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Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation:

The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Thomas Hopkin

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Arts and Cultures

For my brother, Will.

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Abstract

Since 2010, the United Kingdom government's austerity programme has led to the intensification and legitimisation of marketised cultural policy, locally and nationally. Marketisation of policy in the UK is associated with the Conservative governments of the 1980s. The severity of the UK's austerity programme (2010-) is unique compared to its European neighbours. Within the UK, England has led the "pioneering moves" (McGuigan, 2016, p. 17) of neoliberal austerity, despite the objections from the devolved governments of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The research's focus is Arts Council England (ACE) and National Portfolio Organisations (NPOs). I interviewed the directors of South London Gallery, Nottingham Contemporary and Baltic Centre for Contemporary Art and gathered data related to contemporary visual arts NPOs. The case-studies and broader data enable analyses of individual responses to marketisation, how this is reflective of the sector and the implications for the production and reception of art.

I argue that marketisation creates a different existential register to previous phases of cultural policy. There are familiar issues of public funding and private sponsorship, but more complex dynamics related to decentralisation. As the arts sector adapts to Bourdieu's 'rules of the game' it reinforces new *demands* of the game. This hypostatizes socio-cultural hierarchies and solidifies market logics in public galleries. I contend that galleries should engage in Rancièrian *politics* to re-realise futures for the arts. Galleries may intensify critique of marketisation, agitate for reform of public and private sector institutions through radical democracy, co-production and co-ownership (Fisher & Gilbert, 2014, p. 292).

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

I find that whilst much of the sector has an appetite for change away from marketisation, there is not a consensus on how to achieve this. The future of the arts is uncertain – practical and philosophical contradictions of arts funding are unresolved, particularly the balance of public and private influence in arts organisations.

Table of Contents

<i>The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations</i>.....	<i>i</i>
Acknowledgements.....	i
<i>Abstract</i>.....	<i>ii</i>
Table of Figures	vi
Chapter One: A Sorry State of The Arts - Marketisation, Cultural Policy and Contemporary Art Galleries.	1
1 Introduction	1
1.1 The research focus	7
1.2 The research value	21
1.3 Research questions – aims and objectives.....	24
1.4 Limitations.....	27
1.5 Thesis structure.....	29
1.7 Conclusion	32
Chapter Two: Art and Politics - Navigating Theory and Locating Practice.	36
2 Introduction	36
2.1 Project overview	39
2.2 Disciplinary and theoretical approaches.....	40
2.3 Theorising art and politics	60
2.4 Conclusion	88
Chapter Three: Methodology – Investigating Art, Institutions and Politics.....	90
3 Introduction	90
3.1 Investigating cultural producers.....	90
3.2 Research design: methods, analysis, and ethical concerns.....	96
3.3 Introduction to case studies.....	105
3.4 Ethical Considerations	115
3.5 Conclusion	118
Chapter Four: Cultural Policy in England – From Independence to Intensified Marketisation?.....	120
4 Introduction	120
4.1 Formation of the Arts Council	123
4.2 'Golden Age' and retrenchment.....	125
4.3 New Labour and instrumentalism	132
4.4 Social exclusion.....	136
4.5 Creative industries	138
4.6 The Arm's-Length principle, structural reform and centralisation	141
4.7 The "Arts Debate."	146
4.8 Cultural policy since 2010.....	151
4.9 Conclusion	155
Chapter Five: The Age of Marketised Cultural Policy.	159
5 Introduction	159
5.1 The Marketisation of cultural policy under the Coalition and Conservative governments, 2010-2018.	164
5.2 Reductions to public subsidy after the 2008 financial crash.....	168
5.3 Labour cultural policy under Ed Miliband and Jeremy Corbyn	199
5.4 Conclusion	200
Chapter Six: Marketisation and Sponsorship - Prevalence and Problems for NPOs.....	202
6 Introduction	202
6.1 Why do businesses sponsor the arts?.....	204
6.2 Sponsorship of public art organisations in England	213
6.3 Do public art organisations in England embrace sponsorship?	221
6.4 Do public art organisations in England resist sponsorship?.....	228
6.5 Conclusion	240

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Chapter Seven: Marketisation - Centralising Power, Decentralising Accountability.	243
7 Introduction	243
7.1 Culture as a component of public provision	248
7.2 Centres and decentres	263
7.3 London vs Regions.....	271
7.4 Structure of the field of public art organisations	274
7.5 Conclusion	277
Chapter Eight: Conclusions - Resistance, Agitation, Criticality.	281
Afterword – The New Paranormal	295
Closure of galleries	296
Government rescue package.....	297
Tate strike.....	297
Bibliography.	301
Appendices.....	323

Table of Figures

FIGURE 2.1. THE MUSEUM VALUES FRAMEWORK.....	107
FIGURE 5.1 UNITED KINGDOM REAL-TERM CUTS IN DEPARTMENTAL EXPENDITURE LIMITS, 2010-11 TO 2015-16	173
FIGURE 5.2 LOCAL AUTHORITY FUNDING	178
FIGURE 5.3 LOCAL AUTHORITY & PUBLIC SUBSIDY	182
FIGURE 5.4 MAP OF CHANGE IN SERVICE SPENDING IN WALES, SCOTLAND, AND ENGLAND, 2009-10 TO 2016-17	187
FIGURE 5.5 NPO FUNDING OF CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS.....	193
FIGURE 6.1 NPO SPONSORSHIP INCOME CHART	211
FIGURE 6.2 CASE STUDY SPONSORSHIP INCOME	218
FIGURE 6.3 NPO VISUAL ARTS SPONSORSHIP INCOME BY REGION.....	235
FIGURE 6.4 NPO VISUAL ARTS SPONSORSHIP INCOME BY REGION (EXCLUDING LONDON)	236
FIGURE 6.5 NPO VISUAL ARTS SPONSORSHIP INCOME: LONDON VS REST OF ENGLAND...	237
FIGURE 7.1 NOBUKO KAWASHIMA'S THREE TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION	264

Chapter One: A Sorry State of The Arts - Marketisation, Cultural Policy and Contemporary Art Galleries.

1 Introduction

[T]he public sector of art galleries and museums has been subjected to immense financial and, indeed, ideological pressure, which is a particular manifestation in this governmental sector of the transition from organised capitalism to neoliberal capitalism that has swept the world since the 1970s. Amongst other changes, this involved a long-drawn-out de-legitimisation of public subsidy and liberal-democratic state involvement in the cultural field, which, incidentally, had itself been legitimised only quite recently in historical terms.

(McGuigan, 2016, p. 66)

This thesis is concerned with the relationship between cultural policy and publicly-funded contemporary art galleries in England. It follows the arguments made by figures such as Jim McGuigan in the opening quote and aims to evaluate how marketisation has become a prominent feature of the visual art field and how this aids the intensification of neoliberal capitalism. It contends that the Cameron-Clegg coalition (2010-2015) and the subsequent Conservative governments under David Cameron (2015-2016), Theresa May (2016-2017; 2017-2019) and Boris Johnson (2019-) have marked periods of significant change in the relationship between policy-making and the arts. These changes include reduced public funding, the pressure to adapt to new demands and a deterioration of the bargaining power of the arts sector. Jim McGuigan places these developments within an economic context, beginning in the 1970s, and David Cameron's Conservative party leadership had continuities with the policy foundations of New Labour and Thatcherism. However, Cameron's identification with the need to scale back public spending enabled the Conservative party to radically reformulate the size and scale of the state. The government's commitment to retrenchment marks 2010 as a significant year in the trajectory of national politics.

This thesis assesses whether successive governments from 2010 mark a shift in the register and intensification of the politics and economics that influence cultural policy and the practice of public-funded contemporary art galleries. This thesis asserts that reductions in public funding and the central government's promotion of market logic in the cultural sector offers practical issues for galleries and artists. However, more than that, it affects interactions, relationships and criticality by making the sector less inclusive, more unstable, and opening up fundamental conflicts of interest in public spaces. Museums and galleries can represent the art and practice of dominant social groups and these groups can use culture to legitimate their position and reproduce social status. This point is foundational to Pierre Bourdieu's sociocultural research and his analysis of cultural capital. This position challenges the assumption that art has an intrinsic value and a social benefit that is unimpeachable. This research draws on Bourdieu's (Bourdieu, 1994) theories and contemporary academics' application of his analytical processes. However, it also challenges his work and refers to his detractors, such as Jacques Rancière (Rancière, 2008), and radical, Anglo-centric thinkers, such as Mark Fisher (Fisher, 2009).

As Grenfell and Hardy state, "[h]ere, culture is not a democratizing force, and individual artistic expression is condemned to play a part in the field of artistic production in terms of buyers, sellers and critics" (2007, p. 177). Therefore, should we claim that cultural institutions represent undemocratic practices in a democratic nation? This research responds to Bourdieu's analysis but expands it to incorporate divergent positions from figures such as Jacques Rancière. Rancière agrees with Bourdieu (Rancière, 2013) in that he claims that culture can be used to enforce hierarchy and domination. However, Rancière dismisses the idea that we live in democratic states. Instead, we live under the rule of oligarchy (Chambers, 2010). Oligarchy is a form of rule where power rests with a select group of people. Robert Michels developed a theory of oligarchy that remains influential in political sociology. His most notable idea is the "Iron law of oligarchy", which he uses to describe the situation whereby political parties, including socialist parties, inevitably transition into bureaucratic oligarchies (Drochon, 2020, p. 186). Michels conception of oligarchy and democracy were context specific – he was a member of the Social Democratic

Party of Germany and later supported the Italian Fascist movement (ibid). However, whilst I am not specifically engaging with the legacy of Michels, his basic thesis is relevant here. I disagree that oligarchies are inevitable but concur with Michels that interrogating and challenging those who possess political, economic and social power is a potent form of resistance. This point resonates with Rancière and his perception of political action.

Sectoral and local government opposition to austerity in the UK has had little or no effect – Rancière suggests economic domination, which I identify in the marketised policies of the UK, is an expression of oligarchy (Chambers, 2010). Labour's rallying cry for portions of the 2010s, was "for the many, not the few" (The Labour Party, 2017, p. 5). Should we take this at face value? I would suggest that this signals the identification of deep, undemocratic inequality by sections of the political mainstream, not just figures such as Rancière. This point is explored throughout the thesis, but it is vital to note at this point that this research argues that a critical function of art and its relationship with politics is its ability to reveal regimes of oligarchy where it masquerades as legitimate democratic governance. For Rancière, art is not a trait of a healthy, representative democratic state, but a critical practice that presupposes the potential for democracy and equality and "by revealing the rule of oligarchy, Rancière broaches the possibility of democracy. Such a possibility depends on seeing that democracy is not a question of regimes; it is a question of politics" (Chambers, 2010, p. 67).

Following this point, it is also pertinent to ask how or why is marketisation relevant to the association between art and democratic potentialities? Marketisation represents the preference of liberty over equality in attempting some approximation of democratic society. Rancière might say that marketisation supports oligarchy as it assumes hierarchy and stratification not only as inevitable, but fundamental to 'policing' social and political order. Rancière bases his notion of democracy on *equality*, not liberty (Deranty, 2010). Equality is not something that is given and received but is presupposed. This research claims that contemporary art in a public context is fundamental in revealing oligarchy and developing the conditions for democratic politics based on equality. Marketisation counters the transformative

potential of art practices and institutions, not totally, but significantly. As the practice, language and logic of marketisation reproduce across the cultural sector, so do the naturalisation and legitimisation of inequality, stratification, and hierarchy.

This scenario has occurred during a period of stark political contestation and division. The financial crash of 2008, the political campaigns to leave the European Union and the changing composition of the Conservative party and Labour party have all contributed to a period of political uncertainty. In early 2020, the English government imposed a 'lockdown' and social isolation measures in response to the global Covid-19 crisis. The crisis is expected to bring about another severe economic downturn, which will only add to the sense of uncertainty for public institutions. Whilst policymakers and ministers, such as Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock, have expressed a desire for change; it is unclear whether this stands for an adaptation to political and economic contexts, or a fundamental reshaping of the funding ecology of the arts in England. In his influential text, *Culture and Society* Raymond Williams stated that "[t]he shaping influence of economic change can, of course, be distinguished. [...] But the difficulty lies in estimating the final importance of a factor which never, in practice, appears in isolation." (1960, pp. 299-300) Therefore, this thesis will consider economic contexts alongside the factors related to the arts and culture.

This thesis suggests that changes to funding structures directly impact the core creative and charitable activities of publicly-funded contemporary art galleries. The changes to funding impact both resource allocation and the construction of organisational identity. The research also posits the marketisation of cultural policy as a significant factor in reshaping the dynamics of power within and between art worlds. When this thesis refers to art worlds, it does so whilst acknowledging that there are specific and generalised conceptions of art worlds. In a general sense, art worlds refer to a dynamic system where the production and reception of artworks and artefacts occur. As an object of study, art worlds are an intersection between the philosophy of art and sociology. To explore them is, in the words of academic Hans van Maanen, an investigation into "*how the organization of the art worlds serves the functioning of arts in society*" (2009, p. 7). The development of the term

'artworld' coincides with the changing narratives regarding aesthetics and artistic production. In 1964, the American theorist Arthur Danto referred to 'the Art world' as a way of describing the conditions in which everyday objects could be considered artworks. Therefore, Danto's 'Art world' was a necessary concept to support his philosophical formulation of the art object. George Dickie would continue the institutional conception of art worlds, but several theories have emerged in response to Danto's initial thesis (van Maanen, 2009).

Howard Becker's 1982 monograph *Art Worlds* was one vital response to Danto and Dickie. Becker posited an interactionist conception of art worlds, and it suggested that cooperation between participants and their observation of conventions were critical features. We can understand art worlds according to different theoretical and conceptual positions, but throughout this thesis, we understand them as a dynamic system of production and reception. The primary focus of this research is the public-funded contemporary art gallery system in England, from 2010 to 2019. However, this research will also refer to the national context before and after this period, as well as pertinent features of the global art world.

Between 2011 and 2015 the Arts Council England (ACE) had a £457m reduction in funding, prompting a shift in the national ecology of arts funding in England. Whilst ACE funding has stabilised and Lottery funding expanded, LAs continue to restrict arts budgets due to their understandable prioritising of statutory services. A decade (2010-2020) of funding cuts has seen £16 billion reduction in core funding from the government to LAs, representing a 60% drop in pre-2010 funding (Local Government Association, 2018). The aim of this research is to understand individual organisations as part of a larger art world that is negotiating the ramifications of dwindling public investment in the arts. This point is important from a research perspective as it is a current phenomenon, but also because an investigation of this 'public' art world can be a useful tool for organisations and policymakers. However, it is crucial to demonstrate that cultural policy has evolved over several decades, but the political and economic contexts since 2010 are singular and have prompted sudden, rapid and intense changes to the arts in England. We can identify the prompts and character of this evolution and its precedents, but it is vital to understand what

makes this current change unique. This context means this is a crucial time to undertake this research, as the current changes will have an enduring impact on the future of public galleries due to the concentration of funding in larger institutions, competition for resources and the promotion of economic resilience over criticality.

This area of research is significant as public funding is a contentious issue in the current political climate. Whilst other core public services, such as education and healthcare, have been severely impacted by the continued attempts to reduce the national budget deficit, libraries, parks, and leisure facilities have also faced funding crises due to restricted local authority budgets. Local Authorities (LAs) have suffered a 49.1% real terms reduction in government funding between 2010/11 and 2017/18 (National Audit Office, 2018). Museums and galleries have also faced similar existential crises. Publicly-funded museums and galleries¹ and other front-line arts organisations have had to negotiate conflicting funding scenarios since 2010. For example, ACE National Portfolio Organisations (NPOs) saw their funding from local authorities fall by 27%, from £89 million in 2010 to £65 million by 2015. However, over the same period, NPO funding increased by 17%, from £1.14 billion to £1.33 billion (Harvey, 2016, pp. 9-10). The different funding scenarios have placed NPOs in a more secure position compared to their non-portfolio counterparts. Furthermore, funding changes have altered the relationships between funders and institutions at a local and national level as the ties between local government and the arts have weakened, and the national government has exerted power to force through private financing in the arts by making mixed-funding a central element for assessing arts organisations.

¹ National museums and galleries have not experienced the same financial uncertainty as others. The national museums and galleries are directly funded by DCMS and the funding settlements have remained relatively flat since 2010. In June 2019, the Conservative government awarded £44m in maintenance funding to the national museums and galleries and whilst this is not a large enough sum to address the breadth of problems issues identified by these institutions, it does indicate the government's awareness of the financial pressures faced by national galleries and museums. However, we might suggest that this shows a commitment to fund institutions with significant prestige, rather than an interest in a more expansive function of museums and galleries (Pickford & Parker, 2019).

1.1 The research focus

This research will study three of ACE's NPOs that have received significant funding from 2010-2018. These will include the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art (Gateshead), Nottingham Contemporary and South London Gallery (Southwark). All currently receive between £1m and £5m over three years. The research will supplement these more detailed examples with other organisations from the ACE visual art portfolio, such as Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art and The Hepworth Wakefield. These case studies have superficial similarities in terms of their focus and relationship to ACE, but there are distinct regional variations that highlight the different obstacles to sustainability within and between regions. The focus on arts organisations and senior staff offers a tangible site and set of actors to assess the impact of marketisation in England since 2010.

LA funding and support has varied massively in the wake of tightening budgets. Bodies, such as the Office of National Statistics (ONS) or the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), use metrics such as wages, labour productivity and public investment as indicators for the economic health of regions. London and the South East have historically had a more significant share of gross domestic product (GDP) than the rest of the UK, and gross value added (GVA (a unit measuring labour productivity)) well above the national average (Wales, 2019). However, analysis by the NIESR shows that there is significant divergence in incomes in London (ibid). This point is suggestive of how the visual arts operate in complex regional and national economies. The research process will gather data related to sponsorship, revenue, demographics, commissions (see Appendix A-H), and qualitative data from interviews with senior staff across the organisations (see Appendix J), to assess the impact of cuts individually and collectively. This sample will enable a focus on similar organisations. There will also be the scope to refer to other NPOs and international contexts. The research will employ a model similar to the Museums Association's *Cuts Survey* (Museums Association, 2015), and this will act as a framework for gathering quantitative and qualitative data.

At the heart of this research is an exploration of the tension inherent in the interaction between art, culture, politics, and society. The specific tension this

research is concerned with is that of contemporary visual art and the free market. The thesis develops the nuances of these terms in subsequent chapters, but at this point, it is pertinent to establish some general clarifications. Firstly, when this research refers to markets in conjunction with art, that does not necessarily imply art markets, or indeed the relation between art and commerce. This reductive framework is quite visible in some discussions on the subject of art and markets (see Dellorco, 2013) and does not represent the expansive nature of the relationship. Instead, the reference to art and markets includes a range of scenarios, transactions and obfuscation. Whether it be competition for audiences for experiential exhibitions, art investment funds, the freeports used to house art collections or, culture-led regeneration projects, the interaction between art and markets is varied, expansive and often unseen (Horowitz, 2014; Steyerl, 2017).

Furthermore, public-funded galleries, which are a primary point of departure for this thesis, operate in proximity to, but not necessarily within an art market. Instead, galleries operate in a political and economic structure in which market forces are more or less influential. As a result, the thesis will explore public contemporary art galleries within the political and economic frameworks of cultural policy and cultural economics. Although 'mainstream' political and economic discourses incorporate these approaches, there is also scope for more radical perspectives (Towse, 2019).

The primary duration of time covered by this research is 2010-2018 and it focusses on the specific conditions of England's arts sector. During this period the debate over the nature of public provision had intensified in a period of economic downturn. 2010 was a seismic year in the political and economic trajectory of the UK. The 2010 general election led to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, with the leader of the Conservative party, David Cameron becoming Prime Minister, marking the end of consecutive Labour party governments since 1997. Furthermore, Cameron's election campaign focussed on the UK government's budget deficit and the ill effects of the 2008 financial crash. In a speech in 2009, he declared that "In this new world comes the reckoning for Labour's economic incompetence. The age of irresponsibility is giving way to the age of austerity" (Coleman, 2016, p. 5). Cameron, with the support of Nick Clegg's Liberal Democrats, initiated a series of measures that drastically

reduced public spending across the public sector, and this continued under Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson. The austerity programme, or "the austerity delusion", as economist Paul Krugman (2015) puts it, has been criticised not only for the harm it produced, especially towards vulnerable members of society but because Cameron and his allies, such as George Osborne and the think tank Policy Exchange, based their austerity programme on a flimsy economic rationale.

2010 is also a significant year for ACE and NPOs. ACE launched a ten-year strategy covering 2010-2020², with some revisions in 2013. This period also saw several funding cycles with the period of 2014-2018 being the most recent completed cycle as of 2020. The economic uncertainty that has characterised the UK since 2010 has manifested itself in different ways in each of the home nations; England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In terms of cultural funding, each nation has its arts councils and some devolved powers for monetary and fiscal policy. This thesis focusses on England partly because of the range of galleries and art museums in the country. Importantly though, England and expressly, London, represent a dominant political culture with accompanying economic privilege and a historical access to arts and culture. London also benefits from being a major tourist destination. In 2018, it had 19.1m inbound visits with visitors spending a total of £12.3bn (VisitBritain, 2019). London completely dwarfs every other region in England in terms tourist pulling power, creating a unique opportunity for exposure and revenue for museums and galleries. The focus on England allows this research to question the levels of access and inequality within a bounded system and ask how policy produces this.

The direction and function of publicly-funded arts and culture are one component of this conversation. In January 2010, the political right alluded to the projected nature of future relationships between arts institutions under a Conservative government. Speaking at the State of the Arts Conference the then shadow culture secretary, Jeremy Hunt indicated some of the critical features of Conservative arts and culture

² The Covid-19 crisis has prompted some uncertainty about the relevance of ACE's current ten-year plan, Let's Create. ACE launched the strategy in January 2020, but it will be delaying the delivery plan until later in 2020. In the meantime, ACE has announced a £160m emergency response package to support individuals and organisations impacted by the Covid-19 crisis. The package has been pieced together with government funds, reallocated funds and ACE's financial reserves (Pickford & Parker, 2019).

policies. Firstly, he indicated a move towards a “US-style culture of philanthropy” (Higgins, 2010) with less dependence on public money and private donations, forming the core of art institutions' income. Also, he announced that the government would cut England's arts budget by 30%, 15% of which the government would recoup from regularly funded organisations. Furthermore, the funding changes would ask ACE to halve its operating costs, just eighteen months after an organisational review that saw it cut its costs by 21% (ibid). Finally, Hunt indicated that the government would reassess the relationship between the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS (now Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport)).

