* can perform, the most salient function regards the retention of sub-macro level details about the practices and manifestations of international politics in the past that are otherwise glossed over by or deemphasised within *long-term historical time perspectives* (e.g. emotions, the everyday, influential roles of particular minor actors during specific historical periods).²⁴⁰ Retained within these sub-macro level details are articulations about how a theory explains 1) the development and historical contexts of international politics within particular (historical) situations, 2) the effects of ongoing and temporary phenomena on international politics and their coexistence, and 3) the validity and applicability across time of claims made within a theory.

Unlike the two aforementioned sections of this chapter, which individually focus on the functions and effects of each type of *historical time perspective*, the final section emphasises the cumulative effects both *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* have on shaping understandings of Morgenthau's theoretical claims regarding notions about the future. This shift in focus from individual to cumulative effects of multiple time perspectives was necessary to address for two reasons. First, *historical time perspectives* do not exist in isolation from one another within a theory. As my analysis of Morgenthau's theory shows, they co-exist and interact with each other in subtle, yet profound ways. These interactions are worth highlighting because they offer insights into how particular understandings of theoretical claims are sustained within a theory despite the changing historical circumstances accounted for within a theory. Such understandings can indicate: when a *historical time perspective* is more dominant over another; how relations among time perspectives support one another and fill in explanatory gaps; and/or why understandings may appear contradictory or contentious within a theory. The second reason for focusing on the cumulative effects is to emphasise how understanding the past as a whole rather than in parts (via a theory's different *historical time perspectives*) can be helpful in recovering and deepening understandings of theoretical claims. To limit the study to the individual level of each *historical time perspective*, either *long-term* or *short-term*, would ignore how theoretical

²⁴⁰ Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman, "Time: A New Research Lens," 647; Solomon and Steele, "Micro-moves in International Relations Theory," 280.

claims are shaped simultaneously by multiple *historical time perspectives*. By the end of this section, the relevance of considering how theoretical claims acquire historical meaning and contextualisation via *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* will be made clear.²⁴¹

5.1 Priming my analysis

To help set out the premise of this chapter and starkly draw attention to the roles *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* play in adding meaning to and contextualisation for theoretical claims, the two following excerpts from Morgenthau's work relating to his theory of international politics were provided. The two excerpts are useful examples that help to illustrate that distinctions about the past within a theory (e.g. the recent past vs distant past) are being made by Morgenthau, specifically between *long-term and short-term time perspectives* of the past.²⁴² Furthermore, as will be made clear in the explanation following the excerpts, these two excerpts also serve as examples that highlight how historical distinctions provide meaning and context to claims made within a theory. Within each excerpt, the words articulating *historical time perspectives* have been bolded and italicised by myself for the reader's convenience:

'International politics embraces ***more than recent history*** and current events [(i.e. alluding to time perspectives beyond the *short-term* past and present)]. The observer is surrounded by the contemporary scene with its ever shifting emphasis and changing perspectives. He cannot find solid ground on which to stand, or objective standards of evaluation, without getting down to fundamentals that are revealed only by the correlation of recent events with the ***more distant past*** and the perennial qualities of human nature underlying both'.²⁴³

'The truth is, though we have learned the lessons of ***recent history*** chapter and verse, though we have memorized them and have never tired of reciting and applying them whenever faced with a problem which seemed to be similar to one of those that we failed to solve during the Second World War, yet we have failed

²⁴¹ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 140-50.

²⁴² Other time perspectives (e.g. *short-term present*) appear in these excerpts as well, but are addressed in greater detail in chapters 6 and 7.

²⁴³ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 15.

to see that behind the specific lessons of history learnt from *specific blunders*, there stands the lesson of history, of *all history*, which alone gives meaning to the lessons to be derived from any particular period'.²⁴⁴

After reading through these excerpts with a focus on time perspectives, it is clear that historical distinctions are being made between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives*. These historical distinctions are not arbitrary, however, but add particular meaning and context to theoretical claims which is noteworthy. For example, if all the bolded and italicised distinctions in the above excerpts were replaced with the words '*the past*', then the interpretations of the theoretical claims being made would markedly change. The subsequent interpretations of the claims made within either excerpt would suggest that they apply at any moment of the past which is not what Morgenthau is articulating.²⁴⁵ These changes in interpretations resulting from this word-play exercise suggest that associations are not arbitrarily made (or not made) between a particular claim and *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives*, but are intended to shape what a theory conveys. In this chapter, my aim is to further unpack the aforementioned distinctions between the *historical time perspectives* beyond what has already been addressed in chapter 3 and examine their unique effects on claims. Insights gained from this effort will help readers develop new understandings as to why distinctions between *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* matter in relation to theoretical claims, as well as in relation to how international politics is understood in regards to the past.

²⁴⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Lessons of World War II's Mistakes: Negotiations and Armed Power Flexibly Combined," *Commentary*, October 1952, <https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-lessons-of-world-war-iis-mistakesnegotiations-and-armed-power-flexibly-combined/> (accessed June 23, 2016).

²⁴⁵ The significance of distinction is particularly clear in the second excerpt where Morgenthau is making a theoretical claim that a sole reliance on *short-term historical time perspectives* is problematic.

5.2 Long-term historical time perspectives

5.2.1 A macro-level overview

My analysis and illustration of *historical time perspectives* and their effects within a theory begins with those articulated within Morgenthau's theory. A primary function of *long-term historical time perspectives* within this illustrative theory is to provide a macro-level overview of the past, either as a whole or over multiple historical fragments of time.²⁴⁶ Taking a macro-level overview enables a theory to identify and consider various explanations for what has been observed in international politics in the past over extended periods of time. These various explanations are derived from patterns or commonalities found among historical international political phenomena.²⁴⁷ For instance, without the inclusion of *long-term historical time perspectives*, Morgenthau's argument that the struggle for power is partly rooted in human nature would be less compelling if based on a *short-term historical time perspective* where the span of time covered might be months or years, rather than millennia.²⁴⁸ Further reflection on this example indicates that by examining international politics via a *long-term historical time perspective*, it was possible for theorists like Morgenthau to identify human nature as a perennial aspect across time which has consistently influenced international politics.²⁴⁹ Making this theoretical claim that human nature and international politics are connected enables Morgenthau to put forward another theoretical claim; namely that international politics has a long history which can in part be explained and understood via human nature.²⁵⁰ Consequently, international politics in this sense is understood as pre-dating the formation of states and their engagement in international politics on the world stage.²⁵¹ Furthermore, by linking international politics to the human nature rather

²⁴⁶ Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 211; Robinson, *Transnational Conflicts*, 2.

²⁴⁷ Bluedorn, *The Human Organization of Time*, 138.

²⁴⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4-5; Anthony F. Lang Jr., "Morgenthau, agency, and Aristotle," in *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28. The intention here is not to reduce Morgenthau's theory to a human nature theory, but rather to illustrate that human nature is equated to one of many *long-term historical time perspectives* articulated within his theory.

²⁴⁹ Morgenthau, "Love and Power," 247-51; Gellman, "Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism," 252-3.

²⁵⁰ The effects of contingencies are examples of other factors that Morgenthau's theory considers as contributing to the manifestation of international politics. MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 216.

²⁵¹ Morgenthau, *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, 93; Gellman, "Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism," 254.

than to time-bound international actors (e.g. states) or manifestations of political structures and processes (e.g. treaties), a theory like Morgenthau's is able to make the claim that as long as humans exist so too will international politics in a particular way. This linkage illustrated in Morgenthau's theory is significant because it extends the relevance of the explanations a theory provides in regards to international politics beyond the past and well into the present and the future via human nature itself which exists perennially unchanged during those segments of time.²⁵²

In addition to helping to identify patterns or commonalities found in the past which are likely to persist in the present and the future²⁵³, *long-term historical time perspectives* can be used to help make sense of how certain international political phenomena come to be classified in particular ways over extended periods of time. For example, what might be classified as perennial issues and influences within particular *short-term historical time perspectives* can be re-evaluated and possibly reclassified as ephemeral when considered within a broader international political context across a greater span of time covered by one or more *long-term historical time perspectives*.²⁵⁴ This re-evaluation and possible reclassification is evident in Morgenthau's discussions regarding the balance of power.²⁵⁵ From a *short-term historical time perspective*, the Concert of Europe appeared to be a perennial aspect of international politics within Europe.²⁵⁶ When evaluated through a *long-term historical time perspective* as articulated within Morgenthau's theory, however, the balance of power offered by the Concert of Europe appeared to be an ephemeral aspect of international politics within Europe. Based on this assessment of the Concert of Europe and other mentioned historical periods where a balance of power-system was maintained (e.g. period between WWI and WWII), Morgenthau derives two significant insights about international politics which shape his theory in profound ways. The two insights drawn from my analysis of

²⁵² Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss, and Christoph Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme," *Theory, Culture and Society* 20, no. 2 (April 2003): 1-33.

²⁵³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics in the Twentieth Century*, vol. 2, *The Restoration of American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 167.

²⁵⁴ Yetiv, "Thinking about Greater Interdisciplinarity," 101-04.

²⁵⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 166-200.

²⁵⁶ Concert of Europe was a grouping of five Great Powers -- Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia -- which, through a series of treaties and informal alliances was orchestrated to preserve a particular status quo and peace among European countries.

Morgenthau's theory, detailed below, help to illustrate the potential extent of effects *long-term historical time perspectives* can have on just one claim within a theory.

5.2.2 *Why macro-level perennial and ephemeral classifications matter*

The first insight is that no balance of power structures or alliances among international political actors last forever. According to Morgenthau, this finiteness can be attributed to the following: 1) the different forms balance of power systems have taken (e.g. bilateral, multilateral, League of Nations), 2) the various purposes they have needed to serve (e.g. defence, economic), and 3) the changing international political actors (e.g. monarchies, empires, states) which have been involved in their construction, operation, and maintenance. Recognising that the finiteness of these attributes affecting balance of power dynamics in the past over the long-term is unlikely to change, Morgenthau remained sceptical of the promises balance of power structures like the UN could offer in the present and in the future because the guarantors and attributes of such structures are ephemeral.²⁵⁷ Considered in isolation, this *long-term historical time perspective* would suggest that Morgenthau did not consider that a permanent balance of power could ever exist.²⁵⁸ Such a reading of Morgenthau's claims regarding balance of power as impermanent is important with respect to his conceptualisation of the present as novel.²⁵⁹ The historical shifting balance of power helps provide a historical explanation as to why each present in the past has been different (i.e. novel), as well as why any shifts in the future balance of power are expected to continue to uniquely affect each present in the future.²⁶⁰ Therefore, the dynamism of balance of power within Morgenthau's theory is the norm and a departure from that norm (e.g. a permanent balance of power system) would be an indication that a fundamental change has occurred within international politics.

²⁵⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 171, 175, 178, 465, and 452.

²⁵⁸ As my analysis and discussion of *short-term present time perspectives* featured in Chapter 6 will suggest, the present is conceptualised within Morgenthau's theory as being novel and thus leaves open the possibility that a permanent balance of power (however unlikely) might begin at some point in a future present.

²⁵⁹ The novelty of the present will be detailed further in section 6.2.

²⁶⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 175, 180, and 187.

This second insight recovered from my analysis of Morgenthau's *long-term historical time perspectives* relates to how Morgenthau understands the idea of status quo in the context of international politics. Using a *long-term historical time perspective*, Morgenthau draws attention to a common, continuous aim among international political actors of the past to strive toward conditions of status quo via balance of power systems or the formation of alliances.²⁶¹ For Morgenthau, these power balancing phenomena appeared to be accepted ways of providing a status quo that people (e.g. politicians, diplomats) repeatedly sought to maintain or return to after periods of uncertainty or disorder.²⁶² Maintaining or (re)constituting normalcy within international politics was continuously sought out because it provided ontological security to international political actors.²⁶³ Diplomacy and peace treaties (e.g. Treaty of Chaumont, Quadruple Alliance, and Treaty of the Holy Alliance) are examples Morgenthau references to illustrate how international actors have tried to manifest status quo conditions within international politics.²⁶⁴ This shared aim and the repeated historical attempts (even if not long lasting) toward manifesting status quo situations within international politics suggest, for Morgenthau, that the aim to create and cultivate a status quo offering ontological security to international political actors is perennial.²⁶⁵

By acknowledging this aim toward manifesting a status quo as perennial and power balancing means in international politics as ephemeral, Morgenthau must then understand the concept of status quo within international politics as being in a constant

²⁶¹ Ibid., 171-72.

²⁶² Studies in the field of psychology support claims regarding the instinctive inclination among humans to maintain or return to a status quo. For examples see: William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* 1, no. 1 (March 1988): 7-59; Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall, "Bias in Favor of the Status Quo," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 6, no. 3 (March 2012): 270-81; Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall, "A Psychological Advantage for the Status Quo," in *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, ed. John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorrisdottir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 85-106.

²⁶³ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States," *The American Political Science Association* 46, no. 4 (December 1952), 972.

²⁶⁴ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 35-40 and 428-37.

²⁶⁵ Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (September 2006): 342; Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (New York: Polity Press, 1991), 243; R.D. Laing, *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 41-2; Brent J. Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-identity and the IR State* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

state of flux; a flux that is a perennial aspect of international politics.²⁶⁶ This understanding is noteworthy because it illustrates how short-term historical phenomena (e.g. temporary shifts in power) can come to be understood as long-term historical phenomena (e.g. a working balance of power system). Furthermore, the effects of this understanding of status quo derived from Morgenthau's *long-term historical time perspective* are twofold. First, this claim helps to explain what prompts and sustains interactions between international political actors in the past, present, and future. Second, this claim supports Morgenthau's other claims, such as every present is novel and the manifestation of international politics is dependent upon various contingent circumstances (both perennial and ephemeral); both claims will be addressed in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter and in Chapter 6. Consequently, *long-term historical time perspectives* can enable a theory to distinguish between and provide insights into the perennial and ephemeral aspects of international political phenomena, even when such aspects simultaneously appear within one category of phenomena as the above discussion regarding balance of power illustrated.

5.2.3 Structuring and aggregation

Helping to clarify distinctions between perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics is just one function *long-term historical time perspectives* may perform within a theory. These *historical time perspectives* also help to draw attention to the significance of particular perennial issues and long-term influences on international politics. Essentially, the focus of attention is directed by how historical periodisations are structured and aggregated within a theory over the long-term.²⁶⁷ The structuring and aggregating of individual and multiple periodisations within a theory's *long-term historical time perspective* is not arbitrary, but intended to highlight or emphasise the dominant themes and concepts central to a theory's understanding and interpretation of international politics in the past.²⁶⁸ In the case of Morgenthau's theory, the past is structured and aggregated in such a way in order to show how international politics can be understood through the historical and perennial struggle for power among international actors. The structuring and aggregation of the past within a

²⁶⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 18, 140, 143-5, 161-2, 175, and 190.

²⁶⁷ Lundborg, "Limits of Historical Sociology," 12.

²⁶⁸ Muzzetto, "Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz".

theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*, however, is not necessarily objective or comprehensive but limited by a theorist's subjectivity.²⁶⁹ For example, many historical periodisations included in Morgenthau's *long-term historical time perspectives* are structured around the starting and ending of wars, such as Peloponnesian Wars, the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, rather than intellectual or social movements. Consequently, certain contributions to international political situations in the past stemming from particular social or intellectual movements get overlooked or deemphasised in contrast to the effects war has on those situations.²⁷⁰ This overlooking or de-emphasis is not confined to *long-term historical time perspectives*, but also influence the periodisations reflected in *short-term historical time perspectives*.²⁷¹ Therefore, the subjective structuring and aggregation done within a theory via *long-term historical time perspectives* shape what a theory is able to identify and explain about international politics in the past, as well as in the present and the future.

To a certain extent, however, this subjective structuring and aggregation done within theories via their *long-term historical time perspectives* is understandable and acceptable for a practical reason.²⁷² First, *long-term historical time perspectives* perform an important distillation function within a theory whereby the noise (i.e. irrelevant or less significant historical detail) of ephemeral issues or influences obtained from an examination of international politics in the past in its entirety is reduced, deemphasised, or omitted.²⁷³ What remains are the underlying perennial issues and influences that have effected international politics in the past. For example, the individual diplomatic successes and failures of European powers in trying to avoid engaging in two world wars within the first half of the 20th Century is not lost on Morgenthau.²⁷⁴ However, as the salience of these and similar ephemeral historical phenomena fade into the background when considered within the *long-term historical time perspectives* found in

²⁶⁹ MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 223 and 229.

²⁷⁰ Alexandra Lianeri, "Resisting Modern Temporalities: Toward a Critical History of Breaks in Time," *History and Theory* 53, no. 4 (December 2014), 606 and 609-10.

²⁷¹ Ian S. Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias," *The American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (September 1996): 605-18.

²⁷² Liliann Manning, Daniel Cassel, and Jean-Christophe Cassel, "St. Augustine's Reflections on Memory and Time and the Current Concept of Subjective Time in Mental Time Travel," *Behavioral Sciences* 3, no. 2 (April 2013), 233.

²⁷³ Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, "Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 2 (June 2018), 235.

²⁷⁴ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 59-64 and 511-17.

Morgenthau's theory, the perennial historical significance of the quality of diplomacy as an element of national power becomes apparent to him. The distillation function is not only helpful in highlighting the commonalities among similar phenomena, as the diplomacy example from Morgenthau's theory illustrates, but it also helps to identify shared aspects across different international political phenomena. Referring to the diplomacy example again, Morgenthau includes the quality of diplomacy as one of the perennial elements of national power because it appeared alongside other perennial elements of national power he found when evaluating the role of national power within international politics across time.²⁷⁵ Thus the distillation that occurs as a result of *long-term historical time perspectives* enables a theory to develop delimited, general theoretical claims about international politics that are interpreted as not limited to the past, but international politics across time.

5.2.4 *Extending a theory's explanations and relevance beyond the past*

A second practical reason why *long-term historical time perspectives* are included within a theory is because the structure and aggregation that these *historical time perspectives* provide can be used to extend the explanatory power and relevance of a theory beyond the past. This extension is done by employing *long-term historical time perspectives* to state or imply what a theory's trajectory is.²⁷⁶ Essentially, how a theory's trajectory articulates where international politics was, is, and will be headed in the future is shaped by time perspectives. With respect to the historical portion of a theory's trajectory specifically, it stems from *long-term historical time perspectives* which shape how historical international phenomena are understood and interpreted. Serving as the basis upon which a theory's overall trajectory is constructed, the historical trajectory (itself constituted from the structuring and aggregation done within *long-term historical time perspectives*) is projected into or mapped onto the present and the future.²⁷⁷ For example, throughout Morgenthau's theory examples of the effects contingencies (e.g. shifts in global alliances) have had on international politics in the past are cited as

²⁷⁵ For more details regarding the other elements of national power (e.g. geography, natural resources), see Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 102-37.

²⁷⁶ Examples of this are addressed in MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 213-14 and 218-21.

²⁷⁷ Hutchings, *World Politics*, 126-27.

evidence and reasons for concluding that international politics itself is contingent. This notion that international politics has been historically contingent is then projected throughout Morgenthau's theory to be the state of international politics across time. Thus the overall trajectory of Morgenthau's theory can be interpreted as one that is open-ended and indeterminate because international politics is contingent.²⁷⁸ As the aforementioned example from Morgenthau's theory illustrates, this projecting of the past into or mapping onto the present and the future enables a theory to carry explanations of international politics in the past forward.²⁷⁹

There are a variety of ways through which understandings and interpretations of international politics in the past are interpreted to be applicable outside the historical context. Historical patterns, trends, and cycles or lack thereof, as well as the anomalies, disruptions, and unanticipated contingencies highlighted in the historical trajectory are used to substantiate pre-emptive linkages and non-linkages to international phenomena in the present and particular visions or versions of the future (i.e. *long-term* and *short-term future time perspectives*).²⁸⁰ For example, Morgenthau's references to international political actors' repeated attempts at maintaining different status quos serve as examples of historical patterns highlighted in his *long-term historical time perspectives*. Conversely, his reference to the advent of nuclear weapons serves as an example of a disruptive, unanticipated contingency. Collectively, they both help to create an overall trajectory within his theory that suggests certain aspects of international politics that can likely be anticipated (e.g. struggles for power) while other aspects are less likely to be anticipated (e.g. the tipping point triggering nuclear war).²⁸¹ Such pre-emptive moves within a theory to establish (e.g. identification of cycles) and disrupt (e.g. identification of unknowns) teleological linkages between the past *and* the present and the future are necessary for three reasons. First, to maintain internal consistency of a theory's

²⁷⁸ Hom and Steele, "Open Horizons."

²⁷⁹ Bennett and Elman, "Case Study Methods," 181-82.

²⁸⁰ Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World," *European Journal of International Relations*, 6, no. 1 (March 2000), 54; Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 262-63; Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1967).

²⁸¹ Mueller's discussion of imperialism is a helpful illustration of this point. Justin Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism: When Is Imperialism?," *Politics* 36, no. 4 (November 2016): 428-40.

trajectory and the logic behind it.²⁸² Second, to perpetuate the theory's relevance to the study of international politics in the present and the future. Finally, to attribute historical perennial and ephemeral characteristics to contemporary known and unknown aspects of international politics, as well as anticipated and unlikely aspects of international politics. As a consequence of extending historical attributes to contemporary and future aspects of international politics, a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*, its explanations, and its claims about international politics derived from those *long-term historical time perspectives* are further reified within a theory.

5.2.5 Problematic issues of reifying and fitting together the past

The reification of the *long-term historical time perspectives* and corresponding explanations within a theory is problematic. When included within a theory, the *long-term historical time perspectives* essentially become dominating ways of viewing and interpreting international politics.²⁸³ As a consequence, the trajectory and explanation of a theory can become trapped by a theory's account of history regardless of what occurs in the present and the future.²⁸⁴ For instance, the *long-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory suggesting that international political problems (in part) stem from human nature is limiting.²⁸⁵ These particular time perspectives prevent a reader of his theory from conceiving of a world absent of political problems as long as human nature does not fundamentally change from its historical manifestation according to Morgenthau's account. The consequences of this understanding are twofold. First, international political actors (past, present, or future) are understood as always having international political problems to resolve. Second, the trajectory of Morgenthau's theory and explanation must make sense of and leave spaces open for the emergence of new and old problems. This example illustrates how *long-term historical*

²⁸² The non-linkages can mark the end of particular trajectories and the beginning of new ones brought on by novel changes, such as the concept of state sovereignty or nuclear weapons.

²⁸³ Rob B.J. Walker, "State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time," *European Journal of Political Research* 20, no. 3 (March 1991), 448. As will be discussed in this chapter and in subsequent chapters regarding other time perspectives, this domination is not absolute and can co-exist and be modified by other time perspectives found within a theory.

²⁸⁴ Levine, "Morgenthau Was Not a Critical Theorist," 102; Stefano Guzzini, "The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorizing," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (September 2013), 536.

²⁸⁵ Morgenthau's theory also includes contingencies as contributing factors that affect what and how international political problems manifest.

time perspectives can limit what particular present(s) and future(s) may fit within a theory's trajectory and explanation.²⁸⁶ What is determined as 'fitting' within a theory's trajectory and explanation is based on how international politics of the past has been structured and aggregated within a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*.²⁸⁷ The effects of *long-term historical time perspectives*, however, are not limited to delimiting what understandings and interpretations fit within a theory's trajectory.²⁸⁸

In the process of limiting what fits within a theory's trajectory and explanation, *long-term historical time perspectives* are also denoting what does not fit within a theory's trajectory and explanation.²⁸⁹ Examples from Morgenthau's theory of what does not fit within his theory's trajectory or explanation include the possibilities that 1) human nature will cease to be an element of international politics or 2) that international politics can return to or move to a point where the nuclear condition is no longer a concern. In essence these hypothetical examples illustrate that a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives* predetermine what present and future phenomena do not fit within a theory's trajectory and explanation. These predeterminations, however, need not be interpreted necessarily as problematic limitations on a theory's trajectory or explanation, but as instrumental ways of refining the trajectory and explanatory scope of a theory.²⁹⁰ As the examples mentioned earlier in the paragraph illustrate, by accepting human nature and the nuclear condition as perennial political concerns, Morgenthau is delimiting and extending the historical attributes of these theoretical claims to their present and future manifestations. Such delimitations enabled Morgenthau to tailor the focus of his inquiry and understanding of international political around specific theoretical claims without having to explicitly address

²⁸⁶ King and Zeng, "Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference." This recognition of the delimiting effects of time perspectives is not meant to discount the delimiting effects that, for example, existing language or concepts may have on a theory's trajectory and explanation. The point being emphasised is that time perspectives, along with other factors, contribute to how a theory's trajectory and explanation are delimited.

²⁸⁷ Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 204-5; Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science."

²⁸⁸ This paragraph, along with the subsequent paragraph, suggest that conscious choices are being made by theorists as to what does and does not fit within a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*. This may be true in cases when theorists want to highlight that a particular claim is valid at different moments of time and in different circumstances. However, conscious choices can have unintended consequences and thus suggests that what is interpreted as fitting and not fitting within a theory may be done unconsciously as well.

²⁸⁹ Guzzini, "Ends of International Relations Theory," 536; King and Zeng, "Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference."

²⁹⁰ Elman and Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory," 20.

contemporary or future international political phenomena that are irrelevant to his study and understanding of international politics. In other words, *long-term historical time perspectives* help a theory separate out what is relevant for a particular theory of international politics to account for and interpret, as well as what phenomena should be the focus of inquiry by another discipline such as economics, sociology, and law.

These predeterminations can become problematic, however, as presents and futures become part of the past and are found to not 'fit' within the *long-term historical time perspectives*.²⁹¹ For instance, the rapid speeds that signals can be sent to and from individuals anywhere in the world coupled with the increasing automation of traditional decision-making processes increasingly affect contemporary struggles for power in the world (e.g. currency manipulations by China, the role of artificial intelligence programmes in the production of news articles and posts on social media platforms) exemplify phenomena that do not quite fit within Morgenthau's theoretical explanations. I interpret these phenomena as not fitting within Morgenthau's theory because his theory's *long-term historical time perspectives* suggest that either time lags, individual people, or both will always have the potential to affect communications and processes in a timely and meaningful manner. However, signals traveling at the speed of light that trigger an automated process such as the deployment of a computer virus, trades on the currency markets, or the launch of missiles in close proximity to an enemy target make any lags in time or potential human interventions irrelevant.²⁹² When such non-fitting phenomena arise in international politics, they call into question the validity of a theory's trajectory and a theory's ability to offer explanations about international politics beyond the past.²⁹³ Moreover, such phenomena indicate that there are limits to a theory's explanatory power supported by *long-term historical time perspectives*. These limits can highlight three issues: 1) a lack of analysis and elaboration, 2) how the past can bind a theory's explanations to a particular moment or segment of time, and 3) a lack of space or flexibility created by a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*. Each one is addressed further in the following paragraph.

²⁹¹ Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 207-08.

²⁹² Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 2-4 and 116-17; Scheuerman, *Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond*, 565.

²⁹³ Felix Berenskötter, "Deep Theorizing in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 4 (December 2018), 819.

First, non-fitting phenomena can indicate where a lack of analysis has not been done by a theory on particular historical phenomena and where further elaboration upon them might be needed in order to explain how such phenomena ‘fit’ within the existing *long-term historical time perspectives*.²⁹⁴ To a limited extent, Morgenthau’s discussions in *Science: Servant or Master?* about the effects of technological advancements on individuals in society allude to an awareness of concerns regarding the growing automation and increased pace of communication within society. These discussions, however, do not detail how these changes fit with long-term historical understandings of international politics which suggest considerations of time and human intervention are central to understanding international politics. Second, non-fitting phenomena can indicate that a theory’s explanation is bound to a particular historical time and highlight the dangers of classifying claims about the past as timeless.²⁹⁵ Morgenthau’s theory is able to avoid the aforementioned issues by acknowledging that his theory’s explanation and classification of claims are reflective of a particular analysis of international politics during a specific period of time. In essence, Morgenthau is aware that his theory’s explanation and claims are bound by and in time and specific contexts.²⁹⁶ Finally, the limits can highlight the lack of space or flexibility *long-term historical time perspectives* create within a theory to allow the theory to incorporate new international political phenomena. Regarding this final point, whether consciously or unconsciously aware of this issue, the introduction of Morgenthau’s notion that each present is novel (via his *short-term present time perspective*) helped him to mitigate the potentially limiting effects that his theory’s *long-term historical time perspectives* could have had on his theory.²⁹⁷

Before moving on to analyse and discuss *short-term historical time perspectives* and their effects within a theory, a brief summary of the functions and effects *long-term historical time perspectives* have on a theory and its claims is necessary. First and

²⁹⁴ King and Zeng, “Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference,” 193.

²⁹⁵ McIntosh, “Theory across Time,” 477.

²⁹⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 7-9; Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 308. As will be developed in the analysis and discussion of the four other time perspectives found within Morgenthau’s theory, the interactions and relationships between all five time perspectives within his theory enable his explanations and claims to appear less bounded by time than they actually are.

²⁹⁷ Although each present is novel for Morgenthau, he does acknowledge that the novelty does not emerge independently from the past. Morgenthau’s notion of the novelty of the present is detailed further in Chapter 6.

foremost, *long-term historical time perspectives* provide a macro-level overview of the past context of international politics. This overview provides the historical background from which subsequent theoretical explanations and claims are drawn. Commonalities among international political phenomena, as well as distinctions are made possible via *long-term historical time perspectives*. These commonalities and distinctions help a theory identify what aspects of international politics are perennial and ephemeral, as well as what time perspectives to use to attribute these aspects to particular theoretical claims. The second function *long-term historical time perspectives* perform is to structure and aggregate the past. By structuring and aggregating the past in particular ways, specific aspects of international politics are distilled from the past. What remains are the perennial (and to a lesser extent ephemeral) aspects which end up framing how a theory understands and interprets international politics of the past. The resulting theoretical claims about the past are then extended to international politics in contemporary and future contexts, thus forming the basis upon which a trajectory can be constructed. This extension of historical, perennial claims into the present and the future delimits which international political phenomena are interpreted as fitting or not fitting within a theory's explanation of international politics, while simultaneously re-substantiating theoretical claims derived from a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*.

5.3 Short-term historical time perspectives

5.3.1 Detailing the past

Like *long-term historical time perspectives*, *short-term historical time perspectives* also play several distinct roles in delimiting a theory's claims and explanations regarding international politics. One primary function of *short-term historical time perspectives* is to enable a theory to address ephemeral aspects of international politics in more depth at sub-macro levels than would otherwise be possible through *long-term historical time perspectives* alone. *Short-term historical time perspectives* are essential for theories to draw attention to and understand historical ephemeral issues and influences in international politics. Although some ephemeral aspects of international politics in the past can be identified and understood in part via a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*, knowledge about these ephemeral aspects remains incomplete without

considering *short-term historical time perspectives*. This limitation on knowledge occurs because the less prevalent factors and daily minutiae constituting ephemeral issues and influences are either glossed over or remain hidden within the *long-term historical time perspective(s)*. The less prevalent factors and daily minutiae can include, but are not limited to, political motivations and pressures, the everyday, emotions, and domestic and international economic environments.²⁹⁸ In other words, *short-term historical time perspectives* within a theory can help retain, recover, or make visible details about the past not otherwise possible via *long-term historical time perspectives*.²⁹⁹

Such minute details, while interesting in their own right, are included in a theory via *short-term historical time perspectives* for a greater purpose; namely to add depth and meaning to theoretical claims. In the process of helping to identify, understand, and explain details regarding different aspects of international politics via *short-term historical time perspectives*, these details are attached to or associated with claims. For example, while *long-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory help to highlight the perennial desires among international political actors to maintain a balance of power and a status quo, his theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* call attention to the fact that the balance of power and the status quo are not perennial themselves but are constantly in flux.³⁰⁰ This attribute of balance of power and status quo, by default, gets attached to theoretical claims regarding both notions. Consequently, as this example illustrates, because of the additional dimensions (i.e. details) *short-term historical time perspectives* attribute to claims, the meanings and understandings of claims move beyond one-sided, long-term historical meanings and understandings toward those that are more profound.³⁰¹ In other words, *short-term historical time perspectives* serve as a means of associating and attaching ephemeral and perennial aspects to theoretical claims which are not otherwise obtainable from or possible via *long-term historical time perspectives*. Consequently, if a theory were to not articulate any *short-term historical time perspectives*, then a theory might not be able to

²⁹⁸ Gerard Holden, "Who Contextualizes the Contextualizers Disciplinary History and the Discourse about IR Discourse," *Review of International Studies* 28, no. 2 (April 2002), 262; Dominick Lacapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," *History and Theory* 19, no. 3 (October 1980): 245-76.

²⁹⁹ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 146.

³⁰⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 36-9, 140, 161-62, 171-72, 175, and 187.

³⁰¹ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 146.

support and make certain general and nuanced claims about the past as a whole or in relation to a specific historical period.

To emphasise the aforementioned points and illustrate in greater detail as to how and why *short-term historical time perspectives* are necessary for capturing and retaining empirical details which *long-term historical time perspectives* cannot easily provide, Morgenthau's recounting of the appeasement of Germany during the second half of the 1930s serves as an example.³⁰² Through a *short-term historical time perspective*, Morgenthau's theory is able to add details to claims that alter how they can be understood beyond what a *long-term historical time perspective* alone would suggest. For example, viewed through the lens of a *long-term historical time perspective* the appeasement of Germany was merely an ephemeral occurrence that led to World War II. Although an ephemeral occurrence, the *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory enabled his theory to capture and articulate insights about the appeasement process itself in more general terms within the context of countering or furthering intermittent imperial ambitions. These insights included an understanding of the appeasement process as being both rational and as a means of maintaining the status quo in Europe as well as disrupting the status quo, as was the case with Germany in the 1930s.³⁰³ Furthermore, the appeasement process was also understood as a series of successive steps which changed, even if slightly, the status quo of international politics. Understood in this way, the resulting appeasement measures are interpreted by Morgenthau as finite, short-lived, and part of an evolution toward a particular status quo. Appeasement for Morgenthau, then becomes a meaningful, short-term execution of or surrendering of power within the context of longer term imperial ambitions. This example from Morgenthau's theory illustrates the significance of the details captured by *short-term historical time perspectives* and their effects on how claims made within a theory are understood.

What makes the capturing of empirical details possible is that a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* are able to focus on the finer aspects of international politics by limiting the scope of a theory's analysis. These finer aspects are important to

³⁰² Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 59-62.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 60-61.

understanding the evolution of ephemeral phenomena. Referring again to Morgenthau's account of the appeasement of Germany, his mentioning of the three month time period between Germany's initial imperialistic ambitions in 1935 to the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement is not insignificant.³⁰⁴ The short-term historical account details and highlights the rapid escalation of events which ultimately led to the outbreak of World War II. Other detailed knowledge about ephemeral phenomena in international politics that can be derived from *short-term historical time perspectives* articulated within a theory may include the following: how and why particular ephemeral aspects begin, exist, and end (e.g. the appeasement process of Germany before WWII); relations between perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics (e.g. the perennial struggle for power in Europe and Germany's ephemeral ability to exercise power across Europe); the residual effects that short-lived historical ephemeral aspects have on the international political sphere (e.g. World War II's effects on the distribution of power in the world). As a result, a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* make it possible (though not guaranteed) for a theory to retain and articulate greater detail about ephemeral (as well as perennial) issues and influences occurring over a limited period of time in the past.

Among the various details obtainable or articulated within a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives*, three are unique to this type of time perspectives and warrant further discussion. The three groupings of details include: 1) details regarding the presences and statuses of both perennial and ephemeral aspects over a specific period of time in the past, 2) details concerning the relations among perennial and ephemeral aspects on sub-macro levels within international politics, and 3) details about a theory's priorities and the congruency of its explanation. A section corresponding to each grouping of details follows this paragraph to elaborate further the distinct contributions a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* make to adding historical substance to claims.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 61.

³⁰⁵ As will be made clear after reading through each section, the historical substance added to a theory's claims by a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* differs from the historical substance typically added by a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*.

5.3.2 *Presence and status*

The first group of details regards the presences and statuses of both perennial and ephemeral aspects within international politics over a specific, yet limited period of time in the past. Addressing the perennial aspects first, via a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives*, it is possible to determine how perennial aspects, such as the importance of geography in international politics, manifest themselves directly through ephemeral influences and issues evident in international politics during specified periods of time like during the negotiations regarding the partitioning of Palestine or Japan's invasion of the Manchurian Peninsula in 1931.³⁰⁶ The resulting determinations or expressions are necessary for understanding and interpreting how theoretical claims are manifested in different contexts. In regards to the status of perennial aspects, either active or dormant, a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can also offer insights. For example, the status of national morale in times of peace or war can be decisive in determining the success and outcome of either. Considering the instability of national morale, it would be difficult to determine the role it played in international politics during any particular period by examining it via a *long-term historical time perspective* alone. However, by including *short-term historical time perspectives*, the ephemeral nature of perennial aspects of national power such as national morale can be understood.³⁰⁷

In regards to assessing the presences and statuses of particular ephemeral aspects of international politics, a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* are equally valuable. For example, a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can enable a theory to retain details about who the key actors were and what were the unique contexts that led to a particular ephemeral phenomena of international politics. This observation is supported by various accounts within Morgenthau's theory of the different actors involved in and circumstances contributing to or complicating the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe during distinct periods in the past. Retention of such details by a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* is vital to

³⁰⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 445.

³⁰⁷ National morale is referred to here as a perennial aspect of national power because Morgenthau lists it as one of his identified perennial elements of national power, although the instability of national morale makes its nature ephemeral.

not only understanding the international politics that was interpreted to have existed during a specific period of time in the past, but to also highlight one or both of the following: 1) the contingency and uniqueness of each historical past or 2) the (ir)relevance of actors and circumstances in relation to unresolved perennial issues of international politics. In the case of the *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory, they retain details that highlight both aspects of the past to emphasise that each historical, international political issue was distinct and should be understood as not repeatable. Morgenthau, however, also recognises there are similarities among historical issues and provides multiple short-term historical examples within his theory to show underlying commonalities among them. From these two understandings, Morgenthau's notion of international political problems is refined. His notion is that each international political problem in the past was a unique manifestation of an ongoing perennial problem; similarities between problems can be explained because they derive from similar ongoing perennial problems. Thinking beyond Morgenthau's theory, this example illustrates that in the process of articulating the presences and statuses of ephemeral aspects of international politics, *short-term historical time perspectives* within a theory can also convey understandings about the presences and statuses of perennial aspects of international politics.

