Ideology and Radicalisation: Applying Hannah Arendt's Criteria of Ideology to Conceptualise Elements of the Mindset of the Islamic Radical

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A thesis presented for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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October 2020

Abstract

A violent and complex phenomenon referred to by many observers as Islamic radicalisation has affected certain individuals linked to Muslim societies. Research studying Islamic radicalisation has been trying, through different frameworks, to construct a standard profile of a typical Islamic radical, but without success. This thesis argues that the violent Islamic radical is an abstract, political person comprising of the Arendtian ideological mindset and, hence, may be identified as an Islamic ideologue. The study develops and applies a novel theoretical framework to conceptualise the mindset of the central character of Islamic radicalisation. In Part One, I glean five essential elements of an ideological mindset from Hannah Arendt as my theoretical framework, namely: the superhuman source as origin of thought; the claim to global domination; violence and the call for action; the objective enemy; and rejection of factual reality. I follow Hans Joerg Sigwart who developed the method "characterology" from Arendt to conceptualise a character from the discursive practices of six online magazines (4 English and 2 Urdu) published by Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT). In Part Two, I apply the Arendtian framework to this unique set of empirical material. I conduct a thematic analysis technique to detect, quote and analyse exemplary texts from the magazines that resonate with the Arendtian theoretical articulations of the five elements of an ideological mindset. The research affirms that all five Arendtian elements are part of the character's mindset that has been discursively constructed by these three Islamist organisations. The study also summarises the ideas/themes detected through the Arendtian framework and used by the organisations to create a conceptual tool entitled 'The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals' (MILIR). MILIR can act as the standard profile of the abstract person known as Islamic radical. It can also inform de-radicalisation policy.

Acknowledgements

Glossary of Terms

Word	Meaning	Word	Meaning
Ad-Dahr	Epoch	Deen	Religion
Ahadith	Saying of the Prophet	Dhimmah	Non-Muslim subject
Akhira	Hereafter	Dhulm	Transgression
Alayhis-salam	Peace be upon you	Du'āt	Missionaries
Al-din al-qayyim	Valuable religion	Dunya	Material world
Al-Hukm	Judgement	Fasaad	Mischief
Allah/Allah ta'ālā	God	Fisabīlillāh	For God's sake
Ameer	Leader	Ghanimah	Booty
Ameer-ul-Mumineen	Leader of the Faithful	Hakimiyyah	Sovereignty
[Amr Bil Ma'aroof Wa Nahi Unil Munkir]	[Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil]	Hudūd	Limits
		Ihsan/Tazkiya	Charity/purity
		Ijmā	Consensus
Ansār	Supporters	Ijtihadi	Opinionated
Awliya	Companions	Iman	Faith
Āyāt	Verse	Ilah	Deity
Azza wa jall	Mighty and majestic	Imams	Leaders
Baatil	Falsehood	Jahiliyyah	Ignorance
Bayah	Pledge of Allegiance	Jannah	Heaven
Bid'ah	Innovation	Jihad	Pursuit or fight
Dajjal/Dajal	Quack	Jizyah	Tribute/Protection tax
Dajl	Deception	Kafir	Unbeliever
Dajjali people	Quakers	Khalifa	Successor
[Dar-al-harab/Dar-ul-harab]	House of War	kharaj	[A toll levied on the subjects]
[Dar-al-Islam/Dar-ul-Islam]	House of Peace	Khilafah/Khilafath	Succession
		Kufr	Unbelief
		Kuffar/Kufar	Unbelievers

Glossary of Terms

Word	Meaning	Word	Meaning
Kufrī/ Kufari	Related to unbelief	Sahwāt	Awakenings [Syrian or Iraqis who collaborated with the US]
La ilaha ill Allah [LA ILAHA ILALLAH MUHAMMAD UR RASOOL LLAH]	No God except Allah [No God but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger]		
		Salaf	Ancestors
		Shām	Syria
Majlis-e-shoora	Consultation Meeting	Shariah	Islamic Law
		Shaytan	Evil
Malik al-mulk	The King of kings	Shirk	Polytheistic
Ma'roof	Mainstream	Sunnah	The Prophetic method
Meezan	Balance		
Muhājirīn	Migraters	Taghut	One who crosses the limits
Mujahideen	Holy warriors		
Munâfiqîn	Hypocrites	Tawāghīt	Plural of Taghut
Munkar	Deniers	Tawhid	Unification or oneness of god
Muqtadir-i a`la	Idolaters		
Murtadd	Renegade	Ummah	Community
Mushrikin	Sovereign	Wala and bara/walâ' and barâ'ah	Loyalty and disavowal
Muwahhidīn	Believers in one God		
Najis	Impure		
Nakba	Catastrophe		
Nifāq	Duality		
Rāfidah	Rejectors [Shiites]		
Rahmān	The Merciful		
Sahaba	Companions		

Source: A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Arabic - English), Fourth Edition. Spoken Languages Services, Inc.

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Part II: Analysing Empirical Material

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1   Thesis Introduction

This thesis develops a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of *Islamic[1] radicalisation* and its central *characte r*, namely the *Islamic ideologue* that is radicalised for violence and linked to Muslims in the contemporary radicalisation (and terrorism) studies. The thesis conceptualises *Islamic radicalisation* as *a "process" of acquisition of all the five Arendtian elements of an ideological mindset* namely, the *superhuman source* as the origin of thought; the *claim to global domination*; *violence* and the call for action; *the objective enemy* and rejection of *factual reality*. This study argues that the central *character* of the phenomenon is an abstract political person with an *ideological mindset* which is radicalised by *ideology* and may, therefore, be categorised as an *ideologue.* I glean *five essential elements of the ideological mindset* from Arendt's writings, especially *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958). The thesis applies Arendt's criteria of *ideology* to categorise the *mindset[2]* of the *character* constructed by three Islamist organisations; Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT), in their discursive practices, i.e. textual expressions in online magazines. It uses "characterology" as a method developed by Hans-Joerg Sigwart from Arendt. The *Islamic ideologue* of this research is an abstract *character* constructed by three Islamist organisations in their discursive practices in online magazines.

The study problematises and argues that together the *five Arendtian elements of ideological mindset* weave a toxic intellectual fabric in the mind of a radicalised *character,* which informs their (mostly violent) behaviour and actions. Why is it important to reconceptualise the notion of *Islamic radicalisation*; also, detect and

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[1] The suffix "Islamic" is used to clearly recognise the identity assigned to the contemporary violent radicalisation.
[2] Mindset: a person's way of thinking and their opinions (Cambridge English Dictionary).

categorise the *mindset* of the discursively constructed *character* by the Islamist organisations and the purpose it will serve?

To address this question, I follow a sequence in this chapter that firstly, lays down the contribution of this research to the pre-existing debates on *Islamic radicalisation*. Secondly, I identify gaps in existing studies and their implications. Thirdly, I situate the research and form the research question to address the gap. Fourthly, I conduct a literature review of the five areas or the frameworks that concern the 'research question' specifically, the conceptualisations of the phenomenon of radicalisation; to 'what' does the "process" (of radicalisation) lead to?; de-radicalisation; the existing tools/scales for measuring radicalisation, and theories of radicalisation. Finally, I lay out the structure of the thesis.

This thesis contributes to the research studying *Islamic radicalisation* in two ways. Firstly, it adds a novel theoretical framework, namely, the *five Arendtian elements of an ideological mindset* to categorise a *character* as an *Islamic ideologue*. This theoretical framework has a wider application and can categorise the *mindset* of a *character* in other situations as well, e.g. far-right ideologues. The five Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset* are sufficiently abstract to apply to a variety of *character*s to assess whether the *character*'s *mindset* is ideological or otherwise. Secondly, it constructs the standard profile of the Islamic radical as an abstract person comprising the Arendtian *ideological mindset*. In the conclusion of the Thesis, I summarise all the ideas detected through the Arendtian framework in a chart entitled by me as the "Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic radicals" (MILIR). I think it is an interesting way to summarise and present my findings. Through MILIR, I present 38 ideas from the three Islamist organisations, which they use to construct the *mindset* of the central *character* in their textual constructs. MILIR can inform de-radicalisation policy as well. I also record, in the chart, the level of emphasis with which an organisation engages with an idea/theme.

I, detect, quote and analyse exemplary texts from five online magazines namely, *Dabiq*, *Inspire*, *Azan*, *Rumiyah* (all English), *Shariat* and *Hitteen* (Urdu) published by the three

Islamist organisations. The analysis also notes the distinctions and similarities of the textual constructions across the organisations.

The research studying *Islamic radicalisation* theorises the phenomenon as a "process", without clearly enumerating the essential elements of the product the "process" produces or leads to. Categorising the "product" like violence, Islamist, extremist or terrorist, as identified by *Islamic radicalisation* literature, is too vague and does not help in identifying stable criteria to theorise essential elements of a typical profile of a radical *character*. Due to this gap in the literature, the debate on *Islamic radicalisation* mostly conceptualises the phenomenon as religious violence. This thesis argues that the "process" of radicalisation results in a web of ideas in the *mind* of the radicalised *character*, and these ideas are ideological in nature. These ideas inspire the *character* to commit ideological violence. Ideological violence is unique in its role and functions it performs in an *ideology* (See Chapter 5 'Violence and the Call for Action').

These ideas are not novel in their essence as the *mindset* of past *ideologues*, namely the Communist and Nazi *ideologues*, according to Arendt, exhibited all the elements of an *ideological mindset*. The *character* is pulled or pushed through the "process" of radicalisation by a set of contextual reasoning, which the Islamist organisations construct as they lay out their arguments.

A second contribution of this thesis is to cover a gap in the research also identified by a 2010 "Research and Development" (RAND) study. The study notes that "one of the most glaring gaps in the literature is the failure to examine the similarities and differences between Islamist militants and other types of extremists and then to determine the implications of these findings for the processes of disengagement and de-radicalisation" (Rabasa et al., 2010: 26). This research detects and summarises the distinguishing ideas/themes that represent an ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* (militant), which distinguishes Islamic radical from other types of radicals.

The prevailing conceptual vagueness, identified by the above mentioned two gaps, has its effects on the research studying *Islamic radicalisation*. Firstly, the previous research failed to construct a standard profile of an Islamic radical as a person. The conclusions of two major UK Government-sponsored studies are worth quoting to highlight the

conundrum. The House of Commons report (2006) presented after the 7 July 2005 London bombings concludes.

> What we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Of the 4 individuals here, 3 were second-generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin and one whose parents were of Jamaican origin; Kamel Bourgass, convicted of the Ricin plot, was an Algerian failed asylum seeker; Richard Reid, the failed shoe bomber, had an English mother and Jamaican father. Others of interest have been white converts. Some have been well-educated, some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently well integrated in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with children. Some previously law-abiding, others with a history of petty crime. In a few cases, there is evidence of abuse or other trauma in early life, but in others, their upbringing has been stable and loving (Home Office, 2006: 31).

A few years later, a second study conducted by MI5's[3] "Behavioural Science Unit" concurred with the findings of the House of Commons report mentioned above. The study analysed several hundred individual case studies of Muslim individuals and their associates linked to violence and concluded that "it was not possible to draw up a profile of a typical 'British Terrorist'" (Travis, 2008). The findings of academic research (Bux, 2007; Horgan, 2003; Merari, 1990; Bakker, 2006; Kelly et al., 1992) were no different from the government-sponsored studies mentioned above. For example, Edwin Bakker analysed personnel, social and situational characteristics of 200 radicals, who had been involved in 31 incidents of terrorism in Europe and concluded that "there is no standard Jihad terrorist" (2006: 53).

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[3] The document is classified and for internal use only, however, The Guardian newspaper reported the key findings in August 2008: Travis, A. (2008). *MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain*. London: Guardian.

This study asserts that the conceptual confusion that exists in the conceptualisation of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* is also linked to the methodological approaches. The phenomenon is too complex for the methods adopted to study it. Most of the studies that tried to find a standard profile of an Islamic radical adopted interview-based methods without anchoring the search in a substantial theory (as explained in the next section). The interview-based methods of gathering the standard characteristics of a radicalised person proved inadequate, as a randomly selected sample of radicalised persons may not exhibit all the elements of a *mindset* that the Islamist organisations present and aspire to. Such efforts may locate partial elements of the radicalised *mindset* but embedded in the subjective contexts of the interviewees.

Further, locating a radicalised human in Muslim communities without the conceptual understanding of the radical person is erroneous. We need to know what comprises this radicalised person. I argue that the *Islamic radical* is an abstract construction, which can translate into a politically active person. The analysis of the discursive construction of an ideal type *character* with a radicalised *mindset* by Islamist organisations in their magazines is a good starting point. A discursively constructed *character*, detected through the lens of a substantial theory such as Arendt's, is likely to exhibit all the elements of a *mindset* that is idealised equally by radicalised minds and potential recruits. The clear identification of the elements of the *ideological mindset* is also necessary to inform UK De-radicalization Policy because "[i]f the very concept of radicalisation itself is problematic, the same must – by extension – also be true for 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' – terms that are 'poorly defined and mean different things to different people" (International Crises group, 2007: I).

The existing category of the radicalised *character* is not only unclear (as explained above) but problematic as well. The existing research on *Islamic radicalisation* links the radicalised person to Muslim communities through the category of Islamist, extremist or terrorist. All these categories are rejected by Muslim communities, whose cooperation is crucial in tackling the radicals. The thesis proposes that the category of *Islamic ideologue* is suitable for the identification of the radicalised *character*. It is likely to bring into focus the particular understandings of the religion that are politically

exploitable. By suggesting a separate analytical category of *ideology*, this research affords an opportunity to the common religious people to distance themselves from the violent *Islamic ideologue*. Some other writers such as Jeffrey M. Bale have also linked the present wave of *Islamic radicalisation* to the ideological understanding of religion. Such studies, however, neither move beyond an assertion of their claim nor engage with the Arendtian conception of *ideology*. Bale argues,

> [d]espite their seemingly absolute rejection of Western values and their claims to be purely Islamic in inspiration, several Islamist leaders and thinkers were strongly influenced by and indeed borrowed considerably from modern Western political ideologies and movements such as nationalism, communism and fascism, in particular, their techniques of organisation (the establishment of front groups and parallel hierarchies), propaganda, ideological indoctrination and mass mobilisation. Sayyid Abu al-A'la Maududi went so far as to openly claim that Islam – read Islamism – was a 'revolutionary party' comparable to communism and fascism, Hasan al-Banna was clearly influenced by fascist ideas and organisational techniques, and even the ostensible anti-Western puritan Sayyid Qutb devoted considerable space to emphasising the vitally important role of the Islamist 'vanguard' (tali'a) in organising, mobilising and properly 'educating' Muslims (Bale, 2009: 85).

Bale's abovementioned assertion does not identify those specific ideas that comprise the particular or ideological understanding of Islam. Such a general distinction has also been noted by "The Washington Institute for Near East Policy". It notes: "The extremist *ideology* at issue is a distortion of Islam, and in fact, many who have been radicalised remain surprisingly ignorant about the religion, particularly as the radicalisation process has accelerated in recent years" (Carpenter, 2009: 303). Mark Juergensmeyer, in his work entitled "Religion as a Cause of Terrorism" rightly concludes.

> The grievances – the sense of alienation, marginalisation, and social frustration – are often articulated in religious terms and seen through religious images, and the protest against them is organised by religious

leaders through the medium of religious institutions. Thus, religion is not the initial problem, but the fact that religion is the medium through which these issues are expressed is problematic. [...] Religion brings more to conflict than a repository of symbols and the aura of divine support, it problematizes a conflict through its abiding absolutism, its justification for violence, and its ultimate images of warfare that demonize opponents and cast the conflict in trans historic terms' (Juergensmeyer, 2006:141-143).

The above quoted texts point to the fact that certain scholars did try to conceptualise conflict and violence as a conflated yet a separate analytical category from the religion Islam. However, such efforts did not move beyond their initial assessment of the nature of Islamist violence, and did not develop the ideological violence as a separate category of analysis. The Islamist organisations extensively quote from Islamic sources to support their ideological claims and to identify the constructed *character* with Islam. My research, however, terms their understanding the ideological understanding of the Islamic sources. The research accepts the right of scholars, who view *ideology* as *not* a pejorative term, to have reservations for such a categorisation. Nevertheless, the research asserts that a normative phenomenon such as *Islamic radicalisation* needs a normative criterion such as the Arendtian criteria of *ideology* to conceptualise it. The normative nature of Arendtian articulations on *ideology* alerts the reader to the inherent dangers of violence in an *ideological mindset*. It is, however, surprising that despite Arendt's detailed work on *ideology* and *ideological thinking*, and especially her efforts to theorise the thinking of known ideologues i.e. the Communist and Nazi *ideologues*; her work is missing from the theories that link *ideology* with *Islamic radicalisation*.

While this thesis acknowledges the contributions of theories of radicalisation, these theories (for a detailed discussion see the 'Literature Review' below) fall short of answering the question raised by the government studies mentioned above: that is, what is considered to be a standard profile of an Islamic radical? To my knowledge, being the first of its type, this research shall present a substantial theory-guided map of ideas

that can constitute a standard profile of an ideal type of an Islamic radical, whom I call the *Islamic ideologue*.

Theories of radicalisation are relevant to explain the factors that pull or push[4] a *character* towards the "process" of radicalisation but do not answer the question 'what' elements the radicalised *character's mindset* exhibit after the "process" is complete. The thesis assumes that the *mindset* of the discursively constructed *character* is the cumulative product of the (radicalisation) "process" and an understanding that it is this typical *mindset* that the government-sponsored studies mentioned above are seeking. The thesis, therefore, formulates the question for the inquiry as: whether the *character* constructed by the three Islamist organisations in the textual literature in their online magazines carries all the elements of Arendtian *ideological mindset*? if it does, what is the nature and extent of these ideas?

The thesis divides the research into two parts. In part one, I lay out the theoretical foundations of the research. I discuss Arendt's notions of totalitarianism, *ideology* and "thinking" to glean five essential elements of the *ideological mindset.* I explain the reasons why I selected Arendt to understand the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* conceptually. I follow Hans Joerg Sigwart in developing an Arendtian method of inquiry, namely "characterology" to anchor the method theoretically. I employ a thematic analysis technique to identify the themes that *character*ise the *mindset* of the *character*. In part two, the study conducts a theory-guided thematic analysis of the literature produced by the three Islamist organisations mentioned above. I assume that their discursive practices construct an ideal type *character* whose *mindset* carries all the radicalising ideas the Islamist organisations exemplify and propagate in their recruitment strategies. I allocate five chapters to analyse five elements of the *ideological mindset*. The aim is to detect the ideas associated with the subthemes clustered around the chapter theme. I argue that viewed with an Arendtian theoretical lens, the discursively constructed *character* is the radical person who carries all the

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[4] The contributions of pull and push factors towards a "character's" involvement in the radicalisation process are explained in a major study conducted by Vergani et al. (2018).

Arendtian elements of the *ideological mindset*. However, before I lay out a detailed outline of the chapters, I conduct a literature review of how experts have pursued to understand the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*.

1.2   Literature Review – (Re)conceptualisation of the Phenomenon of Islamic Radicalisation

Due to the very nature of the phenomenon, governments are one of the major stakeholders in its understanding. Therefore, apart from academic research, a significant part of the *Islamic radicalisation* literature is contributed by government-sponsored studies. Basically, I note five frameworks used to conceptualise *Islamic radicalisation*. The first framework conceptualises radicalisation as a "process". This framework has a consensus. The second framework, which is least researched, engages with the questions such as: to 'what' the radicalisation process leads to? The third views the phenomenon through the de-radicalisation framework. The fourth tries to measure the phenomenon through radicalisation measuring scales and tools. The fifth framework consists of theories of radicalisation, which theorises reasons for radicalisation. As this thesis (re)conceptualises the complex phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* and its central character through a novel framework, namely the Arendtian criteria of *ideology*, and concerns with all the five areas, therefore, in the succeeding paragraphs I group the radicalisation literature under the corresponding five headings.

1.2.1   Radicalisation as a "Process". On its own, "Radicalisation" is a term which is "ill-defined, complex and controversial" (Coolsaet, 2011: 240). Tinka Veldhuis et al. note that "a universally accepted definition of the concept [of radicalisation] is still to be developed" (Veldhuis et al.,2009:6). Some authors conclude that "the only thing that radicalisation experts agree on is that radicalisation is a 'process'. Beyond that, there is considerable variation, as to make existing research incomparable" (Nasser et al., 2011, 13). Derek M. D. Silva in his work entitled "Radicalisation: the journey of a concept revisited" observes that "over the past decade, radicalisation has emerged as perhaps the most pervasive framework for understanding micro-level transitions towards violence" (Silva, 2018:1). Further, "what is perceived, for instance, as 'radical'

in one situation, can be considered as 'normal' in another situation" (De Koning, 2015: 420). *Islamic radicalisation* is the term in vogue to link popularly terrorist violence to Muslim communities.[5]

Radicalisation is associated with transformation from one condition to another. Some researchers argue that radicalisation is a gradual process with distinguishable features and that the process is neither sudden nor easy (Horgan, 2005; Sibler and Bhatt, 2007). Therefore, a person may not become radicalised suddenly although an event (such as a personal loss, an experience of discrimination) can act as a "catalyst", and one can start perceiving reality differently. Some studies note that "it has often been assumed that radicalisation precedes recruitment, but there have also been cases where recruitment comes first and is followed by radicalisation" (Sageman, 2008: 72). Such statements indicate that the researchers studying radicalisation miss a stable criterion which can categorise a *character* as a radical. It is precisely due to a lack of theory-guided stable criteria that researchers such as Sageman do not realise that certain strands of radical thinking are already present in a society which may not be noted by an uncritical observer. This thesis argues that a radical *character* acquires the fundamental elements of the *ideological mindset* from the ideas prevalent in wider society. The terrorist (or ideological) organisations provide a platform to crystallise and synthesis the *ideological mindset*. It is, however, possible that the *character* (and the wider society) might be unaware of the ideological nature of the acquired ideas.

The radical *character* has not always been understood in pejorative terms. Historically, the term "radical" had periods of positive as well as negative usages. During the 18th century, the term meant a *character* who is more enlightened than others. During the 19th century, however, the term "radical" became linked with some extreme positions; it meant "supporting an extreme section of a party for social and political reforms" (Awan et al., 2011: 3). The term "radical" was as respectable, if not more, as "liberal" in England in the second half of the 19th century (Williams 1983; reprinted in Awan et

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[5] Other forms of radicalisations include ethno-nationalist anarchist, right-wing and left-wing radicalisation, but this study is only focusing on the Islamic radicalisation. This does not in any way reduce or downplay the role of non-Islamic and non-ideological radicalisations.

al., 2011: 131). Daniel Pisoiu states "it appears that for a significant period of time, radicalism was very much part of 'regular' political life (…) more often than not, radical movements militated for democracy and democratic principles rather than against them. Radical ideas referred, among others, to the progress and liberation of humankind, based on the principles of human rights and democracy" (Pisoiu 2011: 13-24). The usage of the term changed substantively within 100 years: in the time of a century; from a term reserved primarily for progressive, anti-religious, liberal and pro-democratic to "Islamic radical" thereby pointing to the opposite direction, e.g. An Islamic radical is considered to be someone who is anti-democratic, anti-liberal, fundamentalist, and with a regressive agenda.

Likewise, the phenomenon of radicalisation is also contextual in nature. "Radicalisation is a context-bound phenomenon par excellence. Global, sociological and political drivers matter as much as ideological and psychological ones" (European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008: 7). Mark Sedgwick quotes Peter Neumann, the Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) in London, for an interesting explanation as to how the notion of radicalisation was introduced to the current debate on *Islamic radicalisation*. Neumann states:

> Following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (…) it suddenly became very difficult to talk about 'the roots of terrorism' which some commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians (…) It was through the notion of radicalisation that a discussion (…) became possible again. (Neumann quoted by Sedgwick, 2010: 480).

The expert group working under Peter Neumann devised their own conceptualisation of the term. It defines radicalisation as "socialisation to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism" (Coolsaet, 2011: 269). It is an example of further complicating an already complicated term by using the terms extremism and terrorism. The definition replaces the term "process" with the term "socialisation". The academics, however, agree that "radicalisation" is a process (Porta et al., 2012:4). The following definitional

chart is an example to demonstrate that although academics struggle with the conceptualisation of the term "radicalisation", yet they agree that it is a "process".

• Taarnby (2005): "the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to Militant Islamist".

• Jensen (2006): "a process during which people gradually adopt views and ideas which might lead to the legitimisation of political violence".

• Ongering (2007): "process of personal development whereby an individual adopts ever more extreme political or politico-religious ideas and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods".

• Demant, Slootman, Buijs & Tillie (2008): "a process of de-legitimation, which decreases the confidence in the system and the individual retreats further and further into his or her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society".

• Ashour (2009): " a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, or to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals".

• Olesen (2009): "the process through which individuals and organisations adopt violent strategies – or threaten to do so – in order to achieve political goals".

• Githens-Mazer (2009): "a collectively defined, individually felt moral obligation to participate in 'direct action' (legal or illegal – as opposed to 'apathy')".

• Horgan & Bradock (2010): "the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious *ideology*".

• Kortweg, et al. (2010): "the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to the democratic structures and institutions".

• Mandel (2012): "an increase in and/or reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments, and/or behaviour of individuals and/or groups of individuals".

Awan, et al. (2011): "a phenomenon that has emerged in the early twenty-first century because the new media ecology enables patterns of connectivity that can be harnessed by individuals and groups for practices of persuasion, organisation and the enactment of violence. The very possibility of this happening but uncertainty about how it happens created a conceptual vacuum which 'radicalisation' filled".

• Sinai (2012): "Radicalisation is the process by which individuals – on their own or as part of a group – begin to be exposed to, and then accept extremist ideologies".

• Baehr (2013): "The concept radicalisation defines an individual process, which, influenced by external actors, causes a socialisation during which an internalisation and adoption of ideas and views take place which is supported and advanced in every form. [Armed] with these ideas and views, the persons [affected] strive to bring about a radical change of the social order. If the ideas and views represent an extremist *ideology*, they even seek to achieve their goals by means of terrorist violence. [What is] decisive is, that radicalisation presuppose a process of socialization, during which individuals adopt, over a shorter or longer period of time, political ideas and views which in their extremist form can lead to the legitimization of political violence".

Most of the definitions mentioned above acknowledge that radicalisation is a "process", which leads to violence. It is a phenomenon that is linked to political ideas in the mind of a person. The term is still evolving in its conceptualisation. Even some of the studies specifically commissioned to clarify the conceptualisation of the term came up with yet more complex definitions. For example, Alex P. Schmid's detailed study defines a "radical" person the one who is

> [a]dvocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to the radical. The means advocated to bring about the system-transforming radical solution for government and society can be non-violent and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (through coercion and revolution) (Schmid, 2011: 679-80).

Schmid's conceptualisation mentioned above presents the radical *character* as a political person who is involved in a struggle to change the status quo. It constructs the *character* as a political activist. This conception is not very helpful to understand the central and complex *character* of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* because Schmid borrows from scholars who conceptualise radicalisation as violent and non-violent (Midlarsky, 2011: 7; Schmid, 2011: 630). Such scholars categorise a violent *character* as an "extremist" and a nonviolent *character* as a "radical". Radicalism, to them, is more redeemable than extremism. In contrast, this study argues that in the context of *Islamic radicalisation*, violence is an essential element of the *mindset* of a radicalised *character*. Therefore, an apparently non-violent *ideologue* is biding his/her time and using other means (which appear non-violent) only as a strategy. At its core, ideological violence is parallel to any ideological aim(s). Ideological violence is still supposed to continue, albeit in a different form, even after attaining the stated aim(s) (see Chapter 7, 'Violence and the Call for Action').

A *character* conceived under the rubric of violent radicalisation, i.e. "extremism", is the *character* this study is investigating to conceptualise the elements of their thinking. The thesis hypothesises that the discursively constructed central *character* is an *ideologue* as the *character* exhibits all the five essential elements of the *ideological mindset*. Therefore, an *ideologue*, for this study, is a constructed *character* variously called Islamist, terrorist, extremist or radical in the wider discourse of *Islamic radicalisation*.

Another important study employs the term "master narratives" to understand the role of certain Islamic narratives and stories.[6] Jeffry R. Halverson et al. explain some of the themes and metaphors widely used in the Islamic discursive practices in their book entitled "Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism" (2011). In a similar language Mahood et al. have examined the ISIS propaganda literature. The article examines "the core narratives that characterise ISIS propaganda disseminated through its media productions" (Mahood, 2017:15). Halverson's work follows the same format as this thesis and allocates one chapter for a narrative. Accordingly, the book dedicates one chapter to each narrative, and these are: the Pharaoh; the Jahiliyyah; the battle of Badar;

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[6] Several other studies have also analysed Islamist propaganda literature to understand the thinking and behaviour of terrorists like Jorda, J., Torres, M.R., and Horsburgh, N., 2005. The intelligence services' struggle against Al-Qaeda propaganda. *International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence*, 18 (1), 31–49; Torres Soriano, M.R., 2010. The road to media Jihad: the propaganda actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. *Terrorism and political violence*, 23 (1), 72–88; Smith, M. and Walsh, J.I., 2013. Do drone strikes degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence from propaganda output. *Terrorism and political violence*, 25 (2), 311–327; Baines, P.R. and O'Shaughnessy, N.J., 2014. Al-Qaeda messaging evolution and positioning, 1998–2008: propaganda analysis revisited. *Public See See also Public relations inquiry*, 3 (2), 163–191; Baines, P.R. and O'Shaughnessy, N.J., 2014. Al-Qaeda messaging evolution and positioning, 1998–2008: propaganda analysis revisited. *Public relations inquiry*, 3 (2), 163–191. "These studies analyse Islamist organisations' political and propaganda literature to understand the construction of militant worldview. The studies conclude that the militant worldview is centred on death with a suggestion for a struggle to attain pious life that shall be rewarded in the hereafter." What's the reference for this quote? This is only one aspect of the constructed mindset of the Islamic radical. The mindset is more complex than simply having a death wish for a pious life of the hereafter. It has a whole web of political ideas that also have political aims that are central to the mindset.

The Hypocrites; the battle of Khyber; The battle of Karbala; the Mahdi; the infidel invader crusaders; Shaytan's Handiwork; the year 1924 (when the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished); Nakba (the catastrophe for Palestinians), and seventy-two virgins. This thesis, in its analysis, engages with some of the above mentioned "master narratives" such as infidel and invaders, as the Islamist organisations routinely use these narratives in their discursive practices. The overall understanding of the master narratives is in line with this study.

There are, however, two major differences between this thesis and Halverson's book. First, I analyse textual literature produced by the three Islamist organisations only and do not supplement it with the wider Islamic perspective, while the book does. This thesis is an endeavour to present the *character* constructed by the Islamist organisations in their discursive practice. I aim to present a map of ideas which are present in the thinking of the constructed *character* without any normative judgement. The inclusion of wider Islamic literature in the analysis shall call for a comparative analysis of the interpretations. Second, this study follows a theory-guided thematic analysis approach to isolate the ideas that resonate with the Arendtian articulations on *ideology*. Therefore, this thesis differs in epistemological positionality from Halverson et al. The analytical framework of this thesis, also, captures a much wider set of Islamic ideas and metaphors than Halverson. The book explains the meaning of Islamic terms and metaphors from a wider Islamic historical perspective, which may or may not be adopted by Islamist organisations. Nevertheless, both studies are complementary to each other and when read together help in enhancing our conceptual understanding of the complex phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*.

Acknowledging the complexity attached with the term radicalisation, Sedgwick cautions researchers and advises that "the best solution for researchers is probably to abandon the idea that 'radical' or 'radicalisation' are absolute concepts, to recognise the essentially relative nature of the term 'radical'. And to be careful always to specify both the continuum being referred to and the location of what is seen as 'moderate' on that continuum" (Sedgwick 2010: 491). This advice is accounted for in this study by

explicitly explaining the application of Arendtian theoretical framework and the five elements the ideological mind consists of.

1.2.2   To 'What' the Islamic Radicalisation "Process" Leads

If we agree, as the above mentioned broader consensus suggests, that radicalisation is a "process", the conceptualisation of the term remains incomplete until we clearly understand to 'what' this process leads to? It is the question that concerns this research the most; it is the area that is not well researched. My research argues that the "process" leads to a political character that has a distinct mode of thinking, which I call *ideological mindset*.

A limited number of researchers have studied the patterns of thinking of radicalised minds under different approaches (Pearlstein, 1991). What this study calls *ideological mindset* or radicalised minds in the context of *Islamic radicalisation*, others use alternative terms such as "militant-extremist *mindset*" (Saucier, 2009), "dogmatism" (Altemeyer, 1996) or "authoritative ideologue" (Rokeach, 1956). Another study that profiled suicide bombers in the Middle East argues that suicide bombers share personality traits with "authoritative personality" (Lester et al., 2003). Gerald Saucier headed a team of researchers to study the "Patterns of Thinking in Militant Extremism" (2009). The authors selected 13 militant groups from seven regions of the world and relied "as much as possible on explicit statements made by group members" (Saucier et al., 2009: 259). The study detected 16 themes that characterised extremist-militant thinking and concluded that "key themes in this thinking pattern might fit together to construct a potentially compelling narrative, which may be a key part of the ideological appeal of salient militant-extremist groups" (Saucier 2009:256). The study constructs a narrative informed by the 16 elements of the extremist *mindset* as follows:

> We have a glorious past, but modernity has been disastrous, bringing on a great catastrophe in which we are tragically obstructed from reaching our rightful place, obstructed by an illegitimate civil government and/or by an enemy so evil that it does not even deserve to be called human. This intolerable situation calls for vengeance. Extreme measures are required; indeed, any means will be justified for realizing our sacred

end. We must think in military terms to annihilate this evil and purify the world of it. It is a duty to kill the perpetrators of evil, and we cannot be blamed for carrying out this violence. Those who sacrifice themselves in our cause will attain glory, and supernatural powers should come to our aid in this struggle. In the end, we will bring our people to a new world that is a paradise (Saucier et al., 2009:265).

The above mentioned narrative is the type of narrative the Islamist organisations construct in their magazines. My analysis, in Part 2 of the thesis, detects the themes Islamists use to construct such a narrative. Saucier et al., however, constructed the narrative from the 16 themes their study detects in the extremist *mindset*. I detect 38 themes in the texts of the magazines, which construct an *ideological mindset*. I summarise the detected themes/ideas as "The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals" (MILIR). The MILIR includes the 16 themes used in the construction of the study's extremist *mindset*. The 16 themes detected by Saucier at el. are explained as follows.

1. The necessity of unconventional and extreme measures. The theme here is that one cannot work through the system; instead, one must resort to tactics that might seem unconventional and extreme.

2. Use of tactics that function to absolve one of responsibility for the bad consequences of the violence one is advocating or carrying out. Can be seen as a cognitive distortion.

3. Prominent mixtures of military terminology into areas of discourse where it is otherwise rarely found.

4. Perception that the ability of the group to reach its rightful position is being tragically obstructed.

5. Glorifying the past, in reference to one's group. If one's group is currently frustrated from reaching its potential (as in Theme 4), the present might provide too little evidence for the special importance of the group. The best claim for special importance might then be found in

a glorious past, and a theme that a "former golden age" of our people should be restored.

6. Utopianizing. There is frequently reference to concepts of a future paradise or at least 'the promise of a long and glorious future'.

7. Catastrophizing. There is a perception that great calamities either have occurred, are occurring, or will occur.

8. Anticipation of supernatural intervention: Miraculous powers attributed to one's side, miraculous events coming to help one's side, or commands coming from supernatural entities.

9. A felt imperative to annihilate (exterminate, crush, destroy) evil and/or purify the world entirely from evil.

10. The glorification of dying for the cause.

11. Duty and obligation to kill, or to make offensive war.

12. Machiavellianism in service of the "sacred." This theme involves the belief that those with the right (i.e., true) beliefs and values are entitled to use immoral ends if necessary, to assure the success of their cause.

13. An elevation of intolerance, vengeance, and war likeness into virtues (or nearly so), including, in some cases, the ascribing of such militant dispositions to supernatural entities.

14. Dehumanising or demonising of opponents.

15. The modern world as a disaster.

16. Civil government as illegitimate.

(Saucier et al., 2009: 259)

In many instances, however, Saucier et al. had to contend with secondary sources as they could not access primary material produced by some of the organisations due to

content restrictions placed on such material by the agencies as well as by the organisations themselves for different reasons. The study claims itself as exploratory research that aims at locating common themes in the thinking of 13 militant organisations spread across the world by employing the inductive method. This thesis, however, adopts a theory-guided thematic analysis approach to locate the themes and subthemes that *character*ise the *mindset* of a radicalised *character* and is focused only on the *Islamic radicalisation*. I analyse the Islamist organisations' textual constructs directly from their magazines, i.e. primary sources. Further, Saucier at el. do not anchor their findings in a substantial theory as my study links the map of ideas to the Arendtian theorisations on *ideology*. Nevertheless, both the studies are complementary to each other in an area which is less researched, namely the *mindset* of a radicalised *character*.

Saucier et al. are among the very few scholars that tried to conceptualise the *mindset* of a radical through the ideas/themes exhibited by such a *mindset*. Some studies, however, engage this important question but lack precision in identifying and presenting the map of ideas that is the distinct domain of the radicalised *character*; and which can satisfactorily answer the 'what' question. For example, the European Commission conceptualises *Islamic radicalisation* as "[t]he phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" (Veldhuis 2009: 6). The report, however, is silent as to 'what' are those opinions, views and ideas that the phenomenon helped the people to embrace. Certain other studies that prefer to discuss radicalisation under the rubric of political extremism and note some elements, which can be categorised as the elements of an extremist *mindset*. Manus I. Midlarsky, for example, identifies certain elements of political extremism. He conceptualises extremism as

> the **will to power** by a social movement in the service of a political program typically at variance with that supported by existing state authorities, and for which **individual liberties are to be curtailed** in the name of collective goals, including **the mass murder** of those who would **actually or potentially disagree** with that program. **Restrictions on individual freedom** in the interests of the collectivity

and the **willingness to kill massively** are central to this definition: these elements *character*ize all of the extremist groups considered here. This definition is consistent with others put forward by scholars of fascism [*bold mine-used to highlight central themes of the extremist thinking*] (Midlarsky, 2011: 7).

Midlarsky's conceptualisation overlaps with the Arendtian articulations of the *ideological mindset,* especially in the themes of the *objective enemy*, call for action and violence, and curtailment of freedom (See Chapter 2). Midlarsky's approach, however, does not grasp the full extent of elements of the *ideological mindset* as theorised by Arendt. Schmid, working for "The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague" (2011), extracted five elements of an extremist *mindset*. Schmid prefers to use the term "extremist" for the radical *character*. Schmid extracted the five elements from three studies, namely, "Glossary and Abbreviations of Terms and Concepts relating to Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism" (2011), "Origins of Political extremism" (2011) and "Extremismus. Theorien – Konzepte – Formen (2012). Schmid argues that the "process" (of radicalisation) leads to an extremist *mindset* that exhibits the following five elements.

- Use of force/violence over persuasion.
- Uniformity over diversity.
- Collective goals over individual freedom.
- Giving orders over dialogue.
- Strong emphasis on *ideology.*

Schmid separates the first four elements from *ideology,* whereas in the Arendtian theorisation, the first four elements are part of the *ideological mindset*. As such the *ideological mindset* (see Chapter 2) as argued by Arendt, includes all the themes mentioned in Schmid's listing.

As governments are one of the interest groups in the *Islamic radicalisation* debate, I analyse salient governmental conceptualisations of the phenomenon. As this thesis focuses on the elements of a radical *mindset*, to understand 'what' the radicalisation

"process" produces, I highlight some parts of the text which can be assumed as referring to an element.

1. **Danish**: a process, by which a person to an increasing extent **accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism**, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective (Danish Intelligence Service [PET], 2009).

2. **Netherland**: 'The (active) **pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes** in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve **the use of undemocratic methods (means)** that may **harm the functioning of the democratic legal order** (effect)' (Dutch Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, 2004).

3. **US**: 'The process of adopting **an extremist belief system**, including the **willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence**, as a method to effect social change' (Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 2007).

4. **Sweden**: Radicalisation can be both: a process that leads to **ideological or religious activism** to introduce radical change to society' and a 'process that leads to an individual or group using, **promoting or advocating violence** for political aims (Swedish Security Service, 2009).

<div align="right">(Adopted from ICCT Report 2013:12)</div>

Collectively, there are four elements of a radicalised *mindset* in these governmental conceptualisations. These are violence; support for far-reaching changes; an extremist belief system and ideological or religious activism. It should be kept in mind that these four elements are gleaned from separate conceptualisations of different governments and as such do not represent the understanding of any one government. All four of these conceptualisations emphasise the centrality of violence in the radicalised *character*'s *mindset*. Violence is indeed central to the Arendtian *ideological mindset* as well, but the Arendtian *ideological mindset* does not start and end with violence only

as the governmental conceptualisations suggest, but ideological violence has a particular context. This context can be understood once all the five Arendtian elements of an ideological mind are studied together.

Another significant study conducted at Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, focuses on the *functions* of *ideology*. The research (Tretheway et al., 2011) identifies four elements of an ideologically inspired *mindset*, namely naturalising, obscuring, universalising and structuring. The research articulates the following four influences of *ideology* on the *mindset* of a *character*.

> • **Naturalising**: [The *ideological mindset* turns] socially constructed, politically motivated, and fluid ideas into taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs, and meanings. Doing so makes them seem fixed, objective, and 'naturally occurring'.
>
> • **Obscuring**: is denying or hiding contradictions in ongoing systems of meaning, making them seem to be seamless, coherent, and unified worldviews.
>
> • **Universalising**: means presenting the interests or concerns of those in power as the interests of all group members.
>
> • **Structuring**: involves creating rules and resources in a social system that preserves an *ideology*. (Tretheway et al., 2011)

The study, however, refrains from delving deeper into the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*. It consults limited textual material that is produced by only one organisation, namely IS. While some of the identified elements resonate with the Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset*, the study omits certain elements and themes such as the nature of violence and enemy, which are the distinguishing features of an *ideology* inspired radicalisation. The five Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset* are more precise and engage much wider aspects of an *ideology* inspired *character*'s *mindset*. All the five Arendtian elements are integrated into each other and collectively weave the intellectual fabric in the mind of the *character* that perpetrates a particular type of violence within a particular context. The thesis, therefore, adopts

the following conceptualisation of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*, that I will explain in more detail in the following chapters.

> *Radicalisation is the "process" of acquisition of all the five Arendtian elements of ideological mindset, i.e., the superhuman source as the origin of thinking; the claim to global domination; violence and the call for action; objective enemy and rejection of factual reality.*

This conceptualisation fills in the gaps identified in the reviewed literature in this section, and is a contribution to the literature on *Islamic radicalisation*, as the literature misses the answer to the question, namely, 'what' the radicalised *character* consists of? A lack of clarity as to 'what' the radicalised *character* consists of has significant policy implications. For example, a study analysing PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism—a UK Government counter-radicalisation strategy) noted that,

> [T]he central theoretical flaw in PVE is that it accepts the premise that non-violent extremists can be made to act as bulwarks against violent extremists. Non-violent extremists have consequently become well dug in as partners of national and local government and the police. **Some of the government's chosen collaborators in 'addressing grievances' of angry young Muslims are themselves at the forefront of stoking those grievances against British foreign policy; western social values; and alleged state-sanctioned 'Islamophobia'. PVE is thus underwriting the very Islamist *ideology* which spawns an illiberal, intolerant and anti-western world view.** Political and theological extremists, acting with authority conferred by official recognition, and indoctrinating young people with an *ideology* of hostility to western values [bold mine] (Vidino et al., 2010).

A reconceptualisation of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* shall help provide important ideas for the development of de-radicalisation policies. The conceptualisation of de-radicalisation is not independent of the conceptualisation radicalisation. Therefore, in the next section, I engage with the literature that

conceptualises de-radicalisation. The UK De-radicalisation Policy may positively benefit from the outcome of this research.

1.2.3 De-Radicalisation

A confused conception of the radicalisation "process" is likely to affect the de-radicalisation policies as well. In other words, successful de-radicalisation is linked to a clear understanding of 'what' the *Islamic radicalisation* consists of, e.g. a clear map of ideas that constitute the *mindset* of the radicalised *character*. Therefore, a debate of de-radicalisation shall inevitably involve an identification of the elements of the *mindset* which has radicalised the *character*. Therefore, studies discussing de-radicalisation are generally conscious of this fact and try to identify the aspects of the radicalised *mindset* before conceptualising de-radicalisation. A RAND study follows this pattern.

> Islamist radicalisation involves adopting the belief that, to recreate an Islamic state, Muslims must not only adhere to a strict Salafist or ultraconservative interpretation of Islam but also wage Jihad, defined as armed struggle against the enemies of Islam, including non-Muslim nations (especially the United States) and the current rulers of Muslim states who have supplanted God's authority with their own'. Islamist de-radicalisation is therefore defined as the process of rejecting this creed, especially its beliefs in the permissibility of using violence against civilians, the ex-communication of Muslims who do not adhere to the radicals' views (takfir), and opposition to democracy and concepts of civil liberties as currently understood in democratic societies (Vidino, 2011: 9)

Lorenzo Vidino's conception does engage with some of the themes discussed under the Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset* (see Chapter 2). His conceptualisation of the elements of a radicalised *mindset* is, however, very sketchy and limited in its scope. The study, however, suitably defines de-radicalisation as the reversal of the

ideas acquired during the radicalisation process. John Horgan et al. acknowledge that "de-radicalisation includes any effort to change or re-direct views that are supportive of – and thereby, the assumption goes, conducive to – violent action" (Horgan et al., 2012: 86). Omar Ashour, in his work, links the "process" of radicalisation with de-radicalisation in the following manner.

> Radicalisation is a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations(…)De-radicalisation is another process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its *ideology* and de-legitimises the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context (Ashour, 2009: 56).

The researchers, therefore, generally agree that de-radicalisation is a "process" of (again) engaging with the elements of the radicalised *mindset* (*ideological mindset*) and intending to reverse the process. Importantly, the clear map consisting of the elements of the radical *mindset* is central to both "processes": "process" of radicalisation and "process" of de-radicalisation. This thesis, therefore, adopts the following conceptualisation to conceptualise the phenomenon of (de)radicalisation.

> *Islamic radicalisation is a "process" of the acquisition of the Arendtian elements of ideological mindset. De-radicalisation is a "process" of distancing from the elements of the ideological mindset.*

In the understanding of *Islamic radicalisation*, the five elements of Arendtian *ideological mindset* are central to the approach of this thesis. The study argues that the five elements and the attendant sub-themes collectively present a stable criterion to categorise a *mindset* as radical or *ideological mindset*. A *character* with all the elements of the *ideological mindset* in his/her intellectual fabric is the political person that the "process" of *Islamic radicalisation* leads to. Some researchers, as discussed below, name the criteria that can categorise a radical person as radicalisation measuring tools or scales. In the following paragraphs, I shall review the literature that name the elements of radical *mindset* as scales measuring *Islamic radicalisation*.

1.2.4   Scales Measuring Islamic radicalisation

The scales that measure *Islamic radicalisation* list the elements of radical *mindset*. Two such widely used instruments, namely, Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale and the Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA) are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1.2.4.1 *The Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale*

The scale is designed to measure religious fundamentalism. It measures attitudes towards one's religious beliefs through 12 elements of a religiously-motivated fundamentalist thinking. The revised scale cuts down the elements to 12 from the original 22 elements. The scale is not exclusive to *Islamic radicalisation* but can capture elements of fundamentalism of any faith (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004). Both the scales, i.e. original and revised, are attached in Annexes A & B.

The original scale tested the presence of fundamentalism in Roman Catholics in the USA as well as Muslims living in Canada and Ghana with promising results. Both scales rely on statistical tools for the assessment. There was, however, a methodological weakness in the revised scale as it was developed from a very narrow range of participants, comprising undergraduates of two USA Universities and their parents; hence, it did not represent the broader population. Additionally, the scales only measure religious fundamentalism, which means it cannot assess the *ideological mindsets* adequately. Although in many instances, the Islamic *radicals* identify themselves as religious persons, the *ideological mindset* moves beyond the religious fundamentalism. Particularly, my analysis reveals that the elements of compassion, forgiveness and individual accountability, which are propagated by religions, are completely missing from the *ideological mindset*. Additionally, such *a mindset* does not draw a line between politics and religion but thinks that politics is the operationalisation of the religion. Therefore, religious fundamentalism scales do not capture the ideas related to violence, which is the distinguishing feature of

contemporary *Islamic radicalisation*. Further improvement is required to apply the scales to read the *mindset* of the radicalised *character*.

1.2.4.2 *The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA)*

D. Elaine Pressman developed a specialised risk assessment tool, VERA, to measure the risk of "violent political extremism" (Pressman, 20019: 21-26). VERA captures the disposition of a radicalised mind concerning violence. It specifically focuses on the targets, group affiliations and origins of violent action. It estimates the ideological, political or religious origins of violence. In this sense, it describes the elements of a *mindset* that has been radicalised by the (radicalisation) "process". Pressman, furthermore, claims that VERA can also assess a set of the population that is nearing the completion of the radicalisation "process". He, however, advises that the scale is still in the process of development and should be considered as a "conceptual tool for research purposes" (Pressman, 2009: 21-26). A practitioner needs some level of training before applying VERA as it involves judgements. An understanding of the radicalisation process is a prerequisite as the tool does not give a score but acts as a "structured professional judgment tool" (Pressman, 2009: 25).

The scale consists of 28 elements drawn from five risk factors. Each factor is assessed as high, medium or low risk, and the scale produces a "judgement score". Pressman presents a detailed explanation of each risk factor along with its justification and a narrative for the twenty-eight risk factor themes (Pressman, 2009: 35-39 in Christmann, 2012: 36). Pressman draws from previous professional judgement tools that assess the risk of violence in adults and adolescence such as SAVRY (Borum et al., 2006, Pressman, 2009: 31) and HCR-20 version 2 (Webster et al., 1997 in Pressman, 2009: 31). Pressman's 28 elements of the violent extremist risk assessment scale are as follows:

> **Attitude items:** 1. Attachment to *ideology* justifying violence; 2. Perception of injustice and grievances; 3. Identification of target of injustice; 4. Dehumanisation of identified target; 5. Internalised martyrdom to die for cause; 6. Rejection of society and values/alienation; 7. Hate, frustration, persecution; 8. Need for group

bonding and belonging; 9. Identity problems;10. Empathy for those outside own group.

Contextual items: 1. User of extremist websites; 2. Community support for violent action; 3. Direct contact with violent extremists; 4. Anger at political decisions, actions of a country.

Historical items: 1. Early exposure to violence in home; 2. Family/friends involvement in violent action; 3. Prior criminal violence; 4. State-sponsored military, paramilitary training; 5. Travel for non-state sponsored training/fighting; 6. Glorification of violent action.

Protective items: 1. Shift in ideology; 2. Rejection of violence to obtain goals; 3. Change of vision of enemy; 4. Constructive political involvement; 5. Significant other/community support.

Demographic items: 1. Sex; 2. Married; 3. Age.

Fundamentally, Pressman's 10 items described under the heading of attitude items are the elements of radicalised *mindset;* the rest of the 18 elements explain the personal circumstances of the radicalised *character* (4 for context, 6 for the previous history, 5 for mitigating circumstances and 3 for gender, age and marriage [either mitigating or aggravating circumstances]). The Arendtian theorisation on *ideology* covers all the ten items of Pressman's extremist *mindset*. Pressman acknowledges that his scale is a generalised scale with inputs from previous scales based on psychological constructs. As such it is not designed specifically for *Islamic radicalisation;* it further misses, therefore, misses some very pertinent elements of the *mindset* of the *character* of *Islamic radicalisation,* namely; the claimed source of thinking, the understanding of the nature of enemy, the nature of violence, the nature of the claim to global domination and the understanding of factual reality. The research investigating *Islamic radicalisation* needs a map of ideas that help in assessing the radicalised *character's mindset* in political constructs. This thesis constructs such a conceptual scale, which is constructed from Islamist organisations' political literature as the primary source.

Milton Rokeach constructs another conceptual scale to measure dogmatism. Rokeach defines dogmatism as a *character*isation of one's belief systems. He claims that the scale is independent of ideological bias towards left or right. The elements of the scale are supposed to capture a dogmatic or closed *mindset*. Rokeach identifies 5 elements of the dogmatic *mindset*. This *mindset* tends "to accentuate the differences between his beliefs and the belief systems that he rejects; to regard man as isolated and helpless and the future uncertain; to be concerned with power and status; to be, as a "true believer," intolerant of renegades and disbelievers; to discount the present for a utopian view of the past or future" (Rokeach, 1960: 203). The explanations of Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset* include Rokeach's elements of a dogmatic *mindset*.

The purpose of reviewing the literature on the scales that are used to measure a radicalised *mindset* is to familiarise the reader with the fact that other scholars have also engaged with the elements of radicalised *mindsets*. Their constructed scales capture the elements of the ideal types of a religious fundamentalist, extremist or dogmatic *mindset* of a *character*. As I shall also present "the Map of Ideas linked to *Islamic radicalisation*" (MILIR) as a summary of my analysis of the textual literature produced by the Islamist organisations, it was necessary to situate this aspect of my research in the available literature. My MILIR shall be constructed on the lines of VERA. MILIR has the advantage of being informed by a substantial theoretical framework, which is missing in all the above mentioned instruments used to categorise a radicalised *mindset*. More specifically, MILIR incorporates most of the ideas/themes that are included in the above mentioned instruments. *MILIR, therefore, is not novel in its form but novel in its theoretical foundations and the empirical material it is constructed from.*

As this thesis shall also add the Arendtian theoretical framework to theories of radicalisation. It is, therefore, pertinent to review the existing literature on theories of radicalisation. The literature reviewed under the topic of (re)conceptualisation of radicalisation flows from theories of radicalisation. Fundamentally, it is the theories of radicalisation that inform all debate on the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*.

1.2.5   Theories of Radicalisation

Drawing on political, social and psychological research, scholars have tried to understand and theorise the *Islamic radicalisation* (Christmann, 2012; Abbas, 2007b; Fraihi, 2008; Coolset, 2009; Al-Lami, 2009; Mosaddeq, 2009; Pratchett et al., 2010, McCauley et al., 2011). Recent research tends to agree that *Islamic radicalisation* is a complex phenomenon and involves multiple factors (Pressman, 2012; Kundnani, 2015). The researchers articulate the following ten theories to explain *Islamic radicalisation*. These include: biological theories (Bakker, 2006; Wadgy, 2007; Silk, 2008); psychological theories (Ardila, 2002; Arena, et al., 2005); Muslim identity (Thomas, 2008); societal theories (Andrews, 2008); relative deprivation and poor Integration (Runciman, 1966; Gurr, 1970; Home Office, 2004; New York City Police Department (NYPD), 2007; Jenkins, 2007); the role of segregation and enclavisation (Mahmood, 2004; The Institute of Community Cohesion (iCoCo), 2007; Vardy, 2008; Macey, 2008); political explanations (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Moghaddam, 2007; NYPD, 2007; Sanghera et al., 2007; Gill, 2007, 2008; Sageman, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008); the role of social bonds and networks (Sageman, 2004, 2008; Hamid, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Bartlett et al., 2010; Bjørgo, 2005) and the role of religion and *ideology* in the radicalisation process (Altmeyer et al., 2003, 2004; Bell, 2005a; Habeck, 2006; Ansari et al., 2006; Bukay, 2006; Awan, 2007a; Sageman, 2005 in Wadgy, 2007). In the following paragraphs, I shall review each theory.

1.2.5.1 Biological Theories

Biological theories suggest that human biology plays a major part in the radicalisation of minds. Such theories argue that people involved in violence in the west are male, young, and generally aged between 16 to 27 years of age (Bakker, 2006; Wadgy, 2007). These findings have "strong parallels with much mainstream criminological research, which suggest that higher levels of impulsivity, confidence, risk-taking and status need play a partial role in the attraction that violent extremism holds for a few" (Christmann, 2012: 23). Further, personal inclinations towards vengeful retaliation and approval of vengeance are also important (Silk, 2008).

More research is needed to assess the role of females in *Islamic radicalisation*. Presently, their role appears to have confined to mainly supportive roles. Their role,

what the western media labels as "Jihadi Brides", has also surfaced. Lately, the research has noticed a qualitative intensity in their role in the Muslim linked violence (General Intelligence and Security Service of Holland [AIVD], 2006). Biological theories fail to explain that almost all the top leaders of Islamist organisations are well into their forties and fifties. Additionally, many Islamic radicals do not have any history of youth crimes.

1.2.5.2 Psychological Theories

The research in this field has mostly focused on the individual level explanations for terrorism but is silent on the nonviolent radicalisation. Psychological theories capture distinguishing psychological features of radicals that differentiate them from others. The main focus is on discovering a "terrorist personality". The central explanations of psychological theories link pathology (psychological illness, suppressed sexuality or other psychological traits) with radicalisation for violence. However, such explanations have largely been rejected as the radicalised *character* is notable for their ordinariness. Arendt also notes the ordinariness of such a *character* in her "Banality of Evil" (Arendt, 1963). This thesis is also an attempt to offer an alternative to the argument about the psychological theories of *Islamic radicalisation*. I argue that the *character* is radicalised not because of his/her mental illness but because of exposure to an *ideology*. An *ideology* mediating mind develops a particular type of *mindset* which Arendt calls ideological.

1.2.5.3 Muslim Identity

Young Muslim people, in search of their own personnel identity, engage in an exercise to define their relationship with the world, their peer group and heritage. Such radicalisation may or may not lead to violent radicalisation. The theory argues that some young Muslims, however, fail to resolve the contradictions between the outside world and their assumed "Muslim identity", leading to "identity crises" or "identity confusion". The *character* in this situation feels that they do not belong to a wider society. Such feelings are aggravated by adverse experiences or perceptions of discrimination, segregations, blocked mobility and a lack of trust in the political system. The moments of crises can guide the *character* to search for ontological

security, accentuating one's propensity to radicalising influences such as violence or structured religious rituals. Some empirical research exploring conflicts in Britishness and Muslim identity such as Paul Thomas' (2008) reject this assertion and show that most of the young Muslims in Yorkshire do not think that there is an inherent contradiction in the construct of Muslimness and Britishness. I agree that such a construct is too simplistic.

1.2.5.4 Societal Theories

Societal theories are the most cited explanations of *Islamic radicalisation*. These theories typically identify failed integration, influences of discrimination, and perceptions and experiences of segregation as the causes of *Islamic radicalisation*.

1.2.5.4.1 *The role of poor integration and deprivation*

It is possible to experience relative deprivation at an individual as well as at the community level. It is an awareness of one's relative position concerning other individuals or groups. A perception that the difference is meaningful and unjust can lead to a feeling of relative deprivation. People acquire it in several ways, such as when fortunes of an in-group have declined relative to an out-group (Gurr, 1970, in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008b). Perception of relative deprivation may act as a cause to radicalise (The Institute of Community Cohesion (iCOCO), 2007). The reason for linking relative deprivation as a cause to *Islamic radicalisation* is the data which repeatedly show that Muslim communities suffer from relative deprivation in the UK. The Muslim awareness of this inequality is the basis of resentment and resistance. However, the data does not support this claim once closely analysed. Daniela Pisoiu (2007) argues that the relative deprivation hypothesis draws its credibility from a comparison of data at the national level, where Muslims are compared with non-Muslims. The results, however, change radically once the data is compared at local levels. It reveals that generally, Muslims are more likely to concentrate in the areas that have high unemployment rates for all populations. Pisoiu asserts that the argument of relative deprivation is further diluted as "studies on the education levels and overall performance of British born Muslims have actually shown better results than the

national average." (Pisoiu, 2007:8). Additionally, the available integration data in Europe is not very reliable (Pisoiu, 2007: 8).

Another common explanation cited as a cause for *Islamic radicalisation* is the failure of the second and third generation of Muslims in integration into wider European societies (Jenkins, 2007; NYPD, 2007; Home Office, 2004; Netherlands Ministry of Justice, 2004). Some biographical data of the violent radicals, however, does support the "failed integration hypothesis" (Dornhof, 2009; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Alonso and Reinares, 2006;). Some Jihadist biographies do sight identity crises and failed integration as the reasons for radicalisation, but many biographies do not sight such a reason. Insufficiently supported correlation may not be considered as proof of a valid reason (Pisiou, 2007:13).

Some ethnographic studies (Wiktorowicz, 2004), however, do avail some data which suggests that the experiences of discrimination, relative deprivation and hostility can play some facilitative role in radicalisation. There is evidence which suggests that intense feelings about the experiences of discrimination, blocked mobility and hostility can trigger a "cognitive opening" for a change in identity formation. One can change previous belief systems and adopt new ones which may be radical. The new identity formation may lead the *character* to a new group which may be extreme or violent in its thinking. These findings, however, cannot be generalised as methodologically, Quintan Wiktorowicz's research is at a very small level and uses a sample which is non-random (Christmann, 2012: 26). The societal theories citing the role of failed integration and relative deprivation in radicalisation are quite frequent and hard to settle, yet, these can be considered, at best, as "the cause of the causes" in the "process" of radicalisation, which is not an essential one. I argue that the societal conditions linked to Muslim communities in the West are shared by other (non-Muslim) migrant communities as well, yet none of their members is involved in this particular type of radicalisation. Even this type of radicalisation is comparatively less frequent in the members of Muslim communities that migrated from India. India, with 201 million Muslims (2018 estimate), houses the world's largest minority Muslim population in the world. Societal theories, as testified by the governmental studies cited

in the introduction, may contribute towards enabling environments for *Islamic radicalisation* to some extent.

1.2.5.4.2 *The role of enclavisation and Segregation*

Enclavisation is the result of different groupings living separately from each other; clustered and segregated, they lead "parallel lives" (Cantle, 2001). Some suggest that enclavisation "only play a limited role" (Vardy, 2008: 6) in the radicalisation of the *character*, others suggest that more than enclavisation, self-segregation in residential spaces play greater role in the "process" of *Islamic radicalisation* (Macey, 2008; iCoCo, 2007; Mahood, 2006). Many other communities also suffer equally from enclavisation and segregation in the UK, but they do not radicalise for violence.

1.2.5.4.3 *Political explanations*

Several explanations of *Islamic radicalisation* link socio-psychological conditions to the "process" of radicalisation. These conditions emphasise a relationship between the radicalised *character* and discontent, which may be generated by certain emotions such as grievances, frustration or humiliation. In one sense, grievances and discontentment can push a *character* to violent radicalisation. The grievances can have a powerful effect on one's thinking and maybe a by-product of political, cultural and socio-economic conditions.

A range of data and surveys support the assertion that Muslim populations in Europe feel aggrieved by western policy towards certain Islamic countries. A perception of humiliation is prevalent in Muslim minds (Christmann, 2012: 26). Therefore, there are political reasons which may be linked to radicalisation.

Nevertheless, despite their importance, political explanations alone are insufficient to answer one of the most defining questions of *Islamic radicalisation* debate, namely as to why some individuals from the same communities become violent while others do not? (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008: 5; Sageman, 2008: 21; Moghaddam, 2007; NYPD, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004: 4). Dalgaard-Nielsen and other scholars argue that a

progression from non-violent to violent radicalisation requires something more than psychological anxieties and grievances. Others suggest that some form of crisis acts as a catalyst for joining the violent social networks (Gill, 2007: 144, 2008: 416; Sageman, 2004, 2008; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Such arguments suggest a closer look at the role of social networks and bonds.

1.2.5.4.4 *The role of social networks and bonds*

Within societal theories of radicalisation, the role of social networks and bonds is one of the most cited reasons of *Islamic radicalisation*. Such theorists consider participation in the radicalisation "process" as a group phenomenon. "Several mechanisms such as group socialisation, group bonding, group polarisation and isolation, and peer pressure can transmit and intensify indoctrination and moral disengagement, possibly leading to entry into violent extremism" (Christmann, 2012: 27). Researchers argue that social movement and network theory, framing theory and resource mobilisation theory explain how potential recruits are recruited through the exploitation of political opportunities (Hamid, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2004, 2008). These theories explain how normal activists move into violent extremism through the motivation created by inter-subjective and social processes (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008/2: 7). The process involves mobilising agents, who reach out to a grievance sharing "sentimental pool" and "re-frame" issues as blatant injustices with, thus, constructing a moral justification for violence against the framed enemy (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

However, these studies do not answer this counter-question: can social groups and bonds turn anyone into a violent radical? Some studies argue that would be radicals are "pushed" into a group because of "their pre-existing cognitive or affective attributes" (Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2008: 22). The role of social bonds are important in the recruitment processes but "questions remain about the developmental process leading to the acquisition of these 'pre-existing' attributes, or to the selection process, by which some individuals come into contact with environments (settings) conducive to moral change and the acquisition of new moral habits"(Bouhana and Wikstrom, 2008: 22).

I assert that the "pre-existing cognitive or affective attributes" are the elements of *ideological mindset*, which are prevalent in Muslim communities but in scattered and mostly unarticulated form; the Islamist organisations use social networks and bonds to synthesise the elements of pre-existing attributes into a cohesive set of mutually supporting ideas that resonate with the subjective emotions of young Muslims. Inducements or motivations such as a sense of belonging, vengeance, self-esteem, sense of risk, danger, excitement and being part of Ummah are the consequences of group dynamics (Demos 2008a, 2008b; Crenshaw, 2003; Silke, 2008: 117). Group pressures play an important role in the acceptance of radicalising ideas. "Radicalisation depends on how far one's peers accept such ideas and the extent to which they are seen as worthy of imitation" (Demos, 2010b: 31). This thesis focuses on the nature of "radicalising ideas" and argues that these ideas are ideological in nature and are present in scattered social pockets in a Muslim society. The Islamist organisations provide a platform to organise these scattered ideas into a logical thinking Arendt calls *ideological mindset*. In the case of *Islamic radicalisation*, Islamist organisations use Islamic historical terms and metaphors to construct the thinking of the *character* in their discursive practice. That is one of the reasons that, instead of calling it ideological radicalisation, some theories call it religious radicalisation.

1.2.5.5 The Role of Religious Ideology in Islamic Radicalisation

Even though most of the studies point out that Islamic *ideology* is at play in the radicalisation of Muslim people, yet oddly enough, "it is the area, which is comparatively less researched" (Pressman, 2012, 29; Blaydes et al., 2008). Some researchers theorise that the central *character* of *Islamic radicalisation* "draws authority from a particular interpretation of Islam" (Christmann, 2012: 28). Awan noted increased religiosity in *character* before violent radicalisation (Awan, 2007a). Others, also, cite religious beliefs as "the principal motivating factor" for involvement in the violence (Sageman, 2005 in Wadgy, 2007; Bell, 2005a; Ibrahim, 1988). These facts place religious Islam at the centre of *Islamic radicalisation*. This thesis, however, differentiates between the religion of Islam and (Islamist) *ideology*. The discursive practices present the *character* as a Muslim, but the explanations that feed into the

character are ideological. The studies linking *Islamic radicalisation* to *ideology* have not focused fully on the *mindset* developed by *ideology*. Without contesting the claims that equate religion with *ideology*, I assert that it is the patterns of thinking of the radicalised *character*, which when studied retrospectively, can point to the fact whether the structural concept is religion or *ideology*. The elements of *mindset* developed by *ideology* are different from the elements developed by a religion.

The existing research linking religion or *ideology* with *Islamic radicalisation* suffers from two aspects. One, empirical studies in this area are significantly rare. Two, the research is struggling to agree to a stable set of criteria that can help to differentiate between mainstream Muslims and the *character* that is radicalised for violence.

Ansari's study is one such exception that has made an attempt to empirically show that "respondents who felt their primary identity was Muslim held more positive views towards Jihad and martyrdom, terrorism, violence, suicide, Jihad and the 9/11 attacks, whereas respondents with a dominant British identity did not" (Ansari et al., 2006, in Silke, 2008). The study is important because of empirical evidence yet, methodologically, it suffers from a smaller sample size. Others also found a link between religiosity and prejudice (Allport and Ross, 1967, in Altmeyer, 2003). Altmeyer concluded that "religious fundamentalists tended to have a very small 'us' and quite a large 'them'" (Altmeyer, 2003:17). There are, however, studies that put up the counterarguments. For example, Ghulam Abbas and Githens et al. argue that majority of Muslims are not radicals and think that radicals misuse religious terms for politically motivated violence (Abbas, 2007; Abbas, 2007a; Gothens et al., 2008).

The purpose of reviewing the literature in the five sections mentioned above is to bring home the point that the conception of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* suffers from a kind of compartmentalisation in the research. The research in one area is not sufficiently communicating with the research in other areas. For example, the scales of measuring radicalisation do not link the instruments with the theories of radicalisation; and theories of radicalisation do not present stable criteria to categorise a *character* as a radical. One of the reasons for such a flaw can be linked to the methodology adopted by the research. Generally, the studies researching *Islamic radicalisation*, whether in

the areas of radicalisation measuring instruments or theorisations, rely on the individual stories of the violent radicals. The individual stories narrate individualised and subjective conditions of a radical. I appreciate the efforts of the researchers to find patterns of behaviours in the selected samples. However, such efforts are likely to miss some areas which are part of an ideal type *character's mindset*. Additionally, there is an element of subjective judgment involved in the understanding of a condition by a narrator.

Islamic radicalisation research lacks a study that links all the areas mentioned above, namely, conceptualisation (to 'what' the process leads to); de-radicalisation and the radicalisation measuring scales with a substantial theory. The Arendtian theorisations of the *ideological mindset* are not only linked to the past ideologues but also connects all the reviewed areas of *Islamic radicalisation*. It also has the potential to link theory with policy, as I construct MILIR by applying the theory to the empirical material.

1.3   Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is structured in two parts. Part I forms the theoretical framework and part two applies the theory to the source material. Chapter 2 of Part I discusses the theoretical foundations of the thesis. I explain my rationale for selecting Hannah Arendt for understanding *Islamic radicalisation* in section 2.2.

Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 explains Arendt's articulations on the phenomenon of totalitarianism. I assume that the three Islamist organisations, namely Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT) are totalitarian movements as per the criteria of Hannah Arendt. For Arendt, totalitarianism has three central concepts: firstly, it is a radically original and unprecedented development; secondly, it is formless and thirdly; it combines *ideology* and terror. Arendt argues that totalitarianism replaces all previous political understandings of the "principals of action" of regimes such as virtue, honour and fear. In totalitarianism, *ideology* becomes the "principle of action" as well as the "essence" of a regime. Totalitarian movements do not differentiate between the "principle of action" and the "essence" of a government; it is *ideology*-inspired terror in both cases. The unprecedented "principle" that totalitarian

movements introduce is less of a principle and more a "substitute of a principle; it is the '*ideology*'" (Arendt, 1958: 468).