Furthermore, Hunt suggested scrapping audience targets, maintaining free entry to museums and galleries and a Conservative commitment to a “mixed-economy funding model for the arts” (Higgins, 2010). A mixed-economy funding model combines elements of public enterprise and private enterprise. A combination of public subsidy and private sponsorship is one such combination; however, the preferred balance of these two elements can vary massively depending on the political stance of public policy. The Conservative party has overseen a period of protracted and aggressive privatisation of the public sector since taking power in 2010. For example, government health spending in England going to private health providers has risen by more than three-quarters since 2009 (Pym, 2019). Critics, such as the Labour party under Jeremy Corbyn (2015-2020), suggest that the trend of privatisation undermines the principles of universal access to health, education, welfare – by introducing profit-driven market forces into these sectors. In the case of contemporary art, there are similar anxieties but also specific concerns about how businesses, the art market and collectors may begin to exercise more influence over the production of art and its display in public spaces.

ACE has identified the financial pressures experienced by publicly-subsidised art organisations from 2010 onwards as fallout from austerity measures enacted by the coalition and Conservative governments following the 2008 financial crash (Harvey, 2016). However, this research can begin to present these shifts as a broader pattern of applying the social and economic values of neoliberalism to arts and culture through government policy. What distinguishes this research to that of studies of

New Labour's cultural policy is that it identifies a new and unique register to the adoption of neoliberal practices in public galleries in England. Whereas New Labour's cultural policy bargained with investment to achieve its aims, the Conservative party has threatened and delivered divestment. This trait creates a different existential register to previous phases of cultural policy and arts funding and this research delivers a unique insight into this phenomenon by exploring the points of tension and agreement in Bourdieu and Rancière's analysis of art and politics, whilst also suggesting strategies of resistance. This research is also unique in that it builds on existing quantitative data as well as qualitative data gathered specifically for this project. This research demonstrates how this shapes practices in the arts sector and how public galleries may become stunted fora for public debate and criticality. The marketisation of policy is a principal component of this; political decision-makers value the arts and culture in terms of their direct economic contribution or their relation to other policy areas. This is not a new relationship, but the balance has shifted so that economic rationale dominates decision-making. This process has the potential to alter the relationships and structures of cultural institutions, and the wider art world, by reinforcing policy and administrative structures favoured by the state and limiting the agency of organisations.

Furthermore, it has far-reaching consequences. As Jim McGuigan states, such changes are indicative of a "whole way of life of a civilisation, whereby, in the case of neoliberal capitalism, the autonomous value of culture is reduced to economic value" (2016, p. 3). This research can help to demonstrate that the funding squeeze experienced in the arts is symptomatic of a greater political shift that can threaten creative freedoms in the arts. Although it is impossible to identify a period where there was absolute creative freedom or autonomy, this research suggests that an indirect effect of restricted funding is the curtailing of creative freedom and criticality. As Robert Hewison suggests, neoliberal capitalism treats individuals as highly motivated competitors, and for the arts, this means a preference for the arts that pay, rather than the arts that cost (Hewison, 2014). The intensification of marketisation in the arts does not create a 'free' market; it constructs a prescribed market. Furthermore, incidents of direct censorship in the arts, such as the cancelled theatre

production, *Homegrown* (Ali, 2018), are suggestive of increased political scrutiny, as is the dwindling provision of arts and humanities subjects in British schools (Knott, 2019).

Importantly though, this research hopes to demonstrate that contemporary art organisations have a fundamental role in resisting exogenous influences in order to protect a diverse, creative, and critical public environment that is a functional aid to democratic actions based on equality, rather than an economic bottom line. Rancière bases his conception of democracy on equality, just as many other political theories do. However, there are important distinctions that have a bearing on how we define democracy and how art is related to this. "A politics of the Rancièrian kind, a politics that presupposes rather than distributes equality, is in an important way the inverse of traditional liberal political theory. Where the latter sees equality coming from the distributor to the people, Rancière sees equality coming from the people. It is a presupposition out of which they act, the presupposition of their equality. In democratic political action, people take the hierarchies of a given political and social order to be, as Rancière says, contingent rather than natural or inevitable" (May, 2010, p. 72). Rancière does not advocate art as simply an instrumental tool of his notion of democracy, though it can function in this way, but as one method of expressing criticality and cognisance. The transformative power of art represents a mode of conceiving, making, reading; one can transfigure these traits into challenging rooted patterns and structures of dominance. Rancière makes a convincing case for the vital relationship between art and politics:

Given that Rancière casts social formations as incorrigibly oligarchic, he conceptualizes both politics and artistic operations as capable of reconfiguring hegemonic perceptions of reality. In other words, art and politics share a potential to dispute any sense that existing meanings of sociocultural life are unassailable or inevitable.

At the heart of Rancière's characterization of democratic politics lies the supposition of the equality of all. This premise is situated as a guiding thread

of practices that struggle against institutionalized patterns of domination in all their forms.

(Ross, 2010, p. 152)

This research follows this formulation of the interaction between art and politics – they have the potential to affect and change established order. This can be deliberate or incidental and can occur both within and outside of existing structures of domination. Therefore, whilst galleries and museums funded through public money and subject to public policy are partly culpable for reproducing institutionalised domination, they are also potential vectors for resistance.

2010 is a watershed moment for cultural policy and arts funding in England. This investigation into the implementation of cultural policy and the response from art institutions is a vital process for assessing the current conditions in which public contemporary art galleries operate, and what their future might constitute. This line of enquiry also contributes to existing discourses regarding the value and role of arts institutions, and indeed the value of art itself. Furthermore, the research calls for an appraisal of marketisation in the arts and how contemporary art galleries assimilate or resist it. The research discusses the period, 2010-2018, and whilst this is the primary focus of this study, it also considers recent and more distant contexts. In addressing what the state of cultural policy is during this timeframe, there has to be some acknowledgement of what preceded it. For example, Nicholas Garnham says "historically there was a clear division between policy towards the arts, based broadly on principles of patronage and enlightenment and on assumptions of an inherent opposition between art and commerce" (Garnham, 2005, p. 16). 2010 is by no means presented as a singular tipping point between historical and contemporary funding ecologies and their associated policy arenas. However, it is deserving of investigation because of the sweeping changes across public policy and the ongoing impact of a decade where governments have scaled back public spending. The depth of cuts across public spending is so severe that the Conservative party autumn budget, 2019, had 'additional' spending commitments that were, in reality, only able to alleviate proposed funding cuts. The Institute of Fiscal Studies stated

that "the Chancellor will need to find a way to fund an extra £5 billion of spending next year, relative to plans published at the Spring Statement, just to avoid cuts to other public services. Increasing spending on other priority areas would require even greater funding" and that there is little suggestion that spending pledges are sustainable (Crawford et al., 2019).

This research draws on many sources. Chapter Three explores these in detail, and this section offers an initial introduction to principal authors and their texts. The existing research and material related to the subject of this thesis is varied and occupies many critical positions. Firstly, there is a robust research community concentrated in the UK that is concerned with cultural policy and cultural institutions, and they provide an essential blueprint for the essential points of reference for any exploration of present-day cultural policy. Secondly, there is a keen interest in the dynamics of art and institutions' interests from several prominent North American and European art historians and critics. These figures offer a distinct perspective to policyorientated research as it is more responsive to the discourses within artistic practice, as opposed to policy arenas. Finally, the relationship between art and politics as explored by several contemporary philosophers and cultural theorists forms a significant body of work related to this thesis.

Literature is abundant, both contemporary and historical, that addresses the relationship between art, art organisations and politics. However, the critical framing of this literature can vary significantly and have more or less focus on the specificities of policy. Cultural policy studies, museum studies and cultural economics are areas that engage with some of the critical concerns of this thesis (see section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion of these research areas). Dave O'Brien (O'Brien, 2014; 2015; O'Brien & Miles, 2010) David Hesmondhalgh (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt, 2005; Hesmondhalgh, 2006; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015a; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b , Andy C Pratt (2011) Kate Oakley (Oakley & O'Connor, 2015; Oakley et al., 2017) Clive Gray (2000; 2007; 2008; 2010; 2015; 2017) Nicholas Garnham (2005), Bruno S. Frey (Frey, 2000; Frey & Meier, 2006), Tony Bennett (1995; 2005; Bennett et al., 2009; Bennett & Savage, 2004), Eleonora Belfiore (2009; 2015; Belfiore & Bennett, 2008), Oliver Bennett (2015), Jim

McGuigan (1992; 1996; 1997; 1999; 2004; 2005; 2009; 2016) and David Throsby (2010) have all published key works discussing cultural policy, museology, creative industries and meaning-making, often within a British context. The New Labour governments under Tony Blair (1997-2007) and Gordon Brown (2007-2010) have been covered extensively by these and other authors, and this period is a crucial reference point for both the changing nature of cultural policy and the academic discourse that informs and responds to it.

There are also vital texts emerging that respond directly to the current political contexts of a coalition and conservative governments and the issue of cultural funding. Jim McGuigan has written about the relationship between capitalism, global free-markets and the production and circulation of culture. His 2016 text *Neoliberal Culture* is a recent response about such conditions and the arts. Jack Newsinger is another figure to make a cogent analysis of the impact of economic policy on arts and culture. His 2015 paper in *Culture & Society* analyses how the creative industries have endured the austerity measures introduced following the 2008 financial crash. Various critical perspectives have approached the relationship between marketisation and public services often with a focus on healthcare and education. Roger Brown (Brown & Carasso, 2013), Mike Molesworth (Molesworth et al., 2010) and Schwiter (Schwiter et al., 2015). Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) and Gray (2000) are figures who have identified marketisation of cultural policy in a UK context.

There have also been many public reports and studies produced by ACE, DCMS and independent think tanks. For example, ACE and the New Local Government Network (NLGN) produced the 2016 report *Funding Arts and Culture in a Time of Austerity* (Harvey, 2016) and it highlighted the impact of austerity measures and potential responses to them. This example highlights the continuing relationship between ACE and several think tanks concerned with public policy. The 2016 publication (Department for Culture Media & Sport, 2016) of the first white paper on cultural policy since Jennie Lee's 1965 white paper (J. Lee, 1965) has indicated the governments continued interest in this area. However, the paper's contents largely synthesise existing cultural policy found in budgets or communicated through

speeches, rather than representing a cogent plan to develop a national cultural policy as the 1965 white paper did. Several ACE and think tank reports have covered issues such as participation in the arts, notions of value in the arts and the distribution of resources to regions and organisations. Public reports offer a direct response to cultural policy and the ways government and government-sponsored bodies implement it. There have been several responses to the 2016 Culture White Paper; for example, in 2017, DCMS commissioned the Mendoza Review (Mendoza, 2017). The review advocated for a more joined-up approach to the existing museum and gallery network. Art Fund and the Wolfson Foundation commissioned *Why Collect* (Cannadine, 2018) which heavily criticised the Mendoza Review because it overlooked the foundational issues within the arts and culture sector. The report cited chronic underinvestment, poor staff morale and the avoidance of government departments in acknowledging the scale of the decline of the arts sector in the 2010s.

The Mendoza Review offered little reassurance to the museums and galleries it addressed. If the government did not invest, initiatives and structural tweaks would not reverse underinvestment. However, in October 2019, DCMS and Culture Secretary, Nicky Morgan announced £250 million of new investment over five years, through the 'Culture Investment Fund' (Department for Digital Culture Media & Sport, 2019). The announcement prompted messages of support from some senior figures in the culture sector. ACE Chair, Sir Nick Serota stated that, "this additional and very significant investment is exciting news for culture and for communities across the country" and that, "we are grateful to the Secretary of State and to the government for responding so positively" (ibid).

Although the investment would have some benefit across the sector, many professionals and commentators derided the announcement, with some suggesting that the bulk of the funds were not new at all, that the government made the announcement in anticipation of the December 2019 general election and that Serota's comments were suggestive of the growing disconnect between ACE and the arts. Liz Hill, writing in *Arts Professional*, described the investment plan as "a sticking plaster on a patient with a life-threatening injury" (2019). She goes on to

state that the ACE has become increasingly politicised and that for the arts, it is hard to perceive it as an independent arm's-length body. Instead, she says, "ACE has become an integral part of a political agenda to clip the wings of local government" (ibid). Robert Hewison (2019) made similar claims in *Arts Professional* with regards to ACE's ten-year strategy, in that the strategy appeared to be more concerned with securing the bureaucratic future of ACE instead supporting the organisations it funds and advocates.

Furthermore, Hill states that the arts have been marginalised through funding decisions but also because successive Conservative governments have pushed arts policy to the fringes. She says, "as for the Government, it has made its attitude towards the sector crystal clear. In 2017 DCMS downgraded 'Culture' to the portfolio of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, separating it from the 'Creative Industries' which remained under the wing of a Minister of State" (Hill, 2019). Much of the critical analysis of the reports and reviews since 2010 has suggested that the Government's interest in the arts is primarily about bringing it in line with other policy areas. This process means the introduction of market forces into public galleries and the arts sector and DCMS exerting greater control over ACE to fulfil this vision.

Discussions regarding the relationship between artistic production, display and the political and economic contexts in which these occur have also taken place amongst artists, art historians and critics. Artistic movements and individuals have engaged with these issues, and exhibitions and written analysis have covered it extensively. For example, early avant-garde movements such as Dadaism and mid-twentieth-century movements such as CoBrA and the Situationist International brought into focus artists' reactions to the political contexts they worked in and how art functioned in wider society. Artists associated with the practice of 'institutional critique' (directly engaging with the structures of power inherent in museums or other features of cultural life) include Daniel Buren who posited art as public property, (Mariño, 2007, pp. 5-8) and figures such as Louise Lawler, Andrea Fraser, Lawrence Weiner, Hans Haacke, Marcel Broodthaers. Their work and the critical responses to it form part of a large body of artistic practice that acknowledges how markets interact with and shape artistic practice. It also asserts that artistic production and display act as a

vital method for exposing how institutions, such as art galleries and museums, obfuscate power dynamics, finances and labour relations.

Although there is a history of patronage and market interest in the arts, the understanding of what art is and what constitutes a financial market, has not remained fixed. Larry Shiner's 2001 text, *The Invention of Art* (2001), responded to the philosophical and aesthetic discourses of the 1990s that focussed on defining art, particularly the writings of figures such as Arthur Danto and Morris Weitz and instead developed a genealogy of art. He contended that the myriad developments during the long eighteenth century (Shiner defines this as the 1680s to the 1830s) culminated in a notion of art that is recognisable today. That is a complex cultural form that is semi-autonomous and operates within modern society (ibid). Before the eighteenth century, artistic production was financed mainly by the aristocratic classes, who commissioned works to their specifications. The emergence of the bourgeoisie during the long eighteenth century meant that there was a wealthy social class who would emulate the cultural practices of the aristocracy, such as collecting art. A key difference was that whilst the aristocracy had the financial means to commission art, the bourgeoisie tended to purchase existing works from artists or an emerging art market. For Shiner, this is a crucial development in our collective understanding of when a modern notion of art and artistic production crystallises. This occurrence also marks the beginnings of a tension particular to modernity. This is the tension between the creative liberty artists could enjoy by extricating themselves from the artist-patron dynamic and the fact that the ability to make a living as an artist required one to produce work per the tastes and trends of the art market. Public institutions, such as museums, galleries, libraries, communicated the *intent* of artistic autonomy but failed to deliver this fully.

Similar dynamics play out in contemporary art practices. In a 2014 interview, Shiner stated, "the shibboleth that art and money should have nothing to do with each other, that 'pure' art is not affected by the dynamics of monetary value, has become a new hurdle for artists" (Mansour, 2014). Public art museums and galleries (in democratic nations) are spaces where semi-autonomous art practice can thrive. However, artists and critics concerned with 'institutional critique' and contemporary critiques of the

publicly funded art sector in England, either overtly state or imply the erosion of even semi-autonomy. Whereas the art market is implicitly and visibly transactional, art museums and galleries can conceal transactions through the conventions of philanthropy, sponsorship and patronage. The bureaucracy of institutions can enable concealment, but so can a collective perception that they are reified (semi)-autonomous spaces. Marketisation promotes monetary value-systems, and the marketisation of cultural policy prompts a monetary valuation of visual art.

Several contemporary commentators have discussed artistic production and display in the context of global capitalism and the organisational practices borne from this. Julian Stallabrass, Luc Boltanski, Arnaud Esquerre, Boris Groys, Hito Steyerl and Sven Lütticken are particularly active in this area. For example, Julian Stallabrass (2006; 2014) has discussed the rebranding of the Tate galleries and the concurrent restructuring of the organisation in relation to the increased presence of neoliberal forces in arts and culture. He suggests that the Tate galleries are a vital reference point for identifying trends in the complex interaction between the world of money and the art world. He suggests that branding is fundamentally about finance rather than culture and an example of conscious political pressure to push galleries into the arms of private partners (2014). Luc Boltanski and Arnaud Esquerre (2016) have examined art's relation to other areas of commerce, such as the luxury goods market, and Boris Groys (2008; 2016) has discussed art's position in post-communist states and how changing political structures impact the dynamics of artistic production. Sven Lütticken (2012; 2014; 2017) has also developed a position arguing that signifiers of global capitalism imbue the aesthetic coding of art.

The previous paragraph outlined several commentators who have tended to follow an art historical trajectory and their practices have directly informed curatorial projects and criticism in contemporary visual art publications and platforms such as *e-flux*, *Artforum*, *Frieze*, amongst others. The relationship with art and politics is also a key discourse in the tradition of continental philosophy. This focus differs from the aforementioned art historical approach in several distinct ways. Firstly, although discourse of art and art histories is key, it tends to be a component of continental philosophy, rather than a singular anchor point. Linked to this point is the fact that

continental philosophy offers complex ontological and epistemological theories that elucidate and critique phenomena. Thus, as a philosophical tradition, it is broad and expansive.

Although continental philosophy represents a range of positions and lines of inquiry, there are several thinkers whose writings are particularly relevant to the subject of this thesis. For example, Jacques Rancière (2004; 2008; 2013) has written extensively on the relationship between art and politics. His critiques are variously in agreement with or in opposition to key contemporary thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze (1988; 1994; 2004), Jacques Derrida (2006) and Antonio Negri (2004; 2009; Guattari & Negri, 2010; Hardt & Negri, 2004). These discussions tend to orientate around the issues of the aesthetic experience, the politics of art and its wider relationship with democracy.

Also relevant to this thesis are works by figures such as Michel Foucault (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006; Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, 2002b, 2002a, 2006b, 2006a) and Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1986, 1994, 1996, 1998; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Foucault's body of work engages with power and knowledge and has been a formative influence on those conceptualising the dynamics of power and knowledge in cultural institutions, a point that Tony Bennett, (1995; Bennett et al., 2009) has explored in his work. For example, the 2009 text, *Culture, Class, Distinction* Bennett moves his focus from Foucault to Bourdieu and argues that taste and cultural capital shape and stratify British society in the early 21st century, but the awareness of this is less pronounced than in the French society Bourdieu studied.

ACE has also supported the exploration of class and cultural tastes through their research. For example, Bunting et al. (2008) explored patterns of artistic engagement. They found that social status, education and ethnicity remain significant indicators in the participation and engagement, even though there was no longer an entrenched connection between an elite social class and high art in an English context. Bourdieu's sociological studies have directly engaged with artistic production, and researchers have applied his field theory to demonstrate agency-structure dynamics in these areas. His work has had an influence across disciplines

as well as contributing to a wider sociological interest in the artistic production (Howard Becker's *Art Worlds* (1982) being another foundational text).

The opening section of this thesis begins to introduce a variety of discourses that inform this research and also broader considerations of the interaction between art and politics. As this section has indicated, there are explicitly philosophical discussions as well as those that are policy orientated. This thesis references this broad spectrum of research. It will also explore niche issues specific to the recent political history of England and the phenomena associated with it.

1.2 The research value

This thesis draws on existing research, but it is primarily concerned with the recent political history of England. It focusses on the Coalition and Conservative governments from 2010 to 2018, while also acknowledging the potential pace of change to arts funding following the Conservative party victory in the 2019 general election. Concerning this period, the research identifies gaps and potential issues in what has preceded it. For example, several texts are exploring cultural policy and the arts under New Labour with Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015b) asking if we might consider New Labour's policies to be neoliberal. Robert Hewison (2014) has written on the development and recent iterations of ACE and offers a vital commentary on the legacy of New Labour's policy initiatives. There are commentaries and analysis of the post-2010 governments, but they are often reports or articles outside of an academic context. For example, *Arts Professional* and *The Guardian* have traced arts funding and policy, but there are few examples of a wide-ranging exploration of the nature of the arts under conservative governments. Furthermore, the period under scrutiny in this thesis prompts an investigation of political and economic factors that are still unfolding and are not fully known. Figures such as Hesmondhalgh and Hewison have explored the Labour years in detail, but my contribution is a thorough analysis of the conservative policies since 2010. The media has discussed these factors and their relationship with cultural institutions, but this 'live' issue is yet to be discussed comprehensively in a research context. Secondly, commentators have discussed marketisation concerning public funding in

the UK since the emergence of neoliberal policies in the 1980s. Recently, healthcare and education in the UK have come under particular scrutiny from the Labour party, as they suggest market forces encourage social division.

What is notable is that the coverage of this issue outside of the specialised arts press has tended to consider arts and culture as a secondary concern. The main parties in the 2019 general election spoke little of their respective positions on arts funding and policy; instead, Brexit, the NHS and education dominated the debate. Although this is not surprising, it is suggestive of how since 2010, other issues have pushed the public discourse around art to the periphery of English politics. However, the moral and ethical considerations of arts funding have emerged in conjunction with the notion of the 'new museology' in the late 1980s (Vergo, 1989), as a vital point of discussion amongst art professionals, commentators, and audiences alike. The 'new museology' prompted a turn to socially-minded, ethically responsible cultural spaces, and this quality continues to resonate in current discussions about arts funding. For example, the criticism and lawsuits targeted at the Sackler family and their alleged culpability in the opioid epidemic in North America has prompted many high-profile galleries, both in the UK and abroad, to sever funding arrangements with the trust funded by the Sacklers (Associated Press, 2019; Badshah & Walters, 2019; Chrisafis, 2019; Chrisafis & Walters, 2019; Perraudin & Neate, 2019; Walters, 2019b, 2019a). The media focus on this issue throughout 2019 is evidence of the interest in funding issues in the arts and the timely nature of research that further explores the details of this.