In addition to perennial problems and perennial aspects of international politics serving as bases for similarities between ephemeral problems and ephemeral aspects of international politics, similarities between ephemeral problems and ephemeral aspects of international politics can also be attributed to the effects of short-lived ephemeral aspects. These effects can best be retained within a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives*. Examples of these effects on international politics mentioned within Morgenthau's theory include the failure of the League of Nations and the advent of nuclear weapons. With regards to such effects, of particular interest raised by *short-term historical time perspectives* concerns the duration of these effects on historical and later occurring international political phenomena. The durations of these effects can be either immediate or residual.³⁰⁸ In the first case from Morgenthau's theory, despite the relatively short tenure of the League of Nations and its numerous failures leading up to

³⁰⁸ Residual effects are understood to include both continuous as well as intermittent, finite effects. Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 147.

the outbreak of WWII, the plagued League was immediately followed by the creation of the United Nations as a re-imagination and reconstitution of a 'new' League of Nations.³⁰⁹ In reference to the second case, the residual effects of the U.S.'s development and use of nuclear bombs shifted dramatically over time. What began as thinking of nuclear weapons as just another advancement of weapons in terms of their magnitude, eventually ended up with nuclear weapons fundamentally altering how international actors and people in general thought about and interacted within international politics. As illustrated in the aforementioned examples, awareness of these different durations are useful in establishing and tracing linkages between ephemeral aspects (however brief, if at all) and their effects on later occurring international political phenomena. Consequently, *short-term historical time perspectives* can be useful in providing explanations about the origins or factors contributing to international politics during defined periods in the past and beyond. Furthermore, examples from Morgenthau's theory also suggest that these *historical time perspectives* can provide insights into how effects from ephemeral international political phenomena alter the manifestation of perennial international political problems.

5.3.3 *Connecting the perennial and ephemeral*

The altering effects that ephemeral (and perennial) aspects have had on the argument of the existence of perennial aspects within international politics in the past within a relatively short-term period point to the second type of detail *short-term historical time perspectives* help to expose within a theory. These relations are worth examining because they detail at the sub-macro level³¹⁰ how a theory interweaves and (dis)connects perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics to form and support coherent and consistent theoretical arguments -- although coherency and consistency are not always guaranteed.³¹¹ At the sub-macro level, *short-term historical*

³⁰⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 274-80, 415-17, and 447-56.

³¹⁰ In contrast, a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives* detail international politics at the macro-level.

³¹¹ Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 438; Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Event," 147. This statement implies a fitting together among various aspects of international politics. This 'fitting together', however, is different from that discussed earlier in regards to *long-term historical time perspectives* which does not necessarily focus on the connective 'tissue' between aspects. For example, it is the difference between seeing the connections between the UN and the UK and how the UK is connected to the UN via specific treaties and norms.

time perspectives can expose details which include what, when, how, and why various aspects of international politics connect, overlap, and work in concert at a sub-macro level in international politics. For example, via *short-term historical time perspectives*, Morgenthau's theory is able to articulate in detail how multiple historical perennial and ephemeral phenomena and surrounding circumstances interact with one another to culminate in the inevitable demise of the League of Nations.³¹² This example from Morgenthau's theory suggests that a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can include details regarding the interactions between historical phenomena which provide insights into a theory's explanations of how international politics unfolds. Furthermore, the example suggests that if such a theory had no articulations of *short-term historical time perspectives*, then awareness and understanding of the sites and means of connection and interaction between the perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics would be less comprehensive. In essence, *short-term historical time perspectives* within a theory provide a way for a theory to illustrate how it explains and links or relates what is perennial about international politics to what is ephemeral.³¹³

Implicit within this understanding of the relations among perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics is a sense that both types of aspects do not appear out of thin air nor do they exist completely independent of one another. In other words, perennial and ephemeral aspects in international politics are interconnected and relate to one another. Their contingent interactions and relations help constitute international politics in the past, as well as in the present and the future. Furthermore, phenomena during these historical periods are often arranged within a theory in sequential order. This sequential ordering is done to help readers follow the logic of a theory's explanation in regards to a given historical period in international politics.³¹⁴ However, as a consequence of this sequential ordering, periods of international politics in the past are represented as always progressing in a linear manner toward particular ends; ends that are either explicitly in the past or perhaps ends in the present or the

³¹² Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 435-46.

³¹³ These explanations, linkages, and relations between perennial and ephemeral can also offer insights into 1) how perennial and ephemeral attributes attached to a particular claim can simultaneously apply multiple meanings to that claim, 2) how claims with different perennial and ephemeral attributes relate to one another, and 3) how *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* related to one another. A sampling of these insights will be provided and addressed in the final sections of this chapter, as well as in Chapters 6 and 7.

³¹⁴ Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 221.

future. For example, discussions from Morgenthau's theory regarding efforts to establish a balance of power (via the Holy Alliance and later the Concert of Europe) that would maintain a status quo in Europe during the post-Napoleonic Wars period illustrate how international politics of the past is characterised as progressing toward particular historical ends.³⁵ While the intentions behind and arrangement of a theory's linear development of international politics articulated within these limited, short-term historical contexts may be contested, they do provide insights into how a theory understands the linear evolution of international politics in the past. However, *short-term historical time perspectives* within a theory also articulate other forms of development (e.g. vertical and horizontal development) which provide quite different insights into how a theory understands the historical evolution of international politics.

5.3.4 Articulating other forms of development

In order to understand these other forms of development within international politics that a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can potentially articulate, it is necessary to understand development as not only leading to particular ends. Development can also be understood as a spread of perennial and ephemeral changes and effects throughout international politics (e.g. the perpetuation or implementation of structures and practices). The spread of changes and effects is the result of interactions among perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics. This idea of development as a spread within international politics, however, is not always obvious via a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives* which can fail to capture or provide details of certain changes and effects within international politics. Conversely, a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can help to capture and highlight the various ways (e.g. rates, incremental) in which this spreading occurs at the sub-macro levels of international politics than would otherwise be possible via a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*.³⁶ Illustrating this contrast between the two types of *historical time perspectives* is Morgenthau's discussion regarding historical accounts of European

³⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 37, 192, 196-97. In regards to the cited examples, that end was a balance of power that yielded a status quo which was most conducive to the interests of dominant international political actors at the time (i.e. great powers such as Russia and Great Britain).

³⁶ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 143.

thoughts on the protection of human life in war in the past. The discussion begins with a general account derived from a *long-term historical time perspective* that is slim on detail and ends with a detailed account (via *short-term historical time perspectives*) regarding the spread of the codification of the protection of human life in war.³¹⁷ Consequently, *short-term historical time perspectives* are useful in helping a theory to portray a clear, detailed picture of how international politics has supposedly progressed to particular points (which are not necessarily ends) in history over well-defined, limited timeframes.

Development as a spread of changes and effects occurring within international politics can be classified into one of two categories, vertical (or intensive) development and horizontal (or extensive) development.³¹⁸ To elaborate, vertical development occurs when new innovations in organising political interests or means of exercising power are introduced to the international political sphere. Looking to Morgenthau's theory, an example of the former is the emergence of states as dominant international actors over monarchs and empires; an example of the latter is the inclusion of nuclear weapons within a state's military arsenal. With regards to horizontal development, this type of development characterises international politics when the systems, processes, means, values, and norms that appear to be working are sustained, replicated, and spread throughout the international political sphere. An illustrative account of this type of development regards the application of law within international politics. The overenthusiastic faith in law on the domestic level, coupled with Wilson's Idealism, led to the belief that replicating similar legal structures and processes at the international level would produce similar results.³¹⁹ Both vertical and horizontal ideas of development can be useful when a theory is trying to characterise and explain the historical status of international politics during a particular period of time and the subsequent outcomes. Furthermore, these types of development are helpful in understanding how change takes place within a theory's trajectory derived from its *long-term historical time perspectives*.

³¹⁷ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 214-16.

³¹⁸ Although Peter Thiel used these categories of development (which he calls categories of progression) in reference to the spread of globalisation and technology, they are useful in categorising the types of developments and transformations international politics goes through over time which also exhibits vertical and horizontal development. Peter Thiel and Blake Masters, *Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2014), 9-11.

³¹⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 249-308.

In addition to detailing within a theory the potential vertical and horizontal development of international politics, a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can also indicate that the development of perennial and ephemeral changes and effects within international politics can look quite different at sub-macro levels of the past versus development at a macro-level via a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*. Helping to illustrate manifestations of these differences within a theory are various discussions by Morgenthau regarding balance of power and status quo. For example, in these discussions, his theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* help to indicate that developments within international politics in the years leading up to the outbreak of WWII looks quite different from the perspective of a status quo maintainer such as France vs. from the perspective of a status quo disruptor such as Germany.³²⁰ In another example, *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory regarding the question of Germany's development toward appeasement or war during the 1918-1939 interwar period suggest that a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can help to highlight that development within international politics over a specific period can move in potentially different historical directions not always accounted for by a theory's *long-term historical time perspectives*.³²¹

The different views of development provided by a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can also offer insights regarding the statuses of development during specific historical periods and its overall nature. For instance, *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory regarding the Concert of Europe offer insights into how development within international politics during a specific period can become fixed by a particular system of power that locks international political actors into behaving in certain ways. Conversely, collective consideration of *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory regarding the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe suggests that the formation of alliances within international politics is in a constant state of flux. Each of the aforementioned points and corresponding examples shared thus far in this section help to emphasise that *short-term historical time perspectives* are useful within a theory for providing different perspectives of development that might otherwise be overlooked or hidden within a theory's *long-term*

³²⁰ Ibid., 374-76.

³²¹ Ibid., 60-3.

historical time perspectives. Of equal importance is that such perspectives are necessary to include within a theory because they provide insights into how a theory makes sense of the perennial and ephemeral changes and effects shaping the transformations and developments (i.e. unfolding) in international politics over time.

5.3.5 *Prioritising and congruency*

When accounting for various details about historical developments, the presence and status of perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics, and the immediate and ongoing effects of these various aspects, a picture of what a given theory prioritises emerges. The highlighting of these priorities is another significant function that *short-term historical time perspectives* can perform within a theory. Essentially, the details acknowledged and highlighted in the *short-term historical time perspectives* illustrate which elements of international politics on a sub-macro level a theory values most or deems relevant to explanations given the phenomena being examined.³²² The opposite of the previous statement is also valid and provides insights as to what a theory considers to be insignificant or less important. Together, these priorities are significant because they serve as dominant narratives within a theory that shape the context within which old and new international political phenomena are examined and interpreted. To illustrate how aspects of international politics are prioritised by *short-term historical time perspectives* within a theory and the effects those prioritisations have, examples from Morgenthau's theory are detailed in the two following paragraphs.

Morgenthau's references to states and empires are highlighted in his theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* depending upon which manifestation of an international political actor dominated the international political sphere at the specific period of time in the past he is offering an explanation of. The entities themselves are only significant to Morgenthau within the short-term historical context provided, not

³²² The prioritisations on the sub-macro level can also correspond with what is prioritised at the macro-level via *long-term historical perspectives* and thus reaffirm the significance of theoretical claims associated with those shared prioritisations. These prioritisations, however, might not correspond due to recent historical changes in international politics (e.g. advent of nuclear weapons; the Cold War) which are not yet reflected in the long-term historical record. Carstensen, Isaacowitz, and Charles, "Taking Time Seriously," 178.

necessarily over the long-term. The conclusion drawn from this example is that aspects of international politics identified as significant within a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* need not necessarily correspond directly to those aspects identified as significant via *long-term historical time perspectives*, although at times they may. This incongruence can occur as a result of some aspects being only noticeable at the sub-macro levels such as emotions, the everyday, or the influence of particular less powerful states, but not observable at the macro levels. Conversely, where there is consistency between those aspects of international politics emphasised or prioritised in both the *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives*, a theory highlights not only the timeless significance of particular perennial aspects of international politics, but also the coherence of explanations that a theory provides to scholars.

In regards to the latter point about explanatory coherency within a theory 'across time', a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* can support coherency in two different ways. First, *short-term historical time perspectives* are a means of demonstrating the applicability of a theory's analytical tools, methods, and arguments in explaining various situations in international politics at any point in the past. Consequently, a theory's explanatory power appears robust and time-tested over multiple historical periods which span the scope of a whole past.³²³ Examples of this usage are demonstrated throughout Morgenthau's work via the historical case studies analysed using his theory (e.g. his analyses of attempts at maintaining peace via the Holy Alliance and the League of Nations).³²⁴ Second, *short-term historical time perspectives* are selectively chosen to establish a theory's relevance regarding a particular past of international political circumstances and phenomena that are similar to contemporary circumstances and phenomena found in the international political sphere. As a result, the inclusion and usage of *short-term historical time perspectives* in this way extends a theory's explanatory power regarding the past into the present.³²⁵ This particular usage is evident and effective in establishing coherency between the *short-term historical time perspectives* relating to the immediate past leading up to the present and the present

³²³ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, *Red Flag over Hong Kong* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 53.

³²⁴ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 427-46.

³²⁵ *Long-term historical time perspectives* can perform similar functions with respect to the present, although they provide macro-level explanatory insights rather than sub-macro level insights.

itself.³²⁶ For example, to understand the seriousness of the political tensions between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the majority of the latter half of the 20th Century, Morgenthau referenced the significance that the nuclear context created during the same period.³²⁷ In supporting and maintaining explanatory congruency in these two ways, *short-term historical time perspectives* play a crucial role in (re)validating theoretical claims about perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics derived from both *short-term* and *long-term historical time perspectives*.³²⁸

5.4 Combined effects

Thus far in this chapter, *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* have been addressed in isolation. This separation is artificial and was done for analytical reasons to elaborate the significance of each *historical time perspective* in relation to the understanding and interpretations of a theory's claims about international politics. In practice, however, these *historical time perspectives* (where they both exist) appear in international political theories simultaneously and constitute each theory's panoptic view of the past in its entirety. At times they are complementary of one another; at other times they are contrasting, although tension does not always exist between them.³²⁹ Although the co-existence among the two *historical time perspectives* within a theory and their effects on theoretical claims have been alluded to in the earlier sections of this chapter, this final section is intended to make their co-existence and cumulative effects on theoretical claims more evident. This will be done by examining these *historical time perspectives* and their effects in relation to Morgenthau's claims about the future; a similar examination will be done with respect to *present* and *future time perspectives* in the final sections of chapters 6 and 7. By calling attention to the co-existence of a theory's *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* and their cumulative effects on

³²⁶ This usage can be problematic because the coherency established by a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* immediately preceding the present can create a small-scale, context-specific, predetermined trajectory of time independent of other longer trajectories of time found within a theory.

³²⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Détente: The Balance Sheet," *New York Times*, March 28, 1974, <https://www.nytimes.com/1974/03/28/archives/detente-the-balance-sheet.html> (accessed April 10, 2018).

³²⁸ Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 205 and 207; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Introduction: Negotiating International History and Politics," in *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations*, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 7.

³²⁹ Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 218.

theoretical claims, this section helps emphasise the importance of scholars to remain attentive to a theory's *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* and their effects when studying international politics and making claims.

Within Morgenthau's theory, he explicitly states that the future of international politics cannot be predicted.³³⁰ At best, he states that all that a theory can do is anticipate the likelihood that international politics will unfold in particular ways, however, without guaranteed outcomes. This claim is derived, in part, from examining international politics from two separate *historical time perspectives*, long-term and short-term.³³¹ Based on his theory's *long-term historical time perspectives* regarding the patterns, trends, and cycles of international politics, Morgenthau understands that particular historical perennial aspects of international politics, such as the influence of human nature on international politics or the constantly shifting nature of the balance of power among international actors, will inevitably continue to manifest themselves in the future. These inevitable, ongoing manifestations will occur regardless of the contingent circumstances that may arise in the future, just as the contingent circumstances of the past did not hinder their previous manifestations.³³² Morgenthau is therefore claiming within his theory that certain aspects of future politics are known (e.g. interests affect politics), or at least more likely to be known (e.g. human nature), based on perennial aspects of international politics accounted for in his *long-term historical time perspectives*. These aspects which are more likely to manifest are significant because they are used to pre-emptively populate and signpost areas of international politics in the future. As a consequence, regardless of how the future will unfold concretely, this pre-population and signposting of the future provides some structure as to how to think about the future which is embedded into his theory. Examining the past through his theory's *long-term historical time perspectives* from the aforementioned angle alone would suggest that Morgenthau is claiming that the perennial aspects of international politics in the future can be predicted or at least be accurately signposted. However, the inclusion of *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory modify and call into question the potential for prediction or signposting derived solely from

³³⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 18.

³³¹ As will be detailed in Chapter 6 and 7, *short-term present, short-term future, and long-term future time perspectives* can also shape a claim.

³³² Morgenthau, "National Interest of the United States?," 4.

long-term historical perspectives.³³³ Thus, *short-term historical time perspectives* help to make readers aware of changes in international politics through empirical foci on the minute details of international politics.

The *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory modify and call into question what can be claimed to be known about the future by detailing that the timing, form, and activity or dormancy of historical perennial aspects of international politics manifest in different ways within a particular, limited period.³³⁴ These different ways can be attributed to the short-term historical contingent circumstances which are distinct from other historical (e.g. long-term) and contemporary and future contingent circumstances. As Morgenthau's theory illustrates, the details articulated via a theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* are essential to understanding where in the evolutionary process perennial and ephemeral aspects were in the contexts of the past as a whole (i.e. long-term) and within a specific historical period (i.e. short-term). Furthermore, such time perspectives are necessary to understanding where aspects are or are not possibly and likely headed in the near and distant future.³³⁵ Because international politics is not static nor are future manifestations of international politics independent of the past, knowing the aforementioned details derived from *short-term historical time perspectives* can help reassess, reposition, or alter those future signposts originally derived from *long-term historical time perspectives*. Consequently, these modifications end up yielding different potential manifestations of the future which are more reflective or fitting with recent historical developments than *long-term historical time perspectives* could yield on their own. In other words, the insights Morgenthau gains through *short-term historical time perspectives* enables him to clarify (i.e. modify) the broader claims about the future made within his theory.

This clarification, however, does not necessarily guarantee his theory can foretell the future of international politics. For example, how the influence of human nature on international politics in the future will manifest itself is still a mystery to Morgenthau even with the inclusion of *short-term historical time perspectives*. The future remains a mystery because his theory's *short-term historical time perspectives* provide numerous

³³³ Morgenthau, "Problem of Social Planning."

³³⁴ Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate", " 985.

³³⁵ Essentially, history limits what outcomes are possible.

and unique examples of when and how human nature's influence has or could have manifested itself differently in international politics in the past. These examples serve as templates or representations of what scholars might and might not expect to see reflected in other manifestations of human nature's influence in the future, although the actual manifestations can never be guaranteed. Furthermore, accepting that the manifestations of human nature's influence are indeterminate keeps Morgenthau's notions about the future open to various possibilities.³³⁶ Therefore, at best, the *short-term historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory can only help anticipate (not predict) the probability and possibility of future manifestations of international politics in similar, future circumstances. In claiming that his theory can anticipate rather than predict, Morgenthau is also not completely ruling out the possibility of any future phenomena from occurring, including phenomena that have only a slight chance of occurring within an anticipated future.

Subsequently, the combination of the two *historical time perspectives* alters how he interprets international politics unfolding in the future. Rather than interpreting the unfolding of international politics as moving in a particular direction or manner that is predictable, the two types of *historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory suggest that the future of international politics is open, with the potential for both the known and unknown aspects to unfold in any number of various directions and ways. By considering the past in its entirety via the two types of *historical time perspectives*, Morgenthau recognises that perennial aspects in international politics throughout the past have not existed in a vacuum nor have their expressions and influences been immune to influences from other perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics and beyond.³³⁷ Likewise, the expressions and influences of perennial and ephemeral aspects of the past are not bound to a particular past or the past as a segment of time separate and disconnected from other segments of time such as the present and the future.³³⁸ Essentially, there is an interaction among perennial and ephemeral aspects

³³⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 18.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 7-9 and 12.

³³⁸ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 144-53. The residual effects of the past extend to the future as the advent of nuclear weapons during WWII aptly illustrates.

of international politics across time which yield distinct outcomes that remain beyond prediction because of dynamic, contingent circumstances in international politics.³³⁹

These interactions may also not be known in advance for any number of reasons. Explanations for this might be because the interaction process may be slow and drawn out,³⁴⁰ occur on a micro-level that may only come to light after the future has come to past,³⁴¹ or involve yet-to-emerge ephemeral aspects.³⁴² Consequently, Morgenthau acknowledges within his theory that making sense of international politics in the future can only partially be done prior to its manifestations. While insights from his two types of *historical time perspectives* can offer suggestions of how the manifestations might occur as well as their potential for occurring, these *historical time perspectives* offer no guarantees. In other words, only after international politics has manifested in the future and time has passed since its manifestation can known and unknown future aspects (derived from *historical time perspectives*) be fitted together and (re)interpreted using updated understandings of international politics.³⁴³ In both instances, prior to the future occurring and after the future has come to pass, insights from his theory's *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* are used to make sense of the future of international politics. However, in a theory such as Morgenthau's which aims to understand and offer explanations about international politics as it was and is, only in the latter case (i.e. a future that has passed) is there value for Morgenthau. For Morgenthau, the post analysis has value because it augments our understanding of international politics while, in contrast, the pre-analysis will always fall short. In other words, predicting and predictions do little to contribute to theoretical understandings and explanations of international politics in the future. Consequently, they are thus largely absent from Morgenthau's theory and considered insignificant given the aims of

³³⁹ How aspects fit together are not arbitrary but influenced by the structuring and aggregation done via *long-term historical time perspectives* and by the interactions among aspects captured and detailed in the *short-term historical time perspectives*.

³⁴⁰ The decline of Great Britain as a balancer of power in Europe is one example mentioned in Morgenthau's theory. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 328, 443-44.

³⁴¹ This point is illustrated within Morgenthau's theory via the analysis and discussion regarding the appeasement measures that led to the fulfilment of Hitler's ambitions for Germany.

³⁴² Here Morgenthau's discussion of potential common interests that might lead to the need and creation of a world state serves as an example of this point.

³⁴³ MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 213.

his theory which is to understand and offer explanations about international politics as it was and is.³⁴⁴

While the primary objective of the chapter was to highlight the distinctions between *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives*, as well as their effects on theoretical claims, a secondary objective was to begin to illustrate that the effects of *historical time perspectives* are not self-contained, but work in relation to the effects of one another, as well as in relation to time perspectives of the present and the future. The relations between the *historical time perspectives* found within Morgenthau's theory are of particular interest because of what they demonstrate. First, the *historical time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory demonstrate how one can think about one time perspective within the context of another time perspective; for example how to think about *short-term historical time perspectives* within the context of *long-term historical time perspectives*. Second, they demonstrate the co-existence of two distinct types of time perspectives within one segment of time (i.e. the past). Within this co-existence one is not necessarily more dominant over the other, but together constitute a whole historical context which adds to and delimits the understandings and meanings that can be attributed to each theoretical claim by individual *historical time perspectives*.³⁴⁵ In other words, to ignore or be unaware of the multiple *historical time perspectives* associated with particular theoretical claims is to not fully comprehend the understandings and meanings attached to theoretical claims.³⁴⁶ Consequently, such circumstances contribute to an incomplete understanding of the explanations about international politics which Morgenthau's theory tries to limit.

5.5 Chapter summary

In this chapter, an effort has been made to unpack and develop understandings regarding the functions and effects of *historical time perspectives* within a theory which have been largely assumed or taken for granted, and only infrequently addressed in a

³⁴⁴ Morgenthau's prediction that China will one day become a great power is a rare instance where he offers a specific prediction. For examples see Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Roots of America's China Policy," *The China Quarterly* 10 (April 1962): 45-50; Morgenthau, "World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century," 160; Morgenthau, "Realism in International Politics," 8).

³⁴⁵ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 144.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 146-47.

substantive way in the IR literature.³⁴⁷ This effort was made to substantiate and falsify assumptions, as well as illustrate how *historical time perspectives* substantively shape international political theories. To unpack and enrich contemporary understandings of how historical time perspectives shape the meaning and contextualisation of theoretical claims, *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* were analysed, individually and cumulatively, in relation to theoretical claims across the three sections of this chapter. The first section began with an overview of the functions *long-term historical time perspectives* play in a theory and their subsequent effects on theoretical claims. The functions and effects covered included the following: providing a macro-level overview of the past; indication of historical patterns, trends, and cycles which extended over multiple periodisations; the structuring and aggregation of the past; how understandings and explanations of the past get extended and reified in the future; and the delimiting effects a theory's trajectory (derived from *long-term historical time perspectives*) has on theoretical explanations and possible explanations.³⁴⁸ The second part of the chapter addressed the functions and effects related to *short-term historical time perspectives*. A summary of these functions and effects include the following: the drawing out, capturing, and retaining of details which add nuanced and deeper understanding and meaning of the perennial and ephemeral aspects of theoretical claims; what claims and aspects get prioritised within a theory's explanation; how perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics manifested themselves; the interaction and fitting together of various theoretical claims and their related aspects at a sub-macro level; the applicability and congruency of a theory's explanation across time. The final section in the chapter highlighted the cumulative effects that the two types of *historical time perspectives* can have on theoretical claims regarding the future.

As a consequence of my analyses conducted in the aforementioned sections, this chapter has illustrated that multiple *historical time perspectives* are embedded within a theory. Using illustrative examples drawn from Morgenthau's theory, my analysis suggests that the various *historical time perspectives* within a theory are not arbitrary, but are included for particular reasons. Beyond helping to cope with complexity of the past in its entirety, my analysis indicates that *long-term* and *short-term historical time*

³⁴⁷ MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 204.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 206.

perspectives within a theory add meaning and contextualisation to theoretical claims. Furthermore, my analysis indicates that the meanings and contextualisations added to a theoretical claim are dependent upon how each claim is understood and interpreted within each historical time perspective. This insight supports one of the central arguments made throughout this study, namely that time perspectives shape theoretical claims. Although this chapter only dealt with *historical time perspectives*, my analysis found that the meanings and contextualisations added to theoretical claims by these time perspectives were not limited to those of the past. *Long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* can also add meanings and contextualisations to theoretical claims in regards to the present and the future. Finally, by unpacking and developing more substantive understandings of how the functions and effects of *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* within a theory shape theoretical claims, this chapter offers new insights into how and why (mis)readings and (mis)understandings of theoretical claims may emerge within the IR literature. The insights and analyses of this chapter also suggest that readers of IR theory should maintain an awareness and develop a deeper understanding of a theory's *historical time perspectives* in relation to understanding and interpreting theoretical claims. Doing so helps reduce the likelihood of misunderstanding claims made within a theory.

Chapter 6: Short-term Present Time Perspectives

Having delved deeply into the nuances of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past in the previous chapter, the attention within this chapter shifts now toward the nuances of *short-term time perspectives* of the present. Consequently, the aim of this chapter will be to analyse the functions and effects of a theory's *short-term present time perspectives*. The following analysis will be conducted in a similar manner as the one found in the previous chapter. The analysis will begin by addressing different functions and effects of *short-term present time perspectives* that may be found within a theory, their relations to each other, and their relations to theoretical claims as they can appear within a theory. Guiding my analysis of *present time perspectives* will be a series of questions similar to those which guided my analysis of *historical time perspectives*.³⁴⁹ To maintain consistency, Morgenthau's theory will once again serve as a theoretical example from which examples will be drawn of *short-term present time perspectives'* manifestations, functions, and effects. From this analysis, distinctions among different *short-term present time perspectives* will be made clear. Furthermore, as a consequence of highlighting these distinctions, the differences between *short-term present time perspectives* and *historical time perspectives* will also be made apparent. By the end of the chapter, I will suggest an understanding of how theoretical claims acquire unique meaning and contextualisation in the past, present, and future from *short-term present time perspectives*.

The chapter is comprised of four sections. The first section begins with a discussion regarding the ubiquitous presence of *short-term present time perspectives* across various theories of international politics. The pervasiveness of this type of time perspective is unmatched by any other type of time perspective considered in this thesis. This pervasiveness matters because it suggests that *short-term present time perspectives* can be used as places to initiate studies of time perspectives in a theory. The second section then continues by addressing five primary functions that *short-term present time perspectives* perform within a theory and the effects that these time perspectives have

³⁴⁹ These questions include: What distinguishing features do *short-term present time perspectives* possess in relation to *historical* and *future time perspectives* found within the same theory? What purposes do *short-term present time perspectives* serve within a theory? How does the presence or absence of a particular *short-term present time perspectives* affect how theoretical claims can potentially be understood and interpreted by readers of a particular theory? How do *short-term present time perspectives* help readers make better sense of international politics?

on theoretical claims. These functions include 1) articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions of international politics, 2) problematising international politics in the present, as well as in the past and the future, 3) characterising the present, 4) building relations between a theory's present and its past and future, and 5) situating a theory and its claims internally and externally in time.³⁵⁰ As will be addressed in detail later in this section, understanding how these functions are performed by a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* is important to reflect upon. This understanding helps to highlight how a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* shape and direct how the aforementioned functions are performed within other time perspectives and their subsequent effects on claims made within a theory. In the final section, I will illustrate the cumulative effects that multiple *short-term present time perspectives* have on Morgenthau's notions regarding the future in a similar manner as was done in Chapter 5's analysis of the combined effects of *historical time perspectives*.

6.1 Ubiquity and pervasiveness

Of all the time perspectives addressed in this thesis, no theory of international politics seems to be without a *short-term present time perspective* accounting for or articulating something about a theory's contemporary international politics. For example, classical theories frequently associated with international politics such as Clausewitz's realism, Paine's liberalism, and Marx's and Engels's Marxism all include accounts of contemporary international politics that are articulated via *short-term present time perspectives*.³⁵¹ The ubiquitous presence of these *present time perspectives*

³⁵⁰ Muzzetto, "Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz".

³⁵¹ The following quotes from each of the three mentioned classical theories are provided as examples illustrating references to a contemporary time. From Clausewitz's *On War*: 'If we examine the conditions of modern warfare, we shall find that the wars that bear a considerable resemblance to those of the present day, especially with respect to armaments, are primarily campaigns beginning with the War of the Austrian Succession. Even though many major and minor circumstances have changed considerably, these are close enough to modern warfare to be instructive. The situation is different with the War of the Spanish Succession; the use of firearms was much less advanced, and cavalry was still the most important arm.' Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 173. From Paine's *Common Sense*: 'Our plan is peace for ever. We are tired of contention with Britain, and can see no real end to it but in a final separation. We act consistently, because for the sake of introducing an endless and uninterrupted peace, do we bear the evils and burthens of the present day.' Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* (Philadelphia: W. & T. Bradford, 1776), 169. From Marx's *Capital*: 'They show that, within the ruling-classes themselves, a foreboding is dawning, that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable of change, and is constantly changing.' Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I: The Process of Capitalist Production*, ed. Frederick Engels, trans. from the 3rd German edition, by Samuel

is not limited to classical theories; other theories stemming from classical theories, like neorealism, neoliberalism, and feminism do the same.³⁵² Further supporting this claim that every theory contains *short-term present time perspectives* is the idea that every theory begins from the premise that pre-existing theories are insufficient or incomplete (in the present) in explaining something about the world. Consequently, *short-term present time perspectives* are ubiquitous across theories of international politics because every theory of international politics makes reference to and is an outcome of a particular present. Acknowledging that *short-term present time perspectives* within theories of international politics are ubiquitous is important for the following reason.

The pervasiveness of *short-term present time perspectives* within theories of international politics suggests that theories of international politics possess, at a minimum, one *short-term present time perspective*. This minimum standard of inclusion with respect to *short-term present time perspectives* is not meant to disregard the significance of other time perspectives, either historical or futural. In practice, however, the same pervasiveness exhibited by *short-term present time perspectives* cannot be claimed in regards to other types of time perspectives; reasons for this will be addressed in later sections of this chapter. Therefore, *short-term present time perspectives* offer unique entry points, within any theory of international politics, through which scholars can begin to identify, study, and understand the functions and effects that time perspectives have on a theory's claims. For example, a reader of Morgenthau's theory could start to begin to identify, study, and understand the relationship between time perspectives and his theoretical claims regarding balance of power in international politics by initially looking at *short-term present time perspectives* included within Morgenthau's theory articulating the contemporary circumstances between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. By sharing the insight with IR scholars that *short-term present time perspectives* within a theory are unique entry points that can be used to initiate studies of time perspectives, new and latent understandings and interpretations regarding theoretical claims and their relations with time perspectives can also be

Moore and Edward Aveling, revised and amplified according to the 4th German ed. by Ernest Untermann (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1909), 16.

³⁵² For examples of each of the latter theories stemming from classical theories see: for neorealism Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub., 1979); for neoliberalism Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); for feminism Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, rev. edn. (1990; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014).

excavated as illustrated in this chapter. Furthermore, this insight regarding *short-term present time perspectives* as entry points of research opens up new, fruitful discussions and dialogues about time perspectives and time in general which have thus far been limited or difficult to include in contemporary IR conversations. For example, discussions around *short-term present time perspectives* can enable scholars, indigenous peoples, and political practitioners, who might maintain different understandings of the present (e.g. the present as all-encompassing or the 'here-and-now' is all that matters), to talk to one another from a single type of time perspective (i.e. a *short-term present time perspective*) that each group can likely relate to. Such dialogues would be fruitful in the sense that they would potentially yield a more comprehensive picture of how international politics is understood by disparate groups through a 'shared' *short-term present time perspective*.³⁵³

6.2 Necessary and sufficient

To better understand why *short-term present time perspectives* are always present in theories and what makes them distinct from other time perspectives, it is helpful to consider what *short-term present time perspectives* add to a theory and its claims. First, *short-term present time perspectives* provide insights into the necessary and sufficient conditions (in a mathematical sense)³⁵⁴ for the manifestation of international politics which a theory uses to develop understandings and interpretations of contemporary international politics.³⁵⁵ 'Necessary and sufficient conditions' are here referred to as those historical, contemporary, and potential perennial and ephemeral aspects, situations, and problems of international politics which a theory deems to be the most

³⁵³ For example, differences between Australian Aboriginal and Western notions of time have made it difficult to discuss international politics across time. However, time perspectives that apply in similarly recognisable forms in both notions are *short-term present time perspectives*. For a basic example of Australian Aboriginal notions of time and perspectives regarding the present see: Aleksandar Janca and Clothilde Bullen, "The Aboriginal Concept of Time and Its Mental Health Implications," *Australasian Psychiatry* 11, no. 1_suppl (October 2003): S40-44. For an example of an in-depth discussion regarding connections between politics and Aboriginal notions of time see: Eric Kline Silverman, "Politics, Gender, and Time in Melanesia and Aboriginal Australia," *Ethnology* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 101-21.

³⁵⁴ For example, in ' $2+2=4$ ' and ' $3+1=4$ ' the necessary and sufficient conditions such as '2', '3', and '1' are varied. However, the sum of '4' limits what possible numbers can be inserted into the equation. Likewise, a manifestation of a present imposes limits on what the past and notions about the future can possibly be considered to have led to a particular manifestation of a present.

³⁵⁵ *Historical* and *future time perspectives* might not necessarily provide information about conditions which are relevant to contemporary conditions of international politics.

salient and essential in contemporary international politics.³⁵⁶ Those aspects and situations articulated via a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* may include the existence of states, international norms and laws, or ongoing political tensions that lead to conflicts. To illustrate what these conditions might look like within a theory, bringing in examples from Morgenthau's theory is useful. Reflecting upon the *short-term present time perspectives* found within Morgenthau's theory, the nuclear condition (perennial) and the relationship between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union (ephemeral) can be considered to be examples of the necessary and sufficient conditions of contemporary international politics at the time Morgenthau was writing about and studying international politics.³⁵⁷ Although these conditions captured by Morgenthau's *short-term present time perspectives* may on the surface appear random, they are not. His theory's *short-term present time perspectives* frame and delimit them.

A theory's *short-term present time perspectives* essentially articulate the present in particular ways within a theory. They focus on what a theory considers most salient to understanding and interpreting manifestations of contemporary international politics. Because those articulations of the present are limited and vary depending upon a theory's *short-term present time perspectives*, so too are the conditions of contemporary international politics embedded into a theory via its *short-term present time perspectives*. The conditions (historical, contemporary, and potential), which are identified as contributing to particular manifestations of the present, are deemed as 'necessary and sufficient' conditions of international politics because without them a particular present manifestation of international politics would not be possible. In other words, certain historical, contemporary, and potential conditions and their combinations (articulated via *short-term present time perspectives*) can only yield a particular present.³⁵⁸ An example of how this notion appearing within a theory is evident in the following remarks drawn from Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*. First, Morgenthau claims that 'the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history [(i.e. past presents)] depends upon the political and cultural context

³⁵⁶ *Short-term present time perspectives* are only able to make unsubstantiated claims about whether particular aspects of international politics are perennial or ephemeral; other time perspectives are needed to support such claims.

³⁵⁷ A perennial condition, such as the nuclear condition, captured by a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* illustrates the manifestation of that condition in the present, but does not necessarily mean that such a condition does not have a historical or a future manifestation.