In section 2.4, I explain Arendt's understanding of *Ideology*. Arendt explains *ideology* as a restraint of the mind, an intellectual constraint that impedes the process of thinking. It is a kind of "super sense" or a "superstition" which claims to have resolved "the riddles of the universe" (Arendt, 1958: 468-469). All ideologies have totalitarian elements in them, but "the real nature of all ideologies was revealed only in the role the *ideology* plays in the apparatus of totalitarian dominations" (Arendt, 1958: 470). I argue that the three terrorist movements, namely AQ, IS and TT operationalises "the real nature of the *ideology*" and construct a *character* in their discursive practices that exhibits all the elements of the *ideological mindset*.

Section 2.5 engages with the Arendtian notion of thinking. Thinking, argues Arendt, is a dialogue with self; which can be imaginary or real. The faculty of thinking helps humans to have an internal dialogue. *Ideology* replaces me from myself and stifles the internal dialogue. An *ideology* dominated *mindset* stops thinking and draws *ideology* compliant conclusions from the factual reality. Arendt also differentiates between, solitude, isolation and loneliness. In loneliness, a *mindset* draws the worst conclusions.

In the rest of the chapter, I deduce the five essential elements of the *ideological mindset* from Arendt. These elements are: the superhuman source as the origin of thought; the claim to global domination; Violence and the call for action; the *objective enemy* and rejection of factual reality. I allocate one part to each element and follow Arendt in linking *ideological mindset* with the past *ideologues,* namely the Communist and Nazi *ideologue*.

In Chapter 3, I follow Hans Joerg Sigwart to conceptualise the method of inquiry "characterology". Sigwart develops the method from Arendt. The "characterological" approach signifies three aspects of a phenomenon. Firstly, it supports the idea that a dynamic, mutually constitutive and reciprocal relationship exists between the action of a *character* type and the abstract concept. Secondly, it interprets incidents and narratives to construct a representative type. Thirdly, it allows detection of the elements which are employed to construct the *character* type. I select the online magazines

produced by three organisations (AQ, IS and TT) as empirical evidence to understand the characteristics of the *mindset* of the central *character* constructed by these organisations. I employ a thematic analysis technique to analyse the exemplary texts. In the analysis, I note the differences and similarities between the textual constructs of the three Islamist organisations.

Part II of the thesis conducts a theory-guided analysis of my source material and consists of five chapters. I compare the texts across the three organisations to note similarities and differences in the constructs. Chapter 4 analyses the exemplary texts to detect the first element of the *ideological mindset*, namely 'The Superhuman Source as the Origin of thought'. I quote original passages from the magazines as evidence of the presence of this element in the *mindset* of the constructed *character*. I argue that the *character* describes a superhuman source, specifically God, as the origin of all thought. The eternal superhuman source operates through an eternal Divine Law. Humans are not supposed to think but only to implement the divine law. I quote exemplary texts to explain the characteristics of the superhuman source. The Islamist organisations construct a *character* in the texts, which is supposed to believe in the sovereignty of God. I use additional literature to explain how the idea of the sovereignty of God is constructed. This is the only chapter where I use wider Islamic literature to clarify the origins of the idea. It is necessary because this is the idea which is common in both; the ideological version of Islam and the mainstream religion of Islam. I, however, argue that adoption of one element of *ideological mindset* does not mean that a *character* is an *ideologue*, but rather it is the adoption of all the elements of the *ideological mindset* that signify the *character* as an *ideologue*. Through this idea, the terrorist organisations appropriate legitimacy for themselves against the democratic principle of the "will of people".

Section 4.5 cites examples from the texts to note that the proposed Superhuman source is independent of "consensus iuris", i.e. wider consent of the people for the law. Arendt asserts that "both moral judgment and legal punishment presupposes this basic consent" (Arendt, 1958: 462). The *mindset* constructed by the Islamist organisations does not believe in the "consensus iuris"; rather, it shows contempt for any notion that

links "will of the people" with governance. The constructed *character* abhors all types of freedoms. As Islamist organisations cannot ignore the modern idea of freedom, they change their meaning. "Freedom", for them, means a surrender of worldly desires, emotions and thinking to the Divine Law. Such surrender is supposed to liberate man from manmade shackles. In addition to thematic analysis, this chapter also employs two linguistic terms, namely dixies and metaphors. With regards to this element of an *ideological mindset*, these two linguistic terms capture the themes more effectively in the analysis to better comprehend the 'pointing' in the texts. In a unique perversion, the organisations assign the title of a freedom fighter to the constructed *character*.

Section 4.8 analyses the themes where the *character* is constructed as a freedom fighter. The Islamist organisations extensively use time, person and place deixis and metaphors to construct the themes of a freedom fighter in their rhetoric. I decipher the deixis and metaphors to understand the themes. In such rhetoric, the organisations extensively construct the identities of 'us' and 'them'. The *character* as a freedom fighter is fighting against historical injustices committed by the West against Muslims. The ideal type is the one who follows the Divine Law in letter and spirit and following true freedom.

In Chapter 5, I analyse the texts from the magazines that thematically carry a 'Claim to *Global Domination'*. By rereading the material using the Arendtian theoretical framework (see Chapter 2), I generated six subthemes. After sifting the available material under the subthemes, I further segregated the material affiliated with an organisation.

It appears from the analysis that cross-fertilisation of ideas across the organisations took a particular concretisation as the textual construction shifts to IS and TT from AQ. One of the reasons for such a shift in expressions can be attributed to the actual operationalisation of the *ideology* in the real world. AQ is still free from the actual execution of the professed *ideology,* while IS and TT had to execute the *ideology* in the real world.

The constructed *character,* however, appeared stuck in regional politics in the TT constructs as the themes in their texts carry a strong flavour of Afghan nationalism.

With such a nationalistic leaning, it is, therefore, not surprising that TT as an organisation is less idealised and attracting fewer recruits than the other two organisations. Arendt asserts that "a development towards nationalism would frustrate its exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive" (Arendt, 1958:389). Nonetheless, at the fundamental level of conceptual understanding, TT nationalism is ideological; there is an ideological brotherhood across the three Islamist organisations. It can also explain the presence of AQ safe heavens in TT dominated Afghanistan before the 9/11 incident. Even with these differences in the circumstances of the organisations and the resultant compulsions vis a vis the operationalisation of *ideology*, 'The Claim to *Global Domination*' and its attendant themes are shared across the organisations.

Essentially, the discursive practices construct a *character* who thinks that they are entitled to dominate the world for ideological reasons. The claim to *global domination* draws its legitimacy from the Islamist organisations' understanding of history. They interpret history through the lens of *ideology*. History, in the textual constructions, appears non-contradictory and a proof of the correctness of the *ideology*. The discursive practices' reference to history illuminates those areas brightly where Muslims dominated the world.

Ideology, as it springs from a universal superhuman source, is not for one nation but the whole world. The *ideologues* "are not satisfied with the revolution in one country but aim at the conquest and rule of the world" (Arendt, 1958: 359). Therefore, with the *ideological mindset* acting as the philosophical foundations, the *ideologues* try to engage with important ideological questions spread over centauries. Being a true embodiment of the Divine Law, the *character* is supposed to think that they are in knowledge of the historical operation of the Divine Law. This knowledge (of historical operation of Divine Law) entitles them to answer ideological questions of import spread over centuries. Such a mode of thinking is useful to the discursive construction as it obliterates and confuses the existing political arrangements to the ideologues' advantage. History is (re)interpreted and portrayed as moving in sync with the *ideology*.

The discursive practices draw on selected Islamic political and theological literature to articulate the answers to support their claim to *global domination*.

The *character* is presented as a representative figure of historical discourses clustered around religion. In this sense, the organisations do not consider the constructed *character* as a new *character*, but such *character* was always present in the discursive practices of religious beliefs. The contemporary *character,* however, is presented as the refined model that does not suffer from the imperfections of the past *character*s and, therefore, is ideally placed to dominate the world for the benefit of everyone.

One of the main hurdles that the claim to *global domination* is the manmade political division of the world. International and intranational political boundaries are manmade and superfluous. The *character* is supposed to obliterate or at least ignore these superfluous divisions. The textual constructs suggest that the ideologue should believe that the world comprises of two exclusive political categories; the people of truth namely, ideologues, and the people of falsehood, namely "Kuffar". These two political categories are well integrated, homogeneous and plan their actions collectively. As the *ideological mindset* believes that all action flows from some *ideology*; therefore, it is assumed that 'they' are also following an *ideology*.

The idea of the nation-state is another hurdle to the claim to *global domination* that the discursive practices construct; the idea is an innovation orchestrated by 'them'. People are not supposed to innovate, but rather discover the true meaning of eternal law and follow it. Instead of many nation-states, the *character* is supposed to imagine a global state led by a global leader. The global state namely, Khilafah, should unite all Muslims under a global state ruled by the *ideology*. The textual constructs suggest that ideological rule shall benefit all including "Kuffar". Khalifah, being the supreme leader of the global state, is tasked to understand the will of the eternal law and personally guard against all innovative interpretations of the law. The organisations imagine Muslim ummah in terms of a global race.

The discursive constructions articulate that Muslims were the original race known as humanity. All humanity was following one eternal law, but then the "Kuffar" deviated from the laws of humanity and started perceiving themselves as different races. All

racial thinking except the thinking of "nation of Islam" are false. The "nation of Islam" is following the laws of truth. Therefore, for the sake of truth to prevail, this nation must dominate the world. For effective domination of the world, the "nation of Islam" should establish its own global institutions parallel to the United Nations and acquire military muscles. The true potential of this race, however, lies in true allegiance to the *ideology*. True allegiance to the *ideology* is also the fundamental precondition of becoming a full member of the "nation of Islam". The imagined "nation of Islam" shall comprise of fully disciplined subjects reformed to shun all notions of human diversity and spontaneity.

Chapter 6 analyses the exemplary texts to detect the third element of the *ideological mindset*, namely 'Violence and the Call for Action'. The constructed *character* across all three organisations is supposed to believe that 'Violence and the Call for Action' are essential to dominate the world for the sake of *superhuman* sourced law. However, in places, there are subtle differences in the articulations of the themes linked to *violence* and action among the organisations. The analysis of the texts in this chapter supports the assertion of the previous chapters that mostly AQ articulates the reasons for the ideological claims.

The *character* that emerges from the discursive constructions is restless and ready for *violence* and action all the time and in all circumstances. They prefer violent over non-violent action. Non-violent action is a position of compromise; the *character* is supposed to aim at culminating the activity in *violence*. They believe in the ideological division of the world; the world comprises of two parts, Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harb. Dar-al-harb are the areas not under the control of the organisations. *Violence* is central in all action in Dar-al-harb. The *character* is supposed to be a law unto themselves in Dar-al-harab. The organisations employ metaphors to point, dehumanise and violently eliminate the 'other' as part of their call for *violence* and action.

"Dajjal", drawn from Islamic history, is one such metaphor that the organisations employ to this effect. The metaphor represents falsehood, concealment and "decadent races", fit to be eliminated. All the three organisations suggest the *character* to call their opponents "Dajjal". Such a 'pointing' helps the *character* to imagine the 'other'

in ideological language. AQ is more philosophical and abstract in its application of the metaphor and calls the Western civilisation as "Dajjal". IS and TT, being involved in the actual contest for territory, are more concrete in naming their immediate opponents, e.g. Assad/Iraqi government sympathisers and Americans as "Dajjal". The Arendtian *ideological mindset* capitalises on the prevalent inconspicuous phrases to dehumanise the 'other'. The Islamist organisations frequently employ the metaphors used by Islamic theological/political history for 'pointing' dehumanising and eliminating the 'other'.

"Kuffar" is another metaphor that frequently linked the *violence* with the action in the magazines. The discursive practices construct a *character* that calls all the opponents "Kuffar". The construction sufficiently dehumanises "Kuffar" before suggesting their ruthless elimination. "Taghut" is the third metaphor that inherently calls for *violence* and action against the 'other'. The constructed *character* calls violent action as Jihad.

The discursive construction does not believe in a nonviolent Jihad and rejects all explanations that try to explain the nonviolent nature of Jihad. Jihad for the *ideological mindset* is part of the *ideology* and shares equal status with the worship. It is endless and shall never cease. Therefore, there shall always be a need to create new categories of the 'other' if, and when, the existing categories are eliminated.

In line with the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, the Islamist organisations suggest to the *character* that they employ *violence* as a tool to unmask the hypocrisy of the world (Western) states. In the Arendtian articulations, the ideologues may perform an act to provoke a power to use *violence*. The aim is to expose the hypocrisy of power. The *ideological mindset* feeds on contradictions and hypocrisies of the real world, which must be exposed. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers can be categorised as one such action.

The ideal form of action for the constructed ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* is violence. However, the *character* is not supposed to remain passive but actively seek other forms of action such as disavowal. The *character* is required to disown virtually everything that is not owned by the *ideology*. The *character* should not only keep the

hatred towards the non-ideological world in their heart but actively express that hatred through all available means.

'The Object Enemy' is the fourth element of the *ideological mindset* that I analyse in Chapter 7. I argue that the enemy of the *ideological mindset* is objective and eternal. It is designated by the *ideology*, and any subjective behaviour cannot change the status of an enemy. I quote exemplary texts to explain the themes of the *objective enemy* constructed by Islamist organisations. All efforts to eliminate the *objective enemy* should be considered as Jihad. The fundamental principle of relationship with 'them' is hate. Hate, towards the enemy, should not be allowed to recede even in those cases where Islamists are under some compulsion to take lenient action against the objective enemy. "Wala" and "Bara" are concepts used in the texts to decide the nature of the relationship with 'them'. Elimination is the best option to apply to the *objective enemy*; however, when such an option is not available, the ideal type is supposed to adopt the action of disavowal. Jews, Christians, Kuffar and Munafiqeen are among the categories of the *objective enemy*. Jew and Christian are the worst enemies as they are supposed to hate Muslims the most. Virtually everyone is declared as an enemy who does not follow the *ideological mindset*. The constructed *character* is supposed to perform the ideological role of an executioner and a victim. The organisations visualise an eternal fight with an eternal enemy.

Chapter 8 analyses the texts to detect the themes of the fifth element, the 'Rejection of Factual Reality'. I argue that for an *ideological mindset,* facts are only admissible if these are consistent with the ideological explanations. The super sense developed by *ideology* in an *ideologue* is the final arbitrator between a fact and a non-fact. For Islamists, life itself is temporary, unreal and superfluous, hence, should be rejected. "Dunya" and "Akhira" are the terms used for the temporariness of 'this' world and 'eternity' of 'that' world. The imagined nature of 'this' world helps in eliminating the emotion of fear in the ideal type. Such conceptualisation strengthens the emotion of sacrifice. Islamists radically alter the meaning of commonly understood terms. For example, I quote texts to show that how the term "peace "is transformed for the ideological consistency. For the ideological consistency the facts can be twisted. They

shall take every action to transform factual reality to the reality that is consistent with the ideological world. Logical reasoning as a tool is employed to twist facts and achieve imagined consistency. For the *ideological mindset* it is legitimate to twist facts to uncover the *objective enemy*.

Finally, in Chapter 9, I conclude the study with the thesis conclusion. I review the findings. I summaries all the ideas the Islamists organisations used in their texts to construct an ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* in a tool, I call 'The Map of Ideas Linked to *Islamic radicalisation*' (MILIR). I also clarify how to use the tool and point out the areas it can be usefully employed. I explain about the limitations of the research and indicate the future research areas.

Chapter 2: Hannah Arendt's Theorisations on Totalitarianism, Ideology, Thinking and Ideological Mindset

2.1   Introduction

In the writings of Arendt, all the four conceptions of totalitarianism, *ideology*, thinking and *ideological mindset* are inseparable and make sense only with each other. In this chapter, I shall explain first the reasons for my selection of Arendt's theory as the theoretical framework for my research. Second, I shall engage with Arendt's theorisation on totalitarianism, *ideology* and thinking. Third, I shall explain the five essential Arendtian elements of an *ideological mindset*, which Arendt calls *ideological thinking*. Arendt studies the *mindset* of the past *ideologues*, namely the Nazi and Communist *ideologue* in her work *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958).

Arendt's philosophical articulations have a peculiar style. She specialises in discovering basic experiences in action. She would analyse individuals and groups in their contexts, looking for unprecedented experiences in historical moments. Her philosophising would start from concrete and particular experience, which astonished her, instigating her to explore. She starts her journey with the analysis of philosophies of Saint Augustin in her PhD dissertation with Martin Heidegger. Heidegger and, also, Karl Jasper had a profound influence on Arendt's philosophy. Arendt also draws significantly on Montague, Aristotle, Kant and many others while crystallising her concepts on totalitarianism.

It is Arendt's standard method to single out a concept, explore how the humans had used that expression with relation to their experiences in recorded history. She identifies shifts in their experiences and uses her strong philosophical instincts to

subject the key concept to scrutiny. She devises a new expression if the historical expression has failed to express all the facets of new experience(s).

For Arendt, humanity was subjected to an unprecedented experience during the first half of the twentieth century, necessitating a fresh look, as all previous expressions linked to the past political dispensations had failed to express the new phenomenon in its entirety. The new experience, which she calls totalitarianism was different from all previous political organisation known to man, namely, tyranny, despotism, republics and dictatorship. She mainly explores the concept in her book *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958).

2.2   Arendt's Relevance for this Research

It is somewhat surprising that, despite her well-known work on the notion of *ideology*, Arendt is neglected even in the theories that link *Islamic radicalisation* to *ideology*. This is especially so as such research has been useable to substantially link the ideological radicalisation with empirical evidence. The research, while debating ideological radicalisation, either mixes up or simplistically equates religion with *ideology*. It mainly focuses on theological belief systems of the Islamic radicals (Christmann, 2012: 29), and does not delve deeper into the nature of the ideas that develop a radical *mindset*. Arendt's theorisations on *ideology* give us a lens to understand the true nature of the *mindset* of the Islamic radical as the constructed *character*. Seen through this lens, the ideas of the radical *mindset* appear ideological.

The scarcity of empirical research into ideological radicalisation is attributable to the difficulty in finding the theoretical framework that can connect the abstract concept of *ideology* with the agency, i.e. a radicalised *character*. The paucity of such frameworks (Christmann, 2012: 4, 73) is one of the reasons for the lack of empirical research on the topic. A suitable framework should allow certain empirically oriented questions such as how do we study the thought of a *character* before we categorise their *mindset* as ideological? Alternatively, are there certain characteristics which can be identified as elements of an *ideological mindset*?

Additionally, as the previous chapter has outlined the current wave of *violence* is

closely identified with Muslim communities, the attention of researchers is diverted to the nature of religiousness and the sociology of the Muslim communities. Consequently, the debate on *Islamic radicalisation* spares less attention for ideological radicalisation than the debates of religiousness and societal aspects of the radicals. The expression 'Muslim communities' is a religious expression; therefore, the problems of religion get greater primacy in the radicalisation debate than the problems of the thinking framework, i.e. the *mindset*. Moreover, it is the very nature of the phenomenon at hand that can account for such a lack of empirical research in this field. Some research, however, has tried to fill this gap by devising certain measuring scales, such as "The Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale" (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004) and "The Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA)" (Pressman, 2009); but have mixed up *ideology* religion as analytical categories.

Mostly, studies researching ideological radicalisation try to locate violent behaviour in the religiosity of the *character*. While some research does suggest a correlation between levels of religiosity and Islamist *violence*, (Ibrahim, 1988; Bell, 2005a; Sageman, 2005; Awan, 2007a; Wadgy, 2007), there is also compelling evidence to the contrary: namely, most of religious Muslims are not violent (Demos, 2006; Abbas, 2007; Githens-Mazar, 2008). So how to resolve this puzzle? Some theories try to answer this question through the rubric of enabling environments linked to several possible factors (Christmann, 2012: 42). Arendt's theorisations help answer this question as she separates religion from *ideology* as an analytical category. Although, religious beliefs can become part of *ideology* (and in the case of Islamic radical it is true, as they perceive the *ideology* in religious phraseology), an *ideological mindset*, in principle, is independent of any forms of religion. In this sense, this *mindset*, once operationalised is more similar in its intellectual structure with a Nazi *ideologue* than a fellow religious Muslim.

Arendt, however, argues that "ideologies are a recent phenomenon" (Arendt, 1958: 468) and a result of modernity. On the contrary, the religious phraseology employed by the Islamist organisations in their discursive constructions are linked to centuries old Muslim political history and practice of religion i.e. Islamic theology. I argue that

the Islamic ideology in twentieth century is shaped by the current trends of modernity albeit as a reaction. I follow Hansen at el. who identify the similarities between the three ideologies namely, Islamic, Bolshevik and Nazi ideologies[7] and argue that the Islamic ideology "does not attack the lack of modernity in Arab countries, but the very ideas of modernity: the concept of freedom and democracy" (Hansen et al., 2007: 56).

I assert that in their endeavour to react to modernity, Islamists in their discursive constructions transform religious thinking into ideological thinking. At least in three of the five proposed elements of the Arendtian ideological thinking in this research namely, 'essential violence', 'objective enemy' and 'rejection of factual reality', the departure from religious thinking to ideological thinking is quite evident. I propose that religious thinking does not subscribe to all of the above mentioned three elements as constructed by the Islamists in their magazines (see chapter 5,6 and 8). The remaining two elements of ideological thinking namely, 'the superhuman source as the origin of thought' and 'the claim to global domination' appear common to the religious as well as ideological thinking, yet this commonality is only in principle and differ in operationalisation of the ideas.

Arendt, in *Origins* as well as in her other writings, does not engage much with the idea of religious thinking. She calls the thinking that perceives itself as originating from the idea of God as deism. She explains,

Deism, for example, would then be the ideology which treats the idea of God, with which philosophy is concerned, in the scientific manner of theology for which God is revealed reality. Yet we know that this is only part of the truth. Deism, though it denies

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[7] Hansen et al. produce a very interesting table at page 65 of their article which compares the salient claims of the three ideologies. Even before the 9/11 event, some scholars pointed to the similarities between the ideological version of Islam and the two totalitarian ideologies of the past. See Frederic Volpi, "Understanding the Rationale of the Islamic Fundamentalists' Political Strategies: A Pragmatic Reading of their Conceptual Schemes during the Modern Era", in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 1/3 (2000), pp.73–96; Whine, "Islamism and Totalitarianism", or Bernard Lewis, "The roots of Muslim rage", in *Policy* 17/4 (1990), pp.20f.

divine revelation, does not simply make "scientific" statements on a God which is only an "idea" but uses the idea of God in order to explain the course of the world. (Arendt, 1958: 469).

However, in this thesis, I extend the above mentioned Arendtian articulation of deism in this thesis and argue that a theology which claims to originate in divine revelation can also be transformed into ideology — a distinct mode of thinking which is different from religious thinking. This transition is most evident in the constructed character of the Islamic ideologue of this research. It takes place as the Islamist organisations resist and articulate their response to the modern ideas such as freedom, democracy or nationalism. These organisations re-interpret Islamic theology in their contest against the modern ideas. This political contest is one of the main drivers which is facilitating the transformation of Islamic religious thinking into ideological thinking. It is through Arendt's articulations of ideological thinking that one can distinguish between the said two types of thinking which otherwise appear to be indistinguishably blurry and confusing and co-exist in the overall spectrum of contemporary Muslim thought.

Arendt's assertion that an ideologue is the embodiment of eternal law (Arendt, 1958: 462-465) is very helpful in distinguishing between "ideology" and "religion". The Islamists in their belief that they comprehend the 'true essence' of the will of God, obliterate all distinction and space between God, Divine Law and man. They perceive themselves as the true embodiment of the Divine law. The religious idea of separation of these categories presupposes a space between them. This space allows humans freedom—freedom to even reject the religious message itself. The Quran explicitly states that "there is no compulsion in religion" (Quran, 2: 256). The faculty of thinking in humans need this space for its operation, and freedom to think is contingent upon a space for the activity of thinking. This freedom to think, or its absence could be considered as a distinguishing indicator between religion and ideology.

Religion assigns a mission to humans. It is "to lead a life that will get him closer to God – in Islam this can be achieved by following God's commandments. Yet, a person living a devout life does not become God, but rather remains an imperfect and flawed human being. This fundamental difference between man and God cannot be overcome"

(Hansen et al., 2007:63). Even when a religious character thinks they are following absolute truth, they "do not become *identical* with God in the fight against what he[/she] regards as evil" (ibid). The perception of fighting evil is common in religious as well as ideological thinking. It is the prioritisation of external over internal struggle which separates ideology from religion. The religious thinking turns into ideological thinking as and when an internal struggle against one's evil inclinations is either prioritised or replaced by essential violence to rout external evil. Hansen et al. endorse this distinction in the following argument.

It is this operationalisation of the notion where Arendt is distinguished from other main approaches to *ideology*[8]. She has delved much deeper into the notion and has managed

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[8] One other main approach is from Karl Mannheim who argues that ideology operates at two levels -- particular conception and total conception of ideology. The particular ideology is concerned with the individual and psychological explanations while total conception explains sociological and cultural views of the notion. He argues that "whereas the particular conception of ideology designates only a part of opponent's assertions as ideologies--the total conception calls into question the opponent's total Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus) and of which he partakes" (Mannheim, 1976:50). Mannheim's conception, however, is in line with one aspect of the Arendtian ideological thinking as Mannheim thinks that ideological thinking "comes from the outside and shapes the personality of the individual as well as the group", and that ideology operates "through individuals and groups, rather than individuals and groups creating them in response to their circumstances" (Williams, 1988; 26). A further very prominent, however, politically highly controversial notion comes from Karl Marx who conceptualises ideology as "false consciousness". According to Marx, when our thinking fails to properly reflect the circumstances, it gets confused. Such mindset does not appreciate the material basis of man's thinking and his existence in its entirety. For Marx, "consciousness can never be anything else except conscious existence, and existence of men is their actual life-process" (Easton et al., 1967: 414). The "false consciousness" thesis is problematic as it implies the existence of a true consciousness. Even Marxists such as Alex Callinicos suggests that "epistemological elements in Marx's own theory of ideology" should be scraped (Callinicos, 1985: 134). Martin Seliger thinks that "such pejorative and negative conception of ideology should be discarded all together" (Seliger, 1976:11). Goran Therborn argues that the ideas of true and false consciousness should be rejected "explicitly and decisively, once and for all" (Therborn, 1980: 5). An important, and next to Mannheim, second sociological approach is explained by Emile Durkheim, who argues that "ideological methods are concerned with the use of notions to govern the collation of facts rather than deriving notions from them" (Durkheim, 1982: 86). The opposite of ideology therefore as per this tradition is "not absolute truth"; rather than

to grasp an operationalisation which is empirically applicable in the case of this study. In Arendt's thinking, it is possible to identify certain characteristics of an *ideological mindset* which separates it from a non-*ideological mindset*. While, of course, this identification cannot be strictly binary, the distinguishing features of an *ideological mindset* are traceable. In this sense, the *mindset* of the *character* constructed by the three Islamist organisations in their discursive practices shares features with a Nazi or a Communist *ideologue* according to and following the characteristics developed by Arendt.

As the radicalised *character* is geographically pattern-less, too much focus on their physical location has frustrated research. The House of Commons report (2006) presented after the 7 July 2005 London bombings confirms this assertion (see literature review in the previous chapter). Although this *character* belongs to Muslim communities, he/ she is obscure, ordinary, normal, and indistinguishable. Apart from Arendt, this normalness is also noted by an English writer, who describes Heinrich Himmler in "*The House that Hitler Built*", as "a man of exquisite courtesy and still interested in the simple things of the life……..No man looks less like his job than this police dictator of Nazi Germany, and I am convinced that nobody I met in Germany is more normal" (Roberts, 1938: 89-90). It should be remembered that Heinrich Himmler was not an ordinary *ideologue* in the Nazi hierarchy. He was tasked by Hitler to raise and command deadly SS troops. Later he was promoted to head the United Police Force of Germany. He played a major role in the Holocaust. Arendt appears surprised to find ordinariness of such a *character* in "*Eichmann in Jerusalem; Banality of the Evil*" (1963). With the *Islamic radicalisation*, this amazement is expressed by friends and

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"empirical". More recently, Terry Eagleton (2007) summarizes different definitions of ideology as: "a process of production of meaning, signs and values in social life; a body of ideas (which may be false) characteristics of a particular social group or class which help to legitimize a dominant political power; systematically distorted communication; a position for a subject; [a] form of thought motivated by social interest; identity thinking; socially necessary illusion; the conjecture of discourse and power; the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world; action oriented set of beliefs; the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; semiotic closure; the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their relations to social structures; the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality" (Eagleton, 2007: 1-2).

neighbours of the Islamic radicals, who express this sentiment as they realise that "the terrorist" was their well-mannered neighbourhood boy/girl. Arendt intensely focuses on Eichmann's *mindset*, where he was distinguishable from his fellow beings. The Eichmann trial helped Arendt to theorise a link between thoughtlessness and radical evil. So, either this *mindset* thinks everything to the worst or stops thinking. This is, likewise, the *mindset* of the *character* that is constructed by the Islamist organisations in their discursive practices I call *Islamic ideologue* and shall be dealing with in this study. I apply Arendt's theory in this exercise due to certain advantages she had over her contemporaries who have written on *ideology*.

Firstly, Arendt was born and belonged to a group on which *ideologues* executed their *ideology*. Her group was the *objective enemy* of the *ideological mindset*. This belonging to the victim group was, according to Arendt (1994:12), an advantage in the sense that she could grasp the concept in its totality. A member of the victim group is an outsider from the oppressor group, and sometimes the *factual reality* is better understood from a marginal position.

Additionally, ideological persecution is a multidimensional phenomenon; while parts of oppressor groups might be contributing towards some part of the whole exercise, the hapless victim experiences all the facets of the occurrence. Arendt and her community had practically endured the abstract concept of the notion in action, especially the race *ideology*. The Jewish community was the immediate target of *ideological mindset* at the social and political level. This personal experience is missing for other social theorists who dealt with *ideology*. The experience helps the philosophical mind of Arendt to grasp the elements of the *mindset* of the persecuting *ideologues* and articulate these as elements of an *ideological mindset*.

Secondly, Arendt's book, *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (first edition 1951, revised edition 1958)[9], where she substantially engages with the notion of *ideology* and *ideological mindset*, was written and published after the Second World War. This was

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[9] Two chapters were added to the revised edition in 1958, i.e., "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government" and "Reflections on Hungarian Revolution". The main arguments and the focus of the book stayed the same.

the time when an *ideological mindset* had run its full course. It was, therefore, possible for her, in retrospect, to interpret the *ideology* as well as the *ideological mindset* to reconstruct a *character* type that thinks ideologically.

In my research, I assume that Islamist organisations in their discursive practices construct this *character* type. This research is not about why and how a normal human being develops this *mindset*. This is an area for further or separate research. Arendt, however, has given certain hints to throw some light on these questions. In *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1951, 1958) and "*Eichmann in Jerusalem: Banality of the Evil"* (1963), she hints that mass atomization, propaganda, dominant *ideology*, logicality, loneliness, superfluousness, and thoughtlessness are some of the areas which might help explain why and how someone is entrapped into an *ideological mindset*.

Arendt's efforts to interpret the phenomenon of *ideology* and totalitarianism are, however, not without criticism. The critics argue that her work in *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* lacks an epistemological basis, a theoretical framework and an explicit methodology (Crick, 1977: 111; Canovan, 1992: 18; Bernstein, 2002: 382; Shapiro and Wendt, 2005: 39– 41).

It is true that in the first instance, it is difficult to locate Arendt's work on totalitarianism and *ideology* in some methodological understanding. It seems that the effort suffers from the absence of an explicitly explained conceptual framework. Arendt argues that her work "does not belong to any school and hardly uses any of the officially recognised or officially controversial instruments" (Arendt, 1953: 77). This seemingly unconventional *character* of Arendt's thoughts on totalitarianism is also a reflection of her critical perspective on methodology.

Arendt is quite sceptical about too much emphasis on methodology and believes that as a result of social scientists' over-emphasis on methodology during their "academic quarrels (…) methodological problems are likely to overshadow more fundamental issues" (Arendt, 1953: 77). For her, "experience in how to think can be won, like all experience in doing something, only through practice, through exercises" (Arendt (1968/2006: 13). Arendt also resists the abstraction of structural theories and asserts that "theory must be relentlessly and ruthlessly concrete" and should be able to deal

with "events and action which have taken place in fact" (Wolin, 1977: 93).

Arendt concedes that her approach to *ideology* lacks an explicit explanation of her method of inquiry. She argues that it is, rather, an "unusual approach …. to the whole field of political and historical sciences as such" (Arendt, 1953: 77). Arendt called her method "unusual" as it did not fit nicely into the Anglo-American tradition of her time.

Sigwart (2016: 1) argues that Arendt did use a methodology which was "unusual" for her time, but now is described as the "characterological" method of political theorising. I adopt "characterology" as the method of inquiry in the next chapter. Through this method, Arendt manages to interpret empirical material, including biographical narratives within a specific framework. Her frame of reference connects the interpretive method of structural elements with an ideographic and individualistic perspective on a political phenomenon. Arendt's deliberate effort to keep articulation of methodology obscure helps her to devise a method where she successfully manages to connect the structure (totalitarianism/*ideology*) and the person (the *ideologue*).

In order to understand the political movements of her time, Arendt studies history and concludes that the phenomenon of totalitarianism movements was unprecedented in its manifestation. For her, totalitarianism was the result of crystallisation of certain concrete historical elements. This study, however, starts with the assumption that the three-understudy Islamist organisations resemble the totalitarian organisations of the twentieth century, namely the Nazi and Communist organisations. If they succeed, the Islamist organisations will establish a totalitarian form of government. The basic unit of present-day totalitarian organisations is the violent Islamic radical, like the basic unit of racism was a Nazi, or for Communism, it was a Bolshevik. Eric Voegelin in a review of *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* concludes:

> The investigation inevitably will start from the phenomena, but the question of theoretically justifiable units in political science cannot be solved by accepting the units thrown up in the stream of history at their face value. What a unit is will emerge when the principles furnished by philosophical anthropology are applied to historical materials. It then may happen that political movements, which on the scene of history are

bitterly opposed to one another, will prove to be closely related on the level of essence (Voegelin, 1953: 85).

In line with the above statement, this research will apply Arendtian philosophical principles of an *ideological mindset* to the discursive practices to unearth the ideas that the Islamist organisations use to construct the *mindset* of the *character*. In other words, the research design is an interpretive and empirical analysis of an agency (the constructed *character*) with reference to an intellectual structure, i.e. the *ideology*.

In this research, I am concerned with the ontological inquiry of the "characterology" of an *ideological mindset*. I assert that the constructed ideal type of the *character* has adequate signatures of a distinct *mindset* woven in an *ideology* which is empirically traceable. In this endeavour, I shall try to narrate the story of the ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* through Arendt. Before I layout the Arendtian essential elements of the *ideological mindset*, I shall explain Arendtian notions of totalitarianism, *ideology* and "thinking".

2.3   The Arendtian Conceptualisation of Totalitarianism

According to Arendt, totalitarianism had a great role in Europe's political, moral and economic devastation during the first half of the twentieth century. The phenomenon originated during the First World War, amplified in National Socialism and Bolshevism and receded in the late 1950s. Totalitarianism is the ultimate destiny of the *ideological mindset*. In other words, totalitarianism is the operationalisation of *ideology*, which the Islamist organisations are also trying to establish.

Arendtian theory of totalitarianism has three central concepts. First, totalitarianism is a radically original and unprecedented development. Arendt disagrees with social scientists who attempted to locate a long-established lineage of the phenomenon and do not see the novel uniqueness of totalitarian government. She argues:

> The trouble with totalitarian regimes is not that they play power politics in an especially ruthless way, but behind their politics is hidden an entirely new and unprecedented concept of power, just as behind their Realpolitik lies an entirely new and unprecedented concept of reality.

Supreme disregard for immediate consequences rather than ruthlessness; rootlessness and neglect of national interests rather than nationalism; contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered pursuit of self-interest; "idealism," – i.e., their unwavering faith in an ideological fictitious world, rather than lust for power – these have all introduced into international politics a new and more disturbing factor than mere aggressiveness would have been able to do (Arendt, 1958: 417-418).

The second essential feature of totalitarianism is its formlessness. Formlessness in totalitarianism is maintained consciously and deliberately. Formlessness, besides helping in masking the true objectives of the movement, also helps to adapt to the situation. Interestingly, Nazis never used any slogan which described their future form of the government. Hitler's statement in *Ausgewahlte Reden des Fuehrers* was one of the very few instances when he explained the form of future government, he said, "Incidentally, I am not the head of a state in the sense of a dictator or monarch, but I am the leader of the German people" (Hitler, 1938: 114).

Formlessness does not mean totalitarianism is unorganised. By contrast, such movements are well organised and have very strict selection criteria for their membership. Hitler understood the masses in two categories, that is, "members", who are fanatically "devoted" to the cause and "sympathisers", who are too "lazy" for the organisation or "cowards" (Hitler, 1943: chapter iv). The sympathisers would form part of the front organisations. These front organisations act as a bridge between the fictitious ideological world and the normal world. This bridge is necessary; otherwise, the gap between the fictitious reality and the real world created by *ideology* is too obvious to be ignored by the fanatical members. Arendt explains,

The world at large, on the other side, usually gets its first glimpse of a totalitarian movement through its front organisations. The sympathizers, who are to all appearances still innocuous fellow-citizens in a nontotalitarian society, can hardly be called single-minded fanatics; through them, the movements make their fantastic lies more generally

acceptable, can spread their propaganda in milder, more respectable forms, until the whole atmosphere is poisoned with totalitarian elements which are hardly recognizable as such but appear to be normal political reactions or opinions (Arendt, 1958: 367).

The front organisations play a very important role in the evolution of the *ideological mindset*. The sympathisers who belong to a front organisation are *ideologues* but in a more normal and confused manner. Although these sympathisers believe in the *ideology*, they have yet not fully surrendered to the logical consequences of the *ideology*. They are still confused about their role in the ideological world; they are yet not fully radicalised. The sympathisers help the *ideologue* to reassure their self-identity. The *Islamic ideologue* probably gets these sympathisers at the places they like to visit the most, namely the places frequented by religious people. Unknowingly, the places of worship such as mosques and madrassas are serving as front organisations for *Islamic radicalisation*. The members of Islamist organisations easily blend in the places of religious gatherings because Islamist organisations, like the past totalitarian organisations, are also flexible and formless.

Formlessness keeps the focus on the realisation of the ideological "essence". It allows switching orders without any notice as per the dictates of the situation. In totalitarian organisations, which are at the core of totalitarian movements, the problem of succession is left unresolved so that it may not cloud the primacy of the *ideology*. The prime objective being the realisation of the ideological objectives.

 Totalitarian regimes such as the IS regime in Syria or the TT regime in Afghanistan were in a feverish mode all the time. Domestic populations are continuously mobilised through struggles, campaigns, wars or eliminations of the *objective enemies*. The will of the leader and the led must be continuously harnessed to accelerate the world movement towards its culmination. Certain other contemporaries of Arendt also note this centrality of activism and feverish activity in the totalitarian form of government. For example, Sigmund Neumann titles his comparative analysis of the Nazi, Fascist and Bolshevist uproar as "*Permanent Revolution: The Total State in Total War*" (1942). Franz Neumann calls the Third Reich a "movement state" in his *Behemoth* (1944), and

Ernst Fraenkel terms national socialism a "prerogative state" in his book "*The Dual State"(1941)* to explain the feverish arbitrariness of Nazi intrusions in legal and administrative affairs of the state (Baehr, 2010: 59).

Third, *ideology* and terror are combined in totalitarianism. In Arendt's writings, totalitarianism has roughly two phases. The first phase is a pre-power phase where the phenomenon appears in the shape of totalitarian movements. At this stage, selective *violence* is used to supplement the ideological propaganda appeal of the movement. Propaganda is used for the outside world, whereas internally totalitarian movements indoctrinate its members through the *ideology*.

In the second phase—when the movements are in power—ideological propaganda may even be prohibited. The terror gets primacy at this stage. It dehumanises the victim through relentless repression. *Ideology* may not be relevant to this dehumanised man anymore. Himmler, for instance, emphasised that "[the] education [in concentration camps] consists of discipline [and] never of any kind of instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have for the most part slave-like souls" (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol v: 616).

After eliminating real opponents, totalitarianism categorises its victims as "objective enemies" or "enemies of the people" – "decadent races" or "dying classes" – supposedly condemned by nature or history for elimination" (Arendt, 1958: 465). The totality of the terror lies in the fact that one's compliance and behaviour is not taken into account while deciding the status of an enemy. The total terror should, among other things, fashion the kind of man that accepts his own disposability. This new man is dehumanised and bereft of reflection and spontaneity.

Total terror creates ideal conditions for the transition of this new man. Terror becomes total when it is bereft of any opposition. Total terror is the "essence of totalitarian governments" (Arendt, 1951: 466). According to Baehr, "the essence or nature of a regime, according to Montesquieu, refers to its basic institutions, particularly those that establish who is sovereign" (Baehr, 2010: 60). All institutions established through laws guide human behaviour to the extent as to what is prohibited or unacceptable. However, it is "the principle of a regime [that] animates it, the guiding sentiment, or ethos that

survive so long as people actively uphold the conduct it requires" (Baehr, 2010: 60). In this distinction, i.e., between essence and the "principle of action", Arendt identifies a unique aspect of totalitarian regimes.

As "just lawfulness in constitutional government is insufficient to *Inspire* and guide man's actions, so terror in totalitarian government is not sufficient to *Inspire* [emphasis added] and guide human behaviour" (Arendt, 1958: 467). Unlike its perceived (perceived by those who consider totalitarianism to share some aspects with other typology of governments; a perception which Arendt rejects, viewing totalitarianism as "unprecedented") predecessors like tyrannies, monarchies, despotism and republics, totalitarianism, Arendt says, appears to have no corresponding "principle". Finding what Montesquieu calls a "principle of action" in a body politics is an attempt to resolve a very old problem of political thought. The argument is that, if positive laws are meant only to tell man what not to do, what inspires them to act? It is the "principle of action". Arendt asserts that "such guiding principles and criteria of action are, according to Montesquieu, honour in a monarchy, virtue in a republic and fear in a tyranny" (Arendt, 1958:466-467).

In principle, says Arendt, under perfect totalitarian conditions (i.e., where all men have been pressed to act like one man; where all action is to keep the superhuman laws in motion by executing death verdicts on *objective enemies*), we need not differentiate between the "essence" of what? and the "principle of action". It is terror in both cases. These perfect conditions, however, can only be met if somehow the complete world is dominated by a totalitarian government (Arendt, 1958:459).

Nevertheless, until totalitarianism controls the complete world, it must share with other regimes; there is a need for its subjects to have a guiding "principle of action". Arendt, however, is reluctant to call any human stimulus in totalitarian regimes a "principle of action", as terror destroys any capacity of man to act at all. Arendt also excludes another likely candidate, namely fear, as a "principle of action" in totalitarianism. Fear, explains Arendt, cannot guide human behaviour in total terror. Although, fear would be much more widespread in totalitarianism than any other regime; however, fear as a stimulus to guide the human behaviour would lose its usefulness as any action guided

by it will not reduce the risk man fears.

No human behaviour originating from sentiments like fear, virtue or honour, which may be useful for the above mentioned forms of governments, is useful for totalitarian affairs. In this sense, totalitarianism "has introduced an entirely new principle into public affairs that dispenses with human will altogether" (Arendt, 1958:468). The populations of totalitarian regimes are caught up in the process of accelerating the movement of superhuman laws and make themselves available for the dual role of the executioner and the victim.

Here, one is tempted to ask two questions: one, why the nontotalitarian world fails to realise the true potential of totalitarian organisations in real-time? Two, why the totalitarian populations form part of the fictitious world of totalitarianism? Answering the first question, Arendt calls it a "judgmental dilemma" of the nontotalitarian world. She argues:

> Those who rightly understand the terrible efficiency of totalitarian organisations are likely to overestimate the material force of totalitarian countries, while those who understand the wasteful incompetence of totalitarian economies are likely to underestimate the power potential
>
> which can be created in disregard of all material factors (Arendt, 1958:419).

The nontotalitarian world fails to anticipate the power potential generated by an "in concert" working of ideological minds.

The second question is further rephrased for clarity: If totalitarianism is based on a distorted or fictitious reality, then, what provides mental alignment or at least a mode of positioning for populations under totalitarianism? Alternatively, what primes the man to do away with common sense and certain subjective innate human instincts, and follow a "principle of action" which requires a man to be an executioner or a victim? In Arendt's articulations, this unprecedented "principle" that totalitarianism introduces is "less a principle and more a substitute for a 'principle of action'; it is the '*ideology*'" (Arendt, 1958: 468).

2.4 Hannah Arendt's Theorisations on Ideology

Ideology, in Arendt's conception, is a restraint of the mind and intellectual constraint that impedes the process of thinking. It is a kind of "super sense", or a "superstition" which claims to have resolved "the riddles of the universe" (Arendt, 1958: 457-458). The *ideological mindset* is very rigid, rejects alternate conceptions and is unresponsive to the "miracle of being" (Arendt, 1958: 469). For Arendt, being is plural and communicative. *Ideology* disputes plurality and spontaneity and prepares the mind for two alternative roles – the roles of an executioner and a victim. Only under totalitarian regimes, the entire texture of life can be fashioned according to an *ideology*. Politically, ideologies may be harmless until and unless taken seriously and literally by totalitarian organisations. For totalitarian movements, *ideology* is not a mere set of opinions but becomes "as real and untouchable an element in their lives as the rules of arithmetic" (Arendt, 1958: 363). These explanations adequately apply to the Islamist organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT.

Historically, argues Arendt, the rise of ideologies is a very recent phenomenon. It was only with the benefit of hindsight that it became possible to analyse certain elements of ideologies which were so disturbingly useful for totalitarian dominations. In the absence of profound influence of ideologies, totalitarian dominations of the 20th century may rather resemble more with tyrannies. It is the *ideological mindset* which was revealed by Arendt after the totalitarian storm had passed that can help us frame the actions of contemporary totalitarian organisations mentioned above. We are in a position now to deconstruct the *mindset* of an ideal type of an *ideologue* constructed by the organisations in their discursive practices and to find the elements of the *ideological mindset* —a distinct mode of thinking, which primes the *ideologue* to perform certain despicable acts for the sake of an *ideology*.

Arendt calls ideologies pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophy because they transgress the limits of science and philosophy. Ideologies have a scientific *character* to the extent they consider that an "idea" can become a subject matter of science. However, this is only partially true. It transgresses science when it does not use this idea to make scientific statements but instead to explain the course of the world. Deism

in this sense would be an *ideology* which scientifically treats the idea of God – God as revealed truth. The idea of God will not be used by *ideology* to make scientific statements on this idea, but the "idea of God" will be used to explain the course of history. Likewise, ideas of racism would not be used to make scientific statements on race laws but would be used as an instrument to assert that past, present and future events can be calculated by this pseudo-scientific idea (Arendt, 1958:468-469).

In principle, all ideologies have certain elements of experience which form the basis of their ideological claim. Humankind was not unaware of the struggle of races for world domination and the struggle of classes for political power before the Nazi and Communist parties. It was the political importance of theses ideologies in Germany and Russia which made racism and communism respectively the dominant ideologies of the time. These ideologies had already influenced the populations of respective countries before the totalitarian movements used them for their purposes.

In an Arendtian sense, it is the political usefulness of the ideological version of Islam in contemporary national as well as international politics that leads this version to be used for political power by the Islamist organisations. An *ideology* becomes politically useful if large populations subscribe to it. The ideological version of Islam is supposed to work stealthily preparing Muslim populations long before the Islamist organisations so firmly saddled the *ideology*. Before the totalitarian movement's surface, certain sections of the populations already think in an ideological mode.

The source of the ideological mode of thinking, argues Arendt, lies in "our fear of contradicting ourselves" (Arendt, 1958: 473). This fear of self-contradiction is the force that drives the logical process in the minds. Stalin also confirmed that it was "the irresistible force of logic [which] thoroughly overpowered [Lenin's] audience like a mighty tentacle seizes you on all sides as in a vice and from whose grip you are powerless to tear yourself away; you must either surrender or make up your mind for utter defeat" (Stalin, 1924)[10]. The postulate is forced on the mind with the help of logical reasoning. The *ideological mindset* draws conclusions through mere logical

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[10] Quoted from "*Lenin, Selected Works*" (1947), Vol 1. Moscow. p.33.

reasoning; and no new idea or new experience can interfere with this process (Arendt, 1958:469-471). Terry Eagleton has also noted an irreversible change in the *mindset* of an *ideologue*. He concludes his work on *ideology* with these words: "When men and women engaged in quite modest, local forms of political resistance find themselves brought by the inner momentum of such conflicts into direct confrontation with the power of the state, it is possible that their political consciousness may be definitely, irreversibly altered" (Eagleton, 2007:224). Terry Eagleton's conceptualisation of political consciousness is closely aligned with the thinking patterns of *ideological mindset*.

2.5   The Arendtian Notion of Thinking

Thinking and its processes have been a well-reflected area in Arendt's writings. She traces the thinking frameworks of an *ideologue*. Apart from *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958), she substantially engages with the thinking patterns of the *ideological mindset* in *"Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil"* (1963), "*Thinking and Moral Considerations*" (1971) and "*Life of the Mind*" (1978).

Thinking, so argues Arendt, is a dialogue with another self; this can be imaginary or real. All thinking, Arendt says, is done in solitude. Solitude is being with oneself, i.e., two in one. It is an unequivocal "dialogue of thought" with oneself. In solitude, I do not leave the contact with the real world, as this "world of fellow men" is represented by myself with whom I enter into the "dialogue of the thought". Solitary men, however, need others for reconfirmation of their unmistakable single identity, which was in doubt while in solitude. Solitude is different from isolation and loneliness (Arendt, 1958: 474 – 475).

Isolation and loneliness, argues Arendt, differ only in their function. Isolation functions in the political sphere, while loneliness belongs to the social sphere. Isolation takes place once no one is ready to act with me. Isolation is the beginning of the terror and is a fertile ground for totalitarianism. Although isolation is anathema to power, yet it is "required for all so-called productive activities of men" (Arendt: 1958; 474). Isolation is anathema to power because power is generated when people shun their isolation and "act in concert" (Burke quoted by Arendt, 1958: 474). Men sometimes contribute

something of their own to the common world as a result of isolation from the political world. Isolation, however, becomes loneliness once the isolated men "are deserted by the world of the things as well" (Arendt, 1958: 474). Totalitarian dominations (unlike tyrannies that keep the private life and its innovations intact) destroys the private life as well. Totalitarianism is unprecedented in transferring isolation into loneliness.

Loneliness, Arendt argues, is the common ground for terror and *ideology*. Loneliness is closely linked with uprootedness and superfluousness. "To be uprooted means to have no place in the world recognised and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all" (Arendt, 1958: 475). Just as the isolation can be a primary condition for loneliness, uprootedness can be a primary condition for superfluousness. Arendt thinks that

> what makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one's own self which can be realised in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals. In this situation, man loses trust in himself as the partner of his thoughts and that elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make experiences at all. Self and world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same time (Arendt. 1958: 477).

So, in absolute loneliness when man's experience and even his thinking becomes so unreliable, and he/she is dependent on others for self-realisation, is there something in man which can determine the truth? Arendt answers that:

> The only capacity of the human mind which needs neither the self nor the other nor the world in order to function safely and which is as independent of experience as it is of thinking is the ability of logical reasoning whose premise is the self-evident (Arendt, 1958: 477).

Even under the conditions of absolute loneliness, the truth that two and two equal four cannot be corrupted. Logical reasoning is the only reliable truth, argues Arendt, which is available to human beings to fall back, once they are no more tied to common sense. It is their mutual guarantee to make sense of the common world around them. However,

this truth is of no use in itself because it does not divulge anything. Under the conditions of loneliness, even this process of logical deduction can think the worst possible conclusions. A lonely man, Arendt quotes Luther, "always deduces one thing from the other and thinks everything to the worst" (Arendt, 1958: 477). Arendt further argues that "the famous extremism of totalitarian movements, far from having anything to do with true radicalism, consists indeed in this 'thinking everything to the worst'" (Arendt, 1958: 477).

While "thinking everything to the worst" may point towards the thinking pattern of the *ideological mindset*, Arendt points to another aspect of worst thinking. This is the opposite of thinking, i.e., not thinking at all. Radical evil is not only identified with worst thinking but also, thoughtlessness—not thinking at all. The stage of thoughtlessness comes when one stops dialogue with oneself. Internal dialogue guides us through the riddles of conventional truths and conventional norms. If murder has become the norm of the time in a community, the thinking man will not live with me, the murderer. To live with me, the murderer, I will have to silence the thinking man in myself and find another partner of thought. So, who can be that comforting partner of my thought that can live with me, the murderer?

It is the *ideology* that is the substitute for thinking. The *ideological mindset* can coerce independent thinking in man. This internal coercion is akin to the iron band of terror. Totalitarian domination eliminates space between men through the iron band of terror; thus, all avenues of their freedom are destroyed. At the same time, ideological logic tames the mind to only deduce from the self-evident premise of *ideology* and to stop thinking. *Ideology* can conspire against internal dialogue. It can restrain and straitjacket the thought. *Ideology* has the capacity to align the mind with a thought which is totalizing, insulating, violent, rejecting everything inconsistent with *ideology* and pretending to think objectively. This is the framework in which Arendt analyses the *mindset*s of the past *ideologues*, i.e., the Nazi and Communist *ideologues*, and articulates the essential elements of the *ideological mindset*. In the succeeding paragraphs, I substantially engage with the five essential elements of a *mindset* that thinks ideologically.

2.6 The Five Essential Elements of the Ideological Mindset

In the succeeding paragraphs, I glean five essential elements or characteristics of an *ideological mindset*, which Arendt calls *ideological thinking*. These five elements act as the core of my theoretical framework. After explaining elements of an *ideological mindset* with respect to the violent Nazi/Bolshevik *ideologue*, subsequently, in the analysis part, I apply these elements to the textual literature produced by three Islamist organisations, i.e., AQ, IS and TT, to ascertain whether the discursively constructed *character* carry these elements in its *mindset*.

2.6.1 *The Superhuman Source as the Origin of Thought*

The *ideological mindset* believes that their *ideology* originates from a superhuman or supernatural source. This anchorage of the *ideology* in a *superhuman source* is very important. It not only places the *ideology* above the human philosophies but also provides desired consistency to the otherwise confused understanding of the *factual reality*. As the idea of the *ideology* is not sourced to human thinking, it is clear from human inconsistencies. The *ideological mindset*, however, is not content with the idea of the *ideology* alone but goes a step further and claims that it has captured the essence of the superhuman or natural law. With the help of this essence of the divine law, the *ideologue* can now resolve the riddles of the earth. This *mindset* thinks that it is equipped with a code which can unmask "the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, [and] the uncertainties of the future" (Arendt, 1958: 469). This code, which is unavailable to others, enables the *ideologue* to reach to the reality and expose the conspirator. This pseudoscientific code reduces everything to one simple postulate or an idea (Arendt, 1958:470-471).

The *ideological mindset* does not treat the idea of "race" in racism for some genuine effort to understand human races but uses this idea to explain the movement of history. This *mindset* thinks that one idea is sufficient to calculate all the events of history. Arendt argues that *ideological mindset* draws conclusions through mere argumentation; and no new idea or new experience can interfere with this process (Arendt, 1958:469-471).

The *ideologues* think that they have understood the hidden laws of divinity. This discovery interests the masses, who in the words of Tocqueville, want to know the "absolutist systems which represent all the events of history as depending on the great first causes linked by the chain of fatality, and which, as it were, suppress men from the history of the human race" (Tocqueville quoted by Arendt, 1958: 345). In this sense, the first cause of all natural and historical laws is the Divine Almighty, and man can only prosper if they submit to the divine will. Martin Bormann's memorandum entitled "*Relationship of National Socialism and Christianity*" hints at the source of thought of the Nazi *ideologue*. He writes,

> [t]he more accurately we recognise and observe the laws of nature and life (…) so much the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will be our success (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol IV: 1036).

Arendt notes striking similarities in the *mindset* of Nazi and Communist *ideologue* as they articulate the origins of their thought. She only replaces the word "Almighty" with "dialectical materialism" in the case of communists. Arendt borrows from Stalin's notion of "correct leadership" as mentioned in *Leninism* (1933, Vol. II: chapter iii) and rephrases it to highlight the striking similarities between both the articulations. She writes,

> [t]he more accurately we recognise and observe the laws of history and class struggle, so much the more do we conform to dialect materialism. The more insight we have into dialect materialism, the greater will be our success (Arendt, 1958: 346).

The sources of the *ideology* of a Nazi or Bolshevik *ideologue* had its origin in history. Although both ideological articulations point to the same superhuman force as the source of thought, Nazi phraseology uses almost the same words as are used by the discursive practices of the Islamist organisations. The concept of Nazi God, however, is different from the Islamic radicals. Bormann expresses the concept in a secret decree of the Party Chancellery, circulated to all Gauleiters on 7 June 1941, as under:

When we National Socialists speak of a belief in God, we do not understand by God, like naive Christians and their spiritual opportunists, a human type being, who sits around somewhere in the sphere. The force of natural law, with which all these innumerable planets move in the universe, we call the Almighty or God. The claim that this world force (…) can be influenced by so-called prayers or other astonishing things is based upon a proper dose of naiveté or on a business shamelessness (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol 1: Chapter 7).

In all such ideological articulations (Islamic *ideology* included) man is not left with any other option but to submit to these historically experienced superhuman laws. The Nazi pamphlets, issued for the "ideological indoctrination" of cadets, time and again reminded them about this inevitable fact. One such pamphlet (1942) reads:

The laws of nature are subject to an unchangeable will that cannot be influenced. Hence it is necessary to recolonise these laws (…) While man struggle against the iron logic of nature, he comes into conflict with the basic principles to which alone he owes his very existence as man (…) We shape the life of our people and our legislation according to the verdicts of genetics (Quoted from Arendt, 1958: 343).

Contrary to the popular perceptions, *ideological mindset* follows the law and "obey(s) strictly and unequivocally (…) the "Laws of Nature or Laws of History" (Arendt, 1958: 461). To the *ideologue*, everlasting victory is only possible if we follow the superhuman linked historical law (natural or divine laws are also historical laws in the sense that it is the history which proves their existence). The purpose of invoking superhuman laws is twofold: one, it gives required legitimacy to the ideological rule; two, it allows the *ideological mindset* to defy existing positive laws, as it draws legitimacy from a higher source and, hence, can do away with the petty legality of the positive laws.

Positive laws give stability, hedge against unpredictability and assure freedom of movement to human affairs. Nevertheless, for an *ideologue*, "even the most unjust legal rules are an obstacle" (Arendt, 1958: 457). Ideological lawfulness applies the Laws of

History or Laws of Nature directly to mankind; without translating these into the standards of right or wrong. This "direct reign of justice" does not take into account the individual behaviour of men (Arendt, 1958: 457).

The *ideological mindset* does not substitute a set of laws with another law but defies all laws, including its own positive laws. "It promises to release the fulfilment of law from all action and will of man; and it promises justice on earth because it claims to make mankind itself the embodiment of the law" (Arendt, 1958: 462).

The construction and subsequent invocation of the Laws of Nature (race) or History (class struggle) are ruthless and inflexible. The *ideologue* is supposed to clear everything which is hindering the realisation of these superhuman laws. The distinction between man and the law is obliterated—which is the hallmark of positive laws—and man himself is made "an active unfailing carrier" of the law (Arendt, 1958: 457). In the *ideological mindset*, it is the action of the man which hinders the movement of eternal laws, therefore, in order to allow the movement of eternal laws, the *ideologue*, who is the obedient servant of the eternal laws, must clear all hindrances in their path. Man must conform to the eternal laws.

It is, however, not possible for every man to understand the true will of the Almighty as translated into eternal laws. Man being subjective shall tend to draw different interpretations of the same law. Different interpretations would be a sign of man's freedom. Individual freedom, whether in the physical realm or thought is against the grain of the *ideological mindset*.

The *ideological mindset* resolves this problem through the "leader principle". In this principle, the leader embodies the will of the Almighty. The will of the leader is the will of the Almighty. All actions of the followers must conform to the essence and will of the leader, rather than the petty laws and rules. No law or rule should be allowed to interfere with the will of the leader. One Nazi assertion in "*Nazi Conspiracy"* explains the role of the leader as follows.

> The Fuehrer unites in himself all the sovereign authority of the Reich; all public authority in the state as well as in the movement is derived

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from the authority of the Fuehrer. We must speak not of the state's authority but the Fuehrer's authority if we wish to designate the *character* of the political authority within the Reich correctly. The state does not hold political authority as an impersonal unit but receives it from the Fuehrer as the executor of the national will. The authority of the Fuehrer is complete and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the means of political direction; it extends into all fields of national life; it embraces the entire people, which is bound to the Fuehrer in loyalty and obedience. The authority of the Fuehrer is not limited by checks and controls, by special autonomous bodies or individual rights, but it is free and independent, all-inclusive and unlimited, who in his personality embodies the idea which sustains all and whose spirit and will, therefore, animate the entire community" (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol 1: Chapter 7; 2780-PS).

The pledge of the Nazi party members asserted that the "Fuehrer is always right" (Arendt quoted from Ley, 1936: 8). It is, however, interesting to note that four years earlier the same pledge in "*Dienstvorschrift fuer die P.O. der* NSDAP (1932: 38) [adopted from Arendt] had a different phraseology. It then read: "Hitler's decision is final". Difference in phraseology may be linked to the level of totalitarian organisation's hold on the affairs.

Nazi pledge that "Fuehrer is always right" point to another peculiar aspect of the *ideological mindset*: namely, in this thinking, the leader can neither be defeated nor can make a mistake. A defeat or misjudgement of the leader is always interpreted as a new beginning. The communist party, at least for the initial two years, refused to accept that Hitler's victory in 1936 was actually the defeat of the German Communist Party. The ideological rule in one country with well-defined boundaries is a dilemma for the movement. Arendt summaries this danger in the following words:

> To a totalitarian movement, both dangers are equally deadly: a development towards absolutism would put an end to the movement's interior drive, and a development towards nationalism would frustrate

its exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive (Arendt, 1958:389).

In order to address this dilemma, the movements go into "permanent revolution" (Arendt, 1958:389) mode. This mode helps them satisfy the requirements of domestic politics and maintain their *claim to global domination*.

2.6.2   *The Claim to Global Domination*

The *Ideological mindset* thinks transnational. It does not settle for total control of a state, rather, looks beyond its geographical boundaries and thinks that in order to fulfil the ideological claims, they need to dominate the world. Hitler in his Reichstag speech of 30 January 1939 declares:

> One must take the point of view, coolly and soberly, that it certainly cannot be the intention of Heaven to give one people fifty times as much space ("Grund und Boden") on this earth as to another. One should not permit himself to be diverted in this case by political boundaries from the boundaries of eternal justice (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol: Chapter7).

This claim springs from the ideological conviction that "the law of nature or law of history, if properly executed, is expected to produce mankind as its end product; and this expectation lies behind the claim to the global rule of all totalitarian governments" (Arendt, 1958: 462). Therefore, the *ideological mindset* suppresses narrow nationalism. The state is just a means to achieve the ideological aim. Hitler consistently asserted that "the state is only the means to an end. The end is the conservation of race" (Reden, 1939: 125). Arendt further notes that *ideologues* "discard national sovereignty and believe, as Hitler once put it, in a world empire on a national basis. They are not

satisfied with a revolution in one country but aim at the conquest and rule of the world" (Arendt, 1958: 358, 359).

In "*Nazi Conspiracy*", a transcript of SS meeting held at the SS Headquarters on January 12, 1943, suggests that the word "nation" should be eliminated as it was insufficient for the Germanic People (Document 705, V: 515). Dossier Kersten quoted

Himmler that "[t]he Fuehrer does not think in German, but in Germanic terms". It was a global race transcending manmade national boundaries. For a Nazi *ideologue*, the exclusive Aryan race should be contrasted from all other people; and its most absolute contrast was with the Jew. Hitler confirms in *Mein Kampf* that "the most extreme contrast to the Aryans is the Jew" (Book 1, Chapter xi). To him, the Jews were ruling the world through conspiracies. Liquidation of this species (the Jews) shall pass the global rule to the rightful species (the Aryans).

Hitler thought he had a clear idea about the Germanic people, as he articulated in 1923 that "[t]he Germanic people consists for one-third of heroes, for another third of cowards, while the rest are traitors" (Baynes, 1942:76). It was obvious from Hitler's assertion that what was waiting for certain categories of the Germanic people as well. They were earmarked, albeit lower in order, as part of the "dying races".

The *Ideologue* does not differentiate between local and foreign populations. They plan the events in foreign lands with total disregard to any issues of sovereignty. For them, independent states are just like the provinces of a global state. An *ideologue* thinks that domestic and foreign political categories are just man-made abstractions, the superhuman law applies everywhere equally.

Politically, the *ideologue* abhors a definite political goal. Anything which does not discuss "ideological questions of importance of centuries" (Arendt, 1958: 470) or subscribe to global domination is an abstraction to the *ideologue*. A Nazi Party Organisation Book reads "[t]he Party includes only fighters who are ready to accept and sacrifice everything in order to carry through the National Socialist *ideology*" (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol 1: Chapter 7; 2774-PS). Hitler was clear that the *ideology* of global domination would require *violence*. He said:

> Only a part of the people will be really active fighters. But they were the fighters of the National Socialist struggle. They were the fighters for the National Socialist revolution, and they are the millions of the rest of the population. For them, it is not sufficient to confess: "I believe", but to swear: 'I fight" (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol 1: Chapter 7; 2775-PS).

The *ideology* thus not only stresses total intellectual commitment to its fictitious world but also calls for *violence* and action.

2.6.3 *Violence and the Call for Action*

The role of *violence* in human history is too obvious to overstate. Arendt has dealt with the phenomenon in her book "*On Violence*" (1970). *Violence*, i.e., "acting without argument or speech and acting without counting the consequences" (Arendt 1970: 64), in Arendt's writings, is opposite to power. Power is a political phenomenon and is generated wherever "men act in concert" (Burke quoted by Arendt, 1958:474). *Violence* is also important for the function it plays in a phenomenon. Absolute power, however, is exercised without *violence*. Use of *violence* indicates a corresponding lack of power (Arendt, 1970: 63-67). The ideological organisations need *violence* for effective propagation of their claims. "Power formations which have their origin in mere propaganda are fluctuating and can disappear quickly unless the *violence* of an organisation supports the propaganda" (Hadamovsky, 1939:21).

An *ideological mindset*, however, is not interested in power for its own sake. Himmler, in a SS pamphlet, "*Die SS*", *Schriften der Hochschule fuer Politic* (1939) says "[t]here is no task that exists for its own sake". The pamphlet repeatedly emphasises "the absolute necessity for understanding the futility of everything that is an end in itself" (Arendt, 1958: 318). Generally, *violence* appears in relation to power. Ideological *violence* is independent of the state of power; it is for the sake of an *ideology*. Hitler is quoted as saying:

> The lack of a great creative idea means at all times an impairment of the fighting spirit. The conviction that it is right to use even the most brutal weapons is always connected with the existence of a fanatical belief that it is necessary that a revolutionary new order of this earth should become victorious. A movement which does not fight for these highest aims and ideals will therefore never resort to the ultimate weapon (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol 1: Chapter7).

The *ideological mindset* is well aware of the role *violence* plays in social restructuring.

Hitler can be seen thrilled with the outbreak of the First World War in his book *Mein Kampf,* Book 1; Chapter V. Himmler thought *violence* furthers the ideological objectives. He believed that "the most severe selection procedure is brought about by war, the struggle of life and death. In this procedure, the value of blood is shown through achievement. War, however, is an exceptional circumstance, and a way had to be found to make selections in peace" (Hafkesbrink, 1948:43).

In peace times, this *mindset* takes an extreme and violent position concerning its ideological claims. The actions committed in pursuit of this position are so violent that the *ideologue* is no more acceptable in the normal world. Goebbels writes in his diaries (1942-1943) that "[o]n the Jewish question, especially, we have taken a position from which there is no escape(…)Experience teaches us that a movement and people who have burned their bridges fight with much courage than those who are still able to retreat" (Lochner, 1948: 266).

Some *violence*, in pursuit of a position, is an everyday experience of every human being. *Violence,* in this sense, is a natural and "rational" human behaviour and stems from our sense of rage. Sometimes, the spontaneous violent response generated by the rage is the only remedy to rebalance the scales of the injustices. *Violence*, however, turns irrational from a rational emotion, once it is deliberate, planned and directed against the substitutes (Arendt, 1970: 65-66).

One of the sources of the violent behaviour of the *ideologue* lies in the rage that is generated against apparent injustice and hypocrisy. The *ideological mindset* is logically very consistent and does not have a place for injustice or hypocrisy. It is at peace with itself and has found a way (*ideology*) to resolve the contradictions of the real world. *Ideological mindset* acts (mostly violently) for the sake of consistency, which they have acquired exclusively.

Violence is important because of the function it plays. Sometimes the *ideologue*, even at the cost of his/her annihilation, uses violent behaviour to unmask the hypocrisies of the dominant powers which have managed to rule without overt means of *violence*. The devious manipulator, who plays with the words, should be provoked to be seen in its true colours. This function of *violence* has also been noted by Spender who writes that

"they have frequently recommended provocations of the police as a strategy for 'unmasking' the *violence* of the authorities" (Spender, 1969: 92).

For an *ideological mindset*, *violence* is a means to an end; the end being the realisation of the *ideology*. *Violence,* in this sense, shall always be in need of justification and guidance. While *ideological mindset* draws its legitimacy from the past, *violence* is justified for a future ideological world which matches with the distant past. So that the whole historical process, from the past to the future, can be ironed out in the light of only one interpretation. The *ideological mindset*, in the Arendtian sense, calls for action. This movement for action is inherent in ideologies.