Another point that makes this research pertinent and relevant to academic and public discourse is that, whilst diffuse criticisms of capitalism, neoliberalism and austerity exist, these criticisms are often without a research-led focus on arts and culture. Jim McGuigan (2004, 2009, 2016) is a notable exception, as are figures such as the academic and cultural critic Mark Fisher (2009, 2014, 2016; Fisher & Gilbert, 2014), who was until his death in 2017, a central figure on the Visual Cultures degree at Goldsmiths, University of London and the writer and academic Joe Kennedy (2018). They write on many aspects of contemporary culture and its relationship to capitalism and whilst visual art, and its related institutions are a component of their

discussions, it is not as central to analysis as literature, music, and film. This research can complement the nature and tone of the writers as mentioned above in that it can make a case for the radical reformation of the relationship between art, culture and politics. Furthermore, the unique focus on the public or public-private institutions that form a constellation of artistic production, policymaking and public engagement in the arts offers a specific site of cultural-political action where radical left positions can exert influence and effect change. This research is a vital and timely intervention as the current structures that support the arts in England face an existential threat and the conversation around this must graduate from asking how we 'save' the arts, but rather, ask what kind of art system do we want? Cooperative systems of governance and the application of Rancièrian 'politics' can offer frameworks for an arts sector that reduces rather than reproduces socio-cultural hierarchies.

Thirdly, this thesis incorporates a range of literature, but a limitation is how various critical positions speak across disciplines. There are, of course, exceptions, but addressing the disciplinary isolation of some discussions of art and politics is essential for establishing a cogent direction for this thesis. Finally, the range of cultural institutions that could fall under the scope of this study precludes an exhaustive case-study led piece of research. However, this offers the opportunity to explore organisations that are not a common point of reference in news coverage of arts funding. The DCMS directly funds National museums and galleries, and they are often the subject of much media coverage due to their scale, prestige, and geographical location. There is considerable research value in incorporating case studies and subjects that highlight the similarities and differences between arts organisations, as this can provide cogent insight for arts professionals, organisations, and policymakers concerned with different scales of organisation.

In response to these gaps and issues, this thesis will offer a unique position and critical approach, whilst also responding to a 'live' issue. This thesis will begin to establish a critical terrain that locates art institutions within David Cameron and Theresa May's terms in office. This focus can contribute to similar research focussing on the Blair and Brown eras, or New Labour, and extend it further. This

thesis will also present marketisation as a critical agent in the formation of cultural policy and identify the relationship with contemporary art galleries. This detail is essential for distinguishing the unique aspects of Conservative-led policy since 2010, whilst also responding to the complex critical and theoretical terrain of art worlds. In response to the varying disciplinary perspectives, this thesis will practice interdisciplinarity. Furthermore, this critical approach will consider recently founded and pre-existing public gallery spaces as a nexus for many different critical voices and exogenous powers.

1.3 Research questions – aims and objectives

This research engages with the relationship between the marketisation of cultural policy and the practice in England's public contemporary art galleries. It is a study of the political, economic, and social conditions that inform the shaping and delivery of cultural policy, and how policy, in turn, affects the practice, values and theory in the art world. The aims and objectives of this research are as follows:

The first aim of this research is to critically review the theoretical and practical terrain concerned with public art galleries and their practices. In order to do this, there are several objectives the research will cover. This research will discuss the development of public art galleries in urban areas and identify the different considerations with 'contemporary' art as opposed to historical art in a public context. This research will also explore and identify the varying contexts in which societies found contemporary art galleries. England is the primary focus of this project, but some comparison with the broader national context, as well as European and North American museum and gallery funding. Furthermore, this research will discuss the critical responses to the cultural infrastructure in England and its relation to broader global contexts.

Another aim of this research is to critically review the relationship between publicly-funded contemporary art galleries and cultural policy stakeholders. In order to address this, there will be a review of the funding changes in the arts at national, arm's-length, local and organisational levels. Related to this is an attempt to define 'cultural policy' as understood by the arts. In response to the understanding of

cultural policy in this research, the project will contextualise the development of cultural policy at local and national levels. Central to this research is the concept of marketisation and consequentially the project will forward a definition 'marketisation' as understood in an arts policy context. Crucial to this aspect of the research is the engagement with case-studies across a variety of regions and in order to identify continuities and differences.

The third aim of this research is to critically analyse the construction or reconstruction of organisational identity in publicly-funded contemporary art galleries. This aim will require a review of the literature concerned with organisational identity, which in turn will enable identification of the core funders in the selected case studies. It will also be necessary to investigate the key datasets used by arts organisations and ACE. This reporting data will be vital in developing a nuanced understanding of the policy trends and practices in place. Related to these points is the analysis of the central relationships within and between art galleries, and their local, national, and international contexts. Also, this work will assess how the core charitable activities, particularly exhibitions, articulate or contribute to organisational identity.

The fourth aim of this research is to critically assess the extent to which marketised cultural policy represents a break or continuation of market forces in public contemporary art galleries. In order to address this aim, the research will consider whether public galleries' artistic output is in isolation of political and economic forces and it will explore the dynamics of institutional power in art worlds and how the market mediates this. Furthermore, there will be a discussion of how arts professionals respond to managing the relationship between artistic output and funding. Related to this point is an analysis of the alternative or standard funding streams outside of public funds and the implications of pursuing these revenues. This discussion will also prompt an evaluation of whether the relationship between public contemporary art galleries and artists is changing.

A final aim of this research is to critically evaluate findings and suggest potential future relationships between publicly-funded contemporary art galleries and their primary stakeholders. This aim will involve attempting to identify 'future' conceptions for the role of public contemporary art galleries and identifying how current and future political contexts might encourage or inhibit these roles.

Throughout this research, there is a discussion of the key concepts and metaphors for understanding how contemporary art galleries perceive their current and future function. The idea of the 'public' and the relationship between visual art and democratic societies is vital to this. Furthermore, this research will identify and evaluate alternative models of funding in a global context.

There are many recurring concerns, questions, and routes of inquiry in this research project. The following overarching themes will influence the direction of the project.

To summarise, this research aims to investigate how and to what extent the marketisation of public policy has affected the development and delivery of cultural policy. It will analyse the response by public contemporary art galleries to policy directives in terms of funding and their core charitable objectives. This will then be a platform to discuss the ideological, political, and theoretical implications of cultural policy practices in terms of cultural value, artistic autonomy, and agency.

Further to this, some questions continue to shape the direction of this research project. For example, it asks what are the genealogies of cultural policy in England, and how have their rationales altered under successive governments? What are the theoretical justifications of marketised cultural policy and how does this conflict sectoral values? [SEP] How has the practice of public contemporary art galleries adapted to the funding climate? [SEP] How is artistic autonomy protected in the negotiation between political institutions and cultural organisations? How do the dynamics of power alter as the relationships between public funding, private support and contemporary art organisations change? There are not necessarily clear and definitive answers to these questions, yet they form an essential tone to the critical approach of this research and its intrinsic themes.

1.4 Limitations

This section will highlight some of the limitations of this research project. Some of these points are unique to this specific research, whereas we might see others as generalised issues apparent in any qualitative methodology. The limitations described here were, where possible, acknowledged at critical moments during the research. In order to mitigate the limiting factors present in this research, it was necessary to be reflexive and responsive to expected and unexpected challenges.

One unavoidable limitation is time. Whilst a crucial step in any research is to develop a methodology that can explore the research questions comprehensively, it is also vital that the scope of the project matches the time within which it must be completed (Giddens, 2009). As a result of this condition, this research is not an exhaustive investigation of every visual arts NPO as the scale of this project would not be realisable within a three to four-year timespan with the resources available to a PhD student. Instead, the research focusses on qualitative data from a smaller number of case studies and gathers publicly available quantitative data to contextualise the broader portfolio.

There are benefits of fieldwork forming a component of qualitative data gathering and the focus on several case studies has produced richer information than purely documentary based research (Giddens, 2009). However, this has meant that there has been a smaller sample of case studies which makes more comprehensive generalisations based on this research more difficult to justify. Another limitation of this research is the fact that the organisations and arts professionals who agreed to allow access and participate had time to commit to it and a willingness to do so. Contacted organisations that declined to participate, or did not respond to correspondence, may have offered a different insight into the questions and ideas discussed. There are notable omissions from this research. LAs, DCMS and ACE were contacted and asked to participate, however after repeated attempts, none of these responded to either accept or decline participation. Although this is a loss, the focus of the research, in terms of interviews, was firmly on galleries as public spaces.

Another aspect that we could perceive as a limitation is the use of interviews and the interview dynamics inherent to them. Interviews are a vital method for engaging with individuals in a sector or field who have specialist insight; but they have the potential to affect the responses of the participants because of the interviewer's presence (Giddens, 2009, pp. 50-52). There are of course ways to mitigate these factors or scenarios, but bringing a specific subject matter to the attention of an interviewee and discussing that expansively will potentially elicit responses that the participant may infer as being more applicable to the critical position of the interviewer.

Conversely, there is also the potential for the participant to push specific points and resist more delicate subject matters. The difficulty in this situation is that there is not necessarily a balanced power dynamic. The position of a PhD student is relatively low in the academic field, whereas directors or similar senior staff in a public art gallery are at the top of their professional field. This situation may mean that there is a need to gain the confidence and trust of participants (Giddens, 2009) without compromising the critical nature of the research. Part of the research process is the ability to develop a knowledge and awareness of one's structural position in a field (Leavy, 2014). Throughout the research process, this consideration tempered how participants were recruited and were interviewed and, in some cases, it meant overlooking contradictions or inconsistencies between the perceptions of participants and the available quantitative data. Although, there were instances where inconsistencies were clarified, and there was a degree of mutual agreement between interviewer and interviewee, there was also a benefit to allowing interviewees to speak uninterrupted so that their narrative could become apparent. This tactic was useful as it reveals convergence and divergence from the more prescriptive narrative and defence of public subsidy in the arts and the push towards private funding. Eleonora Belfiore (2009) refers the tendency of 'bullshit' in cultural policy practice and research circulating either because it is politically prudent or there is a simple lack of concern with the truth (343). The rhetorical defence of public subsidised art is an entrenched aspect of the art world in England. In allowing space for these to be aired there is also the chance to critique them and question how different professional communities and audiences adopt preferred rhetoric or conventions.

Another limitation, (Giddens, 2009) albeit only a minor one for this research, was the use of audio-only to record interviews. It was not possible to film interviews, nor was it particularly necessary. However, this does mean that there is no record of visual cues such as facial expressions, which could have the potential to be another interpretive component of the data gathered. Related to this point is the fact that interviews sometimes took place in noisy, public settings, and this impacted on the clarity of the audio. Although the vast majority of the audio is legible, there are nonetheless inaudible sections. Despite the limitations of interviews as a primary source of data, combining interviews with other approaches and resources in the research mitigated any potential issues (Brinkmann, 2014; Leavy, 2014; Simons, 2014).

Finally, although the optimal position of a researcher might be to adopt what Haraway calls the "God trick" which is akin to "seeing everything from nowhere," (Haraway, 1988 in Leavy, 2014, p. 171), this is not always possible. In section 1.6, which offers some context about my background and how this is relevant to this research, the points described do hold and will continue to hold some influence over the reading and interpretation of critical aspects of this hindrance. This issue may well be a limiting factor. However, it is also an essential aspect of my ability to gain access to the organisations and participants that form an indispensable component of the research, as well as supporting knowledge and understanding of arts organisations and the internal structures within them.

1.5 Thesis structure

This section will provide an overview of the thesis structure. Chapter Two introduces some of the key terms, such as marketisation, that the thesis uses throughout the research and the debates associated with these terms. Also, this chapter gives the key moments that have influenced the primary period of investigation, 2010-2018, additional context. Chapters Two and Three offer a summary of the critical literature referenced in this research and then presents information about the methodology and case studies, as well as a summary of the key literature and research areas that will influence this research. Chapter Two discusses a variety of existing disciplinary and theoretical approaches that are relevant to this research. There is an in-depth

exploration of key concepts in the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Rancière, and this informs the philosophical trajectory of the thesis. Chapter Three goes into detail about the methodological foundations of this research, such as the research design and methods. Following this, there is an overview of the ethical considerations in this research and the methodology used.

Chapter Four covers in detail the development of cultural policy in England, the formative institutions in this development and the subsequent institutions still in existence during the main timeframe of this research. This chapter gives particular focus to New Labour and the influence it held over cultural policy and how this has shaped contemporary perceptions of the role and function of arts and culture in society. This chapter also covers the turn from New Labour to the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition and the impact this has had on cultural policy and public spending. This chapter offers a cogent analysis of the development of cultural policy in England and the contemporary issues surrounding it, particularly marketisation, in order to demonstrate that these issues are comprehensively understood.

Chapter Five narrows the focus of the research on the marketisation of cultural policy, firstly by identifying critical quantitative and qualitative data to evidence the development of the phenomenon. This chapter focusses on one indicator of marketisation, which is the reduction of public spending. The chapter also explores the consistencies and inconsistencies of changes to funding as well as the reactions to this from various critical positions. The research references academics, politicians, public servants, arts professionals, and cultural commentators throughout in order to illustrate the variety of interests in the practices of public galleries. This chapter functions as the first of three chapters that analyse the prevalence of marketisation and its impact on public galleries.

Chapter Six follows on from Chapter Five in its focus on the features of marketisation. Specifically, Chapter Six explores sponsorship of the arts and public spaces by corporate bodies or related philanthropic organisations. This chapter discusses the benefits and limitations of sponsorship, and much like the preceding chapter, it incorporates critical viewpoints from several positions, not just academic

literature. The third of the related chapters, Chapter Seven, discusses centralisation and decentralisation as another key identifiable component of marketisation. This chapter will position the case studies and broader visual arts national portfolio within a context of shifting positions of power. This chapter suggests that this phenomenon is centralising some forms of capital, whilst decentralising others. These chapters will offer the reader a detailed analysis of critical aspects of marketisation, and it will also advance the critical arguments developed throughout the thesis.

Chapter Eight will act as a conclusion to the thesis, and it will outline the key findings of the research. The research will assess these findings in terms of their contribution and addition to the body of knowledge concerned with the subjects of this study, as well as identifying areas that future research could follow up. There will also be the opportunity to reflect on the research both as a set of findings and as a process. Elements of the conclusion discuss occurrences outside of the primary period studied and it discusses several factors that came to the fore after 2018 that are significant in their impact on various policy areas. The appendices and references follow the concluding chapter.

Throughout this text I will follow some simple frameworks to structure the argument I develop. I will identify the problems and issues of marketisation, both general and specific to the arts in England. This includes the negotiation of public and private funding, political rhetoric versus the socio-economic 'reality' of marketisation and increased economic and political centralisation. Evidence of marketisation in England's public-funded arts is provided throughout and from a variety of sources. Official statistics and reports from government and NDPBs regarding funding and the scale of ACE NPOs is presented. This is coupled with specific responses from NPOs through interviews and sectoral responses in the form of reports and articles. I also return to theoretical aspects of arts policy and the role of art in contemporary societies. The former translates well into practice, the latter is more complex. I believe that omitting fundamental philosophical questions about the nature of art would avoid a discourse at the heart of the very production and display of art. Of course, this is fraught with difficulty. Art is an unresolved philosophical question, not

just a policy one, and I can only offer insight, not resolution of these fronts. These are problems, yes, but without fixed solutions.

I argue that there are unique features of arts policy and practice since 2010. I point to the restructuring of local government, specific policy changes affecting the arts, the change in the rhetoric surrounding arts and culture, the centralisation of financial and political power in London and the partisan abdication of responsibility by central government. These points contribute to embedded market logics in the arts. I also point out that there are continuities with previous governments and that the Arts Council has deep historic flaws. Further to this, I point to the fact that the arts in England have had various periods of success and failure and the navigation of crisis is nothing new. I try to introduce some approaches for engineering positive change based on democratic equality. This framing of art's essential qualities may be vital strategy in contesting the influence of national politics on the practice of public galleries in England and prompt a concerted sectoral effort to shift discourse away from economic rationale.

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter introduces several critical elements covered in this research. Firstly, it discusses the context and primary subject matter, and the specific research focus of this project established. This chapter introduces the concept of cultural policy and marketisation and posits that marketisation is a defining factor of policy directives in England between 2010 and 2018. Furthermore, this chapter clarifies the specific focus of contemporary visual arts organisations in the national portfolio, and it indicates what this excludes. It highlights the importance of arts organisations as spaces where marketisation is negotiated and experienced. Vitally, it begins to elaborate on how we might understand the system in which cultural policy and marketisation proliferate. The concept of art worlds is vital to this work as it helps to position art institutions within a complex system of production and display. At the beginning of this chapter van Maanen (van Maanen, 2009) comments on how an understanding of the organisation of art is a route to understanding the function of art in society. This detail is a fundamental point to be aware of throughout this thesis. The questions that this research seeks to answer, for example, include asking how funding

contexts impact on the practice in public contemporary art galleries. Within this, there is the implicit questioning of how art functions in society and how this might be changing.

With this foundational understanding of what an art world consists of, we can start to explore the specific conditions of the public subsidised production and reception of artworks in an English context from 2010. Later chapters refine and challenge the terminology and conceptual frameworks vital to this research, which allows us to consider how art worlds, or fields, experience change and how the limits of these concepts are put under strain in the specific conditions explored in this thesis.

Although this chapter establishes some essential parameters and points of reference, it is necessary to note that the complex interactions between art, politics and the publics that form these arenas are not fully resolved or reconciled. Kate Oakley and Justin O'Connor (2015, pp. 24-25) make this observation and refer to quotes from Harney (2010) and Hobsbawm (2013) to illustrate the fluctuations of how we experience art and consequently, how disciplines academic communities research areas such as cultural studies. Harney states the following:

Art is closer to people than at any other time in history. People make and compile music. They design interiors and make-over their bodies. They watch more television and more movies. They think deeply about food and clothes. They write software and surf the net of music videos and play online games together. They encounter, study, learn and evaluate languages, diasporas and heritages. There is also a massive daily practice in the arts, from underground music, to making gardens, to creative writing camps. And with this there is production of subjectivities which are literally fashioned, which are aesthetic, which are created. ... There is a massive daily register of judgment, critique, attention, and taste.

(Harney, 2010, p. 437)

Conversely, Hobsbawm perceives the expansion of artistic and cultural experience as undermining the experiential and emotive quality of art. He says:

At the end of the twentieth century the work of art not only became lost in the spate of words, sounds and images in the universal environment that once would have been called 'art', but also vanished in this dissolution of aesthetic experience in the sphere where it is impossible to distinguish between feelings that have developed within us and those that have been brought in from outside. In these circumstances, how can we speak of art?

(Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 46)

These two comments are illustrative of the difficulty of speaking for an entire sector, profession, academic discipline, or indeed the interaction between art and everyday life. However, a point to glean from these assertions is that regardless of whether something is or is not classified as an art object, we exist in an environment of proliferating signs and language, in which the shared public semiotic understanding is constantly in flux, without a coda. Gallery spaces continue to be consecrated spaces where the navigation of this world is deferred to those who have traditionally been held to understand its particularities. If this thesis' main task is to explore marketisation in an art world, an accompanying investigation into the criticality of that art world must take place simultaneously. Over chapters Two and Two, the critical debates surrounding art and politics are discussed. There are theoretical issues that are part of a broader discussion in continental philosophy about the dynamics of power in our social world and how knowledge is formed and received. There are also implications on the issues of how we study the interplay between art and politics and how different approaches open or foreclose certain assertions and findings. Chapter Two sets out some different approaches for a project such as this and then outlines the methods used in this research.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Chapter Two: Art and Politics - Navigating Theory and Locating Practice.

2 Introduction

Cultural policy is, in this sense, a site for the production of cultural citizens, with the cultural industries providing not only a ream of representations about oneself and others, but a series of rationales for particular types of conduct (Lewis & Miller, 2003, p. 1)

The quote by Lewis & Miller is indicative of the close interplay of art and politics. If cultural policy is concerned with the production of cultural citizens, it is a means for policymakers to assert the ideal cultural lineage of a nation, region or locality. However, as this thesis explores, the conduct, rationales and representations of public contemporary art galleries in England is contested from outside and within the sector.

This chapter addresses major theoretical points relevant to this research. I suggest that some of the theoretical approaches detailed in this chapter can help to greater understand what is happening, why and how the sector might articulate and enact positive change. For example, it presents Bourdieu's field theory as a way to understand the shape and dynamics of the arts in England. The chapter also begins to explore how Rancièrian 'politics' can shift socio-cultural hierarchies underpinned by marketisation, more democratic practices based of the presupposition of equality. The chapter reviews the various academic literature that has informed this research and constitutes the disciplinary framework of cultural policy studies and the study of art institutions. There is considerable variation in the different disciplinary approaches to researching museums, galleries and processes of cultural production and this chapter serves to acknowledge this variety and to indicate the relationship between the literature discussed and the critical positions put forward in my analyses of the critical issues and phenomena identified in this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter will establish the primary ontological and epistemological assertions forwarded by my analysis. We can think of the ontological questions inherent in this

research in terms of the nature and being of art, its institutions, and politics. These are, of course, broad and expansive areas with their rich history of philosophical study and the focus of this research is not an exhaustive analysis of the ontology of art, or politics. However, these philosophical notions are crucial to establishing the terrain of a critical discussion of art and politics, as an investigation of their relationship must also question why and how they are of significance.

Related to a discussion of the ontological frameworks forwarded in this chapter is the discussion of the epistemological issues posed by this research. For example, there has been a significant amount of research concerned with how museums and galleries construct knowledge and communicate this to audiences within the physical confines of these spaces and how they formulate local, national, or international identities. Some consideration of this is vital for a critical discussion of the functions and roles of art institutions. Not only is there variety in the theoretical structuring and analysis of a research project concerned with museums, galleries, and cultural production, but also case-study research. This chapter will also outline the considerations in working with organisations as part of case-study research.

Finally, this chapter will narrow the broader theoretical discussions and disciplinary approaches and present several key writers whose influence is present throughout this research and have, therefore, constituted a foundational part of my perception and analyses of the critical questions and issues broached in this thesis. The writers who form this foundation are from several genealogical trajectories. For example, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Rancière are from a tradition of French critical theory that formed and continues to influence continental philosophy and sociology. These three academics sometimes offer complementary, but also oppositional interpretations of the nature of art and politics, as well as developing their lexicon in which to establish specificity to the positions they hold. At this point, it is pertinent to clarify that this research is not *Bourdieuian*, *Foucauldian*, or *Rancièrian* in its perspective. That is to say; it is not an unwavering attempt to apply the theories and philosophies of these figures to a question with contemporary

parameters. This approach, I suggest, would result in a kind of simulation³ of the thesis question(s) through the work of another; instead, the intention is to develop my own critical framework that engages with and synthesises the theories espoused by a number of figures. For example, the cultural critique of Mark Fisher, with its specificity to a contemporary, and often British context, is useful for balancing the francocentric philosophy and writings of figures such as Bourdieu or Foucault. Fisher is adept at capturing the tone and register of art and culture in Britain but does not offer the metatheories of capital and power this research adopts.