³⁵⁸ MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 211.

within which foreign policy is formulated'.³⁵⁹ A few pages latter he goes on to claim that '[t]he events he [the observer of international politics] must try to understand are...unique occurrences'³⁶⁰ and are made sense of in the present through 'the correlation of recent events with the more distant past and the perennial qualities of human nature underlying both'.³⁶¹

The identification of particular historical, contemporary, and potential conditions as 'necessary and sufficient' within a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* are of importance because they help outline and define at the time of theorisation (in a particular *present*) the following elements from: 1) what international politics is and is not in the past, present, and future from a present perspective, 2) what is included and worthy of examination when studying international politics of the past, present, and future, and 3) what is excluded or considered less relevant in regards to contemporary international politics in a particular present.³⁶² For example, by identifying states as contemporary dominant actors, but not permanent actors within international politics, the *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory are delimiting that international politics is not reliant on the existence of states or their dominance.³⁶³ The consequence of these delimitations stemming from a theory's *short-term present time perspectives*' articulation of the present is the establishment, in part, of the essence of what international politics is in the present and what historical, contemporary, and potential conditions of international politics contribute to the present's manifestation.³⁶⁴ This basic understanding and interpretation of what the necessary and sufficient conditions of contemporary international politics are in the present also frame and limit how the past and future of international politics are understood and interpreted within a theory.³⁶⁵ This is because conditions in both the past and future must have some connection between those in the present.³⁶⁶ In this

³⁵⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 8.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁶² Mueller's and Walker's separate discussions regarding the 'originary moment' and 'temporal moment' flag up these unique qualities of the present. Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 430-31; Walker, "Articulation of Political Space/Time," 448.

³⁶³ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 9.

³⁶⁴ *Historical and future time perspectives* help to further refine what international politics is within a theory.

³⁶⁵ Bernstein, Lebow, Gross Stein, and Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems," 49.

³⁶⁶ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 147.

respect, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* are claimed in this study to be providing a theory with an articulation of what it considers to be the necessary and sufficient conditions of international politics, which in turn limits the types of explanations of international politics that a theory can provide to readers.³⁶⁷

To further clarify the abstract points made in the above paragraphs, Morgenthau's notion of the novelty of each present addressed below is a helpful illustration. Via *short-term present time perspectives*, Morgenthau's theory conceptualises the *present*, or rather each *present*, as being novel. This particular perspective of each present as being novel is dependent upon certain claims made about the conditions of international politics such as international politics being contingent (i.e. conditional) and in a constant state of flux. At first glance it might appear that obtaining any objective 'truths' about international politics (such as the necessary and sufficient conditions of international politics) from a particular *present* would be difficult. Rösch's interpretation of passages from Morgenthau's *Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft*,³⁶⁸ however, suggests that Morgenthau acknowledges that a theory can still reveal objective 'truths' about international politics; '[o]bjectivity is still possible, albeit tied to the specific sociopolitical and cultural constellations that inform individual perspectives'.³⁶⁹ Consequently, within Morgenthau's theory, contingencies and the constant state of flux of international politics are interpreted as objective truths of international politics and as such both are understood as the necessary and sufficient conditions which contribute to novel manifestations of each present in international politics.

In making the aforementioned theoretical claims about the conditions which yield each novel present, claims within Morgenthau's theory are also being made about what the essence or core qualities of international politics are in general, namely that international politics is dynamic and unpredictable.³⁷⁰ But this essence or core qualities are not limited to international politics of the present; they also apply to how international politics of the past and future are understood and interpreted throughout

³⁶⁷ Guzzini, "Ends of International Relations Theory," 530.

³⁶⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen*, 1934 (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Container 151), 20.

³⁶⁹ Felix Rösch, "Crisis, Values, and the Purpose of Science: Hans Morgenthau in Europe," *Ethics & International Affairs* 30, no. 1 (March 2016), 27.

³⁷⁰ Morgenthau, "Problem of Social Planning," 176.

Morgenthau's theory. In other words, that which is identified as 'necessary and sufficient' in contemporary international politics via a theory's *short-term present time perspectives*, suggests what is likewise 'necessary and sufficient' for each *present* of the past and each present in the future.³⁷¹ Thus, the dynamism and unpredictability of international politics are perennial aspects. Consequently, the delimiting effects of a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* extend beyond a theory's understanding and interpretation of contemporary international politics to international politics in the past and the future. This insight suggests to readers that there is a kind of presentism within a theory that can effect claims made within a theory and subsequently influence readers' understandings and interpretations of international politics past, present, and future.³⁷² Hence, by conducting a detailed and technical analysis of *short-term present time perspectives* within a theory and their effects on theoretical claims, this section and others in this chapter aim to highlight what areas of awareness and understanding in relation to a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* readers should consider developing. This development is necessary to better comprehend the limitations of theoretical claims available for use in studies of international politics.

Based on the aforementioned insights that a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* help to frame and delimit the necessary and sufficient conditions contributing to the manifestations of international politics, it is not surprising that *short-term present time perspectives* are so pervasive across theories of international politics. As will be addressed in the following section, the pervasiveness of *short-term present time perspectives* can also be attributed to their role in problematising international politics in contemporary circumstances, as well as those of the past and the future. In addition to sharing insights which suggest why *short-term present time perspectives* are so persuasive, these two sections were placed together in this study to impress upon readers the fundamental contributions that *short-term present time perspectives* make to a theory and its claims. Having already addressed in the previous section one fundamental contribution made by *short-term present time perspectives*, my

³⁷¹ This implies that there must be some consistency or continuity between the necessary and sufficient conditions of international politics in the present with those of the past or future to confirm that international politics remains the focus of a theory's inquiry rather than some other type of politics (e.g. domestic, local) or phenomena (e.g. social, economic).

³⁷² Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 268-69.

analysis of *short-term present time perspectives* will now address a second contribution, namely their role in the problematising international politics within a theory.

6.3 Problematising international politics

Among the distinct, salient functions that *short-term present time perspectives* perform, one of their functions is to problematise international politics within a theory. The problematisation of international politics via a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* is necessary for three reasons: 1) to help draw attention to perennial and ephemeral aspects and situations of international politics that are themselves not inherently problematic but remain unresolved or are in need of making sense of, 2) to provide a purpose for a theory, and 3) to help a theory prioritise which international political problems are most pressing. Regarding the first reason, there is a suggestion that perennial and ephemeral aspects and situations of international politics become problematised in the present. They become problematized in the present when international politics of the past, present, or future do not appear to be resolved or make sense given the contemporary understandings and interpretations of international politics. To illustrate the point that problematisation occurs in the present, Morgenthau's analysis on appeasement serves as an illustrative example. The idea of appeasement itself is not inherently problematic. Based on Morgenthau's assessment of the acceptance of successive German claims beginning in 1935 until 1938, appeasement was considered a relatively unproblematic, rational policy option at the time it was pursued to maintain a perceived status quo in Europe and avoid war.³⁷³ Only in subsequent presents after the outbreak of WWII was appeasement of that the same period (i.e. 1935-38) broadly reinterpreted as wholly problematic.³⁷⁴ This example highlights how contemporary circumstances in international politics problematise an aspect of international politics (e.g. a policy of appeasement) when present interpretations of an historical record change. Consequently, what becomes problematised in the present via a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* affects

³⁷³ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 60-1.

³⁷⁴ Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 147; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 60-1.

what theoretical claims are made and how understandings and interpretations of those claims shape the study of international politics.

A second reason why a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* problematise international politics in the present is to give a theory of international politics its purpose.³⁷⁵ Essentially, a theory of international politics is developed with an intention to provide an explanation or help make sense of aspects and phenomena of international politics. Morgenthau himself shares a similar understanding: '...a theory of international relations performs the functions any theory performs, that is, to bring order and meaning into a mass of unconnected material and to increase knowledge through the logical development of certain propositions empirically established'.³⁷⁶ However, not every aspect or phenomena is explained; only those which are designated by a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* as needing explanations are predominately addressed. The aspects and phenomena needing explanation include those that are most relevant to understanding contemporary international politics.³⁷⁷ They may also include aspects and phenomena regarding the past and the future which appear to be insufficiently explained by existing explanations or require (re)interpretation because the present manifestation of international politics has raised questions about the past and the future that previously did not exist. Therefore, a theory's focus of inquiry and explanatory purpose becomes narrowly defined as a consequence of what aspects or situations of international politics in the past, present, or future become problematised in the present. Understanding how problematisation in the present defines the focus of inquiry and purpose of a theory of international politics offers new insights into the internal limits *short-term present time perspectives* place on the explanations and claims a theory can provide.

To illustrate how international politics is problematised via *short-term present time perspectives* and the subsequent effects of that problematisation, Morgenthau's comments regarding bi-polarity are worth examining. For Morgenthau, a world where international politics is dominated by two opposing, yet equally powerful international political actors is not necessarily problematic. As Morgenthau's discussions about the

³⁷⁵ Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 268.

³⁷⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 257.

³⁷⁷ Elman and Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory," 13-4.

balance of power dynamics in Europe prior to World War II suggest, in general, a bi-polar world did not automatically pose a great threat for him. The reason why is because the actors holding places of dominance were not fixed and the balance could be tilted in favour of one actor or another through an alliance with a third actor. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in both the U.S. and former Soviet Union, *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory problematised Morgenthau's contemporary bi-polar world differently than the bi-polar worlds of old. 'The [nuclear] power of the United States and of the Soviet Union in comparison with the power of their actual or prospective allies has become so overwhelming that through their own preponderant weight they determine the balance of power between them'.³⁷⁸ The nuclear condition of Morgenthau's contemporary bi-polar world became one of grave concern and a contemporary aspect of international politics which he could not ignore. On the one hand, Morgenthau was claiming in his theory that the study of contemporary international politics must not be blind to the influence that the nuclear condition has on the contemporary bi-polar world. On the other hand, Morgenthau was also aware that theoretical claims about international politics in the past (e.g. the role of the balancer in a bi-polar world) took on different meanings and relevance to his contemporary bi-polar world.³⁷⁹ As the above example illustrates, the problematisation of contemporary international politics has broad effects on theoretical claims made throughout a theory.

The third reason why problematisation via a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* is necessary is because the problematisation helps a theory prioritise which international political aspects and situations are most pressing and in need of being addressed. The aspects and situations of international politics problematised by *short-term present time perspectives* help a theory prioritise which particular historical, contemporary, and future aspects or situations should receive proportionately more attention in the study of international politics. Drawing on an example from the previous paragraph, Morgenthau's singling out of the nuclear condition as a particular international political problem needing attention because of the existential threat it poses, highlights how *short-term present time perspectives* prioritise certain problems

³⁷⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 326.

³⁷⁹ Regarding the latter point, the nuclear condition forced the re-evaluation of the past which led to a distinction between bi-polarity as evidenced in the past and bi-polarity in the present.

within a theory. This prioritisation is important in narrowing down the focus of inquiry and purpose of a theory. The prioritisation also distinguishes one theory of international politics from another without deviating from their shared purpose of trying to offer explanations of international politics. Furthermore, by limiting the scope of what a theory tries to account for with respect to contemporary international politics, *short-term present time perspectives* likewise limit how a theory examines the past and explains the future. The past and the future are problematized based on what in the present is prioritised and problematized via *short-term present time perspectives*. Although I acknowledge that other time perspectives within a theory do their own prioritising and problematising work on international politics, the prioritisation and problematisation work done within them is pre-emptively constrained. The work of these other time perspectives is pre-emptively constrained because it namely builds upon and is governed by what aspects and situations of international politics get prioritised and problematised within a theory by its *short-term present time perspectives*.

To gain a better grasp of how and why prioritisations and problematisations made within a theory via its *short-term present time perspectives* warrant consideration, reflecting upon Morgenthau's references to the state offer insights. Via the *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory, international political struggles for power and peace in the present are interpreted as caused by interactions among states. States are singled out and prioritised among other international political actors because they are considered by Morgenthau to be the dominant actors in international politics at the time he is trying to develop a theory to make sense of international politics.³⁸⁰ According to Morgenthau, the struggles for power and peace among states persist for various reasons such as the pursuance of national interests and maintenance or expansion of state sovereignty.³⁸¹ By associating these interests with the state and no other actor in international politics in the present, the idea of the state becomes problematised in the present within Morgenthau's theory. Therefore, a theory of international politics focused on states and their interactions with one another should contribute to an understanding of international politics and the struggle for power and

³⁸⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 9; Sean Molloy, "Truth, Power, Theory: Hans Morgenthau's Formulation of Realism," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 15, no. 1 (2004), 27.

³⁸¹ For examples see Morgenthau's analysis and discussion regarding imperialism in *Politics among Nations*, pages 41-66.

peace. Morgenthau recognises that the struggle for power and peace, however, is not unique to the state because the struggle is perennial. Thus, what problematises the state might also not be limited to the state or the present.

For Morgenthau, the state is merely the latest form of dominant international political actors to appear, actors which sustain the perennial struggles for power and peace in the world. Other forms of previously dominant international political actors include city-states, empires, monarchs, and sovereign religious institutions such as the Catholic Church. In claiming that the state shares connections with previous dominant international political actors, the problematisation of the state in the present can be linked to dominant international political actors of the past.³⁸² This relationship suggests that the state as a unit of analysis in his theory is understood within Morgenthau's theory as a contemporary, temporary, and transient representative of the broader category of a unit of analysis which include dominant international political actors of different forms of the past and the future.³⁸³ Therefore, theoretical claims made within Morgenthau's theory about the state as a dominant actor in international politics offer insights about international political actors in general.³⁸⁴ In a creative way, the prioritisation of the state in Morgenthau's theory via *short-term present time perspectives* helps to establish the relevance of Morgenthau's theory to the present contexts without undermining the applicability of his theoretical claims in relation to international politics of the past and the future.

6.4 Characterising the present

As my analyses of the two prior functions have suggested, a third function *short-term present time perspectives* perform within a theory which is to characterise the present. Through the process of articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions which contribute to the manifestations of international politics and problematisation of

³⁸² Conversely, this connection between present and past also attributes problematisations of historical actors to present actors (i.e. the state). Furthermore, future forms of dominant international political actors can also be claimed to share similar problematisations as those of the state.

³⁸³ Carr holds a similar view of the state as seen in Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis*, 211.

³⁸⁴ Such a reading of Morgenthau's theory which consciously accounts for historical perspectivism in Morgenthau's theory is in contrast to how Morgenthau's theory had been read for many decades in mainstream IR which tended to over exaggerate the importance of the state as his unit of analysis and assume he was writing a grand theory.

international politics within a theory, *short-term present time perspectives* can end up characterising international politics in the present in three ways. International politics in the present can be understood as 1) a product or consequence, 2) a departure or disruption, and/or 3) a staging ground.³⁸⁵ With regards to the first, *short-term present time perspectives* can characterise international politics in the present as a closed, predetermined product or consequence of historical trends, cycles, deliberate and indirect efforts made by policymakers or other international political actors.³⁸⁶ This type of characterisation suggests a theory's study and explanation of international politics is oriented toward the past.³⁸⁷ Essentially, the unique understanding and meaning of contemporary international politics these theories often rely on a continual awareness of or reference to (i.e. orientation) to the past. Postcolonial theory offers an example of a theory that exhibits a definitive orientation toward the past.³⁸⁸ This close association and dependency of the present on the past can become problematic within a theory because theoretical interpretations of international politics in the present and future have difficulty moving beyond the past which is no longer relevant.

As demonstrated in Morgenthau's theory, *short-term present time perspectives* can also characterise the present as a product or consequence of a combination of circumstances in the past and the present or a combination of circumstances in the past, the present, and the future.³⁸⁹ The discussion within Morgenthau's theory regarding the ineffectiveness of the international legal system serves as an example of how Morgenthau characterises the present as a product of a combination of circumstances of the past, present, and future.³⁹⁰ For Morgenthau, international laws are created and

³⁸⁵ Karl Mannheim, *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* (1925), eds. David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr, trans. David Kettler and Volker Meja from a first draft by Elizabeth R. King (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 96; Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 217. Evidence that Morgenthau was also aware of these different perspectives of the present can be found in: Han J. Morgenthau, "Toynbee and the Historical Imagination," 73.

³⁸⁶ Arthur N. Gilbert, "International Relations and the Relevance of History," *International Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (December 1968), 355; Lawson, "The Promise of Historical Sociology," 403.

³⁸⁷ Mannheim, *Conservatism*, 97.

³⁸⁸ For an example see Robert J. C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 4-6.

³⁸⁹ Although future circumstances have not occurred, they are nevertheless taken into consideration when thinking about the present. For example, before signing a proposed international agreement regarding climate change, state officials consider what the contemporary and future effects such an agreement will have on, for example, the global economy. The future effects will be considered on some level by the state officials as if they had already occurred.

³⁹⁰ In this example, future circumstances considered might include the future legal implications of a new international law or particular ruling on a contemporary legal issue.

enacted in the present to address specific contemporary international legal issues which have occurred neither before nor since. Hence, Morgenthau concludes that 'international law is of a clearly static nature' where-by it 'limits itself to establishing a relationship which has existed in the past at a specific moment in time between two given states'.³⁹¹ The problem of this 'static nature' of international law becomes apparent to Morgenthau as these laws accumulate over time and are found to be ineffective when applied outside of their original historical contexts to contemporary and future legal issues which appear to be similar or have relevance with legal issues in the past, but in fact exist under different circumstances (e.g. different actors involved in a legal dispute). Consequently, the present international legal system is characterised by, and claimed to be, ineffective within Morgenthau's theory not by the past or the present individually (both which would assume the system to be effective) but through a combination of circumstances of the past, present, and future.

In the second instance, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* can characterise the present state of international politics as a departure from or disruption of historical evolutions.³⁹² International politics in the present is identified as a departure or disruption when international politics in the present does not appear to be fully explained by, fit with, or be anticipated based on knowledge of international politics in the past.³⁹³ A departure or disruption can manifest when new forms of international political actors arise and supplant older actors' dominance in the world (e.g. states supplanting monarchies) or political, social, and technological developments represent a point in international politics that once crossed cannot be returned to or a point actors do not want to return to.³⁹⁴ Consequently, the nature of international politics appears less static and predictable and more dynamic and indeterminate. Thus, by characterising the present as a departure from or disruption of the past, international politics in the present cannot be interpreted as merely a continuation or repeat of the

³⁹¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Concept of the Political*, eds. Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, trans. Maeva Vidal (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 124.

³⁹² Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 30.

³⁹³ Steele, *Ontological Security in International Relations*, 12-13; Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-9; Elman and Elman, "Role of History," 361.

³⁹⁴ Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 61. Two examples of a departure from or disruption of historical evolutions include the U.S. use of nuclear weapons on Japan during WWII and the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Both examples were thought to be unthinkable, or at least manifest differently, until they became real in their respective presents.

past. The aforementioned conceptualisation of international politics in the present suggests that more than a historical account is needed to explain manifestations of international politics in the present. If history alone is insufficient to make sense of the present, then some aspect(s) of the present must be distinct or separate from the past and requires another time perspective focused on the present to account for the differences. By setting the present apart from the past in this way, there is the suggestion that a theory's focus is oriented toward the present itself based upon the present's own significance.

Articulating the present as distinct from the past is a significant claim and one which effects other claims made within a theory. For example, within Morgenthau's theory each present is understood to be unique and distinct from previous presents and future presents. 'A given matter, considered to be political today, could no longer possess this characteristic tomorrow, while some other matter could suddenly become a prime political issue'.³⁹⁵ This interpretation of politics suggests that each present is either a departure from the past or disruption of historical patterns; an interpretation that Morgenthau finds support for in historical records. If no two presents are the same, though they may be similar, then the nature of international politics across time is open and indeterminate in Morgenthau's theory, as Hom and Steele have argued.³⁹⁶ For Morgenthau, this interpretation of the present is essential to the study of international politics for two reasons. First, claiming each present is unique and the nature of international politics is open and indeterminate supports Morgenthau's theoretical claims regarding contingencies and their significance in shaping international politics. Second, the open and indeterminate nature of international politics helps explain why the claim that international politics is unpredictable (because of contingencies) is made within Morgenthau's theory.³⁹⁷ In other words, unique presents and contingencies are mutually reinforcing claims within Morgenthau's theory that, for Morgenthau, capture key aspects of the nature of international politics in any present (and across time).

³⁹⁵ Morgenthau, *Concept of the Political*, 101.

³⁹⁶ Hom and Steele, "Open Horizons".

³⁹⁷ Claims regarding the openness and indeterminacy of international politics, as well as the role of contingencies in shaping international politics are also reinforced by the historical record articulated throughout Morgenthau's work on international politics.

Finally, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* can characterise international politics in the present as a staging ground for the future.³⁹⁸ In this characterisation of the present, the importance of the present is about what it can reveal about the future rather than what contemporary circumstances can reveal about the present itself or the past. Unlike the two previously discussed characterisations of the present (i.e. the present as a product or departure), characterising the present as a staging ground suggests contemporary international politics has a future (i.e. the present is future oriented). As a staging ground, articulations of the present within a theory provide the contemporary (and sometimes historical) context from which a theory's particular vision of the future of international politics emerges and is understood to have originated. Thus, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* create a crucial link between the present and the future within a theory. For example, the discussion within Morgenthau's theory regarding a contemporary two-bloc system based around the U.S. and the former Soviet Union help to foreshadow what a two-bloc system will be based upon in the short-term future.³⁹⁹

This characterisation of the present as a staging ground also adds significance to contemporary ephemeral aspects of international politics mentioned within a theory that might otherwise be overlooked. For example, Morgenthau's mentioning of uncommitted nations⁴⁰⁰ (e.g. India, Indonesia, China, Japan, a unified Germany) and a Third Force advocated by General DeGaulle in 1946 appear as contemporary ephemeral aspects of international politics within Morgenthau's theory with hypothetical or unknown effects on the future of international politics that should not be overlooked.⁴⁰¹ Significance is added to these particular contemporary aspects by suggesting that their effects are not confined to the present, but potentially set into motion or are crucial to the manifestation of a theory's particular versions of the future. Over half a century later in 2018, contemporary readers of Morgenthau's theory can appreciate the benefits of not overlooking such aspects and presenting them as potential staging grounds for the future. Many of the uncommitted nations mentioned by Morgenthau are now, over half

³⁹⁸ The phase staging ground used here refers to a place in time where international politics of the future is initiated.

³⁹⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 338.

⁴⁰⁰ 'Uncommitted nations' for Morgenthau are those that are not firmly committed to or within the orbits of influence of either the U.S. or the former Soviet Union in the decades following the end of WWII. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 327.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 327-30.

a century later, political actors who significantly shape international politics and at times serve as leaders challenging dominant political forces (e.g. China, India) or as advocates calling for alternatives to the status quo (e.g. France and Germany calling for more EU military independence from the U.S.).⁴⁰² In other words, contemporary international politics plant seeds which might later manifest into particular outcomes in the future. Regardless of how the notion of the present as a staging ground is expressed via *short-term present time perspectives*, the clear focus of the present is on the future.

To further illustrate how a theory can interpret the present as a staging ground for the future, Morgenthau's analysis of the nuclear condition is introduced here as an example. Within Morgenthau's theory, the nuclear condition is a defining feature of the present within his theory that is articulated via *short-term present time perspectives*. Had Morgenthau only made this claim about the nuclear condition in the present, then the claim would have been limited to describing and pertaining to just the present state of international politics without alluding to the future. However, more than one *short-term present time perspective* can exist within a theory. Subsequently, additional *short-term present time perspectives* can be included within a theory to add different characterisations to claims about the present. In other words, additional *short-term present time perspectives* enable a single claim to be viewed and interpreted from different vantage points. The following quote highlights this possibility of articulating multiple characterisations about the present. '[The] continuous surveillance of the prospective enemy's military actions and the continuous readiness for retaliation have put both nuclear powers on a permanent footing of readiness for immediate nuclear war'.⁴⁰³ The first part of the quote up until 'retaliation' indicates the present state of international politics. This present state of international politics, however, also serves as the 'permanent footing' that sets the stage for the future of international politics alluded to in the second part of the quote. Therefore, the nuclear condition of the present is a staging ground for the future of international politics. As a consequence of making this claim, a further claim is attached to the notion of the nuclear condition within Morgenthau's theory. In this additional claim, the nuclear condition of the present is

⁴⁰² Hans-Werner Sinn, "Europe Finally Pulls the Trigger on a Military Force," *The Guardian*, November 21, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/21/europe-finally-pulls-the-trigger-on-a-military-force-eu-army-trump> (accessed December 12, 2018).

⁴⁰³ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 140.

said to be a condition that cannot be overcome or avoided in the future. This additional claim suggests that the nuclear condition in the present is a staging ground from which a particular present condition (i.e. nuclear condition) will come to determine and dominate the future of international politics. The latter claim is significant in the context of Morgenthau's theory. The claim enables Morgenthau to link certain theoretical explanations of international politics in the present to the future without having to fully develop a particular theoretical vision of what the future of international politics will look like.

This articulation of the present as having a focus on the future, however, should not imply that the present as a staging ground does not also convey something about the past. Essentially, anything that happens before a future manifestation of international politics, such as contemporary manifestations of international politics, are by default part of a future's past. Consequently, because a present is a point of origin from which future manifestations of international politics emerge, a present is also a past for a theory's notions regarding the future of international politics. Therefore, if the present is a staging ground for the future and the past of the future of international politics, then is accounting for international politics preceding the present (i.e. the past) even necessary to making sense of the future? Or would the past and the present need to be accounted for separately? The answer to both is no; detailing the past separately might not be necessary in a theory which characterises the present as a staging ground for the future. To arrive at this interpretation requires accepting that knowledge of the past that has any relevance to the present or the future of international politics is already embodied within a present characterised as a staging ground because the present is itself a product of the past.⁴⁰⁴ Consequently, this characterisation of the present suggests that the present can be a comprehensive staging ground (without explicitly articulating the past) that provides all the contexts necessary to yield and make sense of a theory's particular notions about the future. Even for those theories that do not interpret the present as a comprehensive staging ground for the future, this idea of the present as a staging ground is still helpful in recognising that the present is and will become part of

⁴⁰⁴ This collapsing of the past into the present and by interpreting the present as a type of past helps explain how neorealism accounts for the past and is able to make claims about the past and the future based on the present alone. Elman and Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory," 14.

the past in relation to a theory's notions about the future. Thus claims made in the present inevitably become claims about the past even when the present is expressed as oriented toward the future.

6.5 The present's orientations toward the past and the future

As alluded to in the previous sections, a consequence of the problematisations and characterisations a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* articulate about the present is that the reader develops an awareness of whether a theory's present is oriented more toward the past or the future.⁴⁰⁵ For example, if the present is characterised as a product of history within a theory, then a theory's present is perceived as oriented toward the past. Conversely, if the present is characterised as staging ground for the future, then a theory's present is perceived as oriented toward the future.⁴⁰⁶ This question of orientation relates to the third function that *short-term present time perspectives* perform within a theory; their role in establishing whether the past or the future is a dominant influence shaping a theory's contemporary understandings and interpretations of international politics. The subsequent paragraphs aim to unpack this role further with corresponding examples. Awareness of a theory's present orientation is useful to recover insights about the following: 1) particular theoretical claims which seem derived solely from contemporary circumstances of international politics but in fact are linked to circumstances in the past or future, 2) whether claims about the present are included within a theory to support (or refute) historical or future theoretical claims, and 3) why the past, present, and/or future might not be equally referenced or reflected upon within a theory. These unrecognised insights are important because they can dramatically alter orthodox understandings about theoretical claims.⁴⁰⁷ For example, *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory orient the present within his theory namely toward the past.⁴⁰⁸ Having an awareness of this

⁴⁰⁵ Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, "Taking Time to Integrate," 519.

⁴⁰⁶ Although Zimbardo and Boyd attach an emotional component to their orientation, this component is not addressed in this section as a discussion about the relationship between time, emotion, and international politics is beyond the scope of my study. Zimbardo and Boyd, "Putting Time in Perspective".

⁴⁰⁷ 'Orthodox understandings' are understood as those which appear in first year undergraduate IR textbooks. For an example, see John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owen, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 7th edn. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁴⁰⁸ In contrast, *short-term time perspectives* within Kant's *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* orient the present to the future by articulating a present that is forward looking toward a particular end.

orientation helps readers to see Morgenthau's theory not as a grand or general theory of international politics, but a theory that is situated in a particular time and offering an explanation that will inevitably become outdated.⁴⁰⁹ In other words, examining a theory's present orientation can help reduce misreadings and invalidate critiques of theoretical claims, as well as augment understandings of how a theory orients the present to the past and/or future.

To begin to identify a theory's present orientation, it is necessary to first determine whether or not the present is a departure or disruption in relation to the past. If the present is not a departure or disruption from the past, then the present is a product of history (e.g. a continuation of a historical pattern). In this case, the orientation of a theory's present will depend upon how the present is addressed within a theory. A theory's *short-term present time perspectives* are considered to be orienting a theory's present to the past when the present is articulated as being a culmination or fulfilment of historical patterns or a moment within a cycle.⁴¹⁰ Conversely, a theory's present is oriented to the future when articulations of the present describe the present as part of a historical process necessary to the manifestation of the future.

Not a departure/disruption = present is product of history =

- 1) product as culmination/fulfilment of history = present orientation to the past.
- 2) product as necessary for future manifestations = present orientation to the future.

However, if a theory's present is interpreted as a departure or disruption, then a different means of determining a theory's present orientation is needed. Determining the orientation of a theory's present depends upon whether the present marks the end of an era, the beginning of a new era, or both.⁴¹¹ If the present marks an end, then the orientation of the present is to the past. If the present marks a beginning, then the orientation of the present is to the future.⁴¹² When a theory's *short-term present time*

Immanuel Kant, *To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003).

⁴⁰⁹ Behr and Heath, "Misreading in IR Theory," 335-38.

⁴¹⁰ Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 437.

⁴¹¹ Michelle Bastian, "Time and Community: A Scoping Study," *Time & Society* 23, no. 2 (July 2014), 149.

⁴¹² Davenport, "The International and the Limits of History," 257.

perspectives articulate the present as both the end and beginning of an era, then the orientation of a theory's present is either to the past and the future simultaneously or on the present itself to emphasise the unique significance of a particular moment in international politics.

Yes a departure/disruption = present as...

- 1) end of an era = present is oriented toward the past.
- 2) beginning of an era = present oriented toward the future.
- 3) both = present oriented toward past and future and/or the present itself.

In cases where the present is articulated as a staging ground for the future, then a theory's present orientation is directed to the future.

Yes a staging ground = present is oriented to the future.

Through the process of identifying a theory's present orientations, a theory's overall orientation can also be identified and recovered. Essentially, the overall orientation of a theory is the broad approach a theory takes to studying and making sense of international politics.⁴⁴³ For example, post-colonialism tries to make sense of international politics in the present *through* the colonial past.⁴⁴⁴ The connection between a theory's present orientation and its overall orientation is that the overall orientation can be approximately ascertained through the aggregation and assessment of a theory's various present orientations.⁴⁴⁵ This relationship between these two types of orientations is worth noting. The relationship ensures that every theory of international politics which make references to the present, and only the present, contains an overall orientation. In other words, a theory's overall orientation can be derived from articulations of the present via *short-term present time perspectives*. This novel insight is not meant to suggest that a theory's overall orientation could not be ascertained by aggregating the orientations of other time perspectives (e.g. historical and future) found within a theory. The insight is meant to highlight what *short-term present time perspectives* can articulate about the relations among a theory's present,

⁴⁴³ Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, "Taking Time to Integrate," 519.

⁴⁴⁴ For an excellent example see Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Iraq* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).

⁴⁴⁵ Zimbardo and Boyd, "Putting Time in Perspective," 1273.

past, and future, irrespective of whether other time perspectives are explicitly articulated within a theory.

The relationship between a theory's present orientations and its overall orientation also suggests that the latter orientation can be limited by *short-term time perspectives*. This insight helps inform scholars that a theory's overall orientation does not independently impose limitations on a theory. Limitations attributed to a theory's overall orientations actually originate from articulations of the *short-term time perspectives*, as well as other time perspectives if articulated in a theory. As an example, the overall orientation in Morgenthau's theory does not exist independently. To begin to make sense of his theory's overall orientation, it is first necessary to aggregate and assess his present orientations. Only after aggregating his accounting of the present as a product of history, a departure from the past, and a staging ground for the future does his theory's overall orientation become clear. The result is that his theory's overall orientation is focused on the empirical past and present, not what might have been or might be (i.e. the future).⁴⁴⁶ Therefore, if a theory's overall orientation does not independently impose limitations on a theory, then a theory's overall orientation does not independently impose limitations on theoretical claims. The limitations originate from individual orientations of the present articulated within a theory via its *short-term present time perspectives*. This finding affirms arguments made elsewhere in this thesis that linkages and relations between the past, the present, and the future are made on a micro-level via a theory's *long-term and short-term historical, present, and future time perspectives*.

In addition to highlighting the relationship between time perspectives and a theory's overall orientation, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* are key to situating a theory's present among other time segments (i.e. the past and the future).⁴⁴⁷ This situating of a theory's present can be both internal and external. Regarding the first, internal situating of the present within a theory is important because the present serves as an anchor point from which to define other segments of time and corresponding

⁴⁴⁶ This overall orientation can also indicate that a theory may discount the value of speculating about the future. Kreb and Rapport, "Psychology of Time Horizons," 530-1; Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, "Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 199-226.

⁴⁴⁷ Hartog and Brown, *Regimes of Historicity*, 82-83.

claims within a theory. Illustrating this point is Morgenthau's Chapter XXI: The New Balance of Power in *Politics among Nations*. In this chapter, Morgenthau is essentially articulating the present state of affairs of international politics as he interprets it. References which help situate his theory's present in a particular time within his theory include some of the following: the 'drastic numerical reduction of the players in the game' of international politics; 'the tendency toward a two-bloc system' governed by the relations between the former Soviet Union and the United States; Great Britain's lost role as 'the "holder" of the balance'; 'the disappearance of the colonial frontier'; and the spread of revolution among 'colonial and semicolonial countries' against colonial powers. Subsequently, references to the recent past or foreseeable future become less abstract and are allocated in time based off of when the present is situated within a theory. However the situating of a theory's present by *short-term present time perspectives* is not limited to internal situating; these time perspectives also situate a theory's present externally.

6.6 Date-stamping a theory and its claims

The external situating of the present occurs as a consequence of the contemporary context and status of international politics articulated within a theory by *short-term present time perspectives*. The context and status of international politics provided within a theory situates a theory's present within a particular moment in time of international politics and effectively date-stamps the present with a specific time. For example, Morgenthau's references to the UN in *Politics among Nations* places the present of this major work after 24 October 1945, the year the UN officially came into existence.⁴⁸ As a consequence of date-stamping a theory's present, the present becomes fixed. This fixed date of a theory's present can then be used to situate a theory in time as time exists outside a theory; in essence, a theory's present in relation to 'now' (e.g. 2019). This placing of a theory's present into a 'now' occurs every time a scholar applies a theory developed in one present (e.g. 1956) to study or explain international politics

⁴⁸The example given is for illustrative purposes. References to other international incidences made within each edition of *PAN* can further refine the date-stamping of Morgenthau's theory. Care was taken when trying to situate his theory's present using the publication dates of articles and books because these dates did not always correspond to the present his theory was referring to in the text under analysis.

operating under different contemporary circumstances of another present (e.g. 2019). By relating the present of a theory to 'now' (e.g. 2019), a theory's present dated 1956 for example becomes externally situated in the past within a contemporary context of international politics which is never fixed and being perpetually reconstituted (e.g. the present of the reader). Consequently, a theory's present is for example not necessarily reflective of international politics as it is now in 2019, but international politics as it was in the past.⁴¹⁹ Thus, even if a theory's claims are outdated in relation to international politics in 2019, they still have relevance to explaining international politics of the past. The effects of this date-stamping and external situating of a theory's present extend further throughout a theory.

By date-stamping and externally situating a present that is articulated within a theory, *short-term present time perspectives* are also date-stamping and externally situating a theory's claims regarding the past, present, and future of international politics. The external situating of the present a theory is referring to in the text is important to keep in mind when interpreting theoretical claims about international politics because as the international political context changes so too does the meaning and significance of a theory's claims. Evidence of this shift in interpretation is evident for example when examining claims made in Morgenthau's theory regarding China. Within Morgenthau's theory, China is always referred to as becoming a potential 'Great Power' whose significance in international politics is secondary to the actions and policies taken by the U.S. and former Soviet Union. Morgenthau's theory subsequently interprets international politics within this context of dominant actors. However, when this context of dominant actors circa 1956 is placed within the context of a 2019 present, the claims within Morgenthau's theory about the potentiality of China appear outdated because China is taking on the responsibilities of and acting as a 'Great Power' that can be interpreted as rivalling that of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. This example suggests that a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* can be useful in validating and invalidating claims, particularly those claims articulated as timeless or universal (i.e.

⁴¹⁹ Friedrich Kratochwil, "History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the 'Second' Great Debate and Assessing Its Importance for Social Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (March 2006): 5–29. There is a suggestion here that there is a time lag between a theory's claims about international politics and contemporary claims that can be made about international politics in the present (e.g. 2019). This presence of a time lag, which a theory's *short-term time perspectives* contribute to, suggests that the usefulness and relevance of a theory's claims to contemporary international politics in either 1980, 2006, or 2019 might have a finite shelf-life.

perennial). When these time perspectives and corresponding claims are considered in the context of international politics in a future 'now', they help to validate whether or not theoretical claims made in a particular present are in fact perennial. Furthermore, the aforementioned China example suggests that claims relevant to a present articulated within a theory are contextualised and interpreted internally but can subsequently become fixed in time and limit the applicability of a theory over time.⁴²⁰

The cumulative effect of examining a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* both internally and externally is the removal of the ambiguity of the present referenced within a theory. As a result, the origins of a theory's claims, from the problematisation of international politics to how the past and future are constructed and interpreted, become clearer.⁴²¹ From this clarity, theoretical claims are found to be bound to a particular account of international politics as they exist in a theory's articulated present.⁴²² This insight raises new doubts as to whether a theory can ever make the claim that its theoretical claims are timeless or that reflecting on time is not relevant to understanding and interpreting the meaning and significance of claims.⁴²³ Furthermore, the binding of theoretical claims to a particular present suggests that a present articulated by a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* places a particular set of 'contemporary' interpretive lenses onto a theory regarding what international politics is or is not. These lenses are important to acknowledge because they have a biasing effect on studies of international politics. The insights contained within this chapter not only illustrate how *short-term present time perspectives* embed biases within a theory, but also highlight how any attempts at removing or altering these biases to reduce their effects when studying international politics is problematic. Any removal or alteration of *short-term present time perspectives* would result in fundamental changes to how claims are understood and interpreted. Therefore, by removing the ambiguity of a present within a theory via an analysis of a theory's *short-term present time*

⁴²⁰ Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 431-32.

⁴²¹ Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 433.