Past ideological rulers such as Hitler and Stalin who transformed their ideologies into weapons for the elimination of enemies used very simple and inconspicuous premises such as "dying classes" or races which are "unfit to live", therefore, need to be eliminated through *violence*. Anyone who is in agreement that there are things like "dying classes" but then does not draw the conclusion of their elimination or believes certain races are superior to others and the right to remain alive is linked with race, and do not draw the logical conclusion for exterminating "unfit races", is seen as either a coward or a stupid (Arendt, 1958:471-473).

After doing the needful, i.e., *violence*, the *ideologues* not only glorify and boast about their past crimes but enthusiastically forecast the future ones as well. The Nazis "were convinced that evil-doing in our times has a morbid force of attraction" (Borkenau, 1940: 231). A gruesome act, conducted against all moral standards in pursuit of an ideological aim, not only seems objective but also increases its propaganda value. The objectivity of the violent act lies in the fact that the act cannot be linked to the personal interest of the *character*. Even today, it is indeed very difficult to find a correlation between violent acts of the present-day Islamic radicals and their personal interests.

An absence of personal interest is typical of ideological *violence*. An *ideologue* does not appear to be a "power-hungry" individual who uses *violence* for their personal interest. Even power, which is the essence of almost all forms of governments, is attractive to the *ideologue* only for the role it can play in the realisation of the ideological aim (s).

The *ideologue* is not interested in their own welfare—the very source which is supposed to tie them to social, political and economic structures. Selflessness is typical of the *ideological mindset*. Arendt rightly identified the severity of this selflessness when she said that "compared with their non-materialism, a Christian monk looks like a man absorbed in worldly affairs" (Arendt, 1958: 313-316).

The ideological *character* is so superfluous and selfless that they would willingly help in any ideological action, even if that action means their own execution. A Nazi or Bolshevik will not be shaken by any violent acts committed against their own people. Present-day violent *Islamic ideologue*s amply exhibit these traits. The level of selflessness is also used as a yardstick to assess the ideological commitment of the *character*. Anton Ciligia, an engineer, experienced this method during the trials of foreign engineers in Russia year. He narrates:

> All the time the authorities insisted on my admitting having committed acts of sabotage I had never done. I refused. I was told 'if you are in favour of the Soviet Government, as you pretend you are, prove it by your actions; the Government needs your confession' (Ciliga, 1940: 153).

The *ideologue* is expected to fulfil all the ideological expectations and lose all interest in oneself. Himmler, who organised and indoctrinated the SS men, explained the selflessness of the Nazi *ideologue* in a speech. He says:

> They are not involved in 'everyday problems' but are only interested "in ideological questions of importance for decades and centuries, so that the man knows he is working for a great task which occurs but once in 2000 years (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Part V: 616).

The *ideologue* does not take action for the sake of it; least of all for their own personal interest. Everything the *ideologue* does has a higher ideological purpose. Arendt sites SS's watchword, "there is no task which exists for its own sake". She also notes a quotation from an internally distributed pamphlet. The quotation, translated from German, emphasises, "the absolute necessity for understanding the futility of

everything that is an end in itself" (Arendt, 1958: 473 -475).

Apart from the absence of personal interest, ideological *violence* is distinguished by another aspect, i.e., the perversity of its total domination. Totalitarian domination is not content with the external subjugation of its subjects but demands absolute internal surrender as well.

The idea of domination in the *ideological mindset* is so complete that no means of *violence* alone can achieve it. Ideological domination is not satisfied until and unless every single human being is dominated in every sphere of their life. A continuous and endless struggle is required to fashion man as per the *ideology*. While answering criticism that, even after rise to power, National socialists are still talking about "a struggle", Dieter Schwarz explained that "National Socialism as an *ideology* will not abandon its struggle until (…) the way of life of each individual German has been shaped by its fundamental values, and these are realized every day anew" (Arendt, 1958: 390).

For the *ideological mindset*, man being spontaneous and unpredictable should be so fashioned that they become the true carrier of the supernatural law. *Violence* is legitimate and essential to bring about the required change in man and the circumstances. The man must be stabilised and dehumanised. For an *ideological mindset*, terror is the only method to dehumanise the man; dehumanise in the sense that although the man does not become animal-like but does abandon all human actions and reactions. The totality of terror is achieved when it manages to eliminate all opposition and takes away all freedom of man. Terror pronounces on the spot death sentences in order to clear the path for the movement of the Divine Law; the path which was hindered by the undesirable actions of the free man (Arendt, 1958: 465-468).

While total terror is employed to eliminate external freedom of man, "self-coercive force of logicality [a kind of internal *violence*] is employed" to deprive the man of internal freedom. Internal freedom lies in the ability of the man to "think". Thinking being purest and freest of all human activities is opposite to the ideological mode of thinking—which does not think but follow a chain of logical deductions derived from a premise. Man's thinking is akin to a new beginning. The new beginning is the only

way the man can escape the tyranny of the ideological logicality (Arendt, 1958:472 – 474). Each new beginning can presuppose a new premise, which can be the start of de-radicalisation of the previous *ideology*. In the existing *mindset*, an *ideologu*e shall continue pursuing violent means to eliminate an *objective enemy*.

2.6.4 *The Objective enemy*

For the *ideological mindset*, the enemy is absolute and objective. The enemy's subjective behaviour motivated by fear or any other motive has nothing to do with their status. It is the superhuman law expressed in the *ideology* that has declared certain people as *objective enemies* (Arendt, 1958: 424).

The Ideological mindset also replaces a suspect with an *objective enemy,* i.e., replacement of a suspected infraction with an objective crime. As the *ideology* has categorised certain people as *objective enemies*, to an *ideologue*, it is just a matter of time that the suspect commits a crime. The *ideologue* thinks that they should act before the crime is committed. As the *ideology* has objectively defined the crime, therefore, it is not difficult for the *ideologue* to anticipate that a crime is about to be committed by a suspect type. Arendt narrates a story related by C. Pobyedonostzev as an example of the *objective enemy*. The event is related to a Russian General Cherevin of Okhrana, who was asked to explain the situation as the opposing party, who was about to lose a case, had hired a Jewish Lawyer. The General stated that:

> The same night I ordered the arrest of this cursed Jew and held him as a so-called politically suspected person (…) After all, could I treat in the same manner friends and a dirty Jew who may be innocent today but who was guilty yesterday or will be guilty tomorrow? (Arendt, 1958: 426).

An individual can also be suspected due to their resemblance with certain objective criteria. The *ideologue* can logically conclude that due to their suspect type personality, which matches the *objective enemy,* they can be suspected of planning an imagined act. In the Moscow trials, the logical anticipation of a crime yet to be committed by a suspected (objective) enemy, was stretched to remarkable limits. During the trials,

Stalin somewhat employed the following reasoning against the suspects.

> They may want to overthrow me in a crisis—I shall charge them with having made the attempt (…) A change of government may weaken Russia's fighting capacity: and if they succeed, they may be compelled to sign a truce with Hitler, and perhaps even agree to a cession of territory (…) I shall accuse them of having entered already into a treacherous alliance with Germany and ceded Soviet territory (Deutscher, 1949:377).

In the same vein, Frank quotes a Nazi *ideologue* in *Nazi Conspiracy* as follows:

> A complete catalogue of attempts 'dangerous to the State' can never be drawn up because it can never be foreseen what may endanger the leadership and the people sometime in the future (Quoted from Arendt, Frank, 1939:881).

For an *ideological mindset*, if the laws of some superhuman force (History or Nature) have pronounced "inferior races" or "dying classes" to be the *objective enemies*, "[g]uilt and innocence become senseless notions; 'guilty' is he who stands in the way of the natural or historical process which has passed judgement over 'inferior races', over individuals 'unfit to live', over 'dying classes and decadent peoples'" (Arendt, 1958: 465).

It is the task of the *ideologue* to find or nominate certain people as "dying classes" or *objective enemies* of the *ideology*. As the *ideologue* considers themselves as a mere interpreter of a divine process which will take its course regardless, their political statements are delivered in the form of a prophecy. *Ideologue*'s prophecies are their future intentions. Two examples are relevant here to prove this point. Hitler famously prophesized in 1939 that "I want today once again to make a prophecy: In case the Jewish financiers (…) succeed once more in hurling the peoples into a world war, the result will be (…) the annihilation of Jewish race in Europe" (quoted from Goebbels' diaries by Lochner, 1948: 148). Translated into plain language, the statement meant: I have recognised the *objective enemy* and war is necessary to eliminate them.

Similarly, Stalin once decided to liquidate party deviants, declared them as the representatives of the "dying classes" in his famous speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1930 (Stalin, 1933). The phrases like "dying classes" or "dying races" sharpen the focus of the audience and contextualise the issue concerning a historical process. When Stalin was declaring certain opponents as "dying classes", he was, in fact, prophesizing their liquidation. In other words, the time had come to liquidate the *objective enemies* of the *ideology*. The liquidation is fitted into the ideological realisation of the historical process. Declaring somebody as the *objective enemy* of the *ideology* is one of the greatest discretions in the hands of an ideological leader.

For the *ideological mindset,* any sentiments of sympathy or support are equally useless as ideological terror selects its victims and executioners according to the objective standards. These standards are independent of "candidate's convictions or sympathies", and have nothing to do with individual thoughts or actions (Arendt, 1958:467-468). In the *ideological mindset*, man is dispensable, selfless and can be tasked objectively to play the role of an executioner or a victim. On the one hand, *violence* is employed to realign the reality with the understanding of the *ideological mindset*; on the other, the tyranny of the ideological logicality is employed to reject the existing reality. The *ideological mindset* rejects everything different from its thinking, i.e., *factual reality*.

2.6.5 *Rejection of Factual Reality*

The *ideological mindset* rejects reality. It does not subscribe to the plurality and uniqueness of everyday experiences of life, rather wants to see consistency in world affairs. Logical reasoning is employed to achieve this imagined consistency. Logical reasoning, says Arendt, not as a necessary check on the arbitrariness of the totalitarian rule, but as a tool to control the thought, i.e., to reject everything inconsistent with the idea or the premise of *ideology*. If some statements have two proclamations, which contradict each other, we know that we have gone wrong somewhere; and to reconcile, we need to think them all over again. The *ideological mindset* is fashioned to suppress any such response. It does not promote reflection, and rather it gleans out any view, judgment or fact which is in tension with the *ideology* itself (Arendt, 1958:469).

The *ideological mindset* is not interested in what *is* (i.e., the *factual reality*); rather it falls back either to its "super sense" or history, which is interpreted in light of the "only idea" of the *ideology*. The *factual reality* means the reality realised through the five senses. Ideological interpretations do not support things as they *are*, but point to the historical process which is in constant change. The present is just a stage of the historical process. The *ideological mindset* is "historical, concerned with becoming and perishing" (Arendt, 1958: 469). In this thinking, man is merely a part of a gigantic process moved by nature which is evident in history. Life is historicised and created for the sake of historical movement. Life in itself is bereft of any meaning.

In this sense, the *ideological mindset* becomes independent of all reality of daily life and new experiences. It insists on some truer reality which is concealed and can only be uncovered by the *ideologue* through their super sense. To the *ideologue*, "[t]he concepts of enmity is replaced by that of conspiracy, and this produces a mentality in which reality - real enmity or real friendship - is no longer experienced and understood in its own terms but is automatically assumed to signify something else" (Arendt, 1958: 471). This *mindset* thinks in terms of conspiracies and hidden agendas. Nazis used "'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'—a patent forgery—as a symbol of a Jewish conspiracy" (Curtiss, 1942). The "protocols" were extensively used to denounce the Jews and to mobilise the mobs against them. The *ideological mindset* was not interested in the authenticity of the "protocols", but as Hitler confirmed, the plausibility of the "Protocols" was located in the fact that "what many Jews may be doing unconsciously is here consciously made clear. And that is what counts" (Hitler, 1943: book 1; Chapter iv). The intentions of the enemy become objectified. The *ideological mindset* works on the principle that anyone who is not included is excluded. This principle was laid out by Hitler as early as 1922 when he said:

> The gentlemen of the right have never yet understood that it is not necessary to be an enemy of the Jew to drag you one day……to the scaffold…….it is quite enough……..it is quite enough not to be a Jew: that will secure the scaffold for you (*Nazi Conspiracy*, Vol 1: Chapter VII; 490).

The *ideological mindset* has a great capacity for extreme contempt for the facts. Koneird Heiden in his "Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power" states that Hitler could not show "demonstrable reality in all his utterances" and was "phenomenal[ly] untruthful" and demonstrated complete "indifference to the facts which he does not regard as vitally important" (Heiden, 1944: 368, 374).

The *ideological mindset*, however, is not content with the rejection of the *factual reality* as such, but when in power makes every effort to transform the reality in line with its fictitious ideological world. Propaganda supported by terror is used to transform reality. They neither believe in the reality of their experience nor their eyes and ears but only in their imagination, i.e., the "super sense". Such imagination is lured by anything consistent and universal. They are not convinced by the facts—whether true or invented—but the consistency of the system. Repetitive propaganda is very attractive to such a *mindset* as repetition itself substitutes the facts for the sake of consistency. To an *ideologue*, facts as such are just the examples of divine laws, and ideological propaganda can explain all accidents in light of an all-encompassing omnipotent first cause. In an ideological sense, however, propaganda and terror are two sides of the same coin. For the *ideological mindset*, "terror without propaganda would lose most of its psychological effect, whereas propaganda without terror does not contain its full punch" (Bamstedt, 1945: 164). Nazi theorist Eugen Hadamovsky supports the idea of using *violence* for the sake of propaganda. In his opinion, *violence* and propaganda are mutually supportive (Hadamovsky, 1939).

In efforts to transform *factual reality*, totalitarianism would take definite steps to support its ideological propaganda. In Soviet Russia, for example, "at that time, it was officially announced that unemployment was 'liquidated'. The result of the announcement was that all unemployment benefits were equally 'liquidated'" (Ciliga, 1940: 109). Similarly, when Nazis liquidated Polish intellectuals, who, in Hitler's words can be "wiped out without qualms" (Poliakove, document no: 2472), the reason was not to terrorize the population but to conform to the fictitious reality of the *ideology*, which stated that Poles had no intellect, and that superior "Germanic blood" must be saved. The purpose of Himmler's "Operation Hay*"* started on 16 February

1942 was to take "Germanic children" from Poles and hand them over to families "that are willing [to accept them] without reservations, out of love for the good blood in them" (Nuremberg Document, R 135, Centre de Documentation Juive, Paris).

Karl Brandt, a physician, charged by Hitler to execute the program protested vehemently when he was suggested that the project aimed to eliminate superfluous food consumers. He opined that Nazi party members who toed such a line were clearly rebuked. He testified during "*Medical Trial: The US against Karl Brandt et al. Hearing of May 14, 1947"* that the considerations for eliminations were purely "ethical". Likewise, records show that military staff repeatedly reminded that deportations of millions of Jews and Poles were against the "military and economic necessities" (Poliakove, document No 321).

The *ideological mindset* is fond of using a "super sense" and may not take into account economic, political or common-sense considerations while taking decisions. Such a *mindset* is concerned with only one consideration, namely, to prove that its ideological predictions have come true. It was this consideration which convinced organised Nazis in the last days of the war to ensure as complete a destruction of Germany as possible, so that their prediction may come true that Germany would be ruined in case of a defeat.

Real enmity grows out of a sense of injustice; it has an object which has committed the injustice. Real enmity is naked, direct, real and generally visible. Principally, every kind of injustice or aggression has a different enemy. In the conspirational sense of an *ideology*, the enemy never changes. The *ideological mindset* only focuses on that part of the reality, which is recognised by *ideology*. For the ideological *mindset*, it is legitimate to ignore or twist the factual reality in order to uncover the ideological claims.

2.7   Conclusion

This chapter lays the foundations of an analytical framework aimed at conceptually understanding the *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character* through the Arendtian criteria of *ideology*. Arendt has engaged with the notion in her various works, especially *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958).

Thinking and its manifestations are a speciality of Arendt. Thinking, in Arendt, is understood as a phenomenon in a political context. Arendt argues that a lonely man either thinks everything to the worst or stops thinking. In both cases, they may surrender their thought to the "mighty tentacles" of a totalizing *ideology*. She argues that an *ideologue* under the influence of *ideology* develops a distinct mode of thinking. This mode of thinking has certain characteristics or elements. Arendt traced these elements through the "characterology" of an *ideological mindset*. She assumes the Nazi and Bolshevik *ideologue* as an ideal *character* type for the "characterology" of an *ideological mindset*. Arendt interpreted these elements of *ideological mindset* through the actions of the *characters* (Arendtian "action" includes spoken or written word). The elements which characterise an *ideological mindset* are: the *superhuman source* as the origin of thought; the *claim to global domination*; *violence* and *the call for action*; the *objective enemy*; and rejection of *factual reality*.

Following Arendt, in succeeding chapters, I shall locate these elements through the "characterology" of the *mindset* of the *Islamic ideologue*. I shall argue that the discursive practices constructed by the three Islamist organisations, once interpreted, exhibit Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset*. The constructed *character* thinks in a similar pattern as the past ideologue, i.e. the Nazi/Communist *ideologue*. Next, I shall explain the method of my inquiry before I commence the analysis of Islamist organisations' published magazines.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Although, I deduce the five essential elements of ideological thinking from my readings of Arendt's writings and especially "*The Origins of Totalitarianism*" (1958), I consciously deviate, in some aspects, from her theory and method of inquiry (as interpreted in Sigwart 2016, i.e. characterology). This deviation is based on plausible reasons and has certain implications for the findings of this research.

In *Origins*, it is Arendt's standard method to construct important characters which represent the "spirit" of the time and "essence" of the structural phenomenon. Through this characterology Arendt focuses on the significance of the structural phenomenon, which mediates and guides the conduct of her exemplary character(s). In this sense, she is more inclined to note the performative and contextual aspects of the characters. This focus enables her to articulate the main structural elements namely, antisemitism, imperialism and ideology, which crystallised into the phenomenon of totalitarianism. Fundamentally, Arendt "proceeds from some typical theoretical questions: What happened? Why did it happen? How could it have happened? (Arendt 1968a: xxiv quoted by Buckler, 2011).

In a deviation from the Arendtian emphasis, this research focuses on the character itself. Specifically, it is trying to identify the set of essential ideas that comprise the mindset of the violent character of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation. This research inquiry is limited only to the question: what does the mindset of the constructed abstract character of the phenomenon comprise of? This deviation is necessary as this thesis is trying to deduce the standard profile of the character, i.e. Islamic ideologue, which is based on the assumption that such a standard profile consists for a typical mindset. This study's focus also entails an important methodological departure from the Arendtian method employed in *Origins*. Arendt employs inductive rationality to theorise her understanding of the phenomenon, whereas this research deduces the elements of an ideological mindset from the

empirical material through an existing (Arendtian) theoretical framework, hence, it is a deductive method. I assert that deductive rationality of this research, though inspired by Arendt, has a value in its own right as it is likely to extend a strong theory to another character that has been produced by another phenomenon namely, Islamic discourses producing radicalisation, which has not yet been analysed using Arendt. This methodological difference has certain implications for the findings of this research.

Firstly, a researcher with a different theoretical framework may read the empirical material differently and come up with different kind of findings. In this sense, the findings of this research assume an agreement with the Arendtian articulations of ideology. Specifically, it assumes the separation of religion and ideology as an analytical category. The findings of this research would imply that certain Islamic theological interpretations are not religious but ideological in nature and inspire violence. Whether these interpretations are mainstream or not is a complex investigation and would require epistemological and ontological positioning on the idea of 'mainstream Islam', which is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Secondly, although this research in its conclusion does note certain deviations, in the thinking of the Islamic radical, from the Arendtian theory, yet such observations (on the deviations) are still deductive in nature and remain tied to the Arendtian theory. Hence, this research is conscious of the fact that, although the research is grounded in a strong theoretical framework, the same framework does limit its methodological flexibility as compared to an inductive method. A researcher approaching the same empirical material through inductive methodology may name the ideas exhibited by the constructed character differently but shall lose the advantage of drawing conceptual parallels between the past ideologues, i.e., Nazi and Communist ideologues, and the contemporary Islamic ideologue; a comparison that becomes possible through the Arendtian theory.

Thirdly, this research deduces the ideas mentioned in the MILIR (see Chapter 9) from the empirical material published by the Islamist organisations. The ideal character constructed by these discursive practices is not only a cognitive realisation but also engages with the contextual and performative aspects of the action in the real world.

The analysis chapters (chapter 4 to 8) highlight the performative and contextual aspects of the character as the analysis progresses.

This chapter discusses the methodological approaches I employ to analyse the empirical material that is produced by three terrorist organisations in their discursive practices. These approaches pay special attention to embedded themes in the written texts. I take the online magazines published by three Islamist organisations (AQ, IS and TT) as space where these organisations discursively construct an *ideal type* of a *character*, whom I call the *Islamic ideologue*. In the first part of the chapter, I follow Sigwart in conceptualising "characterology" as a method of inquiry from Arendt. I explain why it is important to construct and study characteristics of an *ideal type* of a *character* that is linked to a complex phenomenon such as *Islamic radicalisation*. In the second part, I elaborate on the technique that I use to work on the exemplary written texts selected from the magazines. I use theory led thematic analysis technique to interpret the exemplary passages that construct the *ideal type character*. The objective is to find whether the ideal type constructed by the Islamist organisations carry all the Arendtian theorised elements in its *mindset*. The last part of the chapter elaborates on how and why I select my source material. This may raise some questions about source selection and the advantages and disadvantages of thematic analytic techniques for reading the characteristics of an abstract *character* constructed through written texts. I am careful to claim that I have comprehensively addressed these issues, and I provide a determined defence of my approach. I also stress that my empirical chapters (Chapter 3 to 7) should be seen as illustrations of the theoretical framework and analytical argument explained in the first two chapters. This is a theory-led qualitative approach that is designed to reconceptualise the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*.

3.2   Conceptualising "Characterology" as the Method of Inquiry

In *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958), Arendt employs a distinct method of inquiry. She shapes this method into a critical method of political analysis. The method not only illuminates the "elemental structure" of totalitarianism, but it also renders a critic of the phenomenon itself, thus sensitising the reader to the "immediate practical implications" of an unprecedented occurrence (Sigwart, 2016: 271). Although it is

possible, according to Sigwart, to find some commonality of tradition in Arendt within the oeuvre of Charles de Montesquieu and her teachers, namely Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, Arendt is, however, unique in her way of theorising. It is this uniqueness of Arendt's way of theorising that has become the main cause of criticism by her rivals.

The main problem originates from the persistent efforts to categorise the Arendtian methodology within the known political philosophies and traditional schools of thought (Vollrath and Fantel, 1977: 160). One can note the strong traditional epistemological language in the critique by her opponents. According to Ernst Vollrath, her critics describe her "as a proponent of a normative attitude, a neo—Aristotelian, an adherent of obsolete doctrines of natural right, as a philosophical anthropologist; or to simplify matters, as a political essayist, a hyperbolic commentator on timely events, or, a historian without methodological training" (ibid). Methodological ambiguity, in the traditional sense, is an area noted by almost all the scholars who chose to reflect on the Arendtian methodology.

Steve Buckler, for example, opines that "Arendt's methodological commitments are neither immediately nor easily identifiable and her remarks on the subject were occasional and elusive" (Buckler, 2011: 2). Arguably, such an ambiguity is not a lapse on the part of Arendt but a deliberate and conscious departure from traditionalism in line with her understanding of the very nature of politics. She "wished to look at politics with eyes unclouded by philosophy" (Buckler, 2011: 1). Understandably, the political actions of the political characters are supposed to be contextual and performed in peculiar conditions of the time (Sigwart, 2016). Therefore, Arendt chose "to think in a mode that would reacquaint us with the distinctive fabric of political experience, gaining greater proximity to the political through the development of a manner of speaking that answers more closely to the discursive conditions of the public realm itself" (Buckler, 2011: 6). Arendt approaches the phenomenon of totalitarianism through a discrete method of inquiry.

Therefore, at first instance, it is indeed difficult to locate Arendt's work on totalitarianism and *ideology* in some explicit methodological understanding. It seems that the effort suffers from the absence of an explicitly explained conceptual

framework. However, Arendt is not only aware of this dimension, but it appears that she has deliberately avoided the methodological formalities (Sigwart, 2016: 265). She acknowledges the fact that her work "does not belong to any school and hardly uses any of the officially recognised or officially controversial instruments" (Arendt, 1953: 77). For Arendt, it is more important to understand the political reality of an unprecedented phenomenon like totalitarianism than the method through which such a reality has been understood (Sigwart, 2016: 265). She is quite sceptical about putting too much emphasis on methodology and believes that as a result of social scientists' over-emphasis on methodology during their academic quarrel "methodological problems are likely to overshadow more fundamental issues" (Arendt, 1953: 77). For Arendt "Inquiry Method" means "such mental processes as deducing, inducing, and drawing conclusions whose logical rules . . . can be learned once and for all and then need only to be applied" (Arendt, 2006: 13). Arendt calls methodological procedures an "experience in how to think", which can be learnt "like all experience in doing something, only through practice, through exercises" (Arendt, 1968/2006: 13). One may note that her thoughts are not very conventional, especially with regards to the questions of methodology.

In a reply to Eric Voegelin, who is the first commentator on her *Origins*, Arendt acknowledges that she "failed to explain the particular method which I came to use, and to account for a rather unusual approach …. to the whole field of political and historical sciences as such" (Arendt, 1953: 77). Arendt calls her method "unusual" as it does not fit neatly into the Anglo-American theoretical tradition of the time. It is worth pointing out that in some instances her critics failed to appreciate the real focus of her work (Sigwart, 2016: 265-270).

Sheila Benhabib also notes the "redemptive power" of the Arendtian narrative. She argues that Arendt in *Origins* "is searching for the 'elements' of totalitarianism; for those currents of thought, political events and outlooks, incidents and institutions, which once the 'imagination of history' has gathered them together in the present reveal an altogether different meaning than what they stood for in the original context" (Benhabib, 1990:172). Arendt appreciates the novelty of the totalitarian phenomenon

and then from that position studies the history backwards to locate the elemental threads of the phenomenon in the political and social space of the time (Crick, 1977:120). Would it have added to the methodological clarity of *Origins*, had Arendt explicitly said what she was doing? Arguably, "she selects what is relevant to understanding the mentality of the Nazis and the Communists under Stalin; and she is not writing a general account of nineteenth-century extreme political sects" (Ibid). Arendt successfully illuminates the elements of a novel mindset at the centre of the totalitarian phenomenon, yet she "say[s] nothing helpful to the reader faced with a work so large, so unusual, so diverse, so outside the Anglo-American scholarly tradition, about her presupposition" (Crick, 1977:122). She, however, reflects on the nature of her ideas in her later works. Bernard Crick notes this shift and argues that Arendt clarifies her assumptions about human freedom, the political, and the capacity for action in *The Human Condition* (1958); the possibilities of deliberate social change in *On revolution* (1963); freedom and normative practice in *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963); and the nature of authority and power in *On violence* (ibid). Therefore, if her "books are read as each taking up a theme that emerges in *Origins,* but is left unresolved or insufficiently clarified, then we see her writings in true perspective and as constituting a whole" (Crick, 1977:123).

Nevertheless, Arendt's remark about her methodology has at least two interesting implications: First, "her comment suggests that she indeed exercises a distinct method of inquiry in *Origins"* (Sigwart, 2016: 265,266). She chooses to call her method a "rather unusual" approach. The expression "unusual" indicates the distinctiveness of the method and affirms the realisation that it was difficult to categorise her methodology with the help of Anglo-American Schools of Thought of her time (ibid). Principally, it appears that Arendt is not comfortable with the idea of formally laying out one's method of inquiry in the research; therefore, we are unable to find an explicitly laid out methodology in her writings. At the same time, it is, however, unfair to conclude that Arendt's writings are without a methodology when we know that she most certainly used a methodology which she described as unusual.

Second, Arendt concedes in her reply to Eric Voegelin that the plausibility of her argument would have been further strengthened, had she cared to elaborately explain the elementary assumptions of her "unusual" approach. In *Origins,* apart from ambiguity with regards to methodology, Arendt has also refrained from explicitly explaining the fundamental assumptions of the inquiry (Sigwart, 2016: 266). Both assumptions, once reviewed together, do suggest that Arendt did use a methodology in *Origins* which was "unusual" and implicit. These assumptions open up a "potentially rich source of inspiration regarding the methodological foundations of political theorising" (Ibid).

Sigwart conceptualises Arendt's methodology as implicit in *Origins* (Sigwart, 2016) and employs reconstructive interpretation to unearth the method used in the study. He "reconstruct[s] the *Origins* as an implicit 'exercise' on the question of 'how to think'" (Sigwart, 2016: 266). Sigwart borrows from Lysa J. Disch's (1993) in describing his attempt, namely, "to tell a story that Arendt did not tell because she considered it inappropriate to do so" (Disch, 1993: 665). Sigwart argues that

> there indeed is an only vaguely articulated and partly rather underspecified, yet decisive methodological motive woven into Arendt's analyses which substantially shapes the study's general frame of reference. I denote this motive as Arendt's "characterological" method of political theorising (Sigwart, 2016: 266).

Theoretically, "characterology" is aligned with "realist" or "non-idealist" approaches. These approaches emphasise the practicalities of historical explanations of political theory when it engages with "concrete practices of politics" within a specific framework of institutions and structures (Sigwart, 2016: 275; Galston, 2010). A "non-idealist" social theorist would focus on the practicability of the facts as they exist. Nevertheless, both, the idealists and realists, understand that sometimes an imaginative journey into the future is essential to recreate certain ideal situations to assess a *character's* response to the changed circumstances. Beyond this point, the realists (in contrast to idealists), however, argue that the theory should not stretch the circumstances to the extent that it presents the world radically different from the

existing one. The "non-idealist" approaches lay more emphasis on the probability and feasibility aspects of the human experience and argue that the possibility that all humans will appreciate a certain value or attribute equally is very low. Likewise, as the influence of a specific social phenomenon would differ from one individual to another, therefore, it is unlikely that all members of a community would engage with the disposition with the same intensity. An outward empirically verifiable disposition, in this sense, is a real and concrete disposition displayed by a certain *character* type.

The employment of "non-idealist" approaches in explaining an unprecedented phenomenon by Arendt is understandable. Sometimes, a unique phenomenon needs a unique method to understand it. Arendt's "decided refusal to join the fashionable trends emerging from the desperate efforts of current political theorists to appear properly 'scientific', however, led her to, ironically, characterise her thinking style as 'my old-fashioned storytelling'" (Vollrath and Fantel, 1977: 160,161).

Using this "old fashioned storytelling" method, now described as the "characterological" method of political theorising by Sigwart, Arendt manages to interpret significant empirical material comprising biographical narratives, official reports, historical records and other literature to tell the story of the totalitarian phenomenon. Epistemologically, this is done under a theoretical framework of "interpretive connection of structural elements with an individualistic and ideographic perspective on political phenomena" (Sigwart, 2016: 266). The framework suggests that the concepts that are central to the phenomenon i.e., structural concepts, such as *ideology* have an intimate and reciprocal connection with the individual dispositions. The connection between individual perspectives and the structural phenomena is, however, in need of interpretation.

The conceptual connection between the structural concept and individual disposition is comprehended through conceptually constructing exemplary *character* types. The exemplary *character* type is the living embodiment of the structural phenomenon such as *ideology* that is being examined in this research. These ideal-type *characters* are central to the "characterology" as a method of inquiry. Sigwart asserts that these *character* types "articulate the practical significance of elemental social, political, and

historical patterns by highlighting the intimate, reciprocal, and dynamic relation between individual dispositions and actions and their structural context" (Sigwart, 2016: 266). These *character* types take specific and concrete positions on social understandings of the historical and political narratives. The dispositions are informed by their understandings of the structural narrative and pattern. The *character* types' dispositions are like a focal point for the structural concept and the action. In their dispositions, the *character* types make sense of the *ideology* (the structural concept) and initiate the informed action.

The action of an *ideologue*, informed by *ideology*, can empirically materialise in two forms. One, it can be in the form of concrete physical action, and two, it can be in the shape of a written/spoken word or a symbol. The latter form, which can also be called the narrative method, can hermeneutically expose the basic elements or characteristics of a phenomenal condition like a radicalised or *ideological mindset*.

The "characterological" approach is also premised on certain other useful concepts. For example, the idea that the structural concept has a definitive relationship with the action of the *character* type. This relationship is not stagnant but dynamic and reciprocal. After having engaged with the *ideology*, the *character* type interprets and fixes its sense and meaning in their thought. During the conceptual understanding of the *ideology*, a dialogue of thinking takes place between the self of the *character* and the concept, i.e., *ideology*. Ideally, such dialogue of thinking takes place in two in one, i.e. me and myself, situation. However, as the *character* has replaced "me" with an *ideology*, the dialogue becomes meaningless. The other self of the *ideologue*, which is now a non-negotiable *ideological mindset*, mimics a dialogue. This dialogue is not in the form of any contest or argumentation but only to think the ways to reorder the thought. The thought is no more guided by an independent logic and rationality, but only by the logicality of the *ideology*. The *character* stops thinking and submits to the "mighty tentacles of the logicality" (Arendt, 1958: 472). Under the influence of *ideology*, the thinking pattern of the *character* changes permanently. This change in thinking patterns is the result of the assimilation of the *ideology*. I call this thinking an *ideological mindset*. The *character* has been radicalised to become an *ideologue*, and

most of their actions are a result of the changes specified above, i.e., the ingrained thinking pattern informs them.

The *ideological mindset* has certain characteristics. Interestingly, these characteristics of the *ideological mindset* are more or less common to all *ideologue*s irrespective of the nature of the *ideology*. A focus on the conceptual characteristics of a radicalised person's *mindset* can help us to identify certain peculiar characteristics, which are common to all *ideologue*s. These characteristics of an *ideological mindset* can be hermeneutically gleaned from the action or the narrative of the *character* type, i.e. the *ideologue*.

The "characterological" approach has certain fundamental conceptual cornerstones. First, the approach supports the idea that there is a dynamic, mutually constitutive and reciprocal relationship between the action of a *character* and the abstract concept. Second, it interprets concrete incidents and narratives to construct a representative *character* type. This *character* type then acts as a methodological category to mediate between the action and the elementary structural concept (Sigwart, 2016: 274, 275). Third, it allows us to deconstruct the conceptual thinking of a "representative *character* type" to understand their *mindset*.

The "characterological" approach aims at defining the structural aspects of a phenomenon by recognising the typical "individual dispositions of action" (Sigwart, 2016: 267) and by articulating these actions in ideal *character* types. In line with the "characterological" approach, this research is focusing on the *ideological* aspects of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*. I explain this phenomenon through the narratives of Islamist organisations. This approach provides a theoretical framework which takes into account the significance of structural patterns (like *ideology*, in this case) while at the same time draws on the concrete, dynamic and empirical political action, as narrated by the Islamist organisations. Political "characterology" assesses the individual *character* types in action while affording them freedom in their settings; it connects the structural concept to empirical evidence.

The "characterological" approach augments the very few studies that have conducted empirical research to understand the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* with the

particular focus on its central character. The approach, however, is based on certain specific assumptions. For instance, it assumes that certain *character* types express politically noteworthy social concepts like *ideology* through their narratives and concrete actions at the practical level, and these exemplary *character* types "are composed of peculiar sets of individual dispositions" (Sigwart, 2016: 267). As the character types readjust their actions in line with the "peculiar sets of individual dispositions", *ideology* does not remain abstract at the level of individual action or narration. The *ideal type* of *ideologue* takes a definitive position in their textual expressions. In other words, an *ideologue* is an actor agency which transforms an abstract concept of *ideology* into concrete and practical action informed by a peculiar *mindset*. The practical action of an *ideologue* can take many forms like: physical, visual, written or spoken word.

The practical action of an *ideal type* of *ideologue* is, however, problematic. It is problematic because it flows from a fictitious and distorted *mindset*. It is also possible that an illusionary worldview might be shared, more so, by other members of the *character's* wider group, social network or society. What distinguishes the *Islamic ideologue* from other members of their community, however, is their seriousness to operationalise this conceptual construction. In other words, this *character* type is very serious in eliminating any tension between the abstract concept and action. Paradoxically, it is also this action-oriented seriousness that enhances the social position of the *character* in Muslim communities. The level of social acceptance of the *Islamic ideologue* in the Muslim communities is a strong indicator to assess the level of importance the communities attached to a particular *ideology*. This assumption is in line with the Arendtian insistence on the empirical concreteness of the action in political theory. Methodologically, the assumption implies a dynamic relationship between the "practical logic of political action" and its "structural context" (Sigwart, 2016: 267). Political action at an individual level makes sense once viewed in a structural context.

According to the Arendtian understanding, the relationship between action and the structural concept is not unilateral or causal but reflects a complex mutuality. In this

sense, *ideology*, if understood as a structural phenomenon fuelling violence in Muslim societies, should be comprehended in personal and concrete expressions of individual dispositions of action or narration.

In their political and social engagements, as the individuals actively attempt to relate to the structural environment of the society, they also translate the "structural pattern" of the society through concrete actions or narratives. In this process, certain representative *character* types claim to have acquired the "spirit" of these structural patterns in their personal dispositions of action (or narration) (Sigwart, 2016: 269). This claim, of having acquired the "spirit" corresponding to structural concepts, also gives the *character* a kind of monopoly over the interpretations of the abstract concept. If the *ideology*, for example, is the structural concept under review, the *ideologue* goes beyond the stated laws of the *ideology* in their claim of understanding the "spirit" or essence of these laws.

This conceptual claim of understanding the essence of *ideology* on the part of the *ideal type* might be a point of distinction between *ideology* and religion. At this point, the *ideal type* moves beyond the stated laws of the religion Islam. The *character* is turned into an *Islamic ideologue* from a religiously observant Muslim. The *Islamic ideologue* justifies his/her behaviour with the help of the essence of the *ideology*. The idea of the essence helps the *ideologue* to resolve the tension between the radical concept and their personal disposition. An *ideological mindset* is always aligned with the essence of the *ideology*.

In *Origins*, Arendt analyses a dynamic relationship between a structural concept and an individual disposition. However, the idea of such a relationship does not exist a priori in her studies, but she elaborates this in and through her studies. In her endeavour to explain this relationship, she conceptualises certain representative *character* types which she considers as "living embodiments" or "living symbols" of the basic structural idea (Arendt, 1958: 71, 189). While selecting and then studying ideal *character* types, Arendt methodologically translates "structural concepts into more concrete and practical terms of a political theory of action" (Sigwart, 2016: 267).

In *Origins*, Arendt studies many *character* types, such as the *ideologue*, the bourgeois, the Jewish *character*, the mass-man, the bureaucrat, the imperial *character*, and others. These *character* types are realised in concrete individual conceptual dispositions and their practices when they relate themselves to society.

For example, the Jew of the time is expressed in the "characterology" of the parvenu and the pariah. The conceptual "principle of action" for the parvenu is "honour". Accordingly, as external signs of distinction, this *character* type strives for privilege, reputation and distinction (Arendt: 1994, 335, 336). The parvenu is political and represents the "spirit" of the peculiar political position of Jews of the time. Arendt constructs "the conceptual Jew" to conceptualise the history of antisemitism. "The conceptual Jew provided the critical energy for Arendt's (...) theoretical reflections on antisemitism" (Judaken: 2012, 173). The character of the Jew is constructed in both roles i.e. as the originator as well as the victim of modernity. In the Arendtian conception, the identity of "the conceptual Jew" is quite an unsettled one when viewed with the help of Jewish traditions (Judaken: 2012, 174). The prevalent social structure of the time excludes Jews from being fully integrated into society as equal members. The parvenu, left with no option, develops a *mindset* which "follows the peculiar social logic of distinction". The parvenu *mindset* is equivalent to "subject" disposition as described by Montesquieu in monarchical societies (Sigwart: 2016, 271). In a hostile society, the parvenu must protect their "honour" through privilege and "reputation". Therefore, the *character's mindset* was influenced by the prevailing structural ideas. Arendt treats these conditions, which forced the parvenu to adopt a particular *mindset* as early symptoms of the structural concept of anti-Semitism. The parvenu *mindset,* however, became dysfunctional in the changing political environment of the 19th century. The *character* of the parvenu failed to adjust their behaviour to the structural ideas of the century and fell out of tune for the time. The *Character's* failure, in itself, indicates a change in the structural ideas and concepts of the time. Arendt's "characterological" scenery sketches different *character* types to understand certain structural concepts like anti-Semitism, racism, imperialism, all of which crystallised into totalitarianism at the critical juncture of the 20th century. Interestingly, an anti-

political orientation of Arendt's many *character*s also tells the story of the absence of a "citizen" as a *character* type in 19th century Europe (Sigwart, 2016: 272).

Likewise, for Arendt, the *mindset* of a *character* type in the personal disposition of a Nazi or a Communist *ideologue* indicates the presence of a mediating structural concept as well, i.e. an *ideology*. Arendt studies deeply the mediating structural concept of *ideology* to understand the *mindset* of the *character*, i.e. the *ideologue*. Arendt interprets narratives and biographical accounts of the exemplary *character*s to arrive at the peculiar characteristics or elements of an *ideological mindset*. Arendt understands the peculiar elements of an *ideological mindset* or *ideologue* through the interpretations of actions and discursive practices of the Communist and Nazi *ideologue*. In her endeavour to trace the discursive practices of the *character* type, Arendt relies heavily on primary resources. These resources include the inquiry report known as *Nazi Conspiracy*, Nazi publications, Nazi and Communist propaganda/training material, speeches, interviews, newspapers and party manifestos of both the organisations. Apart from the secondary material, Arendt reinforces her argument with two exceptional direct sources available to her. These are: First, her own life experience in Germany with the Nazi *ideologue* and second, her direct exposure to an exemplary *ideologue,* namely Eichmann, during his trial in Jerusalem. Although, the Eichmann trial was held several years later than her "characterological" exercise of a Nazi *ideologue* in the *Origins,* yet the Eichmann experience only reconfirms her earlier findings, and she does not revise any of her thoughts on *ideological mindset*. What's more, the Eichmann trial only confirms the assertion that *ideological* radicalisation is more of a mental phenomenon than the physical appearance of a character, and such a *character* is indistinguishable from ordinary fellow human beings.

While studying these exemplary *character* types, Arendt discovered a unique thinking pattern which had its origin in the *ideology* and informed the action and the discursive practices of the *ideologue*. This thinking pattern or *mindset* was common in both the *character* types, i.e. the Nazi and Communist *ideologue*, although the geography and the *ideology* separated them.

I argue that, apart from the *character's* "representative disposition" as an *ideologue*, Arendt sufficiently explores the elements of the *character's* (*ideologue*'s) *mindset* as well. Arendt not only introduces us to the *ideologue* but also digs deeper and guides us to a *mindset* which is the essence of this *character*. It is here, in the realm of thought, that all *ideologue*s, irrespective of their background and gender, have a strange commonality. They all think similarly. They have a peculiar *mindset,* which can be deciphered with the help of Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset*. In this sense, the study argues that the *mindset* of the "representative disposition" of the *Islamic ideologue* is *ideological*, like the Nazi and the Communist *ideologue*; and elements of Arendtian *ideological mindset* can be traced in this *character* type by interpreting the *character's* empirical textual expressions.

Although conceptualising the elements of the *mindset* of the *Islamic ideologue* as an *ideal type* through the Arendtian theory is central to this research, it is pertinent to reflect on the situation of the *Islamic ideologue* as a *character* type in the social and political realm of society as well.

The *Islamic ideologue* as a *character* type originates from and belongs to the Muslim communities. The *character* has predominantly religious leanings and is inflexible in their interpretations of the religion. The *character* (wrongfully) thinks that they are guided by the religion of Islam. The *character* tries to spend most of their time in religious pursuits. They are politically very active, and most of the time they are associated with some organisation that legitimises violence for a political change. Being very punctual in the religious rituals, the *character* is viewed as a pious person by the ordinary Muslim community members.

The *character* is neither distinguishable by economic, social and ethnic background nor by any plausible criteria of gender, age and education. They are socially very amicable and look very ordinary. The *character* considers themselves as part of the wider Ummah (an imaginary worldwide Muslim community). The *character* is filled with self-righteous pride and interprets events in a binary sense, i.e. Islamic or un-Islamic. The *ideology* serves as the "principle of action" for the *character*. They hinge their worldview on an *ideology*, which is not in sync with the contemporary political

and social structures. The *Islamic ideologue* articulates the peculiar essential and personal meaning of the "spirit" or "essence" of the structural concept, namely *ideology*. Although *Origins* is the best example where Arendt has used her interpretive method of relating the person to the structural concept and its engagement with the "principle of action", she has substantially engaged with this method in her other writings as well (Cane, 2015: 68-71).

The "characterological" method of political theorising helps lay the empirical foundations of the study. The lack of empirical research in *Islamic radicalisation* debate is one of the main reasons this study has been conducted. "Characterology", as a methodological framework, binds abstract theoretical analysis to concrete personal experiences expressed through narratives or actions. This relationship is further substantiated by exemplary empirical textual constructs of actual individuals who represent *character* types in Islamist organisations. The inclusion of biographical accounts and textual constructions in this methodology, therefore, are not any "idiosyncratic digressions ... but [are] integral parts of the analysis itself" (Sigwart, 2016: 267, 268). Through these textual constructs, the *character* types reflect on their fundamental arguments. An interpretive analysis of individual stories and narratives in the "characterological" context does help in deciphering the elemental structure of an *ideological mindset*. It is also useful in understanding the intimate connection between the personal disposition of the *character*, i.e. the elements of *ideological mindset* and the structural concept, i.e. *ideology*.

Arendt, however, advises a distanced position as an academic to fully grasp the explicit relationship between the *character* and the structural concept that influences the *character's* behaviour. She thinks that "alienation" helps in understanding the "story's theoretically essential aspects" (Arendt, 1962:2). A kind of "alienation," argues Arendt, is necessary to guard against the common sense understanding of the story. Common sense understanding may result from the immediate involvement of the observer with the event. Such understanding may be close to a popular viewpoint but may obscure theoretically significant aspects of the story. Therefore, a distanced position can serve as a methodological means to focus attention on the explicit description of the

conceptual currents of the story. For example, the isolated acts narrated in the magazines, in itself, are open to endless interpretations, therefore, "these acts and stories need to be contextualised and interpreted" through a "method of insulating, distilling and hence alienating interpretations" so that it becomes possible to trace a theoretical pattern in them (Arendt, 1962: 2-10). Therefore, this study treats the narratives of the three Islamist organisations hermeneutically to trace the theoretically essential elements which can relate the radical minds to a theory-driven five elements of the *ideological mindset*. It is necessary to contextualise and interpret the actions and stories if we want that "the figure in question… to perform the function, we assign to the exemplary *characters*" (Arendt, 1978: 169). The narratives not only tell personal stories but also help in the "transformation of a historical figure into a model" which reflects a "representative function" (Arendt, 1978: 169).

"Characterology" relies heavily on concrete empirical instances flowing out of the abstract structural phenomenon like *ideology*. Arendt emphasises that "the curve which the activity of thought describes must remain bound to the incident as the circle remains bound to its focus" (Arendt, 1962: 10). This relationship between thought and concrete incident is central to Arendtian political theory. In Arendtian sense, the empirical incident (whether in the shape of action or narrative) should link up to the theory or vice versa; the theory should be able to explain the incident. If the ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* thinks *ideological*ly then the discursive practices constructed by the Islamist organisations, once interpreted, should yield certain theoretically plausible elements of *ideological mindset*. Arendt resists the abstraction of theories and asserts that "theory must be relentlessly and ruthlessly concrete" and should be able to deal with "events and action which have taken place in fact" (Wolin, 1977: 93).

In *Origins*, Arendt does not approach the structural phenomenon of totalitarianism directly but "dispensing with such structural definitions, she develops them in the form of a broad empirical casuistry of symptomatic 'instances' and exemplary *character* types" (Sigwart, 2016: 268). Such an Arendtian technique is very relevant to this study. This method allows us to bypass numerous definitional debates of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*. Thus, focusing our attention on the *character's mindset*, which

informs the *character's* actions and narratives. This *mindset* expresses itself empirically in the literature of the Islamist organisations. A contextualised theory-oriented interpretation of such textual constructions can lead us to the ideas of the *mindset* that are constructed by a structural phenomenon, namely *ideology*.

The method also caters for the "significance of human behaviour" (Arendt, 1958: 8). For this inquiry, "human behaviour" means the behaviour as noted by the organisations in their magazines through written texts. Arendt approaches the "human behaviour" with "situated impartiality" (Judaken, 2012: 175, 176). Through "situated impartiality" Arendt "sought a plural and perspectival approach to her narratology" (Judaken, 2012: 175). In this sense she "recreated the past as a shared world where the historian never represented only one view on that past"; rather, she insisted on multi-perspectivity and many versions of historical truth (Ibid). Thus "situated impartiality" is "neither an objectivism nor a relativism, neither a historicism nor a presentism". It is pluralist and perspectivist in the sense that it engages with the "complex matrix of meaning", which informs human behaviour (Ibid).

In this sense, the contemporary phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* can reveal the *character's* political understanding of their relation to the world. The individual behaviour of the *Islamic ideologue* directly flows from their understanding of the world. They directly translate the "essence" of the *ideology* through a peculiar behaviour. The *ideology*, as the structural concept, has long before removed any uncertainty in the *character's mindset;* an element of uncertainty could have helped the ideologue to modify their behaviour. In their discursive practices, individual stories of the *Islamic ideologues* leave behind identifiable signatures. Interpreting these signatures can help us identify a theoretically plausible pattern of thought in the radical minds. This pattern of thought can be hermeneutically distilled from their textual expressions. The pattern of a *character's mindset* is probably more explicit in textual narrations than in action as it is easier to construct an idealised behaviour in the textual narrations than in action. Many uncontrollable external factors may influence the action at the point of delivery.

The research theorises that, when *ideology* is understood in Arendtian sense, all *ideologue*s are substantially similar in their *mindset* and that an *ideological mindset* has certain elements of thought which can be traced empirically through the "characterology" of this *mindset*.

This study assumes that the three Islamist organisations resemble totalitarian organisations of the twentieth century, namely, Nazism and Communism. If they succeed, the Islamist organisations shall establish a totalitarian form of government. Eric Voegelin in a review of *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* concludes:

> [t]he investigation inevitably will start from the phenomena, but the question of theoretically justifiable units in political science cannot be solved by accepting the units thrown up in the stream of history at their face value. What a unit is will emerge when the principles furnished by philosophical anthropology are applied to historical materials. It then may happen that political movements, which on the scene of history are bitterly opposed to one another, will prove to be closely related on the level of essence" (Voegelin, 1953: 85).

This research reaffirms Voegelin's assertion in its entirety. The investigation is centred on the contemporary phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*. The research does not take the constructed character namely, the *Islamic radical* at face value. My argument is that the discursive practices of the three Islamist organisations construct a *character* that exhibits all the five elements of Arendtian ideological *mindset* and that the elements of such construction are traceable through a "characterological" approach. The constructed *character* type has adequate signatures of a distinct intellectual fabric woven in an *ideology* which is empirically traceable.

Employment of "characterology" to understand the "essence" of an abstract concept and its disposition is, however, not unique to Arendt only. Others such as Max Weber have also employed such a method in their social and political theory. Weber's ideal types have "an objective basis in the very nature of thought itself" (McIntosh, 1977: 265). A "deep structure" of human thought emerges as humans try to understand and deal with the world, they live in. It is important for social scientists to note this "deep

structure" while validating their understanding of a social (and political) action (ibid). Arendt and Weber, however, differ in the conceptual construction of the *ideal type*s. This difference may be due to their dissimilar understanding of politics and action (Baehr, 1999: 317—323). Weber and Arendt agree that the "spirit" of a conceptual connection between action and society can be grasped by the construction of an ideal type of an individual *character*. Sigwart argues that Weber used the "characterology" of Benjamin Franklin to explain the "spirit of capitalism". Epistemologically, Weber favours abstract hypothesis construction along with the ideal *character* types to represent the "spirit" of "the institution's functioning logic" (Sigwart, 2016: 269). Arendt, on the other hand, "aims at hermeneutically 'distilling' her theoretical concepts directly from the empirical material itself; an interpretive method which Weber (…) explicitly denied" (ibid).

Sigwart credits the use of similar framework to others as well, such as Erich Fromm in his *Escape from Freedom* (1940), Theodore W. Adorno et al. in their *The Authoritarian personality* (1950) and David Riesmann et al. in their *The Lonely Crowd* (1950). Sigwart contends that despite sharing some common ground, Arendt's approach differs from these studies. While Reismann's perspective is predominantly social, Fromm deals with psychoanalytical and sociological questions while analysing his "authoritarian character". The authors of *Authoritarian Personality* focus on psychosocial elements of the authoritarian personality (Sigwart, 2016: 5). Arendt, however, in *Origins* is predominantly concerned with the political aspects of her *characters*.

The "characterological" analysis makes it possible to operationalise the otherwise abstract and faceless concepts as living concepts. *Ideological mindset*, being one of such concepts, can be operationalised in the "characterology" of an *Islamic ideologue*. The ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* serves as a reference point for the adherents of the Islamic *ideology*. The power that helps the *Islamic ideologue* to organise life is drawn from the concrete realisation of the abstract concept. *Ideology*, however, does not remain an abstract concept for the *character*, but they become the living embodiment of the *ideology* for themselves and others.

The current *Islamic radicalisation* debate has not only missed the study of a dynamic and reciprocal "relationship" between a structural concept, namely *ideology* and its central *character* but has also failed to grasp a standard profile of this *character's mindset*. This thesis fills this gap.

3.3   Explaining Methodology - Thematic Analysis Technique

Qualitative approaches are diverse, nuanced and complex (Holloway et al., 2003). Thematic analysis is an expansively used qualitative analytic method (Boyatzis, 1998; Roulston, 2001). It is a technique of finding, analysing and recording patterns, i.e., themes within available data (Boyatzis, 1998). Some scholars consider thematic analysis as a tool, rather than a traditional method that is used as a process within a "major" analytic approach (Boyatzis, 1998; Ryan et al., 2000). This thesis agrees with such studies that mention thematic analysis as a tool within a broader qualitative analytic methodology. I use the thematic analysis technique to supplement the study's major analytic approach, which is "characterology".

Drawing from the previous part of the chapter where I explain reasons for the suitability and usefulness of the "characterological" method of analysis in conceptualising a complex phenomenon such as *Islamic radicalisation*, in this part I explain the need and suitability of the thematic analysis technique as it can detect the themes and subthemes woven in the written words of a language. Most fundamentally, in this study what qualifies as a subtheme are those words, phrases and texts in the written language that essentially carry something important once seen through the lens of an Arendtian element of an *ideological mindset*. The subtheme must reflect meaning and a pattern in the texts. I consider the five Arendtian elements as five themes. Therefore, just for analytical clarity, I call the detected themes in the magazines as subthemes. The thematic pattern means the prevalence of a subtheme in the entire data. Prevalence is not assessed through some occurrences of a subtheme but through the ownership and conviction about an idea expressed through language by the Islamist organisations. It essentially, however, means that the idea expressed through a subtheme has not been denied in the entire set of the data. It is a qualitative judgement. To support my

judgement, I quote a sufficient length of a text from the magazines that allows a reader to make their judgment about a subtheme that is linked to the quoted texts. Long quotations in the analysis sections, therefore, are part of the study design. I further supplement the derived ideas with additional quotes from the magazines that are woven in the ensuing analysis. I also quote and note instances where the organisations present a subtheme in a different language, or it conveys a different sense of meanings. This is indeed the case as three different organisations are participating in the discursive practice. I do note and reflect on the similarities and differences in my analysis wherever I note such instance(s). This analytical differentiation is very useful, as in the MILIR, I can reflect on the intensity of an idea in a particular organisation.

As my empirical material consists of the written texts in the online magazines of the three Islamist organisations, I needed a technique that can find the thematic map of all the ideas, which are aligned with the five Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset*. The purpose is to construct a thematic map of the *mindset* of the ideal type *character*, i.e. the *Islamic ideologue* that the Islamist organisations construct in their discursive practices through written words. Through this technique, I detect 38 ideas/themes (see the table in Chapter 9) that represent the standard profile of the *mindset* of the *Islamic radicals*.

I use the thematic analysis technique due to its inherent flexibility. It is compatible with both inductive methods and deductive methods. This research, although decidedly deductive—it essentially follows a theoretical framework and a clear lens in the shape of five Arendtian themes of an *ideological mindset*—also inductively notes the instances that are symptomatic of an *ideological mindset but* are expressed in a different language than the Arendtian language. This is not a departure from the theory led analysis, because the symptomatic themes in the written language were guided by the theoretical lens. However, most of the headings of the paragraphs that appear in an analysis chapter flow from an Arendtian element of *ideological mindset*, and use the same language as used by Arendt in her writings. A kind of mixing of inductive instances with the deductive ones is possible in thematic analysis and is compatible with the strong theoretical framework of the study. In my opinion, the application of a

strong theoretical framework such as Arendt's should not suffer from some definitional demarcations of analytic techniques.

I start by writing one chapter for each Arendtian element of the *ideological mindset*. I read the magazines to find exemplary texts that thematically align with an element of the *ideological mindset*. As a first step, I decide five colour codes for five elements. As I read the texts, I apply the colour codes to symptomatic and exemplary texts that align thematically with an element. I then sift all the texts under the relevant Arendtian element that forms the chapter heading. I reread the separated texts under an element alongside the Arendtian theoretical articulations, as explained in Chapter 1. Sometimes I read both the separated text and Arendtian theorisation several times. Through this exercise, I generate subthemes that resonate with an Arendtian element of *ideological mindset*. The subthemes, derived from an element, form the paragraph headings in a chapter. The subthemes, which are mostly the paragraph headings, are the ideas that I use to construct "The Map of Ideas linked to Islamic Radicals" (MILIR) in Chapter 9.

After generating the wordings of the subthemes linked within an element, the search for exemplary texts in the magazines moves to another level. I decide a keyword that is central to the language of a subtheme. I use this keyword to apply a computer-assisted search in all the English language magazines. I use Adobe Acrobat Pro DC software for the search. This software presents all the instances where the keyword has been used in the texts in the magazines. I use this method to confirm and supplement the manual search of the exemplary texts. This dualisation in the research is useful in ensuring that all symptomatic texts of the empirical material that carry a theme are read and accounted for. This software, however, is not available in the Urdu language. Therefore, the Urdu texts are searched for manually. To ensure that I do not miss the symptomatic instances where a subtheme is present in the Urdu magazines, I made a master list of all the content lists of the magazines. As I have read all the Urdu magazines, I can understand from the title of an article about the presence of a particular subtheme in the text. The master list is only specific to Urdu language Magazines.

3.4 Selecting and Interpreting Sources

This section has two purposes. Firstly, it outlines the source material I draw from and use as the empirical evidence of Islamist organisations' discursive practices. Secondly, it explains how I justify the selection and note the methodological limitations that arise from it.

I adopt the definition of "discursive practices" from the discourse scholar Norman Fairclough who is known for the development of his Critical Discourse Analysis. Fairclough defines "discursive practices" as "the production, distribution and consumption of texts" (Fairclough, 2010; 1992: 5, 73). Michael Shapiro also notes language (written or spoken) as "discursive practices" (Shapiro, 1981: 18, 27). Rather than following the traditional style of interviewing known Islamic radicals—the approach most of the studies on *Islamic radicalisation* adopted – I decided to analyse the online magazines published by three Islamist organisations. This approach had some advantages over the interview-based approach in the context of a complex phenomenon such as *Islamic radicalisation*. The interview-based methods of gathering the standard characteristics of a radicalised person proved inadequate, as a randomly selected sample of radicalised persons may not exhibit all the elements of a *mindset* that the Islamist organisations present and aspire to. Such efforts may locate partial elements of the radicalised *mindset* that are, also, embedded in the subjective contexts of the *characters*. I, however, suggest that a separate research effort with the theoretical framework of this study using an interview-based approach would help to confirm and supplement the findings of this research.

I select six online magazines of the three Islamist organisations. *Azan*, *Inspire* (both English) and *Hitteen* (Urdu) are published by Al-Qaida (AQ); *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* (both English) by Islamic State (IS); and *Shariat* (Urdu) by Tahreek-e-Taliban. Four magazines are published in English and two, *Hitteen* and *Shariat*, are in Urdu. The decision to select material from a different language, namely Urdu has certain advantages. It became possible to compare and analyse the presence of the elements of the *ideological mindset* in the discursive construction of another language. It supports

the argument of the thesis that at a fundamental and abstract level, all ideologues exhibit a similar *mindset*. It enhances the wider appeal of the research.

The English language used by authors in the magazines is not ideal. The authors, at places, are not very particular about the grammatical aspects of the language. I, however, quote exemplary texts from the magazines verbatim. The aim is to convey the underlying thematic message in the texts. I also support this aim by quoting the texts in sufficient length. Long passages help in comprehending different strands of a theme, and may allay the allegations of cherry-picking, which is generally a convenient observation in a qualitative research such as conducted by this study.

All three Islamist organisations, selected for this research, are well known. AQ is one of the most well-known organisations due to its role in the 9/11 attacks. AQ is also the mother organisation, as the analysis confirms, in initiating the "process" of *Islamic radicalisation*. The organisation is international in its operations and has cells in many countries around the world. The second terrorist organisation, namely IS, is also well represented. It appeared comparatively more recently than the other two organisations. Although it is predominantly based in Syria, it has cells in different countries. IS governed many parts in Syria from 2014 to 2018. The third organisation namely Tahreek-e-Taliban [the movement of religious students] (TT), is based in Afghanistan. It ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. At present, they claim they have a Government in Exile and are fighting the international coalition forces in Afghanistan. *Shariat* is their official magazine published to propagate their views.

All said three organisations, however, follow the Sunni school of thought in Islam. The selection of empirical material consisting of the magazines published by the Sunni organisations is justified because the contemporary Islamic radicalisation is widely identified with Sunni (Salafi) Islam (Aly et al., 2012:851; Cook, 2009: 184-185). Although the Shia school of thought in Islam is represented by separate organisations such as Hizballah, which are also associated with certain acts of terrorism, the Shia organisations are not part of the current and popularly known wave of Islamist radicalisation. Fundamentally, Shia Islamist organisations are mostly involved in regional conflicts, whereas Sunni Islamist organisations have a global presence.

Approximately 10 to 13 percentage (PEW Research Center-2009) of world Muslim population follows Shia Islam, yet none of the violent Islamists identified in terrorist attacks in the West has shown their allegiance with Shia Islam. Rather, as the empirical chapters of this research show, the texts in the magazines view Shia organisations as part of 'them'. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the current Islamic radicalisation, which is under consideration here, is a phenomenon stem from the Sunni interpretations of Islam. A further inquiry, however, may compare the ideal character constructed by the discursive practices of Shia organisations with that of this study. I, however, think that if analysed through the Arendtian theoretical rationality applied in this research, the character constructed by Shia organisations in their discursive practices is also likely to exhibit similar mindset as that of constructed by the Sunni organisations.

The question arises that, even if it is accepted that these six magazines represent the dominant groups that are involved in Islamic radicalisation, how can we be sure that these are also influencing the minds of Muslim people? I admit that this study does not capture the area that deals with the question, i.e. how much these magazines influence the minds of the Muslim people. Yet the decision concerning this selection stands for three reasons. Firstly, there are separate and numerous studies that have measured the influence of terrorist organisation's online propaganda (Canway, 2006: 283-298; Macdonald, 2015: 10-34; Denning, 2011: 194-213; Lieberman, 2008; Gendron, 2007, White, 2012). These studies conclude that online propaganda material significantly influences young Muslim people. These studies also captured the confessions of young people who admitted to being radicalised by online propaganda material. Secondly, Islamist organisations publish these magazines to propagate their *mindset*. The continuous publication stretched over five years of these publications proves that the organisations think that the magazines are serving the purpose. Thirdly, all the magazines except the Taliban *Shariat* Magazine (Urdu) are banned by the UK and other governments. The UK National Counter Terrorism Security Office, which publishes guidelines on "online radicalisation", states that "[the terrorist organisations] are increasingly reaching out to young people using the web as a tool for recruitment and radicalisation (…) [a] national survey of 11-24 years old has highlighted that groups such as ISIL reach a larger global audience, with boarder and dynamic messages"

(National Counter Terrorism Security Office, 2015). The terrorist involved in the London Bridge attack previously possessed "copies of the Al-Qaida English-language extremist magazine Inspire" (The Guardian, 30 Nov 2019). The act of banning indicates that these magazines are influencing the minds of the targeted groups.

Accessing these magazines in the UK is banned by law. I had to follow a Newcastle University special protocol to access the online magazines. The protocol starts with an academic research request, through supervisors, to an academic committee with detailed justifications of the request. The academic committee's approval initiates a procedure that informs the university Departments of Security, Student Wellbeing and IT. A University PREVENT Team member interviews the researcher to assess the suitability of the request to access the banned material. After the authorisation, IT Team makes special arrangements to ensure the security of the downloaded material. The Student Wellbeing Team remains in touch, through PREVENT Team, to support the researcher in case the reading of the empirical material causes any distress to mental health. I am indebted to my supervisors who helped me at every step of the effort. I downloaded the material in a week and stored it responsibly for the duration of the research.

PART II

Analysing Empirical Material

Chapter 4: The Superhuman Source as the Origin of Thought

4.1   Introduction

This is the first analysis chapter where I approach the discursively constructed ideal types by the three Islamist organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT in the texts of their online magazines. The objective is to detect the elements of the *mindset* of the *character* constructed by these discursive practices through the Arendtian theoretical lens. In this chapter, I analyse the first of the five essential Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset*, namely 'The *Superhuman Source* as the Origin of Thought'. I read the magazines to find the exemplary texts that carry the theme of a *superhuman source*. I isolate these texts and reread these using the Arendtian theorisations (see Chapter 1). Through this exercise, I generate subthemes that form the chapter paragraph headings. Under each subtheme, I analyse the texts of all the three organisations. I compare and note instances of thematic concurrence or otherwise across the three organisations. I also reflect this aspect of the analysis in 'The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals' (MILIR). MILIR reflects the intensity of an idea in an organisation, which is essentially a qualitative judgement based on my reading of the entire empirical material (see Chapter 9).

In this chapter, I also slightly digress from my standard format of analysis with regards to the empirical material. In the remaining four chapters, I strictly limit the empirical material to the magazines produced by the three-terrorist organisation. In this chapter, however, I consult some wider Islamic literature to clarify the idea of sovereignty. This is necessary because the idea of "sovereignty of God" is common in both types of *mindset*s, i.e., the religious *mindset* and *ideological mindset*. However, the presence of one or some ideas in a *mindset* is not enough to categorise it as ideological; rather, it is the presence of all the five Arendtian elements in the *mindset* to categorise it as ideological. This digression, however, is only confined to clarify the origin of the idea of "sovereignty of God"; the analysis retains its focus on the texts in the magazines. In this chapter, I also apply certain additional linguistic categories, namely deixis, as these

techniques are useful in explaining certain themes in the language, which otherwise remain obscure.

Understandably, epistemic explanations of a knowledge claim pre-supposes certain assumptions of the explanation. A source of thought positioned in human philosophies is most certainly, challengeable, arguable and changeable; and further, it could be argued to be subjective and falsifiable. Such claims are a product of human thinking. However, if the source of thought is perceived to be superhuman or eternal, as in the case of the constructed *character*, it may be assumed as objective and non-challengeable. In such a case, the source is an external phenomenon that is independent of human thinking. Since the source is eternal, the laws flowing from this eternity should also exhibit eternity. AQ articulates that "[w]hat was false yesterday might become true tomorrow – and this is a farce because it would implicate that nothing is absolutely true or absolutely false. So, homosexuality, abortion, extramarital relations were wrong yesterday but are right today! In effect, Islam – because it is revealed by Allah - is perpetual in its definitions of rights and wrongs which do not change over time" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 11). The human role, in this case, is to understand these eternal laws and tailor his/her actions according to (the "essence" of) the laws. The human faculties of logic and reason should not be used to question the eternal laws, and thus improve upon their acceptance, but should be used to reason out any contradiction between the eternal laws and the subjective human condition.

Especially, if one's life is prone to accidents, a human may read superhuman meanings into all such happenings so that God's hand can be traced to the accidents. As a rational understanding of such happenings is beyond the knowledge and understanding of such believers, the confused victim, unable to think and thus understand the true perspective of the situation, starts taking pride in their suffering. Further, in the *character*'s understanding, the misfortune and evil of the suffering are then identified with destiny. A destiny is drafted by a superhuman entity for the *character*, and they are expected to accept this treatment with dignity and perseverance. Such a position blocks the *character*'s rational self from entering into an internal dialogue and becomes

ideological—in my estimation, an open internal dialogue has the potential to de-ideologise the *ideological mindset* (see Chapter 1).

As per the Arendtian notion of *ideology*, a perceived *superhuman source* of thought is an essential element of the *ideological mindset*. The past *character*s, i.e. Nazi and Communist ideologues, attributed "nature" and "history" as the sources of their thought (see Chapter 1). The Islamist organisations claim a superhuman, namely God, as the source of their thought. The organisations perceive that this source is more explicit and revealing than "nature" and "history"; the source of all sources and the very creator of "nature" and "history". The *superhuman sources* do not speak directly to an ideologue in the common language; rather, the ideologues deduce its presence from certain eternal laws.

Textually, God in the magazines is represented by three types of texts, namely, the word of God, i.e. the Quran and other revealed scriptures, the sayings of the Prophet[11] and the interpretations of righteous ulema (true scholars). The discursive practices consult all the three resources as the sources of thought. In this chapter, I shall analyse the texts in the magazines under seven subthemes, namely, the nature of the *superhuman source*; the sovereignty of the *superhuman source*; the philosophy of the *superhuman source*, the independence of *superhuman source* from "consensus iuris", the non-separation of religion from politics; freedom as an antithesis to the *superhuman source*; and the *Islamic ideologue* as a free man fighting for freedom.

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[11] Prophet Muhammad's interpretations are preserved in the books entitled *Ahadees*. The books of *Ahadees* were compiled around 250 years after the prophet's death. The compilers took great care while compiling the sayings of the prophet. They invented a scientific method to ensure the authenticity of the narration. The central emphasis in such compilations is laid on the truthfulness of the narrator. There are clear categories of narrators based on their truthfulness. Before categorising a narrator, his/her entire life events were scanned through available knowledge and specific enquiry. The information about the category of a narrator was documented carefully for reference in case of disputation. The books of *Ahadees*, however, sometimes have contradictory narrations.

4.2 The Nature of the Superhuman Source

The Islamist organisations' constructions in the texts of their magazines attribute all thought and action to a *superhuman source*. AQ published *Azan* Magazine quotes from the Quran to explain the nature of the *superhuman source* in the following text.