Another figure whose work has a significant bearing on this research is Jim McGuigan. McGuigan has written on the relationship between capitalism and culture, with an excellent eye for identifying the inflexions of capital in a variety of cultural outputs. Furthermore, McGuigan has, though not exclusively, researched these phenomena in a British context, which provides a crucial point of reference for this research and the focus on art organisations in England. It is crucial that this research when it refers to meta-concepts of art, politics, capital, it can relate this to the specific context of the research question, that is, its relation to England's public-funded contemporary art galleries from 2010 to 2018. McGuigan is invaluable in that his research can provide a blueprint for how one can study cultural and political phenomena with an awareness of the micro and macro manifestations of it. This chapter will survey McGuigan's work, particularly his work from the mid-2000s to 2019, and indicate how this will shape my perceptions. Also, this chapter will situate McGuigan's work within a larger body of academic research that is concerned with cultural policy in the UK.

Finally, the American artist and writer Andrea Fraser is an influential figure in the development of the critical perspectives expressed in my analyses. Fraser is an artist, writer, and lecturer with a body of work that has become strongly associated with the development of performance art and art as a mode of institutional critique.

³ A term that has its specificity within the literature associated with these figures, but here is simply intended to indicate a preference for how to carry out this research. There are numerous benefits to carrying out a study of contemporaneous phenomena through the focussed application of the logic and critique of one figure. However, in this instance, the research is best served by a dialectical approach that conceives (an initial) parity between several critical positions rather than a single figure or theory with which to agree or disagree.

Fraser's writings on the nature of art institutions and their evolution beyond the interaction of artist, dealer and critic are vital reference points for this research. They advance the institutional critique inherent in the work of artists such as Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke and others, and invigorate a perspective of art and its institutions that exposes the power dynamics situated around race, gender and identity as well as the relations of capital, class and power.

2.1 Project overview

We can break the scope, scale and focus of this research down into several constituent parts, as indicated by the research question. Firstly, the question indicates the exploration of the relationship between marketisation and cultural policy, and secondly, cultural policy and public contemporary art galleries. The location; England, and the timeframe; 2010 to 2018⁴, limit the parameters of the study. These elements incorporate different areas of literature, from different disciplinary traditions. For example, the policy aspect requires an analysis of current and past cultural policy as well as the institutions that are involved in its creation and implementation. Therefore, the literature in this area is often responding to specific national contexts and combines empirical and theoretical material.

In questioning the relationship between policy and practice, we must discuss specific outputs of a gallery's activities, so as not to limit the scope of the analysis. This requirement necessitates case-studies that represent the parameters of the question, but also represent some of the different contexts in which galleries operate. The purpose of the research is not to reassert or confirm the aphoristic tendencies within the current discourses of cultural policy that funding cuts inhibit cultural production, but to understand the relationship of culture to this political moment, and to explore how exhibitions, education, public programmes and administration articulate this, or indeed create it.

⁴ Although I refer to 2010-2018 as my primary timeframe, there is inevitable bleed up until 2020, when I concluded my writing-up.

2.2 Disciplinary and theoretical approaches

This research incorporates and responds to several disciplinary areas, some of which share processes, assumptions, and methodologies, whilst also representing distinct research objectives. In this section, there are brief overviews of cultural policy studies, museum studies and cultural economics, and critical literature from these research areas. This discussion intends to present theoretical parameters to the literature referenced hereon in and offer considerations for the ontological and epistemological concerns of this research.

2.2.1 Cultural Policy Studies

This research draws upon literature and methodological approaches from cultural policy studies (sometimes referred to as cultural policy research). Cultural policy studies have emerged as a sub-discipline of cultural studies and have reached a degree of academic maturity whereby common practices, methods and conventions have emerged, without it being a prescriptive or limited area of study (Scullion & García, 2005). Cultural policy studies have a distinctly interdisciplinary dimension and draw from a range of research areas. These include, but are not limited to, art history, economics, sociology, critical and cultural theory. Consequentially, the body of literature emerging from cultural policy studies may display greater or lesser focus on one or more of these disciplinary areas. For example, Clive Gray (2000, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2015, 2017; McCall & Gray, 2014) has published widely across the area, David Throsby (2010) has focussed on the economics of cultural policy, Tony Bennett has applied Foucauldian analysis to the museum sector (1995) and reinterpreted Bourdieu's sociological analysis (Bennett et al., 2009). Later, this chapter will detail Foucault and Bourdieu's influence in a broader sense and their relevance to this research.

Although varying disciplinary approaches have buoyed the reach and understanding of cultural policy studies, there are also inherent problems in a research area incorporating such multifaceted approaches. Regarding Bennett's (Bennett & Savage, 2004) assessment of the incompatibility of differing cultural policy studies approaches, Clive Gray summarises the areas that generate friction. He states, "[t]he lack of understanding that is displayed derives in the main from: a failure to

comprehend the differences between methodologies of analysis that are employed within and between different disciplines; a failure to engage with the broader literature arising from different disciplines; and the existence of stereotypical images concerning different theories, disciplines, ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies that are often, at best, misleading and, at worst, simply wrong” (Gray, 2010, p. 215). With this in mind, it is essential to acknowledge that whilst the discipline should aim to be critical; it should also be omnidirectional. To do this, Gray recommends a higher degree of theoretical and methodological sophistication within the field and a more diligent recognition of the different voices that contribute to the body of knowledge.

In the introduction to Miller and Lewis' *Critical Cultural Policy Studies, A Reader* (2003), they highlight a crucial variable impacting the scope and direction of cultural policy studies. They say, "[h]ow we understand cultural policy depends on how we define culture. There is, first of all, aesthetic notion of culture that focuses on self-consciously 'artistic' output, emerging from creative people and judged by aesthetic criteria," alternatively, "[a] second, less specific meaning than aesthetic discrimination takes culture to be an all-encompassing passing concept about how we live our lives, the sense of place and person that make us human – what Raymond Williams referred to as a 'structure of feeling.' This is a more anthropological definition, and the array of policies that guide people through it encompass a much wider field than those envisioned by art agencies – or even by broadcasting authorities” (ibid, 2003, p. 3). Lewis and Miller are critical of the first definition, suggesting it to be elitist and an obstacle to a more expansive understanding of culture. The second definition rejects the division between high and low, or mass culture and allows for everyday life, not just aesthetic experiences. Gray (2010) is wary of Lewis and Miller's dismissal of the first definition they offer. Although elitism in the cultural sphere is an issue worthy of consideration, an all-encompassing definition is invariably unwieldy and ignoring the specificity of cultural difference. That is to say, the methodologies and theories that inform an understanding of art worlds, game design and intangible heritage, will differ and necessitate different focus.

Whilst we can discuss the scope of cultural policy studies in terms of definitions of culture, it is also important to make the distinction between cultural policy, and policy that impacts varying cultural forms. Referring to an editorial in the *International Journal of Cultural Policy (IJCP)* (Ahearne & Bennett, 2009), McGuigan (2016) comments on the direction of cultural policy studies and how it is being encouraged to find new territory in what is described as 'implicit' cultural policies, expanding on the traditional 'explicit' cultural policies. McGuigan considers the following definition of these two terms:

'Explicit' cultural policies will often identify 'culture' with certain consecrated forms of artistic expression, thereby deflecting attention from other forms of policy action on culture. Within the domain of 'implicit' cultural policies, one might also distinguish between the unintended cultural side effects of various kinds of policy and those deliberate courses of action intended to shape cultures, but which are not explicitly thematised as such. It is true that policies are usually conceived as deliberate strategic courses of action, but these can usefully be analysed in terms of patterns of neglect or inattention they apply. (Ahearne & Bennett, 2009, p. 139)

The problem McGuigan identifies with such an expansion of the remit for cultural policy research is that we can interpret it as including almost anything. In the way, we can assume that all things are 'cultural', if considered with a degree of flexibility, the 'implicit' distinction might be a remit without limits, but also one without direction. McGuigan offers a more succinct survey of the ambition of cultural policy studies instead. He says:

It makes sense for cultural-policy studies to remain modest in its purview, borrowing from adjacent fields of study, to be sure, but focusing centrally on the politics of culture, including both public and private courses of action within the field of predominantly signifying practice, whether 'explicit' or 'implicit', 'manifest' or 'latent', 'proper' or 'as display'. (McGuigan, 2016, p. 13)

McGuigan's observations resonate with the scope and ambition of this research project. It is, in essence, concerned with the 'politics of culture', albeit a specific manifestation of politics, culture and the relations that mediate them. Where this research project does expand beyond the disciplinary boundaries of cultural policy studies, it does so following the insight offered by McGuigan when he suggests the expanded field of the discipline might be more concerned by the "multiplicity of relations between culture and power in general" (2016, p. 13).

2.2.1.1 Cultural policy

Cultural policy is a broad term and one that has different inflexions depending on the context. In order to add some clarification, the following section draws on the journal article, *Cultural policy: Definitions and theoretical approaches*, 2006, by the American academic Kevin V. Mulcahy. Mulcahy first illustrates the different ways in which we might describe the descriptor 'culture' or 'cultural'. He says:

Culture, according to literary critic Raymond Williams, is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. It is worth noting that the root of the word is from the Latin *colere*, to till. There is the cultivation of a field as there is the cultivation of intellectual and aesthetic sensibilities; the process of becoming educated, polished, refined; that is, cultured: the state of being civilized. In sum, culture suggests a process for the deliberate and systematic acquisition of an intellectual sensibility.

(Mulcahy, 2006, p. 319)

The Oxford English Dictionary, according to Mulcahy, indicates how we might see culture as anthropological as it refers to customs, achievements, production and outlooks. In short, culture implies intellectual and artistic sensibility, but it is also the foundation of social interaction and activity. Mulcahy refers to *The American Heritage Dictionary* which "first defines culture as 'the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of work and thought; the predominant attitudes and behavior that characterize the functioning of a group or organization'" (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 319). This emphasis on the social component of culture is another aspect of what we might understand as cultural policy.

In political discourse, interlocutors often deploy culture as meaning the 'arts' in a general sense, including artistic activities and the scholarly responses to them, as well as the administrative organisations and processes that mediate this (Mulcahy, 2006; Williams, 1960). However, cultural policy is also bound to a notion of public policy in that it is concerned with activities, processes and conditions which impact on a public or public's way of life, or, "stated most simply, public policy is the sum of government activities, whether pursued directly or through agents, as those activities have influence on the lives of citizens" (Peters, 2016, p. 4).

The problem with matching a definition of culture to the practice of policymaking and delivery of those policies is that culture can soon seem to include all human activity. Therefore, culture as a descriptor of policy is more focussed and is understood "with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and heritage" (Schuster, 2003, p. 1). If we follow this assertion, we can say that cultural policy is concerned with "the production, dissemination, marketing, and consumption of the arts" (Rentschler, 2002, p. 17). However, cultural policy often has secondary or instrumentalised purposes and bureaucracies often assess it in terms of its relationship to a national economy, education or social inclusion.

Also, it is important to note that arts policy is a component of cultural policy, in terms of it being an area impacted by cultural policy. Cultural policy is extensive in what it covers, particularly in recent years where there has been a greater focus on digital technologies, their production and reception. Mulcahy points out the expansive nature of cultural policy:

A cultural policy encompasses a much broader array of activities than what was traditionally associated with an arts policy. The latter typically involved public support for museums, the visual arts (painting, sculpture, and pottery), the performing arts (symphonic, chamber and choral music; jazz, modern dance, opera and musical theatre, and "serious" theatre), historic preservation, and humanities programs (such as creative writing and poetry).

A cultural policy would involve support for all the activities mentioned above, but also other publicly supported institutions [.]

(Mulcahy, 2006, p. 320)

These myriad areas are not the focus of this research; instead the specific element of cultural policy explored here is visual arts policy, particularly the conditions in which art museums and galleries operate. There are aspects of cultural policy that will directly address these conditions, and there are some that will affect a broader cultural sector. As we shall see throughout this research, there is a reticence for many in and out of the arts sector about binding issues affecting the arts and arts organisations with a general cultural policy agenda.

2.2.2 Museum Studies

Museum studies have many commonalities with cultural policy studies and draw from related literature, theory, and research methods. It is directly relevant to this research as it often studies the specific practises of museums, much like my focus on the galleries BAL TIC Centre for Contemporary Art, Nottingham Contemporary and South London Gallery. However, it is a distinct field with its evolution and territory, responding to and shaping the contemporary concerns of the museum profession, conceptual understandings of museums and the future parameters of research in the museum sector. Museum studies, or museology, has evolved in the past three decades, shifting from a focus on collecting practices, administrative or professional skills such as conservation and curation, to considering the broader social and political contexts the museum as an institution sits within. Researchers have described this shift as "the new museology" and have developed from Vergo's influential work *The New Museology* (1989). The current landscape of museum studies continues to respond to the "first wave" of the "new museology", and as Macdonald states in the introduction to *A Companion To Museum Studies* (Macdonald, 2006), it aims to go further "by broadening its scope, expanding its methodological approaches, and deepening its empirical base. It also asks questions of some of the new orthodoxies – including the supremacy of the visitor – that have found their way into contemporary museum practice; and it suggests possible new avenues for future museum work and study" (1-2).

Three key areas summarise the emphasis of *The New Museology*. Firstly, it challenges the assumption that objects had inherent meaning; instead, it gave attention to display contexts and how they might contribute to, or construct meaning. Secondly, it replaced the presumption of museums as separate hermetic entities with the recognition that museums are interlinked with everyday concerns, or might be concerned with entertainment, commercialism, or market forces. Finally, the contention that exhibitions and displays produce multiple interpretations and perceptions from museum visitors (Macdonald, 2006).

The expanded focus of museum studies taking place in the 1980s and 1990s was in many ways, a response to developments in the cultural and social research disciplines (Macdonald, 2006). Macdonald identifies several areas that had an impact on the development of museology. Firstly, she identifies representational critique as being significant as it signalled "a move toward regarding knowledge, and its pursuit, realization, and deployment, as inherently political" (ibid, p. 3). It was reassessing how the nature of knowledge made museums interlocutors in an epistemological debate, considering how knowledge might marginalise individuals and reinforce cultural hierarchies.

The epistemological questions posed by the research mentioned above share a reciprocal relationship with the burgeoning field of identity politics. The museum can be considered an essential site for the study of identity politics as, "[I]t selects certain cultural products for official safe-keeping, for posterity and public display – a process which recognises and affirms some identities, and omits to recognise and affirm others (Macdonald, 2006, p. 4). These considerations display how museums and other cultural venues could embody the power dynamics between cultures, social groups, and political thought, but could also become critical places of discourse to reflect upon and challenge some of the issues raised through discussions of identity politics.

The broader remit of museum studies has also reacted to the significant expansion of the museum and gallery sector in the second half of the twentieth century. Gordon

Fyfe has described this as the "museum phenomenon" (Mason, 2006, p. 4), and this is suggestive of the critical lens employed by museum studies. That is, resisting characterising museums only as historical institutions and instead employing critical, contemporary approaches that draw from within and outside of the discipline. This development represents the plural nature of museum studies and the fact that it incorporates various methodological and critical approaches.

In the introduction to *Museum Studies Volume 5. Museums, controversy and politics*, Rhiannon Mason (2020b) points to the fact that in the past three decades controversy and politics are focal issues in the study and reception of museum studies. Scholars from a cultural studies background have applied their perspective to museums, galleries and the increasingly politicised aspects of identity and diversity. Texts included in this volume discuss issues such as the museum as a site which negotiates encounters with the global and the local (Message, 2006), representations of and visitor responses to disability in an exhibition context (Dodd et al., 2010) and how theoretical frameworks, such as feminism, can challenge existing ideas attached to museums and museum practise (Hein, 2010). Other texts offer insight into how we might understand what it is to 'queer the museum' (Mills, 2013) and how museums have approached representing multiculturalism, diversity and migration and the inherent challenge of balancing individual and community identities (C. Ross, 2015). Evidently, museum studies incorporate many contemporary issues, theoretical approaches and geographical contexts. Despite this somewhat amorphous characteristic, museum studies offers structures for developing our collective understanding of cultural institutions.

There are several areas within the broad remit of museum studies that will have particular application in this research. Firstly, museum studies and its relation to cultural theory will inform the analysis and critical interpretation of the practices and values espoused by institutions and organisations affecting cultural activity. Mason offers a concise description of the discipline's approach by saying, "contemporary cultural theory involves the analysis of culture in its broadest sense: from culture as a way of life to culture as the result of aesthetic practices" (2006, p. 17). Cultural theory has developed a close relationship with the European Academy of the mid-

twentieth century, drawing on elements of continental philosophy, linguistics, sociology, psychoanalysis, and many other fields. For example, the study of signs by Ferdinand de Saussure, known as Semiotics, provided a trajectory that would lead to Structuralism, post-Structuralism, and a more reactionary Deconstructionism. These disciplines shared a common interest in the construction and stability of meaning, or knowledge, through language, signs, and broader social constructions. These concerns have penetrated museum studies as they raise questions of identity, representation, and difference, which are necessary for developing pluralistic cultural institutions (Mason, 2006).

Michel Foucault's work and ideas have exerted significant influence on museum studies since the 1980s. Of particular relevance to cultural theory and museum studies are his works concerned with power, knowledge and subjectivity (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006; Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, 2002b, 2002a, 2003, 2006b, 2006a). The influence of these works is most evident in publications, such as Tony Bennett's *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics* (1995), which contrasts the function of the museum to the disciplinary power found in institutions such as prisons. Bennett contends that whilst Foucault's prison is a site where disciplinary power/knowledge is exercised, the initial conception of the public museum was as a site of "knowledge/power relations whose field of application was that of free subjects and whose modus operandi was oriented toward the production of a population that would not only be governable but would freely assent to its governance" (Bennett, 2015, p. 4) Furthermore, Eileen Hooper-Greenhill's *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge* (1992), considers Foucault's understanding of epistemes and how different understandings of knowledge impacted the practice and policy of museums. Bennett, in particular, continues to shape the museum studies discipline by incorporating key concerns of cultural studies with the contemporary landscape of the museum and gallery sector.

2.2.2.1 Public contemporary art galleries

In order to offer a working definition of the term 'gallery' in this work, it is vital to establish what this includes and excludes. As this section will indicate, there are multiple definitions of the term gallery, but within the context of this research, it refers

to a specific set of practices and governance structures, and in relation to NPOs or public funded organisations, the notion of them being 'public' places. Firstly, this section will detail the various definitions of the word 'gallery'. According to *Oxford Art Online* (also, *Grove Art Online*), we can define a gallery as follows:

Gallery (i) Upper storey open on one side to the main interior space of a building. We can apply this in various contexts, for example in church architecture to the area over a side aisle (also called a Tribune) and in secular architecture to the elevated seating in a theatre.

Gallery (ii) Long, covered or partially covered service passageway, acting as a corridor inside or outside or in between buildings.

Gallery (iii) Long narrow room in a grand private house, used for recreation or entertainment.

Gallery (iv) Place where works of art are displayed. In a commercial gallery, works of art are displayed for the purposes of sale. Historically, patrons commissioned artworks directly from an artist and produced in his workshop. In the Netherlands, the economic boom following the conclusion of the Eighty Years' War with Spain (1648) led to a rising demand for art. Patrons began buying from dealers, some of whom produced illustrated catalogues. (Dorkin, 2016)

This last definition is closer to the idea of the gallery that is familiar to contemporary society. Dorkin goes on to explain some of the developments in the production and display of visual art, as well as the impact of art markets on the development of the notion of the gallery.

The 19th century saw the development of an international art market, particularly as Americans began buying European paintings. Art dealers often managed their own commercial gallery spaces, which often had accessible opening times, specialisation and programmes of temporary exhibitions. Commercial galleries now tend to fall into

two categories; primary-markets where galleries represent living artists for a percentage of the proceeds from selling work, or secondary-markets where work has previously been bought and sold. Galleries also represent artists at art fairs or similar events (Dorkin, 2016).

The final development of the gallery that is pertinent to this research draws on the historical trajectory of these previous descriptions but operates in a distinct set of conditions. We can define the gallery as primarily a physical space, though digital platforms may be included in this as well. It is a space dedicated to displaying works of art. However, galleries in the public context are not concerned with the trade and exchange of works of art, or overtly motivated by commercial gain. It is this feature that makes this definition (iv) insufficient for this research. We can understand the contemporary art gallery as understood in a public, non-commercial context, as an intersection between the conventions of artistic display seen in commercial galleries and the public-facing role of museums.

Museums, in the broadest sense, do have similar but divergent histories as galleries (see *Volume 1. Museums: histories, theories and debate of Museum Studies, 2020*, edited by Rhiannon Mason) and they are invested in the display and preservation of objects with cultural, historical, or aesthetic value. Museums also perform many social functions in their contemporary iteration. Museums or spaces akin to museums have been present since Classical times. The Renaissance period saw the further development of the museum as a recognised public institution, and with it, the architecture and methods of display also became more specified (Abt et al., 2015).

Classical origins.

Mouseion is the etymological root of 'museum', and this was the term used for ancient Greek temples dedicated to the muses of the arts and sciences and these later usually became sites for funerary cults and spaces of competition for members of literary societies. The association with literary activities is one reason for the expansion of the museum beyond an explicitly religious function (Abt et al., 2015).

Egalitarianism and instruction.

Many royal, aristocratic, and church collections were given 'public' access, from the 17th century onwards. However, the idea of the public was a restricted one, where class, occupation and education were determining factors on who accessed nominally 'public' museums. The Ashmolean Museum in Oxford was founded in 1683, and it forwarded a notion of public equality and accessibility that is recognisable today. However, the museum primarily served the faculty and students of the university, somewhat undermining this notion of publicness. (Abt et al., 2015). Researchers such as Jennifer Barrett challenge the idea of 'publicness' and museums and question whether museums do in fact perform a truly public function (Barrett, 2011; Mason, 2020a).