⁴²² Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, "The Ethics of Anti-Hubris in the Political Philosophy of International Relations – Hans J. Morgenthau," in *Religion and the Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to International Relations Theory and Back*, ed. Jodek Troy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 116; Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), 76.

⁴²³ For incidence, Marxists have made the former claim when referring to contemporary class struggles. The latter claim suggests no theory of international politics can ever be like a theory of mathematics where time is not necessary to understand or interpret claims.

perspectives,⁴²⁴ the new insights shared in this chapter can enable scholars to more objectively assess whether a particular theory's interpretive lenses, explanations, and claims are still relevant to study an updated contemporary international politics or whether they are outdated.⁴²⁵

6.7 Delimiting effects on the predictability of the future

The discussion that follows regarding the effects of a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* on its notions of the future is markedly different from the final sections found in Chapters 5 and 7. The difference is that *short-term present time perspectives* were the only *present time perspectives* analysed in this chapter because *long-term present time perspectives* are not currently articulated within theories of international politics, although I recognise that they exist.⁴²⁶ Nevertheless, the aims of this final section remain similar to the final sections of chapters 5 and 7; to illustrate that time perspectives do not exist in isolation and that they have cumulative effects on theoretical claims. However, rather than demonstrating the lack of isolation by discussing how time perspectives of different categories (i.e. long-term and short-term) co-exist, this section will be emphasising that multiple time perspectives within the same category (e.g. *short-term present time perspectives*) co-exist. This point is worth highlighting because it illustrates that a theory with only one category of time perspective can still contain multiple time perspectives which shape and effect understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims.⁴²⁷ To illustrate that multiple *short-term present time perspectives* co-exist among themselves (as well as with other time perspectives) within a theory and have cumulative effects on theoretical claims, this section will again use Morgenthau's claims about the future as examples. In particular, the following discussion will highlight

⁴²⁴ 'Man's capacity to rise above his social and historical situation seems to be conditioned by the sensitivity with which he recognizes the extent of his involvement in it' from E.H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964): 54.

⁴²⁵ Furthermore, awareness of when a theory's present is situated can also be used to explain deficiencies or limitations of a particular theory's explanations of and claims about international politics.

⁴²⁶ For a brief discussion of *long-term present time perspectives* and reasons for not including them in my analysis of *present time perspectives*, see section 3.4.

⁴²⁷ Currently, I am unaware of a theory with only one category of time perspectives, but I acknowledge that cultures may exist in the world where everything is interpreted and understood in the present. For a primer, see the following work on aboriginal thought: Janca and Bullen, "Aboriginal Concept of Time" and Silverman, "Time in Melanesia and Aboriginal Australia."

how multiple *short-term present time perspectives* shape and delimit claims found within Morgenthau's theory regarding the predictability of the future of international politics.

For Morgenthau, no notions about the future are made from nowhere. Predictions and speculations about the future begin in a present based upon contemporary interpretations of international politics in the past and the present. In reference to the past, one of the *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory characterises the present as a unique product of the past. 'A historical situation always contains only a limited number of potentialities into which it might develop' in the present.⁴²⁸ Subsequently, 'the contingencies of the present and future present themselves in a limited number of typical patterns [(i.e. perennial patterns)]'.⁴²⁹ Therefore, predictability within Morgenthau's theory is delimited by the uniqueness of the present as a historical product and contemporary contingencies of international politics well before future contingencies are taken into consideration. The predictability is inhibited further within Morgenthau's theory by adding another *short-term present time perspective* which characterises each present as a perpetual departure from the past where 'the social cause itself is an indeterminate element which can never be reproduced identical with itself and which we are never sure to reproduce with exactly those qualities relevant to the result'.⁴³⁰ This *short-term present time perspective* emphasises that a present is perpetually reconstituted, thus limiting the accuracy of a prediction. In yet another *short-term present time perspective* found within Morgenthau's theory, the 'nuclear age' of the present is characterised as a staging ground for the nuclear condition of the future which potentially cannot be escaped.⁴³¹ This *short-term present time perspective* suggests that aspects of international politics in the future (e.g. the nuclear condition) can be predicted with some level of accuracy based upon contemporary aspects of international politics. Cumulatively, these three *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory add various layers of delimitations on the present which subsequently shape the basis upon which notions about the future are created.

⁴²⁸ Morgenthau, "Problem of Social Planning," 183.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 183.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 175.

⁴³¹ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 152-3; Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events," 150.

Awareness of this aforementioned basis is crucial to understanding notions about the future as articulated within Morgenthau's theory. This basis outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions of international politics in a particular present which can only yield certain outcomes. These conditions essentially are that international politics is open and indeterminate in the present.⁴³² Consequently, the future of international politics is difficult to predetermine or know (i.e. unpredictable); each political problem 'must be solved every day anew'.⁴³³ This difficulty of foretelling the future, however, is not unique to the particular present of international politics Morgenthau's theory is addressing; the difficulty is a feature shared by all contemporary moments of international politics, past and future. According to Morgenthau's theory, difficulty in foretelling the future is shared by all contemporary moments of international politics because the present is perennially novel. In other words, the novelty of one present yields the novelty of a future present which continues on in perpetuity.⁴³⁴ The additional inclusion within Morgenthau's theory of *short-term present time perspectives* articulating the present as a staging grounding for the future sets this perpetual process in motion and helps to explain why the future remains unpredictable in the foreseeable and unforeseeable future according to Morgenthau's theory.

Two further ways that predictability and notions about the future are curtailed within Morgenthau's theory regard the role *short-term present time perspectives* can play in problematising international politics as detailed earlier in Section 6.4 and the overall orientation of the present within Morgenthau's theory. Regarding problematisation, *short-term time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory place an emphasis on the urgency of addressing contemporary problems (that may trigger the use of nuclear weapons) over future problems.⁴³⁵ Consequently, thinking about future problems becomes secondary to contemporary problems. This urgency attributed to contemporary problems also contributes to the overall orientation of the present within Morgenthau's theory away from the future. Other *short-term present time perspectives* orienting the focus of the present on the past further deemphasise the significance of

⁴³² This openness and indeterminacy does not necessarily preclude that certain perennial aspects of international politics, such as the nuclear condition, cannot continually effect the manifestation of international politics in the future. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the manifestations of perennial aspects and their effects can be altered by ephemeral aspects of international politics.

⁴³³ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man*, 216.

⁴³⁴ Morgenthau, "Problem of Social Planning," 184.

⁴³⁵ Morgenthau, "Another "Great Debate", " 977.

the future in relation to the present and the past addressed within Morgenthau's theory. Therefore, by emphasising the urgency of international political problems in the present in relation to those potential problems in the future and orienting the present away from the future toward the present itself and the origins of the contemporary problems (i.e. the past), *short-term present time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory do little to create a space or need within his theory for predictions. This lack of space or need makes sense given the general stated concern of Morgenthau's theory which is to explain and understand international politics 'as it actually is' and the relevant 'historical processes as they actually take place' by 'ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason'.⁴³⁶ Consequently, *short-term present time perspectives* within a theory play a crucial part in delimiting how notions and claims about the future can be articulated within a theory.

6.8 Chapter summary

Unlike chapters 5 and 7 which analyse and discuss two categories of time perspectives, *long-term* and *short-term perspectives*, the contents of this chapter only address one category of time perspective, *short-term present time perspectives*. Despite addressing one category, this chapter has illustrated the diversity of *short-term present time perspectives* that can potentially be found within a theory and the extensiveness of their effects. The arguments made throughout this chapter highlight how a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* shape notions of the present, which in turn shape how claims about international politics are interpreted and understood within the contemporary circumstances articulated. As addressed throughout the chapter, the shaping effects of a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* were not limited to claims regarding contemporary international politics, but also extended to claims about international politics in the past and the future. To recover an awareness and understanding of these effects, distinctions among various *short-term present time perspectives* which can potentially be found within a theory were first individually

⁴³⁶ Unlike the present or the past, the future has not occurred and therefore future facts cannot be ascertained for examination to help explain and understand international politics of the future. All that can be understood about the future at any contemporary moment is facts that relate to the present and the past. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4-5.

identified, analysed, and discussed using examples drawn from Morgenthau's theory. Analysis and discussion at the individual level was followed by an analysis and discussion of their combined effects on notions about the future and prediction within Morgenthau's theory. By addressing the functions and effects of *short-term present time perspectives* individually and collectively, this chapter provides scholars with key insights into where and how claims about international politics are initially established within a theory.

The key insights about *short-term present time perspectives* within a theory shared in this chapter include the following. First, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* help to initially outline what the necessary and sufficient conditions of international politics are according to a theory. Such an articulation of these conditions is crucial within a theory because it serves as a shared basis from which international politics in the past, present, and future can be linked, analysed, and discussed. Second, these time perspectives delimit how international politics is problematised in the past, present, and future within a theory. Third, by characterising the contemporary circumstances of a claim as a product or consequence, a departure or disruption, and/or a staging ground, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* play key roles in establishing relations between claims about international politics within a particular present context to claims about international politics in the past and potential future. Fourth, a theory's *short-term present time perspectives* help to establish whether the past or the future is a dominant influence shaping a theory's contemporary understandings and interpretations of international politics in the past, present, and future (i.e. a theory's overall orientation). Finally, these particular time perspectives date-stamp a theory's claims which is useful when evaluating the applicability and validity of those claims beyond a theory's own articulated contemporary international political context. Collectively, these insights indicate how *short-term present time perspectives* shape claims within a theory.

The aforementioned insights also provide strong evidence as to why *short-term present time perspectives* are so pervasive within theories of international politics. Without having the basis *short-term present time perspectives* embed within a theory of what is and is not considered international politics, how international politics is problematised, and how contemporary international politics is and is not related to

international political phenomena of the past and the future, then a theory would be unable to provide logical explanations and understandings about international politics past, present, or future. Consequently, *short-term present time perspectives* are essential to include within a theory in a way that *historical* and *future time perspectives* are not. In other words, it is possible for a theory to exist without *long-term* and *short-term historical* or *future time perspectives*, but it is impossible for a theory to exist without a *short-term present time perspective*. Nevertheless, there are limits to what *short-term present time perspectives* can perform within a theory in relation to claims. The following chapter addressing *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* will emphasise the previous point. Furthermore, the next chapter will draw attention to what delimitations *future time perspectives* add to claims made within a theory which *short-term present time perspectives* (and *historical time perspectives*) would have difficulty executing.

Chapter 7: Long-term and Short-term Future Time Perspectives

In this chapter, the aim is to recover an awareness of and appreciation for how *long-term* and *short-term future time perspectives* shape particular understandings and interpretations of claims about international politics within a theory. Similar to chapters 5 and 6 addressing *historical* and *present time perspectives* respectively, this chapter's analysis has three foci: 1) the functions and effects that make each *future time perspective* distinct, 2) the relations, or lack thereof, between the two *future time perspectives* and 3) the relations between *future time perspectives* and a theory's claims. Once again, examples illustrating and supporting the arguments presented throughout this chapter will be drawn from Morgenthau's work.⁴³⁷ On occasion, references will be made in this chapter to examples appearing in previous chapters because they are useful for highlighting more than one aspect of a *future time perspective*.⁴³⁸ By the end of the chapter, the recovered awareness of what *future time perspectives* uniquely add to a theory's explanation and claims will alter current scholarly perceptions regarding the role of *future time perspectives* within a theory. Consequently, this chapter offers new insights about how essential *future time perspectives* are in shaping theoretical claims. Furthermore, this chapter fills a space in the discipline's current understanding of international politics, which is largely focused on the past and the present, by examining how claims are conceptualised in regards to a theory's notions about the future.

Helping to recover an awareness of and appreciation for *future time perspectives*, the following questions were used to guide my analysis of *long-term* and *short-term future time perspectives* and their effects. What distinguishing features do *long-term* and *short-term future time perspectives* possess? Why include either *future time perspective* within a theory? How does the presence or absence of a particular *future time perspective* effect how theoretical claims are understood and interpreted? How do these *future time perspectives* help scholars make better sense of international politics? I intentionally designed these questions to be non-theory specific to enable readers to apply them to their analyses of other theories of international politics whose *future time perspectives*

⁴³⁷ Although *future time perspectives* feature very little in Morgenthau's theory in comparison the theory's *historical* and *present time perspectives*, the examples of Morgenthau's theoretical *future time perspectives* included in this chapter are sufficient to illustrate and support the arguments made.

⁴³⁸ For practical reasons, the repeat usage of an example is a consequence of Morgenthau's infrequent referral in his theory to the future in general. This stems from his theory's primary foci on providing explanations of international politics in the past and present.

have yet to be fully examined and understood. To illustrate the usefulness of these questions, they were directed at Morgenthau's theory. Although the broad range of insights regarding the distinctness of *future time perspectives* and their effects covered in this chapter are exhibited through one theory, *future time perspectives* in other theories may exhibit fewer (or more) distinctions or play limited (or greater) shaping roles. In other words, insights derived from analysing *future time perspectives* within other theories may be more or less comprehensive than the insights presented in this chapter as Morgenthau's theory is less focused on understanding and interpreting the future of international politics and more focused on the making sense of the past and the present. Therefore, the analysis of *future time perspectives* that follows is not intended to be comprehensive, but suggestive of some of the features and effects scholars are likely to find when examining *future time perspectives* and their effects on theoretical claims within other theories of international politics used in the discipline.

To address *long-term* and *short-term future time perspectives* and their effects, this chapter consists of three sections. The first section of the chapter addresses the functions performed by and effects of *short-term future time perspectives* within a theory.⁴³⁹ The functions discussed in this section cover two broad categories: 1) providing predictions or approximations about the immediate future and 2) moving a theory's explanation beyond the known/knowable world. As these broad categories are unpacked, new insights about *short-term future time perspectives* are gained. These insights include: 1) the transition or bridging work that these time perspectives perform; 2) how particular unknowns of the near future become known; 3) the inseparable linkage between the present and the immediate future; 4) how certainty is attached to near future predictions; and 5) how meaning and significance are pre-emptively added to aspects of international politics in the near future. While these insights help to differentiate *short-term future time perspectives* from *long-term future time perspectives*, they are also important because they help differentiate short-term future from the present (e.g. short-term future is an extrapolation from the present). The importance of the latter distinction between the short-term future and the present is that without making this distinction clear, *short-term future time perspectives* could easily be

⁴³⁹ A discussion on *short-term future time perspectives* precedes the discussion on *long-term future time perspectives* because the immediate future articulated via *short-term future time perspectives* directly follows the present according to Western chronological notions of time.

misinterpreted as rearticulating the present or a type of *long-term present time perspective*.

In the chapter's second section, the functions and effects of *long-term future time perspectives* within a theory are identified and discussed. In regards to the functions performed by a theory's *long-term future time perspectives*, the two primary functions include 1) extending a theory's applicability beyond the foreseeable future and 2) providing glimpses into the long-term future evolutions and manifestations of international politics. As a consequence of performing these functions, new insights about a theory's claims and explanations are gained. These insights include how *long-term future time perspectives* can effect: 1) how theoretical claims are interpreted as finite or infinite; 2) interpretations of the applicability and usefulness of a theory's claims in both familiar and unfamiliar international political contexts; 3) what known aspects of international politics are retained via a theory's long-term predictions, probabilities, and aspirations; and 4) the interpretations of historical and contemporary theoretical claims via the introduction of new theoretical claims about the distant future. Examining *long-term future time perspectives* can also indicate how long-standing, salient international political questions and problems of concern within a theory can be solved or adequately addressed in the distant future. Even if not comprehensive or realistic, the solutions and depictions of the distant future provided by a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* affect how a theory's claims and explanations are to be understood and interpreted. Considering all the above functions and effects that *long-term future time perspectives* have within a theory, it is surprising that more attention has not been given to *long-term future time perspectives* regarding their role in shaping claims within a theory.⁴⁴⁰

The final section of the chapter offers an illustration of how a theory's *short-term and long-term future time perspectives* simultaneously shape theoretical claims. To maintain consistency with the final sections found in chapters 5 and 6, I will again be using examples from Morgenthau's theory regarding notions about the future and the (in)ability to foretell it to analyse how his theory's *future time perspectives* affect both.

⁴⁴⁰ Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 264; Bernstein, Lebow, Gross Stein, and Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems," 54. Difficulties in collaboration between IR and Future Studies (FS) offer potential reasons as to why *long-term future time perspectives* and their effects within IR theories have received less attention among IR scholars than *historical and present time perspectives* and their effects. For a more detailed discussion see Mert Bilgin, "The State of Future in International Relations," *Futures* 82 (September 2016): 52-62.

The purpose of discussing these two time perspectives together is to show how their co-existence within a theory delimit understandings and interpretations regarding the future of international politics which cannot be done via other time perspectives (e.g. historical and present). Furthermore, by looking at how these two time perspectives relate to one another and theoretical claims about the future, new insights about the limits of what each *future time perspective* can convey about such theoretical claims are obtained. Consequently, this section augments contemporary understandings of how a theory's conceptions and articulations of the future in its entirety (conveyed via *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives*) contribute to the shaping of how claims about international politics are understood and interpreted. By the end of this section, the distinct contributions that *future time perspectives* make to the meanings of a theory's claims will be difficult to disregard and recognised as being on par with those contributions stemming from *historical* and *present time perspectives*.

7.1 Short-term future time perspectives

At a minimum, *short-term future time perspectives* serve two basic roles in a theory, 1) predicting or approximating the near future and 2) moving a theory beyond the known/knowable world. The first role regards providing guaranteed predictions (e.g. the world will continue to be anarchic) or high probabilities of likely outcomes regarding the immediate future within a theory.⁴⁴¹ Formulations of these predictions or probabilities are based upon a theory's own understanding and interpretation of known perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics existing in the past and the present. Given the historical and contemporary basis of their formulations, these predictions or probabilities can be seen as expressions of a theory's own confidence in its arguments and claims made about the near future. While I acknowledge that a theory's confidence in its explanations can also be expressed via *historical* and *present time perspectives*, both of the latter categories of time perspectives have the luxury of addressing aspects of international politics that are known or potentially knowable

⁴⁴¹ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 121. Prediction and probability (or forecast) are understood as distinct from one another in this study, a distinction that should not be overlooked. Essentially, probability lacks the certainty that a prediction implies. A similar distinction can be seen in Havard Hegre, Nils W Metternich, Havard Mogleiv Nygard, and Julian Wucherpennig, "Forecasting in Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 2 (March 2017): 118.

through additional research.⁴⁴² *Short-term future time perspectives*, on the other hand, address both known *and* unknown aspects of international politics alike. In other words, addressing unknown aspects is a defining feature of *future time perspectives*. However, the unknowns addressed by *short-term future time perspectives* are distinct from those unknowns addressed by *long-term future time perspectives*. The unknowns addressed by *short-term future time perspectives* are directly tied to or products of known aspects about international politics that have either already occurred or are in the process of occurring.⁴⁴³ Whereas a *long-term future time perspectives* do not necessarily have to address all known aspects nor those unknown aspects with connections to the past or present.⁴⁴⁴

The following excerpts from Morgenthau's section in *Politics among Nations* on the 'Continuation of the Cold War' illustrate how *short-term future time perspectives* account for both known and unknown aspects of international politics. The section begins with a claim about the short-term future based on the contemporary known aspects of international politics as perceived from the perception of the present in Morgenthau's theory. 'Turning...to short-run probabilities, we find it likely that two power blocs centred on two superpowers [(i.e. the U.S. and the former Soviet Union)] will continue to dominate the arena of world politics'.⁴⁴⁵ He continues on in the section to claim that the known strategies used in the past to maintain or restore a balance of power in international politics are no longer effective in the present nor the future because of the new structure of Morgenthau's contemporary bi-polar world. The section concludes by addressing the unknown aspects of this new balance of power. '[T]he new balance of power is a mechanism that contains in itself the potentialities for unheard-of good as well as for unprecedented evil. Which of these potentialities will be realized depends not upon the mechanics of the balance of power, but upon moral and material forces which use that mechanism for the realization of their ends'.⁴⁴⁶ Consequently, Morgenthau's *short-term future time perspectives* articulate notions about how the

⁴⁴² MacKay and LaRoche, "Conduct of History," 222-23.

⁴⁴³ *Short-term future time perspectives* help a theory account for unknowns in the present. Dunne, Hansen, and Wight, "The End of International Relations Theory," 420.

⁴⁴⁴ A discussion regarding the unknowns addressed by *long-term future time perspectives* is detailed in section 7.2.1 of this chapter.

⁴⁴⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 338.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 339.

struggle for power and peace between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union can unfold from known and unknown aspects of international politics.

7.1.1 *Bridging and extending the known into the unknown*

By addressing both types of aspects, *short-term future time perspectives* fulfil their second role of extending a theory's explanatory power regarding known aspects of international politics onto the not wholly known world of international politics in the near future. The importance and consequences of this transition or bridging work done by *short-term future time perspectives* (discussed in more detail in the subsequent paragraphs) further distinguish these time perspectives from the other time perspectives identified thus far in chapters 5 and 6. Within *short-term future time perspectives*, the linkages made between the known aspects and the not wholly known aspects of the near future are understood as given. This understanding can be heuristically derived considering the present is directly followed by an immediate future which is not wholly known. Consequently, the evident linkages between the present and the immediate future help claims made about the near future appear less random and more consistent with the logic of a theory's explanation. Conversely, linkages between known aspects and the aspects of the near future appear less clear, if at all, within *long-term future time perspectives*. Therefore, *long-term future time perspectives* cannot be relied upon within a theory to perform the necessary bridging work to enable a theory's explanation to be extended beyond the known/knowable world. Similarly, the *historical* and *present time perspectives* are also unable to perform the bridging work because at best they can only allude to or suggest the layout of the foundation upon which the immediate future might be based. What is markedly missing from the articulations of the *historical* and *present time perspectives* is what the immediate future will or might manifest as; *short-term future time perspectives* provide those manifestations in more definitive terms. These near future manifestations are essential to pulling together known and existing aspects (i.e. knowable) of international politics into configurations which yield particular notions of the future yet-to-be realised. In other words, the manifestations provided enable *short-term future time perspectives* to extend a theory's explanation of known (and knowable) aspects to an imminent future.

This type of bridging work performed by *short-term future time perspectives* is evident in Morgenthau's theory when referring to China's rise in the near future. According to Morgenthau, 'Asians beheld with a mixture of awe and admiration' China's position as a prospective great power, a 'fact that determines today, and is likely to determine tomorrow, the fate of Asia'.⁴⁴⁷ This quote clearly illustrates an understanding within Morgenthau's theory that known aspects of today (i.e. the present) effect how tomorrow (i.e. the near future) will manifest. Referring to the rise of China again in another piece, he wrote that 'once 600 million Chinese are in the possession of modern instruments of industry' the threat posed by China to the U.S. during the Cold War will become real.⁴⁴⁸ The aforementioned quote is useful for illustrating that claims within Morgenthau's theory regarding the rise of China in the near future are rooted in known aspects of international politics. As a consequence of the bridging work done by the *short-term future time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory, the known aspects of international politics are extended into the near future to such an extent that China's near future status is not completely unknown. Furthermore, the bridging work enables claims within his theory, such as the significance of industrial capacity and size of population as sources of national power, to be extended beyond the past and the present into the future.

In addition to extending known aspects of international politics and the relevance of a theory's claims into the near future, the bridging work done by *short-term future time perspectives* also introduces particular unknowns into a theory. The particular unknowns introduced into a theory appear as a theory's articulated manifestations of the near future; manifestations which are attributed with known aspects. Thus, particular unknowns of the near future, in part, become 'known' and help to make a theory's perception of the near future seem less ambiguous. As a consequence of helping to make sense of the near future, the particular unknowns introduced into a theory become a theoretical claim about the near future. In other words, *short-term future time perspectives* introduce new theoretical claims into a theory that might not be evident in a theory's historical or contemporary account of international politics. Interpreted as theoretical claims, the unknowns introduced into a theory have the effect

⁴⁴⁷ Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, 393.

⁴⁴⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, "Realism in International Politics," *Naval War College Review* 10, no. 5 (January 1958), 8.

of both validating and invalidating theoretical claims made elsewhere in the theory via *historical* and *present time perspectives*. Even if the unknowns are restricted to only conveying something about the near future, they still remain claims about the near future.

To clarify why *historical* and *present time perspectives* are not interpreted as introducing new unknowns (i.e. theoretical claims about the future) in the same way as *short-term future time perspectives* do, it is helpful to reflect upon how Morgenthau's theory refers to China's rise as a great power. Within Morgenthau's theory, long-term historical trends regarding the rise of China are not mentioned, therefore historical trends are not useful in attributing known aspects to China's unknown future. The *short-term historical time perspectives* refer to the U.S.'s support for building a strong Japan as a counterweight to China's expansionary interests post 1949; expansionary interests which do not extend beyond China's traditional notion of where its borders should be.⁴⁴⁹ While these expansionary interests may contribute to China's rise in the near future, they alone are not sufficient to conclude that China will be a great power in the near future. The addition of a *short-term future time perspective* articulating the manifestation of China as a future great power changes how China's expansionary interests can be interpreted. *Short-term future time perspectives* found within Morgenthau's theory also indicate that China's rise is not perpetual as conveyed via his theory's *short-term present time perspectives*, but is leading toward a particular end. By articulating what the end is (i.e. China assuming its status as a great power), a theoretical claim is introduced by a *short-term future time perspective* into his theory's notion about the near future. Consequently, a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* play an essential role in introducing theoretical claims (i.e. unknowns) into a theory which would not otherwise be possible via a theory's other time perspectives.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁹ Morgenthau, *Truth and Power*, 394-5.

⁴⁵⁰ The unknowns articulated via *long-term future time perspectives* differ from those articulated via *short-term future time perspectives* in that the former's unknowns have the potential to appear as more random and their realisations are not seen as imminent.

7.1.2 *Direct extrapolation*

Unlike the other time perspectives, *short-term future time perspectives* are sequentially and inseparably linked to a particular conceptualisation of the present within a theory.⁴⁵¹ This link exists because *short-term future time perspectives* are direct, rather than indirect, extrapolations from a theory's particular notions of the present and corresponding theoretical claims.⁴⁵² As direct extrapolations, *short-term future time perspectives* serve a dual purpose with respect to offering insights about time within a theory. These future time perspectives simultaneously articulate a theory's ideas about the immediate future as well as its ideas about the present.⁴⁵³ The dual insights offered by *short-term future time perspectives* highlight the impossibility of disjoining a theory's ideas about the present from its ideas about the immediate future. Furthermore, *short-term future time perspectives* cannot exist independently (detached from the present) within a *long-term future time perspective* without direct reference to and obvious connections with a theory's notions of the present.⁴⁵⁴ Consequently, awareness and knowledge of a theory's notions of the present are necessary to understanding and interpreting *short-term future time perspectives*. Without this awareness and knowledge, then a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* appear as random, groundless insertions within a theory; pure speculations doing little to strengthen or extend a theory's explanatory relevance. For these reasons, *short-term future time perspectives* do not appear in a theory unless *present time perspectives* have also been articulated elsewhere in a theory.

An example of the close relationship between a theory's notions of the present and a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* is found in the following excerpt from Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* regarding 'the problem of a "Third Force"':

In view of the disparity of power between them [(i.e. a Third Force)] and the two superpowers, it is hard to see at present how they can hope for more. While it

⁴⁵¹ *Long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* do not have to immediately precede the present or be rooted to a particular present to be understood and interpreted. The lack of connectivity with *historical time perspectives* is possible when the present is considered a point of departure or disruption with the development of the past. Likewise, the *long-term future time perspectives* might also be envisioned as departures from the present, as well as the past (e.g. utopias).

⁴⁵² Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 60-1.

⁴⁵³ Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 269.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 269. Alternatively, *historical* and *long-term future time perspectives* can exist independently.

would certainly be presumptuous to suggest that their hopes to play a decisive role as a “Third Force” in the world balance of power can never be fulfilled, it is safe to say that they are bound to be disappointed in the foreseeable future.⁴⁵⁵

In this excerpt, Morgenthau is leaving little doubt about the prospects of a “Third Force” filling the balancer role vacated by the UK after WWII.⁴⁵⁶ Morgenthau’s doubt, however, is a direct extrapolation of international politics in his own present. Understanding his notion of the immediate future does not require some unknown aspect of international politics of the future to intervene or materialise; in essence, there is no unknown intermediary step necessary to arrive at similar conclusions. Consequently, this excerpt is helpful in illustrating that a theory’s *short-term future time perspectives* are derived and dependent upon a theory’s articulations of the present.

As the above example suggests, *short-term future time perspectives* are shaped by particular notions of the present (and to some extent by *historical time perspectives* as well) in different ways. On the one hand, *short-term future time perspectives* can be interpreted as articulations of the inevitable consequences of present circumstances. In this sense, the shaping of the immediate future is restrictive and predetermined, thus attaching a guaranteed level of certainty to predictions about how the future will manifest itself in the short-term given the contemporary context of international politics. This understanding of the immediate future suggests that theoretical claims about international politics in the near future are known in the present. For example, if the present within a theory is considered to be part of a repetitive cycle of processes and events, then the immediate future will be predicted to unfold and manifest itself in accordance with the expected next phase of the present cycle or trend.⁴⁵⁷ Predictions derived in this way, in turn, appear to add further credibility and validation to a theory’s explanation of the present and the past. However, understanding predictions solely as inevitable consequences of present circumstances can be problematic for the following reasons. This interpretation runs the risk of negating or underestimating the significant effects that unknown and unforeseen aspects of international politics can have on the

⁴⁵⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 329.

⁴⁵⁶ According to Morgenthau, this “Third Force” is the group of states (e.g. India, Indonesia, and the Arab and Latin American states) ‘which have not committed themselves definitely or completely to the Western or Eastern bloc’ (Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 329).

⁴⁵⁷ Neumann and Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning,” 258.

immediate future. Furthermore, when the predictions do not come true, a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* are subsequently called into question and can potentially result in a domino effect of questioning other time perspectives and claims made by the theory. However, *short-term future time perspectives* are not limited to being shaped by notions of a theory's present in just one way.

Alternatively, the shaping of *short-term future time perspectives* can be less restrictive and indeterminate about what the near future will look like. Rather than providing predictions or certainties, they offer probabilities of likely outcomes in statistical terms. For example, the probability of states remaining the dominant international political actors in international politics in the immediate future (e.g. next 10 years) is high. However, merely having a high probability does not rule out the low probability of multi-national corporations becoming the most dominant actors in international politics in the near future. *Short-term future time perspectives* which are less restrictive and indeterminate effectively leave the future open to any number of potential outcomes and enables a theory to acknowledge forecasting mistakes without calling into question fundamental claims that a theory may make. This openness also allows a theory to acknowledge the relevant effects that particular historical and present contexts have on the immediate future without having to claim that these contexts only lead to one particular outcome. Finally, interpreting *short-term future time perspectives* as indeterminate indicates a theory's self-awareness of its limited ability to accurately account for unknown aspects which can alter the probabilities of particular outcomes manifesting in the near future.⁴⁵⁸ Consequently, interpreting *short-term future time perspectives* in this way acknowledges the significance of unknown aspects in regards to the roles they can play in shaping the near future.

Although shaped by notions of the present, *short-term future time perspectives* also offer assessments of various known aspects of international politics in the present (and possibly the past) that cannot otherwise be determined. The various known aspects assessed include both perennial aspects of international politics as well as newly emergent ephemeral aspects of international politics. In regards to the perennial

⁴⁵⁸ Ian Wilson, "The Effective Implementation of Scenario Planning: Changing the Corporate Culture," in *Learning from the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios*, eds. Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 354.

aspects, *short-term future time perspectives* indicate what theoretical claims can be made about the influences of perennial aspects on the near future. For example, are perennial aspects in decline, stable, rising, or dormant?⁴⁵⁹ Regarding newly emergent ephemeral aspects, a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* indicate which ephemeral aspects will play greater or smaller influential roles in the near future. In other words, *short-term future time perspectives* attribute near future significance and status to theoretical claims through their assessments. Knowing that *short-term future time perspectives* can alter how theoretical claims are understood and interpreted in the near future helps to explain how a theory can have multiple understandings of its claims within a historical context or contemporary context. An example of this can be seen in the discussions within Morgenthau's theory regarding the role of a balancer of power in international politics in the immediate future. In the past a role of a balancer of power -- played by Great Britain for many centuries with respect to European great powers -- existed and was a perennial aspect of the structure and function of international politics within Europe. However, in consideration of the contemporary bipolar world dominated by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union as articulated within Morgenthau's theory, a claim is made that the place for a balancer of power no longer exists and thus it is 'futile...to hope that another nation or group of nations will take the place vacated by Great Britain'.⁴⁶⁰ This example illustrates how *short-term future time perspectives* lock their assessments of theoretical claims in the near future without undermining past and present understandings and interpretations. *Short-term future time perspectives* enable a theory to account for recent or pending changes in international politics or discount seemingly important developments in contemporary international politics without compromising theoretical claims made about the past or the present.⁴⁶¹

By adhering to a theory's particular aggregation and structuring of contemporary international political contexts, *short-term future time perspectives* maintain a theory's internal consistency and coherence in the arguments and explanations. For example, if a theory claims international politics is the result of cycles and trends, then the predictions suggested within a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* should reflect

⁴⁵⁹ Mueller raises similar questions in regards to the existence of imperialism. Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 429.

⁴⁶⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 329.

⁴⁶¹ Streich and Levy, "Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice."

the continuation of a theory's existing claims about those cycles and trends. Illustrating this point are discussions within Morgenthau's theory regarding the tendency of a two-bloc system and the continuation of the Cold War in the near future.⁴⁶² Within these discussions claims are made that the two-block system dominated by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union will continue to keep other nations within the system and influence international politics in the near future. Conversely, if a theory characterises international politics as indeterminable and dynamic, then a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* might suggest alternate states of the international politics which may be clear departures from the present state of affairs. This characterisation of international politics is illustrated within Morgenthau's theory where Morgenthau states that '[t]he changed structure of the balance of power [(between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union)] has made the hostile opposition of two gigantic power blocs possible, but it has not made it inevitable'.⁴⁶³ In either case, the aggregation and structuring articulated by *short-term future time perspectives* allow a theory to extend its arguments and explanations into the future and thus preserve the theory's continued relevance to the study of international politics in the future.⁴⁶⁴

While aggregating and structuring known aspects of international politics, *short-term future time perspectives* also simultaneously do the same with unknown aspects. This aggregation and structuring can appear in a theory as an acknowledgement that factors not yet materialised (i.e. unknown) will contribute to the manifestations of international politics in the near future. Conversely, unknown aspects may also be excluded from consideration; in essence, left out of the structuring because such unknown aspects are considered to have diminishing effects on international politics. The reason why *short-term future time perspectives* have to aggregate and structure both types of aspects is because these *future time perspectives* are rare nexus points within a theory where the knowns and unknowns of international politics are discussed in conjunction with one another.⁴⁶⁵ The resultant discussions are insightful because they

⁴⁶² Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 326 and 338.

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*, 339.

⁴⁶⁴ The two examples mentioned in this paragraph indicate the tension within Morgenthau's theory that readers of Morgenthau have picked up on over the years. For examples see Richard Rosecrance, "The One World of Hans Morgenthau," *Social Research* 48, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 749-65; Duncan Bell, ed., *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 56-7.

⁴⁶⁵ *Historical and present time perspectives* typically focus on known aspects of international politics.

demonstrate how a theory addresses known and unknown variables existing or yet-to-exist within international politics. An illustrative example of a theory addressing known and unknown variables can be found in a brief discussion within Morgenthau's theory regarding the possibility of a peaceful co-existence in the 'foreseeable future' between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.⁴⁶⁶ At the end of the discussion a claim is made that a peaceful co-existence between the two superpowers does 'not seem likely to materialize in the foreseeable future'.⁴⁶⁷ This example also suggests that a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* helps to outline and map out a theory's logic regarding how international politics will unfold toward or away from particular manifestations in the near future under known and unknown contemporary and near-future circumstances. It is thus important to understand the logic that is found within a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* because this logic provides the framework that a theory uses to prescribe rational outcomes in the near future.

Via the logic articulated in a theory's *short-term future time perspectives*, a theory is able to perform three prescriptive functions. First, a theory is able to signpost which areas or aspects within international politics where unknowns may or may not arise in the near future. For example, discussions within Morgenthau's theory regarding a world community and the future of diplomacy help to signpost which aspects, where unknown advancements may take place in the near future, would lead to the emergence of a world state.⁴⁶⁸ Second, the logic provides guidance as to how unknowns in the near future should be recognised, classified, and assessed by a theory (i.e. either as perennial or ephemeral). For example, a theory's logic might underestimate or relegate the significance of all near future unknown variables in comparison to known perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics. This type logic can be derived from discussions within Morgenthau's theory regarding near future unknown variables of limited warfare which are only considered within the context of total warfare (i.e. a perennial aspect of international politics in the future).⁴⁶⁹ Conversely, a theory's logic might prescribe unknown variables the same or greater significance as known variables. For example, within Morgenthau's theory unknown variables of the near future

⁴⁶⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 339-40.

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 340.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 486-502 and 518-35.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 341-62.

regarding diplomatic practices have greater significance in the struggle for peace than known variables associated within UN action or peace through force because of their potential to support and advance efforts of peace. Finally, an awareness of which unknown variables fall within and outside the logic embedded within a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* indicate the explanatory limits of a theory with respect to the near future. For example, the impossibility of unknown variables arising in the near future that would render the nuclear condition of international politics an insignificant concern would fall outside the logic of Morgenthau's theory. Consequently, a conclusion that can be drawn from this observation is that the explanatory power of Morgenthau's theory with respect to the near future of international politics are bound by a nuclear condition in the near future.

In addition to the prescriptive functions mentioned above, *short-term future time perspectives* pre-emptively add meaning and significance (i.e. perennial and ephemeral) to international political aspects beyond what their historical and contemporary meaning and significance are (i.e. their future manifestations). As examples, the threats of terrorism, cyberwarfare, and climate change in the 21st Century are and will continue to redefine how states organise and coordinate their defence and security in the near future. Conversely, in the 20th century these issues were of less importance in comparison to the threat of nuclear war or the struggle for global domination between the former Soviet Union and the United States as articulated within Morgenthau's theory. By pre-emptively assigning meaning and significance to certain aspects of international politics manifesting in the near future, a theory is effectively extending its theoretical explanations into the near future. This explanatory extension into the future via *short-term time perspectives* ends up foreshadowing and directing where future developments of politics should head. In the case of Morgenthau's theory, the discussion emphasising the revival of quality diplomatic practices among states indicates diplomacy as an area of international politics where developments need to take place in the near future. Furthermore, these time perspectives prepare the theoretical groundwork in the near future for subsequent scholars using a particular theory to study international politics. In other words, as a consequence of this explanatory extension into the near future a theory pre-establishes and predetermines its relevance and

applicability to the unknown international political sphere.