> Blessed indeed is Allah, The Creator of the Heavens and the earth who created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them. He regulates the affairs of His creation and provides sustenance for each and every being that He created. His is the dominion that extends over the spread of this universe and He makes none to share in his Decision and Rule (*Azan*, Issue 3:23).

The text advances the theme of a *superhuman source*, i.e., Allah as the first cause of all the causes. All other knowledge claims "refer instead to opinions, desires and customs that people themselves invented, all of which have no basis in Allah's religion" (*Azan*, Issue 5:19). Therefore, for the organisation, a knowledge claim is entertainable only if it flows from the *superhuman source* — Allah.

Allah or God is the idea that is supposed to explain fundamental queries about this universe. The idea of God explains not only the creation of the cosmos but also all historical and current action. It is the first premise of the Islamic *ideology* that lays its foundations in the historical experience. In the *ideological mindset*, the first premise of *ideology* is a self-evident truth that is based on historical experience (Arendt, 1958: 468). In the Arendtian criteria of *ideology*, one has to believe in the first premise of *ideology* to initiate the ideological mode of thinking. It was also the case with the past ideologues, i.e. Nazis and Communist ideologue. The Nazi believed in "nature" that operates natural laws, and the Communist believed in "history" that operates historical laws (Arendt, 1958: 469). Likewise, to be an *Islamic ideologue*, one has to accept the first premise mentioned in the above text. All other sources of knowledge are "nothing but whimsical thoughts and ideas stemming from imperfect human intellect, without any Guidance or Sanction by Allah" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 11). All three organisations are unanimous in the first premise of *ideology*. The Islamist organisations pretend that all

their actions are anchored in this first premise. They do not consider any other motive for their action. The TT published Urdu magazine *Shariat* narrates this ideological belief in an article entitled "Jihad an *Ideology*" as follows.

فرمایا لیسنا نقاتلھم بعدد ولاعدۃ۔ ہم اسباب وسائل اور افراد کی بنیاد پر نہیں لڑتے۔ بلکہ ہماری جنگ صرف اور صرف اللہ تعالی کی ذات پر توکل اور اس کی رضا کے لیے ہے۔ اس لیے مخالف لشکر جتنا بھی بڑا ہو ہم اس سے لڑیں گے اور

[*Translation by the author*] We do not fight based on men and material, but our struggle is just for the sake and pleasure of Allah. So, we will continue our fight irrespective of the strength of the opponents (*Shariat*, Issue 13: 28).

The theme of action is inherent in the idea of God, as the quoted text mentions that "He Regulates the affairs of His creation and provides sustenance for each and every being" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). The Islamist organisations anchor all their thinking in a *superhuman source* that is independent of human action or inaction and is the creator of everything in the universe. Allah is also the source of thought of a common religious Muslim. The fundamental difference between the two, i.e. a religious *mindset* and an *ideological mindset*, lies in the understanding of the nature of the idea of the *superhuman source*, i.e. God[12]. An ideologue uses the idea of a *superhuman source* to explain simplistically

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[12] In a religious person's perception: God, person and revealed laws are three separate entities. The revealed laws are designed to guide man towards a *civilised* behaviour. The purpose of revealed laws, for a religious mindset, is to provide a stable alignment where they may anchor their normatively judged actions such as morality and acceptable behaviour. In the religious mindset, man being the centre of the creation enjoys considerable autonomy in decision-making. Major religions have different conceptions of the Divine Laws. In the ideological mindset, however, the Divine Laws are eternal, inflexible and independent of subjective sociology (Arendt, 1958: 462-465). In addition, the Islamic ideologues do not recognise any space between God, the Divine Law and man. The religious idea of separation of these categories presupposes

"the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, [and] the uncertainties of the future" (Arendt, 1958: 468). The idea of *ideology* helps an ideologue to stay consistent. This need for consistency "springs from our fear of contradicting ourselves" (Arendt, 1958: 473). Particularly, the theme in the text rejects all the alternate knowledge claims of factual reality concerning the origin of the universe, and authoritatively states that a *superhuman source* created it. Thus, abridges a complex reality for the simplistic comprehension of the *ideological mindset*. I discuss 'Rejection of Factual Reality' as a separate element of *ideological mindset* in Chapter 8. After constructing the primary premise of the *ideology*, the Islamist organisations deduce certain logical conclusions from it. The AQ published text, therefore, continues in the next paragraph:

> It is only logical that Allah's Law be applied to the entirety of this earth and that all systems of human life upon it be brought under the regulation of Allah's Revealed Law, i.e. the final Shariah legislated upon Prophet Muhammad and his followers – the Quran and the Sunnah, (*Azan*, Issue 3:23).

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a space between them. This space allows the man their freedom, e.g. the freedom, even to reject the laws. The Quran explicitly states, "there is no compulsion in religion" (Quran, 2: 256). The faculty of thinking in humans needs this space for its operation, and freedom to think is contingent upon a space for the activity of thinking. This freedom to think or lack of it could be considered as a distinguishing mark between a commonly religious person (Muslim) and an Islamic ideologue. The Islamist organisations despise any suggestion of freedom. They construct that there is no space in man and the revealed law. For them man is not a separate entity from the law, rather he/she is a mere carrier of the law. An ideal type character is supposed to be an embodiment of the revealed law. The supposed eternal laws, being independent of human action or inaction, are eternally destined. Humans are condemned to follow the course. Any suggestion of freedom of thinking is apostasy and *irtidad* (rejection of Islam); *Murtadz,* therefore, is a person who leaves Islam. Another major difference between a religious person and an ideologue is the nature of the idea of God. A religious person is interested in the nature of God — God as a revealed and approachable entity. A Muslim would like to investigate the nature of God, i.e. to know the attributes of God and would endeavour to communicate with him. For them, God establishes an intimate and personal relationship in the depths of one's thinking (soul). In this sense, God is predominantly personal and less political. An Islamic ideologue, on the contrary, is interested in an idea (of God) that can explain the gaps in their conception of the world; God, for them, is predominantly political in nature.

No sooner has the *mindset* accepted the *superhuman source* for the thought (and action), then it is required to follow the logical implication of the premise. The logical implication is an instigation for an action, which is inherent in the source of the *ideology*. To guide the action, the *superhuman source* has revealed a law, i.e. the Divine Law. I discuss this aspect as the third element of the *ideological mindset*, namely 'Violence and the Call for Action' in Chapter 6. As the *superhuman source* is eternal and "His is the Dominion that extends over the spread of this universe" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 23), the *character* is required to enforce the eternal law over the entire universe. I discuss 'The Claim to Global Domination' as the second element of the *ideological mindset* in Chapter 5. Humans are blessed with this unique privilege to operationalise the Divine Law in themselves. The TT published Urdu language magazine *Shariat* further explains the relationship between God and man. The magazine writes,

اسلام کے احکامات واضح اور روشن ہیں، اسلام کہتا ہے کہ اقتدار اعلیٰ اللہ

تعالیٰ کے لیے ہیں، انسان زمین پر ان کا نائب اور خلیفہ ہے۔ اللہ تعالیٰ کے احکامات

اللہ کی منشا کے مطابق نافذ کریں گے، عقل کو وحی کے تابع بنا کر انسانی فطرت پر عمل

کیا جائے۔ لیکن مغرب کہتا ہے کہ عقل ہی راہنما ہے اور برے بھلے کی تمیز کے لیے

واحد وہی معیار ہے۔ کونسی چیز حلال ہے کونسی حرام؟ حکم دیتا ہے تاکہ عورت

اس کا فیصلہ عقل اور انسانی سوسائٹی نے کرنا ج میں انہماک کے ساتھ

ہو گا۔ جب ان کے ہاں عقل ہی برے بھلے میں تمیز ی عبادت کرتی رہے۔ گھر

[*Translation by the author*] Islam is very clear and equivocal on the issue. It states that sovereignty belongs to God; man is his vice-regent on earth; God's Law shall be implemented as per God's will. Follow the law of human nature and subordinate reason to revelation. On the contrary, the West says that reason is central in the decisions of right

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and wrong. Society and reason should be the final arbiter to decide about permissions and restrictions (*Shariat*, Issue 63: 17).

The theme of a *superhuman source* of thought, which should have priority over reason, is repeated in the text mentioned above. The Islamist organisations do not confine themselves to the word of God as the *superhuman source* but also include the word of the Prophet and the word of righteous scholars in this source (*Azan*, Issue, 3: 23). A text in the pages of *Azan* Magazine persuades the readers to interpret reality through the words of the Prophet and the righteous scholars. It reads, "[l]et us go through each of these stages through the truthful and blessed words of Prophet Mohammad and the righteous scholars" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 12). Although the terrorist organisation pretend that they anchor all thought in a single *superhuman source*, in practice, they construct three parallel sources as the origin of their *mindset*. IS constructs the *character* that is supposed to believe that the Prophet did not speak on his own accord but dutifully conveyed what had been revealed to him by God, and "[t]he scholars are conveyers of the orders of Allah and the orders of His Messenger" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 9: 23). AQ also thinks that "[t]he greatest treasure of this life is knowing Allah, loving Him, reflecting upon his amazing Attributes and spending this whole life serving Him. Knowing Allah involves discovering one's purpose of life" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 12). The discursive practices of all the three organisations in the magazines, however, lay special emphasis on the idea of the sovereignty of this *superhuman source* of thought.

4.3 The "Sovereignty" of the Superhuman Source

The idea of "sovereignty" is the fundamental idea that separates the *ideological mindset* from the modern secular political thought. The discursive practices reject any claim of sovereignty by a human being, an "artificial person" of a state or an assembly of a people. "[T]here is a vast difference between the Islamic and the Western political method because both stem from entirely different premises. Islam enjoins collectivism based on faith in Allah (La ilaha ill Allah) while the West seeks collectivism based on land and the (false) sovereignty of other than Allah (*Azan*, Issue 4: 18). The sovereignty of God is the idea that is equally shared by ideological as well as a non-ideological but

(Islamic) religious *mindset*. It is therefore important to understand the nature and origin of this idea to conceptualise a distinction between the two *mindset*s.

In the wider Islamic literature, the idea of the sovereignty of God is a derivation of different passages from the Quran. The Quran repeatedly mentions the power, the authority, and the majesty of God. The Quran states "Authority (*Al-hukm*) belongs to God alone" and "it is God's prerogative to give authority (*Al-mulk*) to whom He wills and to take it away at His pleasure" (Zaman, 2015: 389-418).

The terms like *Al-hukm* and *Al-mulk* have been variously interpreted as the sources of the modern concept of sovereignty in the Islamic thought. In medieval Islamic tradition, the term *mulk* is referred to as the possession of dominion, as Prophet Mohammad prayed that "dominion over Persia and Byzantium be given to his people" (Al-Tafseer-al-Kabir, viii: 4). Some interpreted the term as the God-given ability of faith through which a believer can achieve total submission to the will of God. While others understood it as a Prophetic authority designed by God in a manner that the followers of the Prophet shall be honoured when the errant are debased (ibid). A well-noted Quran and Hadees scholar Baghawi (d. 1122) explains that "God has said in one of His books: 'I am God, the king of kings and the master of kings. The hearts of kings and their forelocks are in my hand. If my servants obey me, I make the kings a mercy for them; and if they disobey me, I make the kings a punishment for them. So, do not concern yourself with reviling the kings but turn instead towards me and I will dispose them favourably towards you'" (Nimr et al.,1993: 23). The *superhuman source* has complete control of the worldly authority invested in kings.

Although political authority seems to be inherent in the term *Al-mulk,* it is not limited by it. *Al-mulk*, for medieval Islamic scholars, meant "the endowment of Prophethood, the possession of knowledge, intellect, health and praiseworthy dispositions, power and the ability to implement [things], the power of love, and the possession of wealth" (Razi, *al-Tafsir*, viii: 7). *Al-mulk,* therefore, is an attribute of a superhuman entity who endows all political as well as personal favours according to his/her preferences.

Likewise, the term *Al-hukm*, i.e. God's authority, has been understood as diverse by others. For example, a very influential tenth-century commentator, Tabri, understands the term to mean that "God alone is worthy of worship" (al-Jalali, 1962:154). Qurtabi (d. 1273), an Andalusian scholar of repute, explains the term to mean that God "is the creator of everything" (Jami, ix: 192). Some medieval scholars such as Fakhr al-din al Razi (d. 1210), did raise the theological argument against the idea of free will to argue that God exclusively controls all the material and immaterial possibilities in life (*Al-Tafsir*, viii: 7–8).

Principally, political authority, which is sometimes not very explicitly expressed, is part of the Islamic understanding of *Al-mulk* and *Al-hukm.* The Islamist organisations' conception of God's sovereignty is rooted in these two terms. The ideological conception of the idea of the sovereignty of God has been shaped by two twentieth-century Islamic scholars, namely Sayyid Qutb (d.1966) of Egypt and Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (d. 1979) of Pakistan. It is, therefore, important to conceptualise how these two scholars discussed the idea.

4.4   The Philosophy of the Sovereignty of God

The discursive practices by the Islamist organisations with regards to the idea of the sovereignty of God are influenced by the interpretations of Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi. Qutb's interpretations of the holy texts rhetorically use the modern concept of sovereignty, i.e. God's power (*al-mulk)* and God's authority (*al-hukm*). He explicitly lays down the foundations of the idea of the sovereignty of God in the following passage.

> Authority belongs to the exalted God exclusively by virtue of His divinity. For sovereignty (*al- hakimiyya*) is among the characteristic features of divinity. Whoever lays a claim to sovereignty — whether it is an individual, a class, a party, an institution, a community or humanity at large in the form of an international organisation — dispute the primary *character*istic of His divinity. And whoever does so is guilty of unbelief in the most blatant manner . . .. Laying claim to this right [to

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sovereignty] does not necessarily take a particular form, which alone might be deemed to remove the claimant from the fold of 'the true faith' (*al-din al-qayyim* [Quran, 12.40]). Rather, one lays claim to it simply by deriving laws from a source other than [God] (Qutub, Vol IV; 1974:1990).

The passage mentioned above carries the theme of a *superhuman source* (God) as the source of thought and action. The term Qutb refers to as sovereignty is a modern derivative of the term *hukm*, which means authority or judgement. Qutb conceives the term sovereignty as a political concept. This conception of the sovereignty of God that links the ideas of law, state and Islam is at the heart of the *ideological mindset*. AQ warns the readers to be aware and "[u]nderstand the heinous crime of those who forsake the Hakimiyyah (sovereignty) of Allah and implement laws on the earth that do not have any authority from Allah" (*Azan*, Issue 5:4). The *character* is supposed to believe that it is a crime to follow any law other than Allah's law. Qutab further clarifies the idea of the sovereignty of God as follows.

> In the Islamic system, it is the community that chooses the ruler, thereby giving him the legal right to exercise authority according to God's law. But [this community] is not the source of sovereignty which gives the law its legality. God alone is the source of sovereignty. Many people, including Muslim scholars, tend to confuse: the exercise of power and the source of power. Even the aggregate of humanity does not have the right to sovereignty, which God alone possesses. People only [have the right to] implement what God has laid down with His authority. As for what He has not laid down, it has neither authority nor legality (Qutub, Vol IV; 1974: 1990).

Medieval scholars, however, did not have such a binary view as far as the operationalisation of the idea of the sovereignty of God was concerned. Qutab and other radical scholars envisioned a different operationalisation of the idea.

Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, the founder of subcontinental Jamaat-e-Islami, is one of the most influential Islamist of the past century. His interpretations of the holy texts widely affected the contemporary *Islamic radicalisation* in the Islamic world in general and in South Asia in particular. Maulana Maududi is a perfect example of a phenomenon which we nowadays call as non-violent extremism, i.e. the *character* shares the *mindset* of the violent radicals but has not yet operationalised the *mindset*. While interpreting the term *Al-hakm*, Maududi writes, "sovereignty (hakimiyyat) rests only with God. God alone is the lawgiver. No human being, not even a Prophet, has the right to command and prohibit on his own" (Maududi, 1941, 1981: 27). Maududi goes further and says:

> If a person considers anyone's command to be binding without its carrying the support of God's command, then that person is guilty of associating partners with God in the very same manner as does someone who directs his prayers to other than God. If anyone claims in a political sense to be 'the holder of all control' [(*malik al-mulk*) Q 3.26], the sovereign (*muqtadir-i a`la*) and the absolute ruler (*hakim `alal-itlaq*), then his is a claim to divinity in just the same manner as the claim of someone, in metaphysical terms, that he is that person's [ultimate] master, deity (*karsaz*), support, and protector (Maududi, 1981, 1941: 28).

Maududi's articulations carry the theme of God as the source of all thought and legitimacy. To be a good Muslim, one must reject all institutions of legitimacy other than God (*Malik al-mulk*).

Another contemporary of Maududi, Abul-Kalam Azad (d. 1958) sensed the centrality of the idea in the Muslim thought; therefore, he took it upon himself to use the interpretive framework to articulate the idea of the sovereignty of God for the Muslims. To clarify the confusion associated with the ideas of temporal authority and God's authority, Azad, in 1913, published an article entitled "Authority belongs to God alone". He writes:

Today, an intense war is taking place between the government of God (*khuda ki hukumat*) and human kingdoms. Satan's throne has been placed over the largest portion of the earth. The inheritance of Satan's household has been distributed among his worshippers and the army of the "great deceiver" (Dajjal) has spread everywhere. These satanic kingdoms seek to utterly destroy God's government. On their right side is the bewitching paradise of worldly pleasure and honour, and on their left rages the clearly visible hell of hardship and corporal punishment. These unbelieving and dark deceivers open the doors of their sorcerous paradise for any son of Adam who denies the kingdom of God (*khuda ki badshahat*) (...) and they push anyone who affirms God's kingdom into the hell of their satanic torments and corporeal punishments (Quoted by Zaman, 2015: 7).

Azad did not use the modern phrase "sovereignty" in his articulations but instead refers to the idea as God's government. Curiously, the rhetorical language used by a mainstream Muslim scholar as early as 1913 bears a close resemblance to the language used by the Islamist organisations in their propaganda literature.

The conceptualisation of the idea of the sovereignty of God helps to understand the nature of the *superhuman source*. God's sovereignty means that if the laws of government conflict with the perceived laws of the *ideology* (God), the latter should prevail. In this sense, once the idea of the sovereignty of a superhuman entity is operationalised, it has certain practical implications.

The contestation over the nature and limits of God's sovereignty and its relationship with the temporal political dispensation is a question which could not be settled in the Muslim thought. Consequently, a "devout Muslim" is bound to get confused. The religious scriptural interpretations prepare the common Muslim for the rejection of any sovereignty other than God. Under such conditions, a "devout Muslim" may think that they do not have any option except to compromise with the modern political arrangement while keeping alive a desire to establish the Kingdom of God, whenever

the opportunity arises. This confusion with regards to the sovereignty of God in the Muslim thought is the area which is being exploited by the Islamist organisations in their recruitment drives.

Apart from the confusion over the idea of the sovereignty of God itself, the interpretations of holy scriptures are another controversial area. The question of legitimate authority to interpret God's laws for the state is also unresolved. If the sovereignty belongs to God and not to a parliament, which represents the will of the people, then the word of God should be interpreted in the light of the will of God. So, can we equate the will of people with the will of God? Arguably, the will of the people implies that the destiny of man is unscripted and that they are free to adopt a rational course of action. On the contrary, the *ideological mindset* follows an imagined grand plan scripted by the *superhuman sourced* laws. The will of people has no role in the *ideological mindset*.

The *ideological mindset* encourages man to endeavour to understand and conform to a superhuman scripted design. Such an understanding of the idea of the sovereignty of God once operationalised in the real-world politics of a country shall propel the *ideology* to take centre stage in the affairs of that country. The idea of the sovereignty of God as constructed by the Islamist organisations is, therefore, problematic. It is the concrete operationalisation of the idea(s) of *ideology* in the real world that highlights the inherent tension between an *ideology* and its practical manifestation.

However, the discursive practices in the magazines are alive to the contradictions between the will of God flowing from the idea of sovereignty and the will of people. In line with the Arendtian *ideological mindset*'s desire for consistency, the Islamist organisations cannot ignore this contradiction. They eliminate the contradictory idea, i.e. the will of people, by declaring it against the laws of the *superhuman source*. The Arendtian *ideological mindset* is consistent, simplistic and links all thought to a *superhuman source*. AQ constructs the same theme in *Azan* Magazine as follows.

> This means that Sovereignty and Kingship belong to Allah Alone, and this Sovereignty is established by the human being as a legislative

system on earth which is an expression of the Sovereignty of Allah, in consistence[sic] with the rest of the universe. So, Allah is The Sovereign, and His Sovereignty is established on earth by man's implementation of Allah's Law in his collective life, and this is the passing of the *Hakimiyyah* from the "existential" circle to the "legislative" real (*Azan*, Issue 6: 30).

The Islamist organisations seem to have found a way to resolve the tension between the idea of the sovereignty of the *superhuman source* and its operationalisation in the real world; they do not mention any consent of the people, or in Arendt's words, "consensus iuris".

By eliminating the idea of the will of the people and declaring humans as part of a "legislative system", the Islamist organisations confirm the Arendtian assertion that humans are a mere carer of the eternal law and part of a grand process (Arendt, 1958: 462-464). AQ constructs a *character* that is supposed to believe that "God's Sovereignty is established on earth by man's implementation of Allah's Law in his collective life" (*Azan*, 6: 30). This direct rule is independent of man's subjective behaviour. As this thinking draws its legitimacy directly from the sovereign source — the source of all positive laws, therefore, it need not care about the petty legality of the "legislative process". It is far more obedient to the *superhuman sourced* law while passing it "from the 'existential' circle to the 'legislative' real" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 30). Therefore, the constructed *character* must be prepared to sacrifice every vital immediate interest for the implementation of what the organisations consider Allah's Law. AQ articulates such a theme in the Urdu magazine *Hitteen*.

اس مسئلہ کو اچھی طرح سمجھ لینا چاہیے کہ اصل دین اسلام ہے، وطن نہیں۔ اسلام کی وجہ سے وطن کا حکم بدلتا ہے، وطن کی وجہ سے اسلام کا حکم نہیں بدلتا۔ شریعت کے احکام اٹل ہیں۔ یعنی کسی ملک میں اگر شریعت کا قانون رائج و غالب ہو تو وہ ملک دارالاسلام ہے، اس کے مطابق اس کے احکام ہیں اور اگر اسی ملک میں کفر کا قانون رائج و غالب ہو جائے تو اب یہی ملک دارالحرب بن جائے گا، یہاں سے ہجرت واجب ہو گی۔ گویا شرعی حکم کا دارومدار کفر و اسلام پر ہے نہ کہ وطنی پیمانوں پر۔

خدا پرستوں اور وطن پرستوں کی جنگ آج بھی جاری ہے

تمام انبیاء کی تاریخ اس بات پر شاہد ہے کہ انھوں نے کلمۂ حق کہنے میں کسی کی پروا نہیں کی، دین نے تقاضا کیا تو وطن سے بھی بغاوت کر دی اور اللہ کی حاکمیت کی جانب لوگوں کو دعوت دی۔ جن نفوسِ قدسیہ کو اللہ تعالیٰ نے بھیجا ہی اس لیے ہو کہ وہ اللہ کے احکامات کھول کھول کر لوگوں تک پہنچائیں وہ بھلا حق کو کس طرح چھپا سکتے تھے؟ کسی کو اچھا لگے یا برا، اہلِ اقتدار راضی ہوں یا ناراض یا خوش وہ ہر حال میں اپنے رب کے حکم کو پورا کرتے ہیں۔ یہ سنت آج تک جاری ہے۔ اللہ والے وہی کرتے

[*Translation by the author*] It should be clearly understood that Islam, and not nationalism, is the essence of a state. A nation or country can be sacrificed for Islam but not vice versa. God's law is eternal, which means that if Sharia Law is the dominant law in a country, the country shall be treated as *Dar-ul-Islam* [the home of Islam] but if the same country is governed through any other law, it shall be treated as *Dar-ul-harab* (the home of battle); migration shall be mandatory from such a country. That means judgements through Divine Law has priority over judgments through nationalism. There is a continuous war between Godhood and nationhood.

History is a witness that Prophets never compromised on the propagation of truth. On occasions, they rebelled against their nations but upheld the call to the sovereignty of God. How can they hide the truth when God has appointed them? In the propagation of Allah's Law,

they do not care about anyone, including the people in authority (*Hitteen*, Issue 8: 178).

The main theme in the texts mentioned above constructs a *character* that is supposed to show total disregard to any notion of consent or will of people in the operationalisation of the idea of the sovereignty of God. Such a *character* can do away with the will or consent of the people, which Arendt refers to as "consensus iuris".

4.5   Superhuman Sourced Law is Independent of "Consensus iuris"

"Consensus iuris" is the wider consent of the people for the law. All laws, including the most tyrannical laws, can function under some conditions of "consensus iuris". "Both moral judgement and legal punishment presuppose this basic consent; the criminal can be judged justly only because he takes part in the "consensus iuris", and even the revealed law of God can function among men only when they listen and consent to it" (Arendt, 1958: 462). The *superhuman-sourced* law has a fundamental difference with other concepts of law; it is independent of any "consensus iuris". Although the Islamist organisations claim that they replace secular law with eternal law, e.g. Sharia Law, but in the discursive constructions, they defy all forms of consensus. In their perception, Allah's law does not need any "consensus iuris" for its execution because it is independent of all action and consent of people. They not only defy "consensus iuris" but reject all notions that are manifestations of "consensus iuris", such as the notion of democracy.

Inherently the democratic system of governance is sceptical of a *superhuman source* of thought. It functions, at least in theory, on the notion of the will of people. Because the Islamist organisations are well aware of the potentiality of "consensus iuris" in the notion of democracy, they are, therefore, very sensitive to such a possibility. AQ explains,

> [t]hey say that democracy is of "expression". This apparently nice sounding idea is actually the antithesis of Islam. Islam teaches man the worship and servitude of Allah, whereas democracy teaches man all-out

freedom in which even the most misguiding and blasphemous opinions are considered to be of the "fundamental rights of man"; democracy accepts it even if someone insults Allah, His Messenger or the Laws of Shariah. In a democracy, there is nothing which cannot be criticized or commented upon (*Azan*, issue 1:61).

The theme in the text contrasts the idea of God with free expression. The *ideological mindset* does not accommodate any alternate expression of reality. Democracy, therefore, is singled out because of its propagation of space for freedom of expression, which is a form of "consensus iuris".

The superhuman sourced thought process rejects all knowledge claims that do not flow from the anchoring idea—i.e. God. This *mindset* does not recognise any freedom of expression. Such attempts are labelled as "misguided" and "blasphemous". AQ condemns democracy because it allows "even if someone insults Allah, His Messenger or the Laws of Shariah" (*Azan* Issue, 1:61). The Magazine quotes Sayyed Qutab (one of the most influential scholars) to lend further authenticity to the disapproval of the idea of democracy.

> No doubt in all of the systems of the world, men take each other as gods besides Allah. No man-made system is free from this corruption from the most ideal democracy to the worst dictatorship (…) The most obvious aspect of Uluhiyyah (Lordship) is to enjoin obedience upon the subjects, to legislate for them a code of life and a criterion. Hence, if a person or a system seeks to subjugate human beings to its obedience, and it creates for them a code of life, a criterion, laws (for right and wrong), obligations and rights etc., then that person or system has declared itself a partner to Allah 'The Exalted' in one of His Most Precious Attributes; and it has declared its own (false) godhood (*Azan*, issue 1:61).

Sayyed Qutub's interpretations have played a major role in developing the *mindset* of Islamic radicals. In line with Qutub's interpretations, AQ considers any attempt by

people to legislate a system of governance as claiming godhood (*Azan*, issue 1:61). The theme in the above-quoted text rejects all the progress made by humans on account of systems of governance in history. It is a rebellion, as humans are supposed to be mere executioners of the *superhuman-sourced* law. The Islamist organisations construct a *character* in the magazines that is supposed to completely surrender freedom to think, consent or legislate in favour of the *superhuman-sourced* law. Democracy, therefore, being the formal mode of consent, is the foremost opponent of the *ideological mindset*. the TT published magazine *Shariat* concurs the ideological mod of thinking as follows.

جمہوریت ہے کہ دین اسلام کی توہین کرنے،دین کو چھوڑنے،اسلامی اقدار کو حقارت کی نگاہ سے دیکھنے اوراسلاف کو برابھلا کہنے کو بیان کی آزادی قرار دیا جاتا ہے۔

جمہوریت ہے کہ پیسہ کمانے کے لئے جو بھی ذریعے استعمال کریں وہ جائز ہے اگرچہ دوسروں کی جنسی خواہشات کی تکمیل سے ہو،کیونکہ یہ بازار کا اچھا کاروبار سمجھنا جانے لگا ہے۔

جمہوریت ہے کہ زبان، قلم اور نظم ونثر کے ذریعے جنسی بے راہ روی کو ہوا دی جاتی ہے اسے ترقی کا معیار اور روشن خیالی قرار دیا جاتا ہے۔

مختصر یہ جمہوریت ہے کہ آسمانی قوانین کے لئے کوئی جگہ نہیں ہے،جائز اور ناجائز،حق اور باطل کو ایک پلے میں تولا جاتا ہے اور ترجیح دینا صرف اور صرف لوگوں کی ذاتی رائے، نفسی خواہشات اوراحساسات تک محدود ہے۔

[*Translation by the author*] Democratic freedom means insulting Islam, abrogating Islam, insulting Islamic traditions and Islamic scholars. Democracy means that any business that earns a profit, including prostitution, is considered good. Democracy means using pen and speech for the promotion of sexuality as it is considered the standard of development and enlightenment. To sum up, the notion of democracy does not have any space for eternal laws. Truth and falsehood have equal weight and decisions are based only on peoples' opinion, feelings and desires (*Shariat*, issue 17:24).

Fundamentally, the *ideological mindset* rejects all expressions of formal or informal "consensus iuris". AQ, through an article entitled "The Religion of Democracy" in the pages of *Azan* magazine, names such "consensus iuris" as "freedoms" inherent in the notion of democracy.

It may be possible for democracy to be interpreted and understood in more than one manner. However, in all the interpretations that may be done - despite all the conflicting points - the following seven fundamentals are always retained. These are:

1) La ilaha illal Insaan (There is no god but man): The declaration of Kufr.
2) The satanic principle of "freedom of belief".
3) The false principle of accepting the judgment of the people in mutual disputes.
4) The blasphemous principle of "freedom of expression".
5) The polytheistic principle of separating Dunya (world, life) from Deen (religion).
6) The disastrous principle of the freedom of formulating "parties".
7) The misguiding principle of obedience to the "majority opinion" (*Azan*, issue 1: 60).

A common theme in all the rejections as mentioned above by the Islamist organisations is the denunciation of "the freedom to consent" or "consensus iuris". The Islamist organisations summarise their ideas about the freedom to consent or "consensus iuris" in those seven "fundamentals of democracy". All the metaphors used in the text to enumerate the supposed "fundamentals of democracy", i.e., satanic, false, blasphemous, polytheistic, disastrous and misguided are used to denounce the expressions of fundamental freedoms and "consensus iuris".

There may be a lexical value in the use of any particular metaphor for a certain fundamental, but I interpret these statements for their thematic value, i.e. an implied message of anti-freedom and an anti "consensus iuris" tone. In the succeeding paragraphs, I interpret these governing principles of democracy to conceptualise the linkage between *superhuman source*, "consensus iuris", freedom and democracy.

The first principle in the text questions all the activity centred on people and their welfare. The *ideological mindset* does not conceive humans as the centre of human activity; rather, this coveted place is reserved for *ideology*, and humans act as an instrument for the implementation of a grand design.

The term "Kufr" is, therefore, used in the texts for all the deviant thinking that is not in line with the *ideological mindset*. The Islamist organisations extensively use this term in the magazines for grouping together the category of 'them'. We shall come across this term frequently with wider meanings in the following chapters.

AQ articulates that the formal system of "consensus iuris", i.e. democracy "is founded on the principle that people are the source of all authority" (*Azan*, Issue 1:61). In their perception, the concept of "consensus iuris" is the declaration of a human being as a god. "[I]n democracy, the highest authority is the human being, not Allah. It is the masses who become lords *ilah* (deity)" (*Azan*, Issue 1:61). The theme of denunciation of consent and freedom continues in the next narrated fundamental of democracy, i.e. "freedom of belief".

AQ constructs the theme that "the building of democracy is established on the freedom of belief. In the democratic system, every person has the freedom to have whatever belief he so desires to have, and to adhere to whatever religion he wishes" (*Azan*, Issue 1:62), or the adherent may "return to his old religion or revert to another one if he so desires" (*Azan*, Issue 1:62). Such liberty is not permissible in the *ideological mindset*. The *ideological mindset* does not tolerate man's freedom of choice and considers it as an act of disloyalty to the *superhuman source*. It is very harsh on any such act of freedom and pronounces that "if a Muslim return to disbelief and apostatizes from the religion, then he is to be killed (*Azan*, Issue 1:62). The transgressor has only two options, either "he comes back [to the *ideology*], or he is killed" (*Azan*, Issue 1:62).

Therefore, the second principle focuses on the notion of absolute truth. This *mindset* argues that, as the absolute truth has been revealed, there is no space for any other claim of truth. Absolute truth is non-negotiable and must be conveyed to the ignorant. Hence, for the *character*, "the satanic principle of 'freedom of belief'" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 60) means, allowing the ignorant to follow the falsehood and thereby undermining their welfare. Therefore, the *Islamic ideologue*, being the blessed one and the most informed one, takes upon themselves to shepherd the misguided souls back to the truth. I discuss ideologue's zeal for action in a subsequent chapter entitled 'The Call for Action and *Violence*' (see Chapter 6). IS is in complete agreement with AQ and TT in denouncing "freedom". In an article entitled "Why We Fight You and Why We Hate You" IS articulates,

> [w]hat's equally if not more important to understand is that we fight you, not simply to punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom in this life and salvation in the Hereafter, freedom from being enslaved to your whims and desires as well as those of your clergy and legislatures, and salvation by worshiping your Creator alone and following His messenger. We fight you in order to bring you out from the darkness of disbelief and into the light of Islam, and to liberate you from the constraints of living for the sake of the worldly life alone so

that you may enjoy both the blessings of the worldly life and the bliss

of the Hereafter (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 33).

The text repeats the theme that the *superhuman-sourced* law can operate without any "consensus iuris". The terrorist action of reforming people need not take into account any "consensus iuris". The Islamist organisations conceive a special purpose of *violence*, i.e. the ideological reformation of humans. Therefore, IS emphasises that their fight is "not simply to punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom in this life and salvation in the Hereafter" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:33).

In doing so, the Islamist organisations are not bothered about any "consensus iuris" as the self-assured tone of the message in the theme conveys that they think they must impose their brand of *ideology* for the salvation of the ignorant. In their perception, the violent Islamic action is not for a material gain, but its fundamental purpose is the reformation of humankind. In other words, the Islamist organisations' action is for enforcement of a *mindset* that interprets factual reality through the *superhuman source*. People-centric notions like "consensus iuris" are irrelevant to the *ideological mindset*.

Therefore, AQ denounces the third fundamental as "[t]he false principle of accepting the judgment of the people in mutual disputes" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 60). Such an attempt for a "consensus iuris" is condemnable by the organisation because "it is the people who hold the right to judge in the various disputes between human beings; no law, no revelation and no Divine Book shall be used to give judgment" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 62). The *ideological mindset* judges all events through the *ideology*; therefore, for the Islamist organisations, it is unacceptable to "see today that in the course of mutual disputes, various democratic parties threaten each other with taking the other to the 'court of the people' and holding 'public opinion' as the final judgment in their matter" (*Azan*, Issue 1:62). In the Islamist organisations' perception, any such principle that refers to "consensus iuris" is a contempt of the *superhuman source* as "without doubt, seeking judgment from the people or from other than Allah is to accept the lordship of the Taghut (a false deity worshipped besides Allah that accepts to be worshipped) (…) Every law and every command other than the Law and Command of Allah is included

in the definition of Taghut*"* (*Azan*, Issue 1:63). The rejection of people-centric solutions is so strong that "people who even wish to go for judgment in their disputes to the Taghut*"* (*Azan*, Issue 1:63) must be condemned. It is the right of the *superhuman source,* i.e. Allah "who Holds the Right to Judgment in all conflicts and disputes, i.e. all disputes must be solved by the Laws and Commands of Allah (Shariah)" (*Azan*, Issue 1:63); on the contrary, "democracy says: in whatsoever you differ, the decision thereof is with the people (or the majority). No authority has the right to give judgment other than the people" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 63).

In principle, the *ideological mindset* advances the centrality of the *superhuman source* in all their conceptions and rejects the people-centric notions like "consensus iuris", democracy or freedom.

The fourth denunciation of democracy by Islamist organisations refers to the "freedom of expression" (*Azan*, Issue 1:60). The *Ideological mindset* does not tolerate alternative views; the word "alternative" presupposes a space - a space where another understanding of reality exists, and such freedom thinking is absent from the *ideological mindset*. "Freedom of expression" needs space in mind for the both, in imagining and in the reception of alternative ideas. It also means a different view or interpretation of an idea. *Ideology*, to an ideologue, cannot be explained differently. The freedom of expression, therefore, must be resisted at every level.

The denunciation of the fifth principle in the text mentioned above, namely, the separation of Dunya (political world) from Deen (religion) has a specific context. The Islamist organisations construct the idea that Islam is a complete religion, and it should not be separated from politics.

4.6   No Separation of Religion from Politics

The Islamist organisations are against the separation of religion from politics. They construct it as a Western idea. As all thought is anchored in the *superhuman source*, political thought is neither an exception nor a separate analytical category. Islam, in their conception, is a complete religion. It is comprehensive enough to guide man;

therefore, one should not look beyond the *superhuman source* for any guidance. AQ engages with this theme in the following text.

> This separation of religion from the life that democracy stands on is an utter falsehood. The one who believes in it commits *Kufr* (disbelief). This principle is against all those clear verses and Ahadith [sayings of the Prophet] which clearly state that Islam shall rule in government, politics, economics, societies, legislations and judiciaries. Islam is not limited to a few rituals of worship to be done inside some specific buildings. Hence, this false principle that separates Islam from human life is utter disbelief in the religion of Allah (*Azan*, Issue 1:64).

The subtheme that Islam as a religion cannot be separated from politics is common in all the Islamist organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT. The idea is traceable to the early days of Islam, where religious and political authority was combined. The idea is very much part of mainstream Islam as well. The main theme that anchors all thought in a *superhuman source* is also part of the mainstream religious *mindset*. That is why the texts of all the three Islamist organisations propagate the subtheme in similar constructs. For example, TT constructs the subtheme in *Shariat* Magazine as follows.

اس سے مغرب کا مقصد یہ ہے کہ اسلام کے فقہی میدان کو سر پھروں کا اکھاڑا بنادیا جائے۔ علاوہ ازیں وہ اسلام کے تصورِ ریاست کو اسلام سے بالکل الگ کوئی چیز باور کرانے میں تگ و دو میں ہے۔ اس کے بدلے کہلوایا جارہا ہے کہ اسلام تو محض اخلاقیات کا نام ہے۔ اسلام بہت روشن دین ہے۔ اسے سیاسیات، اقتصادیات، عالمی تعلقات کی الجھنوں سے آزاد رہنا چاہیے۔ اسلام میں اقتدار کا

[*Translation by the author*] The West aims to trivialise the Islamic jurisprudence. Further, they endeavour to separate religion from

politics. It is being constructed (wrongly) that Islam is nothing more than a set of moral values; it is very enlightened religion, and that it should stay away from complexities of politics, economy and international relations (*Shariat*, 56:32).

The TT constructs the theme in a language that conveys the sense that the separation of religion from politics is a Western conspiracy. The *ideological mindset* rejects all sources of thought that do not flow from a *superhuman source*. They consider the idea of the separation of religion and politics as not organic to the Muslim world but belongs to Western philosophy. To distance comprehensively from the idea of separation of religion from politics, AQ introduces another linguistic category. They use the word Deen instead of religion. In the following text, they explain the linguistic difference between the two words.

> The word *Deen* in the Divine Texts is often translated as "religion" in English. However, *Deen* has a far more encompassing meaning in the Arabic language than "religion" in the English language. Religion generally means a set of rituals and beliefs that are practiced individually; however, religion may not necessarily be the law implemented in the land. However, the word *Deen* encompasses both religion and law (in contemporary vocabulary)– in fact, *Deen* is the socio-economic-political-religious system that governs both the individual and collective life of its adherents and in this sense, Islam is definitely a *Deen* and not just a religion (*Azan*, Issue 4: 50).

The subtheme that Islam can exclusively manage "the socio-economic-political-religious system that governs both the individual and collective life of its adherents" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 50) is the basis for the assertion that Dunya (political world) cannot be separated from Deen (religion). Such an understanding extends the jurisdiction of the *superhuman-sourced* eternal law to all aspects of life, thus handing over a complete script, which has to be implemented in its entirety, to an *ideologue*.

As the Islamic *ideology* covers all the aspects of life comprehensively, there is no need to have political parties representing different political manifestos; hence, the denunciation of the political parties by the Islamist organisations as the supposed sixth "fundamental of democracy". In the *ideological mindset*, it is impermissible to allow any freedom for political organisation. The *Azan Magazine* engages with the theme in its pages as follows.

> Democracy holds that human beings have the complete freedom to formulate political parties, groups and organizations etc. regardless of whatever belief, *ideology* or morals that they may possess. This principle of democracy is also rejected by Islam, because: by accepting this principle, it is being testified that groups which possess Kufr (disbelief) and Shirk (polytheistic) beliefs can exist and can spread their corrupt beliefs among the masses. Of course, this goes against innumerable commands of the Quran and Hadith. The Quran and Hadith teach us to reject Kufr, to stop Munkar (evil, polytheism, disbelief) from spreading and to stand firm against all evils. Our religion does not allow us to let these misguiding and corrupt ideologies (or their upholders) to exist and spread, let alone recognizing the authority of their existence (*Azan*, issue 1: 64).

Any attempt to articulate the "consensus iuris" through the freedom of political organisation is rejected by the Islamist organisations because "by accepting this principle, it is being testified that groups which possess Kufr (disbelief) and Shirk (polytheistic) beliefs can exist and can spread their corrupt beliefs amongst the masses" (*Azan*, issue1: 64). The theme of freedom, and by extension democracy, is incompatible with the *ideological mindset* because it does not prejudge action based on *ideology*. The *ideological mindset* declares all other ideologies and belief systems as "misguided and corrupt". Consequently "[t]he present governments and politics, by giving people the Divine authority to legislate, have made the human society a victim of immorality, misdeeds and mutual dissension; and they have made world peace meaningless" (*Azan*,

Issue 6:33). Such assertions foreclose avenues of discussion on all the issues that have been prejudged by the *ideology*.

The refutation of the seventh principle, i.e. the principle of "obedience to the majority opinion" (*Azan*, Issue 1:60), is in line with the *ideological mindset*. The majority opinion does not matter in such a *mindset*. In the Islamist organisations' construction "that which conforms to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger - is the truth, regardless of the number of its adherents. And whatever is contrary to the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger is false even if the entire humankind agrees upon it" (*Azan* Issue, 1: 65). AQ further pronounces that "to obey the majority of the people of earth is to be misled away from Allah's Path, because the majority is upon misguidance" (*Azan* Issue, 1: 65).

The "freedom" for the Islamist organisations, is not linked to free choice; rather, the notion of "free choice" limits "freedom". AQ in an article entitled "The Real Freedom" in the *Azan* Magazine summarises this *mindset*.

> From amongst the polluted ideologies that have afflicted people the entire world over throughout the course of the tyranny carried out by the forces of kufr, is the notion that the people can choose whether to follow the truth or to embark upon falsehood. This *ideology* teaches that no one has the right, regardless of whom he may be, to impose any creed or set of morals on anyone else, even if that creed or set of morals is the truth revealed by Allah. They went to the extent of attributing this 'methodology of free choice' to the religion of Allah ta'ālā, and to the call of the Prophets, peace be upon them (*Azan*, Issue 3: 37).

The theme in the text mentioned above rejects any suggestion of "consensus iuris". The *ideological mindset* is so convinced about the benefits of anchoring one's thought in a *superhuman source* that it appears surprised over the suggestion that the "'methodology of free choice' can be applied to the religion of Allah taala" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 37). This *mindset* does not conceive of the idea of "freedom of choice", as the *ideology* has already decided truth and falsehood for its adherents; therefore, opting for

the falsehood is not a choice. As mentioned earlier, the reality for this *mindset* appears in binary terms, i.e. true claims and false claims. Implicitly, the Islamist organisations' mistrust the human faculty of thinking, as in their perception an option for a "free choice" would lead people to wrong choices.

Fundamentally, all three Islamist organisations construct the themes and subthemes linked to the first element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset* in a similar language. For example, IS endorses the construction of the other two organisations in the following text.

> These new proponents of choice had forgotten that many of the Ummah who held onto the name Islam had left through their deeds much of Islam's attributes. Therefore, giving the people' choice was no longer a possibility in this new state of affairs. Rather, the guiding principle became that every time choice is allowed, it will result in misguidance, either in the present or in the future (*Dabiq*, Issue 2: 5).

The discursive practices construct a *character* that is supposed to believe that "free choice" is problematic, as it leads to "the psychological and physical slavery" (*Azan*, Issue 3:38). In principle, the notion of freedom of choice cannot co-exist with an *ideology*. The role of man in such an arrangement is not to exercise freedom of choice but to be the obedient servant of the *superhuman-sourced* eternal law. Therefore, freedom for the *character* is an antithesis to the idea of a *superhuman source*.

4.7 Freedom as Antithesis to the Superhuman Source

The discursive practices of the three Islamist organisations in the magazines construct a *superhuman source* that is against all types of freedoms and displays a typical contempt for this notion. The acceptance of a *superhuman source* of thought means the surrender of the *character*'s liberties, especially the freedom to think. The idea of "freedom" is very important in conceptualising the *ideological mindset* as an agreement with the discursive practices' idea of freedom means a high chance for the presence of an *ideological mindset* in a *character*.

In the Islamist organisations' construction, the notion of freedom is an antithesis to the idea of a *superhuman source* as the origin of thought. A potentiality lies in the idea of freedom to do away with the requirement of an essential *superhuman source* of thinking. Unable to do away with the idea and its potentiality, the Islamist organisations appropriate the meaning of the idea itself. Freedom, for the Islamist organisations, means the total surrender of one's thinking and action to the dictates of the *superhuman source*. IS insists that they need to "liberate the Ummah from oppression, tyranny and man-made laws and bring it real freedom under the shades of Islam" (*Inspire*, Issue 9:4). For them, there is no freedom short of total submission to the *superhuman source*, as they draw all meaning to life from this source.

"Freedom", for the Islamist organisations, has a radically different meaning. The *ideological mindset* "operate[s] according to a system of values so radically different from all others, that none of our traditional legal, moral or common sense utilitarian categories could any longer help us to come to terms with, or judge, or predict their course of action" (Arendt, 1958: 460). This is the case in the discursive practices by Islamist organisations. AQ in an article entitled "The Modern Secular Enlightenment" in the *Azan* Magazine constructs the meaning of "freedom" as follows.

> By "freedom" they meant that man is free to do what ever he wants in this life, and he possesses the freedom to decide rights and wrongs. This false supposition of freedom stems from the denial of God and man's reality of being a slave of God. In reality this definition of freedom actually means slavery, which makes man a slave of his own desire or the desires of other human beings instead of a slave of Allah (…) When man is declared the central *character* in the Universe and freedom is declared ideal then what follows is that man's intellect alone is the criterion between right and wrong. The result is that man worships himself or his own desires (*Azan*, Issue 6:29).

The AQ published text mentioned above lays out an important theme of the *ideological mindset*. I employ a linguistic technique, namely deixis, to conceptualise the themes

and subthemes constructed in the text. Deixis is useful in conceptualising the implied meaning. In such expressions, the speaker is at the "deictic centre", and others are positioned in relation to the speaker. A well-known linguistic Charles J. Fillmore describes deixis as "the name given to those aspects of language whose interpretation is relative to the occasion of utterance: to the time of utterance, and to times before and after the utterance; to the location of the speaker at the time of utterance; and to the identity of the speaker and the intended audience" (Fillmore, 1966: 220).

The deictic expressions in the text such as "they meant", "whatever he wants" and "this life" are the major expressions of the construction on "freedom". The deixis "they" represents all the competing narratives, especially Western notions of "freedom". AQ simplistically summarise all the other narratives of freedom as conveying only one idea, that is, humans are free to do whatever they want to do. As the notion of "freedom" is an anathema to the *ideological mindset*; therefore, the Islamist organisations are very sensitive to any idea of decision making based on rational or logical thinking. Interestingly, the organisations are aware of the potentiality in logical thinking. Humans' claim and ability to interpret the factual reality through their intellect and logical reasoning, which is independent of any *superhuman source*, is unacceptable to the *ideological mindset*. To silence this potentiality, they immediately summon the fundamental premise of the *ideology*, i.e. the idea of God.

Nevertheless, implicitly, the Islamist organisations acknowledge that an internal source of thought exists within man. The Islamist organisations often contrast this idea of internal intellect with the idea of an external *superhuman source* of thought. In the above mentioned text, AQ asserts that "when man is declared the central *character* in the Universe and freedom is declared ideal then what follows is that man's intellect alone is the criterion between right and wrong. The result is that man worships himself or his own desires" (*Azan*, Issue 6:29). The magazines reserve much space to root out the idea of freedom to think.

Another deixis expression in 'this' life appeals to the wider religious beliefs, which consider this life only as a temporary abode of humans. The deixis 'this' not only

mainstreams the idea of the transience of life but also answers a logical question that arises when humans are encouraged not to think. The theme in the text implies that the faculty of thinking is not for 'this' life, but for 'that' life, i.e. the hereafter. Logically, if there is 'this' life, then somewhere must be 'that' life. In the discursive constructions, humans shall be allowed to do whatever they want to do in 'that' life. The incentivised 'that' life "of eternity (in Jannah)" is available to only those pure ones who close all their thinking faculties in 'this' life and follow the *ideology*. The *ideological mindset* not only forbids thinking in personal and private life but in collective political life as well.

I note that in the TT published Urdu texts the articulations of the idea of freedom are less philosophical and more conventional than the other two organisations. TT in the *Shariat* Magazine states:

آزادی اپنی سر زمین پر انسانی اصولوں کے مطابق آزادی اور خود مختاری کا نام ہے۔ جب ایک انسان دوسروں کے رحم و کرم پر نہ ہو۔ زندگی کے لیے آزادی ایک بڑی نعمت ہے اور آزادی کے بغیر زندگی مشکلات سے بھرپور ہوتی ہے۔ ہمارے افغان بھائیوں کو یہ بات بہت ناگوار گزرے گی۔ جب ان سے کہا جائے گا کہ آپ آزاد اور خود مختار نہیں ہیں۔ یہ بات بھی افغانوں کے آزاد ہونے کی دلیل ہے کہ وہ غلامی پر آزادی کو ترجیح دیتے ہیں، لیکن افسوس کہ ہم آزاد اور خود مختار نہیں ہیں، بلکہ جارحیت کے سیاہ سائے تلے زندگی بسر کر رہے ہیں۔ جب ایک

[*Translation by the author*] Freedom means the ability to live on one's land with independence and self-reliance in line with the principles of humanity, where man is not dependent on others. Freedom is a gift, and life is full of difficulties without freedom. Our Afghan brethren shall

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take it very hard when they are told that you are not independent and self-reliant. It can be judged from the act of the Afghans that they prefer independence over slavery, but unfortunately, we are not independent and self-reliant and are living under the shadow of aggression (*Shariat*, Issue 56: 21).

I contrast the TT conceptualisation of the notion with the articulation constructed by AQ. AQ conceptualise the notion of freedom in more philosophical terms. A text in the AQ published magazine *Azan* constructs the idea of freedom as follows.

> Free yourself from the shackles of this worldly life and physical pleasures. Yearn for freedom from your constricted desires and embrace the expanse of eternity in Jannah (*Azan*, Issue 4: 23).

In the discursive practice of the Islamist organisations, the metaphors of 'worldly life' and 'physical pleasures' are often used to represent the empirical world. The followers are encouraged to reject the ideas of empiricism and the associated knowledge claims. True freedom, for this *mindset*, is not the commodity of this world but would be available in a life after death. Therefore, the followers must disengage from all social activity that is not sanctioned by the *ideology*. This is the first step to encourage a recruit to opt for loneliness, and "loneliness" is one of the conditions that help in developing the *ideological mindset* (Arendt, 1958: 474—479). In the *ideological mindset*, thinking and free choice are problematic. The Islamist organisations, therefore, suggest a way out of the problem of free choice or "consensus iuris". The solution lies in surrendering the thought to the *superhuman-sourced ideology* and reinterpreting the meaning of the notion of "freedom". AQ articulates,

> [a] person becomes a real slave of Allah by bowing down to none but the Creator - Allah. This freedom is experienced by the thousands of Mujahideen who are spread all around the world, and the hundreds of thousands of Muslims who are joining the ranks of Mujahideen to break the shackles of the psychological and physical slavery that has been

imposed upon them by the Crusader-Zionist enemy over the decades (*Azan*, issue 3: 38).

The theme in the text offers a solution to the problem of 'free choice'. The solution is simple: leave the ambiguity of the free choice, endorse the *ideological mindset* and join the ranks of the organisations. Such action will grant the *character* "freedom" and liberate them from the "psychological and physical slavery" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 38). This is a suggestion to the *character* to rebel against the existing order everywhere. The texts in the magazines suggest that all those who have opted for this path have experienced the suggested liberation. A Mujahid in the pages of AQ published *Azan* Magazine explains his feelings as follows.

> The minute I walked in the tribal belt, I could feel the freedom that this place has got. I am no longer chained by any man-made law and nor am I subject to the tight procedures of homeland security or "NSA". I am a free man – bound by the Law of Allah Alone – who is the Creator of the heavens and the earth and none else. I pay no taxes; the only passport I need here in Waziristan is LA ILAHA ILALLAH MUHAMMAD UR RASOOL LLAH (None has the right to be worshipped except Allah and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah) (*Azan*, issue 3:34).

The theme in the text mentioned above emphasises that freedom comes from defying all positive laws made by man; the only acceptable laws are the eternal laws of the *ideology*. The *ideological mindset* neither recognises international boundaries nor international or local law. They want to live in a land that belongs to no one, is devoid of all positive laws and applies the *superhuman-sourced* law directly to humanity. In their perception, no law is compatible with the eternal law, as "[t]he religion of Allah cannot be stitched together with any man-made religion, philosophy or *ideology*. Islam came down to rule, and it cannot be ruled over" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 4). AQ repeats their unique understanding of "freedom" in the pages of *Azan* Magazine by emphasising that "[w]e are free from this 'New World Order', its bogus 'Charters', its 'Democracy' and its putrid 'Constitutions'" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 4).

In pursuit of a unique understanding of the notion of "freedom", the Islamist organisations perceive themselves as free people fighting for freedoms. This *mindset* also conceives the implementation of the *superhuman sourced* law as a resistance movement.

4.8   The Islamic Ideologue as a Free Man Fighting for Freedom(s)

The notion of "freedom" in the magazines is also a theme of resistance. It takes a particular political tone while discussing freedom as a resistance movement against the existing international world order. The discursive practices construct the ideal type of the *Islamic ideologue* as a freedom fighter, who is fighting for the freedom of the oppressed and downtrodden for the sake of *superhuman source* — God. AQ supreme leader Ayman u Zuwahiri asserts this theme in an article entitled "On Bangladesh and the Situation of Muslim Ummah" in the *Azan* Magazine.

> When the people of Afghanistan, Mali, and Somalia demand freedom from foreign occupation and secular rulers and decide to implement Shariah, imposing economic sanctions become a 'necessity'. They are then met with a full-fledged military onslaught, in which the leading international criminals and their local surrogates take part. Their villages and homes are reduced to ruins. Their women and children are killed. In short, they are unable to establish the Shariah because they are 'terrorists' and 'enemies of freedom'. But when Salman Rushdie, Tasleema Nasreen, and Ali Rajab Haider insult Islam, the Prophet of Islam, and the beliefs of Islam, they are treated as heroes who must be defended, honoured, and given awards. They even get warm receptions in the White House or Ten Downing Street! Why? Because they are icons of freedom who are defended by the West and the enemies of Islam (*Azan*, issue 5: 29).

After Usama Bin Laden, Zawahiri is the supreme head of AQ. The ideas mentioned above are loaded with often-repeated rhetoric. Thematically, the text advances the theme of resistance against an unjust oppressor. The time deixis "when" and person

deixis "they" and "who", once interpreted along with the metaphors used in the paragraph, substantially reveal the themes of the *mindset* Zawahiri is constructing.

By using the time deixis "when", Zawahiri combines different political situations in different areas into one situation. The time deixis "when" as used rhetorically eliminates any difference in the timeline of the political situations in Afghanistan, Mali and Somalia. It reduces the complexity of the situation and simplifies it for the target audience. By combining the three Muslim majority countries in the same time deixis, he legitimises by close proximation the Islamic *violence* in those countries and calls this *violence* as "freedom" for the people of those countries, i.e. freedom from foreign occupation and "secular rulers".

"Secular ruler" is often the repeated metaphor in the texts. The Islamist organisations use this metaphor for the political leadership of Muslim majority countries, who govern through any system other than the approved Sharia Law. In line with the ideological claim, Sharia Law is the law revealed by a *superhuman source*, and the *ideological mindset* does not need arguments for the legitimacy of the claimed laws. It is preordained that such law is the right law for humanity. "secular rulers" are, therefore, those rulers in the Muslim lands who have digressed from their duty to God and his law. The Islamist organisations themselves assess this digression. AQ thinks that secular rulers are "Muslim rulers who stand by in support of these countries against the Muslim people" (*Inspire*, Issue 17:61).

The IS agrees with the conceptualisation constructed by AQ and considers Sharia Law as the only legitimate law, which can ensure human "freedom". As the "secular rulers" are unaware of the fact that their rule is illegitimate, they must be made to realise this fact through all available means. "The Ummah today has been afflicted by the treacherous, apostate rulers and leaders who have even violated the rights of Allah in addition to the rights of His creation. And it is known that the authority of these rulers is invalid and that it is obligatory to oppose them and wage war against them" (*Dabiq*, Issue 12:9). The metaphor "secular rulers" denotes a categorisation of 'them' in the identity construction rhetoric. "Secular rulers" is a simplistic and convenient

categorisation to exclude the vast majority of moderate Muslims from the 'us' category. The 'us' and 'them' categorisation is essential for the *ideological mindset*. It matches with the simplistic and binary *mindset* informed by *ideology*.

The metaphor "secular rulers", however, has a deeper appeal as well. For the constructed ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue*, the term "secular rulers" is a proxy for a modern nation-state and its complex governing institutions. As the Islamist organisations draw legitimacy from the past, where such governing institutions were named differently, they feel alienated from and unattached to the Western named modern state institutions. For example, Islamist organisations prefer to use the word *Qazi* instead of a judge when referring to a judicial person. IS thinks that "[w]ith the spread of Christianity on a large scale in this region under the sword of Crusader colonialism and with support from it, and with this continuing until the current period, wiping out Islam in this region was among the most important declared goals of the mushrikin [polytheists]. They attempted to place pressure on the Muslims using every means in order to change their religion and remove them from the land" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 10:37). It may be argued that the colonisation of the Muslim majority territories in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century abruptly changed the evolutionary course of the Muslim historical institutions of governance. The new Western named institutions of governance could not gain legitimacy in the minds of the conservative Muslims. AQ, in line with IS also thinks that the colonisers "hired local people in the new population period and trained them in their particular *ideology*" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15). The period of colonial disruption in the Muslim lands served as an impetus to the nostalgic feelings of a glorious past, to which the Islamist organisations are trying to lead the ordinary Muslims.

Person deixis "they" and "their" in the textual constructions are the categories of "them". However, sometimes in rhetorical and dramatic language, as used in the above-quoted text, such deixis represent opposite meaning. This is done to dramatise the rhetoric so that the utterance gets a significance. The "they" and "them" deixis in the first half of the above-quoted text rhetorically point to the resistance and sufferings of the ideal type *character*s, who are the freedom fighters. The rhetorical sentence in the

text, i.e. "because they are the 'terrorists' and 'enemies of freedom'" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 29) means the opposite to the apparent wordings of the language, i.e., 'they' (the ideal type *character*s) are not terrorists but are the freedom fighters.

In the second half of the quoted text, Zawahiri repeats his technique of using the deixis in a context. In line with the first part of the paragraph, he combines critical writings of Salman Rushdie, Tasleema Nasreen, and Ali Rajab Haider through time deixis "when". Time deixis "when" has also identified the writers mentioned above as part of 'them'. The *ideological mindset*, through such linguist techniques, simplifies the cognitive understanding of the targeted concept. Writings of Salman Rushdie, Tasleema Nasreen and Ali Rajab Haider differ in subject matter, time and space, yet, time deixis "when", simplistically combines the three writers into a specific time frame. The deixis serves the purpose of the *ideological mindset*, i.e. to forcefully shut any alternate views of social reality.

The selection of the three writers in the text is significant due to two reasons. Firstly, it balances against the selection of three Muslim countries for the comparison. Secondly, as all the three writers have a Muslim background, it is also an effort to delegitimise any alternate explanations within the Muslim world. The *ideological mindset* is trying to neutralise a potential challenge from the modern state institutions and the critical Muslim thinkers. The construction in the text is an attempt to simplify the complex social reality for the consumption of the *ideological mindset*.

In the quoted textual construction, Zawahiri frames the Islamic *ideology* in 'us' versus 'them' categories by predominantly using time and person deixis with the blending of a metaphor. By suitably combining the linguistic techniques, he conveys the core theme to the constructed *character*, i.e. the *Islamic ideologue*s are the freedom fighters, as they believe in a *superhuman sourced* Divine Law. The freedom fighters are being opposed by a conspiratorial alliance comprising Western powers, Muslim secular rulers and writers.

The Islamist organisations construct the adoption of Sharia Law as synonymous with the notion of "freedom". A simplistic and binary view of international politics informs

the political analysis of the *ideological mindset*. AQ continues with the theme of "freedom" as a resistance movement in an article entitled "Destroying the Country Idols" as follows.

> If one researches and ponders deeply, it becomes really clear that the imperialistic powers are behind it. They hired local people in the new population period and trained them in their particular *ideology*; on the one hand, they gave increase to their period of rule and used them against their fellow-country Mujahideen who were fighting for freedom, while on the other, they left, as their inheritors, such people who were not only the protectors of the systems, ideologies, societies and constitutions implemented by these powers, but who also served, through proper planning, to stop any and all attempts to establish Islam (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15).

The *ideological mindset* understands an alternate social reality as a conspiracy. In the text mentioned above, AQ again focuses on the theme of "secular rulers", who should be identified as the conspirators opposing the freedom fighters (Islamist organisations). The magazines devote much space to this theme. The theme is on the lines that anyone among the Muslim people who do not share the *ideological mindset* of the Islamist organisations is a conspirator. Such conspirators are working in an organised manner in league with the imperialistic (Western) powers with a well-defined purpose of defeating the *Islamic ideologues*.

The Islamist organisations simplistically reinterpret the complex experiences of the Muslims in their colonial histories. In such reinterpretations, they construct the themes of resistance by Mujahideen. Mujahideen, a plural form of Mujahid, is an Islamic term reserved for the people fighting in the cause of Allah. By naming the contemporary ideal type *character*s as Mujahideen, the Islamist organisations not only appropriate Muslim history in their favour but also legitimise their violent actions through religious phraseology. Another text in the AQ published *Inspire* Magazine uses deixis to emphasise the theme of a freedom fighter.

What is happening in Yemen today is but a small portion of what has befallen our brothers in Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq. They are a continuation of violations and crimes driven by an all-encompassing hatred for every honourable and proud Muslim who seeks the freedom of Islam, the justice of Shari'ah. Allah says: {They shall keep fighting you until they turn you away from your faith, as much as they can}[2:218]. True was Allah when He said: {And never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow their religion} (*Inspire*, Issue 17: 4).

AQ is promoting the theme of freedom fighter using deixis in the text mentioned above. The deixis expression "what" in the sentence, "what is happening in Yemen…", is aimed at creating two effects. Firstly, it simplifies the complex reality for the *character*. As I explain elsewhere, that *ideological mindset* understands the factual reality in a binary sense; it is incapable of conceiving the reality in shades of grey. The reality for such a *mindset* is simple; it is either white or black, i.e. either true or false. The deixis "what" rhetorically simplifies the situation for a *character*. The *character* is no longer required to study the complex situation in Yemen; rather, they need to understand the implied meaning in the expression of "what". The *ideological mindset* will interpret the factual reality of Yemen in light of the *ideology*. The *mindset* will also judge it as being right or wrong through the same criteria.

Therefore, secondly, the first deixis expression of "what", once combined with the latter expression of the same deixis in the first sentence of the text, gives legitimacy to the understanding of the situation in Yemen by understanding the situations in Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq. The *ideological mindset* has already interpreted the situation in the three countries in 'us' and 'them' categories. The rhetorical use of deixis has made the theme appear sensible for the *ideological mindset* of an otherwise confusing situation in Yemen. The deixis "they" in the next sentence further clarifies the 'us' and 'them' categories. Thematically, "they", in the second sentence, are clearly part of the enemy category as "they" are opposing the freedom fighters, who are fighting for a type of "freedom" that is sanctioned by a *superhuman source*. In the

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ideological mindset, the type of "freedom" that is sanctioned by the *superhuman source* is the superior type of "freedom" than the "freedom" that is perceived through rational thinking.

Another deixis expression "they" in the above-quoted paragraph is directly translated from the Quran. The Islamist organisations liberally use Quranic quotations to lend authority and legitimacy to their discursive practices. The text also conveys the theme that the understanding of the Islamist organisations of the deixis "they" is aligned with the essence of *superhuman sourced* law. God in the quotation has informed the Islamist organisations that 'they' are fighting with 'us' — the freedom fighters, due to the faith; and that 'they' will continue to fight 'us' until 'they' eliminate the category of 'us'.

The Arendtian *ideological mindset* predicts future actions in the form of prophecies. The Quranic quotation implies that 'they' and 'us' shall always conflict until 'they' identify themselves as Jews and Christians, and 'us' identify themselves as Muslims. As this prediction is sourced to an eternal *superhuman source*, people have no control over its operationalisation. It is a prediction of eternal conflict. The Islamic radicals are destined by the *superhuman source* to eliminate the category of 'them', which is also represented by the existing international system led by America. The Islamist organisations urge the *character* to "continue to focus efforts against it until the world gets rid of this international system led by America and until Muslims enjoy freedom to practice their faith, freedom to apply the Laws of Allah and until Muslims secure themselves, wealth and resources from the hands of America" (*Inspire*, Issue 17: 12). This conflict can only cease when and if the *Islamic ideologue*s dominate the world.

4.9   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analysed the discursive constructed by three Islamist organisations, namely AQ, IS and TT, in the texts of their online magazines. The objective of the analysis was to detect the themes and subthemes used in the discursive construction of the ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue* through the lens of Arendtian theorisations on *ideological mindset*. Arendt theorises five essential elements of the *ideological mindset* (see Chapter 1). In this chapter, I quoted texts from the magazines

published by the three Islamist organisations that carry the first element of the *ideological mindset*, namely "The *Superhuman source* as the Origin of Thought". I noted that all the three Islamist organisations equally constructed a *character* that is supposed to attribute a *superhuman source*, namely God, as the origin of their thought. I argued that, contrary to the Islamist organisations' claim that their thought originates from a single superhuman source, the Islamist organisations in their discursive practices consult three types of texts indiscriminately as the sources of their thought. The texts include the Quran, the Ahadees and the interpretations of righteous scholars.

I analysed the chapter theme under seven subthemes that formed the paragraph headings. Fundamentally, the *character* constructed by the three Islamist organisations is supposed to believe that all thought that is attributed to other than their *superhuman source* is essentially false. All sovereignty belongs to the *superhuman source*. Therefore, no government can claim sovereignty for itself. "God's Sovereignty is established on earth by man's implementation of Allah's Law in his collective life" (*Azan*, 6: 30). The sovereignty of God, in the discursive practices, is the idea that is equally shared by the ideological as well as the Islamic religious *mindset*. By engaging with the wider Islamic literature, I demonstrate that although the idea is shared by both the types of *mindset*s, the conception of the *ideological mindset* is different from the religious *mindset*. The *ideological mindset* does not envision any space between God, the Divine Law and human being. This does not mean that the *ideological mindset* considers them a single entity, but they do not allow any freedom to humans to think.

The *superhuman sourced* law, which is the manifestation of the will of the *superhuman-source*, is independent of any "consensus iuris"*,* i.e. the wider consent of the law. The *ideological mindset* believes that Divine Law does not need any "consensus iuris", as it is independent of all action and consent of humans. They not only defy "consensus iuris" but reject all the notions that are the manifestations of "consensus iuris"*,* namely, the will or consent of people, democracy and freedom.

The discursively constructed *character* does not believe in the separation of religion and politics. For this *mindset*, Islam is self-sufficient, complete and can resolve all matters; it does not need any outside source to guide its affairs.

The discursive practices engaged very frequently with the notion of freedom and allied expressions such as democracy and free choice. Unable to get rid of the inherent potentiality (of discarding the *superhuman source* as the origin of all thought and action) in the notion of freedom, the organisations, uniquely, change the commonly understood meaning of freedom. They interpret freedom as applying the Divine Law literally to oneself and the world. Such an application shall free humans from the shackles of desires, ambitions as well as conflict.

In this chapter, I do not note any substantial difference in the discursive constructions between the three Islamist organisations, even though the *character* is constructed in two different languages by three separate organisations. The only difference the analysis noted is with regards to the idea of "freedom". TT conceptualise the idea of "freedom" more in a conventional sense as compared to AQ and IS, which are more philosophical and attach a deeper connection between the *superhuman source* and the idea of "freedom". It is possible to claim that the three organisations consider the same *superhuman source* as the origin of their thought. Nor do they substantially differ in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of this idea. This argument also lends credence to another claim, namely that the idea of a *superhuman source* as the origin of all thought is a mainstream idea amongst Muslims. Being an experiential reality, the idea of a *superhuman source* serves as the fundamental premise of Islamic *ideology*. In the Arendtian criteria of *ideology*, the first premise of *ideology* is based on a widely shared experience. It is the seriousness of the *character* that guides which of the two paths, i.e. the ideological or non-*ideological mindset*, the *character* shall adopt. Since many in the world are either non-serious or incapable of understanding the true nature of the *superhuman source*, it is, therefore, incumbent upon the ideologue to spring into action and realign the world as per the will of the *superhuman source*. Such a possibility cannot materialise in the true sense until and unless the ideologues dominate the world. The claim to global domination, therefore, springs from the first element of the

Arendtian *ideological mindset*. In the next chapter, I shall deal with the second element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely 'The Claim to Global Domination'.