The British Museum, London, was established in 1753, as a public collection. It was conceived as a gift to the British people and served as a vital blueprint for public museums. However, it has been acknowledged that the audience mainly consisted of scholars, artists, and the upper-classes into the 19th century. Institutions such as The British Museum have nonetheless proved to be essential references for more democratic and wide-reaching access to collections of art and objects of cultural value (Bennett, 1988). As well as this there was the development of ideas related to the Enlightenment which emphasised the importance of education and the role of museums in this. (Abt et al., 2015)

Modern reassessments of function of public art museums and galleries.

The gap between the collecting practices of major museums and living artists' work meant that the modern era has seen the development of specialised art museums. This has prompted an overlap in the gallery and museum definitions where they share similar professional specialisms but with a focus on the works of art over broader conceptions of objects of cultural value. Examples of art museums with this specific remit include the Museum of Modern Art, New York (1929); the Musée National d'Art Moderne, Paris (1936); the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art (1979) and the Museum Ludwig, Cologne (1986). Art museums such as these have become central actors in the discovery, patronage, and interpretation of new, emerging or previously unheralded artists. Furthermore, collections, exhibition programmes and audience engagement have risen significantly over successive

decades. With this, there has been criticism regarding the role and function of the museum, art museum and gallery. Sociologists have questioned the degree to which museum practices reach and communicate with disadvantaged groups and minorities within contemporary society. Such is the museum's role in codifying historical narratives, art movements and interpretation; the museum has become an object of study in its own right (Abt et al., 2015).

In Chapter 4 the specific qualities of public art galleries and cultural policy in the UK and England are discussed in detail. However, there are some general points to consider. Firstly, the public galleries are funded in part by local or national government. This means that the activities of public galleries are conducted, owned and managed in the public interest. Activities may include; exhibiting artwork, commissioning new works, managing collections, developing collections, undertaking research, educational programmes and outreach to different communities. Secondly, their 'publicness' is a product of their receipt of public money. Furthermore, their public nature is protected or entrenched through historical and contemporary policy frameworks. As this research explores, these markers of being of and for the public is a quality that can and should be critiqued. As funding arrangements and the structure of cultural policy changes, can we still call these organisations 'public'?

Contemporary visual arts in England have played a part in shaping urban environments across the country. There are a number of strands to the development of public galleries in England in the latter part of the 20th century and into the 21st century. A number of policy initiatives and drivers are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. However, we can briefly summarise some key issues related to new public contemporary visual arts organisations emerging being established in England, with accompanying political and financial support. Firstly, there has been a case for investment in the arts based on the economic benefits and the use of new galleries as a catalyst for the regeneration of post-industrial urban areas. The so-called 'Bilbao effect' (Lewis and Miller, 2003, p. 315), where a flagship museum or gallery spurs an economic revival, is a basic model that has been emulated at various scales over the past 25 years. An important English precursor can be seen in

Tate Liverpool, which opened in 1988 as part of a project to regenerate the Mersey dockside through the Merseyside Development Corporation, established under Margaret Thatcher's government (Hopkin, 2020, p. 9). The opening of Tate Modern in 2000 further compounded the blueprint in England for post-industrial sites being an ideal location for culture-led regeneration.

Culture-led regeneration is a key driver of local economic policy, national and local arts policy. Awards and recognition for cities' and regions' support for arts and culture are now a familiar part of the sectoral landscape, with UK City of Culture, European Capital of Culture and London Borough of Culture being some examples of this. Arts Council England's 'Creative People and Places' and the Arts Council and Heritage Lottery Fund's 'Great Place Scheme', are further indicators of the enduring link between arts infrastructure in England and the logics of culture-led regeneration. One of the accompanying features of the expansion of arts infrastructure in England from the mid-1990s, was the fact that capital projects to build new contemporary art galleries, was not matched by similar investment in the public acquisition and collecting of artworks. As a result, many new galleries from this period onwards had temporary exhibition programmes instead of collections-based exhibitions. BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art is one example of this model.

Kunsthallen – German for “art halls” – refer to non-collecting museums or galleries, often with a focus on displaying contemporary art and are to some extent, municipal or state-run organisations. This model has a number of parallels with the types of institutions explored in this thesis. Exhibitions may bring together objects and artworks borrowed from private or personal collections, loans from museum collections, uncollectable or ephemeral artworks, including some forms of performance. This type of institutional space has also increased the importance of curators and directors working in this model, within the wider field of visual art. Curators and directors play a key role in reorientating the institutional approach in terms of changing public exhibitions and the display of different artists and narratives within visual art.

Another aspect of this gallery model, as seen in England and elsewhere, is the commissioning of new work. This is key as it is a means of supporting new artforms and experimentation outside of traditional patronage structures, and outside of the art market. The kunsthalle model has traditionally positioned itself in a public context and is responsive to local communities – just as we see in much of ACE's policy initiatives. The need for adaptable exhibition spaces is another feature of the non-collecting gallery. As a result, many purpose-built galleries of this type adopt a modular approach within the architecture of the internal space. This means that exhibition spaces can be adapted radically to accommodate large installations or wall-based artwork hung in a more traditional manner.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the type of art organisation explored here is not representative of *all* types of organisations operating in the UK or further afield. The ecology of arts practice and the organisations invested in that activity is vast. Auction houses, private and commercial galleries, Artist Run Initiatives, arts education and many more types of organisation constitute an interconnected set of practices and professions, as well as audiences and stakeholders. However, for many, public art galleries are the tip of the iceberg in an English context and as such they play an important role in our shared understanding of the tensions apparent in the making, displaying and interpreting visual art.

2.2.3 Cultural Economics

Cultural economics, although incorporated within the broad remit of museum studies, offers a focussed analysis of the economic factors affecting the cultural sphere. The parameters of this field of study do not present cultural activity in purely financial terms; instead, "[c]ultural economics applies economic thinking to the arts. It is not restricted to financial aspects, such as subsidies and costs, but uses an economic model of human behaviour to understand the social aspects of the arts (Frey & Meier, 2006, p. 398). Frey and Meier suggest that cultural economics employs a distinct approach, separate from the sociological approaches or art historical, in its focus on the relationship and interaction between individuals and institutions. Furthermore, this approach understands behavioural attributes as a response to constraints, following the "rational choice model". We might understand these

constraints as income, time, or price, but more often, the purview of cultural economics understands constraints in terms of impositions and limitations set by social and cultural institutions (ibid).

Frey and Meier (2006) identify the emergence of cultural economics as responding jointly to the expansion of the museum and gallery sectors and the subsequent changes to funding and governance in recent years. They also recognise that the public or private status of the institutions analysed through cultural, economic methodologies, dramatically impacts the nature of the framework. However, the broad interest of the field considers, "the management of the collection, pricing, special exhibitions, and ancillary activities" (ibid). They recognise that the distinctions between public and private institutions are becoming increasingly blurred as museum directorates respond to conditions in which "public museums gain more autonomy, public subsidies decrease, and private museums are faced with many public restrictions" (ibid, p. 413).

Ruth Towse has also played a significant part in the codification of cultural economics as a discipline. Her book, *A Textbook of Cultural Economics*, now in its second edition (2019), details the historical development of economists, academics and policymaker's application of economic theory to the cultural sector. The text also presents a series of foundational, operative economic principles such as the concept of markets, supply and demand, market regulation amongst others. Trowse also offers comprehensive guides to specific art forms or specialised venues (such as performing arts or museums). She acknowledges that whilst we might conceive of the cultural sector, creative industries or some other grouping of creative practices, each has its specific conditions and conventions entrenched in the economic organisation of those practices. In short, whilst we can speak of 'cultural economics' in a broad sense, a knowledge of the cultural economics of say, the performing arts in theatres, can only help us so far in understanding the cultural economics of exhibitions in a visual art gallery.

Another vital aspect of Trowse's work (2019) is its discussion of artists' labour markets. This is a critical issue in the UK as there is a culture of multiple-job

handling, worker precarity and deregulated labour markets (see Throsby, 2010). Kate Oakley's literature review for *Creativity, Culture & Education* (Oakley, 2009) outlines a number of the concerns faced by those working in the cultural sector. She says, "much of the more boosterish 'new economy' literature has been criticised in particular for neglecting the aspects of insecurity, casualisation and often very low pay" (41). This is significant not only because workers in the arts and culture sector are financially insecure, but also because of its impact on mental health. The critic, Isabell Lorey's excellent text *State of Insecurity* (2015), explores the cognitive conditioning and formation of the self that takes place in such work conditions. Her analysis of contemporary precarity is an apt example of how different registers of power and control rather than create a sense of personal autonomy, in fact, aggressively undermine it.

The cultural landscape museums and galleries find themselves in now can be characterised by the creeping economic and commercial concerns dominating discourses concerned with governance and management. Marketised museums are responses to exogenous factors that affect or encourage philanthropy, funding, and corporatism, generally marked by the shift from public subsidy to diversified funding models. Concerns associated with this shift identify the commodification of cultural experiences and the production of meaning as crucial areas where the marketised museum or gallery alters negatively. The commodification of cultural labour and visitors to cultural institutions are also areas of concern (Oakley et al., 2017). The concerns raised by marketisation are moderated by the need for publicly-funded institutions to become 'resilient' to a shrinking public subsidy, and numerous galleries and museums have adopted approaches that have caused concern with those who might offer an idealised 'best practice' in the public realm.

2.2.3.1 Marketisation

Marketisation has been a feature of many nations' policy initiatives since the 1980s, and in an English context, commentators associate it with the Thatcher governments from 1979 to 1990. In the *Encyclopaedia of Governance* Jane Gingrich defines marketisation in the following way: "Marketization involves introducing competition into the public sector in areas previously governed through direct public control. In its

broadest usage, marketization refers to the process of transforming an entire economy away from a planned economic system and toward greater market-based organization" (2007, p. 547). In the 1980s in the UK, this manifested as the privatisation of utilities and telecommunications. However, at present, the cultural sector has been subjected to marketisation in a variety of ways, rather than a single, sweeping overhaul. Features of marketisation that have affected the cultural sector include the reduction of public spending, the expectation of generating revenue from private sources, processes of restructuring, often through decentralisation and competition amongst organisations and regions for resources.

Although marketisation is associated with privatisation, it is "conceptually distinct" (Gingrich, 2007, p. 547). Gingrich goes on to say that, "privatization involves moving toward more private financing or private ownership of goods or services and can occur both with and without increased incentives for market competition. Equally, some forms of marketization can occur without a change in ownership. For instance, several governments have introduced market incentives within the public sector, creating an 'internal market' where public organizations compete with each other" (ibid). We see the latter through initiatives like the city of culture bids, or the 'Great Exhibition of the North' as well as at the heart of central government through the allocation of funds to different departments, such as DCMS.

Marketisation then, in this research, is referring to both policies and conditions in which the government and organisations enact policies. As we shall see, the reduction of public funds, increased privatisation, organisational restructuring and the elevation of competition between and within sectors are all features of cultural policy affecting the arts since 2010. Marketisation represents a force that is reshaping various policy fields – in the context of this research; we can view it as directly impacting on the field of visual art in England.

2.2.4 Andrea Fraser – Institutional critique

Andrea Fraser is an American artist, writer and educator who, throughout her career, from the 1980s to present, has challenged notions of how art institutions operate and she has continued the tradition of institutional critique practised by

artists such as Daniel Buren and Hans Haacke (Mariño, 2007, p. 8). Her practice and criticism are significant to this thesis as it provides an acute intellectual perspective from an artist who has navigated the art world with a high degree of success whilst maintaining an objective critique. In the introduction to the 2005 collection of Fraser's writing and lectures, *Museum Highlights - The Writings of Andrea Fraser* (Fraser, 2005), Pierre Bourdieu makes the following statement on Fraser's importance to the formation of a critical 'artistic field':

As an artist perfectly well acquainted with the logic and functions of the artistic field, she mounts *analytical interventions* meant not just to interpret the artistic world but also to transform it. Unlike the analyst, who remains detached, remains a spectator, she puts herself personally into play and joins the action. This presupposes the talent, but also the courage, to go to the furthest limits of one's convictions, after the fashion of an exemplary prophet who acts as much through the expressive virtue of actions as through words.
(Bourdieu in Fraser, 2005, p. xiv)

Bourdieu highlights the value of being personally involved in the machinations of the artistic field – and without a durational ethnographic study, this is a position that is difficult to occupy as a researcher. In the context of this research, the position one adopts is more to 'spectate' rather than 'intervene'. That does not preclude the research from being the basis of some positive intervention into, for example, policy areas or gallery administration.

Fraser also offers an incisive analysis of the US gallery system. Whilst this is not the primary area of research for this thesis, Fraser's experience, intervention and critique provide a key point of reference when anticipating what the future of English contemporary art galleries might consist. Her text, "Slashing the *American Canvas*" (1998), written for a panel on "Support for Elite, Middlebrow, and Vernacular Cultures" at the conference "New Trends in Cultural Policy for the 21st Century", assesses how the progress made for and by arts professionals was being undone by the gallery system in the US (in this US example, the galleries are not publicly subsidised but are private non-profit entities). Fraser states:

Within the visual art world, at least, I can say that a large part of the professional autonomy gained by cultural workers since the 1960s was won, not only with the aid of public sector support, but also in the name of the “public” – or publics – newly defined as composed of heterogenous cultural constituencies.

(Fraser, 2005, p. 173)

Fraser goes on to acknowledge that present conditions significantly undermine an initial period of progress and support. She makes the following observation:

My concern today is that those publics in whose name we pursued professionalization – even and perhaps especially as defined as complex constituencies of popular, participatory, ethnic, and avocational cultures – are being reduced once again to audiences, or even clients, of institutions and their administrators: a form of capital to be invested in the reproduction of what remains a field of “elite” culture.

(Fraser, 2005, pp. 173-76)

Fraser's analysis is a pertinent reminder that the characteristics of an artistic field (to use Bourdieu's term), must be considered in terms of how institutions conceptualise individuals who interact with or experience art. If, as Fraser suggests, individuals become treated as 'clients', then an imbalance between arts institutions and the public or publics they are responsible for, is exacerbated. In these conditions, the artistic field becomes less democratic and panders to a privileged social class. This is one approach in critiquing the English gallery system and identifying how the marketisation of cultural policy alters the relationships between those in the artistic field.

One of Fraser's recent projects attempts to reveal the opaque nature of museum and gallery governance and its links to electoral politics. In *2016 in Museums, Money and Politics* (Fraser, 2018), Fraser catalogues 36,000 political contributions linked to 2411 individuals sitting on the boards of galleries displaying contemporary art with

budgets over \$2.5 million. This attempts to illustrate the significant intersection between the governance of the artistic field and political campaigns. Fraser uses this as a contemporary example of how cultural patronage is not intrinsically positive, and it can be part of a process that perpetuates a slide towards an undemocratic and elite art infrastructure. She points to the significant contributions from board members to the Republican party and the implications of this in the context of Donald Trump's presidency and the authoritarian political culture he has promoted (ibid). Given that this thesis has already introduced positions from Conservative politicians such as Jeremy Hunt, that advocate and support the idea of 'US-style philanthropy', the conditions Fraser identifies must be considered when assessing any change to an English or UK context.

2.3 Theorising art and politics

In order to formulate a methodology that can comprehensively and critically answer the research questions of this study, it is necessary to consider the developments that have influenced research in theory and practice. As I have indicated, the development of museum, gallery or arts policy specific research has not developed in a vacuum. It draws on a diverse theoretical base and I return to three influential figures throughout this research. Although the context of my research questions requires reference to the figures discussed earlier in this chapter, it is pertinent to acknowledge the resonance of Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière in this work. For example, Foucault and his work on the development of what we might call neoliberalism and the creative self is cited by Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015b), O'Brien (2014) and Bennett (1995) interprets Foucault's concept of governmentality as a central component of his cultural policy studies, which is in turn critiqued by McGuigan (2004, pp. 138-39) and the Victoria D. Alexander edited text *Art and the Challenge of Markets Volume 2* (2018b) points to the enduring relevance of Foucault to this area of research. Like Foucault, Bourdieu remains a focal reference point for many researchers. For example, Hesmondhalgh (2006), Gartman (2013), Gray (2010), Beech (2015), Mulcahy (2006), McGuigan (2016), Whitehead (2012) and Alexander (2018a, 2018b) are just some of many contemporary researchers who work with close reference to Bourdieu. Rancière is a slightly different proposition. His work is less widely incorporated into discourse regarding art and politics in a policy

context, but we still see his resonance particularly in recent years. The Oakley and O'Connor (2015) edited text *The Routledge Companion to the Cultural Industries* cites him as key to this area and Beech (2015) points to his position as placing art at the heart of politics and politics at the heart of art (240). It is my contention that Rancière, along with Foucault and Bourdieu provide considerable depth to the analysis of art and politics and their prevalence in contemporary discussions is evidence of this. As such, I intend to develop an understanding of some of their key ideas in the following sections and indicate why this is significant. I suggest that figures like Rancière provide an emphatic commendation of the role of art in politics and vice versa. This is fundamental to my own critique and defence of publicly subsidised arts in England.

2.3.1 Bourdieu, Foucault, Rancière

French social theory has had a considerable impact on the development of Anglo and American critical theory and practice. Morrow and Brown (1994) highlight three figures, in particular, who have exerted an unrivalled influence and whose texts continue to shape contemporary research fields. They are Alain Touraine, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michel Foucault; all of which demonstrate an interest in critical theory and its relationship with social and cultural concerns. Morrow and Brown state, "[d]espite their important differences, all three can be considered to be complementing critical theory to the extent that they (a) reject positivism in favor of a poststructuralist agency-structure dialectic, (b) conceptualize social relations in structuralist terms as part of a theory of domination and power, and (c) identify social research with critical and reflexive tasks with respect to social transformation. One might be tempted to call this tradition neo-structuralist critical sociology to differentiate it from poststructuralism, which has too many other connotations and often is used synonymously with postmodernism" (ibid, p. 132).

In this research, Bourdieu and Foucault will have particular resonance. Bourdieu has a well-established position within the field of sociology and his study of cultural activities. Foucault, however, does not position his work within what would be considered a sociological framework; nonetheless, his concerns are "rooted in critical structuralism" (Morrow & Brown, 1994, p. 133). In addition to these two

formative figures, this research will consider Jacques Rancière's theory and critique of art, aesthetics and their relationship to politics and democracy. Rancière differs from Bourdieu and Foucault in many ways, though the secondary literature drawing comparisons between Rancière and other figures are limited when compared to the deeply entrenched position of Bourdieu and Foucault in the European Academy. Translations of Rancière's texts are not as abundantly available as Bourdieu or Foucault's, but he is notable for actively participating in the contemporary public discourses concerned with art and politics. For example, English language digital platforms such as *e-flux* and the blog for the publisher *Verso* (who are one of the primary publishers of his translated works in English), have made Rancière's work more visible and present with particular resonance for contemporary art practitioners and those formulating critiques of art and its related institutions.

Bourdieu's sociological approach, whilst incorporating structural thought into his models and theories, resisted what we might understand as the metatheory of structuralism. Morrow and Brown suggest that "Bourdieu's concerns shift toward the structural side of the agency-structure divide, though he is interested particularly in the processes that mediate between the two" (Morrow & Brown, 1994, p. 133). Bourdieu, and latterly with Wacquant (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), formed a critical framework focussed on cultural reproduction and the distribution of power within and between organisational relationships. The impact of this is significant as, "Bourdieu's approach has contributed centrally the notion of cultural reproduction as a central analytic category in social theory and one particularly important for critical theory" (Morrow & Brown, 1994, p. 134). As this study is concerned with the dynamics of cultural reproduction, regarding the exogenous sources of power, such as the political will to marketise policy arenas, Bourdieu offers a highly cogent critical approach.

2.3.2 Key concepts

In order to determine how Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière's work finds agreement or disagreement in framing the analysis of cultural phenomena or in how they question power, culture and politics, it is pertinent to analyse some of the fundamental concepts of these writers and identify their relevance to this study. We

can draw initial comparisons between Bourdieu and Foucault due to their respective interests in 'practice'. According to Bourdieu, a society is a multidimensional space consisting of many fields. These might be various institutions, social groups like workplaces, local communities, or in the case of this study, visual arts practice in England. Bourdieu's entwines his notion of the field with the crucial formula [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 95). This section will discuss components of this formula in due course. Foucault vitally differs from Bourdieu in that he notes that institutions, ideologies, and theories are not the object of his study; instead, he is concerned with 'regimes of practice'. These two figures depart from one another on several points, but it would be remiss to suggest that this makes their critical positions irreconcilable. For example, on 13 December 1981 Bourdieu organised a petition and campaign with Foucault and other academics against the military takeover in Poland and the suppression of "Solidarnosc". This interaction is suggestive of similar concerns about intellectual, cultural, and political freedom and the practices that promote and inhibit this.

Rancière is also concerned with equality and the political contexts in which this operates. Rancière has become associated with the idea of the 'distribution of the sensible'. This concept posits that systems of inclusion and exclusion, and the general political structuration of relationships, operate on the conceptual and cognitive level, but also on the sensory level, or to put it another way, "the system of divisions and boundaries that define, amongst other things, what is visible and audible within a particular aesthetico-political regime" (Rockhill in Rancière, 2004, p. xiii). He is outspoken in his opposition to many foundational elements of the European Academy and levels several attacks on the role of sociologists and Bourdieu specifically. In *Disagreement* (1999), he pursues his critique of Marxist economicism and the theory of ideology into a critique of contemporary sociology. As far as they assert the supremacy of the social in all political conflict, critical sociologists also elevate themselves to the status of bearers of a "truth" inaccessible to those experiencing the social structures. In Rancière's introduction in 2010 to the second French edition of *The Philosopher and His Poor*, (2010) he acknowledged that *La Distinction*, initially published in 1981 (Bourdieu, 1984), had prompted him to write his work. Bourdieu occupies a vital role in Rancière's argument, he progresses

from an assessment of Plato and Marx and then develops a critique of prominent twentieth-century thinkers that he claims occupy "Marx's horizon": Jean-Paul Sartre and Pierre Bourdieu (Deranty, 2010).