7.2 Long-term future time perspectives

Long-term future time perspectives serve at least one of two primary roles within a theory; they extend a theory's applicability beyond the foreseeable future (i.e. beyond the short-term future and present to some extent) into the unforeseen (long-term) future *and* they provide glimpses into the long-term future evolution of international politics. In regards to the first role, *long-term future time perspectives* are crucial to establishing either the long-lasting, but finitude of a theory's explanatory power on the distant future or its indefinite relevance. This distinction is worth noting because each distinction has different effects on a theory's claims. I classify a theory's relevance as 'long-lasting' when a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* convey a point in time when a theory's claims are no longer helpful in making sense of international politics in the present or future. An expression of this point in time articulated via a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* can appear as a utopia or a grand resolution of a fundamental problem or situation in international politics.⁴⁷⁰ Although Morgenthau's theory does not offer either a utopia or grand resolution in the way other theories such as liberalism and Marxism do, his criticisms of such theories indicate where examples of *long-term future time perspectives* articulating utopias or grand resolutions can be drawn.⁴⁷¹ An example of a utopia or grand resolution articulated via a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* can be found in Marxism which calls upon workers to overthrow existing capitalist modes of production and reorganise society into a classless utopia.⁴⁷² The significance of these points in time is that they bracket or bookend the length of the

⁴⁷⁰ Dystopias can also indicate the limits of a theory's explanation.

⁴⁷¹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 366-67, 513-14; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Machiavellian Utopia," *Ethics* 55, no. 2 (January 1945): 145-47; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Science of Peace: A Rationalist Utopia," *Social Research* 42, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 20-34; William E. Scheuerman, "Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man vs. Power Politics," *Constellations* 14, no. 4 (December 2007), 511-12; Donald F. Dvorak, notes on Morgenthau's Modern Political Theory Lectures 1955, University of Chicago, 20-21, Morgenthau Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Box 80; M. Ben Mollov, "Power and Spirituality in the Thought of Hans J. Morgenthau," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 10, no. 1-2 (Spring 1998), 102; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography: 1904-1932," in *Truth and Tragedy: A Tribute to Hans J. Morgenthau*, eds. Kenneth W. Thompson and Robert J. Myers (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1984), 13; Mihaela Neacsu, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 46-7.

⁴⁷² Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology in Marx & Engels Collected Works Vol 05: Marx and Engels: 1845-1847* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), 438.

future within which a theory's claims can be understood as having relevance to making sense of international politics in the future. In other words, a theory's claims will be valid up to a particular point in time in the future. After this point is reached (e.g. Marxism's classless utopia), a theory's claims about international politics are considered by that theory as only relevant to the past because international politics of the future is fundamentally different than what came before. This interpretation of theoretical claims contrasts with a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* which suggest theoretical claims have indefinite relevance.

The use of 'indefinite' to describe the relevance of a theory's claims suggests that these claims are not bound by a point in time in the future and have the potential to be applicable forever (i.e. timeless). Such enduring relevance can be suggested in three ways by a theory's *long-term future time perspectives*: 1) through articulations of perennial truths, 2) timeless epistemologies, and 3) potential future scenarios. First, a theory might articulate that particular perennial aspects of international politics will never cease to exist in the future (e.g. cyclical nature of international politics, dominant actors). For example, in neorealism, anarchy among states will always be a dominant aspect of the international political system.⁴⁷³ Consequently, there is no conceivable reason or scenario under which a world state as described by Morgenthau would emerge because states would never completely cede their sovereignty to a world state. Second, epistemologies within a theory might be considered relevant to the study of international politics indefinitely regardless of how international politics is constituted at any point in the future. For example, social constructivist epistemology, according to Wendt, is supposed to be continually applicable to and relevant for examining international politics as long as 'the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature'.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷³ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Waltz, *Man, the State and War*; Lawson, "Promise of Historical Sociology," 406; Lawson, "The Eternal Divide?," 206.

⁴⁷⁴ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 1.

7.2.1 *Predictions, probabilities, and aspirations*

Unlike the two previous ways which suggest certain theoretical claims are timeless in a nondescript future, articulations of potential future scenarios provide specific future contexts of international politics where the timelessness of theoretical claims is demonstrated. These potential future scenarios and associated contexts within theories can be expressed as predictions, probabilities, or aspirations about the unforeseeable future. By placing a theory's claims within unforeseen future contexts that differ from those historical, present, and foreseeable future contexts identified elsewhere within a theory, a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* help to illustrate that a theory's claims do not only apply to known contexts but also to unrealised and unknown contexts. In essence, articulating claims via a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* have the potential to ascribe a timeless quality to such claims. However, articulating the relevance of a theory's claims within future contexts that differ slightly from historical and present contexts (e.g. such as those mentioned within *short-term future time perspectives*) are not enough to convey that a theory's claims are timeless. To convey the timelessness of a claim, potential future contexts must differ substantially from known contexts (historical, present, or short-term future) in that they either 1) challenge historical, contemporary, or short-term future contexts of international politics or 2) are so far removed from known contexts of international politics that potential future contexts seem almost unimaginable. *Long-term future time perspectives* are able to articulate these more substantial differences of potential future contexts because the contexts articulated by these *future time perspectives* are not bound as closely to the present and known aspects of international politics as those contexts articulated by *short-term future time perspectives*. In essence, the future contexts articulated within *long-term future time perspectives* help to liberate theoretical claims from their historical and contemporary contexts so they can be interpreted as indefinitely relevant to the study of international politics in the unforeseeable future.

An example of how the future contexts introduced into a theory by *long-term future time perspectives* support interpretations of particular theoretical claims as timeless can be found in Morgenthau's discussion regarding interest defined as power in relation to the creation of a world state. *Long-term future time perspectives* are used within Morgenthau's theory to outline the potential future requirements and contexts

where a world state could become the dominant actor preserving international peace. 'For the world state to be more than a dim vision, the accommodating processes of diplomacy, mitigating and minimizing conflicts, must be revived'.⁴⁷⁵ As a consequence of the revival of diplomacy, 'the interests uniting members of different nations [will eventually] outweigh the interests separating them'.⁴⁷⁶ From these shared interests, Morgenthau claims that an international community can develop and provide the foundation for a future world state.⁴⁷⁷ Although placed in an unforeseeable (i.e. imagined) future context, his claims about interest defined as power are not undermined and remain central to his explanation of how international politics works. By including this specific future context alongside the historical, present, and foreseeable future contexts found elsewhere in Morgenthau's theory where interest defined as power is discussed, this claim can be interpreted as indefinitely applicable to the study of international politics (i.e. timeless). Morgenthau's discussion of the creation of a future world state does not bracket his theory's *long-term future time perspectives*, but serves as an example of a potential future scenario demonstrating the timelessness of his theoretical claims regarding interest defined as power.

The second primary role served by a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* is to articulate long-term predictions, probabilities, and aspirations about the unforeseeable future. Long-term predictions and probabilities and long-term aspirations are distinct from one another in four ways. First, predictions and probabilities are grouped into one category because both denote precision and some degree of certainty in contrast to the uncertainty and imprecision or potential disregarding of reality associated with aspirations.⁴⁷⁸ Discussions within Morgenthau's theory regarding the probability of the creation of a world community⁴⁷⁹ and aspirations of disarmament

⁴⁷⁵ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 534.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 502.

⁴⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 493 and 502.

⁴⁷⁸ The 'disregarding of reality' refers to those aspirations which appear within a theory as a stark contrast to the realities of historical and contemporary international politics perceived and experienced by people in everyday life. For more on what influenced Morgenthau's thought in this regard see Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 3rd edn. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). The idealism promoted by Woodrow Wilson in his 14 Points serves as an example of how certain historical and contemporary realities of international politics in Germany and Japan were either disregarded or marginalised. Harold G. Moulton and Constantine E. McGuire, *Germany's Capacity to Pay: A Study of the Reparation Problem* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1923), 245-48; Noriko Kawamura, "Wilsonian Idealism and Japanese Claims at the Paris Peace Conference," *Pacific Historical Review* 66, no. 4 (November 1997), 504.

⁴⁷⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 486-502.

being a first step toward or 'solution to the problem of international order and peace' help to clarify the distinction between predictions/probabilities and aspirations articulated within a theory via its *long-term future time perspectives*.⁴⁸⁰ Second, predictions, probabilities, and aspirations can have connections to past and contemporary international politics, however, only the predictions and probabilities are derived primarily from experience; whereas aspirations may or may not be derived from experience.⁴⁸¹ Aspirations, however, cannot originate without the influence of an emotional component, namely hope or desire, with regards to the unforeseeable future. Again, the aforementioned discussions within Morgenthau's theory regarding world community and disarmament help to highlight the aforementioned points. For example, the specialised agencies of the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the European Coal and Steel Community are presented as evidence of how and where a world community might develop from contemporary experience;⁴⁸² conversely, it is the belief among statesmen in 'disarmament as a devise to insure international order and peace' that keep disarmament as a policy option worth pursuing despite the many failed attempts made at disarmament in the past.⁴⁸³

A third distinction between predictions and probabilities *and* aspirations is that aspirations are primarily articulated in the context of the distant future rather than in the immediate future. An example of such an aspiration articulated in the distant future is evident within Morgenthau's theory where the manifestation of a functioning international police is addressed.⁴⁸⁴ Conversely, predictions and probabilities appear equally in the context of both *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives*. Those predictions and probabilities relating to the long-term future try to account for a disproportionately greater number of unknowns vs. known variables that may occur in international politics than their short-term counterparts. The final distinction is that aspirations might not be accompanied by (nor require) detailed explanations as to how they are connected to the rest of a theory's explanation. Furthermore, some aspirations may appear to not be in accordance with the evidence presented within a theory in

⁴⁸⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 371-87.

⁴⁸¹ Hartog, *Regimes of Historicity*, 98.

⁴⁸² Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 486-502.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, 367.

⁴⁸⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Political Conditions for an International Police Force," *International Organization* 17, no. 2 (Spring 1963): 393-403; Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 398-400.

support of a theory's central arguments. Drawing on Morgenthau's theory for an example of this latter point is difficult because aspirations mentioned in his theory are rare and remarkably consistent with the evidence presented within his theory; consequently an example of this latter point must be drawn from another theory. For example within Marxist theory, as articulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, aspirations of society evolving in particular stages towards a pure communist society at some point in the distant future runs counter to the historical evidence presented in the theory which suggests capitalism's adaptive qualities can prevent such a linear progression or lead to a different end.⁴⁸⁵ This implicit acceptance of discordance within a theory is not afforded to predictions and probabilities relating to the unforeseeable (i.e. long-term) future as it would undermine the validity and credibility of long-term predictions and probabilities presented within a theory. By clarifying distinctions between long-term predictions and probabilities *and* aspirations, the different ways through which a theory addresses the long-term future of international politics become more apparent.

Although the predictions, probabilities, and aspirations articulated via *long-term future time perspectives* relate to the unforeseeable future, they are not devoid of all known and foreseeable aspects of international politics. For these predictions, probabilities, and aspirations to remain connected with a theory's general explanation of international politics, they must include or reference at least one known core perennial aspect of international politics referenced elsewhere in a theory. For example, within Morgenthau's theory the struggle for power and peace is a known core perennial aspect of international politics that is evident within the predictions, probabilities, and aspirations about the distant future articulated within his theory. Such references to a perennial aspect may include its active presence in international politics, dormancy, overall decline, or ultimate end in the distant future. These references, however, do not need to match how that particular perennial aspect has been interpreted in the past; they need only acknowledge the existence of a perennial aspect. This point is illustrated within Morgenthau's theory by making references to the nuclear condition as a

⁴⁸⁵ Friedrich Engels, "Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith (1847)," in *The Communist Manifesto with Related Documents*, ed. John E. Toews (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), 99-104; Michael Burawoy and Erik Olin Wright, "Sociological Marxism," in *Handbook of Sociological Theory*, ed. Jonathan H. Turner (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2002), 463-68.

perennial aspect in the present and future of international politics, though not the past. Without the inclusion of or reference to at least one perennial aspect, claims about the distant future would appear as random and disconnected from the rest of a theory's explanation.⁴⁸⁶ In addition to addressing known perennial aspects of international politics, the predictions, probabilities, and aspirations articulated within *long-term future time perspectives* may also include known ephemeral aspects of international politics of the present (e.g. rising international actors such as China and India). The inclusion of contemporary ephemeral aspects within articulations of the distant future enable a theory to attach long-term significance and perennial attributes to these aspects. An example of this point is evident within Morgenthau's theory regarding references made to the role of China as an important political actor in international politics in the distant future.⁴⁸⁷ The attachment of these qualities to ephemeral aspects occurs as a consequence of illustrating their manifestations in the distant future. Consequently, understandings and interpretations of contemporary ephemeral aspects in the present can be altered by a theory's *long-term future time perspectives*.

To grasp the significance of *long-term future time perspectives* retaining known aspects of international politics, reflecting upon two known aspects of international politics mentioned in Morgenthau's discussion of the creation of a world state found in his theory is again helpful. One of the known aspects is perennial (e.g. survival interest motivating international political action) and the other known aspect is ephemeral but not found in the long-term past (e.g. the nuclear condition). Within Morgenthau's theory, these two known aspects are combined to consequently suggest that the contemporary nuclear condition has created an immediate and perpetual urgency among states regarding their survival. Morgenthau suggests that this shared threat to survival has the potential at some point in the future to prompt states to consider pursuing the development of a world state which can help secure permanent peace and ensure the survival of humanity for future generations.⁴⁸⁸ In this example, the world state is a long-term aspiration that Morgenthau's theory suggests is created and perpetuated by an ephemeral aspect (i.e. the nuclear condition) of the contemporary

⁴⁸⁶ Those perennial aspects which are not mentioned within a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* may be either dormant or in decline, similar to how perennial aspects can be addressed in *short-term historical, short-term present, and short-term future time perspectives*.

⁴⁸⁷ Morgenthau, "The Roots of America's China Policy," 45-50.

⁴⁸⁸ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 469-70, 477, and 502.

world as articulated within Morgenthau's theory. Morgenthau's theory interprets the creation of a world state as a long-term project which involves multiple developmental stages (e.g. building of a world community and a revival of diplomacy) that would require the convergence or alignment of states' competing interests regarding how to go about creating a world state and what type of world state should be created. The sequence of these developmental stages outlined within his theory suggest the creation of a world state will not happen in the short-term, but over an extended period of time with no definitive date of creation. Until that date arrives, the threat to states' survival posed by the nuclear condition is ongoing and becomes a perennial aspect of international politics in the future. Consequently, from this example, the known perennial interest for survival and known ephemeral aspect regarding the nuclear condition retained by *long-term future time perspectives* help to connect notions of a distant future to the general explanations of international politics offered by Morgenthau's theory.

7.2.2 *Projecting as a common purpose*

As the previous example indicates, *long-term future time perspectives* can serve a common purpose within a theory which is to offer solutions or suggestions -- in the form of predictions, probabilities, and aspirations -- that attempt to adequately address international political questions and problems in the unforeseeable future.⁴⁸⁹ In one sense, this common purpose is meant to help the reader understand what accepting a theory's argument means in relation to thinking about the future of international politics. For example, Morgenthau's discussions regarding the difficulties of creating a world state and a world community in the distant future helps him lead the reader to a particular end, a revival of diplomacy.⁴⁹⁰ In another sense, the common purpose of *long-term future time perspectives* may also be to provide a response (either conclusive or open-ended) to questions or concerns raised by a theory, thus helping to complete a theory's main argument. An example of *long-term future time perspectives* illustrating this type of common purpose can be found in the discussion within Morgenthau's theory

⁴⁸⁹ Edward Hallett Carr and Michael Cox, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), xxiii.

⁴⁹⁰ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 469-535.

regarding the resurrection of the practice of diplomacy among states in the future.⁴⁹¹ According to Morgenthau, resurrecting the practice of diplomacy is a response to addressing the struggles for power and peace in international politics as outlined throughout *Politics among Nations*. The discussion is significant because it draws attention to Morgenthau's disbelief that the struggle for power and peace can be sufficiently addressed, though not resolved (in the context of the nuclear condition) in the foreseeable future.

Regardless of the common purpose(s) that a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* serves, as a consequence of addressing or providing solutions to international political questions and problems in the unforeseeable future, a theory ends up projecting out particular views of how international politics may or will evolve and manifest in the distant future. Included within these projections are general notions about international politics in the future. The potential futures put forward by a theory may include, but are not limited to dystopias, utopias, or ends to ongoing, systemic international political tensions. Where a theory does not put forward specific views of how international politics will evolve or manifest in the unforeseeable future, such a theory may still project out certain notions that are reflective of a particular awareness or understanding of international politics in the distant future. For example, some usages of Critical Theory suggest that theory projects out the idea that alternative understandings and interpretations of international politics which have been historically silenced or marginalised (e.g. notions of international politics from non-Western or gendered perspectives) should not be immediately barred from consideration or adoption in the distant future.⁴⁹² While the objectives of the future projections of certain theories may not always be clear or even exist, particular objectives of the future projections of other theories are more evident and go beyond merely articulating long-term future manifestations of international politics.

To illustrate the additional insights that an examination of a theory's projections can reveal about *long-term future time perspectives* within a theory, I have provided the

⁴⁹¹ Ibid., 518-35.

⁴⁹² Andrew Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 31; Kimberly Hutchings, *Kant, Critique and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1996), 98; Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

following three examples. In the first case, long-term future projections may serve as warnings and/or calls of action against the current practice or evolution of international politics. For example, Morgenthau warns against beliefs that efforts to create a world community via state engagement in NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community, and specialised agencies of the UN (e.g. UNESCO, WHO) will lead to peace and individual citizens transferring their loyalties from a state to a supranational entity.⁴⁹³ In the second case, long-term future projections may provide reassurances that despite the historical or contemporary status of international politics, long-term aspirations for the future can be significantly different and seemingly not rooted in the past or present. For example, Morgenthau's claims regarding the revival of diplomatic practices via overcoming certain vices and following four fundamental rules provide reassurances that there remained possibilities to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear war despite tenuous relations between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.⁴⁹⁴ Finally, long-term future projections may (re)confirm international politics is governed by dominant cycles, trends, and/or forces (i.e. particular perennial factors) which ultimately lead to known ends or serve as an accepted set of factors which maintain a general status quo (e.g. anarchy, international law) within the international political sphere.⁴⁹⁵ To illustrate, Gilpin offers a theoretical perspective which suggests that there will always be hegemonic states which dictate international politics to other states, as well as acknowledges that the anarchic state of international politics is the status quo for the long-term future.⁴⁹⁶ While the above examples are not meant to constitute an exhaustive list, they do highlight what a theory's long-term projections can reveal about its *long-term future time perspectives*.

⁴⁹³ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 486-502.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 518-535.

⁴⁹⁵ Regarding the notion of status quo with respect to the long-term future of international legal theory see Andrea Bianchi, *International Law Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁴⁹⁶ Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 591-613.

7.3 Combined effects

Up to this point, the analyses and discussions regarding *future time perspectives* have focused on how each individual *future time perspective* functions within a theory and subsequently shapes theoretical claims. The purpose of addressing each *future time perspectives* individually was to highlight the unique ways that they each shape claims within a theory, ways that are distinct from each other as well as other time perspectives relating to the past and the present. *Short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives*, however, do not exist in isolation within a theory; they co-exist and together constitute a theory's panoptic view of the future in its entirety. To illustrate how *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* co-exist within a theory and the subsequent effects of this co-existence on theoretical claims, this final section presents and discusses an example from Morgenthau's theory. This example concerns the relations within Morgenthau's theory between its *future time perspectives* and theoretical claims regarding the future as it relates to the notion of immortality. By the end of this section, a greater appreciation for and awareness of the co-shaping roles that *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* play within a theory will be difficult to ignore, particularly considering *future time perspectives* feature less prominently in his theory than time perspectives relating to the past and the present. This welcomed difficulty arises because of the proscriptive and retrospective understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims scholars gain via an analysis of *future time perspectives*; an analysis which has yet to be fully developed in the IR literature.

To begin to gain an understanding of the co-shaping roles *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* within Morgenthau's theory play in regards to his theoretical understandings and interpretations of immortality, initially addressing Morgenthau's general claims about foretelling the future is necessary. As stated in previous chapters, Morgenthau was quite explicit that the future of international politics cannot be predicted. In place of prediction, Morgenthau refers to the likelihood or statistical probability of international politics developing in particular ways in the future. In regards to Morgenthau's theoretical claims about the possibility of immortality within the future context of international politics where nuclear weapons exist, the probability is infinitesimally small so as to equate to zero.⁴⁹⁷ In other words,

⁴⁹⁷ Morgenthau, "Death in a Nuclear Age," 22.

the probability of immortality in the future is so low as to suggest that immortality is no longer considered achievable in the future. This claim of the low probability of immortality is supported by the absence of references made to immortality as an aspiration within Morgenthau's theory. Consequently, Morgenthau's theory is essentially offering a prediction that achieving immortality is impossible in the future. In offering this assessment regarding the inability to achieve immortality, Morgenthau's theory is making a claim about how to conceive of immortality in the future. The central claim is that the notion of immortality is not relevant to thinking about the future because it is not possible. This claim stems from how Morgenthau's theory addresses the future of international politics via *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives*.

When looking at how claims about immortality are affected within Morgenthau's theory by *future time perspectives*, recognising immortality as a *long-term future time perspective* itself must be considered. The longest *long-term future time perspective* referenced within Morgenthau's theory relate to his thoughts on immortality.⁴⁹⁸ As the longest *long-term future time perspective*, immortality provides the extent to which Morgenthau's theoretical explanations and claims might potentially be applicable. Furthermore, this claim implies that no other future time perspective can be longer. With no discernible end, immortality essentially sustains a *long-term future time perspective* within Morgenthau's theory that is indefinite. When this notion of a *long-term future time perspective* with no end is considered alongside Morgenthau's theoretical claims regarding notions of contingency, human nature, and the nuclear condition with respect to international politics, these claims are understood and interpreted as indefinitely relevant to explaining international politics in the unforeseen future. Via these claims, therefore, the applicability of Morgenthau's theory in helping to make sense of international politics in the long-term future can also be understood as extended indefinitely. Morgenthau recognises, however, that the infiniteness of immortality should not be taken for granted.

For Morgenthau, the nuclear condition of international politics in the present and future, challenges the infinite aspect of immortality. Essentially, Morgenthau's *short-term future time perspectives* extend the nuclear condition and the threats it poses in contemporary international politics to the future (i.e. bridging work). The

⁴⁹⁸ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 144-52.

introduction of the nuclear condition and corresponding threats into the future is significant because they represent existing, known ends to the world. In identifying existing, known ends to the world, those ends effectively signpost the limits of immortality. Consequently, the infinite aspect of immortality loses its significance and thus suggests that immortality within Morgenthau's theory is finite; in other words immortality becomes an irrational possibility for Morgenthau.⁴⁹⁹ Morgenthau's notion that immortality is an irrational possibility is further reinforced via his recognition of the immediacy with which nuclear weapons can be used at any point in the short-term or long-term future.⁵⁰⁰ The cumulative effects of this curtailing of immortality within Morgenthau's theory is fourfold. First, a *long-term future time perspective* that has no end is eliminated from Morgenthau's consideration because of the potential usage of nuclear weapons in the future. Second, the longest *long-term future time perspective* is drastically reduced in duration to the point that a nuclear strike tomorrow would make this time perspective a *short-term future time perspective*.⁵⁰¹ Third, because the ends of immortality are derived from the present nuclear condition (and immortality is representative of the longest *long-term future time perspective* within Morgenthau's theory), the nuclear condition becomes perennialised in international politics of the future. Finally, the possibility of immortality is interpreted as dependent upon the political actions of the present.

The aforementioned final point regarding immortality's dependence on the present is significant because it offers key insights into how Morgenthau's theory constrains notions of the future and maintains its primary aim of making sense of international politics in the present. By making the existence of immortality dependent upon contemporary international politics, Morgenthau reorients his longest *long-term future time perspective* and corresponding theoretical outlooks back onto the present. Thus, instead of having this particular *long-term future time perspective* focused on the future for its own sake, its focus is on the present. This reorientation of long-term future theoretical outlooks back onto the present, however, is not unique. As extrapolations of the present, Morgenthau's short-term future theoretical outlooks regarding immortality

⁴⁹⁹ Morgenthau, *Science: Servant or Master?*, 144-52.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 137, 140.

⁵⁰¹ As a result of shortening immortality, the scope of time Morgenthau's theory covers is also shortened. This is similar to an earlier discussion in Section 5.2.5 regarding how the scope of time considered within his *long-term historical perspectives* constrains theoretical predictions.

also contribute to reorienting the theory's notions of the future back onto the present. This interpretation is based upon an understanding that immortality's end (defined by the nuclear condition) remains the same in the short-term and long-term future. Consequently, Morgenthau's *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* regarding immortality illustrate how notions about the future are constrained within his theory to maintaining a focus on the present, even when addressing the future. This insight suggests Morgenthau's *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* are dominated by the present.⁵⁰² Given the aim of Morgenthau's theory to help make sense of international politics in the present, this dominance of the present within Morgenthau's *future time perspectives* regarding immortality and the future in general is not surprising.

The dominance of the present in the future also indicates the relationships between both *future time perspectives* and *short-term present time perspectives*. Each time perspective delimits the claims Morgenthau can make in his theory to render particular understandings and interpretations of immortality with respect to the future; in essence immortality has a finite end.⁵⁰³ These relationships further support the arguments consistently presented throughout this thesis that time perspectives co-exist, interact, and simultaneously shape claims about international politics within a theory. Consequently, this final section shows that to ignore or remain unaware of the substance and meaning *future time perspectives* add to theoretical claims is to not fully comprehend the purpose and meaning of including particular theoretical claims within a theory. In the case of Morgenthau's references to and discussions of immortality, an analysis of his *future time perspectives* helps to recover the sincerity and severity of his warning against perpetuating what he saw as incomplete or delusional understandings and interpretations of the realities of contemporary international politics.⁵⁰⁴ In other words, the individual and combined effects of a theory's *future time perspectives* are not

⁵⁰² For a good discussion the difficulties of escaping the influences of the present and presentism in relation to historicity, see Hartog and Saskia, *Regimes of Historicity*.

⁵⁰³ Although not addressed, *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives* also shape claims about immortality within Morgenthau's theory. Specifically, these *historical time perspectives* illustrate how immortality was a possibility in the past. McQueen, "Salutary Fear?," 89. By acknowledging that this possibility existed in the past and contrasting it with the impossibility of immortality in the future, the future is made more distinct and the significance of the nuclear condition is increased.

⁵⁰⁴ These views are evident in Morgenthau's critique of liberalism; for examples see Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 1946, 72-3 and 85.

just relevant to making sense of theoretical claims about international politics in the future, but across the timescape articulated within a theory.

7.4 Chapter summary

The analyses and discussions regarding *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* articulated in this chapter have helped recover an awareness of and appreciation for how these two *future time perspectives* can potentially function within a theory and shape understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims about international politics. Similar to the analyses and discussions of *historical* and *present time perspectives* found in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, distinctions between *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* were individually detailed and highlighted through examples drawn primarily from Morgenthau's theory of international politics. As a consequence of addressing and highlighting these distinctions, the contrasts between *future time perspectives* and *historical* and *present time perspectives* became more evident. The contrasts between *future time perspectives* and other time perspectives are significant because they indicate that a theory's *future time perspectives* can shape and confer meaning and significance on a theory's claims about international politics which are not otherwise possible via a theory's *historical* and *present time perspectives* (e.g. the perennialisation of an ephemeral aspect of the past or the present). Consequently, to only interpret theoretical claims from a theory's *historical* and *present time perspectives* when at least one *future time perspective* exists within a theory, would lead to a partial understanding of how that particular theory makes sense of international politics. By addressing the functions and effects of *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* individually and collectively, this chapter provides scholars with new insights that can be used to avoid partial understandings of theoretical claims resulting from superficial readings and interpretations of *future time perspectives*.

The new insights provided by this chapter are summarised below. The first section contains insights about the various functions and effects of a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* in relation to theoretical claims. Among the insights recovered through my analysis, *short-term future time perspectives* were found to perform crucial transition and bridging work within a theory between a theory's understandings of international politics in the past and present *and* the future. This transition and bridging

work enables a theory to introduce particular known aspects of the past and the present into international politics of the future, thus making parts of the future foreseeable and pre-emptively adding prospective meaning and significance to a theory's historical and contemporary claims. In other words, a theory's *short-term future time perspectives* help facilitate the extension of a theory's explanatory power and claims beyond the known/knowable world to the yet-to-be world (i.e. unknown future). In the second section, insights recovered about the functions and effects of a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* were less about the foreseeable future and more centred on aspects of the unforeseeable future of international politics. The insights recovered from my analysis include: 1) how a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* help to explain within a theory how international politics will evolve and manifest in the unforeseeable future, 2) the extent to which a theory's explanation and claims are applicable in familiar and unfamiliar contexts, and 3) the shelf-life of theoretical claims in the distant future. Essentially, these insights indicate that a theory's *long-term future time perspectives* help to convey how a theory tries to resolve or address longstanding or pressing questions and problems in international politics of the past, present, and future.

In the final section of this chapter, insights regarding the co-existence and simultaneous effects of *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* within a theory reconfirmed findings discussed in the final sections of chapters 5 and 6 with respect to *historical* and *present time perspectives*; time perspectives do not exist in isolation from one another and collectively shape how claims are understood and interpreted within a theory. Furthermore, the delimiting effects that both *future time perspectives* have on known and unknown aspects of a theory's notions of the future help to make the future less uncertain. By making the future less uncertain, *future time perspectives* within a theory contribute to making sense of international politics in the future, even if it remains wholly unknown. This particular insight is significant because it indicates that a theory is capable of addressing and making claims about both known and unknown aspects of international politics via its *historical, present, and future time perspectives*. Consequently, the insights shared in this final section (and chapter) help to draw out the relevance of *future time perspectives* with regards to how theoretical claims are defined. Awareness of these insights makes new contributions to readers' understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims because these insights both

refine, and in some cases, redefine more accurately claims about international politics made within a theory.

With my analysis of time perspectives and their effects on claims within a theory of international politics complete, my analysis now moves on to time perspectives and their effect on claims within the political practice of a peace process. My chosen case study for a peace process was the Oslo Accords. Remaining mindful of the ideas and understandings regarding time perspectives and their effects developed and presented in this chapter, as well as those presented in chapters 5 and 6, my analyses of time perspectives and their effects within the Accords did not begin from scratch. Furthermore, the insights recovered by my analysis of Morgenthau's theory mirrored those recovered from my analysis of the Accords. Consequently, it was not necessary to conduct the same ground-clearing exercises in the following chapters as was done in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

Conducting my analyses of time perspectives and their effects within the Accords in this way was beneficial for two reasons. First, it reduced the need to repeat explanations and discussions appearing in previous chapters at the same level of detail. This consequently freed up a considerable amount text space which could be devoted to presenting and discussing nuanced insights about the relationship between a peace process and its time perspectives as found in the Accords. Second, this was a way of illustrating that the insights about time perspectives and their effects on claims gained from my analysis of Morgenthau's theory applied to more than just theoretical contexts, but empirical contexts as well. Therefore, the aims of both analyses remain the same in that they improve contemporary understandings of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future and the shaping effects of each type of time perspective on respective claims.

Chapter 8: A Background to a Peace Process and its Time Perspectives

This chapter marks a break between two key parts of my thesis, one theoretical and one empirical. Thus far, my analyses and discussions have namely focused on *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* of the past, present and future and their effects on claims made within a theory. From these analyses and discussions, insights into the relationships between time perspectives and theoretical claims were recovered. The insights gained from my exploration of these relationships collectively indicate that time perspectives shape claims and thus a theory's understanding and interpretation of international political phenomena. These insights I have made about time perspectives with respect to claims, however, contribute to more than augmented understandings of time perspectives found in a theoretical context. To illustrate the relevance of the insights gained from my analyses beyond the confines of a theory, the two following chapters articulate a separate analysis on an empirical case study which led to the recovery of similar insights obtained from my theoretical case study. The chosen empirical example addressed is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, with specific focus on the Oslo Accords.⁵⁰⁵ In addition to illustrating the similarities among time perspectives and their effects within a theory and those within a peace process, an effort is made to highlight the practical value of the insights obtained from my empirical study. The value of these insights is that they can be used to understand, evaluate, and explain historical and existing peace processes and their corresponding claims at various stages of development and execution, as well as in the drafting of future peace processes; examples of both are presented in this chapter and Chapter 9. Consequently, by detailing the relationships between time perspectives and a peace process, I am suggesting that time perspectives have broad shaping effects on the study, practice, and manifestation of the international pursuit of peace.

To help the reader to understand and interpret the effects that time perspectives have on the peace process articulated in the Accords, I have spread my analysis over two chapters. Within this first chapter, explanations of key concepts and historical background information relevant to my empirical case study are provided as they help

⁵⁰⁵ Throughout the remainder of the chapter, all references made to 'the Accords' will refer to both Oslo I and Oslo II collectively. When necessary distinctions between Oslo I and Oslo II are made.

the reader to make sense of the analyses, discussions, and suggestions presented later in Chapter 9. The structure of this first chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I address 1) what a peace process is understood to be in this study and 2) why an awareness of liberal and democratic peace theories is needed to help recover and understand the presence and absence of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* within the Accords.⁵⁰⁶ Discussions in this section will provide the broad theoretical context of the Accords and highlight the connection between theory and practice in a peace process. The reasons as to why an extensive analysis of the time perspectives and claims found within liberal and democratic peace theories was not conducted is also addressed in this section. The second section of the chapter offers an overview of the Accords' historical contexts regarding 1) the primary issues the Accords were intended to address and 2) what circumstances made drafting the Accords necessary and possible. By no means is the historical overview presented in this section intended to be a comprehensive account of Israeli-Palestinian relations or disregard the complexity of the situation and relationship that has existed and continues to exist.⁵⁰⁷ The historical overview presented is rather intended to provide the reader with general historical contexts necessary to follow the analysis and argument articulated in Chapter 9.

The chapter's final section provides a description of how the time perspectives within the Accords' peace process were demarcated via the extreme anchor points articulated within the Accords. These anchor points, however, are different than those articulated within Morgenthau's theory. The differences of duration between time perspectives of a similar type become apparent when comparing for example *long-term historical time perspectives* from Morgenthau's theory to those made in the Accords. The value of this comparison, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, is significant because the duration of time perspectives from one source (e.g. Morgenthau's theory) may be potentially useful to embed different aspects into a future peace process seeking to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations. Although no specific suggestions are provided in this chapter as to what anchor points should be established within future peace processes, knowing when the Accords' anchor points are situated is necessary when

⁵⁰⁶ For an explanation as to why the distinction between liberal peace theory and democratic peace theory matters see Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, "The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 397-414.

⁵⁰⁷ For an even-handed historical overview see Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009).

thinking about how to adjust time perspectives within future peace processes to improve their potential for success. The consequences of adjusting the Accords' anchor points are detailed in Chapter 9 under the various sections relating to specified time perspective suggestions for future peace processes.

8.1 An understanding of what a peace process is

Before beginning my analysis of the relationships between time perspectives and peace processes, there is a need to provide an understanding of what a peace process is. The challenge of developing or providing a definition of what a peace process is stems from the various forms that peace processes can take.⁵⁰⁸ Variations among peace processes can namely be attributed to the context specific aspects and issues of international politics that the processes seek to include and address. For example, the location of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East and religious considerations among Jews, Muslims, and Christians pull in a distinct group of political actors that differs markedly from the actors involved in, for example, the Northern Ireland peace process which dealt with manifesting peace in a different location and under different religious considerations among Catholics and Protestants. Despite this diversity, however, peace processes in general also share common aspects. For example, peace processes are all political, work to build confidence among conflicting parties, and have the ultimate goal of working towards peace. Therefore a useful understanding of what peace processes are must be mindful of both the commonalities and variations among peace processes. Such an understanding is provided by former U.S. diplomat Harold H. Saunders.⁵⁰⁹

According to Saunders, a peace process is 'a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means' via 'a mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue in both official and unofficial

⁵⁰⁸ For an exemplary survey and comparison of different peace processes see Alpaslan Özerdem and Roger Mac Ginty, *Comparing Peace Processes* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019).

⁵⁰⁹ Saunders earned his PhD at Yale before serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. His involvement in the Kissinger Shuttles, Camp David Accords, Iran Hostage Crisis, and facilitation of the 'Framework for a Public Peace Process' among Israeli and Palestinian citizen-leaders are evidence of his familiarity and active participation in peace processes. "Framework for a Public Peace Process: Toward a Peaceful Israeli-Palestinian Relationship," conclusion date: July 19, 1991, Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation and the Beyond War Foundation, <http://traubman.igc.org/ppp.pdf> (accessed October 15, 2018).

arenas.’⁵¹⁰ This understanding underpins what a peace process is in this study. In addition to capturing the common aspects among the various forms that peace processes can take, there are three additional aspects of Saunders’s understanding of what a peace process is that are relevant to and useful for my analysis. First, Saunders’s acknowledgement that a peace process can occur in both official and unofficial arenas has particular relevance to my analysis of the Accords. As will be articulated later in this chapter, official and unofficial arenas were utilised in the build up to the drafting of the Accords.⁵¹¹ Second, other definitions of what a peace process is were found to be too limiting in regards to the types of peace processes that could be covered under these definitions or too prescriptive in terms of what sequential structures peace processes are supposed to have.⁵¹² In consideration of the multi-layer complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the limitations of other definitions, Saunders’s definition of a peace process provides an inclusive and useful understanding for my analysis. Finally, Saunders articulation of what a peace process is does not prescribe or predetermine the form peace would take as a result of the process itself; in other words, his definition is focused on describing the process rather than peace. By not defining or predetermining what peace is, this articulation provides a useful definition that can be operationalised and used in subsequent studies of peace processes and their corresponding time perspectives which do not share the liberal and democratic peace foundations that underpin the Accords’ peace process.