Chapter 5: The Claim to Global Domination

5.1   Introduction

As explained in Chapter 2, 'The Claim to Global Domination' is the second essential element of a *character*'s *mindset* that can be categorised as ideological in the Arendtian sense of *ideology*. In this chapter, I continue to analyse the texts in the magazines of the three Islamist organisations to ascertain whether the *character* constructed by the organisations carry this element in their *mindset*. If this is the case, what is the extent of this presence? I detect, quote and analyse exemplary texts that carry the theme of a claim to *global domination* from the texts in the magazines.

I separate the exemplary texts from the magazines that carry the theme of 'The Claim to Global Domination'. I then reread the separated texts using Arendt's theorisations. Through this exercise, I generate subthemes that are clustered around the chapter theme. The language of the subthemes comes from both the sources, namely the empirical texts and the language used by Ardent in her theorisations. The subthemes form the paragraph headings. In this chapter, I analyse the chapter theme, i.e., 'The Claim to Global Domination' under six subthemes: Engaging with Important Ideological Questions Over centuries; superfluousness of existing international boundaries; contempt for a nation-state; the global state under a global leader; the idea of a global race; and suppression of human diversity and spontaneity. I also compare and analyse the similarities and dissimilarities of the themes across the three organisations.

The *ideology*—as it springs from an eternal and universal *superhuman source*—is not for one nation but the whole world. Arendt asserts that ideologues "discard national sovereignty and believe, as Hitler once put it, in a world empire on a national basis. They are not satisfied with the revolution in one country but aim at the conquest and rule of the world" (Arendt, 1958: 358, 359). Therefore, to be effective, the ideologues must dominate the world. The ideological movements suppress narrow nationalism

because "a development towards nationalism would frustrate its exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive" (Arendt, 1958:389). The eternal law anchored in a *superhuman source* is operating with a specific purpose; it "is expected to produce mankind as its end product; and this expectation lies behind the claim to global rule of all totalitarian governments" (Arendt, 1958: 462). The ideologues view history through the lens of *ideology* and try to answer certain ideological questions spread over centuries. The answers to such questions are useful for the ideological consistency and lend credence to their claim to *global domination*.

5.2   Engaging with Important Ideological Questions Over Centuries

The Arendtian ideologues think that they can answer "ideological questions of the importance of centuries" (Arendt, 1958). Such a mode of thinking is useful to the ideologues as it obliterates and confuses the existing political categories to the ideologues' advantage. History is (re)interpreted and portrayed as not only moving in sync with *ideology* but adequately answering important ideological questions as well. The Islamist organisations draw on Islamic literature to articulate such questions like the relationship of the imagined eternal *superhuman source* with humans. Such engagement with history is important for the organisations' positionality, as the ideological explanations flowing out of this engagement legitimise their claim to *global domination* for easy comprehension of the *character*. A text published in the IS Magazine *Dabiq* not only engages with the theme of *global domination* but also reveals the foundational framework of the *ideological mindset*. It reads,

> Indeed, the Gracious Lord has never left man without guidance. Whenever mankind strayed from His worship, He sent them a messenger bringing both warning and glad tidings. Those who worshipped other than the Creator were warned of punishment, torment, and eternal damnation, and those who persevered upon the worship of the True King were promised forgiveness, salvation, and everlasting bliss. But how astray mankind often chooses to be (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:46).

Thematically, the text addresses a historically constructed ideological question,

namely, the relationship of man with Divine Law. The text explains that Divine Law is primarily for the guidance of humanity. The law divides humanity into two categories, i.e. believers and non-believers. The Divine Law is refreshed through messengers who are sent by the Divine Being whenever the law is either misunderstood or corrupted. The law decrees rewards for followers and punishes non-followers. The subtle theme in the text delegitimises all other divisions of the world, e.g. political, ethnic, geographical, economic, and so on. The IS suggests to the *character* that the world consists of humanity, which is of two types—good and bad types. The Divine Law has decreed that good types, or the followers, shall dominate the bad types or non-followers. It is, therefore, legitimate for the ideological organisations, i.e. the good types and followers of the Divine Being, to make a claim for *global domination* so that the Divine Law takes its course which is hindered by the actions of the non-followers.

IS thinks that Divine Law dominated the world in the past through "the call of Noah(…)Then Abraham, calling his father and clan to the denial of idols and to the worship of the Creator,(…)after Joseph, a son of Israel, brought the grandsons of Isaac into Egypt, wherein they were enslaved by Pharaoh, the Lord sent Moses to rescue them, (…)In the end times, Jesus Son of Mary came to the tribes of Israel but was met with fierce opposition" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:47). The acceptance, as well as the rejection of the Divine Law itself, is also in the knowledge of the *superhuman source*. Inferiority in numbers does not concern the ideologue; rather, it is proof of divine decree. "It is just as the Lord said, explaining this phenomenon of the majority's rejection of the truth, 'And most of mankind refuse [to follow anything] but disbelief (*Al-Isra:* 89)'" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:47). IS suggests to the *character* that all these messengers over the centuries came with a message "often in the form of a scripture, something for the educated to read and comprehend, yet with the simple command of monotheistic worship of the Creator that even the illiterate could follow" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:47). Unfortunately, humanity has always strayed away from the original divine message. "[J]ust as the Torah was not fully preserved, even altered, the Gospel was also corrupted. Its original was lost, with the oldest related manuscripts written only as commentary to the original. So instead of having an unaltered 'Gospel of Jesus,' one finds the Gospel according to Matthew, then Mark, then Luke, then John, each with a

unique take on various aspects of Jesus' teachings, sometimes outright contradicting one another. To say the least, the authentic scripture was lost, and the people strayed" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:48).

Furthermore, Jesus' message was not for the whole of humanity but only for the tribes of Israel. "It was reported that he [Jesus] said, 'Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfil them'" (Matthew 5:17)" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:47). IS announces that now the final message to humanity has been sent through Prophet Muhammad "about whom He [God] said, 'Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but [he is] the Messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets' (Al-Ahzab 40). The God has promised that "We revealed the Reminder and verily We shall preserve it (Al-Hijr 9)'" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:48). The final divine message has divine protection and is "sent not to the Tribes of Israel alone – but to all of humanity. For the same Lord who sent Moses and Jesus also sent Muhammad" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15:48).

IS constructs a *character* who believes that they are the true representatives of all religious discourses. The writers in the magazines imply that the *character* constructed by the discourse is not a new *character*; rather, this *character* was always present in the religious discourse since the start of history. The contemporary *character*, however, has a distinction; it is universal, perfect and does not suffer from the imperfections of the past *character*(s). It is a clever positionality, that is, by acknowledging imperfections of the past *character*s (of the religious discourses), the violent radicals reject all the past assessments and categorisations that can help contextualise and understand the present phenomena of *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character*. It is typical of the Arendtian articulated *ideological mindset* to challenge all the existing categories of understandings and introduce certain new categories of analysis that are guided by *ideology* only.

The IS construction presents a *character* that is not only the true embodiment of the Divine Law but also possesses an exclusive instrument that can interpret factual reality. The exclusive instrument is the monopoly over the understanding of the true essence

of Divine Law. The organisation constructs a *character* that believes in the finality of the Divine Law which is preserved in all its entirety and purity and that the *character* exclusively understands its true interpretations; the interpretations that capture Divine Law's true essence. It is a unique privilege available to the *character* that is unavailable even to most of the fellow co-religionists.

Therefore, as the previous centuries proved, the Divine Law shall again favour the *character*, who shall then conquer the world. As the Divine Law is for humanity, therefore, the *character* must ignore all manmade boundaries that divide humanity so that man can be reformed as per the essence of the Divine Law. The Divine Law, then, shall logically favour the reformed man. IS desires that the *character* should believe that such a favour is already in operation. IS asserts that "[w]hat we see today in these current rounds of the mujahidin's war with all the nations of shirk and kufr – at the head of which are the Crusader nations of the West – specifically over the past two decades, for the banner was clear, and the goal was sincere. Thus, the affair of the muwahhidin continued – by Allah's grace – to rise and to flourish" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 6: 10). IS continues,

> [a]nd we have seen this being confirmed many times throughout the history of this blessed Jihad, which has not stopped since Allah's Messenger and his noble companions commenced it. Makkah and the Arabian Peninsula yielded to the Muslims in a number of years, and they eliminated Khosrau's empire after engaging the Persian pagans in long battles, during the course of which the Muslims suffered what they did of injuries, until eventually Allah brought down Khosrau's throne. They then dealt with the Roman state, which the Muslims continued to attack for several centuries, until Allah permitted that it be eliminated and that its traces be wiped out. Then, there was what the Muslims did with many of the tawaghit and the nations of kufr, which the Muslims did not tire of fighting against, until Allah eventually permitted their defeat and there remained for the Muslims their religion and their lands (*Rumiyah*, Issue 6: 10).

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The main theme in the text proposes that the operation of Divine Law is independent of any national boundaries. Fundamentally, it operates through Jihad and is in continuous motion. The Divine Law, however, does not operate with a uniform pace; the Divine Being strictly controls the pace of the operation. The constructed *character* has a distinction in its *mindset* from the past ideologues, namely the Nazi and Communist ideologue. The past ideologues did not differentiate between the eternal law and eternal being, but the organisations construct a distinction between both; the Divine Being is separate from the Divine Law. For the *character*, Divine Law is controlled by a Divine Being who can adjust the pace of its operation. It is this discretion of the Divine Being that accounts for the differing patterns of Muslim successes mentioned in the above text, i.e. the military successes against Arabian, Persian and the Roman Empires. The *character* is not supposed to consider non-ideological factors, e.g. material differences while assessing the outcome of an action; the outcome of an action depends on the decision of the Divine Being as to how He chooses to operate the Divine Law. For the ideologues, *ideology* explains "the secrets of the past, the intricacies of the present, [and] the uncertainties of the future" (Arendt, 1958: 469). Any difference that is observed in the operation of the eternal law is attributable to the idea of the divine will. The idea of divine will keeps the ontological explanations of the factual reality fluid and formless.

The *character* is supposed to think that history is realised through the divine will, which can be understood retrospectively by understanding the operation of Divine Law. For them, the operation of Divine Law reveals the divine will. It was the divine will that dictated quick domination in Arabia but decided to take several centuries to eliminate Roman Empire. IS articulates that the Divine Law is in operation to endorse their *ideology*, as it helps the reformed one "to rise and flourish".

The two sister Islamist organisations, i.e. AQ and TT, do not present any substantial disagreement with IS articulated constructs, as far as the explanations of the historical relationship between man and Divine Law are concerned, AQ, however, also focuses on the resisting forces that try to operate against the historical arrangements of the *superhuman source*, i.e. the Divine Being. By historicising and naming such forces,

AQ identifies 'them' and their actions. One of the methods used by 'them' to resist AQ's claim to *global domination* is to corrupt the (true) interpretation of the Divine Law. It is done by the Crusader-Zionists duo, who promote the corrupt idea that democracy and secularism are compatible with Islam.

> Oh, our dear Muslim Ummah! The Crusader-Zionists have been working day and night since the last few centuries to demolish Islam, as it was revealed to Prophet Muhammad. They seek to befool us that Islam can be stitched together with their Secular, Democratic "New World Order" and the "Constitutional" system which was only designed to serve their interests (*Azan*, Issue 5:4).

The central theme in the above mention text rejects any suggestion that Divine Law and manmade law are compatible. AQ clarifies to the *character* that the historical suggestion that Divine Law is compatible with manmade laws is a conspiracy hatched against 'us'. Such a *mindset* resonates with the Arendtian *ideological mindset*; it rejects all actions flowing out of human thinking. The *character* must delink human experience and human action.

AQ is very explicit in naming the nations that they think are historically part of 'them'. "One of the nations at the head of this war against Islam is Britain. This is a nation that has a long history of hatred towards Islam and Muslims. In the centuries gone by it was at the forefront of the fight against Islam, and now it is America's most loyal ally" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 16).

AQ not only names the external enemies that resist their 'Claim to Global Domination' but points to the *character* that they should remain vigilant to the internal enemies as well. The internal challenges come from Muslim leaders who do not subscribe to the *ideological mindset*. Arendtian *ideological mindset* rejects all explanations that fall in the category of alternative explanations. Alternative, in *ideological mindset*, is dissent and dissent is a betrayal. AQ pronounces that "[i]n the last few centuries, history has witnessed that self-proclaimed, western appointed leaders of Muslim lands betrayed Islam and Muslims enormously. They proved to be killers, robbers, dictators, tyrants

and loyal to their western lords" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 23).

The above mentioned textual construct normalises and historicizes the conflict between 'us' and 'them'. The conflict appears normal and part of a tradition. AQ suggests that "this method of Jihad is one of the modes of conflict between 'us' and the West - something both new and old- a way of hemming in the enemy and breaking its strength, and this mode of asymmetrical warfare was pioneered by our predecessors centuries ago" (*Inspire* Issue 17: 49). The Islamist organisations take pride in reviving the centuries-old traditions linked to the historical conflict. IS records the joy of a terrorist who thinks he has revived a centuries-old tradition of slavery, which was hitherto abandoned. The IS published *Dabiq* Magazine quotes,

> Therefore, I further increase the spiteful ones in anger by saying that I and those with me at home prostrated to Allah in gratitude on the day the first slave-girl entered our home. Yes, we thanked our Lord for having let us live to the day we saw kufr humiliated and its banner destroyed. Here we are today, and after centuries, reviving a prophetic Sunnah, which both the Arab and non-Arab enemies of Allah had buried. By Allah, we brought it back by the edge of the sword, and we did not do so through pacifism, negotiations, democracy, or elections. We established it according to the prophetic way, with blood-red swords, not with fingers for voting or tweeting (*Dabiq*, Issue 9: 47).

IS constructs two themes in the text mentioned above. The first theme emphasises that *violence* is integral to *ideology* (I deal with this element, i.e. 'Violence and the Call for Action', separately in the following chapter), while the second theme gives a glimpse of the organisation's future plans, i.e. to realign the future with the past. Innovation, to the construction, is an illusion. The future must not innovate, but rather follow the ideological explanations and traditions of the past. All progress that does not follow this ideological rule is considered illusory.

Such an assertion is based on a particular reading of history. AQ constructs the *character* who is supposed to believe that 'we' always dominated 'them' militarily.

"History shows that the usage of military force in any war - not battle - between Muslims and 'Kuffar', failed to finish the war in favour of the 'Kuffar'" (*Inspire*, Issue 12:40). Such domination was maintained in the "nine historical crusades, the Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan and the American invasion of Iraq" (*Inspire*, Issue 12:40), as all these wars "ended with humiliating defeats on the infidels' side, by the Grace of Allah" (*Inspire*, Issue 12:40).

All three Islamist organisations construct a *character* who is supposed to understand and answer important historical questions through the lens of the *ideology*. For them, history is a struggle for domination of the world between two forces; the forces of good represented by the Islamist organisations and the forces of evil represented by "Kuffar". The forces of good are strictly guided by an eternal Divine Law originating in an eternal *superhuman source*. In the Islamist organisations' textual constructs, the position of Divine Law is settled; it always favoured the forces of good for their claim to *global domination*. Wickedly, however, the forces of evil have created manmade boundaries to frustrate and retard the *global domination* of ideologues. The ideologues, therefore, should make every effort to obliterate the superfluous manmade boundaries and reclaim their legitimate right to dominate the world.

5.3   Superfluousness of International Boundaries

The Islamist organisations think that international boundaries are artificial creations having the explicit aim to serve the West. In their construct, the world instead should be divided based on faith. AQ articulates this theme in the following text.

> All Muslims are united upon true faith in Allah, His Messenger and His Final Book. However, these false lines have been etched upon us on the basis of which entire political, military, economic and cultural institutions have been established that seek division between the Pakistani and the Indian, between the Egyptian and the Turk, between the Chechen and the Uzbek. There is no reality in these divides. As has been emphasized earlier in the article, in Islam, the divide between humanity is upon faith, upon love for Allah and His Messenger. So, we

as an Ummah must take practical steps to defeat this divided mentality and erase these map lines physically that indoctrinate the Ummah into believing in this false separation (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13).

The central theme that runs through the text points to an important aspect of AQ's thinking, i.e. the political division of the world is superfluous. AQ suggests to the *character* to imagine the political division of the world based on one's faith. The ideas of Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harab are the concrete political categories for the constructed *character*. Dar-al-Islam, in the organisations' understanding, is a piece of land without any intra-national boundaries.

AQ's claim to world domination, therefore, shall start by dominating the people and countries that identify themselves as Muslims. They assert, "[w]e as an Ummah must take practical steps to defeat this divided mentality and erase these map lines physically that indoctrinate the Ummah into believing in this false separation" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13). Such divisions are superfluous and "[t]here is no reality in these divides" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13). One of the main aims of ideological *violence* is to obliterate these manmade borders. "Ameer-ul-Mumineen Mulla Muhammad Umar, Shaykh Usama bin Laden, Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri and countless other Scholars and Mujahideen from all parts of the world have sacrificed their lives for the sake of destroying these manmade borders (*Azan*, issue 3:5). These manmade borders "divided the hearts and bodies of an Ummah united by faith. Indeed, the reality is that this Ummah is ONE - united by faith in the One True God Allah, His Messenger and His final Book, The Glorious Quran" (*Azan*, issue 3:5).

Fundamentally, all the three Islamist organisations construct a *character* in the discursive practices that is supposed to imagine Muslim identity in terms of a global race, that is, the Ummah. I discuss the "global race" aspect of the Ummah in the succeeding paragraphs; here, I explain the *character's* political understanding of the concept. A very strong presumption exists in the discursive *character*'s understanding of the political identity of people who identify themselves as Muslims; all the three organisations contribute equally to this presumption. The very concept fuels the zeal to

obliterate all political divisions within the Muslim people so that all Muslims belong to an international brotherhood known as Ummah. National boundaries, to the *character*, appear a digression from the ideal past when there was only one identity: the Muslim identity.

It is however interesting to note that, despite considering all Muslims part of the Ummah, the terrorist initiated ideological action does not differentiate between local and foreign populations. This is a peculiar aspect of Arendtian *ideological mindset* (see Chapter 1). In such a *mindset*, the violent ideological action treats local as well as foreign populations alike. They plan and execute their actions in a manner as there are no national or international boundaries. The following textual construct published in IS Magazine *Dabiq* points to the IS thinking as to how they disregard international boundaries in the planning and execution of their actions.

> Brussels, the heart of Europe, has been struck. The blood of its vitality spilled on the ground, trampled under the feet of the mujāhidīn. Flames ignited years ago in Iraq have now scorched the battleground of Belgium, soon to spread to the rest of crusader Europe and the West. Paris was a warning. Brussels was a reminder. What is yet to come will be more devastating and more bitter by the permission of Allah, and Allah prevails (*Dabiq*, Issue 14:4).

The ideological action, as constructed in the above text, shows complete disregard to any implications of the political reality of international borders. In its operation, such ideological action treats all opposing forces and populations, i.e. 'them' as a homogeneous whole, as it imagines 'us' a homogeneous whole governed by a single Divine Law. Likewise, 'they' are also governed by a single law, the law of falsehood. The law, whose spirit is based on falsehood, guides all the actions of the 'other'. The law of falsehood, IS suggests to the *character*, also transcends the national and international boundaries; therefore, a claim for transnational dominance on the part of the *character* is not illogical.

AQ reserves more space in their magazines to discuss the themes linked to the

superfluousness of international boundaries than IS or TT. AQ traditionally delves much deeper into the ideological reasoning of the ideas. For AQ, the political categories of "country" or "nation-state" are innovations and part of the new world order. Therefore, "[i]t is necessary to understand the basis and the founding philosophy upon which this entire world order" runs (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). Such understanding shall help "to uproot the evil that its [new world order's—*inserted by the author*] founding Kafir fathers implanted for deceiving the masses" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). The key element of the new world order "is the concept of the 'country' and the 'nation-state' that has spread far and wide and engulfed almost the whole planet in our modern-day" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). The system supports the "[m]an-made borders that divide people on the basis of land, and man-made constitutional law that is implemented by force over the whole population" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23).

The TT magazine *Shariat* understands the superfluousness of international borders differently. The organisation appears confused on the issue. It propagates the idea of Muslim Ummah but also accepts the existing boundaries. Nevertheless, these boundaries should not restrict free movement amongst Muslim countries. The TT advocates a loose confederation of all Muslim countries to create a Muslim block.

Fundamentally, the discursive practices of the three organisations construct a *character* that imagines international as well as intra-national borders as being superfluous. Such a *character* reserves special contempt for the very idea of the nation-state.

5.4   Contempt for the Nation-State

For an ideological movement, ideological rule in one country with well-defined boundaries is a dilemma as "a development towards nationalism would frustrate its exterior expansion, without which the movement cannot survive" (Arendt, 1958:389). Hence, for a *character* that thinks in ideological terms, a nation-state is a manmade anomaly that needs to be eliminated at the earliest possible moment. The Islamist organisations do not recognise the popularly understood historical evolution of the nation-state; rather, they understand it as an evil inflicted upon the Muslim Ummah by outsiders. The organisations encourage the *character* to challenge the political

categories attached to the notions of the nation-state such as "country" or "territorial nationalism".

AQ takes the lead in ideological and philosophical explanations of the concept compared to the other two organisations. For AQ "[t]he basic philosophy of the 'country' is that it is a group of individuals who ally themselves with each other on the basis of being born in a particular area or land" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 25). AQ calls such nationalism as territorial nationalism. The territorial nationalism is condemnable because, "[t]erritorial nationalism forms the basis for the sketching of map-lines that rip the heart out of the concept of alliance and enmity for the sake of faith in Allah" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 25). Nationalism "is more specifically the 'attachment' or allegiance of a people of a particular land to their land of birth. Nationalism most often pervades [sic] and gathers people from different families and tribes into a nation" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 26). By contrast, Islam, in AQ's understanding, "gives us the concept of 'Dar' instead of the land. The Islamic conception of land is widely different from the Western concept. Islam rightfully recognises the earth as the Property of Allah and fully declares Sovereignty on it to Allah Alone who is without a partner" (*Azan*, issue 3: 26). They construct that the ideas of "country" and "nation-state" are not organic to Islam; rather, the 'other' conspired to infiltrate these ideas into the Muslim Ummah. AQ elaborates the construct in the following text in the *Azan* Magazine.

> Amongst the evils that this secularized system has inflicted upon the Muslim Ummah is the concept of "countries" or "nation-states" that have been implemented upon the masses as if they represent the only form of collectivism for the people of the world! The chassis of the new world order – with respect to collectivism - is deeply disturbing: an amalgam of "countries" – each run by separate "constitutions" all coming together to form a "United Nations" under which the entire population of the world is regulated! It is necessary to understand the basis and the founding philosophy upon which this entire "world order" runs and to uproot the evil that its founding Kafir fathers implanted for deceiving the masses. One of the key components of

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this new world order is the concept of the "country" and the "nation-state" that has spread far and wide and engulfed almost the whole planet in our modern-day. Man-made borders that divide people on the basis of land, and man-made constitutional law that is implemented by force over the whole population – constitute the key aspects of this "country" system (*Azan*, Issue 3: 23).

The theme of rejection of the nation-state runs through the text mentioned above. AQ is uncomfortable with the idea of a nation that is defined by a piece of land and named as a country. Such thinking is understandable as the Islamist organisations view the Muslim Ummah as a homogenous whole; indivisible through any political, social or geographical demarcations. AQ does not believe in the historical evolution of the political categories of statehood but points to some hidden machinations of the "Kuffar", who conspired to bring this political change and fashion the thinking of Muslim Ummah. AQ propagates that the thoughts of people are controlled by 'them' and are made to believe that the categories of nation-state and country "represent the only form of collectivism for the people of the world" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 23).

As the *ideological mindset* rejects pluralism, it seems incomprehensible for such thinking to imagine plurality in governance models. The political categories of "country" and "nation-state" are unnecessary irritants in the path of Islamist organisations' 'claim to *global domination*'. Thus, the *character* thinks that such political categories are working against their ideological aims, i.e. converting people into humanity and rule by one law.

In the above text, the constructed *character* appears critical of man's interference in the divine design. "Man-made borders that divide people on the basis of land, and man-made constitutional law that is implemented by force over the whole population – constitute the key aspects of this 'country' system" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 23). In the *ideological mindset*, man is only an instrument of superhuman law and his/her thinking and actions should be limited to the implementation of eternal law. Any attempt, on the part of man, to think and innovate is contemptible. A nation-state, thus, being a human

innovation, appears anomalous to the *ideological mindset*. The existing arrangement "with respect to collectivism - is deeply disturbing: an amalgam of 'countries' – each run by separate 'constitutions' all coming together to form a "United Nations" under which the entire population of the world is regulated!" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 23). AQ constructed discursive *character*, thinks that the creation of all the above mentioned political categories became possible only once 'they' destroyed the Muslim Khilafah— a global empire under a global leader. Such destruction had a well thought out plan. AQ explains their understanding of this plan in the following text.

> The ruling brains behind this satanic world order would not have been able to rope the Muslims in as part of this new world order without the destruction of the Khilafah and the emergence of the infamous "country" or "nation-state". The nation-state, with its anti-Islamic essentials, allows the *Kuffar* to place their stooges as leaders of the Muslims – who rule by other than what Allah has revealed, restrict Islam to the places of worship and do all that they can to make their "countries" part of the international world order. The nation state's creation as a replacement for the Khilafah paved the way for the *Kuffar* to collectively take Muslims on the same bench as theirs and force their international order based on the secular, capitalistic UN charter upon their necks (*Azan* Issue 4: 22).

In the text mentioned above, AQ desires that the *character* should believe in the theme that had there been Khilafah in place, Muslim majority areas would not have transitioned to nation-states. In this sense, this political development in the Muslim Ummah is a regression from a previously held world-dominating position. The political centralisation is an essential prerequisite for the claim to *global domination*. The idea of the 'nation-state' has "destroyed the unity of Ummah and split it into bits and pieces, entirely vulnerable to the plans of the Kuffar" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 12). This political regression to nation-state weakens the ideological appeal and helps the 'other' to manage political systems of Muslim countries. 'they' can "place their stooges as leaders of the Muslims – who rule by other than what Allah has revealed, restrict Islam

to the places of worship and do all that they can to make their 'countries' part of the international world order" (*Azan* Issue 4: 22). At the centre of the *character*'s *mindset* lies the fear that Muslim Ummah's division into nation-states runs counter to their claim to rule the world through one Divine Law. In an article entitled "destroying the country idols—consequences of adopting the nation-state concept: the destruction of unity, creation of nationalistic armies" AQ explains how the 'other' manipulated the political process to bring in the downfall of Khilafah.

> One of the fundamental interests of the West and the Zionists, and indeed, one of the necessities of their existence, is that they divide us by spreading the principles of the secular nationalist nation-state and homeland among us, so that we become crumbs that they can easily devour. As a result of this ethnic and territorial nationalism, we broke apart after the fall of the Khilafah into more than fifty helpless vassal states (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13).

AQ constructs the theme in the above text for the *character* to believe that in the glorious past they dominated the world because they were not aware of "the principles of the secular nationalist nation-state and homeland" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13). Such unawareness of the new knowledge and experience helped Muslims to stay united. The term Khilafah is presented as an ideological glue that bound together "more than fifty helpless [Muslim] vassal states". Arendtian ideologues articulate simple reasons to explain a complex phenomenon. The "West and the Zionists" managed to neutralise this ideological glue by introducing the ideas of "ethnic and territorial nationalism". The constructed *character* is made to believe that they should reject all new political ideas, especially the ideas linked to the notions of "country" and "nation-state". AQ believes that "[a]fter the fall of the Khilafah in 1924, this "country" and "nation-state" concept of the "Kuffar" was brutally enforced upon the Muslims, and since then, generations of Muslims have been born into this "country"- oriented world" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). Previously, Muslim political understanding was based on "[t]he divinely legislated brotherhood of the Muslims on the basis of faith" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). However, now Muslims are forced to "adopt alliance and enmity for the sake of a new

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idol called the "nation-state" or the "country" instead of for the Sake of Allah" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23).

Consequently, "for example, the American occupation of Afghanistan is termed as an 'internal matter' of the Afghans that, say, the people of Pakistan or Uzbekistan have nothing to do with" (*Azan*, Issue 3:23). In the *character*'s understanding, the idea of "nation-state" or "country" weakens the ideological claim to *global domination*. AQ, therefore, frames the idea of the nation-state as a conspiracy against Muslims.

The Islamist organisations not only reject the political categories of "country" and "nation-states", they also single out one of the most coercive institutions of the nation-state, i.e. nationalistic armies. The discursive practice of the Islamist organisations constructs a *character* who plans ideological domination of the world. The ideological domination for the *character* means domination of every aspect of life, i.e. conceptual as well as physical. As the political categories of "country" and "nation-state" are considered a hurdle in conceptual domination, the nationalistic armies are imagined as a hurdle to physical domination. AQ frames the theme of nationalistic armies as an obstacle to the realisation of the ideological claim of *global domination*. The following text in the *Azan* Magazine elaborates this line of thought.

> In the countries that obtained freedom from the imperialistic powers, the biggest hurdle faced by the Islamic movements that sought to establish the Islamic system and the Shariah Law, has been the (Nationalistic) Army. Whenever these Islamic movements neared victory through protests, demands and the democratic way, the military snatched the Rule and declared these (Islamic) groups as illegal; or the military used its influence and power to dissolve legislative assemblies and deny the standpoint of the parties that had reached the assemblies through democratic elections and their public support. It is worth pondering upon for those people who are trying to revive Islam that how come the Army played such a role against the Islamic parties in all of the Muslim countries that gained

independence from the imperialistic powers? (*Azan*, Issue 5:15).

The above text reveals an important theme of AQ's thinking. It exposes the organisation's perceptions of political and military power. Noticeably, AQ is willing to coexist, rather, and use the existing political institutions to seize power but outrightly rejects any coexistence or use of existing Muslim military institutions to advance their claim to *global domination*. AQ suggests to the *character* that as wider Muslim populations are receptive to their *ideology*, they can succeed to gain power through the existing political institutions. This hope gives AQ the confidence to engage with otherwise "Taghut political systems". It seems to be an "ends justifying means" compromise on the part of the organisation. The compromise is linked to the hope of success. The successful capture of power in a state shall act as a springboard and help in claiming the *global domination* of the world. The past ideologues, e.g. Hitler, ceased power through a "democratic process". Arendt also notes the phenomenon of widespread support of the masses for successful ideologies. She asserts that ideologies stealthily work and influence large populations before these are visible to the outside world (Arendt, 1958: 457). By the time, the ideological movements surface and become visible at the national or international stage, large portions of local populations already subscribe to the ideological claims of these movements. Ideological movements provide a platform to already prevalent ideological ideas.

In the text, the *character* constructed by AQ is supposed to be willing to use existing political systems like "protests, demands and the democratic way[s]" (*Azan*, Issue 5:15) to advance their ideological claims, but outrightly reject engagement with the institutions of Muslim nationalistic militaries. They understand the centrality of *violence* as a commonality between a military and a terrorist organisation; both jealously guard and claim their monopoly over this vital instrument of enforcement. *Violence* and its instruments, being central to the *ideological mindset* because of their role in fashioning the factual reality, need complete monopolisation by ideologues. Fundamentally, the Islamist organisations' understanding of *violence* is akin to the statement: who so ever controls *violence* controls politics.

In the textual expressions, the organisations think that the existing political institutions of the Muslim countries can be used to advance their ideological claim to world domination, but the Muslim nationalistic militaries pose a great challenge to their claims[13]. In the following text, AQ repeats the theme of nationalistic Muslim militaries being a hurdle to their claim to *global domination*.

> At this time, the militaries of the entire world – whether in the West or in the Muslim countries are organized according to these Kufr ideologies of Clausewitz. Hence, it is not possible for these nationalistic militaries to play any role in establishing the Khilafah and waging Jihad in the Path of Allah. These armies have their own formulated beliefs, ideologies and their own thought and philosophy. Their way of thought, organization, goals and aims are all separate from those of this Ummah, and run contrary to Islam. Hence, it is utterly impossible for these armies to be converted to "Islamic armies" via some minor changes. These are not "our armies". They are "armies of the West". Let alone waging Jihad, they are the main obstacle in establishing Khilafath and waging Jihad! May Allah rid us off them! Ameen! (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15)

AQ, in the text mentioned above, explains some of the reasons as to why these militaries are an obstacle to their claim to *global domination*. The chief reason, in AQ's understanding, lies in the ideological training of the institution. The Muslim militaries are trained on the "Kufr ideologies of Clausewitz" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15). They explain,

> According to Clausewitz, 'war' is a state's political tool or a

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[13] This analysis intends to point out a future direction of research. It may be an interesting study to investigate as to what are those specific ideas in the Muslim nationalistic militaries which are not useful for the ideological movements, especially, as the Muslim militaries and ideological movements share the same ideological slogans? Alternatively, if the soldiers in the nationalistic Muslim militaries share the ideas of wider Muslim societies, then, why the Islamist organisations do not consider the standing nationalistic Muslim militaries useful for their ideological purposes? This thesis can be a starting point for further research to contrast the ideas of the Islamist organisations and nationalistic Muslim militaries.

continuation of the state's policy. It is the result of this very *ideology* that despite bearing all kinds of power and ability, all the armies of the Muslim Ummah do not fight Jihad in the way of Allah; rather, they fight under the command of the democratic Government and to safeguard the interests of the state. Thus, even if the Shariah ordains Jihad, and the state's policy is against it, then these armies do not wage war. And if the Shariah forbids fighting and the state's policy dictates war, these armies forego all Shariah commands and jump into these wars" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15).

The discursive practice constructs a *character* that believes in ideological *violence*. The people executing ideological *violence* jealously guards against all constraints except the *ideology*. AQ invokes Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist and general who emphasised the political and "moral" aspects of war, to highlight this important aspect of ideological *violence*. In Clausewitz's writings, *violence* is understood as temporary and subservient to policy; it does not have independent value. By comparison, the ideological *violence*, i.e. Jihad, is permanent and an element of the *ideology*. It has its principles and is waged in its own right. Chapter 6 deals with 'Violence and the Call for Action' as a separate element of the *character's mindset*. The very point is that there is a fundamental difference in the understanding of the nature and role of *violence* that separates Muslim militaries from Islamist organisations. In Muslim militaries' "way of thought, organisation, goals and aims are all separate from those of this Ummah and run contrary to Islam" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15). They conclude, "[t]hese are not 'our armies'… They are 'armies of the West' because "[l]et alone waging Jihad, they are the main obstacle in establishing Khilafah and waging Jihad" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15).

The TT takes a different position on the status of Muslim militaries. They find the existing institution useful but with certain modifications. The institution should suppress its nationalistic outlook, and all Muslim militaries should be merged into one grand Muslim military organisation. They propose the following idea in the Urdu

magazine *Shariat*.

اسلامی ممالک کے افواج کی تعداد 60 لاکھ بنتی ہے جس کو ہر قسم کے 57
ہوائی اور زمینی اسلحے کی قوت سے لیس کرکے ہر اسلامی ملک کے دفاع کو ناقابل
تسخیر بنا دیا جائے ۔ایٹمی قوت کی نعمت سے مالا مال پاکستان تمام اسلامی
ممالک کو ایٹمی فارمولا بتا دے بڑے بڑے میزائل اور ٹینک تیار کریں۔

[*Translation by the author*] The combined military strength of fifty-seven Islamic countries totals up to six million. If they are equipped well with the ground and air armament, they can ensure the impregnable defence of all Islamic countries. Nuclear-armed Pakistan should share the nuclear formula with Islamic countries. We should manufacture long-range missiles and tanks (*Shariat*, Issue 2: 41).

TT appreciates the value in the existing military institutions but wants to combine all the Muslim nationalistic militaries under one command, which should ensure the best skills are shared within the block. TT constructed *character* appears less forceful in obliterating the existing international borders between the Muslim countries but supports the idea of having a superstructure that should combine all Muslim countries on an ideological basis, thereby making the existing boundaries meaningless. The central idea across all the three Islamist organisations focuses on a global ideological state under a global leader.

5.5   A Global State led by A Global Leader

The organisations construct a *character* in their discursive practice who thinks that to realise the claim to *global domination*, they need to have a global state ruled by a global leader. They name such a leader as Khalifa. "Khalifa" is the title drawn from Islamic history. In the ideological state "Khalifa" shall be the head of state who shall exercise absolute political as well as religious authority. A global ideological state, in AQ's

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understanding, is a natural order, "since this earth belongs to Allah, only Allah's system will be implemented upon it – so that even the "Kuffar" can live according to the way of the Fitrah[nature](translated by the author)… so that the earth can be saved from Fasaad[turmoil](translated by the author)" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 43). AQ constructed *character* in the discursive practices believes that Divine Law is the only law that allows people to live according to the laws of nature. They think the main reason for the human conflict is linked to the diversity of political and social systems. A single law under a single leader governing all the subjects shall eliminate conflict. The three Islamist organisations have also appointed such a global leader. AQ nominated Ayman al-Zawahiri (after the death of Usama bin Laden) while IS famously declared Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Khalifah. TT appointed Mullah Umar as the leader of the believers (Amirul Momineen). I note that AQ and IS construct similar themes on the topic of "the global state led by the global leader" while TT gives some allowance to existing political divisions amongst the Muslim countries. Nevertheless, all three Islamist organisations connect to the theme of a global statehood under a global leader. TT imagines such a state to comprise of a loose federation of all Muslim countries. Muslims should leave the existing international institutions and form their own "Islamic General Assembly" with its headquarters in Saudi Arabia. The following textual construct explains their vision of the global state.

اقوام متحدہ سے علیحدگی اختیار کرکے "اسلامک جنرل اسمبلی" معرض وجود میں لائیں تاکہ وہ عالم اسلام کے مابین صلح اور امن قائم رکھے۔ مساوی حقوق اور آزادی کی بنیادوں پر دوستی اور بھائی چارے کے تعلقات استوار کریں، معاشرتی، تمدنی اور انسانی مسائل کو حل کرنے اور انسانی حقوق اور آزادی کیلئے مخلصانہ جدوجہد کریں اس کا صدر دفتر سعودی عرب میں ہونا چاہیے۔

[*Translation by the author*] [Islamic countries] should abandon the United Nations and constitute an "Islamic General Assembly" which

can maintain peace and reconciliation amongst the Islamic world. Equal rights and freedom should form the basis of cordial relationships (amongst Muslim countries). [The Islamic General Assembly] should sincerely work for the resolution of human, social and cultural issues, and human rights and liberty. It should have its central office in Saudi Arabia (*Shariat*, Issue 2: 42).

The constructed *character*, whom I call ideologue, thinks that the whole globe should have one system of governance supported by Allah's Law, which is also the law of nature. The AQ textual construct articulates that "Kuffar" are unaware of the fact that Allah's Law is the law of nature. Therefore, global implementation of Allah's Law shall be beneficial to 'them' as well, as they shall be able to live as per the laws of nature. All existing systems of governance are unnatural as these systems are not following Allah's Laws. These unnatural systems of governance are the main cause of turmoil in the world. The turmoil persists because "the rebels of Allah can never rule over the believers in Allah. They cannot have authority over them. The enemies of Allah cannot have more honour than the friends of Allah" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 42). AQ desires that the *character* should believe that "[t]oday, we are fighting a battle that will reap the fruits of the global Khilafah's return, Insha' Allah. Our fight today requires our utmost effort in all types of expertise since we are fighting to establish a government for humanity" (*Inspire*, Issue 19:19). They think that Khilafah is the "government for humanity" and all other forms of rule are the rules of ignorance. IS shares the thoughts with AQ in the following textual expression.

There is nothing after the rule of Allah, the Wise, the All-Knowing, other than the oppressive rule of the darkness of Jahiliyyah, and no matter what humans name their laws and systems they remain the rule of Jahiliyyah, which the whims of the *Kuffar* manipulate. Its people enjoy no stability in its decrees, nor do they achieve any religious or worldly success. But who is the one who knows that the rule of Allah is the best of rule? Indeed, it is the believer who has certainty (*Rumiyah*, Issue 13: 8).

The above-referred text emphasises the theme that all systems of governance except the rule of Allah are unsuccessful and unstable. However, anyone who is not in the system of faith cannot understand the true nature of this failure and instability—you need to be inside the system to understand the true nature of this phenomenon, i.e. a believer. Contrarily, the universal law of Allah is the only option that can guarantee a stable political system for humanity. This global rule of Divine Law operates through a global leader, i.e. the Khalifah. AQ articulates the philosophy of the global rule through a global leader in the following textual construct published in the *Azan* Magazine.

> When the Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) and Kingship of Allah passes from the existential circle and enters into the legislative realm, and when man, the noblest creation of the universe, by virtue of his status as the vicegerent of Allah, implements the Shariah revealed by Allah on earth, then this is called "Islamic Khilafah". Khilafah is the practical manifestation on earth of Allah's Kingship of the heavens. Just as the Kingship of the heavens belongs to Allah in the same manner, the Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) of the earth also befits Him alone and establishing this very Hakmiyyah (Sovereignty) is called Khilafah (*Azan*, Issue 6: 31).

The theme of a global rule by a global leader, in simple words, is a rule (Khilafah) in the name of Allah. All laws in Khilafah must flow from Allah's Law. IS is in league with AQ in suggesting to the *character* that Khilafah means, "directing people to the path of Allah and realising His word in this life. So, it is a noble trust, and it is a weighty trust. And it is part of Allah's command that people must shoulder themselves, and it requires a special kind of person to have patience while being tested" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 8: 23, 24). This "special kind of person" who shoulders this responsibility and heads the global state is known as Khalifa.

The IS further explains that the institution of Khilafah has recently been revived after a long break. They celebrate this revival and think that "from the greatest of blessings

granted to the Muslim Ummah in general and to the mujāhidīn, in particular, is the revival of the Khilāfah, the Muslim body which had been absent for several centuries since the collapse of the 'Abbāsī Khilāfah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 12:29). The revival of the blessed Khilafah is for humanity and "[n]o one realizes this blessing more than one who has experienced the crusader lands of the West, then Shām [Syria (*Translation by the author*)] tormented by the Baathist and Nusayrī tawāghīt, followed by Shām plundered by the apostates of the Free Syrian Army and its nationalist allies" (*Dabiq*, Issue 12:29).

The AQ affiliated writers, as usual, delve much deeper into the reasoning of the discursive construct than the other two organisations. AQ articulates the following seven fundamentals of a legitimate Khilafah.

> One: Supreme Authority in a Khilafah rests with Allah Alone. And it is for the implementation of Allah's Government on earth that the truthful Prophet or a successor of his (called the *Ameer* or Khalifah [Caliph]) has been made Allah's Deputy or Governor. So, in the system of Khilafah, Hakmiyyah *(*Sovereignty) of Allah Alone is acknowledged. And since it has been acceded to through the Prophet of Allah, therefore the obedience of the Prophet and his successor has been made *Wajib* (incumbent).

> Two: In Islamic Khilafah, the pivot of the system and the highest *Meezan* is the Shariah law, according to which nations of the world are exalted and subdued.

> Three: The axis of the system is the Majlis-e-shoora (a body for mutual consultation).

> Four: The purpose of Khilafah is the establishment of Deen [religion]

> Five: Establishing brotherhood among Muslims and act as mercy

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for all humanity.

Six: Every person in Islamic Khilafah takes the *Bayah* (Pledge of Allegiance) to the Khalifah or his representative, i.e. Ameer.

Seven: Absolute obedience to the Ameer or Khalifah in all *Ma'roof* (good) matters (*Azan*, Issue 6:32).

Thematically, the above mentioned seven fundamentals present a global state under a global leader, called Khalifah. The Khalifah shall establish Allah's Law authoritatively. Such a state shall demand the unilateral and unequivocal submission of the subjects to the authority of Khalifah. AQ insists that "only a Government which consists of these seven fundamentals of Divine Rule, and which is founded on these seven pillars, can truly be accepted as an Islamic Khilafah or an Islamic Government" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32). If somewhere "a personal, tribal or party rule is established in the name of an Islamic Khilafah, then it will absolutely never be termed a Khilafah (…) Rather, it will be the antithesis of the Khilafah" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32).

As the first fundamental of Khilafah highlights, the *character* is supposed to accept Khilafah as the only legitimate authority. It shall be incumbent on Khilafah to make all-out efforts including *violence* (Jihad), to extend Allah's Law to the whole world. The Khilafah shall wage "Jihad against those who oppose Islam after being called to it until they accept it or enter into the dhimmah (The covenant granted to the "Kuffar" in an Islamic State)" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33).

Elsewhere in the *Azan* Magazine, AQ enumerates the important tasks of the institution of Khilafah. The foremost task of the institution is to monopolise and strictly control the interpretations of the eternal law. The constructed character abhors diversity and plurality of opinions. Therefore, Khalifah must ensure that only the *ideological mindset* exists in the world dominated by them. He (the Islamist organisations believe that only masculine gender can be a Khalifah) should ensure the continuity of "the religion upon the established principles and upon the issues that the Salaf [the renowned and pious

scholars of the past[14]] of the Ummah agreed upon" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33). The institution shall control the thinking of the subjects and safeguard against any innovative interpretations of the laws. It is necessary because the *ideology* has already "established principles". These principles were agreed upon by the medieval scholars. Therefore, all new experience must be understood and interpreted in the light of those principles. All affairs in the global state shall be organised according to *ideology*. Khalifah, in the capacity of a global head of a global state, should remain vigilant and "should a man of Bid'ah emerge or a misconceived person deviates, he must clarify the evidence and show them the truth. Also, he must impose on them the punishment they deserve (…) and safeguard the Ummah from deviance" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33). Khalifah shall strictly implement "the Islamic penal code, so as to protect things, which Allah has forbidden from being violated and to safeguard the right of His servants from being lost and abused" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33).

The *ideology* shall guide all rights and obligations of the state. Dispensation of justice is the central occupation of the Arendtian articulated ideologue; it is true for the Khalifah as well. Ideologues think that deliverance of justice to humanity is central to *ideology*; they implement the system of justice directly to humanity disregarding the petty legality of formal laws (Arendt. 1958: 457). Khalifah, therefore, shall engage himself in "the implementation of rules on those who are in dispute and putting a stop to their disagreement, so that equity may be established; and so that the oppressor may not transgress, and the weak may not feel helpless" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33).

Likewise, all financial affairs of the global state shall be decided according to the *ideology*. The state shall collect "Al-Fai (The booty taken from the "Kuffar") and charities according to the textual and ijtihadi [logically deduced from the past examples (*explanation by the author)*] obligations of the shari'ah" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33).

The Khalifah must endeavour at all times to keep the *ideology* central to the affairs of the global state. He must ensure ideological training of "the trustworthy people" and appoint "sincere advisers to take charge of the tasks and wealth that he confers on them,

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[14] Inserted by the author.

so that the tasks may be organized by efficiency and the wealth protected by the trustworthy people" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33). AQ constructs a *character* who believes in a continuous movement in the affairs of the ideological state. Nothing is fixed and static except the *ideology* and by extension, the supreme leader himself, who has final authority over interpretations of the *ideology*. Khalifah should be "[d]irecting and investigating things himself so as to establish the leadership of the Ummah and the protection of the religion (…) For, indeed, the trustworthy man may cheat and the honest may deceive" (*Azan*, Issue 6:33).

IS is equally totalitarian in its thinking about *global domination* through a global state. They think that *ideology* is supposed to dominate the globe so that all opposition to Allah's Law is eliminated. The global state needs to acquire such powers which can avenge injustices committed against Muslims anywhere on earth. All enemies of the ideological state shall be eliminated ruthlessly.

> The death of a single Muslim, no matter his role in society, is more grave to the believer than the massacre of every kāfir on earth. And while the Sharī'ah calls for the invasion of all kāfir lands, certainly the aggressors are dealt with before those nations not actively waging war against the Khilāfah. This is an obvious reality. Any disbeliever standing in the way of the IS will be killed, without pity or remorse, until Muslims suffer no harm and governance is entirely for Allah (*Dabiq*, Issue 14:4).

In their conquest for *global domination*, the ideological state shall prioritise its fight; while all enemies of the *ideology* must be fought against, the state shall prioritise the programme of elimination; certain categories of the enemy must be eliminated first. The active opponents must be dealt with before the non-active opponents. IS constructs a *character* who believes that Khilafah shall continue fighting all nations of the world and eliminate all real or imaginary enemies "until Muslims suffer no harm and governance is entirely for Allah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 14:4). The Khilafah should choose friends and foes based on *ideology*. Allah's Law "calls for the invasion of all Kafir

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lands" and all "Kuffar" can be killed to save one single Muslim. In their understanding, every single Muslim living anywhere is the responsibility of the Muslim Ummah. Muslim Ummah, in the Islamist organisations' discursive practices, closely resembles the ideological idea of a global race.

5.6   Muslim Ummah as a Global Community

The Islamist organisations imagine Muslim Ummah as a global and superior community, supported and acknowledged by eternal law, that has a legitimate claim to dominate the world. The organisations suggest to the *character* that Muslim people belong to the original global community created by divinity. AQ argues that "[a]ll of humanity was Muslim (worshippers of One God) through the Prophet Adam and those who differed from this natural state of collectivism were Kuffar" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32). Therefore, Muslim self-identity, in AQ's understanding, is the identity of the original uncorrupted community that is still following the precepts of the divine and eternal law of nature. The divinity, however, being aware of the deviant nature of humans, planned to keep them on the right path. The arrangements consisted of new prophets and new scriptures. "Humanity were one community, and Allah sent Prophets with glad tidings and warnings, and with them, He sent the Scripture in truth to judge between people in matters wherein they differed [2:213]" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32). The *character* understands the scriptural articulations as the truth.

In the AQ's construct, initially, all of humanity were the followers of truth, but then the deviants differed and separated themselves from the truth; therefore, "[t]he real dividers of humanity are those who deny Allah's true religion" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32). Thus, humanity was divided into two categories; the followers of truth and the followers of falsehood. "And this is the natural order, and Kufr is Baatil (falsehood) in that it has no reality" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32). Peace, in the *character's* thinking, is linked to the acceptance of the truth as "Allah's true religion guarantees peace on earth. No matter how much widespread the "Kuffar" maybe, the truth is the truth" (*Azan*, Issue 6:32). The global nation of truth, with the *ideology* at its heart, is destined to dominate the world provided it remains loyal to the teachings of the truth, namely the religion of

Islam. AQ explains in the *Inspire* magazine.

> In reality, the Islamic Ummah is the greatest of human power if it truly
> establishes the religion of Islam and that is exactly what history proved
> throughout the past centuries. This nation is able to battle and resist what
> are known as superior countries (*Inspire*, issue 7:4).

The AQ constructed *character* is supposed to promote the theme that the success of the nation of Islam is contingent upon the condition that "if it truly establishes the religion of Islam". As explained elsewhere, the religion of Islam is central to the *ideological mindset* of Islamist organisations. They view the religious identity as the national identity of the nation of Islam.

This nation of Islam transcends all political, geographical and ethnic boundaries. AQ blames the West for constructing a non-Islamic way of thinking as follows.

> Sykes and Picot created borders for us. They said to us, Jordan ends here
> at ar-Ramtha, and Syria begins after Ar-Ramtha and Jordan begins after
> Harat Ammar. And Kuwait? Here it is! The city of Kuwait, the "state"
> of Kuwait… And the state of Qatar is a single city. And so is the state
> of Bahrain. And Lebanon? Here it is… the size of a coin. That's the
> state of Lebanon. And here is Syria. Listen, this is your land and your
> birthplace, and love of one's homeland is a part of faith. And so on…
> And so, we have begun to think in an "Islamic way" which is in truth
> not an Islamic way but rather, a territorial way of thinking daubed with
> Islam (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13).

AQ constructs an understanding in the above text that existing political divisions amongst Muslims countries are the result of a well-planned exercise by the 'other'. Such divisions made Muslims think their identity in terms of geography and ethnicity. The *ideological mindset* is independent of geographical and ethnic identities. The ideological claim to *global domination* originates from the imagined fact that eternal law is universal in its nature. The Islamist organisations construct a *character* who

believes that being the true followers of the eternal law means that they have a legitimate claim to dominate the world. An AQ published rhyme in the *Azan* Magazine summarises their claim to *global domination*.

> *India is ours and China is ours*
> *And the earth is ours and all is ours*
> *Islam has become our religion*
> *And the entire world is our homeland.*
> *The constitution of Allah is our religion.*
> *And we have made our hearts its home* (*Azan*, Issue 5: 13)

The idea of a global nation ignores any boundaries. The only qualification to be part of this global nation, i.e. Muslim Ummah, is to belong to Muslim identity. TT notes the immense potential of Muslim Ummah in the following construction.

اس وقت سات براعظموں میں 8 ارب کے قریب انسان آباد ہیں جن میں سے ڈیڑھ ارب مسلمان ہیں ۔ قابل فخر بات یہ ہے کہ آٹھ بڑے مذاہب میں سب سے بڑا مذہب اسلام ہی ہے۔ دوسرے لگ بھگ ممالک میں 60 کے قریب اسلامی ممالک موجود ہیں پھر بھی ہر ایک زیر عتاب ہے اب ہمیں مایوسی کا لبادہ اوڑھ کر خاموش اور مظلوم بیٹھنے کی بجائے اس بات پر سوچنے اور تدبر کرنے کی ضرورت ہے کہ کس طرح ہم مسلم امت کو اس آزمائش اور ابتلاء سے نکال سکتے ہیں میرے ذہن میں چند تجاویز محو گردش ہیں جو ذیل میں پیش خدمت ہیں۔

> [*Translation by the author*] Out of eight billion people populated in seven continents, one and a half billion are Muslims. Proudly, Islam is the greatest of all seven major religions. Sixty out of two hundred countries are Muslims, yet, we are under scrutiny. Now, instead of suffering passively in silence and despair, we should articulate as to

how we can steer Muslim Ummah through this period of trial and turbulence (*Shariat*, Issue 2: 41).

The Islamist organisations construct a *character* that shall view Muslim Ummah as a global community following the *ideology*. Every member of this global community is supposed to be the true carrier of the Divine Law. A true carrier of the Divine Law has a legitimate claim to dominate the world so that every person of the world is forced to follow the Divine Law. The true domination of the world shall be realised only once every man is fashioned to stop thinking and follow the Divine Law. Therefore, the fundamental purpose of the previously discussed subthemes in this chapter namely, answering ideological questions, the rejections of international boundaries and nation-state or articulating a global state or a global community, is to dominate the world so that the project to fashion man into an ideological man can begin. The construction aims at converting humans into humanity; a human who is devoid of all diversity and spontaneity. The human diversity and spontaneity are one of the biggest threats to a fictitious ideological world. The *ideological mindset*, therefore, reserves special contempt for human diversity and spontaneity.

5.7   Contempt for Human Diversity and Spontaneity

The Islamist organisations construct a *character*, which is supposed to think that Allah's Law must dominate Allah's land and convert all men into humanity and follow the Divine Law comprehensively. They think that humanity is divided into certain contemptable categories, which are not sanctioned by the Divine Law. Humans must be disciplined to follow a strict code of life devoid of diversity and spontaneity. As the Divine Law is for all humans, *global domination* is essential to fashion each man according to the dictates of the *ideology*. Man must surrender himself/herself comprehensively to the *ideology*. Spontaneity and diversity, which springs from "free choice" must be curbed in every form. An IS member writing in *Dabiq* Magazine understand the notion of "free choice" as follows.

> From amongst the polluted ideologies that have afflicted people the entire world over throughout the course of the tyranny carried out by

the forces of kufr, is the notion that the people can choose whether to follow the truth or to embark upon falsehood. This *ideology* teaches that no one has the right, regardless of whom he may be, to impose any creed or set of morals on anyone else even if that creed or set of morals is the truth revealed by Allah. They went to the extent of attributing this "methodology of free choice" to the religion of Allah ta'ālā, and to the call of the prophets, peace be upon them. (*Dabiq*, Issue 2: 5).

The IS writers, in the text mentioned above, appear very sure about the truthfulness of their knowledge claims. The construction does not problematize "truth". They think that the revealed law is the absolute truth, and all ideas that do not relate to the revealed law are part of the falsehood. The *ideological mindset* consists of two clear categories of truth and falsehood. The idea of "free choice", therefore, is alien to this *mindset*. How can there be an idea of a free choice when truth and falsehood are so clear and distinguishable? IS, therefore, wonders at the naivety of people who are unable to understand this simple fact, and apply "this 'methodology of free choice' to the religion of Allah ta'ālā, and to the call of the prophets, peace be upon them"? (*Dabiq*, Issue 2: 5). The subtle theme, in the above text, proposes that lack of free choice is the original human condition and the option to free choice is a deviation from the original condition forced through tyranny. People should revert to the original human condition and accept the right of the IS to enforce divinely revealed laws.

In the ideological construct, man does not have a choice against an eternal supernatural law that operates as per divine rules. For the ideologue, the human condition and the operation of Divine Law are inseparable; human condition follows eternal law, and the eternal law mimics the human condition. The Divine Law does not desire that men exercise their free choice. Therefore, any diversity or spontaneity flowing out of the exercise of free choice must be curbed. All men should be disciplined to follow the ideological code of conduct. The *ideological mindset* shows great contempt to the notion of "free choice" in all its forms and manifestations. IS is not ready to tolerate even a limited and qualified option of "free choice". In the following textual construct, the organisation condemns a group, who otherwise agree with the *ideology* of IS, for

allowing a narrower option of "free choice.

> Then, when a group within the Ummah woke up and rejected this
> twisted methodology of giving people the choice between absolute truth
> and complete falsehood, the members of this group were stained by this
> polluted *ideology*, except for those whom Allah had mercy upon. This
> group believed that the people had a choice between right and wrong,
> but within the confines of the "truth"! In other words, they sufficed with
> removing blatant kufr from the field of choice and with letting different
> types of bid'ah and nifāq remain as valid options – bid'ah and nifāq
> whose true nature many Muslims can't distinguish. They even believed
> some of the bid'ah and nifāq in question to be directly from the Sunnah,
> and anything apart from that to be extremism and excessiveness in the
> religion (*Dabiq*, Issue 2:5).

In the above text, a group within Muslim communities think that an actor may be
allowed to exercise limited free choice as and when they submit to the truth and reject
falsehood. IS addresses directly to the group of people within Muslim populations who
believes "that the people had a choice between right and wrong, but within the confines
of the 'truth'" (*Dabiq*, Issue 2:5). This group thinks that the restrictions on human free
choice should be limited to the initial acceptance of the truth. Once the fundamental
premise of the *ideology*, i.e. the absolute supremacy of the terrorist defined Divine Law
has been accepted, thinks the group, people may be allowed to exercise some choice.
IS, however, is sufficiently alert to such innovations and quickly condemns this
approach. All such attempts, in their perception, are "bid'ah and nifāq whose true
nature many Muslims can't distinguish" (*Dabiq*, Issue 2: 5). Bid'ah is "innovation"
(*Azan*, Issue 6: 29) and Nifāq is "hypocrisy" (*Dabiq*, Issue 3: 26).

Fundamentally, all thinking that advocates any flexibility must be rejected. IS threatens
the divergent groups mentioned above with continuous *violence*.

> If, however, you continue upon this condition that you are in, and do not
> repent from the shirk that you are upon and adhere to the religion of

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Allah with which He sent His Messenger and abandon shirk and bid'ah, we will continue to fight you until you return to Allah's religion, and traverse its straight path as Allah has commanded us to do (*Dabiq*, Issue 10: 60).

The central theme of the paragraph mentioned above emphasises that man must be coerced to shun all the notions of choice, spontaneity, plurality and diversity, and follow one and the only interpretation of truth. IS suggests to the *character* in the discursive practice that early people of Islam not only understood Divine Laws comprehensively, but their actions also fit in all situations. The present-day Muslims should only mimic the thoughts and actions of the early people of Islam. Man is neither likely to face any novel situation in the future nor need to think innovatively. Any such practice is likely to lead man to falsehood. They argue, "[t]hese new proponents of choice had forgotten that many of the Ummah who held onto the name Islam had left through their deeds much of Islam's attributes" (*Dabiq*, Issue 2:5). The idea of "free choice" never occurred to their minds. "Therefore, giving the people choice was no longer a possibility in this new state of affairs. Rather, the guiding principle became that every time choice is allowed it will result in misguidance, either in the present or in the future" (*Dabiq*, Issue 2:5).

The Islamist organisations are uneasy with any mention of human diversity and plurality. IS targets Muslim Brotherhood for mentioning human diversity and plurality as part of the human condition. IS states, "[p]luralism is also a call necessitating the abandonment of a clear-cut shar'ī ruling, the obligation to wage Jihad against apostate parties. After denying several clear-cut obligations, this party dares to call itself the 'Muslim' Brotherhood'" (*Dabiq*, Issue 14: 36). This party, "blatantly call to the implementation and preservation of various principles upon which the modern, secular state is founded. How can this party thereafter be described as having anything to do with Islam?" (*Dabiq*, Issue 14:36).

The discursive *character* is required to dominate the world to fashion all men into humanity by obliterating any thinking that subscribes to human diversity, spontaneity

and plurality. The essence of pluralism is "legalization of opposing political parties within a democratic framework allowing all parties to publicly express themselves regardless of their beliefs. All parties have the opportunity thereby to partake in the rule of the land" (*Dabiq*, Issue 14: 35). The Islamist organisations desire that the *character* should understand that all claims to rule should be linked to faith. Such understanding is necessary so that the *character* stays safe from pluralistic thinking. Because pluralism excludes any mention of faith and agrees that "[i]f the majority of voters support a party – whether it promotes liberal secularism or Marxist atheism – it becomes the 'legal' authority of the land" (*Dabiq*, Issue 14: 35). Such thinking is problematic because "[t]he Ummah has ijmā' in that its leaders must be Muslims, as Allah said, {O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from amongst you}" [An- Nisā': 59] (*Dabiq*, Issue 14: 35). As such, the constructed *character* is not supposed to have any obligation to a rule that does not follow the terrorists' *ideology*. Human action and thinking must be judged and controlled through *ideology*. Such control is possible only when and if, the discursively constructed "ideologue" dominates the world.

5.8   Conclusion

In this chapter I analysed the texts in the magazines of three Islamist organisations (AQ, IS and TT) to ascertain whether the *mindset* of the discursively constructed *character* exhibits the second element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, that is, 'The Claim to Global Domination', if so, what are the salient ideas linked to this claim? (for theoretical understanding, see Chapter 1 and 2). I started the analysis by isolating the texts from the magazines that thematically carried a claim to *global domination*. I then read all the isolated material in conjunction with the Arendtian theoretical framework (see Chapter 2.4). Through this exercise, I generated six subthemes. I cited the exemplary texts that carry the second element of the *ideological mindset*, 'The Claim to Global Domination'.

I note that the Islamist organisations do suggest to the constructed *character* to lay a 'Claim to *Global Domination'* in the texts of the magazines. The textual constructs

envisioned the claim to *global domination* mainly through six subthemes. The texts in the magazines of all the three Islamist organisations constructed a *character* that explicitly claimed to dominate the world. However, there were certain subtle differences in the practices of the organisations as they constructed the *character*. The AQ affiliated constructions were generally more abstract and theoretical compared to the other two organisations. It appeared that AQ forms the theoretical reasoning of the ideas. IS was in-between of theoretical abstractions and practical operationalisation of the ideas. TT, however, constructed minimum theoretical reasonings and believed in the practical implementation of the ideas. TT, in this sense, appeared as the foot soldiers implementing the ideology. Nevertheless, all three organisations believed in the claim to dominate the world. A common theme informed by the second element of Arendtian *ideological mindset* runs across the texts of the three organisations.

I quoted examples from the texts where the organisations engage with ideological questions such as the nature of the relationship between human beings and the superhuman source. The *ideological mindset* thinks that, historically, the Divine Law has always favoured the *ideologues* and shall continue to do so in the future as well. The constructed *character* is supposed to believe that they embody the true essence of the Divine Law; hence they qualify to dominate the world and interpret the factual reality. The pace of the operation of Divine Law is controlled by the superhuman source. History, to them, is nothing but the operation of the divine will. The global domination by the *ideologues* means a realignment of the future with the past. The international boundaries are superfluous and manmade and should be decimated. I quote examples to show that this *mindset* shows contempt for the idea of nation-states. The Islamist organisations believe in a global state led by a global leader. They present the Muslim Ummah as a global community and show contempt for human diversity and spontaneity. Such an ideological reformation of the global shall need continuous violence and action. The *ideological mindset* is always in perpetual motion and ready to execute violence to achieve the ideological aims for the sake of superhuman sourced law. In the next chapter, I shall analyse the texts to conceptualise ideological 'Violence and the Call for Action'.

Chapter 6: Violence and the Call for Action

6.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse the written texts of three Islamist organisations, namely Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT) to ascertain whether the third element of the *ideological mindset*, namely 'Violence and the Call for Action' is present in the discursively constructed *character*'s *mindset*, if so, what is the extent of this presence? As explained earlier, I analyse my empirical material in part II of the research to reconceptualise *Islamic radicalisation* and recategorise its central *character* as *Islamic ideologue*. The *Islamic ideologue* of this research is an abstract *character* constructed by three terrorist organisations in their discursive practices in online magazines.

In this chapter, I read the magazines published by three Islamist organisations to isolate the exemplary texts that carry the themes of 'Violence and the Call for Action'. I then re-read the separated texts alongside the Arendtian theorisation of *ideological mindset* (see Chapter 2). This exercise unpacks the discursive construction clustered around the theme(s) of *violence* and action and generates certain theory-guided subthemes which represent the extent of the presence of the elements in the discursively constructed *character*'s *mindset*. The language of the ensuing analysis, as in all the chapters, is guided by the Arendtian articulations on the theme mentioned above.

As three Islamist organisations contribute to the discursive practices, the research, therefore, takes note of the overlapping and divergent themes in the texts produced by the organisations. Such a distinction across the three organisations helps in mapping the conceptual differences (if any) and similarities in the discursive construction of the *character*.

The *ideological mindset* essentially calls for *violence* and action. Fundamentally, passivity is not an option for the Arendtian *character* that thinks ideologically. Seized

with *ideology*, such a *character* becomes restless calling for action, which preferably should be violent. The spectrum of ideological action ranges between passive hatred to the merciless extermination of the 'other'. The constructed *character* prefers *violence* over other forms of action. An emphatic call for *violence* and action is the central theme of the Islamist organisations' textual constructions in the magazines. The renowned terrorist leader Usama Bin Laden urges, "[w]hichever way Allah guided you to this path, you must know that the knowledge that Allah gave you requires acting upon. Knowledge is not a thing that is sought after in and of itself. Are you not afraid of having this knowledge whilst you don't act upon it?" (*Azan*, Issue 4; 25). To the organisations, theoretical knowledge sans violent action is meaningless.

In the texts, violent action is not only a means to an end—the end being the *ideology*—but forms an integral part of the *ideology* itself. In this sense, the terrorist *violence* is ideological *violence* and has certain distinguishing features. It draws justification from the past as well from the future. The ideological *violence*, which the discursive construction calls Jihad, is endless and shall continue forever as "the prophet (صلى الله عليه وسلم) said, there will still be a part of my Ummah who will fight until the last day" (*Inspire*, Issue14: 59). Consequent to such thinking, the categories of the 'other' will have to be invented, as and when the exiting categories are eliminated through *violence*. Another distinguishing feature of ideological *violence* is its perversity of total domination**.** The *ideological mindset* is not satisfied with the external subjugation of the victim but also demands complete internal surrender as well.

The themes, in the discursive practices constructed by the Islamist organisations, suggest that inaction or passivity is not an option for a Muslim — a Muslim must always be in action. The direction and nature of the action, however, is strictly guided by the *ideology*. The organisations use two medieval, theology driven terms to decide the nature of the action. The terms are part of the popular Muslim political history. These terms denote the ideological division of the world. It is important to understand the meaning of these two terms as these are fundamentally tied to the discursive constructions' articulations of the theme(s) of *violence* and action. The term Dar-al-

Islam, as presented by the terrorists, means the areas ruled by (the people the Islamist organisations consider) Muslims,[15] whereas Dar-al-harb are the areas ruled by *'others'*.

6.2   The Centrality of Violence in Dar-al-harb

Theoretically, Dar-al-Islam shall be ruled through (the terrorist interpreted) Divine Law, i.e. Sharia Law. Dar-al-harb, however, is a lawless space, where the *character* is supposed to be a law on to themselves. The *character* is not supposed to obey any laws in Dar-al-harb and is free to use any means of *violence*. Although the organisations claim that there are laws to govern Dar-al-harab, but those laws can be interpreted differently to suit the situation. Formal law, for an Arendtian ideologue, is a needless formality. The ideologues can do away with the petty legality of the formal laws (Arendt 1958: 450). The *ideological mindset* may invent and use any method to align the actions of humans to *ideology*. IS in the *Dabiq* magazine admonishes fellow Muslims to opt to one of the only two choices available to them.

> How can Muslims living in the West who claim to have surrendered themselves to Allah, completely accepting His rule alone, stand idly as these imāms of kufr continue to spread their poison from atop their pulpits?(……)One must either take the journey to Dar-al-Islam, joining the ranks of the mujāhidīn therein, or wage jihād by himself with the resources available to him (knives, guns, explosives, etc.) to kill the crusaders and other disbelievers and apostates, including the imāms of kufr, to make an example of them, as all of them are valid – rather, obligatory – targets according to the Sharī'ah, except for those who openly repent from kufr before they are apprehended (*Dabiq*, Issue14;17).

The text promotes the theme of *violence* and action in Dar-al-harb. "The land [of Dar-al-harb] is permissible [for a Muslim to violate blood and wealth therein] because it is a land of shirk. Al-Jassas al-Hanafi said, 'Anything that is in Dar-al-harb is not a valid

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[15] Dar-al-Islam literally means the house of peace. As explained elsewhere, peace is only possible on the terms of Islamic ideologues, who want the rule of Sharia law.

possession, because it is a land of ibahah and the wealth of its inhabitants is permissible'" (*Rumiyah*, Issue11: 30). The nature of action desired out of an actor is fundamentally tied to their physical location: do they reside in Dar-al-Islam or Dar-al-harab?