2.3.3 Fields, Discursive Practice, Distribution of the Sensible

This section will briefly discuss three concepts attributed to Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière in order to develop further the theoretical terrain related to this research. Firstly, we will cover Bourdieu's concept of fields. Bourdieu's develops a notion of what he calls the "feel for the game" (Hall et al., 2010, p. 267), but he has a set of particular criteria that constitute the game itself. Bourdieu posited a divided social world, and in it there are many distinct social spaces or "fields" of practice (ibid). In this research, there is a specific focus of the field of contemporary art, but professions, legal and religious institutions also have their own fields. Each of these fields has a particular set of rules, knowledges, and forms of capital. Fields can and do overlap, for example, in construction several professional areas combine to perform a task. However, Bourdieu suggests that one can understand fields as relatively autonomous from one another. Regarding this research, there is a distinct overlap between the field of politics and the field of visual art. Principally, this research is concerned with the nature and character of this interaction and negotiation of capital between them. Each field has an established set of positions and practices, and there are tensions and struggles for individuals to assert their position in their field. Capital is a transmutable currency that reshapes one's field position, and the fluidity of this change creates shifts to the field itself. Bourdieu uses art as an example of how field position can be affected by others. As artists seek new styles to distinguish themselves from those that preceded them, they accumulate different forms of capital. However, as art institutions adapt their practices, and they enter into an accepted frame of reference, their symbolic radicalism or 'avant-gardism' is diminished (Grenfell & Hardy, 2007).

Again, it is worth reiterating the criticisms levelled at Bourdieu by figures such as Rancière. He likened Bourdieu's metatheory to modern-day republicanism, as it is primarily concerned with maintaining order and social cohesion in a way that is reminiscent of Plato's archipolitics. In fact, "in his view the success of the social

sciences is in no small measure due to an ongoing desire to be done with the disorderliness of subjects who stubbornly refuse to stay in their assigned place and time or fail to stick to their prescribed task" (Bosteels, 2010, p. 84) . Jean-Phillippe Deranty has written on the theory of Rancière and suggests that Bourdieu's study of cultural and symbolical "distinction" does not elicit the "rules of the game" for all; instead, it has the opposite effect and maintains a submissive state where one propagates delusions of autonomy by knowledge of cultural and symbolic order.

If the concept of the field is a formative locus point for Bourdieu's theory, the concept of Discursive Practice is a comparable component of Foucault's thought. Like Bourdieu, Foucault is describing a set of culturally or historically specific rules, practices or relations. We can think of 'mathematics', 'social sciences', 'local government' as Discursive Practice as there is some generalised, normative consensus on what these practices might be. However, where Bourdieu is concerned with production, Foucault uses this term to develop his epistemological framework that analyses the specificity of knowledge. One should not consider Discursive Practice as an equivalent to power; rather, it is code and convention that is not restrictive but allows specific modes of thought, language and knowledge. It is approximate to an epistemological grammar or a scientific discipline (Tanke, 2009).

As well as discursive practices, non-discursive practices are also identifiable, generally we might see these practices as resistant to categorisation through established conventions of knowledge and language. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault notes several non-discursive practices such as "institutions, political events, economic practices and processes" (Foucault, 2002a, p. 162). However, he does acknowledge a form of exceptionalism to certain cultural forms, that he suggests are not discursive. These include art and music, which suggests that the treatment of these forms in social or political contexts is intrinsically different. In the context of this research, it adds weight to the argument that policy and governance should not treat art as one of many practices in the 'creative industries'. Foucault also notes: "there is nothing to be gained from describing this autonomous layer of discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, institutions, social relations, political relations, and so on. It is that relationship which has always

intrigued me" (ibid, p. 284). Again, this reiterates Foucault's assertion that practices such as art occur outside of a commonly understood rubric – its autonomy is what distinguishes it, but it is also what makes it unintelligible from the position of politics or political institutions.

As mentioned, Rancière is strongly associated with the idea of the distribution of the sensible. The distribution of the sensible captures how we can divide the world according to sensations and the political implications of this (Deranty, 2010; Tanke, 2011). Rancière states that communities contain a dimension of the sensible that is held in common by all members, and this allows members of that community to participate and work towards common goals. However, Rancière subdivides community participation into multiple parts, and members perform different types of participation and non-participation according to established political and social structures. In *The Politics of Aesthetics* (Rancière, 2004) he challenges some of Aristotle's political philosophy in order to illustrate his notion of the distribution of the sensible. He says, "a speaking being, according to Aristotle, is a political being. If a slave understands the language of its rulers, however, he does not 'possess' it. Plato states that artisans cannot be put in charge of the shared or common elements of the community because they do not have the time to devote themselves to anything other than their work. They cannot be somewhere else because work will not wait" (ibid, p. 12). The distribution of the sensible involves the circulation of words and images, the demarcation of spaces and times, and forms of activity. Importantly, as the quote above illustrates, it also entrenches particular practices that can inhibit political participation and representation as it brings particular culturally specific norms into focus whilst filtering out incompatible or destabilising ideas.

The diverse ways that what we hold to be meaningful through sensed or emotional experiences then impacts on what we might meaningfully say, think, make or do. This condition is like an implicit structure of cognition according to immediate cultural contexts (Deranty, 2010; Tanke, 2011). According to Rancière, persistent inequalities, whether they be social, economic or political are the result of unequal or subjective distribution. An implication for the focus of this thesis is that we can understand art, both its production and reception, to be innately political on the level

of the sensible. This point means that art is not merely a representation of the speech, thought and practice conditioned by the distribution of the sensible, but an active and dynamic agent. Rancière's politics and his philosophical project is grounded in a non-utopian ideal of democratic emancipation (Rancière, 2004, 2013), which consists of an unerring intervention into established practice, convention and institutional power. This process intends to open up possibilities and situations for meaningful participation and inclusion in areas that tend to exclude or elide parts of communities, discourses and thought through the distribution of the sensible. Again, art is critically important in the phenomenon Rancière is describing. It can perform a vital political role through interventions and redirection of the existing order and enable a more equitable redistribution of the sensible.

The implications of Bourdieu's fields, Foucault's discursive practice and Rancière's distribution of the sensible are significant for this research. Firstly, field theory offers a theoretical and empirical blueprint for analysing the role and practice of art in a specific temporal and political moment. It allows the development of a comprehensive structure of bound relationships and the transmutable forms of capital that agents exchange between one another. As much of this research is concerned with the relationship between institutions, organisations, and communities, local, national, and international, Bourdieu's sociological framework and theory is valuable due to its reflexive and responsive nature. Although I do agree with Rancière's criticism of Bourdieu to a degree, particularly his criticism of the social sciences doing away with disorderly subjects, I believe the flaws or tendencies Rancière sees in Bourdieu and the sociology he practised are flaws that could he could identify with any discipline or field, inside or outside of academia. That is, the claim to knowledge or insight that exceeds that of the general populace is an inevitable move towards a position of power, just as Plato formulated his Republic, or in Hobbes' Leviathan or through the application of orthodox Marxism. Rancière's critique of Bourdieu is, I suggest, as much a demonstration of his theory in practice in that the position of the intellectual, especially a public intellectual, must be challenged, disrupted, and not held as sacred. John Law's *After Method: Mess in Social Science Research* (2004) aims to tackle some of the political-ontological implications of research methods and practice. His sympathy towards the idea of

'mess' in social science research is a response to the tendency to use theory as a container for all phenomena. Methods, he suggests not only describe social realities but is also involved in constructing them. Law's position is a useful reminder of how we must reassess one's relationship to the subject or object of study and renegotiate to ensure a more responsive kind of research.

Discursive practice and non-discursive practice are also terms that are useful to consider in this research. This research considers political and economic forces that occur as the result of institutional decision at various governmental and non-governmental levels. These are, according to Foucault's parameters, non-discursive practices; however, we might identify the production, distribution, and critique of art as being discursive. Although it interacts with and is in many instances supported by, the non-discursive elements mentioned, it is not wholly dependent on them. That is to say that artistic practices would exist in some form without politically-invested galleries or a commodity-focused art market.

The distinction between the discursive and non-discursive also relates to broader discussions of discourse and representation. For example, the privileged position of text and language associated with the linguistic turn has shifted over the twentieth century. The subsequent shift to images in the visual turn is suggestive of how the procedures we adopt to extract meaning are shifting and continuously renegotiated. Academic Tim Dant (Dant, 2003; Howes et al., 2014), points to Barthes interest in how bodies emerge as material entities and also how Baudrillard later re-engaged with Marx's materialism. The sensory turn initiated by anthropologists in the 1980s questioned whether reading, or seeing culture was sufficient, and suggested that sensing culture was a vital theoretical progression (Howes et al., 2014; Laplantine, 2015). This turn or shift certainly resonated within Rancière's work and his interest in the sensory.

There are also recent developments that are having an impact on how the social sciences structure research and analysis of phenomena. For example, Margaret Wetherell, Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Auckland, made the following claim as part of the *Taking 'Turns': Material, Affective and Sensory 'Turns'*

in the Academy event at the University of Manchester in 2014: “Affect and emotion are becoming codified in contemporary social science. While affect has come to mean the subjective, phenomenological experience of an ‘undifferentiated hit of the world on bodies and minds’, emotion increasingly refers to when that ‘undifferentiated state has been turned into a particular conventional, cultural category, like anger or joy” (Howes et al., 2014). The increased material, popular and academic that engages with notions of 'wellbeing', 'mindfulness' or similar notions that are researched and monetised concurrently evidence this point. Reference to these broader discussions of discourse and representation helps us to identify why and how tensions exist between institutions and practitioners, how assumed truths and aphorisms circulate in some quarters, yet are absent in others. These discussions give additional context to Rancière's writings and also help to indicate where and how he coalesces with certain academic traditions while at other times pursuing a singular, idiosyncratic line of thought.

Concerning Rancière's concept, distribution of the sensible, it can be useful in that it recognises art as a critical mode of intervention into recognised political order and social dynamics. Furthermore, it is a useful way of comprehending the interaction between different spheres or practices, for example, the language and evidence base of a government body or NDPB can stand in stark contrast to the form of communication or discourse used in a contemporary art context. Rancière brings these differences into the realm of the sensory, the intelligible and the linguistic. It is this dialectical formation that can add nuance and specificity to the relationships and dynamics present in this research, where perhaps a conception of capital or power cannot contribute to the same degree.

2.3.4 Habitus, Power-Knowledge, Police and Oligarchy

In this section, I will continue to discuss some of the key ideas associated with Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière and show how they influence the discourses of art and politics, and how they resonate within this research. Firstly, we will discuss Bourdieu's idea of habitus. Habitus is one of Bourdieu's most influential yet ambiguous concepts, it has origins in the works of Aristotle, and commentators attribute beginnings of its contemporary usage to Marcell Maus. Bourdieu uses the

term habitus to describe one's physical embodiment of cultural capital, and the subconscious habits, practices, abilities and dispositions. Bourdieu often used sports metaphors to illustrate a sense of what habitus is and how we might recognise it in our behaviours or actions, often referring to it as a 'feel for the game'. We see numerous examples of this in sport, and how we discuss it, particularly when it comes to fast-paced 'instinctive' actions or reactions. For example, a half-volley in tennis, or split-second volleys in football, or to give a specific example from cricket, Cameron Bancroft's catch at short leg to dismiss England batter Rory Burns in the second test of the 2019 Ashes – are all examples of individuals enacting habitus. These actions are spectacular examples of individuals having a 'feel for the game' they participate. Equally, we can expand this idea beyond the realm of sport and consider how social situations prompt specific actions and behaviours. Habitus, in a more conventional environment, helps us to navigate social situations and interactions.

Habitus is relevant to this research as Bourdieu drew a direct link between our habitus and our cultural tastes. Cultural tastes may include fashion, literature, sport, food, but also artworks and art objects. Bourdieu explores habitus and its relation to class-orientated tastes in detail in, *Distinction* (Bourdieu, 1984). He focusses on French cultural tastes and the link to social class. In this text, Bourdieu makes the case that culturally ingrained habitus shapes aesthetic sensibilities. The French upper-class, Bourdieu suggests, engage with 'high art' as their upbringing brings them into more regular contact with those cultural objects and the discourses or history associated with them. On the other hand, the French working-class tend to have limited access to institutions and experiences where 'high art' and its attendant narratives circulate. As a result, they have not cultivated habitus that prepares them for the arena of 'fine art'. Bourdieu stresses that the nature of habitus is such that it can appear to be naturally occurring, rather than, as Bourdieu insists, culturally constructed. This misconception is a critical link between some notions of habitus, or analogues of this term, being used as a justification of social inequalities. Cultural tastes are not a priori to social standing but are, in fact, a result of it. As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, Tony Bennett (Bennett et al., 2009) applies Bourdieu concepts to a contemporary UK context, and they found that there was not the same

extreme correlation between specific cultural tastes and social class that Bourdieu illustrated. However, there were ingrained social markers that impacted on cultural tastes.

Basil Bernstein, the British contemporary of Bourdieu, with a research focus on the sociology of education (Bernstein, 2003), argues that habitus is “something good to think with, or about” and alerts us “to new possibilities, new assemblies, new ways of seeing relationships” (Bernstein, 1996, p. 136). Michael Grenfell, who has written extensively on the work and theory of Bourdieu suggests that "*Habitus* is to Bourdieu's approach what *power-knowledge* is to Foucault's or coding orientation to Bernstein's – once one has internalised the idea to the extent that it is part of one's way of seeing and thinking about the social world, it becomes second nature” (Grenfell, 2008, p. 64). Foucault makes a central assertion about the nature and mechanism of power. He argues that power produces diverse types of knowledge, and this records the nature and register on an individual's activities and being. The accumulation of this knowledge has the cyclical effect of reinforcing and adding greater structure to exercises of power. Foucault dismisses the reductive analysis that concludes that Foucault is merely stating that 'knowledge is power'. Instead, he is concerned with the interaction and the complex relationship between knowledge and power. They are concepts that are inextricably linked but remain distinct entities (O'Farrell, 2019).

Foucault identifies several registers of power, including disciplinary power. Discipline is a mechanism of power that does not explicitly control individuals or social groups, but it conditions their behaviour. Those with power in a society regulate the organisation of space (architecture, infrastructure), of time (timetables, the forty-hour working week) and people's activity and behaviour (drills, posture, movement) (Grenfell, 2008). Those exercising disciplinary power can enforce it with the aid of complex systems of surveillance. Foucault emphasises that power is not discipline; rather, discipline is simply one way in which one can exercise power (O'Farrell, 2005). Foucault also uses 'disciplinary society' in his analyses of history and institutions he associates with disciplinary power. These institutions include hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools and army barracks. Foucault also makes the

distinction between a 'disciplinary society' and a 'disciplined society'. Foucault is exclusively discussing a 'disciplinary society'. Foucault extends his thesis on power to discuss what he calls biopower. He argues that biopower is technological and power structures deploy it in order to manage populations. It is related to aspects of disciplinary power, but there are subtle differences. If disciplinary power regulates actions and a person's bodies, biopower is the action of managing the births, deaths, reproduction, and illnesses of a population (ibid).

Throughout Foucault's published works and lectures, he developed a concept of power that is opposed to more traditional liberal and Marxist theories of power. However, the progression of his thought is somewhat organic, and as a result, it is difficult to present a totalising metatheory of Foucauldian power, consistent with collected works (O'Farrell, 2005). Foucault identifies the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a historical period where 'disciplinary power' gradually took over from 'sovereign power'. That does not mean that one simply replaced the other – according to Foucault, these two registers of power remain in tension with one another and structure the modern State. Clare O'Farrell, whose 2005 monograph *Michel Foucault* offers a concise overview of Foucault and his work, summarises the relation between modern states and power. She says: "The modern State, Foucault argues, consists of the convergence of a very particular set of techniques, rationalities and practices designed to govern or guide people's conduct as individual members of a population and also to organise them as a political and civil collective in the same way as a shepherd who cares for his flock from birth to death" (ibid, p. 46).

Foucault suggests that there are potential ways in which we might resist the exercise of power. He argues at one point that resistance is co-extensive with power, which is to say that as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance (O'Farrell, 2005). There are some critics, for example, the Marxist Journalist Duccio Trombadori's interviews with Foucault (Goldstein & Cascaito, 1991), suggests that Foucault's version of disciplinary power has the effect of paralyzing any resistance rather than allowing space for it to occur. In Brent L. Pickett's article *Foucault and the Politics of Resistance* (Pickett, 1996) he suggests that rather than Foucault's concept

of power being unerringly insidious, "his notion of resistance supports a wide range of political action. The problem with his politics is elsewhere: his refusal to define any limits to resistance means endorsing all forms of opposition without regard to their form or consequences" (445). If we move on from the notion that Foucault's disciplinary society is an all-encompassing prison, then attempts can be made to identify the specificity of resistance in Foucault's formulation. Again, Pickett's reading of Foucault and his critics is useful in addressing both strengths and weaknesses in the issue of resistance. He says, "though Foucault sees himself as politically engaged, he does not see himself as a new moral legislator. If he did, Foucault would be guilty of the errors of the old, totalizing intellectual" (ibid, p. 463). There is a degree of difficulty in settling on a version of resistance that avoids contradictions. If resistance is primarily a counter-power, then there is an implicit reliance on a normative framework. This in itself veers towards the initial object of resistance in its propagation of a power structure. I would suggest that Foucault does allow for a form of resistance in his conception of power relations in societies, but it does not hold the same moral or ethical imperative we might find in other forms of resistance. However, resistance in the micro-context of this thesis has a quite direct and identifiable target – the political and cultural institutions that steer particular kinds of artistic production and participation.

Institutions are a pivotal issue throughout Foucault's work. He argues that in a society, they freeze certain power relations in order to advance the interest of some people over others. Foucault uses the term 'heterotopia' to describe spaces outside of established social and institutional arenas; he suggests that motels, cemeteries, and museums are all 'heterotopias'. Again, this is significant in terms of this research because, like art, institutions displaying art and artefacts have characteristics that are in some way separate from normative institutional spaces. Although his concept of 'heterotopias' is not as developed as some of his other work, it is an indicator of how we might conceive of galleries and museums as being in some way temporally, socially or politically different. O'Farrell points out that, "Foucault argues that the State is a codification of relations of power at all levels across the social body. It is a concept which provides a 'scheme of intelligibility for a whole group of already established institutions and realities'. Further, 'the State is a practice not a thing'"

(O'Farrell, 2019). This is a detail in Foucault's work as it prompts us to consider how we traditionally conceive of political institutions – there is the tendency to think in terms of the symbols of institutional or state power, such as its architecture or pageantry – but for Foucault *practice* is the distinguishing factor.

Rancière conceives state power in different terms. Firstly, he outlines a commonly accepted version of how we might generally understand state power. In *Disagreement* (Rancière, 1999) he states: "Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, [it denotes] the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution" (28). However, part of his project is to advance beyond notions of the state that are rooted in administrative and bureaucratic functions. In order to do this, he uses 'the police' to denote an expanded form of state power. Samuel A. Chambers clarifies Rancière's use of this term in a chapter titled *Police and oligarchy* in the Jean-Phillippe Deranty edited text, *Jacques Rancière: Key Concepts* (Deranty, 2010). He says:

Rancière takes everything he describes above and renames it: he calls the system of distribution "the police". Rancière repeatedly invokes the phrase "police order" to refer to any hierarchical social order - the orders in which we all circulate, each and every day. He uses "policing" to designate not only policy-making - as the term in English, though not in French, already connotes - but also parliamentary legislation, executive orders, judicial decisions, and the vast array of economic arrangements. Most of what we would take to be politics turns out to be police: from the principles of interest-group liberalism to the actions of bureaucrats and executives; from elections to welfare.
(Chambers, 2010, p. 61)

According to Rancière's "politics of aesthetics", state power is concerned with the distribution of bodies (a concern we see in Foucault's biopower) and the police order as one particular "distribution/partition of the sensible" – which is, in turn, a structure of what can be sensed (again, we can refer back to the sensory turn in the social sciences). Rancière asserts that the police order is also "an order of the visible and

the sayable" (2004, p. 29). Once again, Chambers offers a useful synopsis of Rancière's logic. He says, "police determines not just the part that any party has in society; it also determines the intelligibility of any party at all. To have no place within the police order means to be unintelligible - not just marginalised within the system, but made invisible by the system. Police orders thereby distribute both roles and the lack of roles; they determine who counts and they decide that some do not count at all" (Chambers, 2010, p. 61). This idea of the police is not wholly attributable to Rancière, and he acknowledges that there are historical precedents to his concept. For example, Rancière points to seventeenth-century German and Italian political treatises and discourses and that figures such as Michel Foucault had identified these qualities in their analysis on the nature of state power.

Linked to Rancière's discussion of state power and 'the police' is his idea of democracy and oligarchy. Like Foucault, the focus on issues such as power or 'the police' obscures Rancière's position regarding the nature and desirability of democratic states. Chambers offers a corrective to the liberal misinterpretation of Rancière's work that levels it as anti-democratic:

In his more recent *Hatred of Democracy*, Rancière offers a vigorous defence of democracy against all the critiques of democracy - as individualist consumer society run amok - that have circulated in recent years, especially in France. In making this defence, however, Rancière also forwards a clear and powerfully polemical answer to the questions posed above. He states plainly, yet repeatedly, that "we do not live in democracies". He offers his alternative formulation just as plainly: "we live in States of oligarchic rule". (Chambers, 2010, p. 64)

Chambers suggests that Rancière's logic follows a similar process as his development from state power to police. For Rancière', much like Foucault, division, stratification and social hierarchy mark all societies. Oligarchy functions as an essential distinction between a version of democracy that operates per social equality and the notional democracies that enact programmes of inequality. An important note on Rancière's idea of oligarchy is the fact that it emerged relatively

late in his thinking, and only later texts discuss it in detail. As Chambers states, "whilst some of the 'centrality' of this term comes about retrospectively for Rancière - as he reinterprets early arguments in light of this newer concept - Rancière's conceptualisation of oligarchy has become crucial to his overall project" (Chambers, 2010, p. 64).

The theories discussed here display a similar interest in all three thinkers in the way in which individuals and groups internalise certain notions, behaviours and assumed truths and how this can directly relate to structures of power and domination. We can begin to position market forces and artistic practice within the dynamics of these terms; therefore, they act as a distinct, but related, conceptual frames for analysing the material and phenomena identified in this research.

2.3.5 Cultural Capital, Culture and Stultification

The exploration of Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière will continue with an overview of some more key, related terms in their thought. Their terms are Bourdieu's cultural capital, Foucault's conception of culture and Rancière's critique of European academic and pedagogical traditions which he refers to as stultification. Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital is causally related to his formulation of fields and habitus. In the sociological essay, *The Forms of Capital* (1986), Pierre Bourdieu identifies three categories of capital:

1. Economic capital: command of economic resources (money, assets, property).
2. Social capital: actual and potential resources linked to the possession of a durable network of institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.
3. Cultural capital: A person's education (knowledge and intellectual skills) that provides advantage in achieving a higher social-status in society.