⁵¹⁰ Harold H. Saunders, “Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Multilevel Peace Process,” in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace 2001); 483. For a sample of other definitions of what a peace process is see Darby and MacGinty, *Contemporary Peacemaking*, ; Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity after Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2015), 18-20; Stina Högladh, “Peace Agreements 1975-2011: Updating the UNDP Peace Agreement Dataset, in *States in Armed Conflict 2011 - Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99*, eds. Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2012), 42.

⁵¹¹ Louis Kriesberg, “Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (May 2001): 373-92.

⁵¹² For examples of other definitions of what a peace process is see: Timothy D. Sisk, “Democratization and Peacebuilding: Perils and Promises,” in *Turbulent Peace*, 787; Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-torn Societies,” in *Turbulent Peace*, 721-2.

8.2 Remaining mindful of peace

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as articulated in the Accords, the type of peace that the process was working towards was a liberal democratic peace.⁵¹³ This type of peace combined notions from liberal and democratic peace theories.⁵¹⁴ From liberal peace theory, notions of economic integration between Israel and a yet-to-be established Palestinian quasi-state, among their regional neighbors, and with the broader global market were incorporated into the Accords as means of building and sustaining peace. The idea was that the economic integration and prosperity gained by both sides would be an incentive to engage in the Accords' peace process, as well as make the cost of engaging in contemporary and future conflicts too high to sustain or start.⁵¹⁵ Other liberal peace notions embedded into the Accords included respect for human rights, acceptance of international law, mutual recognition among conflicting parties, adherence to democratic norms (e.g. elections), well-functioning domestic institutions, and respect for property, political, and civil rights.⁵¹⁶ The most striking notion from liberal peace theory embedded into the Accords was the notion that peace could be perpetual (i.e. perennial) if all of the aforementioned liberal notions became inherent features of Israel and a Palestinian quasi-state entity. The notion that peace can be perpetually sustained over time by adopting particular liberal ways of governance and interaction is also supported by democratic peace theory.⁵¹⁷

While many of the aforementioned notions from liberal peace theory overlap with those found in democratic peace theory, a discussion about democratic peace theory helps to clarify the type of peace the Accords' peace process was aiming to create, as well as provide explanations which support the pursuit of democratic peace as outlined in the Accords. First, democratic peace theory claims that peace between two

⁵¹³ Footnote 127 on page 46 includes a sampling of literature that addresses various types of peace that may be sought after in a peace process.

⁵¹⁴ For an example of the Oslo Accords' links to liberal peace theory see Richmond and Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions*, 157; for links to democratic peace theory see Baumgart-Ochse, "Democratization in Israel," 116.

⁵¹⁵ Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 323.

⁵¹⁶ Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, eds., *New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding* (Tokyo: UNU Press, 2009); Richmond and Franks, *Liberal Peace Transitions*, 152. For more on liberal peace theory's association with property, political, and civil rights see Larry Jay Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (Washington, DC: The Commission, 1995); Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik, "The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6433, entry posted April 24, 2017, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973082> (accessed August 30, 2018), 3-4.

⁵¹⁷ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," 636-7.

states is more likely to become a norm between two democracies than between a democracy and a non-democracy or two states that are non-democracies.⁵¹⁸ Consequently, by emphasising within the Accords that the Palestinian people ‘govern themselves according to democratic principles’, the Accords are specifying that the peace it is aiming for is a peace between two democracies.⁵¹⁹ Second, democratic peace theory claims that peace is most stable between two stable democracies rather than among young democracies. Accepting this claim, the Accords outlined the steps and stages of how a stable Palestinian democracy was to be established and then linked them to various stages and agreements of the peace process. As a consequence of this approach to statebuilding and peacebuilding, democracy and the Accords’ peace process were deliberately and inextricably connected to one another.⁵²⁰ Therefore, as Palestinian democracy advanced, so too would the peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Third, democratic peace theory provided structural, cultural, and normative explanations as to why the democratic peace aimed for within the Accords was thought to be possible to achieve and a peace that should be sought.⁵²¹ These explanations are significant because they are based upon theory-supporting empirical case studies which provide empirical support and justification for pursuing the democratic peace aimed for in the Accords. In other words, the incorporation of democratic peace theory into the Accords added empirical support to the Accords’ peace process and its aimed for peace.

8.3 Historical context

In the subsequent section, various historical aspects are covered to provide a slim, yet foundational overview of the historical context that led to the drafting of the Accords and contributed to the difficult implementation of the peace process.⁵²² This historical overview is intentionally basic and slim for two reasons. First, constructing a comprehensive historical account of all the aspects contributing to the drafting and

⁵¹⁸ Merkel Wolfgang, “Democracy through War?,” *Democratisation* 15, no. 3 (June 2018): 487-508.

⁵¹⁹ Oslo I, art. III, para. 1.

⁵²⁰ Baumgart-Ochse, “Democratisation in Israel,” 1116.

⁵²¹ Baumgart-Ochse, “Democratisation in Israel,” 1134; Maoz and Russett, “Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” 624-6 and 634-6.

⁵²² For a historiographic review of the literature on the origins of the conflicts a couple of years before the signing of Oslo I see Kenneth W. Stein, “A Historiographic Review of Literature on the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 5 (December 1991): 1450-465.

implementation difficulties of the Accords' peace process would inevitably introduce topics of discussions that would distract more than contribute to my analysis and argument.⁵²³ For example, discussions of the religious histories of Jews and Arabs pertaining to the territories of modern day Israel and Palestine are not key histories mentioned within the Accords and unnecessarily introduce historical dimensions of the conflict the Accords do not explicitly address.⁵²⁴ Consequently, such a comprehensive historical account would exceed the restricted scope of my analysis. Second, my historical overview uses the histories mentioned in the Accords as the basis from which to construct a historical context relevant to understanding the conflict, the purpose of the Accords, the potential reasons for its failure, and its *historical time perspectives*. Using the histories mentioned within the Accords as my basis significantly reduced the number of tangentially related histories I had to consider including in my historical overview which were not necessary to recover and interpret connections between the time perspectives and the peace process examined in this chapter. Consequently, this approach yielded a slim, yet foundational historical context that could be manageably constructed without losing sight of the purpose for providing such a historical context in this chapter.

An overview of the historical context relevant to my analysis of the relationship between the time perspectives and the peace process articulated within the Accords begins with recognising the purpose of the Accords. The collective aims of the Oslo Accords (i.e. Oslo I and Oslo II) was to work toward a peaceful and permanent resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that would lead 'to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 338'.⁵²⁵ The military and political actions by Israel that prompted the passing of the Security Council resolutions mentioned in the Accords and subsequent drafting of the Accords regarded competing Israeli and Palestinian political claims of sovereignty over

⁵²³ For examples of works addressing the history of the territories of modern day Israel and Palestine see: Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, *A Concise History of the Middle East*, 8th edn. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006); Gudrun Krämer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel*, trans. Graham Harman and Gudrun Krämer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Nur Masalha, "The Concept of Palestine: The Conception of Palestine from the Late Bronze Age to the Modern Period," *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies* 15, no. 2 (November 2016): 143-202.

⁵²⁴ For more on the histories of Judaism and Islam see Adam J. Silverstein, Guy G. Stroumsa, and Moshe Blidstein, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Abrahamic Religions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁵²⁵ Oslo I, art. I; Oslo II, preamble.

particular territories within former Mandatory Palestine. Although there are many explanations as to the causes of the conflict, my analysis focuses primarily on those that can be traced backwards starting from references made in the Accords. The territories in question that the Accords and Resolutions 242 and 338 focus on were once part of Mandatory Palestine, a League of Nations mandate administered by the United Kingdom from 1922-1948.⁵²⁶ At the end of the British mandate, these same territories were intended to one day become part of a future Arab state as outlined in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. According to Resolution 181, the recommendation was made that Mandatory Palestine be partitioned into three parts: an independent Arab state, an independent Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem.⁵²⁷ Although not the sole reason for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Accords suggests that part of its focus was on addressing those aspects of the conflict that could be linked back to the 1947 partitioning plan.⁵²⁸

Subsequent to the adoption of the partitioning plan, on May 14th, 1948, the Jewish People's Council declared the establishment of the State of Israel.⁵²⁹ This declaration is significant and relevant to my analysis of the Accords for three reasons. First, Israel's mentioning of Resolution 181 in its declaration of independence was used to legitimate

⁵²⁶ Council of the League of Nations, Nineteenth Session, "Mandate for Palestine," C.529.M.314.1922.VI. July 24, 1922, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/o/2FCA2C68106F11AB05256BCF007BF3CB> (accessed August 1, 2018).

⁵²⁷ UN General Assembly Res. 181, part I, section A, para. 3; parts II and III.

⁵²⁸ The link between the partition plan and Res 242 can be made based on comments by Lord Caradon, chief author of Res. 242 about 'the unsatisfactory nature of the 1967 line' and how this line was just 'just where troops had to stop in 1947...that night...' First quote from Lord Caradon, Aruther J. Goldberg, Mohamed H. El-Zayyat, and Abba Eban, *UN Security Council Resolution 242 – A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), 13 and second quote from Lord Caradon, interview on Kol Israel Radio, February 1973, <https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/statements%20clarifying%20the%20meaning%20of%20un%20security%20c.aspx> (accessed September 5, 2018). 'We didn't attempt to deal with it [the questions of the Palestinians and of Jerusalem] then, but merely to state the general principles of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. We meant that the occupied territories could not be held merely because they were occupied, but we deliberately did not say that the old line, where the troops happened to be on that particular night many years ago, was an ideal demarcation line.' Lord Caradon, "An Interview with Lord Caradon," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 5, no. 3/4 (Spring – Summer 1976), 45. 'It was from occupied territories that the Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not possibly subject to any doubt. As a matter of plain fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict. It was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the Resolution insisted.' Lord Caradon, et. al., *UN Security Council Resolution 242 – A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), 9.

⁵²⁹ "Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel," declaration date: May 14, 1948, Israel State Archives, <http://www.archives.gov.il/en/chapter/the-declaration-of-independence/> (accessed August 1, 2018).

the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state.⁵³⁰ Second, the establishment of Israel was the initial implementation of the partitioning plan articulated in Resolution 181. Third, at the time of the declaration, Israel initially honoured the territorial boundaries outlined in Resolution 181. Considered collectively, these reasons suggest that Resolution 181's recommendations was initially only partially implemented. Further implementation of the resolution would require the establishment of an Arab state and the *corpus separatum* (i.e. body to be separated) of the City of Jerusalem in the designated territories.⁵³¹ However, the establishment of an Arab state became immediately problematic when hostilities between Jews and Arabs residing in newly created Israel caused neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, to intervene on the side of the Arabs residing within Israel, as well as those residing in the yet-to-be established Arab state as mentioned in the resolution. Consequently, the territories of a would-be Arab state became a battleground between Israel and its neighbours, with each side over a series of decades claiming control or auspices of over these territories. Resolutions 242 and 338 (both of which are referenced in the Accords) were periodic attempts at restoring the status of these contested territories to their initial statuses in 1948 when Israel's declaration began the initial implementation of Resolution 181's partition plan. Therefore, in consideration of the historical context that has been derived from the Accords' references to Resolutions 242 and 338, the roots of the conflict the Accords attempted to address can be traced back to the 1947 partition plan as detailed in Resolution 181. These identified roots suggest that the Accords were an attempt to create conditions between Israel and the Palestinians that would lead to the fulfilment of the remaining recommendations as articulated in the 1947 partition plan, the establishment of an Arab state and the *corpus separatum* of Jerusalem.⁵³²

⁵³⁰ The following are texts of the two incidents where references to Resolution 181 in the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel are made: 'On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.' 'By virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the state of Israel'.

⁵³¹ Included in the partition plan was the establishment of the international status of the City of Jerusalem. This aspect was to be addressed in the final stages of the Accords' peace process after the establishment of an Arab state. Oslo I, art. V, para. 3.

⁵³² The outcome the Accords does not appear in this chapter as they are mentioned in the subsequent chapter along with suggestions of time perspectives for a future peace process where mentioning the outcome serves a more appropriate purpose.

8.4 Demarcating time perspectives within a peace process

Tracing the origins of the conflict addressed by the Accords back to the 1947 partition plan also helps to recover key anchor points which are necessary to identify existing time perspectives within the Accords. The first anchor point implicitly recognised by the Accords is the 1947 partition plan outlined in Resolution 181.⁵³³ This anchor point serves as an extreme historical anchor point that delimits one end of a *long-term historical time perspective* considered within the Accords. By rooting the issues that the Accords are trying to address to the 1947 partition plan, a *long-term time perspective* with respect to the future can also be derived. First, this linkage to the partition plan suggests that the peace process of the Accords is part of an ongoing process of completing the implementation of Resolution 181's partition plan in the long-term future. Second, the partition plan itself provides an end to the Accords' peace process, the establishment of an Arab state and the *corpus separatum* of Jerusalem. An acknowledgement of this end within the Accords is significant because this end marks an extreme future anchor point that delimits one end of a *long-term future time perspective* considered within the Accords. Therefore, both the historical and future extreme anchor points of the Accords are derived from one aspect of the past in the form of Resolution 181.⁵³⁴ Together these two anchor points provide the scope of the conflict and timescape that the Accords considers.

In addition to the extreme anchors points of the past and future, other important anchor points are indicated within the Accords. These anchor points -- corresponding to the past, present, and future -- warrant identification because they help delimit *short-term* and *long-term time perspectives* within the Accords which makes analysing the effects of time perspectives on the peace process possible. One set of anchor points corresponds with references in the Accords to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Resolution 242 in 1967 and Resolution 338 in 1973 delimit *short-term historical time perspectives* that shape how the Accords are understood, points which will be elaborated

⁵³³ Pappé's work suggests that Palestinians ground the origins of the conflict to Israel's declaration of independence and that Israel considers 1967 the point in history which created the issues needing addressed by the Accords. Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁵³⁴ This significance of this common point of origin will be addressed in more detail later in the chapter.

further in subsequent sections. Another set of key anchor points correspond with the adoptions of Oslo I in 1993 and Oslo II in 1995. The adoption of each Accord helps to situate the *short-term present time perspectives* within an ongoing peace process that spans over multiple years. The final grouping of anchor points worth highlighting regard the prescribed timelines and deadlines articulated in the Accords for the future implementation of various aspects and stages of the peace process. These timelines provide fixed points in the short-term future from which the range of *short-term future time perspectives* can be determined and indicate the limits of how far into the future the drafters of the Accords thought a peace process could be scripted out and foreseen to unfold. The range of *short-term future time perspectives* found within the Accords goes from the shortest *future time perspective* being ‘as soon as possible’ to the longest articulated one spanning five years.⁵³⁵ In general, the Accords’ *long-term future time perspectives* lack a specified timetable attached to them, which helps to generally distinguish them from *short-term future time perspectives*. Collectively, these anchor points and general distinctions, along with the aforementioned extreme historical and future anchor points, helped with the identification and delimitation of *short-term* and *long-term time perspectives* of the past, present, and future found within the Accords; a necessary initial step before beginning the subsequent analysis.

8.5 The analysis going forward

The purpose of this chapter has been threefold. First, to lay a context specific foundation upon which analyses, discussions, and suggestions regarding the relationship between the Accords’ time perspectives and its peace process detailed in the next chapter can begin. Second, to make clear the limits of the scope of the analyses, discussions, and suggestions the reader can expect to find in the subsequent chapter. Finally, to serve as a transition between two key parts of my thesis, time perspectives in relation to a theory of international politics and time perspectives in relation an empirical case study of international politics in practice. Given the level of detail and technical analysis already provided in chapters 5-7 on similar time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau’s theory, related information as it corresponds to my analysis

⁵³⁵ Months and years tend to be the time measurements used when articulating *short-term future time perspectives*.

of the Accords' will not be repeated in the same level of detail in the following chapter. Consequently, the following chapter is more compact because a lot of the heavy lifting has already been done in the preceding chapters. Going forward, remaining mindful of the contexts provided in this chapter along with explanations shared in chapters 5-7 were helpful in the recovery of novel insights about the shaping effects the Accords' time perspectives had on the Accords' peace process. The value of these new insights shared in the next chapter is that they to indicate how time perspectives can be used to improve the potential success of future peace processes.

Chapter 9: Time perspectives within a Peace Process

Like time perspectives within a theory, time perspectives also have shaping effects on a peace process. To support the latter claim, this chapter provides analyses and illustrations of how these shaping effects are manifested within the Accords. In addition to this aim, this chapter serves four additional aims. First, to develop an understanding of the shaping effects time perspectives have on the Accords' peace process. Second, to illustrate an empirical example of how time perspectives affect the practice of international politics. Third, to demonstrate the relevance of the insights gained from the analyses conducted in chapters 5-7 beyond a theoretical context. Fourth, to suggest the ways insights about the relationship between time perspectives and international politics presented in this chapter and throughout this thesis could be used to improve future peace processes. In the process of pursuing these aims, the central argument in this thesis that time perspectives shape international politics and the breadth of the contexts in which time perspectives and their effects can manifest is further substantiated. Thus, the insights presented in this chapter should not be considered just in isolation but alongside those insights shared earlier in this thesis.

The structure of the chapter is broken into five parts corresponding to the following time perspectives: *long-term historical*, *short-term historical*, *short-term present*, *short-term future*, and *long-term future time perspectives*. Starting from the conceptual foundations laid in previous chapters, each one of the Accords' time perspectives is analysed and discussed in the initial sections. Following each analysis and discussion are sections regarding suggestions of time perspectives to be included within future peace processes.⁵³⁶ Some of the suggestions include adding time perspectives not found within the Accords, maintaining existing time perspectives, and removing or altering problematic time perspectives. The central aim of these suggestions is to address problematic issues embedded into the Accords so that similar issues do not arise or are minimised within future peace processes to improve their potential for successful implementation. While the suggestions provided are not meant to constitute a comprehensive list or apply to every future peace process between Israel and the

⁵³⁶ Because the suggestions provided were not originally intended to necessarily be used together as they all might not be appropriate within every future peace process, no section is provided regarding how they might work together within a single future peace process.

Palestinians, each suggestion provides an illustration of the various types of time perspective changes that can be made across the five time perspectives and included within future peace processes. Collectively, all five parts of the chapter provide the reader with an in-depth understanding of how time perspectives delimit a peace process and suggest that examinations and reconsiderations of past and existing peace processes might help improve the formulation and successful execution of future peace processes.

9.1 Long-term historical time perspectives

Among the time perspectives articulated within the Accords' peace process, the *long-term historical time perspectives* were mentioned the least in comparison to other time perspectives referred to in the Accords and, where they did appear, they were only in the opening lines of the Accords. Nevertheless, the presence of these *historical time perspectives* still had significant effects. From my analysis of the relationship between the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* and their effects, I was able to recover and highlight the theoretical claims that were embedded into the Accords' peace process. These recovered insights related to both perennial aspects and their corresponding consequences found within the Accords. The particular perennial aspects and their corresponding consequences addressed in the subsequent paragraphs help to illustrate the shaping effecting *long-term historical time perspectives* can have within a peace process. Among the perennial aspects recovered, the following three perennial aspects and their corresponding consequences are noteworthy and warrant further discussion. First, my analysis of the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* suggest that 'confrontation and conflict' are perennial aspects of the relations between Israel and the Palestinians spanning decades.⁵³⁷ Second, the *long-term historical time perspectives* emphasise Israel and the Palestinians as the principle perennial actors in the conflict. Finally, historical resolutions to the conflict (i.e. UN Resolutions 242 and 338) remain persistent aims for the peace process in the past, present, and future. Collectively, these perennial aspects embed into the peace process particular interpretations and understandings of the conflict and issues the Accords seeks to address.

⁵³⁷ Oslo I, preamble.

As perennial aspects, they pre-emptively suggest and define the various ways the future of Israel and the Palestinian people may unfold. Examples of these various ways the future may unfold include: 1) the future will continue to be marked by confrontation and conflict without the implementation of a successful peace process, 2) each perennial actor will remain united in the future (e.g. the Palestinian actor will not split into a West Bank Palestinian actor and a Gaza Strip Palestinian actor), or 3) the 1967 border lines will remain the border lines each side will seek to secure in the future. These perennial aspects, however, should not be interpreted as objective truths. As insights from section 5.2.3 indicate, perennial aspects of the past that are identifiable or highlighted via *long-term historical time perspectives* are the result of subjective constructions of the past. Therefore, the particular way that the past have been structured and aggregated within the Accords over the long-term past limits what perennial aspects are and can be identified or highlighted within the Accords. As the subsequent paragraphs will illustrate, these subjectively constructed perennial aspects are problematic and remain inadequately acknowledged or unaddressed by the peace process articulated in the Accords.⁵³⁸

The first example of how perennial aspects can be problematic was evident in how the long-term the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians was characterised in the Accord. In the first paragraph in Oslo I and second paragraph in Oslo II, the *long-term historical time perspective* helps to define the Israeli-Palestinian relationship as being perennially confrontational and conflict oriented.⁵³⁹ Two different conclusions regarding the outcomes of the peace process can be drawn from these perennial characterisations. If confrontation and conflict are perennial aspects of the relationship between the two sides, then success of the Accords would mean perennial aspects of the relationship have been changed. Conversely, any failures of the Accords would be attributed to the enduring strength of the perennial aspects of the relationship and appear to be expected. Therefore, an acknowledgement within the Accords of confrontation and conflict as perennial aspects of the relations between Israel and the Palestinians suggests that the manifestation of the intended outcome of the Accords' peace process was problematic. In reading through the Accords, however, this problem

⁵³⁸ Markus Kornprobst and Martin Senn, "Introduction: Background Ideas in International Relations," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 18, no. 2 (May 2016), 278.

⁵³⁹ Oslo I, preamble; Oslo II, preamble.

is not immediately evident because it gets readily resolved by introducing particular *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* (derived largely from liberal peace theory) which focus namely on the intended success of the peace process. These *future time perspectives* articulate a vision of the future which suggests that perennial aspects of the past can be either altered or replaced by new perennial aspects and thus make historical perennial aspects irrelevant or dormant in the future. By delimiting how the future will unfold via *short-term* and *long-term future time perspectives* in the peace process, the potential enduring strength of the historical perennial aspects of relationship between the two sides no longer needed to be considered or addressed in Accords' peace process. The ultimate demise of the peace process and return to a situation of confrontation and conflict, however, indicates two things: 1) that perhaps the enduring strength of these perennial aspects of the relationship and 2) the notion of doubt regarding the peace process embedded into the Accords were not adequately addressed by the Accords' *future time perspectives*.

A second example of how the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* embedded problematic perennial aspects within the Accords relates to how Israel and the Palestinian people are categorised as actors in the situation. Via the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives*, both Israel and the Palestinians are categorised as the principle perennial actors in creating the conflict and developing and carrying out the peace process. However, these *long-term historical time perspectives* disregard and de-emphasise the roles of other perennial political entities of the past who contributed to the creation of the conflict and the execution of the peace process. For example, the Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom, and Russia all played significant roles which contributed to the creation of the conflict but are not mentioned in the Accords. Regarding the development and execution of the peace process, Egypt, Jordan, and the United States also made ongoing efforts and contributions during the period covered by the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* but again are not mentioned in the Accords long-term historical account. By narrowing the principle perennial actors to Israel and the Palestinians, the *long-term historical time perspectives* place the responsibility of addressing the historical legacies of foreign policies by various international political actors (e.g. states) of the past namely on Israel and the Palestinians. The advantage of narrowing the number of principle perennial actors is

that there are less parties that need to be consulted with and satisfied during the peace process. The disadvantage of limiting the number of principle perennial actors, as the demise of the peace process illustrated, is that one actor can easily derail the whole process.

In addition to categorising Israel and the Palestinians as perennial political actors, the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* assign further perennial attributes to Israel and the Palestinians which are problematic. For example, by simultaneously referencing Resolution 242 and 338 (adopted as a result of Israeli incursion into non-Israeli territories), Israel is categorised as a perennial aggressor in the past while the Palestinian people are categorised as perennial victims during the same period in their struggles over the contested territories. These historically derived perennial attributes demarcate positions of power and inequalities between the two within the Accords. Furthermore, these assigned perennial attributes are extended into the future via the *future time perspectives* as evidenced in Oslo I regarding the future redeployment of Israeli Forces⁵⁴⁰ and the future withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,⁵⁴¹ as well as via Oslo II.⁵⁴² Consequently, these divisive perennial attributes of Israel and the Palestinian people originating from the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* remain unchanged and contribute to undermining the aims of the peace process. For example, these perennial attributes make it easier for Israelis to interpret the Accords as a threat on Israel sovereignty because the Accords outline the various ways in which Israeli sovereignty over certain lands and governing practices will be lost. Conversely, these perennial attributes also enable Palestinians to interpret parts of the Accords as maintaining Israel's dominance over Palestinians and any territories that fall under a future Palestinian government's administration (e.g. Israel's exclusive right with respect to foreign policy). These conditions consequently limit the extent of positive peace that the Accords' peace process can possibly yield, thus

⁵⁴⁰ Oslo I, art. XIII.

⁵⁴¹ Oslo I, annex II.

⁵⁴² Oslo II, art. X, annex I, art. I and appendix I. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area was detailed and addressed prior to the signing of Oslo II via the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.

indicating the delimiting effects *long-term historical time perspectives* can have on a peace process in terms of what type of peace it can possibly yield.⁵⁴³

The final example illustrating how perennial aspects identified within the Accords via their *long-term historical time perspectives* can be problematic regards the ultimate aim of the peace process, ‘a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338’.⁵⁴⁴ By structuring and aggregating the long-term past as a series of ongoing attempts to realise a quasi-fulfilment of the partition plan as outlined in Resolution 181, the Accords’ *long-term historical time perspectives* help to establish a partition plan as a perennial goal of the past that was worthy of pursuit over the decades of conflict. Acceptance of this perennial goal of the past as a central aim for the Accords is significant because it helps to legitimise the Accords’ peace process in two ways. First, Resolution’s 181 partition plan of the past comes with an endorsement by the global community which is allegedly represented by the UN’s member states. Therefore, accepting a similar partition plan as an aim of the Accords adds legitimacy to the peace process before it even begins. Second, acceptance of a similar partition plan as an aim of the Accords links the peace process articulated in the Accords to a long history of worthy attempts (ex. Resolutions 242 and 338) at resolving the competing territorial claims between Israel and the Palestinians. Despite the legitimacy that is gained by the Accords’ peace process via the acceptance of a partition plan as a perennial goal to resolve the situation between the two sides, this perennial goal is problematic for two reasons.

The first of two reasons this perennial goal is problematic is because it perpetuates a historical solution to a particular historical situation as a viable solution to the particular contemporary situation which the Accords’ peace process was trying to address.⁵⁴⁵ The original historical situation changed fundamentally with the creation of Israel, its subsequent incursion into territories originally earmarked for a future Arab state, and the intervention of nearby states such as Jordan and Egypt in the contested territories. Therefore, the perennial goal of partitioning the contested territories from and for another time in the past is outdated and not suited for the Accords’

⁵⁴³ Positive peace includes both the cessation of violence (i.e. negative peace), but also the deliverance of justice. For a detailed discussion of positive and negative peace see Galtung, “On the Meaning of Nonviolence.”

⁵⁴⁴ Oslo I, art. I; Oslo II, preamble.

⁵⁴⁵ Richmond, *Peace in International Relations*, 17.

contemporary situation. Consequently, perpetuating this goal as a central aim in the Accords' peace process suggests the peace process is working toward a solution that is out of sync with the times and potentially no longer viable.⁵⁴⁶ The second reason acceptance of this perennial goal is problematic is that it restricts the peace process to one end, a partitioning of sovereignty within the contested territories between Israel and the Palestinians. Although the peace process may be conducive to leading to other ultimate ends⁵⁴⁷, a partitioning of sovereignty is the only outcome that has been consistently put forward as worthy of pursuing over the long-term past as confirmed via the past articulated by the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives*. By recognising partitioning as the historical perennial aim of the peace process, the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* limit the definition of success against which the Accords can be evaluated. Success of the Accords' peace process would effectively mean the establishment of a Palestinian government that would exercise sovereignty within territories previously under Israeli control which is respected by and independent of Israel. This limitation effectively suggests that the Accords' peace process is closed rather than open, thus prohibiting Israel and the Palestinians from taking advantage of other forms of peace that may organically evolve from the Accords' peace process in the future. Collectively, the two aforementioned reasons illustrate how the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* helped to embed a problematic trajectory within the peace process with little guarantee of yielding the sought after outcome.

9.2 Perennial aspects need not be problematic

As problematic as these individual perennial aspects are, they all can be linked back to how the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* have been constructed in order to provide a convincing explanation of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the aims of the Accords.⁵⁴⁸ This linkage suggests that going forward, future peace processes

⁵⁴⁶ The rise of the Likud party in Israel supports this claim regarding the unviability of the Accords' original aim with respect to partitioning. David C. Unger, "Maps of War, Maps of Peace: Finding a Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Question," *World Policy Journal* 19, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 6.

⁵⁴⁷ As examples, Palestinian territories could be set-up as an autonomous entity existing within another state similar to how Hong Kong existed within China after the British lease ended in 1997.

⁵⁴⁸ In reference to the origins of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, Mac Ginty asks '[H]ow far back do we need to go to find a convincing explanation of the causes of a conflict?' (Mac Ginty, *No War, No Peace*, 69).

should pay more attention to the *long-term historical time perspectives* they make reference to and the effects the perennial aspects (these time perspectives draw attention to have) on peace processes.⁵⁴⁹ For example, by implicitly beginning the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* with the initial implementation of the 1947 partition plan, the Accords captured only one part of Middle Eastern history during which Israel and the Palestinian people were violently and openly competing for sovereignty over the same territory. Delimiting the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* to this small segment of history not only restricted interpretations of the situation to one perennially marked by 'confrontation and conflict', but also helped define Israel's identification as the perennial aggressor and the Palestinians as the perennial victims in the situation.⁵⁵⁰ How these *long-term historical time perspectives* have been constructed, whether intentionally or unintentionally, effectively excludes those perennial aspects which could have been captured by a more extensive *long-term historical time perspective* regarding the relations between Jewish and Arab and Arab-Muslim populations (of which Palestinians were a part of) in the contested territory and beyond. Those excluded perennial aspects are worth recognising and including within future peace processes as they may help to support the aims of future peace processes rather than work against those aims as the perennial aspects do within the Accords. To illustrate the noteworthiness of the perennial aspects and their effects extended *long-term historical time perspectives* highlight, the following example has been provided.

By stretching the Accords' original *long-term historical time perspectives* back to the time of Muhammad, the founder of Islam, different perennial aspects of the relationship between the two sides become more evident.⁵⁵¹ These different perennial aspects, while not completely unproblematic, do not necessarily embed unnecessary issues and challenges in future peace processes that the Accords' peace process had to address and overcome. Within these extended *long-term historical time perspectives* spanning more than 1400 years, peaceful co-existence appeared to be a defining perennial aspect of the relationship between Jewish and Arab and Arab-Muslim populations. For example, long periods of relative peaceful co-existence between Jewish

⁵⁴⁹ Kornprobst and Senn, "Background Ideas in International Relations," 273-4 and 278; John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 129.

⁵⁵⁰ Darby and Mac Ginty, *Contemporary Peacemaking*, 3.

⁵⁵¹ Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 263.

and Arab and Arab-Muslim populations within the contested territories following the end of the Ninth Crusade and peaceful co-existence within Al-Andalus when large portions of the Iberian Peninsula were under Muslim rule (711 -1492) suggest strong evidence of perennial aspects that are in contrast to those highlighted by or derived from the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives*.⁵⁵² Furthermore, these extended *long-term historical time perspectives* suggest that the perennial aspects of confrontation and conflict associated with the relationship between the two sides according to the Accords' are ephemeral aspects unique to a particular short-term period of the past.⁵⁵³ This redefining of the Accords' original perennial aspects (e.g. confrontation) as ephemeral aspects along with the recovery of previously unacknowledged perennial aspects is significant. Via the process of redefining aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, future peace processes are relieved of the burdens of having to address how these particular perennial aspects of the relationship are overcome or altered.⁵⁵⁴ In other words, the previously unacknowledged perennial aspects no longer require overcoming or altering because they support the peace process. As a consequence, future peace processes can instead be seen as building upon a long-term past defined by peaceful co-existence and working toward the restoration of the peaceful and cooperative perennial historical tendencies exhibited among previous generations of Jewish and Palestinian populations. These are not the only promising effects of extending the *long-term historical time perspectives* of future peace processes.

Two additional effects that extended *long-term historical time perspectives* can have on future peace processes regard religion and options toward peace. With regards to religion first, although not referenced in Accords, religious views have factored into the relationship and peace process between Israel and the Palestinians for centuries.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵² María Rosa Menocal, *The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians, Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002).

⁵⁵³ Milton-Edwards, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 9; Avigdor Levy, ed., *Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth through the Twentieth Century* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 6, 89, and 98. Other incidents of disputes between the two sides occurring within the extended *long-term historical time perspective* can also be acknowledged via *short-term historical time perspectives* without calling into doubt the perennial aspect of peaceful co-existence exhibit over the centuries.

⁵⁵⁴ Kelman's discussion regarding the negotiating identity supports this claim. Herbert C. Kelman, "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes: Insights from Attitude Theory," *The American Psychologist* 62, no. 4 (May/June 2007), 301-02.

⁵⁵⁵ Baumgart-Ochse, "Democratization in Israel," 1120; Hasenclever and de Juan, "Grasping the Impact of Religious Traditions on Political Conflicts: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Perspectives," *Die Friedens-Warte* 82, no. 2/3 (2007): 19-47; Hasenclever and Rittberger, "Does Religion Make a Difference?"

Including *long-term historical time perspectives* stretching back to Muhammad enables future peace processes to acknowledge religion as a crucial perennial factor that effects the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. What this acknowledgement of religion in general does within future peace processes is enhance the breadth of the long-term historical context of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship these peace processes account for; a historical context which provides insights into the intimate connections between civilian and religious aspects existing within Israeli and Palestinian societies. In other words, extended *long-term historical time perspectives* allow essential perennial aspects such as religion to be brought back into the peace process so that these aspects can be evaluated and dealt with accordingly. Although bringing an acknowledgement of religion into a future peace process could be potentially problematic or seen as unnecessary for a peace process that is focused solely on building civil peace rather than a more comprehensive peace that includes religious peace, evidence from the particular extended *long-term historical time perspective* discussed thus far in this section suggests otherwise.

A review of the extended *historical time perspectives* regarding Jewish and Muslim relations suggests that despite the different religious views held by the corresponding populations, they generally got along with one another when they resided in close proximity to one another or within the same territory. Therefore, differences in religious views between Jews and Muslims were never perennially so divisive as to eliminate the possibility of establishing long periods of peaceful co-existence. This insight can be potentially a useful argument against those who might claim that religion in a broad sense is a perennially divisive aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Consequently, embedding future peace processes with certain extended *long-term historical time perspectives* can do more than just highlight perennial aspects of the past, they can also provide a bulwark against religion in general from being used to thwart future peace processes. Whether the drafters of the Accords intentionally chose to limit the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* as a type of bulwark against aspects and discussions of religion cannot be known for certain. Nor can it be known that the choice of delimiting the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* was to avoid

Theoretical Approaches to the Impact of Faith on Political Conflict” in *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, eds. Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 107-47.

inviting any aspects and discussions of religion into the peace process because of the potential problems they might have introduced into the agreement and execution of the peace process. What can be known for certain however, as Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's speech to the Knesset on October 5, 1995 regarding the ratification of Oslo II indicates, is that officials involved in the drafting, negotiating, and execution of the peace process recognised that there was a connection between religion and the peace process.⁵⁵⁶ Therefore, the aforementioned extended *long-term historical time perspectives* is offered as an option (and illustration) which enables future peace processes to engage with the recognised connection between the perennial aspect of religion and a peace process in a meaningful and constructive way without making the claim that a particular peace process will resolve religious differences.

The connection between religion and a peace process alludes to the second effect extended *long-term historical time perspectives* can have on future peace processes; their effects on options toward peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. By making the connection between religion and a peace process more apparent, extended *long-term historical time perspectives* suggest that a future peace process focused solely on building a civil peace via democracy and capitalism (as exhibited in the Accords) might not be enough to establish or restore peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinian people. This recognition of the insufficiencies of 1) the Accords as a narrowly defined peace process and 2) its corresponding civil peace in resolving Israeli-Palestinian relations indicates that future options toward peace (i.e. future peace processes) should be considered more broadly to effectively address various perennial aspects of the relationship. These future options toward peace should include both a variety of processes as well as types of peace they aim to yield. As a place to begin to look for examples of what various forms future peace processes and their corresponding outcomes might take, extended *long-term historical time perspectives* can provide a valuable source. The connections among perennial aspects, as well as between perennial and ephemeral aspects, highlighted within these extended time perspectives can indicate what forms previous peace processes have taken, what made them successful

⁵⁵⁶ Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, "Speech to Knesset on Ratification of Oslo Peace Accords," October 5, 1995, Jewish Virtual Library, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/pm-rabin-speech-to-knesset-on-ratification-of-oslo-peace-accords> (accessed October 18, 2018).

and unsuccessful, and which forms of future peace processes might hold the most promise in resolving difficulties in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.