The Islamist organisations, in the above-quoted text, feel that inaction of the "Muslims living in the West", i.e. Dar-al-harb, is a contradiction. The AQ published texts in *Azan* Magazine resonate with IS imagined constructs and suggest that a "Muslim cannot reside in *Dar-al-harb* anyway and there are detailed legislations pertaining to this as laid out by the scholars. There remains only one way out for them if they wish to save their faith. Either they wage Jihad in their countries, or they do Hijrah and migrate to one of the Muslim lands, and subsequently to the Jihadi battlefields" (*Azan*, Issue 2:31). As *ideology* (Sharia) declares the people in Dar-al-harb as 'others', it is legitimate for the *character* to disregard every law of Dar-al-harb and kill them through violent action. A decree in the IS published *Rumiyah* Magazine encourages the *character* not to "hesitate to take the wealth of the harbi "Kuffar", either by force or through theft and fraud, and ponder the statement of Imam Ibn Taymiyyah concerning the Muslims who enter Dar-al-harb (*Rumiyah*, Issue 11: 39). Taymiyya advises an the *Islamic ideologue* that "if he kidnaps them or their children, or subdues them in any way, then the lives and wealth of the harbi Kuffar are permissible for the Muslims so, if they seize them in a shar'i manner, they own them'" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 11: 39).

In the *ideological mindset*, *ideology* informs as well as controls all action. Personal experience and reasoning bear no weight while deciding the direction of ideological action. In a text in the IS published *Dabiq* Magazine, Khalifah Abubakar al Baghdadi forewarns a potential *character* to desist from any thought that may suggest a deviation from the *ideology*-guided action. The khalifah in an address entitled "March Forth Whether Light or Heavy" says:

> O Muslims! Whoever thinks that it is within his capacity to re-conciliate with the Jews, Christians, and other kuffār, and for them to conciliate with him, such that he coexists with them and they coexist

with him while he is upon his religion and upon tawhīd, then he has belied the explicit statement of his Lord ('azza wa jall), who says, … {And they will continue to fight you until they turn you back from your religion if they are able} [Al-Baqarah: 217] … So, this is the condition of the kuffār in dealing with the Muslims until the establishment of the Hour" (*Dabiq*, Issue 9: 52).

The *ideological mindset* is non-reconciliatory and occupied with a perpetual and continuous active struggle against *'others'*. Such a struggle would continue until the end of the world. A continuous violent action, therefore, is an integral part of the *ideology*. The Khalifa further clarifies this aspect of the *ideology* in the same address.

He [the Prophet] fought both the Arabs and non-Arabs in all their various colours. He himself left to fight and took part in dozens of battles. He never for a day grew tired of war … His companions after him and their followers carried on similarly. They did not soften nor abandon war, until they possessed the Earth, conquered the East and the West, the nations submitted to them, and the lands yielded to them, by the edge of the sword. And similarly, this will remain the condition of those who follow them until the Day of Recompense. (*Dabiq*, Issue 9: 53).

The text mentioned above highlights and historicizes the themes of perversity and perpetual continuity of the violent action. It draws its legitimacy from the past. This continued reference to the past by the Islamist organisations is a distinguishing feature of ideological *violence*.

I note that the Islamist organisations in their discursive practices employ a linguistic technique to draw the required legitimacy from the past, particularly, for the themes of *violence* and action. They select certain popularly used metaphors from Islamic history, which inherently link the violent action to the personified 'other' in the popular Muslim theological imagination. My reading of the texts suggests that these metaphors are central in linking the discursively constructed *character*'s *mindset* to the themes of

violence and action. These metaphors not only legitimise and contextualise the ideological *violence* and action but also—like the past ideologues, i.e. the Nazi and Communist ideologues—transform the metaphors into weapons of *violence*.

6.3 Metaphors as Anchorage of Pointing, Dehumanising and Violently Eliminating

The Communists and racists, in the past, used comparatively inconspicuous premises like "dying classes" or races which are "unfit to live" before urging their elimination through *violence*. The Nazi and Communist ideologues did not invent these terms but isolated them from existing political ideas of the time for particular interpretations (Arendt 1958: 458). Likewise, the Islamist organisations use certain terms and metaphors in their textual constructs to refer to the 'other' as the object(s) of their action. These terms and metaphors are part of Islamic historical literature. Predominantly, political ideas linked to these metaphors refer to pointing, dehumanisation and violently eliminating the 'other'. The Islamist organisations use and interpret these metaphors to guide and legitimise their *violence* and action. Through these interpretations, they identify and dehumanise the 'other' before suggesting a logical action for their elimination. The violent action is inherent in the popular conceptualisation of these metaphors.

In the succeeding paragraphs, I shall explore the themes constructed through the frequently used metaphors of *violence* and action by three Islamist organisations through their discursive practice for an intended *character*. The analysed empirical material uses four metaphors, namely "Dajjal", "Kuffar", "Taghut" and Crusaders. I, however, analyse the metaphors under three headings as the fourth metaphor, i.e. Crusaders, is alternatively used to refer to the first three. In the succeeding paragraphs, I discuss the theme(s) of *violence* and action associated with these metaphors as constructed by the organisations in their magazines.

6.3.1 *The Metaphor of Dajjal*

The discursive practices employ the metaphor of "Dajjal" to dehumanise the 'other' and to suggest a logical violent action against such a demon. The very characteristics (as will be explained in succeeding paragraphs) of this *character*, i.e. "Dajjal" instils fear in the minds of the recipient, and fear instinctively "springs man into action". Fundamentally, the metaphor of "Dajjal" draws its legitimacy from some prophecies of the Prophet, who used the metaphor to sketch certain abstract ideas, which were probably too abstract to be understood by the people of the age. The very title of the IS published magazine *Dabiq* has a direct link with the prophecy of "Dajjal". The organisation claims that they draw the name "*Dabiq* – [from] a town near Aleppo. The Muslims would have encamped here to fight Dajjal" (*Dabiq*, Issue 5: 31). IS portrays that their constructed *character* is the prophesied *character* that will fight *Dajjal*.

AQ, in line with IS, sensitises the readers about the gravity of the problem associated with the metaphor. They write, "the Messenger of Allah said, 'between the creation of Adam and the arrival of the Hour, there is no *Fitnah* [problem] greater than the *Dajjal*.' [*Ahmad*]'" (*Azan* issue, 4: 60). AQ relates to the metaphor as follow.

> The real name of Dajjal is not known, because the Ahadith [sayings of the Prophet] does not mention it. He is famous for his title. For us, he is famous as the Dajjal and this title has become his symbol and mark. *Dajjal* means to cover, to wrap. He is called Dajjal because he has covered the truth with falsehood, or because he has hidden his disbelief from the people because of his lies, exaggerations and mixing of truth with falsehood. Another view is that he is called Dajjal because he will "cover" the earth with his armies. What is intended by this is to recognize that he is the greater Dajjal who possesses his enormous trials with which he will adorn his Kufr and enchant the people, thereby putting doubts in the hearts of the people of Allah (*Azan*, Issue; 5:31).

The theme of falsehood (of Dajjal) in the above text resonates with the theme of the "dying classes" and "decadent people" of race and communist ideologies. The

"decadent people", who need to be eliminated so that the laws of nature or history move unhindered. The inherent theme of *violence* and the call for action against the dehumanised 'other' is the theme the Islamist organisations are interested in instilling in their *character*'s *mindset*. The *character* is supposed to think "Dajjal" as equivalent to the past ideologues' category of "decadent people". In the following textual construct, AQ traces the linguistic roots of the metaphor and reveals its dehumanisation effect.

> In the Arabic language, Dajjal is also referred to as the deceiver, the fraudster and the adorner. "Dajl" is used to refer to coating gold over a fake thing. He is named as Dajjal because lies and deception are the prominent characteristics of his personality. His apparent [sic] will be different from his inner. All of his claims, plans, activities and programs would revolve around one centre: deceit and fraud. All his actions would be under the shade of deceit and falsehood. None of his actions or statements would be free from this satanic habit (*Azan*, Issue 5: 23).

AQ, in the above mentioned passage, conveys the theme that all reality flowing out of "Dajjal" is false and untrustworthy. Such premises help the *ideological mindset* to dehumanise the 'false people' and may lead, through a chain of logicality, to their elimination. The meaning and description attached to the metaphor of "Dajjal" call for action and *violence* for the sake of ideologically imagined consistency. As per the ideological understanding of the operation of Divine Law, the true believer is supposed to align their actions with the movement of the Divine Law. The constructed *character*'s logicality, like the reasoning of the past ideologues, e.g. the Nazis, may unfold as follows: At this critical juncture of history, we (the ideologues) have identified the 'false people' or 'others' of the *ideology*, so, if you do not act against such people, you are either not a true believer or a coward. In both cases, you are not with 'us' but with 'them'. The common usage and linguistic roots of the metaphor evoke a reaction and call for violent action to eliminate the 'false people', a hindrance affecting the movement of history and Allah's Law.

The metaphor gets its value from the fact that in all its manifestations, it serves to personify the object(s) of the ideological action. The discursive construction in the magazines presents the metaphor of "Dajjal" in two senses.

A minority of writers in the magazines consider "Dajjal" to be a literal human being, who shall appear in later days and would lead the forces of falsehood. However, the majority of the texts refer to "Dajjal" as representing the Western civilisation with its supposed machinations/conspiracies. Nevertheless, both types of writers agree that the term "Dajjal" is reserved for the people who rely on falsehood, deceit, and who are the worst of the creatures and need to be eliminated. In an article entitled "Dajjal" in the *Azan* Magazine, AQ applies the metaphor to the West.

> Another meaning of "Dajl" is the bandage that is taped on top of the damaged skin to hide its ugliness. Keep this definition in mind and look at the adorned vocabulary which the western media (which will (probably) serve as the mouthpiece of Dajjal from his first international press conference till the end of his limited period of authority) invents and with which it hides its bloodthirstiness, cruelty and its murderous charades, for example, human rights, socialism, democracy, economic well-being, social equality, family planning, arts, constitution, law etc. All these words are mere slogans. Behind them is a mere mirage. (*Azan*, Issue 4: 60-61).

In the above textual construction, AQ constructs the theme of rejecting every notion that is considered Western as it is inconsistent with the *ideology*. 'Rejection of Factual Reality' is another element of Arendtian *ideological mindset*, which I discuss in Chapter 7. The metaphorical characteristics of "Dajjal" such as deceit, falsehood and cover-up are equated with the Western civilisation. Another text in an article in the AQ published *Azan* Magazine entitled "Dajjal and the World Today" highlights these characteristics of the metaphor.

> The characteristics of the Dajjali civilization are as follows:
> - Complete, utter rebellion against truth and the forces of truth

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- The presentation of truth as falsehood, and falsehood as truth

- Great power, (given by Allah to test humanity) which is used sweepingly against all opposition. When we see the world around us, we come to realize that these characteristics are abundantly found in the "new world order" that is implemented upon the masses throughout the world. The world we live in is quite a uni-polar world with America at the axis, and with Europe and the majority of the states of the world, content to be under its flag. They may have their differences of opinion here and there, but all of them are united in their enmity against 'terrorism' and the absolute rejection of Islam as the absolute truth and political power (*Azan*, issue 6:19).

AQ in the above text expands the central theme of the falsehood of the Dajjali civilisation. The Arendtian *ideological mindset* divides the world simplistically into two parts. One part comprises of truth, which is the *ideology*, while a second part comprises of a people who completely and utterly rebel against the truth. I note that the Islamist organisations display a strong sense of self-righteousness and firmness in the discursive practices, which is typical of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*.

AQ constructs that the Western civilisation is utterly confused, and it is difficult to separate truth from falsehood. In their understanding, the only legitimate instrument of arbitration between truth and falsehood, i.e. power, is in wrong hands and is acting to perpetuate the falsehood. The text implicitly guides the *character's mindset* to the centrality of power in the struggle between the truth and falsehood. An action is logically needed to wrest back the power from the false people or "Dajjal" and hand it over to the truthful people, e.g. the Islamist organisations. The *ideological mindset* converts inconspicuous phrases and metaphors as the weapons of ideological *violence* and action. The constructions suggest that the necessary action required on the part of truthful people is either insufficient or altogether missing from the current situation. AQ articulates such a construct in the following text in *Azan* Magazine.

The world that we find ourselves in at the moment is a world devoid of the Law of Allah - the Divine Shariah revealed upon the heart of

Prophet Muhammad. Even the so-called Muslim countries of the world have suspended the rule of the Quran, and the Muslim of today finds himself utterly handicapped with the loss of Islam as a socio-economic-political authority. The resulting situation is a terribly calamitous one and those who realize it feels the weight of its reality once they try to find a place on earth in which they can worship Allah Alone, and submit to his religion in its entirety. Majority of such people are found beneath the shade of drones, "Hellfire" missiles, with the most basic of weaponry in their hands, yearning to defend the light of faith within their hearts from an enemy that transcends nations and borders (*Azan*, Issue 6: 19).

The AQ textual construct highlights the theme of inaction, and the resultant consequences flowing out of this inaction. They suggest that the difficult and miserable condition the Muslims are in today is due to the inaction of Muslim countries. The text aims at evoking the reactionary and retaliatory action from the *character*. The organisation points to the presence of the element of fear in Muslim societies as proof of manifestation of the miserable conditions everywhere. The *character* is guided to think that they have been left handicapped by the loss of "socio-economic-political authority". In simple words, AQ propagates the idea that as Muslim countries have become inactive due to their "suspension" of the "rule of the Quran", they have lost all power. This inaction and subsequent loss of power have made it very difficult for the *character* to practice their religion. AQ simulates the message to the *character* that the practice of religion is linked to power; it is the *character's* inaction that has resulted into the loss of power and hence, their inability to practice religion. The organisations present themselves as the active ones who are being fought against by "an enemy that transcends nations and borders". The metaphor of "Dajjal" appears a suitable term for the Islamist organisations to convey the understanding of this universal enemy, who possess all the known and familiar characteristics of "Dajjal". The metaphor is understood with regards to the hidden motives. An article in the AQ published *Azan* Magazine highlights this aspect of the metaphor in further details.

> The major difference between the last Crusade wars and this one is that the last Crusades were fought openly under the banner of Christianity, openly against the religion of Islam. This time around, the situation is different. The Crusaders have hidden their true motives behind their *Dajjali* face and are continuously saying that their war is not against Islam or Muslims (when it in fact is!). Rather, it is against a specific group of individuals who are "misguided", "extremists" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 20).

For AQ, the current struggle is different and more dangerous than past conflicts. It is more dangerous because this Dajjali system does not persuade "the Muslims to verbally give up Islam, contrarily, it assiduously seeks to convince Muslims that they can retain their faith and fit into the capitalistic, secular, democratic world order (when in fact this is impossible). It does not tell them directly to apostatise. Rather, it creates an environment for the Muslim of today in which he is required to give up several fundamentals of his religion (at times, not even knowing that he is giving them up)" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 22). Fundamentally, AQ, like all ideological organisations, study history only through the lens of *ideology*. It is only the *ideology* that interprets history for an Arendtian ideologue. For the organisation, there is a reason to cloud the term "Crusader" with the metaphor of "Dajjal" in the above text. The reason lies in the possibility of locating a fixed point of analysis for a past event. The Arendtian ideologue abhors static points of reference. For them, nothing is permanent and fixed; rather, events and points of references are fluid and moving. While AQ likes to use the term "Crusader" as a motivator for the action, they do not want the constructed *character*'s mind to be distracted by any settled analysis of the past. Therefore, for them "this time around, the situation is different", and hence the present actions should not be analysed through the past settled principles. All the dehumanising elements of the 'other', however, are important and must be highlighted through the metaphor of "Dajjal".

The *character* is made to think that the actions of "Dajjal" are so mischievous, dubious and false that there is no instrument except *ideology* that can truly interpret those

actions. In the above text, the metaphor of "Dajjal" once used skilfully in conjunction with the term "Crusader" retains all the dehumanisation effects of the term while not allowing the term to be used as a fixed point for a settled analysis. The article further analyses a text from a RAND Study entitled "In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad" to highlight the aspect mentioned above of the metaphor of "Dajjal". It reads:

> A recent RAND Study unashamedly stated in its introduction: *"While it is true that all Jihadis consider themselves Muslim fundamentalists, few Muslims, or even fundamentalists, are Jihadis. Fanaticism and violence are not unique to Islam, or even to religion. As obvious as this point may be, it is important to stress it. This book focuses on what Jihadis say and on their narrow view of Islam. As crucial as it is to understand their beliefs, they in no way represent the whole of Islam."*
>
> This *Dajjali* deception is extremely widespread. The aim of isolating religion from the conflict and making the Crusade seem like a worldwide military and ideological spree to establish "peace" in the world which is only opposed by a select few "misguided extremists" speaks volumes of the nature of today's conflict – deception… spectacular deception (…) which is the essence of the *Dajjali* Fitnah; and the truth has become strange (*Azan*, Issue 6: 20).

AQ sensitises the *character's* thinking to reject any suggestion that existing conflict is a limited fight, "which is opposed by a select few 'misguided extremists'" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 20). This is a unique position in a sense that at one level the organisation considers the wider Muslim community as misguided and supportive of the cause of the Dajjali fitnah, while at another level they think that any effort to differentiate between the extremists and mainstream Muslims is a "deception… spectacular deception (…) which is the essence of the Dajjali Fitnah". Such a position is helpful to the *ideological mindset* so that the call for *violence* and action is addressed to as wide an audience as possible. The following text argues using a familiar ideological premise with a call to choose a side for action.

> The Muslim Ummah, as a whole, is under attack by the Crusaders. Its Book and Prophet have been insulted... its sons and daughters have been killed… and yet the vast majority of the Ummah is ignorant and immobile to the great wave of events happening around the world. They are busy with the mundane life of this world, oblivious to the blinding reality that lies ahead. However, for as long as Dajjal's emergence isn't confirmed, there is yet time for those who truly seek to act and choose a side. (*Azan*, Issue 6: 20).

AQ constructs the theme that they are willing to accept those who shall reconcile with their past and exhibit a resolve for ideological action and side with AQ. They think that " as long as Dajjal's emergence is not confirmed, there is some time for those who truly seek to act and choose a side" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 20). In this reconciliation, a commitment to the ideological *violence* and action is necessary as "the vast majority of the Ummah is ignorant and immobile to the great wave of events happening around the world" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 20). The Islamist organisations exploit the inherent call for *violence* and action in the metaphor while appropriating the flexibility of its application to their advantage. They are flexible on the true nature of the metaphor as long as the focus remains on the dehumanisation effect of it. The dehumanisation of the 'other' help in deciding the nature of the retaliatory action. To be flexible on the nature of the metaphor (which is against the grain of an ideologue), therefore, is advantageous to them to keep the *mindset* of the *character* tied to the dehumanisation effect of the metaphor. The following text is an example of the compromising tone of such a message.

> However, this much is true that from what is apparent of the modern civilization of the West, it is preparing the ground for the emergence of the "*Dajjal*, the (false) Messiah". This is because in the modern Renaissance of Europe, the work that is being conducted using the power and authority that Europe has - it is the same work that "*Dajjal*, The (false) Messiah" will carry out using his power and authority (*Azan*, Issue 6: 21).

The theme in the above text typically portrays the Western civilisation as the 'other'. AQ makes every effort through select language, while interpreting the symbols of "Dajjal", to keep the focus on the dehumanised aspect of the modern civilisation. As the metaphor is abstract in many respects, the organisation can sense a reasonable challenge to its interpretations. The idea of an alternate interpretation that has the potential to initiate a different action (which may not lead to *violence*) is against the very core of the *ideological mindset*. The organisation, therefore, uses the compromising language as mentioned above to bridge over such a pitfall. Such language is necessary to retain the focus on the ideological action and use the inherent subtle appeal of the metaphor for violent action. The following text is another pointer to the organisation's yearning for a consensus to label the 'other' as "Dajjal".

> However, it should at least be accepted that the beginning of the emergence of the Fitnah that the (false) Messiah will inflict upon the world has occurred in one colour or another – this much should be accepted. In other words, it can be said that regardless of whether *Dajjal* has emerged or not, the *Dajjali* fire has indeed erupted (*Azan*, Issue 6: 21).

The central theme with regards to the use of the metaphor of "Dajjal" in the AQ published magazines is to equate and apply the metaphor to the West. Such a use lends unquestioned legitimacy to ideological action and *violence*. AQ believes that "it is not hidden from the eyes of many that the characteristics of the 'New World Order' that the Mujahideen are fighting against are strikingly similar to the Fitnah of "Dajjal". Many among the people of knowledge have stated so" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 21). One of the fundamental themes in the metaphors used by the Islamist organisations is to present the existing situation in a manner that it seems novel and unparalleled. In their understanding, it is so novel—like all Arendtian totalitarian thinking—that existing terms and categories of analysis fail to interpret the reality. The metaphors, converted into weapons of *violence*, present the ideologically categorised "decadent people" or 'false people' in a manner that a violent action appears the only solution to deal with such a menace. After all, in a situation where every action of the 'other' is a deception, where nothing can be relied upon, what constitutes a suitable action to resolve such a

conundrum? Logically, if there is no starting or engaging point in the riddle of the 'other', negotiation or engagement does not appear to be an option. Such a riddle directs one's attention to an action that can comprehensively resolve it, albeit through removal or elimination. It is precisely this uncertainty where, suggests Arendt, the logicality of the *ideological mindset* takes over and guides the action to a logical conclusion of *violence*.

As the *ideology* has pronounced the Dajjali people as 'false people', logically they must be eliminated to clear the path for Allah's Law to take its course. The *character* must take action against the Dajjali people. It is this inherent interpretation of the metaphor that, once used by the ideological organisations, turns it into the weapon of *violence*. The metaphorical nature of this weapon of *violence* makes it very useful for ideological purposes. As the ideological *violence* and action, would always need new categories of 'them', the metaphorical nature of the phrase is useful to that end. The metaphor has the necessary flexibility to accommodate new categories of 'them'. The following text published by AQ illustrates the idea of expansion of the metaphor; a Muslim country, namely Iran, has been included in this category of 'them'.

> We should remember that Iran is the centre of the one-eyed *Dajjal*. It is the place from which *Dajjal* will emerge. See the authentic Ahadith. All this Iran- American tooth-cracking is a drama that the Americans and Iranians have continued as a display…Iran will never be attacked… If ever you see a conflict in Iran, then know that this is not an attack. Rather, it is merely a shift of authority from the secondary minions of *Dajjal* to the primary ones. An example of this was when the authority passed hands at the time of Khomeini… From the hands of the Shah of Iran to Khomeini…This was portrayed as the "Iranian Islamic Revolution". It would not be far off to swear that Khomeini was a *Dajjal* from among the *Dajjal*s of which the Prophet informed us (*Azan*, Issue 2: 53-54).

IS attributes the same meaning to the metaphor of "Dajjal" as AQ. However, IS applies the metaphor less to the Western civilisation and more to Jews and the deviant Muslims, especially Rafidah. IS, however, is less abstract in their application of the metaphor than AQ. I note that IS, unlike AQ, refrains from mentioning the word "civilisation" while referring to the metaphor of "Dajjal", rather, they prefer to call the Western forces "crusaders". IS applies the metaphor to highlight more concrete and specific categories. They frequently refer to "the Dajjal and his followers, [as] the cursed Jews, who have a history of betraying and even killing the Prophets of Allah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 5: 4). In line with AQ, IS also frames the metaphor as representing the forces of evil, which need to be fought against; both the organisations refer to the same source, i.e. the sayings of the Prophet as the origin of the metaphor. IS refers to the "narrations [that] typically speak of the final battles that the Muslims will engage in with the Christians and Jews, including the confrontation in which the Muslims are led by 'Īsā ('alayhis-salam) against the Dajjāl'" (*Dabiq*, Issue 5:4). They think the Rafidah deserve the title of "Dajjal", more than the crusaders.

> The fact the apostate Rāfidah are more cohesive, organized, fervent, and aggressive than the other allies of the crusaders – the apostate tawāghīt and sahwāt – has gained them the favor of the crusaders, and accordingly, the crusaders rely upon them and the Rāfidah's Kurdish allies more so than others in the war against the Khilāfah. The Rāfidah overall are more barbaric and united than the crusaders themselves, but the muwahhidīn of the Khilāfah have sharpened many knives and prepared many car bombs to slaughter the flocks of Rāfidī sheep until the last Rāfidī under the banner of ad-Dajjāl dies (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:52).

TT, however, when compared with the other two Islamist organisations, relies less on this metaphor in the construction of the *mindset* of the discursive *character*. Such a lack of reliance is consistent with their previously explained thinking, which is less abstract and has a more nationalistic leaning in their approach than the other two organisations. Nevertheless, their conceptualisation of the metaphor is consistent with the other two organisations. In an article entitled سرکس دجالی [the Dajjali Circus]

(*Shariat*, Issue 23: 29), they refer to deception as the distinguishing feature of the *Dajjali* Circus performed by Americans.

Dajjal is not the only metaphor that the Islamist organisations employ to guide the *mindset* of the discursive *character* for *violence* and action, there are others that the organisations frequently refer to in the magazines to incite the *character* to violent action. In the succeeding paragraphs, I shall analyse two other metaphors, namely "Kuffar" and "Taught" that are frequently employed in the discursive practices of the organisations.

6.3.2   *The Metaphor of Kuffar*

"Kuffar" is the plural form of Kafir. In the Islamist organisations' discursive practices, it is used to identify the 'other'. The term is used metaphorically in mainstream Islam to refer to the non-Muslims. Kafir means the one who refuses to believe. The metaphor is very flexible and can accommodate all shades of the 'other'. It is universally used by Islamist organisations to dehumanise the 'other' before suggesting a violent action for its elimination. IS suggests that "the blood of a Kafir is cheap, filthy, and permissible to shed" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1: 35). AQ categorises all those who do not subscribe to their understanding of religion as "Kuffar". "Atheism and empiricism" is one of the distinguishing features of "Kuffar" as, "they [Kuffar] say: 'There is nothing but our life of this world, we die, and we live, and nothing destroys us except Ad-Dahr (the time)[45:24]'" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 10). Such deniers have "'no knowledge'– no basis or evidence for their claim" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 10). AQ suggests a very broad criteria to declare someone Kafir, that is, "[e]veryone who leaves an obligation among the obligations, commanded by Allah the Almighty in His Book or asserted by the Prophet (ﷺ) in sunnah, in a rejecting way and denial, he is surely a Kafir" (*Inspire*, 14; 29).

TT agrees with the two other Islamist organisations in identifying the 'other' as "Kuffar" and then subtly suggesting a violent action against them. All the three organisations firmly instil the centrality of *violence* in the *mindset* of the discursively constructed *character* in all action against "Kuffar". The following textual construction by TT guides the *mindset* of the *character* to the violent action.

امتِ مسلمہ کفار اور ان کے ہمنواؤں کے حملوں کی زد میں ہے۔ کفری اور طاغوتی قوتوں نے اپنے خونخوار پنجے اسلامی ممالک کے وسائل پر گاڑھ رکھے ہیں۔ مسلمانوں کو اس حالت سے نجات کیلئے جہاد کے فریضے کو ادا کرنے کی اشد ضرورت ہے۔

> [*Translation by the author*] Muslim Ummah is under attack from the Kuffar and their supporters. The forces of Kuffar and Taghut have pierced their bloody nails into the resources of Islamic countries. To get rid of this situation, Muslims must urgently fall back to their duty of Jihad (*Shariat* 39: 18).

As mentioned elsewhere, AQ takes the lead in historicizing the meaning and application of the abstract concepts compared to the other two Islamist organisations. AQ refers to certain historical developments as the mischievous activities of "Kuffar". In their understanding, "Kuffar" not only control the existing conditions of Muslims but also have engineered the historical evolution of the Islamic thought to their (Kuffar's) advantage. AQ articulates that

> after the fall of the Khilafah in 1924, the *Kuffar* brought all of their new-age false concepts, ideas and philosophies to the Muslim lands and implemented these upon them by force. Then, through media, education and economic sanctions, the *Kuffar Taught* these philosophies to entire populations of Muslims, rendering them as slaves in both body and mind. Generations of Muslims were born into this "new world order". *Kuffar*-created map lines became etched deeply into their hearts and minds, and the concept of an Ummah based on faith was utterly destroyed (*Azan*, Issue 4: 18).

In the text mentioned above, AQ uses the metaphor of "Kuffar" to simplistically link the changes in the Muslim societies to the machinations of the 'other'; it is being used to delegitimise anything different from the ideological interpretation of history. Here, the "Kuffar" are shown to have coordinated to destroy "the concept of an Ummah based on faith" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 18). The metaphor of "Kuffar" is a proxy for the 'other'. The

ideological mindset makes every effort to dehumanise the 'other'. In the above text, the *character* is being guided to focus on the mischievous effect of the actions of "Kuffar". The metaphor "Kuffar" delegitimises and dehumanises the actions of 'other'. The logical response, therefore, would be a retaliatory action. The dehumanisation of the 'other', fundamentally, frees the responsive action from any moral constraint. That is one of the reasons that the organisations pay so much attention to the dehumanisation of the 'other'. The organisations go a step further to enhance the inherent dehumanisation effect of the metaphor; they add adjectives to the metaphor. AQ constructs the dehumanisation of "Kuffar" in the following text.

> It is known that these filthy *Kuffar* merely sat in rooms and drew lines on maps to divide entire populations of Muslims into "countries". According to the Kafir Winston Churchill, the land of Jordan came about due to a mere single stroke of his pen in the Cairo Conference of 1921! The stroke came out slightly curved because he emitted a hiccup (possibly) due to the whisky he had been drinking that Sunday afternoon. What a sad state of affairs! Borders of Muslim lands were decided by the drunken minds of snobby *Kuffar* (*Azan*, Issue 4: 20).

The text not only carries the theme of wicked actions of the 'other' but also adds adjectives to it like "filthy Kuffar" and "drunken minds of snobby Kuffar". Therefore, for the organisation, it is not only the actions of the "Kuffar" that are condemnable, but the "Kuffar" in their personal capacity are filthy, drunken and snobby. The Divine Law has already reserved a gruesome punishment for such dehumanised people. "The torment of the Kafir, the apostate and the hypocrite, starts immediately after death; the ripping out of the soul, the desperate crying unheard by men, the humiliation of the angels' insults, the spread of fire under him, the regret of seeing his place in Paradise if he had become a Muslim" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 5). Compared with the punishment of the Divine Law, the violent action against "Kuffar" appears to be more lenient.

Additionally, the violent action appears to conform to the Divine Law that has already decreed a much more severer punishment for 'them'. In all their action, the

organisations pretend that they advance the cause of the superhuman law. They are interested in the movement of the Divine Law, which moves to debase "Kuffar" for their transgressions. As "Kuffar" are a hindrance to the movement of Divine Law and also do not deserve to be treated like human beings (due to their actions) violent action against them is actually helping the Divine Law to take its natural course. The "Kuffar" need to be separated and eliminated. The metaphor of "Kuffar" is flexible and can accommodate deviant Muslims, who have been decreed as such. The following IS construct in *Dabiq* Magazine articulates possible concrete actions against such deviant Muslims who fall under the category of "Kuffar".

> Their women can be taken as slaves and their property can be seized. They are apostate heretics whose repentance cannot be accepted. Rather they are to be killed wherever they are found and cursed as they were described. It is not permissible to use them as guards, gatekeepers, or custodians. It is obligatory to kill their scholars and religious figures so that they do not misguide others. It is prohibited to sleep at their homes, accompany them, walk with them, or follow their funeral processions if their deaths are known. It is prohibited for the Muslims' authorities to abandon the order of Allah by not executing the hudūd upon them" [Majmū' al-Fatāwā] (*Dabiq*, Issue10: 9).

IS supports the theme of aggressive action against the excluded "apostate heretics". The ideological action should start from the social boycott and culminate at total elimination and dismemberment of the 'other'. Every possible humiliation is permitted against the creatures who fall under the category of "Kuffar". The only way out for a Kafir to save himself/herself from violent action is to submit to the *ideology*. The IS *character* is supposed to think that "Kafir's blood is not spared until he becomes a Muslim" or gets "a covenant given by the believers [Muslims]" (*Rumiyah*, Issue, 1: 35). In their understanding "shedding the blood of a non-dhimmi Kafir is not sinful but is rather rewarded with Jannah. Allah's Messenger said, 'A Kafir and his killer will never be gathered together in the Fire'" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1:35).

IS, however, suggests a different action for women and children. This discretion, in the nature of the action, is not based on any sentiment of sympathy—as an ideologue rejects such sentiments for the 'other'—but on the usefulness of the action. The organisation explains that imprisonment is more useful "so that they [children and women] can become slaves, which is more beneficial than killing them, and killing them does not harm the enemy; so making them slaves is more optimal than killing them" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1:35). Fundamentally, the ideological action against "Kuffar" includes dehumanisation and elimination. Another metaphor that is frequently used towards the same end is "Taghut".

6.3.3   *The Metaphor of Taghut*

"Taghut" is another metaphor that inherently calls for action and *violence* and is frequently employed by three Islamist organisations in their discursive practices. The textual constructs use this metaphor in parallel with the metaphors of "Dajjal" and "Kuffar". The relevance of such metaphors when used as the weapons of ideological *violence* lies in their intensity of the focus on the violent retaliatory action; these create sharp and distinct categories of 'them'. The use of popularly imagined metaphors helps the Islamist organisations to make the discursive *character* to understand and categorise complex situations as 'them' simplistically. An implied call in such categorisations guides the *character* to an ideological action. AQ explains that "every law and every command other than the Law and Command of Allah is included in the definition of Taghut and as Muslims, we are required to reject every aspect of the Taghut and to believe in Allah Alone" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 63). "Tawagheet is the plural of Taghut which can refer to a ruler who rules by other than what Allah has revealed" (*Azan*, Issue 6: 39). AQ delves deeper into the definition of the metaphor in the following text.

> Tāghut literally means a tyrant, i.e. someone who exceeds limits and exaggerates in kufr. And whoever exceeds his limit in disobedience is a tyrant. Tāghut technically means - Ibnul Qayyim says, "Tāghut is everything/everyone who exceeded his limits either worshipped,

followed or obeyed - so, the deity of any people is the one whom they refer to in judgment besides Allāh and His prophet, or worship other than Allāh, or follow him without taking any consideration of Allāh, or obey him in a matter that is a disobedience to Allāh" (*Inspire*, Issue 13: 38).

Through the metaphor of "Taghut", AQ delegitimises all systems of governance except the one approved by the *ideology*. As mentioned earlier, the organisations exploit the inherent flexibility in the metaphorical nature of the expression and expand its application to new categories of 'them'. Therefore, the metaphor is equally applicable to deviant Muslims as well as non-Muslims. While AQ articulates the metaphor in the more abstract term, IS applies it to its immediate opponents; the concrete operationalisation of *ideology* in the real world guides the ideological organisations to fashion the articulations of the metaphors. For example, IS thinks that "the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey – including their Syrian branch, the PYD (Kur- dish Democratic Union Party) [is] led by the tāghūt Abdullah Ocalan" (*Dabiq*, issue 10: 30). Likewise, Turkey's past leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (*Dabiq*, Issue 10: 32) and present leader Tayyab Erdogan (*Dabiq*, Issue 10: 32) are also "Taghut". In other words, the Islamist organisations construct a *character* that believes that all political leaders who support any system of governance other than the ideological one are "Taghut".

AQ decrees "the falsity of the belief of such people who even wish to go for judgment in their disputes to the Taghut and the laws of the Taghut" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 63). Such a complete control over not only the action of a *character* but also the very source of that action, i.e. the thought, is typical of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*. The metaphorical use of the word "Taghut" incites the action of absolute rejection, resistance and active opposition to everything that falls short of the ideological approval. For the *character,* the metaphor is a label that indicates all areas against which ideological action is required.

In line with AQ's tradition, the organisation provides conceptual clarity on the meaning of the metaphor. The AQ published *Inspire* Magazine names six salient manifestations

of the metaphor. The Magazine quotes and interprets verses from the Quran to support its categorisation. The six manifestations of "Taghut" are "Shaytan; desire; witchcraft; a ruler who changes the laws of Allah; parliaments; and the United Nations" (*Inspire*, Issue 13: 38).

Parliaments are *Taghut* "because parliaments are legislative: they carry out legislation and lawmaking together with Allāh" (*Inspire*, Issue 13: 38). The United Nations deserves this metaphor "because the conventions and agreements of the United Nations are compulsive to kufar and vowing on it. Among the compulsory kufr of the United Nations, is its obligation on its members to go for judgment to the International Court of Justice, i.e. referring judgment to the *Tāghut*. This alone is enough to make this organization - The United Nations – *Tāghut*" (*Inspire*, Issue 13: 38). AQ sees the hand of "[t]he Jews and Christians, who created this secularism (out of which stems nationalism and democracy), invented the term "nationalism" and then used it to divide the Muslim Ummah into pieces. They destroyed the collectivism of the Muslims and planted upon them their agent 'Tawagheet'" (*Azan*, issue 1: 69).

The metaphor "Taghut" thus covers all modes of thought, systems and organisations that take a different view of affairs than the terrorist explained *ideology*. It simplistically categorises everything outside the *ideology* as "Taghut" and hence renders it a legitimate target for the ideological action. AQ suggests that the action against "Taghut" can take the following forms.

> Disbelieving in *Tāghut*: Is done by heart, tongue and limbs:
>
> I.   by heart: This is by believing in the nullification of its worshipping and believing in enmity and hatred towards them.
>
> II. by speech: This is by declaring that they are kufr and disavowing them by tongue and renouncing them, their religion and followers and declaring them kufr.
>
> III. by limbs: This is by dissociating from them, avoiding them and waging Jihād on them, and also waging Jihād on their followers and

soldiers. Sheikh Suleiman ibn Samhaan said: 'Allāh says: and We certainly sent among every Ummah a Messenger (proclaiming): 'Worship Allāh (Alone) and avoid tāghut. [16: 36] Allāh says that all the Messengers were sent with the message of avoiding tāghut. Whoever does not avoid tāghut, contradicts with all Messengers. Allāh says: But those who have avoided tāghut, lest they worship it, and turned back to Allāh – for them are good tidings. [39: 17] In this verse, there is evidence for the obligation of avoiding tāghut in many ways. The word 'avoid' as used here means hating him, enmity by heart, cursing and denouncing him by tongue, removing him by killing him. Whoever claims to be a Muslim but does not do that, he is not sincere' (*Inspire*, Issue 13: 38-39).

The textual construct by AQ engages with the theme of *violence* and action inherent in the metaphor of "Taghut". The organisation guides the *mindset* of the *character* to their understanding of the ideological *violence* and action, that is, "[t]hose who believe, fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve, fight in the cause of tāghūt. So, fight against the allies of Satan. Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak [4: 76] (*Inspire*, Issue 4: 22).

"Taghut", therefore, is an object of ideological *violence* and action. Thus, living with "Taghut" is a contradiction for the *ideological mindset*. The *ideological mindset* is prompted to take action to resolve any contradiction. In the Arendtian articulations, the *ideological mindset* is very consistent in its logicality and reasoning; it calls for *violence* and action for the sake of ideological consistency. Therefore, "[w]hoever claims to be a Muslim but does not do that [i.e. take action against "Taghut"], he is not sincere" (*Inspire*, Issue 13: 39). The terrorists are prepared to take any action— sometimes even irrational action—to stay consistent ideologically. In the pages of IS published *Rumiyah* Magazine, a member "declared baraah [disavowal] from his Taghut father, once even asking the Amir [leader] to allow him to go and assassinate his own father, saying: 'I know one person who should be targeted, my Taghut father. If you give me permission, I will finish him'" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 2: 10).

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Essentially, the preferred nature of an action for the Islamist organisations—like all ideological organisation—is violent. The Islamist organisations use the metaphors for "pointing", dehumanising and eliminating the 'other'. The identified and dehumanised 'other' needs elimination. The Islamist organisations' discursive practices extensively use the term Jihad to guide the whole process of elimination of the 'other' through *violence*. In the succeeding paragraphs, I shall analyse the nature of this violent and ideological action.

6.4   The Nature of Violent and Ideological Action - Jihad

I note that encouraging the followers to engage in extreme *violence*, or Jihad, is the central theme of the Islamist organisations' discursive practices. Principally, in the *ideological mindset*, the preferred mode of action for change is *violence*. The lesser actions, which at an early stage might appear as nonviolent like disavowal and disapproval of "Taghut", should be considered as the stepping-stones that should lead the constructed *character* to the *ideologically* sanctioned extreme *violence*, i.e. Jihad. All three Islamist organisations use the term Jihad as an umbrella term to refer to their violent action. Additionally, the three organisations conceptualise and use the term Jihad in identical ways in the texts; their understanding of the term is independent of their working conditions, e.g. political, geographical, and so on. For example, TT, which has the maximum nationalistic content in its texts, is unequivocal in emphasising the obligatory nature of the violent action in the *Shariat* magazine.

اسی طرح رسول اللہ صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم فرماتے ہیں: "جَاهِدُوا الْمُشْرِكِين بِاَمْوَالِكُمْ
وَاَنْفُسِكُمْ وَ اَلْسِنَتِكُمْ" تم کفار کے ساتھ اپنے مالوں، جانوں اور زبانوں کے ساتھ
جہاد کرو۔

> [*Translation by the author*] The Prophet said: you engage in Jihad with *Kuffar* through your wealth, self and language (*Shariat*, Issue 36:30).

The Islamist *ideology* inspired violent action has certain distinguishing features. Firstly, ideological *violence* is endless. It is not a means to an end but an end in itself. In this sense, it would continue until the time a utopian ideological world, far in the future, is in place. And secondly, Islamist *violence* draws its justifications from the past as well as from the future. The Islamist organisations on the one hand frequently refer to the past violent action and historical holy texts to justify its continuity and on the other, also justifies it through their claim to a utopian ideological world that shall materialise in the distant future.

Generally, the term Jihad is a widely known term. It has multiple interpretations, depending upon who is explaining the term. There are interpretations in certain Muslim circles which interpret the term predominantly meaning as a struggle for self-reformation. This section of the research, however, is focused on understanding the nature of violent action as constructed by three Islamists organisations in their discursive practices. As *violence* is an essential element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, my aim in this section is to present and analyse those exemplary texts from the magazines that thematically carry the salient characteristics of the ideological *violence*, i.e. Jihad.

6.5 Jihad is Only Violent

In the magazines, the Islamist organisations defend the violent nature of Jihad. In their understanding, Jihad or violent action is the essence of Islam. Therefore, IS rhetorically question, "how can the zanādiqah (heretics) or even those who blindly follow them – Bush, Obama, and Kerry – obstinately claim that 'Islam is a religion of peace' meaning pacifism?" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7: 22). The organisation argues that "[o]ne of the biggest shubuhāt [doubts] propagated by the heretics is the linguistic root for the word Islam" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7: 22). It is erroneous to claim that "it comes from the word salām (peace), when in actuality it comes from words meaning submission and sincerity, sharing the same consonant root" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7: 22). A textual construct in the IS published *Dabiq* Magazine reads:

Islam is the religion of the sword not pacifism. He (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) also described the sword as being the key to Jannah [Reported by Ibn Abī Shaybah on the authority of Abū Mūsā]. He also declared that his worldly provision was placed for him in the shade of his spear and that the best livelihood for the Muslim in the future is what he takes with his sword from the kāfir enemy (*Dabiq*, Issue 7; 22).

The sword for IS, when metaphorically used, means violent action. The violent action is justified from the past as "Allah's Messenger (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) was sent with four swords" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7:20). In their understanding, *violence* was central in the dealings of the Prophet with his opponents. He used "a sword for the mushrikīn [who worship other than the God—*translation by the author*]" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7:20). The Prophet used the second "sword for Ahlul-Kitāb [people of the book— *translation by the author*]" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7:21). While the third sword disposed of the "munāfiqīn" [the dual-faced— *translation by the author*] and the fourth sword symbolises the violent action against the "bughāt" [rebellious aggressors—*translation by the author]* (*Dabiq*, Issue 7: 21). Supporting the same understanding, TT further clarifies certain misconceptions surrounding the term Jihad in one of their textual constructs in the Urdu Magazine *Shariat* as follow.

جہاد کی غلط تشریح کرنے والے یہ لوگ عوام کو لفظ جہاد کی کسی حد تک خودساختہ" وسعت کا قیدی "بنا کر قتال سے پیچھے ہٹانا چاہتے ہیں۔ آپ علیہ السلام کے ایک فرمان کے مطابق ایک زمانہ ایسا آئے گا، جس میں کہا جائے گا کہ یہ جہاد کا زمانہ نہیں ہے۔ درحقیقت وہی زمانہ جہاد کا بہترین زمانہ ہوگا۔

[*Translation by the Author*] Some people want to persuade the public away from the sacred killing through their self-expanded meaning of the term Jihad. The Prophet said that there shall be a time when it shall be propagated that this is not the era of Jihad; in fact, that shall be the best of the times for Jihad (*Shariat*, Issue 63: 23).

TT is equally uncomfortable with any suggestion of nonviolent nature of the action. They reject every proposal to present Jihad as a nonviolent struggle. The text in the *Shariat* Magazine continues,

شرماتا۔ قتال فی سبیل اللہ کو لفظ قتال کے ساتھ
بیان کرنے کے بجائے مخصوص نظریے میں
"جہاد "کا لفظ استعمال کرتے ہیں۔ وہ کہتے ہیں کہ
جہاد کا لفظ" جہد "سے نکلا ہے۔ اس کا مطلب ہے
کہ" کوشش کرنا"۔ وہ لوگ لفظ جہاد کو مزید وسیع
کرتے ہوئے فرماتے ہیں کہ کوشش کسی بھی کام
میں کی جا سکتی ہے۔ مثلا :حلال رزق کمانے کی
کوشش بھی جہاد ہے۔ نیکی کی کوشش بھی جہاد
ہے۔ ماں باپ کی خدمت بھی جہاد ہے۔ یعنی ایسی

بہت سی کوششوں کو جہاد میں سمو کر عوام کو اسلام کے معروف و مشہور
"فلسفہ جہاد "سے دور رکھنے کی خفیہ کوشش (جہاد) کرتے دکھائی دیتے
ہیں۔

[*Translation by the author*][Some people] Deliberately do not accept the word "killing" in the phrase "killing for the sake of God" and try to explain away this "killing" in a specific sense by using the word Jihad. They explain that the word Jihad has its roots in the word "johad", meaning an effort. They then expand this meaning and say that one can make an effort in any task, such as an effort to earn lawfully or serving one's parents is also Jihad. By equating Jihad with the effort, they conspire and appear to keep people away from the mainstream understanding of the "philosophy of Jihad" (*Shariat*, Issue 63: 23).

The abovementioned understanding of the term Jihad is common among the three Islamist organisations. IS equally supports the theme mentioned above in the following text.

> O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the religion of peace. Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet (sallallāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam) was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the creation. He was ordered with war until Allah is worshipped alone. He (sallallāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam) said to the mushrikīn of his people, 'I came to you with slaughter' [Reported by Imām Ahmad from ʿAbdullāh Ibn ʿAmr]. He fought both the Arabs and non-Arabs in all their various colours. He himself left to fight and took part in dozens of battles. He never for a day grew tired of war … His companions after him and their followers carried on similarly. They did not soften nor abandon war, until they possessed the Earth, conquered the East and the West, the nations submitted to them, and the lands yielded to them, by the edge of the sword. And similarly, this will remain the condition of those who follow them until the Day of Recompense (*Dabiq*, Issue 9: 53).

The text in the paragraph mentioned above constructs two themes for assimilation of the *character*. One, it suggests that *violence* was instrumental in all the Muslim successes in the past. The Prophet changed reality through *violence*. The companions of the Prophet continued with the *violence*, which shall continue endlessly. Two, it suggests that violence is divinely ordained by God; therefore, it is sacred and good. The "Prophet (sallallāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam) was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to the creation" (*Dabiq*, Issue 9: 53). The theme of *violence*, being good and merciful is peculiar to the *ideological mindset*. Such understanding resonates with the past ideologue(s), e.g. Hitler, who thought that the act of elimination of the disabled and incurable people is not only mercy to them but shall also help in the movement of the law of nature (Arendt, 1958: 433). AQ also repeats the unique theme of *violence* as mercy in their following textual construct in the *Azan* Magazine.

We have come to take you out from the worship of men to the worship of the Lord of men; and from the narrowness of this life to the vastness of that life and the Hereafter; and from the tyranny of all other religions to the justice of Islam" (*Azan*, Issue1: 10).

AQ in the text mentioned above constructs the theme that *violence* is good for the re-fabrication of humanity and society. *Violence* can refashion society in a manner that it can free itself from tyranny and have justice. In their understanding, such a state cannot be reached until and unless each member of the 'other' is either re-fabricated or eliminated. IS believes that "kufr alongside muharabah (belligerence) is present in every Kafir, so it is permitted to enslave him just as it is permitted to kill him" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 11: 29). It also reserves special abuse for those who abandon ideological *violence* as they "are akin to the fornicators, the sodomites, and the drunkards" (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:13). IS repeats the themes of merciful and reformative violent action in an article entitled "Why we hate you and why we fight you" in the following text.

What's equally if not more important to understand is that we fight you, not simply to punish and deter you, but to bring you true freedom in this life and salvation in the Hereafter, freedom from being enslaved to your whims and desires as well as those of your clergy and legislatures, and salvation by worshiping your Creator alone and following His messenger. We fight you in order to bring you out from the darkness of disbelief and into the light of Islam, and to liberate you from the constraints of living for the sake of the worldly life alone so that you may enjoy both the blessings of the worldly life and the bliss of the Hereafter (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 33).

The organisations construct a *character* who is supposed to think that ideological *violence* is good and necessary to refabricate people and their thought. Such *violence* is sacred and guarantees Islamic renaissance. Each person of the 'other' needs to be

refabricated and reformed. The *character* has been tasked by the *superhuman source* for this refabrication. Such ideas shall need continuous effort, hence, infinite violence.

6.6   Infinite Violence

The ideological *violence*, i.e. Jihad, is endless and would never cease. Islamist organisations consider it an essential part of their *ideology* (religion). Therefore, it is supposed to continue until the time the *ideology* wins over the world completely. AQ is explicit about the endlessness of Jihad in the following text.

> Jihad will continue in its various forms and fighting will continue until the Day of Judgment and will not be harmed or deterred by those who betray it (*Inspire*, 2, 40).

The theme of infinite violence is obvious in the text mentioned above. Jihad is not tied to any specific outcome, but being part of the *ideology*, it is mandatory and shall continue forever. However, some textual expressions of the Islamist organisations mention a highly subjective utopian world in the distant future where violent action may cease. For example, IS claims that "the sword will continue to be drawn, raised, and swung until 'Īsā (Jesus – 'alayhis-salām) kills the *Dajjāl* (the Antichrist) and abolishes the jizyah. Thereafter, kufr and its tyranny will be destroyed; Islam and its justice will prevail on the entire Earth" (*Dabiq*, issue 7: 24). Another text links the utopian vision to a narration of a companion of the Prophet in the following language.

> The sky will be permitted to pour its rain and the land to yield its plants, so even if you were to plant a seed on a stone, it would spring. There will be no rivalries, no envy, no hatred, to the point that a man will pass by a lion yet it won't harm him, and step on a snake yet it won't harm him" [Reported by ad-Diyā' and ad-Daylamī on the authority of Abū Hurayrah] (*Dabiq*, Issue 7: 24).

IS, however, suggest that until such a utopian world comes into being the "parties of kāfirīn will continue to be struck down by the unsheathed sword of Islam – except for those who enter into īmān [*Islam-by the author*] or amān – for there will always be a party of Muslims fighting parties of kāfirīn until there is no more fitnah and the religion is completely for Allah alone" (*Dabiq*, Issue 7: 24). Paradoxically, for the sake of continuity of violent action, new categories of 'them' will have to be created, when, and if existing categories are exhausted through elimination. I shall discuss the objective nature of 'them' in the following chapter while discussing another element of the *ideological mindset* namely, 'The Objective Enemy'. Fundamentally, Jihad in the Islamist organisations' imagination is central to the *ideology* and an act of worship. AQ articulates the argument as follows.

> Indeed, Jihad is a lifelong devotion, like prayers and fasting, and religion isn't a matter of taste, for us to leave part of it and perform another part.…… No! Jihad is still obligatory on you as long as you are capable, and the fields of competition continue to be in need of your expertise and efforts (*Inspire*, Issue 4: 18).

The above text refutes any suggestion that the ideological *violence* is only a means to an end. Although it is also used for a purpose; uniquely, this violent action (Jihad) is an end in itself as well. This is the distinguishing feature of ideological *violence*. Continuous and infinite violence for the sake of *ideology* is an essential element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*. IS also floats the idea that the *violence* is a better deal in a bargain for the hereafter. The *character* is asked to believe that the ones "who fight in the cause of Allah [actually] sell the life of this world for the Hereafter" (*Rumiyah*, 11: 30). The following self-explanatory text from TT published Urdu Magazine *Shariat* exposes the endlessness of Jihad.

لیے یہ ظلم اور وحشت کے شعلوں میں لپٹے ہوئے نظر آتے ہیں ۔ باطل کے مقابلے میں جتنے بھی زیادہ تعداد میں مسلمان یا وہ ہستیاں جن سے امیدیں وابستہ کی جاتی ہیں شہید یا زخمی ہو جائیں، اس راہ میں جتنے یتیم اور عقوبت خانوں میں قید کر دیے جائیں تو اسے اسلام پسند قوتوں کی شکست سے تعبیر نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔ کیوں کہ اس جنگ کی بنیاد افراد نہیں نظریہ ہے اور یہ ایک نہ ختم ہونے والا مقابلہ ہے ۔ اسی لیے رسول اللہ صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم نے فرمایا باطل کے خلاف یہ جنگ قیامت تک جاری رہے گی ۔ تو جب تک اختلاف ہو اور زمین پر اللہ کا دین پوری طرح نافذ نہ ہو جائے ۔ یہ جنگ جاری رہے گی ۔

چودہ صدیوں سے اب تک مسلمان بے پناہ قربانیاں دیتے آ رہے ہیں ۔ اپنی جانیں اللہ کے سپرد کر رہے ہیں ، ان لوگوں نے اگر دنیا سے آنکھیں بند کر لی ہیں اور اپنے عام مسلمانوں کو بے آسرا چھوڑ کر گئے ہیں مگر ان کی عدم موجودگی اور شہادت سے اس تحریک کو کوئی نقصان نہیں ہوگا ۔ اس لیے کہ ہمارے اقدامات ، پیغامات ، جنگیں اور ساری کوششیں نظریے اور مذہب کی بنیاد پر ہیں ۔ افراد سے اس کا کوئی تعلق نہیں ۔

[*Translation by the author*] Irrespective of the fact that innumerable Muslims or their representative leaders may be killed, injured, orphaned or imprisoned, this shall not constitute a defeat to the Islamic forces. As it not the people that are the cause of this war, but the *ideology*. It is due to this understanding that the Prophet said that war should continue with falsehood till the end of times. Therefore, the war shall continue until there is a difference of opinion, and Allah's religion is not fully implemented on the earth.

In the last fourteen centuries, Muslims are sacrificing their lives. Although, the sacrificed have left this world, leaving fellow Muslims helpless, yet their martyrdom and absence shall not harm the movement. The reason lies in the fact that our actions, messages, wars and steps are

based on religion and *ideology*; it has nothing to do with individuals (*Shariat*, Issue 24: 37).

The violent action against the 'other' shall continue indefinitely until their complete annihilation or subjugation. IS articulates the endless nature of the violent action in the following text.

> Just as your disbelief is the primary reason we hate you, your disbelief is the primary reason we fight you, as we have been commanded to fight the disbelievers until they submit to the authority of Islam, either by becoming Muslims, or by paying jizyah – for those afforded this option – and living in humiliation under the rule of the Muslims (*Dabiq*, issue 15: 32).

The text carries the theme of an ideological action that is focused on 'their' (the enemy's) *mindset*. IS warns 'them' that, "even if you were to stop fighting us, your best-case scenario in a state of war would be that we would suspend our attacks against you – if we deemed it necessary – in order to focus on the closer and more immediate threats, before eventually resuming our campaigns against you" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 32). Any temporary suspension of the violent action, therefore, is part of a strategy and the action shall resume shortly for an endless continuity. The continuity has been decreed by the *ideology*. IS pronounces that they have been ordered by the *superhuman source*, i.e. God to "fight them until there is no fitnah [paganism] and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 32). The organisation's resolve to continue with the infinite violence can be understood from the following text published in *Dabiq* Magazine.

> The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if you were to pay jizyah [protection tax] and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation, we would continue to hate you. No doubt, we would stop fighting

you then as we would stop fighting any disbelievers who enter into a covenant with us, but we would not stop hating you (*Dabiq*, Issue15: 33).

The above mentioned textual construct highlights an important and implied theme of ideological *violence*. The ideological *violence* aims at something beyond the physical surrender of the 'other'; it aims at complete subjugation of the thought as well. All action flowing out of hate shall continue even if "you live under the authority of Islam in humiliation" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 33). AQ is in sync with IS in this endless hate flowing out of their allegiance to the *ideology*. AQ propagates that those who "claim that loving Allāh does not require jealousy nor anger for the Sake of Allāh…. contradicts the method of the Qurān and Sunnah" (*Inspire*, Issue 12: 33). IS concurs with such thinking and emphasises that "[a] Muslim's loyalty is determined, not by his skin colour, his tribal affiliation, or his last name, but by his faith. He loves those whom Allah loves and hates those whom Allah hates" (*Dabiq*, 11; 19). The *character* is supposed to pursue their opponents through the actions of hate (which is another form of *violence*) until 'they' surrender their inner self completely as well, i.e. stop thinking and become ideologues.

The theme of perpetual and continuous *violence* is the central theme the organisations construct for the discursive *character*. Perpetual activism and feverish activity are central to the *character's mindset*. They must continue to act in all circumstances. When they are unable to act violently, they must pursue the 'other' through the act of hate. Arendt emphasises, "[p]ersuasion is not the opposite of rule by *violence*, it is only another form of it(…)that is, an attempt to use *violence* by words only" (Arendt, 1990: 80).

The *ideological mindset* constructs clear, sharp and distinguishable identities of the 'other' for an equally distinguishable ideological action. Inconsistency and confusion are not the domains of such thinking. The *ideological mindset* perceives inconsistency as an anomaly waiting for an action to resolve the anomaly. The Islamist organisations believe that the "other's" physical surrender has created an inconsistency; 'they' have

yet not surrendered their thinking to the *ideology*. That means, 'they' have managed to live under an ideological rule but without completely surrendering to the *ideology*. In the ideological language living with inconsistencies is hypocrisy. "The essence of hypocrisy – both major and minor – is a discrepancy between what the inner self encloses and what the outer self discloses, and that minor hypocrisy can beget major hypocrisy" (*Dabiq*, Issue 3: 25). For the *ideological mindset*, the action is necessary to unmask the hypocrisy.

6.7 Violent Action as a Provocation to Unmask Hypocrisy

In line with the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, the Islamist organisations employ *violence* as a tool to unmask the hypocrisy of the world (Western) powers. In the Arendtian articulations, the ideologues perform an act to provoke a power to use *violence*. The aim is to expose the hypocrisy of power. The ideological thought feeds on contradictions and hypocrisies of the real world. Sometimes ideologues perform violent action as a strategy to provoke the 'other' to react with disproportionate *violence*. The 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers can be categorised as one such action. AQ relates to the 9/11 attacks as a provocative action.

> Before 9/11, the Jihad was limited to some specific lands. Today, because of their own spending, it has spread throughout the world and the basic belief and *ideology* of all the Jihadi groups is the same - Allah's Law on Allah's Land (*Azan*, Issue 1: 59).

AQ endorses the theme that the 9/11 violent action helped in promoting the terrorist *ideology*. Through this action, they managed to spread the call for action and *violence* throughout the world. AQ argues that "changing the status quo is not an easy task. Rocking the boat affects everyone. The Prophets experienced the consequences of challenging the status quo that was instituted and defended by the powerful. They suffered, and their followers suffered" (*Azan*, Issue 9: 34). The Islamists understand that they will have to pay the price to provoke the status quo. They assert, "today the status quo is fiercely defended by the powerful and not everyone has the courage to go

against it. If you defy it, you suffer. You pay a price" (*Azan*, Issue 9:34). AQ, however, is determined to rock the boat to unmask the hypocrisy of the rulers. They articulate:

> The drone chain has been exposed and the hypocrisy of the rulers has been laid bare. They have been lying to the Ummah from the start. They do not care for the causes of the Ummah. And the Muslims in fact, know this. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, are rocking the boat. And they have Allah on their side (*Azan*, Issue 1: 18-19).

The organisation constructs a *character* in the text mentioned above, which thinks that the initiation of violent action against the Muslim rulers is a way to expose their hypocrisy. Such action forces the rulers to state their position on certain issues. This is an indication that Islamist organisations are confident that Muslim masses shall support their ideology consistent stance. They take pride in taking a provocative action to expose the operations of the drones. The Muslim rulers, while claiming to be close to the Muslim causes, are unable to disrupt the drone operations from their lands. AQ finds it justified to rock the boat after they have identified this inconsistency in the Muslim rulers' position. Rocking the boat is expected to unmask the hypocrisy of the Muslim rulers. The Islamist organisations' constructed *character* is supposed to take every action, including against their self-interest, so that the ideological claims appear consistent. The Islamist organisations list possible actions against the 'other' as part of the action of disavowal.

6.8   The Action of Disavowal

Violence, for the Islamist organisations, is a preferred action, however, in situations where such an action is not possible, the *character* is supposed to practice the action of disavowal against the 'other'. The *ideology* should guide all the actions of disavowal. Disavowal encompasses all the actions that are taken as part of the ideological action. AQ, as usual, articulates the philosophy behind the action of disavowal in the following text.

The Quran does not want a unity in which evil retains its nature and gets mixed up with goodness. It does not want a unity in which darkness and light mix together to form a third mixture. No! If such was the case then there would be no Quran, no Quranic Ummah, no call towards Islam, no Ummah of Islam... This is because the mixing up of truth and falsehood yields darkness in which the reality of all things is lost and this only begets falsehood (*Azan*, Issue 2: 44).

The theme of the textual construction suggests separating the 'false people' from the 'true people'. The *character* is being encouraged to separate themselves from the 'false people' at all levels, e.g. political, social and so on. The following text published by AQ in the *Azan* Magazine narrates seven levels of disavowal.

1. Cutting relations of the heart with them
2. Verbally proclaiming hatred and disavowal
3. Refraining from imitating them in all aspects
4. Completely cutting off any social relation(s) with them
5. Refraining from mixing with them
6. Opposing their desires
7. Fighting Jihad against them (*Azan*, Issue 2: 45).

The Islamist organisations include all tangible and intangible actions in the category of disavowal of the 'other'. The list mentioned above helps in pointing, dehumanising and then violently eliminating the 'other'. The *character* is encouraged to develop a *mindset* that sees reality through the *ideology*. AQ propagates that "the Quran ordered that the hatred and disavowal of the disbelievers should not be kept in the heart only. Rather, it needs to be openly proclaimed" (*Azan*, Issue 2, 46). It urges "the Muslims to separate themselves from the non-Muslims by their actions" (*Azan*, Issue 2: 46). The organisation, being totalitarian, constructs the action of disavowal as a method to control the thinking of the subjects. An article in the AQ published *Azan* Magazine entitled "Disavowal" exposes the totalitarian nature of their *mindset*.

The Shariah of Allah did not deem separation and distinction between the Muslims and disbelievers as sufficient. To make this distinction even clearer, the Shariah ordered the Muslims to refrain from conducting any *mu'amlaat* (social and political relations) with the disbelievers. Hence, if Islamic authority is enforced, the flag of Islam is raised and the Shariah courts are established, then according to the way of the righteously guided Caliphate and the Islamic Government, the Muslims are not to seek help from the disbelievers; and neither are they allowed to give the disbelievers any share in politics; they are to refrain as much as possible to involve them in any socio-economic-political action. This is because this apparent association with the disbelievers may lead to that same affection or love for them (which is forbidden) (*Azan*, Issue 2: 47).

The theme of the discriminatory action against the 'other' runs through the text. In the *ideological mindset,* the binary division of the world is just a first step; decisive action must follow to prove the ideological claims to be the right claims. The above mentioned textual expression gives a glimpse of an ideological world they want the discursive *character* to believe in. The action of disavowal in the textual construct, like the previously explained action of *violence*, draws its legitimacy from the past action, i.e. in the governance model of the righteous caliphs. It suggests that a perpetual action is mandatory for the *character* so that the *ideological mindset* can be implemented in its entirety. Non-believers must be excluded from all "socio-economic-political action". AQ builds the argument on the understanding that "[t]his is because this apparent association with the disbelievers may lead to that same affection or love for them (which is forbidden)" (*Azan*, Issue 2: 47). The organisation communicates to the *character* that "[y]our word is different from theirs. Your matter is different. You and they are completely separate" (*Azan*, Issue 2: 46). This separation must be cemented by further proactive action. The article further suggests:

After removing all the relations of the heart and body, the Shariah took another step forward and proclaimed that the relation of the

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lovers of Allah (meaning Muslims) with the enemies of Allah is one of enmity and hatred (*Azan*, Issue 2: 48).

Like the theme of perpetual *violence*, AQ also constructs the theme of perpetual enmity and hatred. The *character* is required to sever all the relationships from the 'other'. The *character* should follow enmity and hatred of the 'other' as the guiding principles of action. IS articulates reasons for such an action in the following text.

> We hate you because your secular, liberal societies permit the very things that Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He has permitted, a matter that doesn't concern you because your Christian disbelief and paganism separate between religion and state, thereby granting supreme authority to your whims and desires via the legislators you vote into power. In doing so, you desire to rob Allah of His right to be obeyed and you wish to usurp that right for yourselves. "Legislation is not but for Allah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 32).

As the ideological action and *violence* are aimed at refabricating the world as per the Islamist imagined glorious past, all innovation, therefore, must be rejected. Innovation is linked to thinking. The *ideological mindset* is not comfortable with the human faculty of thinking. The Islamist organisations construct such a *character* who thinks that Divine Law should be applied directly to humans without taking into account the human condition. All flexibility that humanmade laws afford to fellow beings through legislation is rejected. Such an activity "rob[s] Allah of His right to be obeyed" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 32). All the influence of the humanmade laws should be fought against and disowned. IS displays their resolve for this resistance in the following text.

> Your secular liberalism has led you to tolerate and even support "gay rights," to allow alcohol, drugs, fornication, gambling, and usury to become widespread, and to encourage the people to mock those who denounce these filthy sins and vices. As such, we wage war against you to stop you from spreading your disbelief and debauchery – your secularism and nationalism, your perverted liberal values, your

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Christianity and atheism – and all the depravity and corruption they entail. You've made it your mission to "liberate" Muslim societies; we've made it our mission to fight off your influence and protect humanity from your misguided concepts and your deviant way of life (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 32).

IS purports that it is mandatory for the *character* to disown and fight against the Western civilisation and all the values it stands for. In the Islamist organisations' discursive practices, this struggle is not optional but mandatory.

6.9   The Mandatory Nature of the Violent Action

In the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, violent action is mandatory for every ideologue so that all hindrance is removed, and the Divine Law can take its course. The mandatory nature of violent action is well settled in the *ideological mindset*. AQ-affiliated terrorists show their surprise that "[e]ven today, many Muslims mistakenly believe that they are absolved of the duty of Jihad because that is the job of the Army and the police! We seek refuge with Allah [from such thinking]" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 15). AQ emphasises the mandatory nature of the violent action to the extent that it equates it with other religiously sanctioned acts of worship. They emphasise that

> Jihad is an obligation upon all, just like the prayer and the fast! Allah Says: "Jihad is ordained for you (Muslims) though you dislike it, and it may be that you dislike a thing which is good for you and that you like a thing which is bad for you. Allah Knows but you do not know." [2:216] (*Azan*, Issue 3:19).

TT also endorses the same theme in their texts in the TT published Urdu Magazine *Shariat* as follows.

ترجمہ: اور تم پر جنگ {جہاد} فرض کیا گیا ہے اور حال یہ ہے کہ یہ جنگ تمہیں ناگوار لگتی ہے اور جو بات تمہیں ناگوار لگے شاید اسی میں تمہاری بھلائی ہو اور جو بات تمہیں اچھی لگے شاید اس میں تیرے لئے فساد ہو، اور اللہ عالم ہے {تیری بھلائی کے بارے میں} اور تم نہیں جانتے {اپنی بھلائی کے بارے میں}۔

[*Translation by the author*] Jihad is ordained for you, while the situation is that you dislike war. It is possible that something you dislike might be good for you and something you like might prove bad for you. God is all-wise (about your welfare), and you lack in the knowledge (about your welfare) (*Shariat*, Issue 33:29).

All three Islamist organisations advocate action and *violence* as a normal way of practising the *ideology* (or religion) in their texts. They think the Divine Law makes it mandatory for them to practice *violence* or Jihad in their routine lived lives. This normalisation of *violence* is the distinguishing feature of ideological *violence*. IS re-emphasises that it is "amongst the major sins that many parents order their children with the abandonment of the fard 'ayn jihād [obligatory fighting—*by the author*]" (*Dabiq*, Issue 10:15). For them, the violent action is like "the prayer and the fast" (*Dabiq*, Issue 10: 16). AQ endorses this mandatory nature of *violence* and decrees that "[t]he scholars of the Ummah have a consensus that under a situation such as ours today, it becomes *Fardh Ayn* [obligatory—*by the author*] upon every Muslim to wage Jihad" (*Azan*, Issue 3: 7). AQ explains,

[i]f the enemy attacks a Muslim border or enters any Islamic land, then as we mentioned before, Jihad becomes *Fard 'Ayn* upon the entire population of the country and all around it. In this situation, permission is not required. There is no permission for anyone from the other; even the child goes out without the permission of his

parents, the wife without the permission of her husband, and the debtor without the permission of his creditor" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 28).