Bourdieu's theory of capital draws inevitable contrasts with Karl Marx. Bourdieu was keen to avoid the label of 'Marxist sociologist', but Marx's influence is evident in Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital. Capital functions as a marker of social position

in a field or social order; it can be exchanged, transmuted, appreciate and depreciate. Whereas Marx saw capital resolutely in terms of economic capital, Bourdieu expands this concept to detail the different types of capital listed above. Bourdieu is consistent with Marx in that he suggests that the more capital one accumulates, the more significant their position in society. Bourdieu goes further and argues that the different forms of capital feed into one another and this process can exacerbate social inequality. For example, Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital "refers to the collection of symbolic elements such as skills, tastes, posture, clothing, mannerisms, material belongings, credentials, etc. that one acquires through being part of a particular social class" (Routledgesoc, 2016). Identity and group position can be affirmed by sharing cultural capital through experiences and interactions. In the UK, we might see overt instances of cultural capital elevating social position — British culture has traditionally held an Oxbridge education as a critical element of the British elites' social position. However, there are also subtle indicators of social position, such as where one may shop for their groceries or preferred television shows. These practised habits and tastes give a sense of collective identity and in turn, compounds one's position (ibid).

In some contexts, we value some forms of cultural capital over others. Cultural capital is not equal in all scenarios, and it can positively or negatively impact on social mobility as much as economic capital. Bourdieu posited that cultural capital comes in three forms—embodied, objectified, and institutionalised (Routledgesoc, 2016). Embodied capital can include one's accent, dialect or first language. These are forms of cultural capital than can be intrinsically linked to one's upbringing or locality. Embodied cultural capital might be one's house, a record collection or perhaps an art collection. This form of cultural capital is in an objectified state. Institutionalised cultural capital refers to professional credentials or educational qualifications. This form of cultural capital signals that a regulatory body or a field's acknowledged authority verifies one's status.

Like Bourdieu, Foucault also conceives culture, material or otherwise, as having the potential to include and exclude. Foucault describes culture as “a hierarchical organisation of values, accessible to everybody, but at the same time the occasion of

a mechanism of selection and exclusion” (Foucault in O’Farrell, 2005, p. 132).

Related to Bourdieu and Foucault’s understanding of culture and cultural capital is Rancière’s idea of stultification. Where Bourdieu and Foucault see culture as an agent of exclusion and inclusion, Rancière highlights philosophy, academia, and pedagogy as one particular cultural formula that has the potential to exercise exclusion and entrench inequality.

As was previously mentioned, Rancière launched many attacks on reified figures in the French academy, none more so than Pierre Bourdieu. He based much of this criticism on the dynamic between the academy and the those in its orbit. Phillip Watts, in his chapter *Heretical history and the poetics of knowledge* (2010), discusses the foundation of stultification.

One of Rancière's boldest claims is that the core of the Western philosophical tradition rests upon this initial gesture of intellectual arrogance in which philosophy claimed for itself the right to think and handed down to others the virtue of manual labour. This is what Rancière calls stultification, and this stultification is also at work in Pierre Bourdieu's sociology. [...] Here is how Rancière sums up Bourdieu's approach: children of the working class are excluded from the university because they ignore the real reasons for their exclusion. And this ignorance is the product of the very system that excludes them. Only the sociologist can reveal to the poor the rules that govern their exclusion from higher education. The triumph of the sociologist thus depends upon the continued ignorance of the poor.

(Watts, 2010, pp. 109-110)

Rancière posits a rather grim version of sociology and its antecedents. We find ourselves in a similar quandary as Foucault, and his position on resistance is that critical projects aimed at exposing accusations of stultification can paralyze social inequality. Furthermore, this position is not a critique based on the dialectical process; it is the complete dismissal of an entire discipline. What’s more, the vampiric characterisation of Bourdieu and his field, distracts from the vital contribution of

Bourdieu and his work. Again, Watts makes a compelling defence of Bourdieu, rather than an explicit dismissal of Rancière's position. Watts says:

Any reflection on pedagogy would, it seems to me, be severely lacking if it rejected out of hand Bourdieu's attempts to expose the mechanisms of social domination. Still, Rancière's point is well taken: a premise in Bourdieu's thought is that hidden forces, that only the expert can detect, govern society, and that the poor because they are poor, will never be able to see without the assistance of the scholar. At the heart of Rancière's poetics of knowledge, we thus find a critique of demystification, this hermeneutic process that claims to unveil hidden truths. Since the end of the Second World War, in France at least, demystification had been one of the most useful intellectual tools of the Left, [...] Rancière calls the "stupefaction", the *abrutissement* of the public by "well-meaning souls" intent upon protecting us from the power of images and the excesses of language.

(Watts, 2010, p. 110)

The complexities of stultification do have a bearing on this research, especially when considering the dynamic between the institutional voice of museums and the publics they serve. Seph Rodney's 2015 Doctoral thesis, *Museums, Discourse, and Visitors: The Case of London's Tate Modern* (Rodney, 2015) investigates the shift of the discursive construction of the museum. It posits that museum practice at Tate Modern has moved from the positioning of the curator and institution as consecrated positions who transmit information to visitors, to creating parameters for customisable and personalised visits, or experiences, to its galleries and displays. However, contained within this rubric of visitor freedom are retail options, marketing data, advertisements and paid-for activities. Bourdieu, Rancière and Foucault would all agree that these conditions are part of the power dynamics they critique – rather than pursue the very outer limits of complexity in the critical debates of these figures there is value in prudence when dealing with their ideas. The excesses of language can be reproduced with a remarkable speed that concurrently accelerates away from the object of study. The aim of this research is not to chase one's own tail – to catch it - only to eat it. Criticality, I would suggest, can morph into a philosophical

ouroboros – more concerned with an unimpeachable, infinite position rather than a practice of 'making sense'.

2.3.6 Regimes of the Arts and Dissensus

As mentioned earlier, Rancière uses the term regimes of the arts to imply the relevance of context, historical and cultural, to his epistemology. A regime of the arts defines the specific ways in which a given epoch conceives of the nature and logic of artistic representation. Rancière proposes three 'regimes' of the arts. These regimes are, to some degree, historically contingent—as different regimes have been formative in some historical periods—but they also complicate and cut across such periodisation (Woodward, 2019). This dynamic of cutting across occurs because they are not fundamentally historical categories but, instead, ways that art operates, is thought of or is significant, which can function in any historical period. Significantly, more than one regime of art can be operative at a single time. These regimes of art are 1. the ethical regime of images; 2. the representative (or poetic) regime of art; and 3. the aesthetic regime of art (ibid).

Plato's discussion of images exemplifies the ethical regime of images which was formative in Ancient Greece. Art does not emerge as a category here, just as we have discussed concerning Shiner in the opening chapter of this thesis. The ethical regime understands images in relation to their effect on the ethos, or mode of behaviour, of members of the community, and they are interrogated according to their origin and their end, function, or purpose. This regime categorises images as truer or falser and considers them to have a beneficial or detrimental effect on the ethical community (Woodward, 2019).

Rancière argues that the representative regime of art was the dominant regime from the Renaissance period to the nineteenth century. This regime of the arts not only conceives of art as an idea but also a system of understanding, distribution and preference. In this regime the:

Arts were thought of in terms of poetics; that is, sets of rules which determine the different forms of expression and arrange them in a hierarchy, and which

also determine which forms of expression (arts, genres) are suitable for particular types of content. The representative regime takes its name because this system of categorisation of the arts is organised around the key idea of representation, or mimesis, understood as a fit between form of expression and type of content

(Woodward, 2019, pp. 25-27).

The hierarchies and preferences of this period are still deeply engrained in our collective understanding of art. For example, art institutions concerned with 'fine art' often celebrate this regime through the implicit content in the narratives and discourses they promote.

Finally, we can link the aesthetic regime of the arts to the developments in the arts and discourses associated with 'modernism' or 'the avant-garde'. As mentioned previously, Rancière is cautious of the idea of 'modernism', but it is still useful to illustrate what he means by the aesthetic regime. This is significant as this regime sees the idea of art develop into something familiar to current discourses about singularity and uniqueness of art objects. As Woodward states, "this singularity is involved in a paradox, as far as the rules for governing the characteristic of the art of the representative regime also breaks down. The aesthetic regime asserts art as a special kind of activity but, since anything can now count as art, there are no longer any criteria for distinguishing it from other forms of activity or production" (Woodward, 2019, p. 27). The aesthetic regime is dominant in the contemporary world, and the art practices and works that fit into this rubric are diverse in terms of medium, production and reception. However, Rancière makes it clear that at present, all three regimes are still enacted in some way.

For Rancière, a notion of ethics is less about the formation of the subject (Foucault) or the individual, or indeed the conventions of specific practices (Bourdieu), but the mode and register of political activity. Key to Rancière's understanding of a *partage du sensible*, or the distribution of the sensible, is the tension between a specific act of perception and its implicit reliance on preconstituted objects deemed worthy of perception. In the original French version of this term, Rancière is performing a

linguistic trick. *Partage* has a double meaning in French, which is why it sometimes translated as partition and/or distribution – therefore, it suggests sharing and division (Deranty, 2010). Therefore, we should conceive, *partage du sensible* as "understood in the double sense of the word: on the one hand, as that separates and excludes; on the other, as that which allows participation" (Rancière, 2013, p. 36). The related concept of dissensus expresses this tension, and it is concerned with the practice of dissent. This dissent targets structural inequality and the condition of insensibility, or the lack of being acknowledged and recognised within a social order. Davide Panagia summarises this point; he says: "Democratic politics occurs when certain elements a society deems insensible challenge the governing political order. The task of political action, therefore, is aesthetic in that it requires a reconfiguration of the conditions of sense perception so that those elements, groups or individuals disrupt the reigning configuration between perception and meaning in society that demand not only to exist but indeed to be perceived. A *partage du sensible* is thus the vulnerable dividing line that creates the perceptual conditions for a political community and its dissensus" (2010, p. 96). These aspects of Rancière's work are relevant to this research as it acknowledges the tightly bound relationship of art and politics – art functions in the dual nature of the double entendre of *partage du sensible*, in that it separates and excludes as well as fostering participation and collectivity. In this way, it is a vital tool for overcoming a sectoral aversion to self-criticism in public-funded art organisations. Whilst there is an eagerness for galleries, museums and similar institutions to discuss how they encourage participation, they often redact their position as a source of a degree of division in contemporary life from this sectoral discourse.

2.3.7 Rancière, Politics and Art

Throughout section 2.3 I have outlined some of the key theoretical concerns of three figures who have come to bear on the critique and analysis posited by my research into contemporary issues of funding and policy in the arts sector. Although some of the notions described, such as capital, power-knowledge, distribution of the sensible, are omnidirectional concepts in that they do not establish purely top-down notions of exchange within social or sensory spaces, there is a tendency to consider art in a public context as something acted upon. At this point, it is essential to establish why

cultural freedoms, in this case, contemporary visual art in public galleries, has any bearing or relevance to a discussion of politics beyond the distribution of resources under any given government or political moment. There are myriad defences for the arts and their connection to public provision; notably, there are the social and educational benefits as pursued by the instrumentalised cultural policy under New Labour. This was based on the supposition that a greater cultural literacy amongst the population would return economic benefits across regions and sectors. However, these positions have received criticism because of the sometimes-flimsy evidence base that informed this logic and potential restrictions that this placed on the types of work displayed and the art practices supported.

Bourdieu and Foucault situate cultural expression, production and taste as a critical element of practice and phenomena. However, I suggest Rancière is most adept, concerning the interests and parameters of this research, at articulating a contemporary dialectical relationship between art and politics. Toni Ross writes on this relationship in her chapter *Image, montage* (2010). She says:

At the heart of Rancière's characterization of democratic politics lies the supposition of the equality of all. This premise is situated as a guiding thread of practices that struggle against institutionalized patterns of domination in all their forms. [...] in order to generate politics, the axiom of equality is said to require an ongoing process of testing and verification via localized acts of dissent. [...] he writes, democracy "is not based on any nature of things nor guaranteed by any institutional form. It is not borne along by any historical necessity and does not bear any. It is only entrusted to the constancy of its specific acts".

(Ross, 2010, pp. 152-153)

This point is useful when thinking about the role of institutional critique in the arts. Figures such as Andrea Fraser reiterate this need to continue testing the limits of artistic freedoms and practices, as the institutions which guarantee this principle can, in fact, inhibit it. Therefore, artists like Fraser practice acts of dissent as a means of discovering new guarantees of equality in the artistic field. Rancière is also a useful

resource due to his discourses on how different artistic mediums function and how this impacts on the ontology of art. Although this is not an explicit component of this research project, drawing attention to this aspect of Rancière's thought is a reminder of the different scales of his studies, whether it be structures, practices or objects. *The Future of the Image* (Rancière, 2008) is a vital reference point for understanding the dual operation of art objects or images. He posits the aesthetic image as a reciprocal process (Ross, 2010) where we conceive "the image as raw, material presence and the image as discourse encoding a history", or as Rancière says in a more evocative phrasing, "the unfolding of inscriptions carried by bodies and the interruptive function of their naked, non-signifying presence" (Rancière, 2008, p. 14). Rancière also makes clear the relationship between the aesthetic image and his conception of political acts of resistance through disruption and disobedience. According to Rancière, artistic images create "discrepancies" to an established order, our perceptions and our notion of reality (ibid). Due to this, we can see symmetry with some elements of modern and contemporary art. Ross states, "This emphasis on the disruptive operations of modern art upon naturalized convention has been a staple of art-historical discourse and art institutions for some time, so much so that it has become an avant-gardist cliché. Although it should be acknowledged that Rancière has recently cautioned against a tendency in the contemporary art world to pre-emptively assume the efficacy of art's transformative powers" (Ross, 2010, p. 155)

We have previously discussed the different regimes of art in Rancière's thought, and this also provides an essential corrective to the idea of the savant artist, whose own mercurial creativity is the condition of the critical reception of their art. Instead, "Rancière insists that a single artist's inventiveness is not on its own sufficient 'to open the doors of artistic visibility...'" (Ross, 2010, p. 153), but it is the regimes of art that lends art a cogent and readable set of reference points, practices and conventions. Therefore, Rancière's conception of aesthetics includes both artistic practices and the frameworks of reception, display circulation (ibid). Within this research, this lends added significance to the sites of reception, such as galleries, as they are intrinsically tied to Rancière's notion of aesthetics and how meaning and understanding emerges through one's interaction with art.

Rancière has returned on many occasions to the issue of art's critical potency in the contemporary era. Writing in a catalogue essay on the work of Alfredo Jaar, Rancière discusses the influence of global capitalism on the critical potential of art projects, and he suggests that the proliferation of images in the contemporary era is an obstacle to be negotiated by artistic production. However, rather than presenting this as an existential threat to criticality, he suggests that art is still a potent politico-aesthetic form that has distinct creative potentials. He argues that whilst governments and financial structures have become increasingly invested in and adept at circulating images and managing their reception, artists, such as Jaar, can adjust, reconfigure and recontextualise these images to reveal the misdirection of the capitalist spectacle and posit alternative formulations of the social world and images (Ross, 2010).

2.3.8 Rancière, contemporary art practice and theory

This section reviews the secondary literature that engages with Rancière's concepts of art and politics. Whilst this is not an exhaustive summary of the recent research and art practice that engages with his work, this review aims to demonstrate the presence of his writings and concepts in different quarters. Furthermore, the engagement in Rancière's thought has shown its influence in different modes of engagement in art and its related discourses. Firstly, we might ask what Rancièrian *politics* looks like in action? With reference to museums and galleries, an article by Divya P. Tolia-Kelly titled *Rancière and the re-distribution of the sensible: The artist Rosanna Raymond, dissensus and postcolonial sensibilities within the spaces of the museum* (2019) discusses an artist's engagement with the Māori collections at the British Museum, the artwork she creates in response to it and the narrative and discourse attached to such collections in political spaces, spaces of "police order" (124) such as the museum or gallery. Tolia-Kelly proposes that the postcolonial interpretation constitutes a challenge to the institutionalised structuration of power between nations, peoples and cultures and in this way performs an act of Rancièrian dissensus (ibid). For example, Sven Lütticken's interest in aesthetics and autonomy is related to Tony Bennett's summation on the dialectical relationship between art and culture. Artists and critics continue to

reference these theoretical considerations in relation to discussions based on Rancière's work around the relationship of art to everyday life and the role of the artist.

Lütticken makes an interesting point relevant to this study. Autonomy is a recurring theme in the relationship between artistic activity and political or cultural institutions. Bourdieu dismissed the potential for a wholly autonomous cultural production and Rancière not only agrees with this point but goes on to suggest that it may not necessarily be desirable to pursue a utopian ideal of autonomy. With relation to this point, Lütticken says the following:

The aesthetic is thus *a specific approach to art*, and with Jacques Rancière we can characterize the aesthetic project in terms of the dialects of logos and pathos, of reason/freedom and the sensible – of autonomy and heteronomy. The aesthetic thus understood is never 'purely' autonomous, for it needs heteronomy as its double. The aesthetic is the constant questioning of art and thus of claims for art's autonomy, counteracting it from persistent problem to ideological given. This is why the comfortable assumption that art is structurally autonomous ultimately leads to aesthetic attrition (Lütticken, 2012, p. 90)

Here we see that there is a significant tension that Rancière and Lütticken identify, in that critically engaged art that continues to develop aesthetically requires challenges to the assumed truths or purely self-referential traditions in practice, display and reception of visual art. Lütticken suggests that the ossification of abstract expressionism as the aesthete's art *par excellence* in the 1970s is indicative of practice without sufficient critical challenges (Lütticken, 2012).

Kate Oakley (Oakley & O'Connor, 2015) also makes a cogent point of the relevance of Rancière in the way in which academic discourse engages with notions of artistic practice and the cultural industries. They suggest that it is vital to recognise that culture is not anthropologically prior to art; instead, they emerged at the same time. This is significant in conceiving the democratic position of art. Art and culture are

distinct but emerge from the same conditions of human, social development, yet commentators often position art as encoded intellectual exceptionalism, as an evolved higher order of its cultural ancestor. It is this falsity that enables social groups to mobilise art as a tool for social stratification and elitism. These are significant concerns for research into the role of arts and culture. As Oakley and O'Connor say "Nevertheless, the problem of a complex society mediated by images, sounds and texts, in which the common good can be articulated over and above the utilitarian nihilism of neo-liberalism, remains central to the work of any critical study of the cultural industries" (2015, p. 26).

Rancière's conception of art is significant as Victoria D. Alexander et al. (2018a) says, it "helps us to structure the world and our experience of it in different and creative ways, or as a thing by which we form our picture of ourselves and of the world surrounding us" (30-31). However, there is the potential to pursue this more basic formulation of art further. Wiszniewski (2012 in Hanks et al. 2012) state that, "In *The Emancipated Spectator*, Jacques Rancière gives a good account of the relation between world, city, community and theatrical representation from ancient to modern times, from Plato to Brecht, Artaud, Guy Debord" (119). They go on to explain the significance of this in terms of the presence of artistic activity and display within communities. They state, "all city institutions assume a representational role for their assumed audiences. However, it can be argued that whilst the world and its representations are as conditioned now as ever by various apparatuses of representation, the apparatuses are more diffuse yet also as politically charged as ever" (Wiszniewsk, 2012 in Hanks et al., 2012, p. 120).

In this statement, there is a crucial point about how city institutions assume a representational role. From this point, we can ask how they formulate this representational role, who is included and excluded in this representation and how the site of the gallery may constitute a different type of representation when compared to other civic spaces. Furthermore, we might ask how the apparatus that condition these spaces change through time and between locations.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has included a discussion of several critical pieces of literature and writers. Firstly, this chapter has discussed academic disciplines and sub-disciplines and the discussion indicates their relevance to this research. Cultural policy studies, museum studies and cultural economics are important research areas that can provide frameworks for similar types of research and analysis of the features and dynamics of a specific English context. The second part of this chapter has presented a thorough discussion of the ontological and epistemological concerns expressed in this research. An in-depth discussion of literature and concepts from key figures such as Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière has been used to illustrate their relevance to this specific research.

There are several vital points and issues explored that will resonate throughout this research. Firstly, there is the issue of how we conceptualise the parameters of the phenomena related to public funding of contemporary art practices. Bourdieu's field theory, Foucault's discursive practice and Rancière's distribution of the sensible are three key concepts that have overlapping concerns yet distinct frameworks and attendant logics. Although this work uses the term 'field' throughout, there are times where we can extend the scope of this concept to allow for elements and conditions that Foucault and Rancière identify in their work. As this chapter has indicated there are points of convergence and divergence in these theoretical frames and at times outright hostility from one to another, for example, Rancière's excoriation of Bourdieu and sociology. However, I believe there is significant value in balancing these different positions and not aligning to one over the other in each instance. Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière are all concerned with practice as an object of study – the position of the researcher and the conceptual frames that mediate this position are different according to each of these figures. To propose a totalising alignment to one method or framework over another presupposes a rigidity that is ill-suited to this research project. As the changes to public arts funding continue to shift, it is necessary to be responsive to this changing context. These three figures provide an indispensable foundation to the theoretical frameworks employed in this research; however, there should also be a willingness to step outside of these and remain alert

to the specificities of this research context that Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière may not have anticipated.

Another vital issue that has emerged throughout this chapter is the relationship between art and politics. As we have seen, the three figures discussed in this chapter demonstrate a keen interest in how political conditions shape the production and reception of different art forms. Their insight is vital in order to formulate a cogent analysis of the specific phenomena of the English arts system since 2010. On the one hand, we can look at Bourdieu's field theory to understand the presence of external forces that shape this particular field, and by doing this, we can conclude the degree of semi-autonomy arts organisations enjoy in this context. As there is a very tangible link between the different levels of government and publicly funded arts organisations, we can start to form an understanding of the relationship between art and politics.

On the other hand, Foucault and Rancière offer slightly different points of reference. Foucault, as we have explored, offers an overview of how different forms of power shape what can be known or said and by extension, the complexity and criticality of art. However, it is Rancière who develops an incisive account of the relationship between art and politics. Like Foucault and Bourdieu, there is a concern with exogenous forces impacting on creative freedoms and artistic practices, but there is also the acknowledgement of art as a vital component of actual democratic governance. This is a central point and one that is relevant to this study in particular. A recurring issue in narratives surrounding arts and cultural policy is the issue of 'value' and how the arts justify their contribution to broader socio-political and economic agendas. Rancière circumvents this narrative by placing democracy and art as intimately linked and suggests that artistic production and reception is not only an indicator of democratic processes, but essential to them. There are present concerns about the health of our democratic systems in the UK, something that Sarah Munro suggests is an example of a "democratic deficit" (2018, pers. comm.), a term used in analysis of governance. I posit that this is a critical point that a sectoral response to marketisation can orientate.