Using the extended *long-term historical time perspectives* as a source from which to gather historical insights that might be relevant to developing future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes is helpful for considering other peace processes not rooted in liberal peace theory. These time perspectives include a greater variety of historical templates that future peace processes can replicate or build from which is in contrast to the lack of historical templates included or available within the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives*.⁵⁵⁷ As a consequence of broadening the range of historical templates that future peace processes can use as models, these extended *historical time perspectives* open up possibilities for peace processes in the future which the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives* could not have done given their limited historical perspectives.⁵⁵⁸ This opening up of possibilities for future peace processes essentially creates multiple ways or trajectories of arriving at a two-state solution rather than limiting it to one type of peace process as the Accords does. For example, a future peace process need not be limited to a democratic peace process where Palestinians must first establish a democratic government. In the long-term past, there were long periods of peaceful co-existence between Jewish and Muslim populations (e.g. during the Ottoman Empire and Muslim-ruled Spain) where democratic governments did not exist as they do in 2019. These periods suggest that successful peace processes can happen between non-democratic political entities. Consequently, the variety of historical peace processes and corresponding outcomes suggest that there are a variety of forms future peace processes might take; forms of peace processes which might prove to be more successful than those processes (e.g. the Accords) that have restricted *long-term historical time perspectives* and work toward predetermined ends. As the following section will illustrate, however, the success or failure of future peace processes does not rest on *long-term historical time perspectives* alone.

⁵⁵⁷ The potential for greater variety to be found within extended *long-term historical time perspectives* stretching back to the time of Muhammad is evidenced by the various examples of peaceful co-existence between Jewish and Arab and Arab-Muslim populations under different governing situations.

⁵⁵⁸ Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 263.

9.3 Short-historical time perspectives

Like *long-term historical time perspectives*, *short-term historical time perspectives* shape peace processes and their corresponding claims as well. To better understand this relationship, the following analysis was conducted of the Accords' *short-term historical time perspectives* in relation to its articulated peace process and corresponding claims. The analysis was informed by relevant explanations and discussions appearing in Chapter 5 regarding connections between *short-term historical time perspectives* and theoretical claims. Based on my analysis, and despite their limited appearance within the Accords, *short-term historical time perspectives* were found to play four noteworthy roles in the peace process. These roles included the following: 1) supporting the claim that there is a historical precedence and legitimacy for the Accords' peace process and one of its aims, 2) limiting the scope of and aims of the Accords' peace process, 3) highlighting progress made in the peace process between Oslo I and Oslo II, and 4) trivialising previous peace agreements. Analyses of these roles and their effects on the Accords' peace process and corresponding claims appear in the first half of this section, while the second half focuses on how *short-term historical time perspectives* not included in the Accords might be of use in future peace processes. By the end of the section, the reader will have gained an augmented understanding of the relationship between *short-term historical time perspectives* and a peace process, as well as an awareness of the importance of not neglecting the shaping roles *short-term historical time perspectives* can play in future peace processes.

My analysis begins by considering the support roles *short-term historical time perspectives* play within the Accords. To illustrate this role, the following example has been provided. The example relates to how *short-term historical time perspectives* helped provide support for the claim that there is a historical precedence for two of the central aims of the Accords' peace process; those aims are the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. By citing these resolutions, the Accords' drew attention to particular ephemeral moments in the past (i.e. *short-term historical time perspectives*) which shared an ongoing aim of restoring Israel's borders back to their original frontiers prior to the 1967 Six-Day War.⁵⁵⁹ While these resolutions shared this aim, they were nevertheless consequences of two separate conflicts; Resolution 242 was

⁵⁵⁹ What these prior frontiers were, however, were not clear as footnote 528 indicates.

the consequence of the Six-Day War in 1967 and Resolution 338 was the consequence of the Yom Kippur War in 1973.⁵⁶⁰ As consequences of separate conflicts, these resolutions mark the ends of two distinct short-term periods in history and represent separate instances (i.e. ephemeral) in the past where the same aim was sought. Therefore, the mentioning of these resolutions essentially embeds two distinct *short-term historical time perspectives* into the Accords. Considered together, these two *historical time perspectives* offer support for the claim within the Accords that the aim of Israeli border restoration has historical precedence.

This historical precedence is of importance in the Accords because it helps to legitimise the primary aims of the peace process (i.e. the restoration of Israel's 1967 borders) via the perennial aspects the historical precedence seems to attribute to this particular aim. Legitimising an aim of the peace process, however, does not necessarily mean that the peace process is automatically legitimised. In other words, legitimate ends (i.e. aims) do not alone legitimise the means (i.e. a peace process). In the case of the Accords, however, the legitimation of the aim of 1967 border restoration was extended to the peace process itself. As a consequence of this extension, the peace process was assumed to be legitimate. This assumption can only be made if in addition to supporting a claim of historical precedence for one of the Accords' aims, *short-term historical time perspectives* within the Accords also contributed to supporting claims of the legitimacy of the peace process. Without this assumption, legitimacy of the peace process would find no support from the Accords' *short-term* or *long-term historical time perspectives*. Because this assumption was accepted, however, additional support for the legitimacy of the Accords' peace process can be drawn from the same *short-term historical time perspectives* supporting the legitimacy of the Accords' aims. By linking the Accords' peace process to Security Council resolutions, the peace process indirectly gained support of the international community of states via the Security Council members which had already endorsed one of the primary aims of the Accords' peace process, the implementation of Resolution 242 and 338.⁵⁶¹ This approach to establishing the legitimacy of a peace process via *short-term historical time perspectives* suggests that the

⁵⁶⁰ Each resolution was a consequence of a specific conflict over the contested territory between Israel and various neighbouring states such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

⁵⁶¹ Resolution 242 was passed with a unanimous vote, while Resolution 338 was approved by all members of the Security Council with the exception of the People's Republic of China which abstained from the vote.

legitimacy of the Accords' peace process is less than robust as it rests ultimately on an assumption that the legitimacy of the peace process's ends extended to its means. Future peace processes may benefit from seeking firmer grounds of legitimacy not based on assumptions but through either multiple *short-term historical time perspectives* which legitimise the peace processes and their aims simultaneously, separately, or in correspondence with *long-term historical time perspectives*.

Just as *short-term historical time perspectives* play support roles with respect to claims of historical precedence and legitimacy within a peace process, a second role *short-term historical time perspectives* play regards their effects on limiting the scopes of the peace process and its aims. Illustrating this point are two examples, references made to the Marshall Plan and to the 1967 displacement of people from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. First, the Marshall Plan is mentioned in Article XVI of Oslo I as guidance for the type of Israeli-Palestinian regional cooperation the Accords' peace process was aiming to promote.⁵⁶² By mentioning the Marshall Plan, ideas of liberal and democratic peace processes and corresponding aims were embedded into the Accords.⁵⁶³ This plan, however, was structured and implemented for a particular time in the past when democracy and capitalism were competing for global dominance against communism and planned economies. Furthermore, the plan was designed to work among pre-existing democracies already in existence and through pre-existing governmental and administrative structures. Therefore, by using the Marshall Plan as a guide for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, particular out of date *short-term historical time perspectives* regarding how to build peace were imposed on the Accords' peace process and aims. As a consequence, the scope of the 1993/95 peace process and aims of the Accords were delimited to one similar to the Marshall Plan. This delimited scope covered regional cooperation programs relating to economic and resource development. This narrowing of the Accords' scope restricted how multilateral regional economic cooperation and development between Israel and the Palestinian people could evolve. Additionally, this narrowing of the scope was problematic as it maintained the balance of power in favour of Israel given the extent of its democratic governance and economic development in

⁵⁶² Norrin M. Ripsman, "Peacemaking and Democratic Peace Theory: Public Opinion as an Obstacle to Peace in Post-Conflict Situations," *Democracy and Security* 3, no. 1 (March 2007), 98 and 107.

⁵⁶³ Kathleen Burk, "The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks," *Contemporary European History* 10, no. 2 (July 2001): 267-94.

relation to the Palestinians. To help avoid these issues in future peace processes, maintaining a more open plan of regional economic cooperation and development or a plan that can change as a future peace process progresses might be worth considering.

While the aforementioned example illustrates how *short-term historical time perspectives* limited the broad scope of the Accords' peace process and its aims, this second example regarding displaced persons illustrates how *short-term historical time perspectives* limited the scope of the Accords' peace process and its aims at a sub-macro level. Article XII of Oslo I and Article XXVII of Oslo II articulate how the issue of displaced persons from the West Bank and Gaza Strip was to be addressed. These articles, however, did not apply to all displaced persons in these regions, only those displaced in 1967. The mentioning of this date is significant because it inserts a specific *short-term historical time perspective* into the Accords that effectively limits the aims of the Accords with regards to displaced person to a specific group of persons. This specific 1967 group did not include any persons displaced pre-1967 as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War following Israel's declaration of independence.⁵⁶⁴ The exclusion of pre-1967 groups of displaced persons in favour of the inclusion of those persons displaced in 1967 suggests that addressing the issues surrounding the 1967 group were considered more integral to the overall adoption of the peace process than those issues associated with the other groups. In other words, some *short-term historical time perspectives* are more important than others to include within a peace process. As consequences of prioritising particular *short-term historical time perspectives*, the aims of a peace process are narrowed to such an extent that some issues remain unresolved and the comprehensiveness of the peace a peace process tries to help manifest is drastically limited. These consequences are necessary to bear in mind when drafting future peace processes because they highlight how crucial a peace process's *short-term historical time perspectives* are in determining whether a process and its aims are comprehensive or limited in scope.

In the aforementioned examples of *short-term historical time perspectives*, these same time perspectives appear in both Oslo I and Oslo II and perform similar roles

⁵⁶⁴ For an insightful discussion regarding 1948 refugees see "1948 Refugees: Proceedings of an International Workshop, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law, 14–15 December 2016," *Israel Law Review* 51, no. 1 (February 2018): 47–110.

across the Accords. In the following paragraph, however, the differences among the *short-term historical time perspectives* found within Oslo I and Oslo II indicate the third role short-term historical time perspectives can play within a peace process, highlighting progress. For example, the additional *short-term historical time perspectives* included in Oslo II illustrate the implicit claim of vertical development⁵⁶⁵ being made in the Accords' peace process from Oslo I to Oslo II. Examples of these additional *short-term historical time perspectives* include the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the 1994 and the 1995 agreements regarding the transfer of powers and responsibilities between Israel and an elected Palestinian government. By illustrating the progress made between Oslo I and Oslo II, there is a suggestion that the peace process was working and that it had some traction going forward. Contributing further to this sense of progress were two other *short-term historical time perspectives* included in Oslo II, but absent from Oslo I; one related to the 1991 Madrid Conference and the other related to an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO in 1993. While both predate the signing of Oslo I, their marked absence from Oslo I but inclusion in Oslo II along with other *short-term historical time perspectives* during the interim period between Oslo I and Oslo II suggests their inclusion contributed to the aforementioned sense of development. There is risk, however, in illustrating such development; it can lead to a false sense of security and faith in a peace process that has yet to be tested. Furthermore, *short-term historical time perspectives* focused on articulating only vertical development ignores the importance of articulating horizontal development; horizontal development is a necessary condition for lasting peace.⁵⁶⁶ Reflecting upon both concerns suggests that thinking more broadly about the various types of *short-term historical time perspectives* that can be included in future peace processes can help future peace processes articulate their progress more accurately.

To gain insights about the final role *short-term historical time perspective* play within a peace process, it was necessary to understand each peace agreement and effort as an indicator of a distinct segment of time; in essence a *short-term historical time perspective*. Via this understanding, my analysis suggests that the Accords' *short-term historical time perspectives* had a role in downplaying specific previous peace

⁵⁶⁵ For clarification on vertical development see page 120.

⁵⁶⁶ For clarification on horizontal development see page 120.

agreements and efforts made to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations. This down playing can occur as a consequence of: 1) emphasising and citing certain peace agreements and efforts of cooperation between the two sides within specific periods of the past which lend support to the currently pursued peace process and/or its aims or 2) by leaving out particular peace agreements and efforts at cooperation in the final articulations of a peace process.⁵⁶⁷ For example, the mentioning in Oslo II of the 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO just prior to the signing of Oslo I suggest that they played important roles in making the drafting and execution of the Accords' peace process possible. The absence of both in Oslo I, however, suggests that perhaps their importance was later exaggerated as the peace process progressed or problematic in the peace process's infancy. In another example, the important roles that either the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty⁵⁶⁸ or the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty⁵⁶⁹ played in making conditions for the drafting and execution of the Accords' peace process possible were not mentioned in the Accords.⁵⁷⁰ Considering that both fell well within the spans of time referenced within the Accords and were crucial to its success, their absence suggests that their relevance or importance was somehow less than those peace agreements and efforts mentioned specifically in the Accords. In essence, the significance of these peace agreements and efforts (i.e. ephemeral aspects of the past) were trivialised in the Accords by the *short-term historical time perspectives* by leaving them out, as well as by highlighting those agreements that were retained by the *short-term historical time perspectives*.

The effects of this trivialisation, whether intentional or not, helped to distance the Accords' peace process and its aims from previous peace agreements and efforts that either: 1) failed like the Geneva Conference in 1973, 2) were controversial for one side (e.g. the Palestinians) like the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Egyptian-Israel Peace

⁵⁶⁷ Potential reasons for leaving out particular peace agreements may include their failure to yield the desired aims, they created more problems than they solved, they competed with the proposed peace process and its aims, or they highlighted deficiencies in the proposed peace process.

⁵⁶⁸ "Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty," conclusion date: March 26, 1979, Economic Cooperation Foundation – The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/606 (accessed October 18, 2018).

⁵⁶⁹ "Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty," conclusion date: October 26, 1994, Economic Cooperation Foundation – The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/616 (accessed October 18, 2018).

⁵⁷⁰ Article 9 of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty directly links this treaty to the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process articulated in the Accords.

Treaty in 1979, or 3) did not exclusively address Israeli-Palestinian relations or involve both sides as the equally invested, primary participants.⁵⁷¹ This observation regarding the role *short-term historical time perspectives* played in downplaying particular peace agreements and efforts in the past is not intended to suggest that future peace processes need to include and articulate all relevant *short-term historical time perspectives* and their corresponding details. This observation is rather intended to flag up two points to bear in mind when drafting and evaluating future peace processes. First, the inclusion and omission of particularly *short-term historical time perspectives* can be strategically used to down play previous peace process and aims which might cast doubt on the success of or introduce unwanted problems and complications into future peace processes. Second, reflecting upon what details of the past are and are not omitted within future peace processes can help ensure that those *short-term historical time perspectives* included within future peace processes are necessary and those that are left out are not necessary. Remaining mindful of these two points, while not ensuring success of future peace processes, helps ensure that a broad range of *short-term historical time perspectives* are considered when drafting and evaluating future peace processes rather than just those *historical time perspectives* which seem to be obviously linked or not linked to particular peace processes.

9.4 Using short-term historical time perspectives to open up a peace process

As has been illustrated thus far in this section, *short-term historical time perspectives* play various roles within a peace process such as supporting claims, limiting the scope of a process and its aims, highlighting progress, and emphasising and down playing parts of the past. At the end of each role's analysis and discussion, broad recommendations were offered without giving specific examples. In the subsequent paragraphs, specific examples regarding the first two roles addressed in the previous section are provided. The purpose is to give the reader an idea of what possible changes related to *short-term historical time perspectives* can be made to improve the likelihood of success of future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes. Specific examples of the latter

⁵⁷¹ This trivialisation also helped support a notion in the Accords that a liberal and democratic peace process and its corresponding peace would be successful where other manifestations of peace processes and peace had failed in the past.

two roles regarding highlighting progress and emphasising and down playing segments of the past, however, are not provided for the following reasons. In regards to *short-term historical time perspectives* highlighting a peace process's development, this observation was only made possible because Oslo I was followed up by Oslo II; there is no guarantee that a future peace process will be contain a follow-up process. Therefore, making specific recommendations would be purely speculative and would not contribute any additional guidance to improve future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes beyond the general recommendations that were presented in the previous section. Regarding providing examples of *short-term historical time perspectives* emphasising and down playing parts of the past, this would also not be helpful without knowing how a future peace process would be structured and what processes and aims will be prioritised. Despite not providing specific examples of *short-term historical time perspective* changes related to these latter two roles, these roles are nevertheless important to bear in mind when draft future peace processes and their corresponding aims.

Among the examples of *short-term historical time perspective* changes that are provided in this section, the first examples to be considered regards possible *short-term historical time perspectives* which future peace processes might be included to improve the robustness of the legitimacies of the peace processes and their aims. As my analysis of the *short-term historical time perspectives* within the Accords illustrated, the legitimacy of one of the Accords' stated primary aims (e.g. restoring Israel's 1967 borderlines) was extended to the Accords' peace process. This legitimacy was based on two *short-term historical time perspectives* relating exclusively to an aim of the Accords not the process by which that aim was to be achieved. Consequently, future peace processes have three options for providing firmer ground for their legitimacy; they can either 1) include *short-term historical time perspectives* which link to *long-term historical time perspectives* so as to suggest the existence of a long-term legitimacy, 2) use *short-term historical time perspectives* which legitimatise both the process and its aims without the need for assumptions, or 3) include separate *short-term historical time perspectives* that legitimise either the peace process or its aims. For reasons which will be made clear in the next paragraph, the third option is the most promising.

The first and second options are not as promising as the third option because of the practical challenges they present. For example, regarding the first option, finding an

existing *long-term historical time perspectives* that corresponds to and legitimatises a peace process which has only recently been conceived of and implemented in the recent past would be challenging because of a lack of available evidence. Other practical challenges include finding connections between peace processes of the short-term and long-term past, as well as being able to make those connections appear as self-evident and in support of a historical precedence of legitimacy within a few brief lines of a future peace process. Regarding the second option, finding a single *short-term historical time perspective* that legitimises both a particular process and its aims is daunting because it would have to perform two tasks simultaneously. A single *short-term historical time perspective* would have to simultaneously 1) illustrate that a particular peace process executed in the short-term past was designed to yield and did in fact yield specific aims and 2) illustrate that the same process and corresponding aims were similar enough to a peace process and corresponding aims that were planning to be deployed in a contemporary situation. Even if such a *short-term historical time perspective* performing both tasks could be found, finding more than one *short-term historical time perspective* legitimising both a peace process and its aims is preferred. Multiple *short-term historical time perspectives* legitimising both a process and its aims would suggest that a particular peace process and its corresponding aims have been tested and yielded satisfactory outcomes in similar or various circumstances; thus making the claims of the legitimacy of a peace process and its aims more convincing. Considering the aforementioned practical challenges posed by the first two options, the third option is more promising because it does not burden any single *short-term historical time perspective* with having to perform too many legitimacy-related functions in a future peace process.

The third option essentially suggests that a future Israeli-Palestinian peace process and its aims can be legitimised separately via individual *short-term historical time perspectives*. By disaggregating how a peace process and its aims are legitimised, this option opens up access to multiple *short-term historical time perspectives* that could be potentially included in a future peace process. This multiplicity enables claims of the legitimacies of a future peace process and its aims to be established and supported independently via various *short-term historical time perspectives* embedded throughout

a future articulated peace process.⁵⁷² Consequently, extending the legitimacy of a future peace process's aims would no longer be needed to establish claims of legitimacy regarding the peace process itself. Although examples of what these *short-term historical time perspectives* might look like in the future would vary depending upon which peace process and aims were pursued in the future to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations, a few examples are offered below for illustrative purposes. As discussed earlier in this section, the *short-term historical time perspectives* relating to Resolutions 242 and 338 help to support claims of legitimacy regarding the aims of the Accords. Similar references to specific UN resolutions and international agreements which clearly articulate the aims of a peace process can be included in a future Israeli-Palestinian peace process to help establish claims of legitimacy regarding its aims. With regards to helping support claims of legitimacy regarding a future peace process itself, mentioning the peace processes used to improve relations between Jordan and Israel since the signing of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty would support legitimacy claims of a future peace process that adopted similar processes.⁵⁷³ Considered together, both examples illustrate the distinct roles different *short-term historical time perspectives* can play in providing comprehensive support for claims of legitimacy of both a future peace process and its aims, a support that is missing in the Accords.

Continuing with this theme of using *short-term historical time perspectives* to open up future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes so that such peace processes might be more successful than the Accords, is the recommendation made earlier in this section to open up the scope of a future peace process and its aims. Essentially, the limited scope problem, stemming from particular *short-term historical time perspectives*, has two consequences. The limited scope 1) restricts a peace process and its aims to such an extent that the future becomes pre-emptively defined as a perpetuation of the past and 2) it ignores the broader issues threatening the long-term success of the a peace process. While there is nothing wrong with using *short-term historical time perspectives* in this way, there are some benefits to rearticulating similar *short-term historical time perspectives* that may be included within future peace processes. These re-articulations

⁵⁷² This use of *short-term historical time perspectives* to support claims is similar to how Morgenthau uses them (i.e. to highlight illustrative examples) within his theory to support theoretical claims regarding perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics.

⁵⁷³ "Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty" concluded on October 26, 1994.

can help to characterise these *short-term historical time perspectives* as beginnings. For example, a future peace process can include articulations that specifically convey the idea that focusing on addressing those persons displaced in 1967 is a starting point from which to begin to address the broader issue of displaced persons in Israel and the contested territories. Such an articulation both maintains the aim of addressing persons displaced in 1967 while also characterising the aim as a beginning step that leaves open the possibility of addressing other displaced persons in the future. Likewise, these re-articulations of *short-term historical time perspectives* within a future peace process can help to characterise historical models of regional cooperation and development mentioned (e.g. the Marshall Plan) within a future peace process as examples of how regional cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian people might begin to develop rather than define how regional cooperation must develop. Both examples illustrate how re-articulations of *short-term historical time perspectives* within a future peace process can be altered to broaden the scope of a future peace process and its aims. The benefits of broadening of scope are as follows: 1) it enables a peace process to organically evolve over time as contingencies arise and circumstances change without having to redraft a new peace process and 2) it embeds within a future peace process the notion that peace is not manifested once a process's aims are reached, but a process of peace is ongoing with ever emerging aims.

9.5 Short-term present time perspectives

Much like *long-term* and *short-term historical time perspectives*, *short-term present time perspectives* appear sparingly in the Accords. Despite their sparing appearances, the few *short-term present time perspectives* that appear in the Accords do shape the peace process and certain claims made within it in particular ways. These particular ways, however, are not immediately clear. Only after reviewing insights about *short-term present time perspectives* addressed in Chapter 6 did the effects of the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives* on the peace process and its claims become clear. In this section, analyses of these particular ways is present and includes how the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives* 1) constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions which prompted the creation of and sustained need for the Accords, 2) situate the Accords' peace process and its steps in time, 3) articulate and

characterise the Accords' present in relation to the past and the future, and 4) problematise and unproblematise the Israeli-Palestinian relations. Some insights gained from these analyses both highlight how problematic articulations of the present can be within a peace process, as well as suggest how *short-term present time perspectives* within future peace processes can be altered to make them less problematic. In general, however, the insights gained from my analyses indicate that *short-term present time perspectives* cannot be absent from an articulation of a peace process, as is the case of their pervasive presence within a theory.

Supporting the claim that a peace process must contain *short-term present time perspectives* is the idea that *short-term present time perspectives* within a peace process articulate the contemporary context of relations between actors involved and interested in the outcome of a conflict. This contemporary context is crucial in a peace process because it provides the necessary and sufficient conditions which initiate the creation of and support the sustained need for a peace process. For example, references to the redeployment of Israeli Forces in Oslo I⁵⁷⁴ and Oslo II⁵⁷⁵ suggest that the conditions of each corresponding present are not peaceful. These references also indicate that Israeli-Palestinian relations were not peaceful in the past, nor will they be immediately peaceful with the signing of each agreement. Essentially, the non-peaceful relations between the two sides in the Accords' presents are manifestations of a perennial aspect of the relationship. By articulating the present in this way, *short-term present time perspectives* outlined the contemporary conditions of Israeli-Palestinian relations as perennially, problematic conditions which were necessary and sufficient to create a contemporary need for a peace process in the form of the Accords. Need alone, however, is not enough to prompt the creation of a peace process or encourage the conflicting parties to engage in a peace process; political desire and commitment are also needed.

In the preamble of Oslo I, words such as 'agree', 'recognise', and 'strive' indicate contemporary desires and commitments (i.e. political will) among both Israel and the Palestinian negotiating delegation for a peace process. These contemporary desires and commitments are reaffirmed in a subsequent present articulated within Oslo II's preamble. By mentioning the contemporary desires and commitments in both

⁵⁷⁴ Oslo I, art. XIII.

⁵⁷⁵ Oslo II, art. X and annex I, art. I.

preambles, the Accords were essentially indicating that existing sets of contemporary conditions in 1993 and 1995 were conducive to supporting both parties' engagement in the Accords' peace process. In other words, the contemporary conditions in 1993 and 1995, although ephemeral, provided the necessary and sufficient ephemeral conditions for the Accords to materialise and be accepted.⁵⁷⁶ Therefore, *short-term present time perspectives* within a peace process articulate perennial and ephemeral aspects of contemporary conditions surrounding Israeli-Palestinian relations in particular ways which delimit how the present is contextualised within a peace process. These ways indicate the necessary and sufficient conditions which give rise to an opportunity to engage with a peace process as well as sustain the need for a peace process beyond the present. Capturing the perennial and ephemeral necessary and sufficient conditions within a peace process's *short-term present time perspectives* in the ever changing Israeli-Palestinian relationship is no easy task and will continue to be difficult in the future. Nevertheless, this fluctuation is not an excuse to disregard particular contemporary conditions which currently affect or have the potential to affect the implementation and functioning of a peace process in the future.⁵⁷⁷ Therefore, future peace processes should not be devoid of clear articulations of *short-term present time perspectives* or fail to use these time perspectives to their fullest extent to try to capture the necessary and sufficient contemporary conditions of a future peace process. By attempting to capture and embed a fuller account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a contemporary context of a future peace process, then a future peace process would be more likely to adequately address the contemporary issues sustaining the confrontational relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

In addition to articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions of a present within an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, *short-term present time perspectives* also situate a peace process and its steps in time. For example, the present of Oslo I is situated on September 13, 1993 and the present of Oslo II is situated on September 28, 1995. Knowing when each present is situated in time is necessary for making sense of how various future steps and stages of a peace process are organised and work together, as well as when they will be implemented. For example, references in the Accords to future

⁵⁷⁶ Darby and MacGinty, *Contemporary Peacemaking*, 2.

⁵⁷⁷ Examples of contemporary conditions disregarded by the Accords include the religious context and the actions of quasi-political actors such as Hamas.

steps and phases being implemented ‘within a period not to exceed four months after the signing of this agreement’⁵⁷⁸ or ‘immediately following the signing of this Agreement’⁵⁷⁹ would make little sense without having an idea of when the Accords’ present is situated. By articulating when the Accords’ present is situated in time, however, *short-term present time perspectives* date-stamp the separate presents for Oslo I and Oslo II and remove the ambiguity of the timelines mentioned above. This date-stamping of each agreement’s present effectively defines an anchor point from which subsequent steps and stages of the Accords’ peace process are organised. For example, the timeline for the numerous phases regarding the redeployment of Israeli military forces outlined in Article X of Oslo II and elaborated further in Annex I: Article I of Oslo II are sequentially organised from the particular present articulated in Oslo I. Thus, to make sense of the implementation and organisation of the sequencing of Israeli military redeployments, the present within Oslo I had to be articulated clearly by its *short-term present time perspectives* as well as later linked in Oslo II to Oslo II’s own present.⁵⁸⁰ Considered collectively, these observations suggest another role *short-term present time perspectives* play in a peace process; their role in articulating how a present relates to the past and the future.

By looking at how *short-term present time perspectives* within a peace process articulate or characterise the present in relation to the past and the future, key insights about what claims are being made and embedded within a peace process can be recovered. For example, in both Oslo I and II, each present is characterised as a ‘historic reconciliation’ and ‘an end’ to a particular type of confrontational relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.⁵⁸¹ Characterising the present as a termination of the past suggests that the conflictual perennial and ephemeral aspects of the past will not persist in the future. In essence, these characterisations empty out the future of the problematic aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the past and subsequently help to create a ‘new era’ with the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful implementation of the Accords’ peace process in the future.⁵⁸² By articulating the

⁵⁷⁸ Oslo I, annex II, para. 2.

⁵⁷⁹ Oslo II, chapter I, art. II, para. 4.

⁵⁸⁰ The latter part of the previous sentence also suggests that the implementations of future steps and stages not linked to the situated present within a peace process are left to chance and indicate where a peace process might potentially fail to progress.

⁵⁸¹ Oslo I, preamble; Oslo II, preamble.

⁵⁸² Oslo II, preamble.

present of a peace process as a departure from a particular problematic past, *short-term present time perspectives* begin to unproblematised a peace process's future and introduce new perennial aspects to the future.⁵⁸³ This process of unproblematising the future is done by a peace process's *short-term present time perspectives* because the necessary and sufficient conditions in the future need to be made less problematic in the present to get a peace process started or encourage an existing process to continue to move forward. Furthermore, without creating an illusion of an unproblematised future, participants in and beneficiaries of a peace process would not support or have any faith that a peace process would be successful. *Short-term present time perspectives*, however, also problematise a peace process's future via their articulations of the present.

Short-term present time perspectives within a peace process can problematise the future in different ways. For example, in the previous paragraph an argument was presented that suggested the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives* unproblematises the future. This unproblematisation is itself problematic because it suggests that a future without defined substance is unproblematic or that which is problematic is inconsequential to the future operation and success of the Accords. Articulations of the present via *short-term present time perspectives*, however, are not unproblematic; they sustain and introduce aspects which contribute to the problematisation of a peace process's future. This role of *short-term present time perspectives* can be seen via the bridging work they do between a peace process's present and future. Essentially, through *short-term present time perspectives*' articulations of a present, they extend problematic present conditions of a peace process into the future. As a consequence, the future context of a peace process becomes pre-populated by *short-term present time perspectives* that articulate what present aspects (both new and historical) of the Israeli-Palestinian situation will continue into the (un)foreseeable future. Two examples of this extension of the present into the future found within the Accords relate to issues of foreign relations and defence. In both cases, *short-term present time perspectives* within the Accords articulated that Israel will continue to maintain its present responsibilities 'in the sphere of foreign relations'⁵⁸⁴, 'for defending

⁵⁸³ Examples of the perennial aspects will be addressed in the subsequent paragraph.

⁵⁸⁴ '[This] sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions' (Oslo II, art. IX, para. a).

against external threats'⁵⁸⁵, and 'for the overall security of Israelis for the purposes of safeguarding their internal security and public order'⁵⁸⁶ well into the future. Consequently, the historical dominant position of power of Israel in relation to the Palestinians is affirmed in the present and perpetuated in the future; essentially making it a perennial aspect of the future. This insight illustrates how *short-term present time perspectives* problematise a peace process's present and its future. Furthermore, this insight suggests that the seeds of a peace process's failure may not exclusively originate from problematic conditions of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the past, but that such seeds can be sown via *short-term present time perspectives*.⁵⁸⁷

9.6 Amending articulations of the present

As the above analyses illustrate, *short-term present time perspectives* within a peace process embed a peace process with a particular articulation of the present. The articulation of the present that is rendered delimits how a peace process such as the Accords will unfold in the future. This articulation, however, is truly unique to the Accords' particular contemporary circumstances unlike the *long-term* and *short-term historical* and *future time perspectives* of the Accords which could conceivably be included with little to no change within a future peace process. Given the uniqueness of a future present which a future peace process will need to capture, the discussion below includes ways of amending articulations of a present in a future process via *short-term present time perspectives*. These suggestions correspond with the analyses found in the previous section relating to *short-term present time perspectives'* roles in shaping contemporary necessary and sufficient conditions, situating a peace process and its steps in time, articulating and characterising a peace process's present in relation to its past and future, and (un)problematizing the Israeli-Palestinian relations. The shared aims of these suggestions is to maximise the accuracy of a present that is embedded within a future peace process by its *short-term present time perspectives*, while simultaneously minimising the potentially problematic effects new *short-term present time perspectives* can embed within a future peace process.

⁵⁸⁵ Oslo I, art. VIII.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Mueller's discussion of the origins of the brutalities associated with imperialism illustrate this point. Mueller, "Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism," 438.

The first suggestion considered regards the role *short-term present time perspectives* play with respect to embedding contemporary necessary and sufficient conditions within a peace process. While I acknowledge that no grouping of *short-term present time perspectives* within a peace process can ever capture all the necessary and sufficient conditions of a contemporary Israeli-Palestinian situation, the absence of particular contemporary conditions within the Accords should nevertheless not be repeated in future peace processes. For example, leaving out the contemporary religious context which is known to be intertwined with the Israeli-Palestinian situation limits the comprehensiveness of the peace process within societies where religious differences exist and matter.⁵⁸⁸ Even if not explicitly addressed by a future peace process, including a *short-term present time perspective* within a future peace process that acknowledges religion as part of the contemporary conditions helps to include Israeli and Palestinian religious communities as beneficiaries in a future peace process. Alongside the absence of articulating a contemporary religious context within the Accords, the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives* also do not articulate contemporary peaceful engagement between Israelis and Palestinians at the grassroots level.⁵⁸⁹ Again, acknowledging, even if not explicitly naming, contemporary efforts at all levels would suggest an awareness among Israel and the Palestinians that contemporary necessary and sufficient conditions must exist at all levels if a peace process is to have any hope of being successful. Including each of the above *short-term present time perspectives* within a future peace process both improves the comprehensiveness of the contemporary necessary and sufficient conditions embedded within a future peace process, as well as augments an awareness among Israelis and Palestinians of the potential areas that a future peace process's success and failure can spread.

In regards to *short-term present time perspective* suggestions related to situating the present of a future peace process, there is value in continuing to use to *short-term present time perspectives* within a future peace process to establish a contemporary

⁵⁸⁸ The Good Friday Agreement is an example of how an acknowledgement of the contemporary religious context within a peace process can broaden the comprehensiveness of a peace process. Section 6: Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity – Human Rights.

⁵⁸⁹ The foundings of Seeds for Peace (1993), Ir Shalem (1994), and the Parents Circle-Families Forum (1994) are examples of grassroots level engagement between Israelis and Palestinians. For an account of academics creating opportunities for Israelis and Palestinians to engagement with one another see Ben Mollov and Chaim Lavie, "Culture, Dialogue, and Perception Change in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *The International Journal of Conflict Management* 12, no. 1 (2001): 69-87.

anchor point. This solitary anchor point, as illustrated in the Accords, serves as a moment in time from which to ascertain the necessary and sufficient conditions of the Israeli-Palestinian situation, as well as to determine how various future steps and stages will be implemented. The Accords also illustrated the need to update articulations of a peace process's present via *short-term present time perspectives* to ensure that such a present reflects any progress made between peace agreements which are parts of the same peace process. While it is difficult to conceive of a future peace process that would not clearly articulate when it's present is situated, the importance of the present within any future peace process and keeping it up to date is nevertheless worth emphasising considering how quickly Israeli-Palestinian relations can change. In other words, when the present is situated matters in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Likewise, characterisations of the present within a future peace process also matters.

The articulations and characterisations of the present in the Accords by *short-term present time perspectives* are to be expected as necessary aspects within a peace process. These aspects help create an allusion that a peace process is introducing a new era (e.g. Oslo I) or a continuation of an existing successful peace process (e.g. Oslo II) that is conducive to the proposed peace process. Consequently, similar articulations and characterisations of the present should also appear in future peace processes to create allusions that future conditions will be conducive to allow for the successful implementation of plans outlined within future peace processes. As discussed earlier in this chapter, however, these allusions are problematic because they assume that a future peace process's *short-term present time perspectives* are not perpetuating or introducing aspects into the future which hinder the possibilities of achieving a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.⁵⁹⁰ A future peace process can reduce, but not eliminate these problematic aspects in three ways via *short-term present time perspectives*. First, a future peace process can avoid including *short-term present time perspectives* which perpetuate or introduce problematic aspects into the future. For example, *short-term present time perspectives* referring to Israel's continued dominance in foreign relations and defence could be excluded from a future peace process which

⁵⁹⁰ See section 9.5 regarding the role *short-term present time perspectives* play in perpetuating Israel's dominance in foreign relations and defence in the Accords' present and future.

supports the allusion that the future will be unproblematic.⁵⁹¹ Second, a future peace process can temper its allusions by altering *short-term present time perspectives*. For example, *short-term present time perspectives* referring to Israel's ongoing dominance in foreign relations and defence could include language that indicates Israel's dominance in these areas will continue from a present until some future point when it becomes the final barrier to securing lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Finally, *short-term present time perspectives* can be added to a future peace process which acknowledge that its contemporary circumstances will continue to present known and unknown challenges throughout the implementation of a future peace process. These additional *present time perspectives* can help limit the extent to which a future peace process's present and future are unproblematised, as well as build in an expectation that a future peace process might not progress smoothly; such an expectation is missing from the Accords.

9.7 Short-term future time perspectives

Given the focus of the Accords' future oriented peace process and aims, it is not surprising that *short-term future time perspectives* feature prominently within the Accords. Much of this prominence stems from the sheer number of *short-term future time perspectives* articulated within the Accords. Despite the large number of *short-term future time perspectives*, in general, all these time perspectives within the Accords essentially provided various types of prescriptions for the immediate future and helped to outline how the Accords' peace process would move forward. The prescriptions and outline provided by the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* were not general in content however, but specific. This specificity was significant, as well as problematic, because it delimited how the immediate future between Israel and the Palestinians could have possibly unfolded and left little room for the accommodation of future contingencies which arose and stalled the peace process. To unpack the various ways *short-term future time perspectives'* specificities were manifested within the Accords and

⁵⁹¹ This particular option would not be acceptable to Israel for practical reasons. Allowing the Palestinians to elevate their existing foreign relations activities to be on par with that of a sovereign state such as Israel would quickly move the Palestinians closer to establishing a Palestinian state which neither Israel nor the Palestinians were prepared for at the time of the signing of the Accords.

why their delimitations on the Accords' immediate future were problematic, explanations and discussions about *short-term future time perspectives* from Chapter 7 were useful in my analysis in this section. These insights helped to explain how *short-term future time perspectives* within the Accords 1) bridged the present with the immediate future, 2) attached certainty to near future prescriptions, 3) made particular unknowns in the near future known, and 4) pre-emptively added meaning and significance to certain aspects of the near future relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. As a consequence of my analysis, suggestions were developed as to how best to structure and incorporate *short-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process to allow for greater flexibility in the near future should future contingencies arise which might threaten to derail or halt a future peace process.