The organisation promotes the theme that in certain circumstances, violent action becomes an individual obligation. In such situations, the *character* is encouraged to disregard all traditions, norms and laws of society and engage in the violent action at all cost. TT follows IS and AQ in emphasising and taking pride in the violent action. TT sensitises the *character* to remain on guard as the 'other' is conspiring to distract 'us' from our real spirit of Jihad. A text in the TT published Urdu Magazine *Shariat* reads,

جہاد جو ہمارا ایک دینی اور روایتی اصل اور بنیاد ہے۔ جارح قوتوں کے خلاف پہلے ہمارے آباواجداد اور اب ہم نے اسے مضبوط اسلحے کے طور پر اسے استعمال کیا مگر بدقسمتی سے دشمن نے اس کا نام دہشت گردی رکھ دیا۔ اور اب ہمارے تعلیمی نصاب سے بھی وہ آیتیں نکال دی ہیں جن میں جہاد کی ترغیب دی گئی تھی۔ اور ایسی کوشش بھی جاری ہے کہ جارحیت پسند اور ان کے غلام افغانوں سے ان کے اسلاف کی کارنامے اور تاریخ بھلا دیں۔ جس کی وجہ سے آئندہ نسلوں سے جہاد کا نام اور اپنے وطن اور سرزمین کی دفاع کا تصور کمزور یا بالکل ختم ہو جائے۔ جارحیت پسند جانتے ہیں کہ افغانستان جیسے ایک

[*Translation by the author*] The Jihad is our fundamental religious and traditional base. Initially, our forefathers and then we employed it as a weapon of strength against the aggressor, but now, unfortunately, the enemy labelled it terrorism. Now our syllabus has been cleaned off the verses, which persuaded for Jihad. Even such efforts are underway, which will obliterate the history from the glorious actions of our forefathers. Due to this effort, the future

generations will either have a very weak understanding or forget Jihad and defence of their motherland (*Shariat*, Issue 38: 27).

The theme of a violent action named as Jihad is central to the Islamist organisations' discursive practices. A perpetual violent action is mandatory to advance ideological aims. The organisations think that such *violence* helped the Muslims in the past, and the same shall be the case in the future as well. The Jihad for the TT, as mentioned in the above text, is not only the part of the *ideology* but has acquired the status of a deep-rooted tradition as well.

6.10   Conclusion

In this chapter, I conducted theory-guided thematic analysis of the discursive practices of three Islamist organisations, i.e. AQ, IS and TT as expressed in their texts, to ascertain whether the third element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely 'Violence and the Call for Action' is present in the discursively constructed *character*'s *mindset*, if so, what is the extent and nature of such presence?

I noted that the third element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset* is present in the *mindset* of the discursively constructed *character*. I argued that Islamist organisations think that the world is divided into two parts, Dar-al-harab and Dar-al-Islam. Dar-al-harab includes all lands ruled by Kuffar, and Dar-al-Islam includes all lands ruled by the *Islamic ideologues*. Violence is central in Dar-al-harab. The *character* is supposed to be the law unto themselves in Dar-al-harab. The Islamist organisations skilfully employ certain metaphors as the anchorage of 'pointing', dehumanising and violently eliminating the 'other'. I cited texts to analyse the metaphors of "Dajjal", "Kuffar" and "Taghut". I argued that the metaphors inherently call for violence against the 'other'. In Sections 6.5 and 6.6, I analysed and discussed the textual constructions to note that Islamists assert that Jihad is mandatory. Additionally, it is endless and can be waged as a permanent feature of the *ideological mindset*. It is legitimate to use violence to unmask Western hypocrisy. A character that is unable to be violent should resort to the actions of disavowal. I cited and analysed the examples of the actions of disavowal.

The *violence* and action are not optional for the constructed *character* but are mandatory. The *character* is supposed to actively seek and take action all the times against the 'other'. The *ideology* had already defined the categories of the 'other'. The ideological 'other' is not subjective but an 'Objective Enemy'. It is the *ideology* that has identified certain people as enemies. The next chapter shall analyse the conceptualisation of the 'Objective Enemy' as an essential element of a *character's mindset,* which thinks in terms of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*.

Chapter 7: The Objective Enemy

7.1   Introduction

In this chapter, I analyse the texts published by Islamists in the magazines to detect the themes of the fourth element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely 'The Objective Enemy'. The aim is to detect and analyse those ideas that the three Islamist organisations use to construct the *mindset* of the abstract, discursively constructed *character*; whom I call the *Islamic ideologue*. The construction of an ideal type is grounded theoretically in the method developed by Sigwart from Arendt, namely "characterology". I employ a thematic analysis technique to work on the texts to detect the themes/subthemes employed by Islamists to construct their ideal type of *character*. I read Islamist texts and Arendtian theorisation on the fourth element of the *ideological mindset* in order to generate subthemes that form the paragraph headings. In this chapter, I analyse the presence of the chapter theme, i.e. the *objective enemy,* as the fourth element of Arendtian *ideological mindset* through six sub-themes.

The Arendtian *ideological mindset* is set into motion by the acceptance of the first premise of *ideology*, i.e. the superhuman source as the origin of thought. The logicality of the *ideological mindset* prompts the ideologue to act in sync with the superhuman sourced eternal law and dominate the world for its re-formation through ideological violence. The *ideology* has already ordained the elimination of certain people who are suspected of opposing the operation of eternal laws. These people gain the status of an *objective enemy*, as this status is independent of subjective behaviour of the nominated people. In eliminating the *objective enemy*, the ideologues do not experience any sense of guilt or remorse as they are following eternal law that decides which people are to play the role of the executioner, and which people should act as the victim. In rest of the chapter, I analyse the theme of *objective enemy* through six subthemes, namely: Insulation from personal experience; the centrality of hate in the construction of *objective enemy*; the *ideology* defined enemy; *ideology* deciding all relationships —

"Wala" and "Bara"; eternal conflict; and the *objective enemy* is independent of subjective behaviour.

7.2   Insulation from Personal Experience

The *ideological mindset* does not conceive an enemy based on some personal experience. Ideological radicalisation rewrites the memory of a *mindset*. It obliterates all ideas and experiences that are inconsistent with *ideology* and insulates the mind from personal experience. It is akin to a new birth of the *mindset* with a clear, unambiguous and consistent script sourced to a Divine Law. The idea of a new birth of the *mindset* is important, as it can guide the deradicalisation efforts as well. A revival of personal experience may hold a key in deradicalising an ideologically radicalised *character*. Arendt rightly concludes in *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958) by emphasising that "the beginning is the promise, the only 'message' which the end can ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man's freedom" (Arendt, 1958: 479).

In the texts, Islamists are aware of the importance of personal experience and its connection with the development of a *mindset*. Personal experience is central to the subjective understanding of a condition. The *ideological mindset* rejects the subjective nature of human experience. It pretends to deal objectively with eternal laws, i.e. laws of nature, history and God. Islamists are particular in insulating the personal experience of the constructed *character* from the potential enemy. AQ advises the potential recruits that the best course of action is to emigrate from the lands of "Kuffar" but "[i]f you fail to emigrate, then at least boycott the disbelievers" (*Inspire*, Issue 1: 17). The theme of disavowal is a particular attempt aimed at insulating the *character* from any personal experience arising out of a relationship with an enemy. AQ narrates seven levels of disavowal, which are designed to insulate the *character* from any personal experience with the enemy. These are:

1.   Cutting relations of the heart with them
2.   Verbally proclaiming hatred and disavowal
3.   Refraining from imitating them in all aspects
4.   Completely cutting off any social relation(s) with them

5.   Refraining from mixing with them

6.   Opposing their desires

7.   Fighting Jihad against them (*Azan*, Issue 2: 45)

The central theme in all the seven actions mentioned above aims at insulating the personal experience from the *objective enemy*. The *ideological mindset* is very particular about ideological consistency. That is why it advises "cutting relations of the heart with them" as a first step so that a new *mindset* is developed. It is akin to having a new birth. All actions of disavowal must flow from a new *mindset*. The discursive *character* is not supposed to have duality in their *mindset*; their *mindset* and actions must be clear from any ambiguity. Islamists construct disavowal to materialise at three levels. At the first level, the *character* should reconstruct the *mindset* through *ideology* by following action number 1 and 6. At the second level, the *character* should take passive actions as listed from number 2 to 5. Finally, at the third level, i.e. action number 7, the enemy must be eliminated.

IS agrees with AQ in the actions of disavowal; however, IS takes it to another level and insists that "the issue [of disavowal] went so far for some Sahaba [the companions of the Prophet] that specific promise would be made to Allah to not even touch a mushrik (*Rumiyah*, Issue 7: 28). Further, "spilling the blood of the mushrikin is the greatest form of disavowal" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 7: 28). The Islamists take the idea of the insulation from the personal experience very seriously and refer to Islamic political history, where "disavowal of the mushrikin was no longer counted to be merely declaring enmity to them and dispraising them. Rather, waging Jihad against them and fighting them until they surrender to the command of Allah was added to it (*Rumiyah*, Issue 7: 27). IS, therefore, constructs the characteristics of an ideal type of the *Islamic ideologue* as follows.

> The Dunya and its adornments could not tempt him. Scholastic degrees and their deception could not confine him. Neither a spouse, nor wealth, nor children could entice him away from his religion. Rather, he cast all of that behind him when he understood tawhid and knew that Jihad in

Allah's cause is the best proof of his allegiance to the Muslims and his disavowal of the mushrikin, amongst whom he was born, raised as a child, and entered into man-hood (*Rumiyah*, Issue 8: 41).

All the seven actions mentioned in the previous paragraphs that govern the relationships between the *Islamic ideologue*s and the *objective enemy* do not include any material considerations as the basis of the relationship. So, then what is the central principle(s) that govern the relationship with the *objective enemy*? It is hating. I note that Islamists construct hate as the central emotion governing all the relationships with the *objective enemy*.

7.3   The Centrality of Hate in the Construction of the Objective Enemy

The discursive *character* is supposed to hate everything related to the enemy. The texts in the magazines advise the *character* not to keep hatred in the heart but display its presence through empirical actions as well. Hate should not be confused with the act of disliking. The emotion of disliking may suggest some discontinuity with the object of disliking. This discontinuity is a space available to the victim where they may escape. On the contrary, hate establishes a continuous and strong bond without any space between the executioner and the victim. The Arendtian *ideological mindset* does not envisage any space for any human innovation. Divine Law must operate as per the will of the superhuman source equally for the executioner and the victim. IS, in the following text, admonishes the followers to avoid soft political statements against the enemy and display animosity towards 'them'.

> [F]ight the kuffār wherever they may be found, show animosity towards all of them, and do not incline towards them using elusive statements or those whose words carry false meanings based upon modern day political concepts. The religion of an individual Muslim is not upright – even if he worships Allah and abandons shirk – until he shows animosity towards the mushrikīn and proclaims his animosity and hatred towards them, how could it be permissible for a party with power

and influence to become feeble in practising this great rite at least in its political messages (*Dabiq*, Issue 10:20).

IS constructs the theme in the text mentioned above that hate is a "great rite", which must be practised even when the political situation suggests otherwise. IS is not ready to permit the usage of diplomatic language that does not carry the message of hate towards the 'other'. It appears from the texts that the sentiment of hate must continue even if the enemy is ready to perform all the empirical actions that are expected out of 'them'. The sentiment of hate is so central to the *ideological mindset* that the corresponding sentiment of mercy is completely missing from it. I have not come across a text in my reading of the magazines that may incite the sentiment of mercy towards the *objective enemy*. In certain instances where a quoted Quranic text suggests an exception to the general rule of hate against the enemy, Islamists interpret it in a manner that the element of hate retains its grip over the discourse. For example, IS interprets an exception to a rule in the following text.

> Ash-Shafi'i said, "And the Kafir's blood is not spared until he becomes a Muslim" (Al-Umm). Mentioning the exception of killing women and children, he also said, "And the reason for the prohibition of shedding Muslim blood being different from the prohibition of shedding the Kafir child's and Kafir woman's blood is that they are not to be killed due to specific revelation restricting this killing (while the initial ruling allows shedding Kafir blood in general). And our opinion regarding this –and Allah knows best – is that the restriction exists so that they can become slaves, which is more beneficial than killing them, and killing them does not harm the enemy; so making them slaves is more optimal than killing them" (Al-Umm) (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1: 35).

IS, in the following text, emphasises the centrality of the sentiment of hate as the principal of the relationship with the enemy.

> What's important to understand here is that although some might argue that your foreign policies are the extent of what drives our hatred, this particular reason for hating you is secondary, hence the reason we

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addressed it at the end of the above list. The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue to hate you because our primary reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you embrace Islam. Even if you were to pay jizyah and live under the authority of Islam in humiliation, we would continue to hate you. No doubt, we would stop fighting you then as we would stop fighting any disbelievers who enter into a covenant with us, but we would not stop hating you (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 33).

The text emphasises the theme that it is the *ideology* (Islam) that is the fundamental reason that the Islamists hate the 'other'. Subjective behaviour has no role in the objective nature of the status of the enemy. AQ in an Urdu text narrates that the nature of enmity is ideological and shall not cease until and unless one *ideology* dominates the other.

"اور یہ (کافر) لوگ ہمیشہ تم سے لڑتے رہیں گے یہاں تک کہ اگر مقدور رکھیں تو تمہیں تمہارے دین سے مرتد کر دیں"۔

[*Translation by the author*] And these Kafir people shall fight you forever, and if they prevail upon you, they will turn you away from your religion (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 24).

IS further explains that "[w]e hate you, first and foremost, because you are disbelievers; you reject the oneness of Allah – whether you realize it or not (…)It is for this reason that we were commanded to openly declare our hatred for you and our enmity towards you" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 31). The Islamists' constructed sentiment of hate is not a spontaneous emotion that springs from an adverse human experience; it is well planned and objective. IS further elaborates,

The gist of the matter is that there is indeed a rhyme to our terrorism, warfare, ruthlessness, and brutality. As much as some liberal journalist would like you to believe that we do what we do because we're simply

monsters with no logic behind our course of action, the fact is that we continue to wage – and escalate – a calculated war that the West thought it had ended several years ago (…) So you can continue to believe that those "despicable terrorists" hate you because of your lattes and your Timberlands, and continue spending ridiculous amounts of money to try to prevail in an unwinnable war, or you can accept reality and recognize that we will never stop hating you until you embrace Islam (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 33).

The theme in the above mentioned IS construction resonates with the Arendtian *ideological mindset* that has a pattern of actions, which are dictated by and are consistent with *ideology*. The *ideology* defined enemy is an *objective enemy,* and the ideologues shall continue to fight against it until and unless it accepts the *ideology*. IS further constructs that "we have been commanded to fight the disbelievers until they submit to the authority of Islam, either by becoming Muslims, or by paying jizyah – for those afforded this option – and living in humiliation under the rule of the Muslims" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 31). The Islamists not only themselves use hateful metaphors in the texts, but they think that enemy is also using the same metaphors against 'us'.

مذہب اور جنگ کا یہ باہمی تعلق امریکی شعور میں جس گہرائی تک پیوست ہے اس کا نمایاں ترین مظہر وہ اصطلاحات ہیں جو اہلِ مغرب اس جنگ کے دوران میں استعمال کر رہے ہیں۔ اس جنگ کے بارے میں دیگر جتنے بھی الفاظ برتے جا رہے ہیں وہ سب صلیبی لٹریچر کا حصّہ ہیں مثلاً بدی سے مقابلہ، عدلِ مطلق، خیر و شر کی جنگ وغیرہ وغیرہ۔ ان اصطلاحات میں بدی اور شر کہہ کر مسلمان مراد لیے گئے۔

[*Translation by the author*] The fact of using certain metaphors related to war and religion by Americans can indicate how ingrained the relationship of war and religion is in the American consciousness. All the words which are being to describe this war are part of the Crusade literature. For example, fighting evil, absolute justice, a war between good and evil etc. in these terms, Muslims are being referred to as evil and false (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 17).

The Islamists not only construct hate as the central principle of the relationship with the *objective enemy*, but they also believe that the enemy is also following the same principle. For example, AQ, in a text in the *Inspire* Magazine, explains that the enemy hates them because Islamists follow the principle of the ideological relationship with 'them'.

> Thus, whoever declares *walâ'* and *barâ'ah* and abandons softening up before them, will be hated excessively. And it is not far from mentioning that defaming and misrepresenting al Qaeda in the media, which belongs to the Jews, Christians and *munâfiqîn*, is an obvious proof [of their hate] for you to observe (*Inspire*, Issue 8:50).

AQ constructs the theme in the texts that "[t]he Jews, Christians and Munâfiqîn hate and detest them [AQ] the most out of all" the enemy groups" (*Inspire*, Issue 8:50). In another rhetorical construction, AQ elaborates the theme of hate as the principle of the relationship between 'us' and 'them'.

> O, the legislations' slaves and the constitutions' slaves. O, the people of the UN and the new world order. O, people of the false religions of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism etc. O, the people of the new religions of Democracy, secularism and nationalism. O, Armies and Police of the Pharaoh. We leave you and your religion. We disbelieve in you and in your polytheistic constitution and your pagan councils and your UN's. And we have enmity and hate towards you! Unless you believe in ALLAH alone! And accept His Law with full submission (*Azan*, Issue 3:18).

Islamists, in their texts, mention an enemy that is constructed by the *ideology*.

7.4   The Ideologically Defined Enemy

The Arendtian *ideological mindset* has an enemy that is determined and defined by the *ideology*. The *character* is supposed to locate, pursue, hate and eliminate the ideologically defined enemy. IS explains, "[w]e perform jihād so that Allah's word becomes supreme and the religion becomes completely for Allah. Everyone who

opposes this goal or stands in the path of this goal is an enemy to us and a target for our swords, whatever his name may be and whatever his lineage may be. We have a religion that Allah revealed to be a scale and a judge" (*Dabiq*, Issue. 15:20). Islamists identify four types of enemies in their texts, which are determined by the *ideology*. Virtually everyone who does not subscribe to the Islamist *ideology* is an enemy. The first types are Jews and Christians. AQ articulates that "[m]any of the people of the Scripture wish they could turn you back to disbelief after you have believed, out of envy from themselves [even] after the truth has become clear to them [2:109]" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 22). In the following Urdu texts, AQ mentions the first types of enemies.

ہم جانتے ہیں کہ اسلام کے خلاف یہود کی عداوت شدید ترین ہے، اللہ تعالی کا ارشاد ﴿ لَتَــجِــدَنَّ اَشَــدَّ النَّــاسِ عَــدَاوَةً لِّلَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوا الْيَهُوْدَ وَ الَّذِيْنَ اَشْرَكُوْا ....﴾ "یقیناً آپ ایمان والوں کا سب سے زیادہ دشمن یہودیوں اور مشرکوں کو پائیں گے"۔

[*Translation by the author*] We know that Jews are the most severe in their enmity towards Islam. Allah says, "verily, you shall find Jews and idolaters as the worst of the enemies of the believers" (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 20).

اہلِ کتاب سے ہماری جنگوں کی تاریخ یہ بتلاتی ہے کہ ہماری اکثر جنگیں نصاریٰ کے خلاف تھیں۔ جنگِ خلیج کے دوران میں بعض مورخین کی تحقیق اخبارات میں شائع ہوئی کہ گزشتہ ۱۴۱۰ سالوں میں مسلمانوں اور رومیوں میں ہونے والی جنگوں کی کل تعداد ۳۶۰۰ ہے۔ در حقیقت ایک مختصر مدت کے سوا ہر دور ہی میں ہماری ان سے آویزش رہی ہے جب کہ گزشتہ چودہ صدیوں میں یہود کے خلاف براہِ راست معرکہ آرائی، دورِ نبوی کے بعد اب جا کر فلسطین میں یہودی قبضے کے بعد ہوئی۔ لیکن نصاریٰ کے ساتھ ہماری جنگ آج تک جاری ہے اور احادیثِ مبارکہ سے پتہ چلتا ہے کہ ان کے اور ہمارے مابین یہ جنگیں قیامت تک رہیں گی۔

[*Translation by the author*] Our history of wars with people of the book

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indicates that most of our wars were waged against Christians. During the gulf war, newspapers published research of certain historians. The research mentioned that during the last fourteen hundred and ten years, Muslims and Romans fought three thousand and six hundred wars. In fact, barring a short period, we remained in conflict. Whereas in the last fourteen centuries, we fought only twice directly with Jews; the first time during the time of the Prophet and second time now after the capture of Palestine by Jews. However, against Christians, we are in a continuous fight, and the sayings of the Prophet informed us that it should continue until the end of time (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 21).

AQ also translates from the Quran to support their construction.

﴿ يَأَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ امَنُوْا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْيَهُودَ وَ النَّصٰرٰى اَوْلِيَآءَ بَعْضُهُمْ اَوْلِيَآءُ بَعْضٍ ﴾

"اے ایمان والو! یہود اور نصاریٰ کو دوست نہ بناؤ یہ آپس میں ایک دوسرے کے دوست ہیں"۔

[*Translation by the author*] O believers, do not make friends from Jews and Christians, as they are friends to each other (*Hitteen*, Issue 1:21).

They translate another verse from the Quran as follows.

"جنگ کرو اہلِ کتاب میں سے ان لوگوں سے جو اللہ پر ایمان نہیں لاتے اور نہ روزِ آخرت پر (یقین رکھتے ہیں) اور نہ اُن چیزوں کو حرام سمجھتے ہیں جو اللہ اور اُس کے رسول نے حرام کی ہیں، اور نہ دینِ حق کو قبول کرتے ہیں، (اُن سے لڑو) یہاں تک کہ وہ ذلیل ہو کر اپنے ہاتھ سے جزیہ دیں"۔

[*Translation by the author*] Fight against those people among the people of the book who, who do not believe in Allah and the last day, and do not forbid which Allah and the Prophet have forbidden, and do not accept the true religion. (Fight against them) until they pay war money in all humility (*Hitteen*, Issue 1:26).

AQ quotes another Hades [sayings of the Prophet] as follows.

"بعثت بين يدي الساعة بالسيف و جعل رزقي تحت ظل رمحي"

"مجھے قیامت سے پہلے تلوار دے کر مبعوث کیا گیا ہے اور میرا رزق میرے نیزے کے سائے
کے نیچے رکھا گیا ہے"۔ (بخاری: ج۱، ص۴۰۸؛ مسند احمد: ج۲، ص۵۰)

[*Translation by the author*] I have been appointed before the hour with a sword, and my livelihood has been placed under a spear (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 30).

TT also constructs the same *mindset* as the other two organisations. Although they are less theoretical and more focused on the actual battle against the American led coalition forces.

کے علاوہ دشمنوں کی بھی گردنیں احتراماً جھک جاتی ہیں۔ سلطان صلاح الدین ایوبی
رحمہ اللہ نے ایک موقع پر فرمایا تھا: "میں اس بات کو نہیں جانتا کہ اسلام تلوار کے
ذریعے پھیلا ہے یا اخلاق کے واسطے سے، لیکن میں اس بات کو اچھی طرح سمجھتا ہوں
کہ اسلام کی حفاظت تلوار کے بغیر نہیں ہو سکتی!"

[*Translated by the author*] Salahuddin Ayyubid once said, "I do not know whether Islam spread through sword or morals, but I know it well that without a sword Islam cannot be protected" (*Shariat*, Issue 40:31).

The second type of *objective enemies* comprises of mushrikin [idolaters] and disbelievers. AQ quotes the Quran to pronounce that "verily, the disbelievers are ever unto you open enemies [4:101]" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 22). AQ, in the following text, lays the basis of the relationship, i.e. enmity, between Muslims and mushrikin.

[I]t is sufficient for a Muslim to know that Allah made duty upon him to take the mushrikin as enemies and to not take them as awliya, and He

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made it obligatory to love the believers and to take them as awliya. He made this an essential of iman, just as He negated the iman of whoever shows love to those who oppose Allah and His Messenger, eve fathers, sons, brothers, or tribesmen (*Rumiyah*, Issue 2: 5).

TT articulates the objective nature of the battle between the forces of Satan and truth in Afghanistan.

یہ ایک حقیقت ہے کہ شیطان کالشکر ہمیشہ حق کے خلاف بر سر پیکار رہا ہے۔ آج امارت اسلامیہ کے خلاف بھی کفار کے چالیس سے زیادہ ممالک کھڑے ہیں، جو حق اور باطل کی اس جنگ میں مجاہدین کے لیے ایک بڑا چیلنج ہے، جسے مجاہدین ایک بہترین مدبر قیادت کی رہنمائی میں قبول کیے ہوئے ہیں۔

[*Translated by the author*] It is the fact that the forces of Satan had always been fighting against the people of truth. Today more than forty countries are fighting against the Islamic government, which is a great challenge for Mujahideen in this battle of truth and falsehood (*Shariat*, Issue 57: 17).

IS further articulates the second type of the *objective enemy* in the following text.

Thus, anyone who is neither a Muslim nor a dhimmi Kafir, while still a tyrant against himself, deserving both hatred and humiliation, is a hostile tyrant deserving aggression. This is because shirk itself is dhulm (tyranny). And although the people of dhimmah are mushrikin from the People of the Book, their shirk is subjugated and humiliated under the Shari'ah of Allah enforced upon them. So, the duty to fight the tyrants – the mushrikin – is clear and established. But Allah did not only command the "fighting" of disbelievers, as if to say He only wants us to conduct frontline operations against them. Rather, He has also

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ordered that they may be killed on or off the battlefield (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1: 34-35).

The third type of enemy is the modern institutions and the ideas attached to such institutions. AQ states that it "is apparent from the goals and operations of their international 'New World Order' in which the United Nations plays the supreme role" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 22). The *ideology* has also identified 'their' aims and objectives against 'us'. "They want to fulfil the plans of their real master - Satan, and to turn the Muslims away from the blessed path of Paradise. Allah says that they 'wish that if they could turn you away as disbelievers'" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 22). TT elaborates in detail the conditions under which Muslims can be declared as objective enemies.

دو حالتوں میں مسلمان کے لیے مسلمان کے خلاف ہتھیار اٹھانا جائز ہے، پہلا یہ کہ کوئی مسلمان کسی کافر فوج میں شمولیت اختیار کرکے یہ کہے کہ میرا تو کام بس جنگ ہی کرنا ہے، سامنے مسلمان ہو یا کافر اسے مارنے میں کسی طرح کا گناہ نہیں سمجھتا۔ یا یہ کہے کہ میں پرائی فوج کا غلام اور نمک خور ہوں، وہ مجھے کسی چیز کا بھی حکم دیں میں پورا کروں گا چاہے کسی مسلمان کو مارنے کا حکم کیوں نہ ہو، مجھے کوئی پرواہ نہیں ہے۔ اس صورت میں باجماع یہ شخص کافر ہے اور اپنے عمل کے ذریعے وہ دائرہ اسلام سے خارج ہو چکے ہیں، وہ کسی طرح ان رعایات کے حق دار نہیں جو حقوق مسلمانوں کے لیے مخصوص ہیں۔

دوسرا یہ کہ جو شخص آپ کی طرح کافر کے ساتھ یکجا اور ہم صف ہو کر ان کی کامیابی کے لیے طالبان یا اسلامی حکومت کے خلاف لڑتے ہیں، یہ صورت کفر کی انتہائی صورت ہے جس سے آگے کفر کی کوئی اور صورت ہو ہی نہیں سکتی۔

[*Translation by the author*] Under two conditions, a Muslim can fight a Muslim. Firstly, if a Muslim joins a non-Muslim military and says that it is my duty to fight, and I do not consider it consider it a sin to kill the opponent, Muslim or Kafir alike. Alternatively, he pronounces that I am paid by them so I obey their orders and can kill a Muslim if I am asked to do so. In this situation, such a person is a Kafir and out of the pale of Islam due to his action; he is not entitled to the concessions which are otherwise specific to Muslims. Secondly, the person who fights well organised as you [Islamists] fight for the success [of the enemy] against

the Taliban or an Islamic government. This is the worst type of disbelief, and no other type is severer than this one (*Shariat*, Issue 63:36).

The fourth type of *objective enemies* are the Muslims who do not follow the interpretations of Islamists, which I call the ideological understanding of Islam. IS constructs this type of enemy as follows.

> "Murtadd Brotherhood" group and its parties, factions, and sister organizations, which have denied tawhid, the Shari'ah, "Wala" and "Bara", and Jihad, and have resisted adhering to these tenets, mocked them, waged war against them, and supported the Crusaders and the tawaghit in waging war against them. Rather, it is obligatory on the Muslim to manifest his disbelief in all of these apostates as much as he is able to, with his pen and tongue, and his sword and spear (*Rumiyah*, Issue 1:6).

AQ, in their Urdu Magazine *Hitteen*, constructs the fourth type of enemy as follows.

پس مجاہدینِ اسلام پر لازم ہے کہ وہ اپنے منہج اور مقاصد کو واضح رکھیں تا کہ جہاد محض مسلم سرزمینوں سے حملہ آور دشمن کو دفع کرنے تک محدود نہ رہے؛ بلکہ یہ جہاد امتِ مسلمہ میں در آنے والے کفریہ عقائد، قدیم و جدید شرکیہ تصورات، مراسمِ عبودیت سے لے کر ایوان ہائے اقتدار تک پھیلی ہوئی مختلف انواعِ کفر، شرکیہ جمہوری نظامِ حکومت، مغربی صہیونی سرمایہ دارانہ نظام، انسانوں کے وضع کردہ جعلی بین الاقوامی قوانین، وطن پرستی کی بنیاد پر قائم ہونے والی مصنوعی سرحدات اور اقوام متحدہ، سلامتی کونسل، آئی ایم ایف، عالمی بینک جیسے اداروں کی شوکت و قوت کے مکمل خاتمے اور اس سب کی جگہ رب کی شریعت کے نفاذ، کلمۂ لا الٰہ الا اللہ کے کامل اظہار، دینِ اسلام کی سربلندی اور خلافت علی منہاج النبوۃ کے قیام تک جاری رہے۔

[*Translation by the author*] Therefore, it is important for Mujahedeen that they keep their objectives clear, so that Jihad should not remain confined to repelling the aggressive enemy from the Muslim lands, rather, this Jihad should be waged against all the ideas that have entered

into Muslims such as non-Islamic beliefs; historical or modern polytheist ideas; different etiquette spread from common human relations to the relations of power; polytheistic democratic system; Western Jewish capitalism; manmade ignorant international laws; superfluous borders enacted on the nation of nationalism; and for complete destruction of UN, Security Council, IMF and World Bank. Jihad should replace all the above with Sharia Law, liberty to pronounce the government of God, the dominance of Islam and establishment of Khilafah on the pattern of prophethood (*Hitteen*, Issue 4:35).

The above mentioned categorisations of the enemies help in conceptualising the idea of the *objective enemy* constructed by Islamists. In their treatment of the enemy, Islamists do not categorise the enemy in such categories and treat all the types equally. The treatment includes, pointing, dehumanising and then eliminating. Equal treatment is premised on the concept that all the enemies have been defined by the *ideology* objectively. Therefore, as the Islamists do not have any control over the nomination of the enemy, they do not enjoy any flexibility in its treatment. An eternal enemy needs an eternal conflict.

7.5   Eternal Conflict

The enemy in the Arendtian theorisation of *ideology* is eternal and objective. Therefore, Islamists domination of the enemy shall lead to two implication; either the enemy shall be refabricated according to the *ideology*, or it shall be eliminated. Arendt emphasises that, if the laws of some superhuman force (History or Nature) have pronounced "inferior races" or "dying classes" to be the objective enemies, "[g]uilt and innocence become senseless notions; "guilty" is he who stands in the way of the natural or historical process which has passed judgement over "inferior races", over individuals "unfit to live", over "dying classes and decadent peoples" (Arendt, 1958: 465). As the enemy constructed by Islamist is eternal, the nature of the conflict is eternal as well. AQ declares that "[i]nflicting terror on the enemies of Allāh moves you closer to Him" (*Inspire*, Issue 12:32). Therefore, if the *character* desires to be closer to Allah, they

shall have to inflict terror on the "enemies of Allah". In the Islamists' perception, seeking nearness to Allah is a hope that shall never end. Hence, the *character* is supposed to nominate new categories of 'them', if, and when the exiting categories of the enemy are eliminated. Such a conceptualisation needs an eternal conflict. AQ constructs the theme of a conflict between the eternal enemies in the following Urdu text.

اسی وجہ سے پوری انسانی تاریخ میں اسلام نے لوگوں کو دو امتوں میں تقسیم کیا ہے۔ ایک امت مسلمانوں کی ہے، یہ وہ لوگ ہیں جو اپنے اپنے زمانوں میں اپنے رسولوں کے تابعدار رہے، یہاں تک کہ آخری پیغمبر صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم تمام لوگوں کے لیے مبعوث ہوئے، اور اب فقط آپؐ کے پیروکاروں کو امتِ مسلمہ کہا جائے گا۔ اور دوسری امتِ کفر ہے جو ہر زمانے میں مختلف شکل وصورت کے بتوں اور طاغوت کے پجاریوں پر مشتمل رہی ہے۔

[*Translation by the author*] That is the reason that historically, Islam has divided humanity into two groups. One group comprise of Muslims; these are the people who obeyed the prophets of the time till the time the last of the prophets, i.e. Muhammad appeared. Now only the people who follow the Prophet Muhammad are called Muslims. The second group consists of non-believers, who appeared in different types every time such as idolaters and worshipers of falsehood (*Hitteen*, Issue 4:89).

The basis of eternal conflict with the eternal enemy is faith (*ideology*). AQ, in the following text, identifies 'our' faith and 'their' sin as the main reason for the eternal conflict.

When will they accept you? Either you abandon your faith, or they abandon their sin, and this won't happen. If they abandon their sin, this means they become Muslims, and the conflict cools down. And if you abandon your Islam, you have committed shirk. So, the conflict continues. So, their sin and our faith is the reason (…)This is because

Allah has set down a rule that does not change, and this rule says: "And the Jews and Christians will never be pleased with you until you follow their way [2:120] (*Azan* Issue 1: 71).

The Islamists, in the text mentioned above, construct the theme of an eternal enemy with eternal conflict. The conflict cannot be managed through any means because ideological laws originate from a superhuman source and never change. IS articulates that even "[a] halt of war between the Muslims and the kuffār can never be permanent, as a war against the kuffār is the default obligation upon the Muslims only to be temporarily halted by the truce for a greater shar'ī interest" (*Dabiq*, Issue 8:67). IS constructs the theme of an eternal conflict in the following text.

Know well that our fight will continue until you are defeated and submit to the rule of your Creator, or until we achieve martyrdom. Allah has made our mission to wage war against disbelief until it ceases to exist, as he has ordered us to kill all pagans wherever they are found. He said, "Then kill the pagans wherever you find them" (At-Tawbah 5) (*Dabiq*, Issue 15: 63).

The Islamists promote the theme in the texts that the idea of an eternal conflict is not constructed by them only, but the enemy also constructs the same idea in its discourse. AQ quotes texts considered as the statements of the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the US President George W Bush, where they construct eternal conflict. AQ published Urdu magazine *Hitteen* articulates the theme in the following text.

جارج بش کے سابق اٹارنی جنرل الیش کرافٹ نے اسلام اور عیسائیت کے تصورِ خدا کا موازنہ کیا اور عیسائیت کے تصورِ خدا کو برتر ثابت کرنے کی کوشش کی۔ اس سے پہلے اٹلی کا وزیرِ اعظم برلسکونی بھی کہہ چکا تھا کہ

''مغربی تہذیب اسلامی تہذیب سے برتر ہے اور اس نے جس طرح کمیونزم کو شکست دی ہے، اسی طرح اسلامی تہذیب کو بھی شکست دے گی''۔

بش نے ایک دوسرے موقعے پر کینیڈین فوجیوں کے اجتماع سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے یہی جملے دہرا کر ثابت کیا کہ وہ اپنے کہے ہوئے حرف حرف پر یقین رکھتا ہے۔ اس نے کہا:

''آئیے اور ہمارے شانہ بشانہ اس صلیبی جنگ میں شامل ہو جائیے''۔

[*Translation by the author*] George Bush's Attorney General Ashcroft compared the idea of God in Islam and Christianity and tried to prove the superiority of the Christian idea of God. Prior to him, the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi had said, "the Christian civilisation is superior to the Islamic civilisation, and the way it defeated Communism it shall defeat Muslim civilisation as well." At another occasion, Bush, while addressing a gathering of Canadian soldiers proved that he believes in every word of the statement by repeating the statement. He said, "come and join us in this war of crusades" (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 14).

Islamists perceive that the enemy fights to gain control of their Islamist *ideology*. They construct every battle that they fight, as the battle of religion. In the following text, AQ highlights the nature of this conflict in their magazine *Hitteen*.

دیں گے۔ بنابریں، اسلام کی نظر میں جنگ ہمیشہ دینی ہی ہوتی ہی ہے اور شریعت ہی اس کی حدود و قیود کا تعین کرتی ہے۔ بعینہ اگر ہمارا دشمن بھی دینی بنیاد پر لڑ رہا ہو تو پھر دونوں ہی فریقوں کے اعتبار سے یہ ایک دینی جنگ کہلائے گی چنانچہ ایسی تمام جنگیں جو یہود و نصاریٰ یا بت پرست مشرکین کے خلاف لڑی گئیں اسی ذیل میں آتی ہیں۔ موجودہ جنگ کا ہدف یہی ہے کہ امت کے ایمان و قوّت کے سرچشموں کو کمزور کر دیا جائے تا کہ سرمایہ دارانہ جمہوریت، لبرل ازم اور سیکولرزم کو امت پر مسلط کیا جا سکے، اسلام بھی نصرانیت کی طرح سرمایہ دارانہ تہذیب کا تابع مہمل بن کر رہ جائے۔ بلا شبہ اہل مغرب کو 'بدھ مت' 'کنفیوشس

[*Translation by the author*] Islam always designate a battle as the battle of religion, fought under the conditions of Sharia Law. Equally, if our enemy is also fighting on the basis of his religion, then it a religious battle from the point of view of both the parties, therefore, all battles which were fought against Jews, Christians and idolaters fall in this category. The objective of the current conflict is to weaken the Ummah's glorious foundational ideas of faith, so that capitalist democracy, liberalism and secularism are applied to Ummah. Islam, like Christianity, should also become insignificant and subservient to the capitalist civilisation (*Hitteen*, Issue1: 15).

TT, in the following text published in the *Shariat* Magazine, dispel an impression that worldly powers assist them, and assert that it is God that is helping them.

یہ لوگ یہ بھی مانتے ہیں کہ طالبان اپنے دشمن کو یہ سمجھا سکتے ہیں کہ ان کے پیچھے انٹیلی جنس قوتیں نہیں بلکہ الٰہی حکمت اور نصرت کا دخل ہے۔ یہ لوگ دشمن کو یقین دلا سکتے ہیں کہ یہ پاکستان، ایران، عرب، روس یا کسی اور ملک کی ٹیکنیک نہیں بلکہ ایمان اور کفر کی جنگ ہے۔

> [*Translation by the author*] These people believe that Taliban (TT) can make their enemy understand that it is God's hand in Taliban's planning and success and that no intelligence agency is supporting them. These people can make the enemy believe that it is not the strategy planted by Pakistan, Iran, Arabia, Russia or any other country, but it is the war between faith and Kuffar (*Shariat*, Issue 63: 33).

The eternity of the conflict with the eternal enemy is permanent. The persecution of declared enemy shall continue even after its elimination from this world, albeit through divine laws. The eternal enemy shall be treated rather more harshly in the eternal life of hereafter than in this world. AQ consoles the ideal types by assuring them that "let not your eyes turn towards those whom the present life deceived and who dawdle away in their disbelief not knowing that an eternal fire awaits them the moment they drop from this world" (*Azan*, Issue 4: 39). The ideas of enmity (or loyalty) are central to the *ideological mindset*. This *mindset* thinks in the binary sense, i.e. you are either with 'us' or with 'them'. AQ, in the following text, askes the ideal types to demonstrate their loyalty through actions.

> In the time of the Messenger of Allah, loyalty to Allah and His Messenger and the believers was by being a soldier of Muhammad's and failing that test was in having loyalty towards the Quraish or the Jews. Today loyalty of Allah and His Messenger and the believers is manifested in defending Islam and the Muslims and failure in that test is having ones loyalty towards America and its allies and the agents of America – the rulers of the Muslim world (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 61-62).

In the pursuit of eternal conflict with the eternal enemy, no rule should pose any hindrance in the elimination of the enemy. Islamists, however, acknowledge that Islamic history does mention certain exceptional circumstances such as contractual obligations, when the life of the enemy may be spared, although on very humiliating terms. Sensing that contractual obligations may hinder their objective treatment to the objective enemy, and may be considered as an opening to sympathetic behaviour,

Islamists encourage abrogation of contracts. IS, in the following text, legitimises abrogation of any contracts made with the enemy.

> The hadith indicates the clear permissibility of spilling their blood and taking their wealth until they accept Islam. This hadith also shows the relationship between fighting and taking wealth, as all *Kuffar* who are not under the contract of dhimmah are enemies from whom ghanimah is taken. Allah said, "Indeed the disbelievers are a clear enemy to you" (An-Nisa 101). He also said, "So consume from what you have taken of ghanimah, as it is halal and good" (Al-Anfal 69). As for those who claim to be bound by contracts which they have made with the *Kuffar*, then they should know that, besides the *Kuffar* of every nation today breaking any possible covenant with the Muslims by waging war with them, imprisoning them, and otherwise transgressing against them, Allah has nullified every contract made with the mushrikin, saying, "Allah and His Messenger convey their disavowal to those of the mushrikin with whom you made covenants" (At-Tawbah 1). He then mentioned the order to kill all those who claim partners for Allah, saying, "So when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikin wherever you find them. Take them, surround them, and sit at every out-post, lying in wait for them" (At-Tawbah 5) (*Rumiyah*, Issue 8: 13).

For Islamists, all the relationships are established through the interpretation of the *ideology*. Personal interest or any other human motive should not be allowed to decide the nature of the relationship with friend and foe. "Wala" and "Bara" is the term used by Islamists to define the ideological relationship with all.

7.6 Ideology Deciding all Relationships — "Wala" and "Bara"

"Wala" and "Bara" is a concept that reveals the nature of ideological relationships. The term is premised on the principle that all human relationships are decided by *ideology*. It is a concept borrowed from Islam's political history. AQ explains: "Al-Walā' is loyalty towards the believers and barā' is a disavowal of the disbelievers. Allah says that every Muslim will be tested for his loyalty" (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 61-62). The

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organisation notes that the "1924[16] was disastrous for the Muslim Ummah and a core degeneration in key Islamic concepts followed. The creeds of "Wala" and "Bara" (Alliance and enmity for the sake of Islam) and Jihad were abandoned, and the Muslims suffered from decline thence on" (*Azan*, Issue 2:37). IS places the concept of "Wala" and "Bara" at the centre in their construction of the *ideological mindset*. At one point the organisation feared that "[t]he sincere mujāhidīn knew all along that it was neither the drones of the crusaders nor their modern high- tech weaponry that could harm them, but it was the gradual and discreet decline of walā' and barā' within the hearts that could deal the greatest injury to the cause of jihād" (*Dabiq*, Issue 12:39). IS follows AQ in the conceptualisation of the concept and constructs that "a Muslim's loyalty is determined, not by his skin colour, his tribal affiliation, or his last name, but by his faith. He loves those whom Allah loves and hates those whom Allah hates. He forges alliances for the cause of Allah and breaks relations for the cause of Allah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:19). In the following text, IS explains the concept and establishes its link with the principle of hate.

> "Islamic" preachers and writers often do so with humanistic undertones that seek to portray Islam as a religion of peace that teaches Muslims to coexist with all. Deluded by the open-ended concept of "tolerance," they cite numerous āyāt and ahādīth that – rightfully so – serve to demonstrate that racial hatred has no place in Islam, but they do so for the purpose of advancing an agenda that attempts to "Islamize" more "liberal" concepts that the kuffār apply across the board for achieving evil, such as political pluralism, freedom of religion, and acceptance of sodomites. In doing so, these "du'āt" seek to encourage the kāfir societies they live in to be more accepting of them, rather than meeting the enmity of the mushrikīn with hatred and disavowal. They forego the concept of walā' and barā' (loyalty and disavowal for the cause of Allah), not bothering to educate their readers of the Muslim's obligation to reject kufr, separate himself from the kuffār, abandon their lands,

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[16] The year 1924 is the year of the demise of Khalafah in Turkey.

harbour enmity and hatred towards them, and wage war against them until they submit to the truth (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:19).

The central theme in the IS published text mentioned above promotes the theme that "Wala" and "Bara" should decide all relationships with the enemy. AQ constructs a similar theme in their Urdu magazine *Hitteen* in the following text.

مسلمانوں کے تعلقات کی بنیاد کلمہ پر ہے نہ کہ وطن پر۔ جب کہ وطن کے بت کا حکم یہ ہے کہ
محبت و نفرت، دوستی و دشمنی اور داخلہ و خارجہ پالیسی کی بنیاد اسی بت کے مفادات کو سامنے رکھ کر
ہونی چاہیے۔ اسلام میں وطن پرستی کی کوئی گنجائش نہیں۔ تمام مسلمان ایک ملت ہیں۔ وطن صرف
ایک پہچان ہے، جس طرح قبیلہ اور نام محض پہچان کے لیے ہوتے ہیں۔ ہمارے محبوب نبی صلی اللہ

[*Translation by the author*] The basis of relationships for Muslims is the declaration of belief in God and not on one's country. While the idol of country orders that love or hate, friendship or enmity and internal or external affairs policy should be based on the interests of this idol. Islam has no place for nationalism. All Muslims are one Ummah. A country is only to allocate an identity, like a name or a tribe (*Hitteen*, Issue 8:169).

The relationships based on the idea of "Wala" and "Bara" do not take into account personal experience but rather the ideological pronouncements. The ideal types are supposed to negate all feelings experienced through personal relationships and generate sentiments of hate and friendship as dictated by the *ideology*. IS, in the following text, takes pride in observing such a relationship.

If one were to have any doubt that this firm bond [of "Wala" and "Bara"] is upheld by the soldiers and leaders of the Islamic State, they could simply look to 1400 Rāfidah massacred by their fellow Iraqis and Arabs (…), or the countless spies dispatched to the Islamic State by the various nations of the world only to be executed by their fellow countrymen. Here in the Islamic State, all affiliations are null and void when they

conflict with one's allegiance to Islam and the Muslims. So, the Syrian mujāhid doesn't hesitate to trample on the Syrian flag, and the American mujāhid doesn't think twice about setting fire to the "star-spangled banner." The muhājirīn and ansār have recognized that their strength is in their unity upon tawhīd, not in any racial affiliations (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:20).

IS, in the above text, constructs a unique idea of a race that transcends all the previous ideas of race. This race is united in enmity and hate towards the *objective enemy*. One way to realise this race is to hate the enemy for the sake of *ideology*. The Islamist organisations encourage the ideal type *character* to commit heinous crimes against their own people so that the *ideology* triumphs. AQ also constructs a similar message and asserts that (an ideological understanding of) Islam "is the kinship between us and the people (…)The American Muslim is our beloved brother, and the kāfir Arab is our despised enemy even if he and we were to have shared the same womb" (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:20). In the Urdu language magazine, *Hitteen*, AQ condemns all relationships (not based on "Wala" and "Bara") as divisive and evil.

پہلے ہمیں قوم پرستی کی کند چھری سے ذبح کیا گیا، پھر ہمیں علاقائی بنیادوں پر تقسیم کیا گیا، پھر قبائلی دعووں نے ہم میں تفریق ڈالی اور یوں ان جاہلی عصبیتوں نے ہمارا خون تک چوس لیا۔

> [*Translation by the author*] Initially we were badly butchered through nationalism; then we were divided based on geography; then tribal claims divided us; this way these pejorative loyalties sucked every drop of blood from our bodies (*Hitteen*, Issue 1:52).

IS admonishes their fellow Muslims for violating the ideological principle of loyalty and enmity. They highlight that certain Muslim societies do not adhere to this principle and complain that "[t]he Arab Iraqi Christian is their brother who has all rights whereas the Indian or Turkish Muslim has no rights" (*Dabiq*, Issue 8: 8). AQ takes it to further extreme and delegitimises all established rights of the native people, and decrees that "Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah's. The

state is a state for all Muslims. The land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims" (*Dabiq*, Issue 11:20). The term 'wala' is not used only for loyalty to Islamists but is also used for anyone who feels any sympathy towards the enemy. Anyone harbouring sympathy towards the objective enemy is considered practising 'wala' towards 'them' and, therefore, considered one of 'them'. IS, in the following text, forewarns Muslims to avoid such gestures.

> Wala and bara are two of the principles of Islam according to ijma' (consensus), and they are from the testimony of "La ilaha illallah." A Muslim is not called a Muslim until he disavows kufr and its people, even if they are his closest relatives (…) So know that having wala for the *Kuffar* is not only through aiding them and supporting them against the Muslims. Rather, simply harbouring love and affection for them and approving of them are examples of wala (*Rumiyah*, Issue 6:22).

IS imagines that the West is working against the concept of "Wala" and "Bara" through a well-planned system of education that dissuades the younger Muslim generation from "a fundamental cornerstone of Islam". They argue:

> Children attending the schools of the kuffār are first introduced to the kufrī concept of nationalism, whereby they are required to stand for the national anthem, and in places such as America, pledge allegiance to some national symbol such as the flag, or recite nationalistic slogans, or pledge allegiance to a tāghūt king or president, as is the case with the lands ruled by murtadd nationalist tawāghīt. The point is to indoctrinate them into the system as early as possible by beating into their heads that their loyalty, first and foremost, is to the nation or to their race, not to the people of Islam, not to their religion, not even to Allah! This runs contrary to walā' and barā', a fundamental cornerstone of Islam (*Dabiq*, Issue 12: 34).

IS appears to be very sensitive to the theme of "Wala" and "Bara" and notes that "[a]fter initiating the destruction of their walā' and barā', the schools of kufr then introduce children to their open-ended concept of 'tolerance' beginning at a young age. They

teach them to tolerate and respect other religions" (*Dabiq*, Issue 12:34). Rejection and hatred of everything that is associated with the *objective enemy* are built into the idea of "Wala" and "Bara". IS states that taking part in the "Kuffar" festivals such as "Christmas, Halloween, and Easter (…)dress up, paint their faces, sing songs, attend parties, exchange gifts, and take part in school plays held for these various occasions" (*Dabiq*, Issue: 12 34) are all against the idea of "Wala" and "Bara". AQ agrees with the IS constructed *mindset* on "Wala" and "Bara". They criticise the Western efforts of weakening "Wala" and "Bara" through the education system. "Instead of the core creed of "Wala" and "Bara" (i.e. a Muslim is an ally to his Muslim and an enemy to the Kafir), the new education system preached the lie of the philosophers: 'All human beings are equal regardless of religion; friendship and enmity on the basis of religion is a thing of the past'"(*Azan*, Issue 2:40). AQ links their understanding of the term to the Quran. They translate from the Quran as saying, "[w]hat is the matter with you? How judge you? Or have you a Book through which you learn? That you shall have all that you choose? [68:5-38]" (*Azan*, Issue 2:40). AQ suggests a different education system for Muslim children with its focus on the *objective enemy*, namely Western civilisation.

> The reality is that there needs to be a completely new education system… a system that recognizes the core creed of *Tawheed* (monotheism), *'wala and bara'* (Alliance and enmity upon belief in Allah, his Prophet and his religion)*, Ihsan/Tazkiya* (Spirituality) and *Jihad*– the four absent avenues in the world of today that work against the new world order and actualize the dynamic reality of Islam. The system must be free from any and all association to Western civilization. Rather, it should consider it as a firm enemy (*Azan*, Issue 2: 41).

The theme of "Wala" and "Bara" is central to the *ideological mindset* constructed by the three Islamist organisations. IS complains that a sister Islamist organisation, namely TT should not have resisted IS expansion in Afghanistan as they (IS) pronounced that they are following "Wala" and "Bara". IS argues that Taliban "waged war against the Khilāfah that ruled by the Sharī'ah and that practised walā and barā while their Taliban

'emirate' forcefully resisted the clear-cut and definite obligations of walā and barā"
(*Dabiq*, Issue 11:4). It shows the acceptance of the centrality of the concept of "Wala"
and "Bara" by Islamists, as mere pronouncement is considered enough to win an
argument in a political debate. TT, in the following text, tries to convince the local
Muslim population that in no way they are harming their interests (which is wala),
rather, they are fighting against the *objective enemy*.

جنگ خاکم بدہن افغانوں کے خلاف ہر گز نہیں ہے، طالبان کا موقف ہے کہ صلیبی
غاصبین نے ہمارے ملک کو غصب کیا ہے اور اسلامی احکامات کے مطابق جب کوئی
کافر ملک مسلمانوں کے ملک پر غاصبانہ حملہ کرتا ہے تو اس مملکت کے باسیوں پر جہاد
فرض عین ہو جاتا ہے۔ طالبان اسی شرعی حکم کے تحت اپنے تن کے خون لیے
امریکی ظلم کے مقابلے میں جہاد کرتے ہیں، انکا جہاد کسی طرح بھی افغان یا افغانوں
کے خلاف نہیں ہے۔

[*Translation by the author*] God forbid the war is not against Afghans.
Taliban takes the position that Crusaders have taken over our country.
And according to the Islamic instructions when a Kaffir country attacks
a Muslim country Jihad becomes obligatory for inhabitants of the
country. Taliban, under the same logic, giving blood in a Jihad against
the American aggression. Their Jihad is not against Afghanistan or
Afghans in any manner (*Shariat*, Issue 63: 36).

7.7   The Objective Enemy is Independent of Subjective Behaviour. In the
ideological mindset, subjective behaviour displayed by the enemy on account of fear
or any other motive has nothing to do with their *ideology* determined status of being an
enemy.   It is the superhuman sourced law, which has declared certain people as
objective enemies. AQ, in the following Urdu text, claim that they do not accept or

reject anything at their own; rather, the superhuman sourced law dictates everything for them. They say,

ہم نہ تو خود سے کسی پر کوئی چیز حرام ٹھہراتے ہیں اور نہ ہی کسی امر کو خود سے واجب قرار دیتے ہیں۔ ہمارا مطالبہ تو صرف یہ ہے کہ اللہ تعالٰی کے حلال کو حلال اور حرام کو حرام مانا جائے۔ امن کی زندگی

> [*Translation by the author*] We neither forbid nor permit something for someone. We only ask that accept whatever God permits or forbids. (*Hitteen*, Issue 8:153).

Islamists think that historically Muslims had been acting upon the advice mentioned above in the text. Therefore, most Muslim campaigns against non-Muslims were unprovoked and launched to fulfil the objectives of the Divine Law. In the following text, AQ reiterates its stand that the chief purpose of the past Muslim campaigns was divinely ordained.

> The wars with the Persian and Roman Empires were unprovoked and were for the prime purpose of spreading the truth to humanity. The Muslim messenger to the Persian leader said: "Allah has sent us to deliver the servants of Allah out of servitude of one another into the service of Allah, and out of the narrowness of this world into the vastness of both this world and the afterlife and out of the oppression of religions into the justice of Islam." There is no conciliatory tone in this statement and no inclination on the part of its deliverer to live in "harmony" with followers of different religions. It was clear to the virtuous Muslims then, who had proper understanding of what their duties towards Allah were and who had pride in Islam, that all religions were false, and that all systems of government were oppressive, and that only Islam can salvage humanity in both this world and in the Hereafter (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 37).

The central theme in the text quoted above propagates that if you fall within the category of an enemy, you shall be eliminated or humiliated sooner or later as per the

dictates of the *ideology*. The *ideology* defined status of an enemy is enough of a crime to allow its elimination. However, in the political history of Islam wherever "[e]xceptions were made for the Jews and the Christians (…) They were made to know that [they] are considered to be misguided and are destined to Hellfire. The early Muslims let the Jews and the Christians know this in the clearest and most unambiguous manner. They did this out of the concern and care for them" (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 38).

AQ cites examples where the enemy has no other crime but the crime of being in the category of the *objective enemy*.

> Regarding their statement: "It is not legitimate to declare war because of differences in religion, or in search of spoils of war." This statement is false. The pagans of Arabia were fought because they were pagans, the Persians were fought because they were Zoroastrians and the Romans were fought because they were Christian.
>
> The great Muslim Sultan Mahmud Sabaktakeen fought against the Hindus because they were Hindus and he personally led his army in a risky campaign deep into the land of India with the sole objective of destroying the most revered idol in all of India. He was fighting because of this "difference of religion" our esteemed scholars are discounting. Allah says: {And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah} [*al- Anfāl*: 39]. The Messenger of Allah said: *"I was instructed to fight humanity until they testify that there is no one worthy of worship except Allah"* (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 38).

AQ constructs a similar theme in their Urdu Magazine *Hitteen* as well.

مسلم حقیقت ہے کہ یہ قتال ہی کا اثر اور تلوار کا رعب تھا کہ وہ مشرکینِ مکہ جو ۲۱ برس تک رسول اللہ صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم اور اسلام کی راہ میں رکاوٹ بنے رہے، جو مکہ مکرمہ میں ۱۳ برس تک آیاتِ قرآنی اور فرامینِ نبویؐ بزبانِ نبیؐ سننے کے باوجود اسلام قبول کرنے سے انکاری رہے، جب انھوں نے رسول اللہ صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کی قیادت میں دس ہزار (۰۰۰،۱۰) صحابہؓ کے لشکر کو مکہ میں داخل ہوتے دیکھا تو اپنے کفر کو ترک کر کے جوق در جوق اسلام میں داخل ہو گئے۔

[*Translation by the author*] It is a factual truth that it was the killings and a display of sword that the polytheists, who were a hindrance to the spread of Islam for the twenty-one years, as despite listening to the Quranic verses and sayings of the Prophet in Mecca, they refused to accept [the message]. But when they watched Muhammad entering in Mecca with the ten thousand companions, they dispelled their disbelief and entered in Islam in droves (*Hitteen*, Issue 4:28).

''(ان سے قتال کرو یہاں تک کہ) تمام ادیانِ باطلہ مغلوب ہو جائیں؛ یا تو اس طرح کہ ان کے ماننے والے سب ہلاک ہو جائیں یا پھر وہ قتل کے خوف سے اپنا دین چھوڑ دیں''۔

[*Translation by the author*] [Continue with the killings until] "all false religions are subjugated; either all their followers are killed, or they leave their religion in fear" (*Hitteen*, Issue 4:32).

TT follows the other two organisations (AQ and IS) in the construction of the theme that it was sword drawn against the *objective enemy,* which turned the tide against the enemy. In a text in *Shariat* Magazine, TT articulates,

اقدامی جہاد تھا۔ علاوہ ازیں کم و بیش ایک یا دو جنگوں کے علاوہ آپ علیہ السلام سے لے کر صحابہ کرام کے زمانے سمیت بہت بعد تک جتنی بھی جنگیں ہوئی ہیں، وہ اقدامی ہی تھیں۔ دفاعی جہاد کی شاید ہی کبھی ضرورت پیش آئی ہو، تا آنکہ مسلمان خود عملی طور پر کمزور ہو گئے ہوں، جس کی وجہ سے کفار کو اہل اسلام پر چڑھائی کی جرأت ہوئی ہو۔ ہشیار رہنا چاہیے کہ جہاد سے متعلق قادیانیت کی سوچ کو غامدیت کے غلاف میں پیش کیا جا رہا ہے۔ یہ شعبدہ باز لوگ عوام کے دلوں سے جہاد کی محبت لوٹ کر دجال کی خدمت کر رہے ہیں۔ ایسے لٹیروں سے بچیے۔ ایک ایمان ہی تو ایسی متاع ہے، جو آپ کو اللہ سے جوڑے رکھتی ہے۔ اگر یہ ہی چھن گئی تو پھر آپ کے دامن میں باقی کیا بچے گا؟

[*Translation by the author*] Except one odd battle all the battles that were fought by the Prophet or his companions after him, were offensive. The need for a defensive Jihad was never felt; this was the case until Muslims became weak, which encouraged the enemies to attack. Watch out; it is the Qadiani version of Jihad, which is being presented under cover of Ghamdian thought. These sorcerers are serving Dajjal by eliminating the love of Jihad from peoples' hearts. Keep clear of such fraudsters. It is only the faith that keeps one connected to God, if one were to lose it, what else is left with oneself ? (*Shariat*, Issue 63:23).

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AQ, in the texts mentioned above, constructs two themes. Firstly, the theme that the main reason for the past wars waged by Muslim rulers was religious (ideological). The enemy had not committed any crime except that they were declared as 'others' by the prevalent Islamist *ideology*. Secondly, the theme that countries can be invaded just for the sake of the spoils of war. The nomination of the enemy by the *ideology* in itself is sufficient for such invasion. A defined and dehumanised enemy is at the mercy of Islamists for any treatment. AQ further continues with the themes.

> Fighting *fisabilillāh* can also be for the objective of spoils of war. Most of the dispatches that the Messenger of Allah sent from Madinah were in search of spoils of war. Badr itself was an expedition headed by Muhammad himself in pursuit of a caravan of goods belonging to the Quraish. In fact, the classical scholar Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali states that the purest and best form of sustenance for the believer is that of *ghanīmah* (spoils of war) because it was the source of living Allah has chosen for His most beloved of creation, Muhammad. The Messenger of Allah said: *"My sustenance was made to be under my spear"* Throughout our early history, the greatest source of income for the Muslim treasury was through the revenue generated from fighting *fisabīlillāh*. Spoils of war, *jizyah* (a tax taken from the Jews and Christians), and *kharaj* (a land toll taken from conquered land) represented the most important sources of income Islamic treasury (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 38).

The discursive *character* constructed by the organisations is supposed to be ever ready to plunder, humiliate or eliminate the *objective enemy*. So, if you are declared an enemy by the *ideology*, you do not have much choice. If your life is spared, you must agree for a much humiliated and politically inactive life, or else you convert to the Islamist *ideology*. The *ideological mindset* actively seeks the *objective enemy*, as elimination of this enemy is essential for the advancement of the cause of the *ideology*. In their endeavour to advance the movement of superhuman sourced law, ideologues should remove all contradictions in the way of ideological rule and achieve consistency in all

their claims. The *ideological mindset* either rejects or reinterprets all fact associated with perceived factual reality for the sake of ideological consistency. The next chapter shall deal with the fifth and the last element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely 'Rejection of Factual Reality'.

7.8   Conclusion

In this chapter, I analysed the texts published by Islamists in their magazines to detect the themes associated with the fourth element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely the *objective enemy*. The aim was to ascertain whether this element is part of the *character*'s *mindset* that is discursively constructed by the three Islamist organisations in their magazines. I started by separating the symptomatic and exemplary texts from the magazines that carried the theme of an enemy. I then reread these texts along with the Arendtian theorisation of the theme of the *objective enemy*. By applying the Arendtian criteria of *ideology*, I generated six subthemes, which formed the paragraph headings in this chapter. I then quoted texts and analysed these according to the thematic instances of the subthemes.

I noted that the Islamists construct a *character* in their magazines that believes in an *objective enemy*, which is defined by the *ideology*. Islamists claim that they have no role in its determination as it is the enemy defined by the Divine Law. The ideal type *character* is supposed to point, dehumanise and eliminate this enemy so that Divine Law takes its own course. The ideological action against the enemy may commence with different levels of disavowal. Disavowal of the enemy should not only be pronounced but demonstrated through empirical actions.

My analysis of the texts reveals that, for the *ideological mindset*, the fundamental principle of relationship with the *objective enemy* is hate. The sentiment of hate should be central to all the relationships with the *objective enemy*. The *objective enemy* should not be allowed to escape hate. The alternative of hate is either the elimination or assimilation into the Islamists' imagined ideological world. The texts affiliated with AQ and IS complement each other in the construction of the *objective enemy*. I do not note any difference between these two organisations in all the subthemes associated with the *objective enemy*. TT, however, is less forceful in the construction of the

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objective enemy. It may be due to the reason that TT has a well-defined enemy in the shape of US-led coalition forces; therefore, they may need less ideological abstraction. Nevertheless, TT does construct an *objective enemy*, but the language that constructs it is more nationalistic in its themes. Yet, TT constructed *mindset* is similar in its fundamental themes. Given the circumstances, it can switch seamlessly to an AQ or IS constructed *mindset*. It is the same *ideological mindset* operating in different circumstances.

The discursive constructions by all the three Islamist organisations convey the theme that they are in an eternal conflict. In this fight against the eternal enemy, the Islamic idea of "Wala" and "Bara" should guide all the relationships. "Wala" and "Bara" are the relationships dictated by the superhuman sourced law. The ideological law objectively lays down an ideological criterion of relationships amongst humans. The relationships of "Wala" and "Bara" are independent of all personal experience. As the real human experience is divorced from the conceptualisation of the *objective enemy*, it is not allowed to interpret factual reality as well. The *ideological mindset* rejects the experience gained through the five senses if it is inconsistent with the *ideology*. The next chapter deals with the fifth element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely 'Rejection of Factual Reality'.

Chapter 8: Rejection of Factual Reality

8.1 Introduction

This is the last of the analysis chapters in which I approach my empirical material to ascertain whether the fifth element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, 'Rejection of Factual Reality' is present in the *mindset* of the discursively constructed *character*. Factual reality means the reality of facts as understood by the five senses in humans. I follow the same method as in previous chapters to separate and then analyse the symptomatic and exemplary texts from the magazines. I read the separated exemplary texts along with the Arendtian theorisations on the fifth element of *ideological mindset*. I generate four subthemes that are associated with the chapter theme, i.e. rejection of factual reality. The subthemes form the paragraph headings.

The factual reality, in the Islamists' constructions, is predestined. Nothing is happening at its own but originates in and guided by the first cause, i.e. God. At its core, the idea suggests a *mindset* that believes all the present or the future events, including one's life span, are minutely written and preserved with God. Conceptually, therefore, the reality is a mere formal display of already decided facts. Man is a mere actor without any control over the events. This actor has been tasked by the Divine Law to act in accordance with the *ideology*. Life does not have meaning in its own right but is just an expression of Divine Law. The Divine Law has its own principles of movement.

Arendt theorises that *ideology* transforms the *mindset* of an ideal type of an ideologue in a manner that the *character* conceives factual reality through a super sense. The *ideological mindset* subjects a knowledge claim realised through the five senses to an additional ideological check. The facts that conform to the fictitious ideological world are accepted, and rest are either rejected or reinterpreted. Rejection, reinterpretation or acceptance of facts becomes an exercise in imagination guided by *ideology*. The *character* type while interpreting the facts looks for the ideological consistency in their observations, even at the cost of the factual reality of the observations.

Rejection of factual reality by the ideal type, however, takes many forms. It is quite a complex exercise to tease out all the categories of this element of the *ideological mindset* from the texts in the magazines. I speculate that this element might be more observable in the visual expressions, namely photos and movies produced by Islamists. Nevertheless, I cite, quote and analyse the texts, as per my adopted method, i.e., to detect and conceptualise the thematic expressions of the element from the written texts.

The texts in the magazines construct a *character* that is supposed to believe that human life is temporary, superficial and created for the express purposes of a higher law. Human life has a fixed end date, which corresponds to a divine script. Factual reality is merely an expression of Divine Law. Therefore, in our interpretations, facts must conform to the Divine Law. Any contrary observation means there is a fault in our interpretations of the facts. Sometimes the factual reality has deeper and hidden meaning, which may be concealed by the conspiring minds. The ideologue, however, is equipped with the instrument of *ideology* to decipher the true nature of hidden facts. It is, therefore, legitimate for the *ideological mindset* to twist facts so that it can realise an imagined consistency. The Arendtian *ideological mindset* shows its true potential once ideological movements assume power; as in power, they manage to operationalise their *mindset* maximally and try to transform the factual reality to match their ideological claims.

8.2   Rejection of Human Life

Human life, for an *ideological mindset*, is superficial. It is bereft of any meaning in its own right but is created for the sake of the historical movement of Divine Law. Its purpose and meaning can only be understood in the context of eternal law. Human life is merely a part of a gigantic process moved by eternal laws. The *ideological mindset* is "historical, concerned with becoming and perishing" (Arendt, 1958: 469). The discursive constructions by Islamists in the magazines express such themes through their texts. The human life on earth, for them, is superfluous and temporary. AQ announces that "this life of the world is only amusement and play! Verily, the home of the Hereafter, that is the life indeed, if they but knew [29:64]" (*Azan*, Issue 2: 13).

Another text in the AQ published *Azan* magazine further elaborates the theme mentioned above as follows.

> Realize that the purpose of our life is not eating, sleeping, engaging in luxury or apparent progress. Rather, we have come into this world for a specific purpose, for a limited time, so that it is clear who does good and who indulges in evil. The real and eternal life is that of the Hereafter, and it is the best life (*Azan*, Issue 6:37).

The above mentioned AQ construction assigns a specific purpose to the temporary life. But this purpose does not originate in human thinking; rather, it originates in a superhuman sourced Divine Law. The Divine Law is moving according to a gigantic historical process; human life is just a part of this movement. The Divine Law is in constant operation to judge human life according to a preordained scale. The scale has patterns of good behaviour and evil behaviour. As this life is temporary, it should not be wasted in fulfilling human needs like "eating, sleeping, engaging in luxury or apparent progress" (*Azan*, Issue 6:37). In contrast to this temporary life, this *mindset* imagines an eternal and real-life that shall start after death. The theme of temporariness and superfluousness of this life is repeated in the same magazines. Such a theme frees men "from wasting their efforts in going after the limited goods of this deceptive life; rather, it broadens their horizons by explaining to them that this life is merely a stepping stone for the coming eternal afterlife when every one shall be held accountable before Allah" (*Azan*, Issue 1:10). AQ constructs the themes of temporariness and superfluousness of this life with a purpose, namely, the rejection of the existing human life. Such a rejection decouples a *character* from the materialistic pursuits they are engaged in the world. This *mindset* thinks that it is a wastage of effort to engage in worldly affairs.

The Islamists, in their texts, construct an *ideological mindset* where existing human life is considered temporary, worthless and deceptive. Human life in this world as such is not real and is created for a different divine purpose. The *character* is encouraged to consider this life as part of a gigantic movement of the historic superhuman sourced law. If the *character* moves in sync with the Divine Law, they shall win eternal life in

the bargain. AQ uses two distinct terms to express the themes related to the temporariness of 'this' life and the eternity of 'that' life. The term "Dunya" stands for the worldly life, and "Akhira" stands for eternal life (*Azan*, Issue 2:77). The texts suggest that the human life of "Dunya" should be rejected while the life of "Akhira" should be desired. AQ further elaborates on the themes of "Dunya" and 'Akhria' in the following text.