My analysis of *short-term future time perspectives* within the Accords began by looking at how these *future time perspectives* helped bridge the Accords' present with the immediate future and examining its effects on how the peace process would unfold. A contiguous link between the Accords' present and articulated near future is established via the timeframe a *short-term future time perspective* specifies for the implementation of a particular future step or stage included in the Accords' peace process. For example, a *short-term future time perspective* in Oslo I specifies that an agreement regarding the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will be signed within two months of Oslo I's 'date of entry into force'.⁵⁹² The timeframe specified begins with Oslo I's present and extends into the near future for a potential two months; thus a link between the present and the immediate future is established.⁵⁹³ These links between a peace process's present and immediate futures are necessary because they enable contemporary notions of a peace process to be extended into the immediate futures and explain how particular contemporary notions are extended into the immediate future. In other words, the links articulated via *short-term future time perspectives* provide the means of prescribing what the immediate future of a peace process will be. The prescribing done by *short-term future time perspectives* done within the Accords, however, is problematic.

⁵⁹² Oslo I, annex II, para. 1.

⁵⁹³ The specificity of the timeframe also attaches certainty to the prescriptions made within the Accords.

One of the reasons the prescribing articulated within the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* is problematic is because the resultant prescriptions are based on presumptions about the immediate future made in the present. Only what is known in the present is considered to be potentially possible in the near future, as discussed earlier in section 9.5 of this chapter. Thus, the prescriptions articulated within the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* are limited by contemporary presumptions about the immediate future; presumptions which are themselves direct extrapolations of the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives*. An example of contemporary presumptions upon which the Accords accepted included presuming that prescriptions outlined in the Accords would become reality at a particular point in the immediate future (e.g. election of a Palestinian Council). Other presumptions included presuming that specific consequences and conditions of the Accords' peace process will manifest within the particular timeframes attached to the articulated prescriptions of the immediate future as such consequences and conditions are necessary pre-conditions for the actualisation of the prescriptions (e.g. phased redeployment of Israeli military forces). While the aforementioned examples of presumptions about the immediate future of the Accords are clearly problematic, and consequently make the Accords' prescriptions clearly problematic, these issues are not immediately apparent in the Accords.

Prescriptions appear sound within the Accords because of the certainty that is attached to them within *short-term future time perspectives'* articulations of how the immediate future of the Accords' peace process will unfold. Certainty is attached to prescriptions by articulating timeframes as to when they are going to happen or by integrating them in a sequence of other prescriptions which appear likely to occur. An example of how certainty is attached to prescriptions is detailed in Oslo's II plan regarding the phased transfer of jurisdiction of contested lands from Israel to an elected Palestinian government. Essentially, the phased transfer coincides with the timelines associated with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Areas A, B, and C because it is explicitly linked to the redeployment plan.⁵⁹⁴ These timelines, ranging from '22 days before the day of the [Palestinian] elections' to '18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council', attach deadlines as to when the transfer of jurisdiction will

⁵⁹⁴ Oslo II, art. XI, para. 2, sec. A.

be complete.⁵⁹⁵ Simultaneously, linking the phased transfer of jurisdiction with the phased Israeli military redeployment plan embeds the former into a sequence of prescriptions which had already begun by the time Oslo II was signed. Both the deadlines and integration of a set of prescriptions into an existing sequence are examples of how *short-term future time perspectives* add certainty to prescriptions found within a peace process. This certainty is false because there remains the ongoing possibility that future contingencies could arise which might disrupt or halt a peace process as illustrated by the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 and the election of harsh Accords critic Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minister in June 1996.⁵⁹⁶ Therefore, *short-term future time perspectives* within future peace processes need to be more explicit in articulating the limits of the certainty they attach when prescribing how the immediate future will unfold.

Another reason why the prescribing *short-term future time perspectives* within the Accords is problematic relates to its role in making particular unknowns in the near future known. *Short-term future time perspectives* are used in the Accords to introduce new norms and institutions which, according to liberal and democratic peace theories, should improve Israeli-Palestinian relations and foster peace between the two sides.⁵⁹⁷ Examples of the range of new norms and institutions *short-term future time perspectives* introduce are outlined in Article VII and Annex IV of Oslo I. These new norms and institutions include, but are not limited to, the creation of independent Palestinian judicial organs⁵⁹⁸, various means of developing and engaging in regional trade⁵⁹⁹, and institutions involved in the development and administration of Palestinian infrastructure projects⁶⁰⁰. By articulating exactly what the immediate future will look like, *short-term future time perspectives* introduced new aspects (e.g. norms and institutions) into Israeli-Palestinian future relations. In essence, the immediate future is pre-populated by *short-term future time perspectives*. This pre-population of the immediate future is problematic because it limits how a peace process can continue to advance. Rather than letting the Accords' peace process evolve organically without

⁵⁹⁵ Oslo II, art. X, para. 1 and 2.

⁵⁹⁶ Dowty, *Israel/Palestinian*, 163 and 273.

⁵⁹⁷ Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, "Beyond the Absence of War," 371.

⁵⁹⁸ Oslo I, art. VII, para. 2.

⁵⁹⁹ Oslo I, annex IV, para. 2, 3, and 6.

⁶⁰⁰ Oslo I, art. VII, para. 4.

knowing how or where it will advance, the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* predetermine the evolution of the peace process by making the immediate future known. But the immediate future is not knowable, as events following the signing of Oslo II illustrated (e.g. Israeli PM Rabin's assassination and Netanyahu's election as Israel's PM), and need to be acknowledged by a peace process's *short-term future time perspectives*. Embedding future peace processes with *short-term future time perspectives* that acknowledge and preserve the inability to know what the immediate future holds can help them better accommodate and weather whatever contingencies arise in the immediate future.

When articulating aspects about the immediate future, as either known or unknown, *short-term future time perspectives* within a peace process also pre-emptively add meaning and significance to certain aspects of the near future relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. For example, along with introducing new norms and institutions into the immediate future, the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* also articulated these new aspects as perennial. In Oslo I, Article III regarding the election of a Palestinian Council and Article XI regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic fields are examples of how *short-term future time perspectives* introduce and link liberal and democratic peace ideals of democratic governance, cooperation, and economics to the peace process. This link is significant because liberal and democratic peace ideals (upon which the Accords' peace process was based) require that democratic governments and institutions, free-market economies, respect for international law, and cooperation be perennial for perpetual peace to exist.⁶⁰¹ Consequently, these aspects introduced via *short-term future time perspectives* into the Accords' peace process have a perennial significance that extends beyond the immediate future. These aspects help to pre-emptively define the future perennial aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations which will contribute to a lasting peace. In other words, the foundations of perennial aspects of Israeli-Palestinian future relations articulated within the Accords originate and are laid down via *short-term future time perspectives*.

⁶⁰¹ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 4. Russett does include 'economic liberties and secure political freedom' in his definition of democracy as Rummel and Doyle do. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 15; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 1 (March 1983): 27-71; Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs".

By singling out particular perennial aspects within the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives*, certain claims about known and unknown aspects of the future are being put forward by the Accords which delimit how the peace process is able to unfold. For example, the singling out of liberal and democratic peace aspects within the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* suggest that they 1) will profoundly shape the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the foreseeable and unforeseeable futures and 2) are necessary to lead to the sought after peace as articulated within the Accords. The perennial aspects highlighted within the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* also suggest that other aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the foreseeable and unforeseeable futures are either ephemeral (e.g. conflict between Israel and the Palestinians) or perennial but less significant (e.g. Palestinians living in Israel as Israeli citizens). These claims about the future, which appear in the Accords via *short-term future time perspectives*, have the effect of oversimplifying the future unfolding of the Accords' peace process. This oversimplification of the immediate and distant future negates the complexity of international politics and Israeli-Palestinian relations, as well as the possibility that anything in the immediate or distant future could arise that would disrupt or halt the Accords' peace process. Thus pre-emptively adding meaning and significance to particular aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations via *short-term future time perspectives* should be done cautiously within a future peace process and in a way that allows either Israel or the Palestinians to adjust course as needed to enable a future peace process to continue to unfold towards its ultimate aims.

9.8 Adjusting the perception of near future realities

The above analyses of the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* addressed examples of how these *future time perspectives* shaped and restricted the immediate future of the Accords' peace process. By providing specific timelines, goals, and details about various aspects of the immediate future, *short-term future time perspectives* were able to predetermine how the Accords' peace process would unfold. The specificity provided by the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives*, however, negated the reality that the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations and international politics cannot be scripted out in advance. Consequently, the Accords' peace process was unable to adjust to near future realities as they arose and thus failed prematurely. Future peace

processes, however, might be able to avoid premature endings if their *short-term future time perspectives* are adjusted. Below are three potential adjustments that could be made to *short-term future time perspectives* included within future peace processes to possibly improve their success. The first two adjustments are offered as suggestions as to how *short-term future time perspectives'* articulations of certainty and the unknowability of the near future could be improved upon. The final adjustment suggests how the preemptive meanings and significance added to aspects of the immediate future can be refined by the addition of *short-term future time perspectives* to allow a future peace process room to adjust course as conditions change in the near future. The adjustments provided are for illustrative purposes and based upon an assumption that a future peace process will contain similar elements that are found within the Accords' peace process.

The first adjustment to be presented regards the issue of certainty. The certainty attached to particular steps and stages throughout the peace process is problematic because it is a false certainty based upon presumptions that the immediate future will unfold along a specific linear path within specified timeframes. Any obstacle or event that occurs in the future along that path has the potential to stop a peace process from advancing or force timeframes to be extended. Rather than ignoring the fact that certainty can never be guaranteed because no one can know what will happen in the immediate future, a future peace process should explicitly acknowledge the limitations of the certainties *short-term future time perspectives* articulate. For example, a *short-term future time perspective* can be added to a future peace process which articulates that the timelines and progression of steps and stages outlined within a future peace process can be achieved so long as both parties remain committed to the peace process and near future conditions remain conducive to the outlined peace process. Although the wording is generic, explicitly acknowledging the limitations of the certainties articulated by *short-term future time perspectives* will help to keep a future peace process grounded to the notion that the future is uncertain. This grounding essentially makes the certainties appear less false.

In addition to adding *short-term future time perspectives* that make certainties less false in a future peace process, *short-term future time perspectives* can also be added to help a future peace process weather or accommodate unforeseen near future contingencies and evolve more naturally. As the Accords' peace process was structured,

Israel was able to largely control how the peace process unfolded, from the phased withdrawal of military forces to the transfer of jurisdiction to the newly elected Palestinian Council. Therefore, *short-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process would need to be constructed in ways that 1) rapidly decouple Israel's control over the peace process, 2) create an environment that increasingly raises the stakes for both Israel and the Palestinians to not abandon a future peace process, and 3) open up multiple avenues for a future peace process to continue to advance even if one avenue fails. These additional *short-term future time perspectives* might articulate the following: 1) near future economic incentives offered by other states with vested interests in establishing peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians, 2) near future concessions regarding settlements, villages, and religious sites in Area C of the Accords⁶⁰², and 3) multiple points in the near future when key processes can possibly begin rather than just limiting their starting points to just one moment in time. By introducing these types of *short-term future time perspectives*, participants of a future peace process might be better able to capitalise on the temporary political will to engage in the peace process, weather unforeseen near future contingencies, and adjust to unknown near future conditions as needed. Furthermore, these additional *short-term future time perspectives* essentially open up the immediate future of a future peace process to multiple possibilities of arriving at the long-term future aims of a future peace process.⁶⁰³

The final adjustment to be suggested relates to how additional *short-term future time perspectives* can be used to clarify the pre-emptive meanings and significance added to aspects of the immediate future of a future peace process or Israeli-Palestinian relations. For example, *short-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process can be added to explicitly articulate whether or not an aspect introduced in the peace process, like an institution or norm, is intended to be perennial or ephemeral. Making these distinctions explicit can help participants in a future peace process to identify which perennial aspects must be accounted for or can be relied upon throughout the peace process and which aspects are or can be made ephemeral. Furthermore, these

⁶⁰² Area C contained a number of sites that were of interest to both Israel and the Palestinians. For examples see Oslo II, annex III, art. II, appendix I.

⁶⁰³ Kahn and Wiener, *The Year 2000*, 357; Neumann and Øverland, "International Relations and Policy Planning," 262.

short-term future time perspectives help to contain perennial or ephemeral characteristics to particular aspects of a future peace process rather than letting these characteristics apply implicitly more broadly to the near future of a peace process. By containing the near future parameters of aspects articulated within a future peace process, the aforementioned *short-term future time perspectives* are creating space for unknowns to exist within a future peace process's near future. This space for unknowns is important to explicitly identify within a future peace process because it is where future contingencies might be able to be accommodated and where a future peace process might be able to adjust its course going forward. The Accords lacked this type of space in the near future because its *short-term future time perspectives* pre-emptively filled it and thus severely limited what adjustment could be made when changes in domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics occurred.

9.9 Long-term Future Time Perspectives

Despite the contributions the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* made in clarifying how the Accords' peace process should have unfolded in the future, no articulation of the future of the Accords' peace process would have been complete without *long-term future time perspectives*. To understand what roles these *future time perspectives* do and do not play within the Accords and what roles *long-term future time perspectives* could play in future peace processes, the following analysis of the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* was conducted with an awareness of the insights about *long-term future time perspectives* discussed in Chapter 7. Based upon this analysis, *long-term future time perspectives* within the Accords were seen to provide general glimpses into the long-term evolution and manifestations of the Accords' peace process, as well as Israeli-Palestinian relations beyond the peace process. While some of these glimpses were fundamental to the aims of the Accords, as they are in any peace process, some were also problematic given the Accords' ultimate aim for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Examples of these various types of glimpses are provided below along with some suggestions as to what types of *long-term future time perspectives* can be included in future peace processes to avoid these problematic issues arising again. By the end of this section, the ways in which *long-term future time perspectives* delimit

a peace process will be made clear and provide useful insights which can help in the drafting of other peace processes in the future.

Evidence of *long-term future time perspectives* shaping peace process is scattered throughout the Accords. At a foundational level, *long-term future time perspectives* within the Accords provide support to the idea that a ‘lasting and comprehensive peace settlement’ will be reached.⁶⁰⁴ By articulating and supporting this idea, the Accords’ *long-term future time perspectives* are suggesting that the Accords’ peace process has an end in the form of ‘a permanent settlement’ between Israel and the Palestinians and no additional peace processes are needed to build or maintain peace. While there is nothing wrong with suggesting that a particular peace process can end, the Accords’ suggestion that no subsequent processes are needed goes against what some of the literature on peace studies suggests.⁶⁰⁵ Peace studies literature suggests that the process of building and maintaining peace is ongoing and may only be deemed (if ever) no longer necessary long after peace has been consciously and unconsciously realised among the populations of conflicting parties and materialised on the ground. Within the Accords, however, there is no mention of what happens after the Accords’ initial peace process ends. There are no additional *long-term future time perspectives* articulating that any subsequent peace processes are needed. These missing *long-term future time perspectives* indicate that the process of building and maintaining peace is not conceived of in the Accords as an ongoing process, but as finite. According to liberal and democracy peace theories, upon which the Accords were based, this finiteness is presumed not to be a problem because the democratic institutions and norms are presumed to serve any of the functions a subsequent peace process would serve between two democracies. This understanding, however, is not explicitly articulated in any of the Accords’ *long-term future time perspectives*. Consequently, the Accords’ *long-term future time perspectives* appear underdeveloped and thus call into question the viability of the permanence of the peace the Accords claimed to be leading to and might have created between Israel and the Palestinians had the Accords’ peace process not been abandoned. These insights about the Accords’ underdeveloped and missing *long-term future time perspectives*

⁶⁰⁴ Oslo I and II, preambles.

⁶⁰⁵ For an example see Eamonn O’Kane, “The Perpetual Peace Process? Examining Northern Ireland’s Never-ending, but Fundamentally Altering Peace Process,” *Irish Political Studies* 28, no. 4 (2013): 515-535. Literature reviewed in section 2.6.3 contain additional examples.

suggest ways in which *long-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process can be used to help account for peace studies' observation that the process of peace is ongoing.

Along with articulating that the Accords' peace process will end, *long-term future time perspectives* are also conveying other aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relation. For example, these *future time perspectives* help convey that peace will become a perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the distant future. As a consequence of articulating peace as perennial, *long-term future time perspectives* are also conveying that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is (or will become) ephemeral.⁶⁰⁶ Evidence of both these claims are found in the Preambles of Oslo I and Oslo II which make references to a 'lasting and comprehensive peace settlement' and 'negotiations on the permanent status'. Words such as 'lasting' and 'permanent' denote that certain aspects of the relationship will continue unchanged in the distant future (i.e. be perennial) while a phrase like 'comprehensive peace settlement' suggests numerous aspects of the conflict will be resolved at some point in the distant future. Making these claims are necessary within the Accords because they provide reasons for both Israel and the Palestinians to see the Accords' peace process through to the end. These claims are made more believable and probable via the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* because they are articulated as both aspirations⁶⁰⁷ and predictions⁶⁰⁸ of what the distant future relationship between Israel and the Palestinians will be. Articulating claims in this way enables the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* to attach emotional and logical appeals to claims about the distant future being peaceful. Future peace processes would benefit from including *long-term future time perspectives* that perform similar functions to help keep Israel and the Palestinians emotionally and logically motivated during the peace process.

⁶⁰⁶ This notion that the conflict is ephemeral is not unique to the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives*, but is also conveyed by its *short-term present time perspectives* as mentioned in section 9.5. The correspondence between these two different types of time perspectives highlights that the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* serve a validating function within the Accords which reinforces claims made elsewhere within the Accords regarding the finiteness of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

⁶⁰⁷ Oslo II, preamble: 'Reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process...'

⁶⁰⁸ Oslo II, preamble: 'Reaffirming their understanding that...the negotiations on the permanent status...will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338...'

Missing from the Accords' articulations of the distant future via *long-term future time perspectives*, however, are timelines as to when these claims about perennial and ephemeral aspects will become reality. This absence is most apparent in Article V of Oslo I and Article XXXI in Oslo II regarding the permanent status negotiations. Within these articles, a number of details are provided about the negotiations regarding the range of potential starting dates⁶⁰⁹ to issues to be covered during the negotiations.⁶¹⁰ Nowhere in these articles nor elsewhere within the Accords,⁶¹¹ however, does one *long-term future time perspective* articulate a specific date as to when the permanent status negotiations will end. Given the details provided by the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives*, as well as its other four time perspectives regarding start dates and timelines for particular steps or stages of the peace process and what was to happen at each step or stage in the process, the absence of a specific end date to the permanent status negotiations suggests that the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* were limited in terms of the extent to which they could articulate a predetermined distant future. Furthermore, fact that the permanent status negotiations officially began within the Accords' articulated timeframe on May 5, 1996 but went nowhere after that date suggests that the timelines and dates articulated by the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* potentially provided traction for the peace process to continue into the distant future.⁶¹² Collectively, these insights suggest that it may be unrealistic to try to simultaneously maintain a notion that the distant future cannot be completely known and a need to articulate details of the distant future. Therefore, *long-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process should try to focus on maintaining one or the other.

⁶⁰⁹ Oslo I, art. V, para. 2: 'Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period...'. Oslo II, art. XXXI, para. 5 specified a start date no later than 'May 4, 1996'.

⁶¹⁰ Oslo I, art. V, para. 3: 'It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest'. Similar issues were articulated in Oslo II, art. XXXI, para. 5.

⁶¹¹ Among the 39 times the 'permanent status negotiations' are mentioned within Oslo II, the references mostly regard matters related to the future jurisdiction of Area C within the contested territory. Examples of these matters include jurisdiction of archaeology and religious, sites, parks, natural resources, property taxes, and tourism.

⁶¹² "The Wye River Memorandum," conclusion date: October 23, 1998, Economic Cooperation Foundation – The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/634 (accessed August 13, 2018).

9.10 Adjusting long-term future time perspectives to reality

In the above analysis, efforts were made not to point out where the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives* got articulations of the distant future wrong, but rather how they could be made more accurate, less problematic, or be used to tie up loose ends. The choice should be made based upon which one will lead to *long-term future time perspectives* that best support claims made within a future peace process. For example, *long-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process need to better account for insights about the peace process highlighted within the peace studies literature. If the process of peace is ongoing, then a future peace process's *long-term future time perspectives* need to be more explicit that at most they can only articulate that the end of a particular process contributes to peace, but does not alone produce a lasting peace. Following this suggestion, a future peace process adopting a similar structure of the Accords' peace process would be able to use its *long-term future time perspectives* to articulate that an outlined future peace process would need to be followed by a subsequent peace process. Such an articulation introduces the idea that the process of peace is indeterminate within a future peace process. Furthermore, these *long-term future time perspectives* would support any claims within a future peace process that the process will lead to, though not solely create, a permanent and peaceful settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Introducing *long-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process that embrace ideas that a process of peace is ongoing and its final end date is indeterminate, does not mean that specific end dates should not be articulated by *long-term future time perspectives* as well. For example, *long-term future time perspectives* can be added within a future peace process to articulate when a particular peace process will end or a deadline by which a subsequent peace process needs to be framed and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians. The importance of specifying these terminal dates or timelines is twofold. First, these dates and timelines draw attention to the limitations and finiteness of a future peace process. Second, as the implementation of the Accords illustrated (particularly Oslo I), adding these dates and timelines would provide traction and

deadlines which help keep a peace process moving forward into the distant future.⁶¹³ These suggestions would fit well within future peace processes modelled after the Accords where peace processes are structured to unfold linearly and according to detailed timelines. These additional *long-term future time perspectives* might also have roles to play within future peace processes that are not structured linearly, but require clear indications as to when particular peace processes end. Regardless of a future peace process's structure, however, at some point specifying particular ends and timelines becomes either impractical or useless because of unforeseen contingencies that might occur in the distant future. Therefore, all future peace processes would benefit from restricting the inclusion of *long-term future time perspectives* specifying dates and timelines to tying up loose ends that are necessary before a subsequent peace process can begin.

In addition to the suggestions mentioned above, a few words need to be said regarding the roles *long-term future time perspectives* play in relation to emotional and logical appeals found within peace processes. Embedding future peace processes with both types of appeals via *long-term future time perspectives* will be necessary for two basic reasons. First, emotional and rational appeals in relation to long-term peace cut across social, economic, and political divisions and serve as a means of bringing different segments of Israel and Palestinian societies together in support of a future peace process.⁶¹⁴ Second, both appeals can be called upon to support a future peace process at various stages of its implementation to help ensure that a process is not pre-maturely abandoned. In other words, by articulating these appeals within a future peace process, *long-term future time perspectives* contribute to ensuring that the hearts and minds of Israelis and Palestinians remain committed to a future peace process and its aims. The suggestion to articulate both appeals via *long-term future time perspectives* within future peace processes, however, is not simply a matter of including equal numbers of emotional and rational appeals. Situational and cultural considerations should be the drivers behind to what extent each type of appeal is highlighted.⁶¹⁵ As the Accords illustrated, a future peace process's overreliance on logical appeals for its long-term

⁶¹³ Goetz, "Time and Power in the European Commission," 585.

⁶¹⁴ Sophie A. Whiting, *Spoiling the Peace?: The Threat of Dissident Republicans to Peace in Northern Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 48.

⁶¹⁵ Nancy D. Albers-Miller and Marla Royne Stafford, "An international analysis of emotional and rational appeals in services vs goods advertising," *Journal of Consumer Marketing* 16, no. 1 (1999), 51.

success may be insufficient to sustain a peace process when external emotional appeals arise. Consequently, *long-term future time perspectives* included within a future peace process need to ensure that their articulated emotional appeals are robust enough to defend a future peace process against external emotional appeals that may arise throughout its implementation.

9.11 Chapter summary

Throughout this chapter, the relationships between *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and the Accords' peace process were analysed and discussed. To unpack the aforementioned relationships each of the five time perspectives within the Accords were examined using the methods and notions addressed in chapters 3 and 4, as well as the insights gained about *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* from chapters 5-7. Based on the analyses and discussions detailed in this chapter, suggestions were offered to illustrate how time perspectives could be altered or added to potentially improve the success of future peace processes. Collectively, the analyses, discussions, and suggestions presented offer readers new insights into how time perspectives are manifested in and shape the practice of international politics in regards to a peace process. Furthermore, the insights gained from this empirical case study also suggest how theoretical claims made in a particular theory of international politics (e.g. democratic peace theory) are embedded into peace processes via time perspectives. Thus, the shaping effects of time perspectives in relation to theoretical claims are not limited to theories of international politics, but can be carried over into the practice of international politics.⁶¹⁶ This observation suggests a connection between theory and practice, via time perspectives, which scholars of international politics have yet to study in-depth but could offer suggestions as to what time perspectives within a theory of international politics need to be modified to improve the potential success of a future peace process.

To arrive at the insights presented in this chapter, I began by looking at the Accords' *long-term term historical time perspectives*. Based on my analysis, the Accords'

⁶¹⁶ This point was not elaborated in this thesis because links between the Accords and the writings of particular democratic peace theorists could not be clearly identified.

existing *long-term historical time perspectives* framed the Accords' peace process as one trying to change problematic perennial aspects of Israeli-Palestinian historical relations rather than a peace process trying to restore peaceful perennial aspects of the past. To reframe future peace processes as restorative processes, I suggested that future peace processes extend the scopes of their *long-term historical time perspectives*. Doing so would enable these future peace process to not only redefine the perennial aspects of Israeli-Palestinian historical relations as peaceful, but also address the role of religion in the relationship and open up peace options beyond those linked to liberal and democratic peace theories. Among all the suggestions addressed throughout this chapter, extending the *long-term historical time perspectives* as I have described and highlighting the same aspects I have drawn attention to would be the easiest to incorporate in future peace processes and have significant effects on the outlook for future peace processes.

Following my analysis and discussion of the Accords' *long-term historical time perspectives*, the effects of the Accords' *short-term historical time perspectives* on the peace process were considered. Among the roles *short-term historical time perspectives* played within the Accords' peace process, the roles regarding the support they lend to the legitimatization of the peace process and the limitations they place on the evolution of the peace process were of particular interest. They highlighted areas within the Accords that could be changed in future peace processes to potentially improve their success. In relation to these areas, the most promising suggestions presented included 1) having *short-term historical time perspectives* that legitimise the peace process and its aims separately and 2) re-articulating some *short-term historical time perspectives* to suggest that specific moments or periods of the past are historical beginnings and models that a future peace process can build upon. Both suggestions embed future peace processes with more freedom to evolve organically than the Accords' *short-term historical time perspectives* allowed for. Despite the freedom these suggested *short-term historical time perspectives* may introduce into a future peace process, the extent to which this freedom can be exercised will be dependent upon how a future peace process's present is articulated by its *short-term present time perspectives*.

As noted in the third part of this chapter, the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives* articulated the necessary and sufficient conditions of relationship between

Israel and the Palestinians. My analysis, however, revealed that the Accords' *short-term present time perspectives* provided an incomplete contemporary context of the situation. To address this issue and to augment the comprehensiveness of the contemporary conditions being embedded in future peace processes, suggestions were made to include *short-term present time perspectives* within future peace processes that acknowledged the contemporary religious context and efforts of peaceful engagement being made at all levels of society. In addition to these suggestions, my analysis also led to presenting a separate grouping of suggestions relating to the allusions about the future created by *short-term present time perspectives* within a peace process. Suggestions on how future peace processes could use or not use *short-term present time perspectives* to improve control over their allusions included the following: 1) avoiding the inclusion of *short-term present time perspectives* which perpetuate or introduce problematic aspects into the future, 2) altering *short-term present time perspectives* to temper the effects of a future peace process's allusions have on the future, and 3) adding *short-term present time perspectives* which acknowledge that contemporary circumstances will continue to present known and unknown challenges throughout the implementation of a peace process.

In the fourth section of the chapter, the focus of the analysis and discussion shifted to the effects *short-term future time perspectives* had on the Accords' peace process. A noteworthy insight recovered from my analysis of the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* regarded the details these time perspectives provided about the immediate future. The specificity of the immediate future articulated via the Accords' *short-term future time perspectives* delimited the peace process's immediate future to such an extent that the peace process was unable to adjust to near future realities as they arose. To help open up the possibility of adjustment within future peace processes, my analysis indicated that *short-term future time perspectives* within future peace processes needed to 1) be more explicit in defining the limits of the certainty *short-term future time perspectives* articulated, 2) preserve space for unknowns to arise and exist, and 3) create multiple avenues through which a peace process could continue to move toward peace when certain paths became blocked. Consequently, the suggestions presented were examples of how *short-term future time perspectives* within future peace processes could be constructed to enable future peace processes to adjust their courses going forward as

various changes in domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics, as well as international politics, arose.

The final section of the chapter addressed the Accords' *long-term future time perspectives*. In general, my analysis suggested that *long-term future time perspectives* within the Accords provided general glimpses into the long-term evolution and manifestations of Israeli-Palestinian relations throughout the duration of the Accords' peace process and beyond. The glimpses provided, however, were limited and at times misleading. As a consequence, recommendations were offered on how to improve the quality of the *long-term future time perspectives* and the accuracy of the articulations of the distant future included within future peace processes. These recommendations included inserting *long-term future time perspectives* within a future peace process that 1) acknowledge that the process of peace is ongoing, 2) recognise the impracticality of pre-emptively scripting out the distant future, and 3) contain emotional and logical appeals which are conducive to sustaining a future peace process in the distant future given the contemporary context of the Israeli-Palestinian relations. Although these recommendations alone will not ensure the success of a future peace process, they will ensure that later steps and stages of implementation of a future peace process will remain grounded in certain realities of the future; a process of peace is ongoing and the future cannot be completely known.

Chapter 10: A New Understanding of Time Perspectives in IR

10.1 Thesis summary

Throughout this thesis, the reader has been taken through a series of steps, analyses, and discussions to help develop an understanding and acute awareness of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and how they shape understandings, interpretations, and claims of international politics within a theory and a peace process. Developing this understanding and acute awareness is important because it highlights the unique ways in which time perspectives perform within and effect theory and practice. To develop this understanding and awareness, the reader was provided with conceptualisations of what *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* are, methods for distinguishing between various time perspectives, and various types of time-related aspects (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) that time perspectives can attribute to claims and practices (chapters 3 and 4). These conceptualisations, methods, and aspects were then used in my analyses and discussions of *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects found within Morgenthau's theory (chapters 5-7) and the Oslo Accords (chapters 8-9). These two case studies were included in this thesis to illustrate the insights these conceptualisations, methods, and aspects can help recover about claims and practices of international politics. Admittedly, the analyses and discussions were quite technical and abstract at times. However, these were necessary ground clearing exercises that needed to be performed to begin to unpack relations between time perspectives and claims and political practices. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 below provide a concise overview of what time perspectives and corresponding salient effects were recovered and addressed in this thesis. Considered collectively, the information in these tables constitute the new understandings of time perspectives and their effects developed in this thesis which readers can reference going forward.

Table 10.1: Time perspectives addressed in this thesis

		Temporal Focus		
		Past	Present	Future
Temporal Depth	Long-term	<i>Long-term historical</i>	<i>Long-term present</i>	<i>Long-term future</i>
	Short-term	<i>Short-term historical</i>	<i>Short-term present</i>	<i>Short-term future</i>

Within the shaded area, six distinct time perspectives are identified conveying both temporal focus and temporal depth.

Table 10.2: The most salient effects and functions of each time perspectives

		Effects and Functions within a theory or a political practice
Time Perspectives	<i>Long-term historical</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide macro level accounts of the past • Structure and aggregate international political phenomena to recover patterns and anomalies within international politics • Extend the explanatory power and relevance of a theory, political practice, or claim beyond the past • Predetermine what contemporary and future international political phenomena ‘fit’ with a certain historical accounting of international politics
	<i>Short-term historical</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide sub-macro level accounts of the past • Capture and retain minute details of the past • Articulate the presence and status of perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics in the past • Illustrate how perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics interact • Detail historical development within international politics missed or deemphasised by <i>long-term historical time perspectives</i>

<i>Short-term historical</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Draw to the forefront those elements of international politics or a political situation that a theory or a political practice deems most important to address or focus attention on • Highlight explanatory congruency or rationale for pursuing certain aims
<i>Short-term present</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serve as ubiquitous time perspectives from which all other time perspectives articulated within a theory or a political practice can begin to be identified • Offer insights into the necessary and sufficient conditions for the manifestation of international politics • Problematise international politics • Characterise the present • Indicate the present's orientations toward the past and the future • Date-stamp claims
<i>Short-term future</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide predictions or approximations about the immediate future of international politics • Perform transition/bridging work that moves a theory's explanation or a political practice beyond the known/knowable world • Help particular unknowns in the near future become known • Attach certainty to near future predictions or approximations • Pre-emptively add meaning and significance to aspects of international politics in the near future
<i>Long-term future</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extending a theory's or political practice's applicability beyond the foreseeable future

	<i>Long-term future</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide glimpses into the long-term future evolutions and manifestations of international politics • Articulate the shelf-life of claims about international politics • Allude to the applicability and usefulness of claims in both familiar and unfamiliar international political contexts • Can alter the interpretations of historical and contemporary theoretical claims via the introduction of new theoretical claims about the distant future • Indicate how long-standing, salient international political questions and problems of concern might be solved or adequately addressed in the distant future
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10.2 Moving forward

In the process of carrying out the initial leg work to conceptualise and analyse the time perspectives and their effects highlighted in Table 10.2, my awareness of additional areas of research needing attention in the future was raised but not fully explored or developed for various reasons in this thesis. Chief among these reasons were two: the word limit constraints of the thesis and the initial conceptualisation work completed in this thesis needed to be done before either of the following topics could be addressed. Among these additional areas of research needing further exploration and development, two in particular warrant further comment: 1) *long-term present time perspectives* and 2) the notions of time used in the articulation, study, and practice of international politics. Regarding the first, *long-term present time perspectives* warrant further research and conceptualisation because these time perspectives have the potential to help scholars interpret and articulate time perspectives and claims about particular international political phenomena which the five time perspectives addressed in this thesis could not or only partially help with. Two examples of unique international political phenomena which further conceptualisation and analysis of *long-term present time perspectives* would be of help to scholars include the everyday experiences of civilians awaiting the end of a crisis or conflict and refugees awaiting confirmation of

their status as refugees, asylum seekers, or citizens.⁶¹⁷ In both cases, there is a sense that the present is never ending or that time is suspended for an individual because the contemporary circumstances surrounding the individual creates a perception that there is no discernible difference from one day to the next. *Long-term present time perspectives* would enable scholars to articulate and study such experiences which have occurred in the past, are occurring in the present, and will likely occur in the future.⁶¹⁸

In addition to conceptualising *long-term present time perspectives*, the insights presented in this thesis suggests that IR disciplinary aspects of time used in the articulation, study, and practice of international politics need to be explored and developed further. While Hutchings' work on *chronos* and *kairos* suggests different types of time at work in international politics and Hom's work suggests that time is a matter of organising occurrences within a timing regime, there are other aspects of time which can contribute to contemporary understandings of time within international politics.⁶¹⁹ One such aspect of time worth exploring and developing further regards different ontologies of international political time. For example, ontologies of time (e.g. absolute time, arrow of time) derived from the block time, presentism, and growing block universe theories of time discussed in the fields of Philosophy and Physics would enable scholars to recover, study, interpret, and articulate new insights about time(s) within international political theory and practice from various Western and non-Western perspectives.⁶²⁰ To illustrate, considering the Accords from a block time perspective (which suggests that the past, present, and future are all real and equally exist) helps to provide insights into the ontological claims regarding time articulated in

⁶¹⁷ An account by one of Serbia's representatives with UNICEF claiming that some refugee children are "breaking down emotionally because they don't know what's next. They don't see any future" suggests that these children might have *long-term present time perspectives*. This example along with others can be found in Rania Abouzeid, "Thousands of Refugee Children Are Stranded on Europe's Doorstep," *National Geographic*, October 23, 2017, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/photography/proof/2017/10/unaccompanied-minors-refugees-serbia-afghanistan-pakistan-children-migration/> (accessed November 30, 2018).

⁶¹⁸ The notion of a *long-term present time perspective* may also help scholars in the recovery and articulation of *long-term present time perspectives* found within the everyday practices and everyday embodiments of international politics. Examples of 'everyday' literature this notion could be applied to include Michele Acuto, "Everyday International Relations: Garbage, Grand Designs, and Mundane Matters," *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 345-362; Oliver Kessler and Xavier Guillaume, "Everyday practices of international relations: People in organizations," *Journal of International Relations & Development* 15, no. 1 (2012): 110-120.

⁶¹⁹ Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*; Hom, "Timing is Everything".

⁶²⁰ For more detailed discussions regarding different ontologies of time addressed in Philosophy and Physics see Emily Thomas, *Absolute Time* and Rovelli, *The Order of Time*.

the Accords. From a block time perspective, separating the past from the present or future is not possible and becomes problematic for Israel and the Palestinians during any peace process seeking to move beyond the historical confrontations. Such ontological insights, combined with those insights regarding *long-term* and *short-term time perspectives* and their effects shared earlier in this thesis, have the potential to offer more comprehensive understandings of relations between international politics (in theory and practice) and time.

Thus, as the two aforementioned examples indicate, this thesis serves as a significant first step that both opens up new discussions of time perspectives and time within international political research, as well as provides the concepts, means, and understandings necessary to begin to engage with such research inquiries more extensively in the near and distant future. Consequences of this further engagement will hopefully lead to refined understandings and interpretations of 1) claims about international politics made within a theory or a peace process and 2) the ways that different perspectives of time shape the study and practice of international politics. Considering that international politics is never static but perennially dynamic, the study of time perspectives with respect to international politics in theory and practice that this thesis contributes to is unlikely to be exhausted, but remain a perennial pursuit in the foreseeable and unforeseeable future. This observation suggests that the relevance of the work completed within this thesis and the corresponding insights may have residual effects within IR research over time. Only time will tell, however, as to whether those effects will be immediate or emerge periodically over time. As Thales of Miletus said “Σοφώτατον χρόνος· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ πάντα”; “Time is the wisest of all things that are; for it brings everything to light”.⁶²¹

⁶²¹ Quote attributed to Thales of Miletus in Diogenes Laërtius, *The Lives Eminent Philosophers*, 2 vols., trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1: 36-7.

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