> How long will you live in ākhira? Infinity. Now if we want to make a ratio of dunyā to ākhira, what do you do to make a ratio? You divide dunyā on ākhira. So 114 divided by infinity, what's the answer? Math tells us that it's zero. Nothing. There isn't even a ratio! But Rasūlullāh was more generous than that. He said, "if this world was worth the wing of a mosquito…" but then you can notice that Rasūlullāh said one wing so the mosquito can't even fly! He didn't even say two wings. So dunyā is nothing. Worthless (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 64).

The term "Dunya" and "Akhira" and the themes attached to it are similarly used in the texts across all the three organisations. IS advises the *character* that "[t]hey should not incline nor adhere to the Earth" (*Dabiq*, Issue 11: 63). A text in the IS published *Inspire* Magazine contrasts the two terms as follows.

> *Jannah* [Akhira] is different from *duny*ā in four areas:
>
> 1. This world is temporary and *akhira* is permanent. Allah says about *duny*ā: [mata `al ghuroor]. And Allah says about *Jannah*: {the afterlife is better and everlasting}.
> 2. There's a difference in *quantity*.
> 3. There's a difference in *quality*.
> 4. Everything in *duny*ā is contaminated and everything in ā*khira* is pure (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 63).

The theme of rejection of a temporary worldly life for an eternal one is deeply embedded in the *mindset* constructed by Islamists. In the IS construction the ideal *character* types were "not held back by the Dunyā from fulfilling their obligation to Allah and proved that they were ready to sacrifice what was dearest to them for the

sake of responding to Allah" (*Dabiq*, Issue 13: 3-4). AQ stretches the theme further to reject the political organisation of people such as democracy. They construct that democracy has "[t]he polytheistic principle of separating "Dunya" from Deen (religion)" (*Azan*, Issue 4:23). It is a pre-emptive move to reject any other interpretation of human life. The *ideological mindset* conceives only one (true) interpretation of the factual reality, i.e. the interpretation of *ideology*. Therefore, AQ thinks that their conception of Islam (*ideology*) "shall rule in government, politics, economics, societies, legislations and judiciaries. Islam is not limited to a few rituals of worship to be done inside some specific buildings. Hence, this false principle that separates Islam from human life is utter disbelief" (*Azan*, Issue 1:64). AQ rejects all knowledge claims that are not interpreted through their *ideology*. The Islamists construct a *character* that is supposed to treat their existence in this world as temporary and unreal.

The theme of un-realness of "Dunya" and realness of "Akhira" is a very powerful idea. The idea has the potential to disengage the *character* from all real human emotions and experiences. Fear, for example, as an incentive to an evasive action is eliminated from this *mindset*.

مسلمان کسی صورت مسلمان کہلانے کا حق دار نہیں جو خدا وندِ ذوالجلال کے سوا کسی اور سے خائف ہو۔ الحمدللہ میں مسلمان ہوں اور اپنے خالق کے سوا کسی طاقت سے نہیں ڈرتا۔ لہٰذا میں بتلا دینا چاہتا ہوں کہ آج کے بعد میں اپنے عمالِ حکومت کے کسی قسم کے

[*Translation by the author*] A Muslim is not supposed to be called a Muslim if he/she is afraid of anything other than God. All praise be to God, I am a Muslim and am not afraid of anything except the Creator (*Hitteen*, Issue 8: 30).

The idea of un-realness of "Dunya" mitigates the emotion of fear in the ideal type *character*. How can an unreal event generate fear in a *character*? IS exhibits their understanding of fear further by narrating a story of a female in their magazine *Dabiq*.

> Yes, she was afraid of him for herself because she knew he was a criminal! She knew that he was upon falsehood, but fear prevented her

from saving herself in the dunyā and the Hereafter! What kind of fear is this that might make you lose your Hereafter? What kind of fear is this that makes you remain with a man that has enmity towards the allies of ar-Rahmān[Allah[17]]. And what kind of fear is this that keeps you remain under the same roof with a man who is not lawful for you, and whom you are not lawful for? Rather, you even give birth to his children! You give birth to the children of an apostate man who is a stranger for you! By Allah, it is obligatory for a woman to feel that the destruction of the entire world is easier on her than to remain in the guardianship of a man who is an enemy of Allah, His Messenger, and the believers (*Dabiq*, Issue 10: 45-46).

The central theme in the text quoted above suggests that the reality (or unreality) of all human relationships should be assessed through *ideology*. IS wonders as to how fear can prevent a believing wife to separate from an apostate husband. The *character* should discount fear as a motive for an action or inaction. As all reality other than defined by the *ideology* is unreal, the emotions generated out of such un-reality should also be considered unreal.

Apart from fear, the idea of rejection of 'this' unreal human life constructs another very strong emotion, the emotion of sacrifice. This emotion of sacrifice has a flavour of a bargain as well, i.e. exchanging a temporary and unreal thing with a real one. I note that a belief system of worthlessness and un-realness of the worldly life is linked to the ideal types' readiness to sacrifice their lives. The Islamists glorify and exemplify this emotion of sacrifice, and also appeal to man's rational self; a rational bargain which is very beneficial. IS declares that "[t]here is no person who dies and is pleased to return to this Dunya - whereby he has (in Jannah what is better than) Dunya and what it comprises - except the martyr for the favours of martyrdom he sees. He is pleased to return to Dunya so that he is killed again" (*Inspire*, Issue 13:5). Such understanding of un-realness of "Dunya" and realness of "Akhira" and the resultant emotions generated by this belief system construct the *mindset* of the ideal types. All three Islamist

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[17] Translation by author

organisations construct such *character*s repeatedly in their textual expressions to inspire followers. AQ published Magazine *Azan* narrates a typical transformational story of an ideal type in a text. The narration is a real story of a suicide attack launched at the Boston Marathon on 16 Apr 2013 and was widely reported in the media. It is a story of two brothers who were spending a normal life. The story has three parts; in part one, the *character*s engage with the *ideology* and realise the un-realness of the factual reality of the worldly life. In part two, they interpret the factual reality through this newly acquired *ideological mindset*. In part three, the *characters* act in a manner which is consistent with the *mindset*. The story reads:

> Tamerlan and his brother realized that the goal of this life was not earning money, living in a comfortable house or organizing a large business. In the midst of complete darkness, they saw the light and realized the purpose of life for which they had been created.
>
> They came to realize that they had been created to worship Allah Alone, to serve His Cause and that this life was merely a transitory passing stage, a test to see which of the humans proved best indeed. They realized that they were to return to Allah one day Who would question them about what they did in this life (*Azan* Issue, 2:16).

All the three organisations use similar examples as mentioned above to promote the theme of "Dunya" as dark and worthless as compared to "Akhira" which is full of light and a worthy place to live in. This theme is the first conclusion that Islamist feed into the mind of the *character* as soon as the *character* accepts the first premise of the *ideology*, namely, the idea of a superhuman source. This sudden change of *mindset* can be due to multiple reasons. *Islamic radicalisation* literature discusses different reasons for this change of *mindset*. Arendt, however, says that loneliness provides a fertile ground for ideological radicalisation; in loneliness, a *character* thinks everything to the worst (Arendt, 1958: 477). Islamists employ logical reasoning as a tool to link all the elements of the *ideological mindset*. In the text mentioned above the *characters* of the story, i.e. the two brothers, prepare to reject the previously held ideas about "Dunya" and adopt the ideological understanding of the term. They acknowledge that previously

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they were unable to understand the true reality of "Dunya" and, hence, unable to understand the true purpose of this life. Through the new lens, namely the *ideological mindset*, they think they can interpret factual reality in its true perspective. The story continues:

> Then, realized the severe attack on the essence of Islam that the colonial powers of the day had engaged in. Through their new age polytheistic religions of secularism, democracy, nationalism, they had misguided entire generations of human beings. They realized, as their brothers in faith previously did, that the real test living in the system of today was to hold on to their faith. They became like those who declared defiantly before them that they shall only worship and obey the Law of The One True God.
>
> They saw that success in Islam was not as the West defined it but that true success constituted meeting Allah, The Exalted with a heart filled with firm faith, and a life lived in service to Him (*Azan* Issue, 2:17).

The text quoted above is a typical construction common to all three organisations. The *character* is supposed to be ready to sacrifice everything for the sake of the newly acquired *mindset*. The ideal type is supposed to reject the reality of human life in "Dunya" and accept the reality of "Akhira". AQ suggests to the *character* that "for Muslims, facts are what the Quran and Sunnah tell us – and our intellects only come after" (*Azan*, Issue 1: 16). The *character* is supposed to believe in the parallel reality.

8.3   Parallel Factual Reality

The Islamist organisations construct the theme of a parallel reality, which is visible only through the lens of *ideology*. AQ constructs such a theme in the following text.

> Indeed, there is more than one way of seeing the events unravelling around the world. There is the secular, misguided way – that disregards the truth of life, ignores man's relationship with his Creator - Allah, overlooks the purpose of life that man was created for and restricts itself to empirical ignominy. And then there is the other lens – the lens of the

final Message of God revealed for the salvation of the entire humanity – the lens of Allah's Book and His Messenger's Sunnah – the lens of the one true way of life, i.e. Islam. Both the lenses produce very different thoughts, perspectives and world views. However, the crucial fact is that the latter is upon the truth while the former is upon falsehood (*Azan*, Issue 2: 13).

In the above AQ published text, the Islamists demonstrate that they are aware of the two lenses through which the factual reality is conceptualised. They call the other lens as "empirical ignominy". The idea of a parallel reality, therefore, is not an illusion of the mind but a well thought out idea by Islamists. The idea of parallel reality is linked to the idea of un-realness of "Dunya" and realness of "Akhira". The construction of the idea of parallel reality is necessary for ideological consistency. Because, in many cases, the factual reality in this world is inconsistent with observed facts, the idea of parallel reality provides much needed ideological lens to interpret the factual reality in a manner that it appears consistent with the ideological claims. AQ contrasts the ensuing political implications as the factual reality is interpreted through the two lenses.

The hands behind the media and those who put up such a one-sided picture of world events surely possess a hidden agenda. So, it is "terrorism" when the oppressed take revenge, "barbaric crime" when the invaded ones produce a backlash and "heinous, cowardly acts" when the opponents strike back – and it is "Enduring Freedom" or the likes when the Americans invade and destroy entire populations of human beings.

The above world lens would have us believe that it is somehow America's stamped right to invade other peoples' lands, play mockery with their religion and kill masses of their populations. And if the oppressed stand up and act in defence then they are guilty of acts of "terror". This lens would have us see that no matter how many people America murders in the name of a supposed "war", the enemy is not supposed to even say a word in reply. If they say a word, it is called

"spreading terror" and if they strike back, it is called "terrorism" (*Azan*. Issue 2: 14).

The above text elaborates the political reality as constructed by Islamists. They think that the non-ideological view of the events is mischievous and conspiratorial. The following text explains how reality appears when seen through the ideological lens.

> And this is what the other lens shows. It shows a world in which there is no justice – a world where a Rule of Law according to the final Scripture revealed to humanity – the Quran – is absent. It shows a world where a few corrupt families have taken reins of entire communities of human beings and have subjected them to ruthless man-made policies. It shows a world where a few corrupt people have destroyed entire civilizations of humanity in the name of a godless, corrupt idea (*Azan*, Issue 2: 14).

AQ articulates a similar theme in the Urdu Magazine *Hitteen* as follows.

دشمن ہر ایک مسلمان ملک کے نصابِ تعلیم میں الحاد اور بے دینی کا خاموش زہر نہیں انڈیل رہا، کیا صلیبی کفر کی پروردہ این.جی اوز ہماری عورتوں کو بانجھ بنانے کے لیے گھر گھر کے چکر نہیں کاٹ رہیں، کیا انٹرنیٹ اور موبائل فون کے ذریعے بے حیائی پھیلانے کا سامان اہلِ مغرب نے ہمارے ہر بچّے اور بڑے کے ہاتھ میں نہیں تھما دیا، کیا کفری قوانین کے نفاذ کے لیے جد و جہد کرنے والی تحریکوں کو یہی صلیبی اقوام عالمِ اسلام میں پروان نہیں چڑھا رہی ہیں؟ کیا ان کے بنائے ہوئے سرکاری اور نجی خفیہ اداروں کے جال کی وجہ سے امت کے ہزاروں نوجوان ''لاپتہ'' افراد کی فہرست میں شامل نہیں ہو چکے؟ کیا یہ اقوام شیطان میں اہلِ اسلام کو کچل دینے کے لیے صلیبی روس کی حمایت نہیں کرتیں؟ کیا یہ سب کا فرنسلیں، فلسطین کے مجاہدین کو دہشت گرد کہہ کر اور دوسری طرف یہودی ریاست کو اسلحے کے ڈھیر عطا کر کے اس کی سرپرستی نہیں کرتیں؟ کیا لاکھوں کشمیری مسلمانوں کے خون کو رائیگاں قرار دے کر ملیچھ ہندوؤں کو چھپکی دینے والے یہی عبّادالصلیب نہیں ہیں؟

[*Translated by the author*] Is it not that the enemy stealthily injects the poison of secularism in the syllabuses of Muslim countries? Is it not that the Crusade NGOs sponsor women to visit our homes to sterilise our women? Is it not that the West has handed over mobile phones and the internet to our every child and adult to spread sexuality? Is it not that the Crusade nations are supporting such movements in Islamic nations that struggle for implementation of Kufari laws? Is it not that due to the conspiracies of their state and privately managed secrete agencies, thousands of youth have to be included in the list of "missing persons"? Is it not that these nations support Crusader Russia to crush Islamists? Is it not that all these non-believer generations, on one side declare Palestinian Mujahideen as terrorists and on the other support Jewish state by delivering piles of weapons to them? Is it not that it is these sons of Crusades, who by declaring the blood of millions of Kashmiris as a waste, pat the lowly Hindus? (*Hitteen*, Issue 1:4).

سوال یہ ہے کہ کیا باقی ایک ارب تیں کروڑ امّت حالتِ جنگ میں نہیں ہے؟ جب کہ اہلِ صلیب نے پورے عالمِ اسلام کو اپنی تہذیبی، ثقافتی، تعلیمی اور عسکری یلغار کی لپیٹ میں لے رکھا ہے۔ ایسا کیوں ہے کہ صرف ایک ہی شخص اور اس کے چند ہزار ہم فکر ساتھی دشمن کے تیروں کو اپنے سینوں پر روک رہے ہیں؟ کیا

[*Translation by the author*] The question is whether the rest of one billion and three hundred million Muslims are not in the state of war? Whereas the fact is that the Crusaders have engulfed the entire Muslim Ummah in a social, cultural, educational and military invasion? Why is it so that only one man [Usama bin Laden—*inserted by the author*] along with a few thousand companions are stopping arrows of the enemy on their chests? (*Hitteen*, Issue 1:5).

The parallel reality is not an illusion, but Islamists imagine it comprising of 'true' and concrete facts. It can only be realised through the ideological lens mentioned in the above-quoted texts. AQ concludes the story of the previously mentioned two brothers

by emphasising that "it is through this lens that Tamerlan Tsarnaev (May Allah be Merciful to him) and his brother Dzhokhar (May Allah Protect him) saw the world. They realized that they were living in a complete system that was designed to work against the one true faith – Islam" (*Azan*, Issue 2: 14). The death in parallel reality has a different meaning. "[D]eath in the culture of the mujahid [means]: a transition from one deficient life to another perfect one, which, although he hasn't experienced it, he knows by heart, through Allah's description" (*Inspire*, Issue 2: 66). Another AQ affiliated text explains how Islamists interpret reality through their adopted lens.

....تو کیا وہ مسلمان جس کا قبلۂ اوّل یہودیوں نے دبوچ رکھا ہو، جس کے دینی مراکز مکہ و مدینہ کی
سرزمین، محمد عربی صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کے جزیرے پر لاکھوں صلیبی افواج قابض ہوں، کیا وہ مسلمان جس کا
سارا وطن، نیل سے لے کر کاشغر تک یہود و نصاریٰ کی سازشوں کے نرغے میں ہو، اور کیا وہ مسلمان جس
کے سامنے لبنان کے کھنڈرات، فلوجہ کی شہید مسجدیں اور فلسطینی و عراقی بچوں کے ان گنت کٹے پھٹے لاشے
ہوں اور کیا وہ مسلمان جسے کشمیر اور ابوغریب کے عقوبت خانوں میں مسلم عورتوں کے ساتھ ہونے والی
درندگی کا علم ہو اور کیا وہ مسلمان جو اپنے محبوب نبی صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم کی شان مبارک میں ہونے والی
گستاخیوں کو جانتا ہو، جس کی مقدس کتاب کو اسے دکھا کر اور جتا کر جلایا یا اور گندی نالیوں میں بہایا جائے
....وہ اگر اب بھی اپنے آپ کو حالتِ جنگ میں محسوس نہ کرے تو آخر کب کرے گا؟ کیا اسے نبی صلی اللہ

[*Translation by the author*] Should a Muslim whose first Kaaba is captured by Jews, whose land of the religious centres of Mecca and Medina is captured by millions of Crusader militaries, who can see ruins of Lebanon, Fallujah's desecrated Mosques, Palestinian and Iraqi children's' severed dead bodies; and a Muslim who is in knowledge of the rapes of Muslim women in the jails of Kashmir and Abu-Ghraib; a Muslim who is aware of the blasphemy committed against their beloved Prophet, whose holy book was deliberately burnt and swept into sewerage; so if he does not imagine himself in a state of war now when shall he feel so? (*Hitteen*, Issue 1: 5).

The interpretations mentioned above of the factual reality seen through the Islamists' lens appear as the inconsistencies of the Divine Law ordained scheme of things to the *ideological mindset*. The ideal type must act and refabricate the Divine Law consistent reality. Divine Law is oblivious of humanmade laws; therefore, the *character* is supposed to reject all facts that are inconsistent with *ideology*. A Divine Law compliant factual reality should appear as follows.

> The earth belongs to Allah and the *Kuffar* have no right to place even a single line on any map to dare demarcate boundaries for anyone. The borders that they have sketched are false. They do not have any reality. The reality for the Muslims is first and foremost what the Divine Law has ordained, and the Law of Allah does not sanction these divides. Therefore, these map lines and fake borders are worthy of trampling beneath the feet (*Azan*, Issue 3:29).

The *ideology* consistent factual reality imagined by AQ has many benefits for humans. Islamists claim that experience tells them that ideological rule generates human prosperity. In the following text, AQ claims that if the affairs are run as per their *ideology*, the existing conditions of factual reality shall change to very favourable.

> The details of the first (general) benefit is that experience tells us that the justice of the Government, the trustworthiness of the people in charge of affairs, generosity of the wealthy, and goodness and sincerity of the common folk collectively result in the descent of blessings from the sky. The rains fall at their proper times, the growth becomes aplenty, the fields yield good crops, trade flourishes, trading goods are transported easily, calamities are annulled, economy gets developed, people of trade and skill are produced in great numbers, the religion of truth gains in strength, pious rulers emerge and their kingdoms stretch to the adjacent lands, the militaries of the righteous rule strengthen (*Azan*, Issue 4:71).

The idea of parallel reality informs the actions of the ideologues. In this reality, for the sake of ideological consistency, the words and ideas are understood differently than the common understanding of these terms.

8.4   Conceptual Manipulation of Common Ideas

The *ideological mindset* conceptualises the meaning of certain commonly used terms differently. This manupulation is not because of an intellectual stimulus, but these concepts anchor their *mindset* to the parallel reality. As usual, AQ takes more of the lead in explaining and theorising the novel conceptualisations of the words and ideas than the other two organisations. In the following paragraphs, I detect the themes attached to the term 'peace' by AQ. The organisation warns that "common terms and concepts are misused today. Words are changed from their places by the enemies of Islam(…) we see that those satanic hands behind this New World Order – the "Kuffar" of the East and the West and their agents from the so-called 'Islamic' countries use the term 'peace' in a completely wrong sense" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24). AQ articulates that whenever the enemy uses the term 'peace' the enemy means,

> [t]o tolerate everything against Shariah, to keep silent on blasphemy – the insult of the Holy Prophet, to ignore the illegal (haraam) interaction of men and women, the presence and "legal'' status of obscenity, nudity, fornication/adultery, homosexuality, etc. It is due to this misuse of the term peace and considering it akin to "secularism" that the enemies of Islam and Muslims - the *Kuffar* and their allies, declare their own selves as peaceful, peace-loving, etc. and their enemies, the Mujahideen of Islam as terrorists, fundamentalists, extremists, etc.! Submission to man-made Kufr law is considered "living as peaceful citizens" whereas submission to Allah (which necessitates rebellion to all man-made constitutions) is termed as "treason" and is punishable by death (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24-25).

The Islamists in the text quoted above promote the theme that, if one views the term 'peace' in the parallel reality, it radically changes its meaning. Peace, in that reality, means a rebellion against all man-made constitutions and human rights. A state of

anarchy is named as 'peace' in the parallel reality. "In short, leaving Amr Bil Ma'aroof Wa Nahi Unil Munkir (Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil) a fundamental obligation of this Ummah is peace to them while, on the other hand, performing this act of worship is terrorism" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24). AQ admonishes the people who "say that 'Islam is a religion of love and peace!' They say a correct thing but what they imply from it is a falsehood. If they know real peace, at an individual level as well as at the collective level, they will rebel" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24). The 'peace' "can only come through the implementation of Shariah and Shariah can only come through the Prophetic method, Jihad" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24-25). The only purpose of man's creation is worship. "Living under any other system, he cannot peacefully strive to achieve the purpose of his creation" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24). In the Islamists' conception, 'peace' cannot be achieved through peaceful means. "Kuffar, as long as they do not accept the Truth, Islam, can never have peace of heart and mind at the individual level" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 24). AQ articulates,

> [s]o, our Dawah of the implementation of the Law of Allah (Shariah) on the land of Allah is that of real peace while those who call for any other system and claim to be 'peacekeepers' or 'Blue Helmets' are in clear error and their Dawah is full of dajl (deception) and ambiguity. These desire-worshippers are misguided themselves and are misguiding others to a deceptive, unclear 'peace' and then Eternal Hellfire with them. They are a good example to learn what happens when humanity puts Allah and the Divine guidance from Him (The Holy Quran) behind their backs and attempts to define and discuss peace (or any other term for that matter) (*Azan*, Issue 5:25).

There does not appear to be any ambiguity in the *mindset* of the ideal type *character* constructed by AQ as far as the understanding of the term peace is concerned. Peace for them essentially means following the superhuman sourced Divine Law. They warn,

> [t]ake note! We absolutely reject any concept of peace without the implementation of Shariah. We call for the peace which Shariah has brought forth for us; which gives man the protection of life, property,

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Deen, intellect, respect, and lineage; not that peace which has been taken from the Charter of the (Kufr) United Nations, which is even unclear about the answers to the very basic questions of human life! (*Azan*, Issue 5: 25).

AQ asserts that "[t]hose who believe that if people do not rebel against their man-made systems (like democracy etc.) and, willingly or unwillingly, accept living under them, then peace will come, are wrong (…) one day or the other, to achieve real peace (…) they will rebel" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 25). The Islamist organisations not only conceptualise the meaning of the certain commonly used term differently but also twist facts to achieve the imagined ideological consistency.

8.5   Facts Twisted for the Sake of Imagined Consistency

The *ideological mindset* neither believes in the reality of their experience nor their eyes and ears, but only in their imagination. Such imagination is lured by anything which is consistent with *ideology*. They are not convinced by the facts—whether true or invented—but the consistency of the system. AQ twists the facts to show that the deviant Islamic rulers—the enemies of the *ideology*—lived such a wasteful life that they qualified themselves for the elimination. AQ narrates that "the Saudi prince Faisal bin Fahd managed to lose 10 trillion dollars on one gambling table. His heart stopped working as a result of this he henceforth died" (*Azan*, Issue 1:53). They further twist the facts to frame the West—an enemy declared by the *ideology*—as performing the acts of an ideological enemy. They estimate that "the price for 1 barrel of petrol with its extracted material should be at least $260 per barrel. However, the reality is that in our whole history, the price for one barrel of petrol has never exceeded $45 per barrel! Most of the time, the price per barrel fluctuates to sometimes even to $10!" (*Azan*, Issue 1:53). In another construction in the Urdu Magazine *Hitteen*, AQ states,

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دصلیبی مغرب کی نظر میں وہ مسلمان بھی دہشت گرد ہے یا ان کا ہمدرد ہے جو کسی ریستوران میں جا کر پیپسی کی بجائے یمن سوڈا طلب کرتا ہے''۔

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[*Translation by the author*] For the West the Crusader, even a Muslim

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who orders a Lemon Soda instead of a Pepsi in a restaurant, is a terrorist (*Hitteen*, Issue 1:13).

Due to the Islamist construction of *ideology*-consistent reality, they need to twist the factual to the limits. It is not only the facts associated with the enemy that area twisted but an *ideology* compliant condition of the Muslim Ummah is also constructed. This construction, to a non-*ideological mindset*, may appear a figment of imagination but for the *ideological mindset*, it is the factual reality. They plan and act according to this reality. In the following text, AQ constructs an *ideology* consistent factual reality.

> All Muslims have a share in the wealth of the Ummah. Every one of us knows that the political teachings of our religion advocate that the whole Muslim Ummah is one Ummah. The responsibility for the protection of its interests is one. The whole Ummah is like one body. The honour, assets and capital of this Ummah are supposed to be the ownership of all Muslims. The wealth and capital of the Muslim Ummah is not the property of a specific group of individuals. Rather, these belong to all Muslims (*Azan*, Issue 1:53).

AQ further argues that that "[t]hese lines have only been drawn by the Kuffar to separate the Muslims and are not more than a few 100 or 150 years old (*Azan*, Issue 3: 28). IS imagines that "the Jews and Christians fight the Muslims for their religion and that the more one is fought by them for his religion, the closer he is to the path of the Prophet" (*Dabiq*, Issue 4:43). Islamists stretch their imagination to poetic levels and construct certain abstraction. These abstractions are very carefully constructed to maintain the consistency of the argument. The *ideological mindset*, for the ideological realisation of reality, learns to draw abstract logical deductions from the first premise of the *ideology*. In the following text, AQ equates war with wind and then draws abstract logical deductions from this first premise.

> This war is like wind. It pushes clouds, resulting into rain, filling valleys and mountain passes. Lands become wet, grass begin to sprout. Water ways may add onto one another causing floods, or can form a torrent

washing the tyrants and their *najis* from the face of the earth (*Inspire*, Issue 11:15).

IS also realises the factual reality in a similar construct. A text in the IS published magazine *Rumiyah* constructs this reality as follows.

> On the margins of European jahiliyyah, which conceals its disgusting reality beneath a glittering veil of lies and claims, such as happiness, security and equality, amongst other false slogans, a wide spectrum of jahiliyyah practices emerged which feed off the rotten milk of jahiliyyah Europe – rotten milk with which it poisons its children and raises them to become deformed versions of the mushrik and atheist monsters of Europe. But whosoever Allah wills guidance, the entire earth couldn't prevent that from him (*Rumiyah* 11:44).

This ideological journey in imagination twists the meaning of certain ideas and instructions in a manner that those become consistent with the *ideology*. For example, in the following text, AQ attributes *ideology* consistent meaning to an otherwise simple instruction in the Quran.

> Allāh says: (O you who believe! Respond to the call of Allāh and His Messenger when they call you to what will give you life) [al- Anfāl: 24]. Imām al-Qurtubī states that this verse is referring to jihād. It is jihād that gives this nation life. We survive through jihād and perish without it. Our history is a testimony to that (*Inspire*, Issue 1: 2).

This *mindset* also twists facts to the extent that those can be categorised as phenomenally untrue claims. For example, AQ narrates that "Palestine was lost when the Khilafah fell" (*Azan*, Issue 5: 12). Historically, Khilafah fell after World War 1 and Palestine was lost after World War 2.

8.6   Conclusion

This is the last of the analysis chapters, in which I analysed the fifth element of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, the rejection of factual reality. Following the previous practice, I detected, separated and analysed the exemplary and symptomatic texts from the magazines published by three Islamist organisations. The purpose was to ascertain whether the discursively constructed ideal type in the empirical material exhibits all the five Arendtian elements of the *ideological mindset*, and if so, what is the nature and extent of the ideas that contribute towards its construction?

I noted that the fifth element of the *ideological mindset* is part of the discursively constructed *character*'s *mindset*. My analysis of the texts carrying the themes of the fifth element, however, reveals a slight variation in the construction of this element across the three organisations. The organisations manipulate the facts to stay consistent with the fictitious ideological world. They do not outrightly reject the facts as Arendt articulated in her theorisation. Instead, the ideal type is supposed to believe in a parallel reality.

While AQ and IS used similar language as well as themes/subthemes in the construction of this element, there was a difference in TT linked constructions. I found comparatively less exemplary and symptomatic texts in the TT published magazines than the other two organisations. I attribute this difference to TT's normal practice that they engage less with the abstract and theoretical ideas, as noted in the previous chapters.

Nevertheless, all three organisations engage with the fifth Arendtian element of an *ideological mindset*. They construct an ideal type that is not supposed to value human existence in this world and rejects the real and concrete experiences of life. This life, for such a *mindset*, is temporary and superficial. The only purpose of this life is to help in the movement of the superhuman sourced Divine Law. They believe in a parallel reality that conforms to the Divine Law. The Islamists are aware that factual reality can be imagined through two lenses. One of the lenses is for 'us', and the other is for 'them'. Each lens interprets the same facts differently. The *ideological mindset* constructs a radically different meaning to certain commonly-used concepts. 'Peace', for example,

is one such concept that is conceptualised differently than the common understanding of the term. The *ideological mindset* engages in such efforts to stay consistent with the ideologically imagined but otherwise absent facts of life. The organisations twist the facts to achieve this imagined ideological consistency.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1   Thesis Conclusion

This thesis has developed a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character*, the *Islamic ideologue*. It did this by revealing a link between the Arendtian elements of an *ideological mindset* and the abstract *character* constructed by three Islamist organisations, Al-Qaida (AQ), Islamic State (IS) and Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT), in their online magazines. It applied an Arendtian theoretical framework to conceptualise the *mindset* of *Islamic ideologue* as an abstract *character*. Specifically, I demonstrated that the study is novel in two aspects, firstly the theoretical framework, and, secondly its application.

I argued that the Arendtian theoretical framework is novel as her criteria of *ideology* (surprisingly) have not been applied by those frameworks that link *ideology* with *Islamic radicalisation*. This omission resulted in missing an important link with similar *mindsets* of the past, namely the thinking pattern of Communist and Nazi ideologues. Arendt, in her analysis of the *mindset* of Nazi and Communist ideologues, theorised five abstract elements of the *ideological mindset*. In Part One of the thesis, I established my theoretical framework and gleaned five essential elements of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, namely: the superhuman source as origin of thought; the claim to global domination; violence and the call for action; the *objective enemy* and rejection of factual reality. I noted that the Arendtian theoretical framework is a right fit to conceptualise the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* and to construct a standard profile of its elusive central *character* that perpetuates violence. *Islamic radicalisation* research was missing the standard profile of the radical person. This was the case despite the fact that the research had a consensus that radicalisation is a "process". Yet, beyond that consensus, other research lacked focus as to "what" the radicalisation process produces. I reconceptualised *Islamic radicalisation* as *a "process" of acquisition of all the five Arendtian elements of ideological mindset* and argued that the

"process" produces an abstract *character* comprising the Arendtian *ideological mindset*.

The thesis is novel in the application of the framework as well. I adopted the "characterological" method of inquiry to conceptualise the ideas/themes which were used by three Islamist organisations in their discursive construction of the *character*. I found the method, developed by Sigwart from Arendt, useful in conceptualising an abstract ideal type *character* from the discursive practices informed by *ideology*. The "characterological" approach to understand the *mindset* of an abstract *character* suited the research design of the thesis. I managed to navigate almost all the themes contained in the empirical material. Nevertheless, I understand that there is a possibility that a researcher with a different theoretical framework may read the texts differently. I, however, assert that the Arendtian theoretical framework was fully compatible with the method of the study and the available empirical material. I noted that a powerful theoretical framework such as Arendt's needs an equally powerful method and a large enough sample to get meaningful findings. The Arendtian theoretical framework applied through a combination of "characterological" method and thematic analysis technique managed to detect sufficient ideas/themes from the magazines, which can act as a standard profile of the constructed *character*, i.e. *Islamic ideologue/Islamic radical*.

The empirical material consisting of six online magazines in two languages, covering a span of seven years, added to the novelty of the research. I claim this as the first study of *Islamic radicalisation* research that has researched a substantial volume of online magazines (in two languages) published by three Islamist organisations. In Part Two of the thesis, I analysed the texts and showed that the abstract *character* constructed by the three organisations through the texts in their online magazines is an *ideologue* as the discursive practices use all the five Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset* in its construction.

I started by reading Arendt's work on *ideology*, especially *"The Origins of Totalitarianism"* (1958) and gleaned five essential elements of a *mindset*, which Arendt calls *ideological* thinking. The five elements of the *ideological mindset*, which

are central to this thesis, are the outcome of my reading of Arendt's work on *ideology* and totalitarianism. I read her work with the predetermined idea to focus on the elements of an *ideological mindset*. Another reader with a different positionality may read her work differently. Nevertheless, I found these elements very helpful in understanding the thinking of the central *character* of the *Islamic radicalisation*. The Arendtian lens can detect those elements of the *character*'s thinking, which otherwise may remain obscure in the texts.

I, however, acknowledge that the decision to apply the Arendtian criteria of *ideology* to conceptualise *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character* was normative. I considered the phenomenon as disruptive and totalitarian, which is based on a perverted understanding; I call the ideological understanding of Islamic texts. The Aredntain conception of ideology assumes the disruptive and totalitarian nature of the phenomenon. The application of the five Arendtian elements of the *ideological mindset* to the Islamist texts underscored the organisations' efforts to construct a *mindset* that is totalitarian and violently disruptive.

Nevertheless, the decision to apply the Arendtian perspective was based on certain plausible reasons. Firstly, my personal experiences of growing up in Muslim societies as a Muslim helped me to make this decision. My experiences were further supplemented by my official engagements with the violent Islamic radicals. My official responsibilities included preparation of training syllabi for military officers fighting violent Islamic radicals in border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, that work was a type of fieldwork without a plausible theoretical conceptualisation of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation*. As I read Arendt's work on the *ideological mindset*, my practical experience helped me to make a calculated assessment of the suitability of the framework for the conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Arendt's articulations on *ideology* had certain distinctions which were not available in other conceptualisations of *ideology*.

Firstly, Arendt employed a unique method of inquiry, namely "characterology" to conceptualise the *characters* influenced by *ideology*. The ideologue was one such *character*, which she realised mainly from the textual constructs of the Nazi and

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Communist movements. Arendt reconstructed the *mindset* of the Nazi and Communist ideologues and theorised five essential elements of this *mindset*. Such operationalisation of the notion of *ideology* in a constructed *character* is missing in other articulations of *ideology*. Secondly, Arendt's Jewish community was the target of Nazi *ideology*. This was a unique position available to Arendt to understand the operationalisation of an abstract concept, namely *ideology* in a society with the concrete consequences. This positionality was not available to others. Being part of a victim group helps you to understand the thinking and methods of the executioner more clearly than being an outsider or part of a larger oppressor group.

I consulted the existing literature to understand the conceptualisations of *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character*. I found that literature broadly uses five frameworks to conceptualise *Islamic radicalisation*, namely: radicalisation as a "process"; to what the radicalisation "process" leads; de-radicalisation; radicalisation measuring scales; and theories of radicalisation. The literature on *Islamic radicalisation* had wide disagreements as to the identity of the radical. Mostly the research focused on the origins of the phenomenon, however, agreed that radicalisation is a "process", but with a marginal focus on the outcome of the "process". Some researchers constructed scales to measure the radicalisation. The radicalisation measuring scales did focus on the elements of the *mindset* of radicals but suffered from certain vital issues such as the absence of a theoretical framework, issues of methodology, the sample size and generalisations (see the literature review in Chapter 1).

This thesis started with the assumption that the Islamic radical is an abstract political person comprised of a typical *mindset*. This *mindset* is ideological in nature as it exhibits all the five essential Arendtian elements of *ideological mindset*. The three Islamist organisations were selected because of their outreach and impact, and the fact that all three have been declared as terrorist/Islamist organisations by the UN. AQ and IS had Middle Eastern origins while TT is based in Afghanistan. The first two are active globally while TT mostly confines itself to Afghanistan and bordering areas. The selection was a good representative sample of the dominant narratives of the Islamist

organisations. In the subsequent paragraphs, I present the findings of the thesis. Firstly, I chart the standard profile of the ideal type of *character* constructed by the Islamist organisations in their magazines. I label my chart "The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals" (MILIR). I also explain how to use the MILIR, and its likely applications, e.g. de-radicalisation. Secondly, I present salient observations of the textual constructions. Thirdly, I offer suggestions for further research.

9.2   The Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals (MILIR)

MILIR is a tool that can help categorising a *mindset* as ideological. Multiple factors can "pull" or "push" the *character*, as the theories of radicalisation testify (see the literature review under the heading "Theories of Radicalisation"), to a condition of thinking, which I call the *ideological mindset*. I detected the ideas mentioned in the map by applying a method developed by Sigwart based on Arendt, namely "characterology". The "characterological" method of inquiry assumes that the participants of the discursive practices construct an ideal type and abstract *character* in their written, spoken or visual expressions. I conducted the thematic analysis of exemplary texts published in the magazines, namely *Azan*, *Inspire*, *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah* (all English), *Shariat* and *Hitteen* (both Urdu) by three Islamist organisations, i.e. AQ, IS and TT.

In its present shape, the tool *does not* differentiate between the themes which might also be part of an Islamic religious *mindset*. This study was not designed for such a differentiation. It will be important for future research to prepare and compare the two *mindset*s, the Islamic *ideological mindset* and the Islamic religious *mindset*. This research presented the ideas that were detectable through the Arendtian theoretical framework from the empirical material and did not differentiate amongst the detected ideas/themes. The overlap is possible with other types of *mindset*s. This thesis confined itself to detecting the *mindset* that the Islamist organisations are constructing in their discursive practices. In the following chart, i.e. MILIR, I summarise all the ideas/ theme that I detected from the magazines and which are used by three Islamist organisations in their construction of the discursive *character*. I claim that the standard profile of an

ideal type *Islamic ideologue/radical* comprises these ideas/themes. An explanation of the assessment follows immediately after table/chart/MILIR.

Map of Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals (MILR)

The Arendtian Elements of The Ideological Mindset	The linked Ideas/Themes Constructed by Islamists	Page No of Thesis	Al-Qaida (AQ)	Islamic State (IS)	Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT)
The Superhuman Source as the Origin of Thought	The world is controlled by a Divine Law	117-123	High	High	High
	Sovereignty belongs to Allah	124-133	High	High	High
	Divine Law is independent of "consensus iuris" (wider consent)	133-140	High	High	High
	No separation of religion from politics	140-145	High	High	High
	Contempt for all types of human freedoms and human rights	145-151	High	High	High
	Islamic radical is the real freedom fighter/real freedom lies in following the Divine Law, i.e. Sharia Law	151-157	High	High	High
	Divine law is superior and at variance with human-made laws	120-140	High	High	High
The claim to Global Domination	Answering ideological questions of historical importance	162-169	High	High	Low
	Superfluousness of international boundaries	169-172	High	High	Medium
	Interested in revival of historical Islamic traditions	167 - 189	High	High	High
	Contempt for the Nation-state	172-181	High	High	Low
	A global state led by a global leader	181-189	High	High	Low
	Muslim Ummah as a global community	189-192	High	High	High
	Contempt for human diversity and spontaneity	192-196	High	High	Low
Violence and the Call for Action	The world is divided into two categories, i.e. Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harab	199-203	High	High	Medium
	"Othering" through the language of metaphors: Dajjal and crusader	203-215	High	High	Medium
	Perpetual action or violence	181-242	High	High	High
	Metaphor Kuffar	215-219	High	High	High
	Metaphor Taghut	219-223	High	High	Low
	Jihad is only violent	224-230	High	High	High
	Jihad shall continue forever	230-235	High	High	High

	Violence as a provocation to unmask hypocrisy	235-236	High	Medium	Low
	The action of disavowal when violence not possible	236-240	High	High	Medium
	Jihad is obligatory	240-243	High	High	High
	Death for leaving Islam	203-239	High	High	High
The Objective Enemy	Insulation from personal experience	246-248	High	High	Medium
	Hating and cutting social relations with disbelievers is mandatory	248-252	High	High	High
	The ideologically defined enemy	252-260	High	High	High
	Eternal conflict	260-266	High	High	High
	Ideology decides all relationships- "Wala" and "Bara"	266-272	High	High	Medium
	Enmity is independent of subjective behaviour	272-278	High	High	Medium
	Jews and Christians can never be friends	252-272	High	High	High
	All actions are permitted against the 'other'	246-278	High	High	High
Rejection of Factual reality	Rejection of Human life/The world is superfluous	281-287	High	High	High
	Parallel factual reality	287-293	High	High	Low
	Conceptual manipulation of common ideas	293-295	High	High	Low
	Legitimate to ignore or twist facts	295-298	High	High	Low
	Eternal law decides who shall be an executioner or victim	47- 64, 65, 84, 135, 245, 307	High	High	Medium

Key to assess the emphasis of ideas /themes in an organisation's textual construction

High: The idea is central to the constructed *character*'s *mindset*. It has been very strongly articulated in the texts. The organisation has a clear idea of its operationalisation and its implications. The exemplary texts that construct the idea are frequent and unambiguously articulate the idea.

Medium: The constructed *character* is supposed to be aware and own the idea. The frequency of the material related to the idea is less than high. The organisation is confused about the execution of the idea in the real world.

Low: The construction does mention the idea but in a very vague manner. The idea appears to have been adopted as part of some tradition. The organisation had a very vague idea of its execution in the real world. The texts that articulate the idea are rare.

Flowchart

The Ideas Linked to Islamic Radicals

The superhuman source as the origin of thought

- The world is controlled by a Divine Law
  | H | H | H |
- Sovereignty belongs to Allah
  | H | H | H |
- Divine Law is independent of Consensus iuris (wider consent)
  | H | H | H |
- No separation of religion from politics
  | H | H | H |
- Contempt for all types of human freedoms and human rights
  | H | H | H |
- Islamic radical is the real freedom fighter/real freedom lies in following the Divine Law, i.e. Sharia Law
  | H | H | H |
- Divine law is superior and at variance with human-made laws
  | H | H | H |

The claim to global domination

- Answering ideological questions of historical importance
  | H | H | L |
- Superfluousness of international boundaries
  | H | H | M |
- A revival of historical Islamic traditions
  | H | H | H |
- Contempt for the Nation-state
  | H | H | L |
- A global state led by a global leader
  | H | H | L |
- Muslim Ummah as a global race
  | H | H | H |
- Contempt for human diversity and spontaneity
  | H | H | L |

Violence and the call for action

- The world is divided into two categories, i.e. Dar-al-Islam and Dar-al-harab
  | H | H | M |
- "Othering" through the language of metaphors: Dajjal and crusader
  | H | H | M |
- Perpetual action or violence
  | H | H | H |
- Metaphor Kuffar
  | H | H | H |
- Metaphor Taghut
  | H | H | L |
- Jihad is only violent
  | H | H | H |
- Jihad shall continue forever
  | H | H | H |
- Violence as a provocation to unmask hypocrisy
  | H | M | L |
- The action of disavowal when violence not possible
  | H | H | M |
- Death for leaving Islam
  | H | H | H |

Jihad is obligatory
| H | H | H |

The objective enemy

- Insulation from personal experience
  | H | H | M |
- Hating and cutting social relations with disbelievers is mandatory
  | H | H | H |
- Ideology nominated enemy
  | H | H | H |
- Eternal conflict with an eternal enemy
  | H | H | H |
- Ideology decides all relationships- 'wala and bara'
  | H | H | M |
- Enmity is independent of subjective behaviour
  | H | H | M |
- Jews and Christians can never be friends
  | H | H | H |
- All actions are permitted against the 'other'
  | H | H | H |

Rejection of factual reality

- Rejection of Human life/The world is superfluous
  | H | H | H |
- Parallel factual reality
  | H | H | L |
- Radically different understanding of concepts
  | H | H | L |
- Legitimate to ignore or twist facts
  | H | H | L |
- Eternal law decides who shall be an executioner or victim
  | H | H | M |

Key:

H: High
M: Medium
L: Low

Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT)
Al-Qaida (AQ)
Islamic State (IS)

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9.3 How to Use MILIR

As mentioned earlier, MILIR is a conceptual tool and does not give a score of the ideological radicalisation. The presence of all five Arendtian elements is essential in a *mindset* to categorise it as an *ideological mindset*. All five elements support the ideological chain of logicality. MILIR, in its present shape, does not prioritise the themes/ideas with regards to the radicalisation and assigns equal weight to all the 38 mentioned ideas/themes. The thematic analysis of the texts could not capture the prioritisation of the detected themes. At places, where the organisations appeared to be prioritising a theme/idea, it was for tactical reasons, and the organisations advised reverting to the original and rigid position as soon as possible.

In any application of the tool, the number of detected themes/ideas may vary among the assessed *Islamic radicals*. It is possible that a character's response may not tally up to the mentioned 38 themes/ideas. Such variation is normal. It may be attributed to two variations: the variation of exposure of the *characters* to the ideological information and the variation in articulation of that information. It is reiterated that MILIR is the chart of the mindset of an ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue/radical* desired by the Islamist organisations; the real representative character of the ideal type in the Muslim societies may exhibit variation in the number of detected themes/ideas due to the above mentioned factors. The five Arendtian elements, mentioned in the first column, are the essential elements of a *mindset* to be categorised as *ideological*. The 38 theme/ideas, mentioned in the second column, are the expressions constructed by the Islamist organisations in their magazines to articulate the main Arendtian elements. A character may use different language to articulate a theme/idea linked to the main Arendtian element. However, a contradiction to the themes/ideas, mentioned in the second column (the 38 themes), is important. A contradiction shall attract a qualitative judgement to assess as to what extent the presence of the main Arendtian element has been weaken by the contradiction. More questions may be asked to assess the nature of the articulation. In case, in the final qualitative judgement, the contradiction is assessed to have neutralised the other affirmative themes linked to an Arendtian element, the main Arendtian element may be deemed to be absent in the *mindset.* As

per the argument of this study, the presence of all the five Arendtian elements, mentioned in the first column, are essential to categorise a *mindset* as ideological. All the five Arendtian elements are interlinked and together weave that toxic web of ideas, which radicalise the ideal type *character* for violence.

The conceptual understanding of the Arendtian theoretical framework is necessary before an application of the tool. The tool is not independent of its theoretical articulations. At first glance, some ideas/themes appear religious in their language, yet it is the particular conceptualisation of these ideas/themes, as explained in the thesis, that makes them ideological. A column in the chart refers to page numbers in the thesis for a consultation.

9.4   Usages of MILIR

In any usage, MILIR cannot be separated from its theoretical foundations and the empirical chapters that constructed it. Therefore, it must be used as an extension of the thesis. MILIR is useful for the following purposes.

9.4.1   *Act as the Standard Profile of the Islamic Radical*

MILIR can fill the gap in *Islamic radicalisation* research by presenting the standard profile of the central *character* of the phenomenon. The standard profile of the Islamic radical is a conceptual construction which focuses on the *mindset*. It is in line with the study's central argument that the Islamic radical is an abstract political person comprising the Arendtian *ideological mindset*. The map presents the ideas/themes, which the Islamist organisations use to construct the discursive *character*. This is the profile of an ideal type of an *Islamic ideologue/radical*, which the organisations discursively construct as part of their self-reflection and to attract recruits from amongst Muslim communities. In other words, the Islamic radicals, as well as potential recruits, aspire to act following this *mindset*. The assertion that the potential recruits try to follow the *mindset* constructed by Islamist organisations in the texts of their magazines is also supported by a recent terrorist incident at the London Bridge on 29 November 2019. A *Guardian* newspaper report states that at one point "[t]hey were part of a group

that had copies of the al-Qaida English-language extremist magazine, *Inspire*," in their possession (*The Guardian*, 30/11/19).

Do the organisations suggest any overt display of the *ideological mindset* which sets them apart from common Muslims? My readings of the texts suggest that the organisations do not construct any unique symbols which help in distinguishing the ideal types from common Muslims. The textual constructions, however, advocate rejection of everything symbolically attached with the West. Such rejection may extend to Western dress codes, mannerisms and modern education systems. In its outlook, the constructed *character* should resemble an orthodox Muslim religious person. The *character* is supposed to practice Islam in its literal sense, which is influenced by the interpretations of Imam Ibn Tamiya. In its routine life, the emerged *character* is supposed to be resigned from the worldly pursuits and remain focused on eternal life after death.

Is there a link between the religion Islam and the standard profile of the constructed ideal type? My reading of the texts suggests that the *character* constructed by the organisations is supposed to be an observant Muslim in letter and spirit of the religion. The discursive practices legitimise all their actions from Islam. The Islamist organisations in their arguments are convinced that they are fighting for the revival and glory of Islam. They do not separate religion from politics, hence are unable to distinguish between political and non-political interpretations of religion. There is only one interpretation of factual reality; the interpretation ordained by the superhuman sourced Divine Law.

9.4.2   *MILIR can Inform De-radicalisation Policy*

A confused conceptualisation of the "process" of *Islamic radicalisation* shall lead to a confused counter-radicalisation policy designed to reverse the "process". This thesis constructs a clear conceptualisation of the "process" of de-radicalisation derived from the (re)conceptualisation of the phenomenon. I conceptualise the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* as follows.

Islamic radicalisation is a "process" of the acquisition of the Arendtian elements of ideological mindset. De-radicalisation is a "process" of distancing from the elements of the ideological mindset.

MILIR presents those ideas/themes which the Islamist organisations use to operationalise the five Arendtian elements to construct the *ideological mindset*. MILIR, in conjunction with this thesis, can inform a de-radicalisation policy in the following areas.

Firstly, MILIR can act as an initial assessment tool to categorise a *mindset* as ideologically affected or otherwise in the context of *Islamic radicalisation*. This use is important for two reasons: one, it can differentiate between Islamist (terrorist) linked ideological violence and some other phenomenon. Such categorisation can help the deradicalisers to be sure to proceed against a particular category of the committed violence. A Muslim identity may not be a priori proxy for Islamist violence. Two, the map has the potential to categorise non-Islamist violence such as violence committed by *character*s affiliated with other ideological movements involving racial/racist, far-right or far-left thinking. For this assessment, the fundamental five Arendtian elements mentioned in the first column of the chart shall apply. Although MILIR is designed specifically to represent the standard profile of an *Islamic ideologue*, the Arendtian theorisations of the five elements of an *ideological mindset* apply to the *mindset*s influenced by other ideologies. Future research can develop a standard profile of other types of ideologues from the five Arendtian elements of an *ideological mindset*.

Secondly, MILIR can help in the preparation of a de-radicalisation programme syllabus. The chart contains the ideas/themes that the Islamist organisations desire for the potential recruits. It is a piece of useful information for de-radicalisation programmes. The deradicalisers can research and include counter ideas in the courses, which can unsettle the arrangement of the ideas in the *ideological mindset*. In the *ideological mindset*, all ideas are logically deduced from the first premise of an *ideology*. A break at any level of this fatal chain of logicality can make an *ideological mindset* less certain. Uncertainty and ambiguity are the conditions the *ideological mindset* abhors; hence, it may act as the starting point of a de-radicalisation effort.

Thirdly, MILIR can help to mitigate a very important observation voiced by a UK Government counter-radicalisation strategy paper in the following words.

> Some of the government's chosen collaborators in 'addressing grievances' of angry young Muslims are themselves at the forefront of stoking those grievances against British foreign policy; western social values; and alleged state-sanctioned 'Islamophobia'. PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism—*Explanation by the author*] is thus underwriting the very Islamist *ideology* which spawns an illiberal, intolerant and anti-western world view (Vidino, 2010).

A governmental research team can develop a questionnaire based on the themes mentioned in the tool to pre-assess the levels of ideological radicalisation of the collaborators before their selection.

The tool can also be used to assess the *mindset* of an (Islamic radical) convict before their conditional release from prison. This aspect has become very important in the wake of a recent terror attack at the London Bridge. The attacker, Usman Khan, was a convicted Islamic radical and was released prematurely from the prison on a license (*The Guardian*, 30/11/19). Further, "Khan was originally classed as never to be released unless deemed no longer a threat, but this condition was later lifted" (*The Guardian*, 30/11/19). The newspaper rightly identified that "[t]here is a flaw in the policy. You should have [a] substantial ideological evaluation of these individuals before they are released to licence" (*The Guardian*, 30/11/19). MILIR, precisely, is the ideological assessment tool that can help the decision-makers deciding whether to release an individual to license or otherwise.

Fourthly, MILIR can act as a reference *mindset* of an ideal type of *Islamic ideologue* for Muslim societies. They can self-reflect on the ideas/themes used by Islamist organisations for recruitment. I think Muslim societies may not be well aware of the consequences of certain political and ideological interpretations of religious beliefs. There is, therefore, a need for debate within Muslim societies to recognise that certain interpretations of religious texts play an important role in the complex web of ideas that construct the *ideological mindset*. Such debate may counter radicalisation attempts

by certain members of the community. This suggestion, although very important, may generate controversy or maybe outrightly rejected by some sections of Muslim communities. My reading of the texts in the magazines coupled with my life long keen interest to understand the Islamic texts suggest that there are at least (if not more) two versions of the religion Islam; a cooperative Islam and a non-cooperative (and ideological) Islam. Both versions have enough material at their disposal to exclusively construct their own belief system and a typical *mindset*. It is also the responsibility of the people claiming following the cooperative Islam to distance themselves from the non-cooperative and ideological Islam. This thesis can help them to conceptualise the *mindset* of non-cooperative Islam. MILIR can also help non-Muslim communities to understand the radical *mindset* as the Prime Minister, Imran Khan, of Pakistan desired in a recent speech at the UN. He said, "the use of 'radical Islam' by Western leaders has created an association between a whole religion and terrorism and put people in the position of suspecting all Muslims. How is a person in New York, in a European country, or in the Midwest of the US going to distinguish between who is a moderate Muslim and who is a radical Muslim?" (UN Speeches, October 2019). This thesis can help to understand the *mindset* of an Islamic radical. Based on this research, I can claim that Islamic radicals link all the justifications of their radical behaviour to Islam.

9.5   Salient Observations about the Textual Constructions Across the Organisations

The three Islamist organisations have their separate organisational structures and operate in different parts of the world. They publish their separate magazines to propagate their message. In chronological order of the establishment of the organisations, AQ is the oldest followed by TT and IS. I noted that some writers shifted from AQ to IS. At the fundamental level, however, despite their difference in the areas of operations and languages, all the three organisations use similar themes to construct the *mindset* of an intended ideal type *character*. Although I assert that all three organisations discursively construct the same *character* that comprises the Arendtian *ideological mindset*, I do note that, in places, the organisations retain a subtle distinction in their textual constructions. This distinction pertains to their level and

language of emphasis as they construct the themes. I include this aspect in the MILIR, where I record three levels of this emphasis through a code: high, medium and low. These recordings in the chart point to certain important organisational distinctions.

Such distinctions help in drawing the overall profile of an organisation. A consistent 'high' grade in the recordings signify the closeness of an organisation to the Islamist exemplary mindset. For example, AQ received 'high' grade in all the recorded ideas. It means the characters associated with AQ are hardcore terrorists and need special handling than the other two organisations. AQ affiliated radicals form the nucleus of the phenomenon of Islamist radicalisation. It appears from the analysis of the empirical literature that AQ leads the path in transforming the theological argument into the ideological argument. The organisation frequently employs argumentative rationality to justify its claims. The claims extensively relate to historical Islamic theological as well as political literature as a rationale to justify AQ actions. The worldview of AQ affiliated characters is transformed completely into the mindset of an exemplary ideologue, as was the case with the past hardcore ideologues such as Hitler and Stalin. At the fundamental level of conception of abstract ideas, which govern the conduct of ideologues, the characters following these different ideologies are indistinguishable. Ideologies transform the thinking of their adherents in a manner that they all exhibit a thinking framework that comprises all the five Arendtian elements of ideological thinking.

In any deradicalisation effort, AQ affiliated characters shall need special handling. It is because of their command over the argument; they pose a special risk for reverse radicalisation. The risk becomes acute in a scenario where the deradicalisers share the faith with the suspect. The ordinarily trained deradicalisers, who may try to detect the tendency for breach of existing positive laws, may not be able to map the full spectrum of dangerous ideas in the mind of an Islamist radical. Certain apparently naïve and ordinary claims do not breach positive laws. Yet once aligned with the web of ideological ideas, discussed in this thesis, the true contribution of ordinary claims towards ideological violence can be realised. It is, therefore, important that specially

trained deradicalisers who understand the significance of ideological thinking should be employed to engage with hardcore ideologues such as those affiliated with AQ.

AQ is populated with convinced members and is not likely to have mercenaries in its ranks. The affiliation is based on strong ideological commitment and less likely to be based on material gains. Replacement of top leadership is comparatively less disruptive in AQ than the other two organisations. Such replacement, however, is likely to be more disruptive to an organisation which is on the other end of the spectrum namely, TT. TT, as it scores more 'lows' than the other two organisations, is likely to be less ideological in its mindset. There is a high chance that non-ideological or mercenary members are present in the ranks of TT. IS, although being more close to AQ ideologically, is more complex in its approach as it is likely to possess the characteristics of both the organisations, that is, more territorial such as TT as well as ideological such as AQ. A defeat of IS in one region is possible due to its territorial element but the organisation may re-emerge in other regions due to its strong ideological appeal.

This spectrum of profiling also helps in understanding the likely relationship between the organisations. Although, heavy cross-fertilisation of ideas between the organisations have been noted, yet there is less likelihood that 'high' profile organisation, i.e. AQ shall exchange members with 'low' profile organisation, i.e. TT. This is due to a wider difference in ideological emphasis among the two organisations. For example, TT scored 'low' or 'medium' in many of the ideas listed in MILAR as compared to AQ and IS. This indicates the distance from the ideological rationality employed by the organisation in its construction. A mindset with high ideological rationality is less likely to shift to an organisation with low ideological convictions. Such inter-organisational transfer is more likely between AQ and IS.

The level of ideological commitment, expressed in MILAR, helps us to understand that, the more an organisation is ideologically committed with these ideas, the less they are likely to engage in actions arising out of some political expediency of the time. These ideological ideas form part of the fundamental intellectual fabric of the Islamists. Therefore, they sincerely believe in the truthfulness of their claims and do not

knowingly digress from their convictions. The analysis, however, revealed that TT is at the far end of the ideological commitment spectrum among the three organisations, hence, some of TT actions may be understood through the notion of political expediency. It means that, due to comparatively weak ideological commitment, TT is more likely to respond to a political incentive than the other two organisations. In the following paragraphs, I discuss some specific observations about the textual constructions of the organisations.

9.5.1 Al-Qaida (AQ)

AQ, in the textual constructions, appeared to be the mother organisation that fertilised the other two organisations in their reasoning of the adopted ideas. AQ articulates maximum reasoning for the constructed themes. I easily found all the themes associated with the Arendtian *ideological mindset* in the magazines published by AQ. There was a perfect fit in the Arendtian articulations and AQ associated constructions. I can claim that AQ influenced *character*s are supposed to be the most consistent, elaborate and philosophical in their ideological reasoning compared to the other two organisations. They are supposed to be a true embodiment of the Islamic *ideology*. In this sense, such *character*s need special handling in their de-radicalisation. The customarily trained deradicalisers may be unsuitable for the de-radicalisation of AQ affiliated radicals, especially if they believe in the same religion; rather, there is a high risk of a reverse radicalisation, i.e. the Islamic radicals radicalising the Muslims employed to de-radicalise them. I, therefore, suggest this category of Islamic radicals should not be kept in the prisons with such prisoners who share their religion.

The texts in the AQ affiliated magazines, namely *Azan*, *Inspire* (both English) and *Hitteen* (Urdu) avoid being specific and construct most of their reasoning in abstract terms. The organisation's Urdu texts in *Hitteen* Magazine are rich in ideological reasoning of their adopted ideas. Such reasoning proved very useful for this inquiry in its endeavour to detect the themes used for the construction of the abstract *character*.

9.5.2 Islamic State (IS)

IS is second, after AQ, in the abstract construction of ideas and themes in their magazines, namely *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* (both English). IS is less abstract in its textual constructions than AQ and prefers to quote concrete incidents and situations than abstract reasoning. They name their immediate enemy explicitly, yet they use all the metaphors and abstract terms which describe the objective nature of the ideological enemy. I note that as the ideological organisations start controlling an area, a mismatch of fictitious ideological world and ground realities becomes apparent. In such a situation the organisational textual rhetorical focus more on immediate conventional issues (of power and politics) and reserve less space for theoretical articulations. The theoretical reasoning becomes implicit in the actions. The organisations, however, continue to employ ideological language mostly borrowed from Islamic political history in the description of their claims. The IS-affiliated texts engage well with all the five elements of the Arendtian *ideological mindset*.

9.5.3 Tahreek-e-Taliban (TT)

This thesis examined the texts published in the official magazine of TT entitled *Shariat*. The texts in the *Shariat* magazine articulated significantly less reasoning for the adopted ideas/themes. TT, as an organisation appearing more as a resistance movement fighting to regain control of lost territory. The themes associated with the Arendtian elements of the *ideological mindset*, in some instances, were more defused in the texts compared to the other two organisations. I think the reason lies in the nature of the publication. The *Shariat* magazine aims at conveying the Taliban side of the story of the fighting in Afghanistan. The fighting has a very strong flavour of a national resistance movement. The magazine mostly narrates stories of battles fought between TT and coalition forces led by America. The themes in the texts surface once the organisation responds to some criticism of its actions. In contrast to the other two organisations that use multiple metaphors routinely to describe the *objective enemy*, TT mostly relies on one metaphor, namely "Kuffar", for such descriptions.

Despite the different nature of the TT publication compared to the magazines published by the other two organisations, I managed to detect exemplary texts that carried the

ideas/themes associated with the elements of Arendtian *ideological mindset*. I, however, noted a lack of texts in *Shariat* that engage explicitly with the fifth element of the *ideological mindset*, namely 'Rejection of Factual Reality'. I attribute this deficiency of texts to the nature of the publication. *Shariat* Magazine allocated more space to narrate the stories of Taliban resistance to the international coalition forces. In a different publication that involves reasoning, TT is likely to articulate sufficient themes associated with the Arendtian fifth element. I base this argument on my reading of texts published in AQ affiliated magazine *Hitteen*. AQ publishes *Hitteen* in Urdu to cater to the same audience as that of TT published *Shariat*. *Hitteen* is full of reasoning and constructed the themes associated with the fifth element explicitly; therefore, I quoted mostly from *Hitteen* to compensate for the lack of texts in *Shariat* for the fifth element.

An analysis of TT affiliated texts resulted in the conceptualisation of a similar *mindset* as of the other two organisations but operating more subtly and in a nationalistic context. TT has already proved during their rule over Afghanistan that, in power, they shall try to operationalise their fictitious *ideological mindset*. It was this commonality in the *mindset* between the organisations that TT refused to cooperate with the world against AQ after the 9/11 attacks and paid a huge cost for the retention of that *mindset*.

9.6   Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis mainly informs theoretical and academic research. I consider it an initial step in the (re)conceptualisation of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character*. The thesis, in line with its adopted structure, remained loyal to the Arendtian theoretical framework and did not consult wider political, Islamic literature in its analysis. I found the Arendtian perspective, which she constructed from her analysis of the past totalitarian movements and their *character*s, suitable to (re)conceptualise *Islamic radicalisation* and its central *character*. Therefore, this thesis is the conceptualisation of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* from the Arendtian perspective; another perspective may conceptualise the phenomenon differently. Based on my reading of the Islamist texts, I can claim that the Arendtian

criteria of the *ideological mindset* are equally applicable to the central *character* of *Islamic radicalisation*.

I noted that the first four elements of the Arendtian ideological mindset (the superhuman source as the origin of thought; the claim to global domination; violence and the call for action; and the objective enemy) were amply articulated in the texts, and I did not face any difficulty in finding and quoting the exemplary texts from the magazines to support my argument. I, however, noted that the Islamist textual constructions slightly digress from the central argument of Arendt in the fifth element, i.e., rejection of factual reality. The digression is not contradictory in nature but articulated in a different language. The Arendtian articulation of the fifth element emphasises the themes of phenomenal untruthfulness and ignoring such facts that are not useful for ideological purposes. My readings of the texts, however, could not detect the themes of phenomenal untruthfulness in the Islamist constructions; the Islamists, rather prefer to manipulate facts than to be outrightly untruthful. The organisations manipulate the facts and terms such as "peace" to convey an understanding which is ideologically consistent. They, however, do reject "worldly life" as understood by an atheist or non-religious mindset and believe in the idea of a 'parallel reality'. The idea of 'parallel reality' is consistent with the Arendtian idea of "fictitious ideological world".

The findings of this research need validation from a further study that should interview the known (and preferably convicted) Islamic radicals through a questionnaire based on ideas/themes mentioned in MILIR. Such a study can assess a correlation of ideas/themes between the discursively constructed abstract *character* and the real representative *character,* based in Muslim societies. Interview-Based further research using the theoretical framework of this study can validate or amend the findings of this research.

During the academic discussions and presentations, I encountered some inquiries that dealt with the "why" questions, i.e., the reasons of *Islamic radicalisation*. This was especially the case in my presentation to the UK Home Office at London, where I

delivered a presentation to researchers and policymakers of the Home Office. Therefore, I mention the areas this research is *not* about.

This research does not investigate the reasons of *Islamic radicalisation*; rather it is limited to present the standard profile consisting of themes/ideas of an ideal type abstract *character*, which is constructed by the Islamist organisations through the texts in their online magazines. I argued that in the absence of a standard profile of the central *character* of the phenomenon, it is difficult to understand the conditions that give rise to the phenomenon. The ideas/themes presented by this study as the standard profile, however, can help in tracing back the (social, political, cultural or religious) conditions that aid in the acquisition of these ideas. The thesis does not focus on the ideas which are shared with an Islamic religious *character*. It separates and presents the ideas/themes, which are detectable through the Arendtian framework from the Islamist magazines and categorises the representative *mindset* of these ideas as an *Islamic ideologue*, and a distinct analytical category from a religious *character*.

Based on this research, I identify mainly four areas for further research. First, future research can confirm or modify the ideas/themes mapped in MILIR employing a different methodology such as interviews of the known Islamic radicals (as explained in the above paragraph). Second, separate research can focus on finding out the reasons or conditions that contribute to the acquisition of the ideas/themes exhibited by the *ideological mindset*. The analysis conducted through the Aredntian theoretical lens gives a novel perspective to view the *mindset* of the Islamic radicals afresh. The analysis of this study is in detail and quotes Islamist texts verbatim, which is useful for further studies in the field. It is a contribution and might surprise some to note that some of the ideas of the *ideological mindset* are mainstream and never considered as disruptive or contributory to violence.

Third, further research can focus on identifying the distinctions between two *characters*, which are conflated and contributing to the complexity of the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation, namely the Islamic religious *character* and the *Islamic radical character or ideologue*. Such research, building an argument from this thesis,

shall help to isolate the central character more precisely, and hence, shall enhance the understanding of the phenomenon.

Fourth, based on the ideas/themes mentioned in MILIR, another study can prepare de-radicalisation course syllabi. This thesis contributes to useful knowledge that guides to a specific understanding of certain ideas which are disruptive in nature. A focused effort can prepare a syllabus that targets the specific understanding of these ideas. The discussions mentioned in the pages of this thesis is useful for training of the deradicalisers. This thesis along with the summary chart, should inform the UK De-radicalisation as well as PREVENT Policy.

Some may observe that during the course of this research, the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* has already peaked citing the defeat of IS. This might be true in terms of military operations as on the 29th of October 2019, the head of IS, Khalifah Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has been killed in a US military operation. However, the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* is far from over as the conditions which gave rise to the phenomenon are neither comprehensively conceptualised nor addressed. The central, indistinguishable and banal *character* of the phenomenon of *Islamic radicalisation* lives seamlessly in Muslim societies, and nothing has radically changed to disrupt the conditions which facilitated the acquisition of the elements of the Arendtian *ideological mindset* by the *Islamic ideologues/radicals*.

The Original 20-Item Religious Fundamentalism Scale

1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.

2. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings.

3. Of all the people on this earth, one group has a special relationship with God because it believes the most in his revealed truths and tries the hardest to follow his laws.

4. The long-established traditions in religion show the best way to honour and serve God, and should never be compromised.

5. Religion must admit all its past failings, and adapt to modern life if it is to benefit humanity.

6. When you get right down to it, there are only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.

7. Different religions and philosophies have different versions of the truth, and may be equally right in their own way.

8. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.

9. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.

10. No one religion is especially close to God, nor does God favor any particular group of believers.

11. God will punish most severely those who abandon his true religion.

12. No single book of religious writings contains all the important truths about life.

13. It is silly to think people can be divided into "the Good" and "the Evil." Everyone does some good, and some bad things.

14. God's true followers must remember that he requires them to constantly fight Satan and Satan's allies on this earth.

15. Parents should encourage their children to study all religions without bias, then make up their own minds about what to believe.

16. There is a religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God's truth.

17. "Satan" is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing as a diabolical "Prince of Darkness" who tempts us.

18. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science must be wrong.

19. There is no body of teachings, or set of scriptures, which is completely without error.

20. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, true religion.

The Revised 12-Item Religious Fundamentalism Scale

This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each statement by blackening a bubble in SECTION 1 of the bubble sheet, according to the following scale:

Blacken the bubble labelled

–4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement.

 –3 if you strongly disagree with the statement.

–2 if you moderately disagree with the statement

–1 if you slightly disagree with the statement.

Blacken the bubble labeled

+1 if you slightly agree with the statement.

+2 if you moderately agree with the statement.

+3 if you strongly agree with the statement.

+4 if you very strongly agree with the statement.

If you feel exactly and precisely neutral about an item, blacken the "0" bubble. You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree ("–4") with one idea in a statement, but slightly agree ("+1") with another idea in the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel on balance (a "–3" in this case).

1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.

2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental truths about life.

3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and ferociously fighting against God.

4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right religion.

5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you can't go any "deeper" because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.

6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will not.

7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from beginning to end.

8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.

9. "Satan" is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really is no such thing as a diabolical "Prince of Darkness" who tempts us.

10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right.

11. The fundamentals of God's religion should never be tampered with, or compromised with others' beliefs.

12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no perfectly true, right religion.

(Indicates item is worded in the con-trait direction, for which the scoring key is reversed.

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