Chapter Three: Methodology – Investigating Art, Institutions and Politics.

3 Introduction

There is clearly a sense that approaching various topics and problems from a Bourdieusian perspective offers insights which are not readily available through conventional approaches.

(Grenfell & Hardy, 2007, p. 1)

Chapter Two, explored the literature and authors that form a fundamental part of this research. It outlined concerns and trends within academic disciplines concerned with the mediation of artistic production and display by political forces and cultural policy. In addition to this, an analysis of the philosophical frameworks that influence these disciplines took place, with a particular focus on the works of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Rancière. Section 3.1 of this chapter also considers their research methods, or at least the characteristics of their research methods.

This chapter explores the different methodological approaches relevant to this research project. There is considerable variation in the different disciplinary approaches to researching museums, galleries and processes of cultural production, and this chapter acknowledges this variety and demonstrates the suitability of approaches over others in this instance. Not only is there variety in the theoretical structuring and analysis of a research project concerned with museums, galleries, and cultural production, but also case-study research. This chapter will also outline the considerations in working with organisations as part of case-study research.

3.1 Investigating cultural producers

Firstly, this section will discuss the methods and practice of Bourdieu, Foucault and Rancière. As illustrated in the previous chapter, their work has a significant bearing on the critical direction of this study. Therefore, this section will cover the methodologies, albeit in a basic form. We can divide Bourdieu's methodological

approach into three distinct phases. These phases help to elucidate the relations between Bourdieu's operative concepts. Here, Grenfell and Hardy illustrate how they apply these three levels of methodological analysis to the study of The Young British Artists (YBAs):

[F]irst, the positioning of the artistic field vis-à-vis the field of power; second, a mapping out of the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents of institutions (art galleries, museums, art schools) who compete for the legitimate form of specific authority of which the artistic field is a site; third, an analysis of the habitus of artistic agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalizing a determinate type of social and economic conditions, and which find a definite trajectory within the field under consideration and a more or less favourable opportunity to become actualized.

(Grenfell & Hardy, 2007, p. 118)

In this case, Grenfell and Hardy refer to arts publications that can offer some insight, albeit subjective, into the critical responses to the subject of their study. They offer an adaptable methodological framework for this research and the relationship between public contemporary art galleries and cultural policy.

Interdisciplinary reach and an impact across many research areas characterise Foucault's work. His academic background in philosophy, psychology and history informed his analyses of knowledge systems and structures of power. His work, although influential, is divisive. Foucault's work and methodologies have been said to undermine the history and practice of critical theory, but some interpret these methods as a driving force behind challenging established norms within it (Morrow & Brown, 1994). Foucault's stance within postmodernist thought derives from his rejection of totalising metatheories across the social sciences, but the singularity of his text has led to selective incorporations of his theories by researchers and academics (Dews, 1987; Grumley, 1989).

Foucault's work falls into two broad categories in terms of his overall contributions. Firstly, his methodology applied to study systems of knowledge, combining structuralist thought, ahistorical processes, and epistemology (the archaeology of knowledge). Secondly, the analysis of the disciplinary power relations that shape and form the modern subject (the genealogy of knowledge) (Morrow & Brown, 1994). This latter direction of Foucault's thought is the point where there is the most significant parallel with the sociological directives of Bourdieu. It represents "a mode of inquiry that claims power relations do not simply distort knowledge as suggested by the theory of ideology; rather knowledge itself is rooted in power relations" (ibid, p. 135).

Foucault does not generate an explicit methodology to follow but does state that "power is never anything more than a relationship that can, and must, be studied only by looking at the interplay of the terms of the relationship" (2006b, p. 168). From this statement, one can infer that Foucault develops his methodology from the various relations that concern him. This process might combine empirical and theoretical approaches, but a necessary operation at the heart of this research process is rigorously and comprehensively defining a framework for the Foucauldian theory of power. The impact of Foucault on this research project will depend on how the relationships between the key institutions, organisations and individuals are best comprehended, and whether a Foucauldian theory of power can articulate the nature of these relationships.

With regards to Rancière, his methodology is difficult to classify, but a simplified and perhaps overly reductive summary might say that he looks to the *partage du sensible* and how this deploys images, phenomena and objects. In the translator's notes in the introduction to *The Politics of Aesthetics* (Rancière, 2004), Gabriel Rockhill states that "His [Rancière] unique methodology, eclectic research habits, and voracious propensity for assimilating European intellectual and cultural history are comparable perhaps only to the unclassifiable work of Michel Foucault, an author with whom he himself acknowledges certain affinities" (2004, p. xiii). Rancière's eclecticism is part of his appeal as a researcher and an academic. His ability to combine an expansive field of practices and histories into an analysis of the present

(again, another similarity to Foucault) is a vital skill to apply and one that there is the ambition to apply in this research. However, his eclecticism is not replicable as it is highly individualised, but research can evoke his methods in spirit and intention.

This section intends to illustrate how conventional research approaches can offer a methodological structure without adhering strictly to the overarching theories of Bourdieu and Foucault. Instead, these approaches represent broad, adaptable methods within which to explore notions of power and cultural production. One can categorise the thesis' broad research approaches as political economy, textual analysis, and sociological/ethnographic work. These methods are not exclusive to one another, and there are benefits to using them in conjunction with each other. However, each has a particular focus and elicits specific results.

3.1.1 Political economy

In the political economy approach, researchers understand cultural production as a level of industry. The approach suggests that the conditions of production directly shape the nature of the cultural content. Therefore, this approach considers the economic, industrial, and political factors, and one can assess organisations and the culture they produce (A. Davis, 2008). This requires gathering quantitative data from the organisations and industries under consideration and assessing factors such as revenue sources, production costs, competing organisations and audience share. This approach can be useful for exploring exogenous factors such as politics, policy, and regulation (Curran & Seaton, 2003; McChesney & Herman, 1997).

In this approach, cultural production is engaged with indirectly. As Davis says, "[t]he focus is not on those individuals who produce culture but, on the structures, external factors and high-level decision-makers which come to influence and shape mass-produced culture" (2008, p. 54). The relevance of the political economy directed approach to this study is that it encourages seeking documents and data from the industry and governing bodies. For example, annual reports, policy, legislative material, and historical archives can be utilised and cross-referenced. The main obstacle here is the access to information; however, with studies of public bodies and the structures they operate in, data is generally readily available for public

consumption and research purposes. For example, DCMS, ACE, the Charity Commission and arts organisations themselves hold publicly accessible data.

This research method can offer insight into the macro level of an industry or sector and generate a generalised representation. It does, arguably, produce a more objective set of findings, but there are some omissions from the political economy approach. This approach may not bring individual actions and agency into focus (A. Davis, 2008). Furthermore, relying on statistical and financial data may not wholly account for a cultural output such as contemporary art.

3.1.2 Texts and textual analysis

Researchers can use textual analysis to study cultural production by analysing cultural outputs. This requires the researcher to engage with diverse types of text, printed or otherwise. Again, this indirectly studies process and structures of cultural production. A motivation for adopting this research method is that it can “highlight the common codes, terms, ideologies, discourses and individuals that come to dominate cultural outputs” (Davis, 2008, p. 56). The types of text selected for analysis can vary considerably; exist as different forms of media and appear from a range of sources. Regarding some of the themes in Foucault's work, as mentioned previously, we might infer or elucidate discourses from sources including historical documents, social and institutional texts (ibid).

Within the scope of this study, textual analysis will be essential for ascertaining the implicit and explicit discourses within policy documents, directives from NDPBs and the material produced by arts organisations. Exploring themes within these texts will be vital in establishing themes across the institutions and organisations in this research and produce a comprehensive account of central narratives. However, it is important not to establish too broad assumptions or make grand claims (A. Davis, 2008).

3.1.3 Sociological and ethnographic approaches

One can categorise the final approach as sociological or ethnographic. In this instance, the processes and people engaged in cultural production are observed and

empirical, often macro-level quantitative data is produced through surveys of professional fields, but sociological work is increasingly carried out at the micro-level and produces qualitative data sets (A. Davis, 2008). The object of this approach is "to discover the practices, cognitive processes and social interactions of professionals involved in producing culture" (ibid, p. 58). Challenges to sociological or ethnographic research can occur for myriad reasons. Problems might include, selecting appropriate participants, maintaining contact with participants, the ongoing collection of material, and how the scope of the research might alter as new material becomes available (ibid).

The success of this research method relies on the degree of access granted and the cooperation of the participants involved. As a result of the problems inherent in this approach, findings can become overly subjective and not be reproducible at a macro level. However, due to the observation of cultural production in action, this research can offer an exploratory research process and be reflexive to evolving research environments (A. Davis, 2008). A prime example of the ethnographic approach within a museum context is Sharon Macdonald's *Behind the Scenes at the Science Museum* (2002) which offered a detailed account of how organisations produce and the public experience exhibitions. Within the context of this research, a sociological approach may be appropriate for gathering data through interviews with key figures affecting cultural production in the public sector, as opposed to the embedded approach of ethnographic work such as Macdonald's study.

It is possible to combine the research and methods mentioned above to develop a comprehensive and rounded research design. It is necessary to balance the strengths and weaknesses of each approach whilst being mindful of the time and resource restrictions of this particular research project. Detailed case studies offer scope to employ the research methods discussed in this section through a mixed methodology. The next section will detail the specificities of the research design for this project.

3.2 Research design: methods, analysis, and ethical concerns

This section will detail the research design of this project. It will introduce the methods used, the types of data collected, and the forms of analysis employed. This section will also discuss the ethical implications of this research. It will also offer information about the case studies in order to form a profile of the organisations.

3.2.1 Research design: case studies

The nature of the research question and the interest in exploring a contemporary phenomenon makes use of case studies appropriate. Various researchers offer justifications for case study research; for example, Yin (2003), Stake (1995) and Merriam (2009) discuss the criteria for structuring case study research. The following table offers a succinct set of parameters for case study research:

Element	Description
The case	Object of the case study identified as the entity of interest or unit of analysis Program, individual, group, social situation, organisation, event, phenomena, or process
A bounded system	Bounded by time, space, and activity Encompasses a system of connections Bounding applies frames to manage contextual variables Boundaries between the case and context can be blurred
Studied in context	Studied in its real-life setting or natural environment Context is significant to understanding the case Contextual variables include political, economic, social, cultural, historical, and/or organisational factors
In-depth study	Chosen for intensive analysis of an issue Fieldwork is intrinsic to the process of the inquiry Subjectivity a consistent thread—varies in-depth and engagement depending on the philosophical orientation of the research, purpose, and methods

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

	Reflexive techniques pivotal to credibility and research process
Selecting the case	<p>Based on the purpose and conditions of the study</p> <p>Involves decisions about people, settings, events, phenomena, social processes</p> <p>Scope: single, within case and multiple case sampling</p> <p>Broad: capture ordinary, unique, varied and/or accessible aspects</p> <p>Methods: specified criteria, methodical and purposive; replication logic: theoretical or literal replication (Yin, 2003)</p>
Multiple sources of evidence	<p>Multiple sources of evidence for comprehensive depth and breadth of inquiry</p> <p>Methods of data collection: interviews, observations, focus groups, artefact and document review, questionnaires and/or surveys</p> <p>Methods of analysis: vary and depend on data collection methods and cases; need to be systematic and rigorous</p> <p>Triangulation highly valued and commonly employed</p>
Case study design	<p>Descriptive, exploratory, explanatory, illustrative, evaluative</p> <p>Single or multiple cases</p> <p>Embedded or holistic (Yin, 2003)</p> <p>Particularistic, heuristic, descriptive (Merriam, 2009)</p> <p>Intrinsic, instrumental, and collective (Stake, 1995, 2006)</p>

Table 1: Case study elements and descriptors (H. Harrison et al., 2017)

With the above criteria and structure applied to this research, it is clear that case studies will be fundamental to answering the research questions prompted by the scope of this study. As this research is concerned with the relationship between organisations and processes in the arts and the public sphere, it is necessary to study these. The binding relationship in this study is the status of some contemporary art galleries as NPOs, making the galleries and their activities a critical unit of analysis.

Furthermore, focussing of galleries helps to articulate the activities and outcomes of a bounded system of cultural policy and public arts funding. The public-facing

activities of these organisations (exhibitions, events, education, outreach, retail) offer a context in which to view the case studies, whilst also offering a framework in which variables can be made visible. Also, the case study approach offers multiple forms of evidence and data. For example, textual data and existing quantitative data can support existing interviews and observations. Due to the parameters of this research, an embedded (Yin, 2003) or heuristic (Merriam, 2009) approach is not wholly necessary to address the primary research questions. Instead, the research utilises case studies for their instrumental value in articulating phenomena associated with the research (Stake, 1995, 2006).

3.2.1.1 Case study selection

The primary criteria for selecting case studies are as follows; firstly, they must be a gallery with a contemporary art exhibition programme forming a core part of their charitable activities; secondly, they must receive their core funding from ACE and have status as an NPO. As the time-frame for this research spans several funding periods (2012-15, 2015-18 and 2018-22), it is pertinent to select organisations that have had NPO status within these periods. The number of organisations fitting this profile is considerable and too numerous to study exhaustively.

It is necessary to make additional qualifications in order to make selections from this broader group. Firstly, the case studies represent several geographic regions; and secondly, that they represent various scales of an institution. This research assesses scale in terms of combined income, members of full-time staff and visitor numbers. In addition to this, a single arts organisation must receive the funding rather than a city, or region-wide consortium of arts organisations. As a result of these criteria, this research identifies three primary case studies. They are; BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead, Nottingham Contemporary in Nottingham, and South London Gallery in London. Furthermore, there is scope to gather additional data from other organisations matching the criteria mentioned above. For example, The Hepworth Wakefield in West Yorkshire, Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art in Middlesbrough, are all organisations that can offer useful comparative data.

Within these selections, it is possible to identify correlations as well as divergences. They are all representative of public funding structures and cultural policy directives in arts organisations, but they also sit within differing regional contexts, organisational identities, and governance. NPO status offers a binding characteristic and allows us to make a case for the similarities and differences in how NPOs navigate uncertainty. Their NPO status also offers a degree of transparency and visibility in terms of reporting data and accessing key figures within organisations. This research acknowledges the vital role of key leadership positions in shaping the direction of organisations and the public discourse related to organisational activities. As a result, the main case studies are all organisations where I was able to discuss in detail and at length with gallery directors, or comparative positions. It is important that the pressures of marketisation could be expressed directly and with reference to their specific roles in the cultural sector.

Leadership in public funded art galleries is a key element in the individual and collective success of the arts sector in England and beyond. The balance between creativity, administrative skill and trust within and outside the organisation is necessary for effective leadership. However, changing policy and funding landscapes, evolving cultural and generational perspectives, and changing habits in consuming cultural material, present ever-shifting challenges. In this research, I speak to 'Directors' as they are in a unique position to navigate these conditions and foster organisational cultures of trust, inclusivity and artistic development. However, these are not simple tasks. England's arts sector has endured external pressures which have eroded trust within and between organisations. The complex interpellation of policy and practice has created a generalised governance structure and career trajectory for arts professionals in English public galleries. A board of trustees tends to appoint a director with experience in a senior curatorial or programming role, therefore placing value in the core function of the gallery space within the context of leadership and administration.

This organisational and professional structure is not without issues. The financial and political pressure since 2010 has highlighted the fragility of trust through organisational hierarchies and in some instances, this manifested in alarming ways.

In 2021, there were reports and allegations of racism at the Barbican Centre, including senior staff using racist language, which contributed to a culture that was “subtle and insidiously” racist. An internal review of the organisation followed these allegations (Bakare, 2021).

A recurring issue within the arts sector is the gap between senior and junior staff in public institutions – precarious work conditions at the bottom and high salaries at the top are one point of contention. This is especially contentious when senior management's decision-making directly impacts the pay and work conditions of its staff. In 2017, when Nicholas Serota left Tate Galleries to take the position of chair of Arts Council England, it was widely reported that senior management had put up notices in staff rooms asking employees to contribute to a leaving gift for Serota – a sailing boat.

This came at a time when there was ongoing disagreement between staff and management over low pay, outsourced jobs and loss of employee benefits at the organisation. These examples, although negative, do highlight the important role of cultural leadership in times of crisis. They also highlight the enduring divisions within the professional ranks of the arts sector. This research engages with cultural leaders in public visual art galleries as they are a focal point for navigating internal and external pressures whilst maintaining trust with the public and the sector (Ellis-Petersen, 2017a).

Their NPO status can also reveal the nature of relationships with LAs, how these are threatened and how they flourish. These case studies represent the total or partial withdrawal of LA funding, as well as local contexts where arts funding has been protected. As a result, the selection of case-studies reveals both the terrain for NPOs and the extreme funding situations manifesting at a local level. Therefore, they are appropriate for investigating the relationship between the arts and marketised cultural policy.

3.2.1.2 *Gaining access to case studies*

A fundamental and widespread problem with conducting case study research is gaining access to organisations. Hammersley and Atkinson (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007), Burgess (Burgess, 2006) and Walford (Walford, 2001) have

detailed this problem, and the following recommendations for access emerge from their observations. Walford uses a basic but adaptable framework that aims to: "Approach, Interest, Desire, Sale" (ibid, p. 36). This will manifest in the following way in this particular research project:

- Carry out background research to identify 'qualified' points of contact and gatekeepers.
- To contact gatekeepers in writing (email) offering a brief synopsis of the research and the relevance to the organisation. Brief information is preferable to extensive detail as "[e]very additional piece of information gives a chance for an objection" (Walford, 2001, p. 39). At this point, it is essential to demonstrate why this research might be of interest to them.
- Communicate the aims and methods in writing to the respondents willing to participate. Also, it is essential to communicate the rationale for approaching the organisation and how it might appeal to the organisation itself.
- Arrange meetings with respondents at their convenience.
- During the meetings, conduct interviews and offer details of how the research will use and store the data, and respond to any concerns respondents might have.

This process will introduce information and details of the research project at various stages. There were instances of success and failures in following this process when planning the case study access for this research. Firstly, there was a problem with finding up to date or correct contact details. Whilst some of the galleries listed email contacts for a PA or similar role in order to contact the Director, not all did. For example, Nottingham Contemporary and South London Gallery both listed contact details to reach the Director or senior management team; however, The Hepworth Wakefield did not. This issue resulted in a considerable delay in being able to make contact with the relevant persons at the gallery.

This experience highlighted the fact that a variety of strategies are needed if the initial 'qualified' points of contact do not elicit an actionable response, for example accepting an invitation to participate, requesting additional information, or declining

to participate. Strategies might include making contact by telephone and post as well as email. Also, it may be useful to determine if anyone within the university or institution where one is based has had previous contact with the case study organisation. Above all, it seemed that persistence in contacting the organisations, responding promptly to their communication and being responsive to their schedules was key to gaining initial access.

Another issue that came up during the case study interview process was the use of the materials distributed in advance of the interviews. Participants received a concise form of the interview questions, an FAQ sheet about the research, and how it would use interview responses and an informed consent form (see Appendix J). In some cases, the participants did not look at this material in advance, creating some confusion or negotiation in the initial stages of the interview process. A straightforward way to avoid this issue would be to send the material well in advance of the interview date and prompt the respondents again a short time (a working week) before the scheduled interview. Depending on the time between scheduling the interview and it taking place, this should be an unproblematic process to follow.

The final point is that the researcher carried out interviews in person and over the phone, depending on availability and preference of the respondents. It was apparent that a face-to-face interview provided a much more conversational and interpersonal experience, and this is potentially conducive to more expansive responses. Also, the telephone interview meant that the preparatory materials previously mentioned were more vital to the structuring of the interaction and potentially foreclosing relevant but unanticipated topics of conversation. It was important to stress to the participating organisations and individuals that the interview did not mark the end of the research process. Instead, they can withdraw content at any time, or cease to participate in any way.

3.2.2 Research methods

This thesis develops research methods for this study regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the discussion in section [3.1](#) on cultural producers and how to study them. The result is a mixed-method research design that will include qualitative

data in the form of semi-structured interviews, textual analysis, and policy analysis, as well as quantitative data in the form of funding, expenditure and visitor figures. Some of the concerns outlined by the Museum Values Framework (MVF) (Davies, Paton, & O'Sullivan, 2013) underpin this approach (see section [2.4](#)).

Case Study	Data Collected
BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art	In-depth interview and follow up with the director of the gallery. Analysis of key documents such as the end of year reports, mission statements, marketing material and internal documents.
Nottingham Contemporary	In-depth interview and follow up with the director of the gallery. Analysis of key documents such as the end of year reports, mission statements, marketing material and internal documents.
South London Gallery	In-depth interview and follow up with the director of the gallery. Analysis of key documents such as the end of year reports, mission statements, marketing material and internal documents.

3.2.2.1 Textual analysis

This research will also refer to several types of media that convey information about organisations. Textual analysis understands 'text' as something from which one can derive meaning. In the case of the galleries addressed in this study, this may include publicly available material such as mission statements, interpretation, press releases and social media content. Also, gatekeepers can make internal documents available. These might include funding applications, business plans and financial reports. Further to these more conventional types of media, the research will consider key features of these galleries where it is relevant to communicating key organisational features. For example, the logos and 'brand' identity of the galleries, the exhibition

programme, supporting education and outreach programmes and the galleries' relationships with other organisations. The practices and characteristics of these organisations are understood through in-depth engagement with wide-ranging points of reference. However, it is important to note that with any form of textual analysis, there is potential for multiple interpretations and simultaneous readings from within and outside the galleries studied.

3.2.2.2 *Semi-structured interviews*

Interviewing is a crucial component of qualitative research but contains a range of styles, approaches, and theoretical justifications. The benefits of interviews as a knowledge-producing method emerge from the cross-cultural prevalence of conversation as social interaction. Employing a dialogic method arguably produces objective data as it gives a voice to the researcher and subject alike, however, the familiarity of such conventions, or the prevalence of what Atkinson and Silverman (1997) call an 'interview society', means that interviewees are more prepared and perhaps more guarded in their responses.

There are several contemporary varieties of interviewing each with a different emphasis on the desired dynamics of the interview and types of data produced. For example, Roulston (2010) identifies *neo-positivist* approaches that posit the interview can reveal "the true self" of the interview subject; *romantic* versions that suggest one can find revelations or confessions through developing intimacy and rapport. *Constructionist* iterations of interviewing reject the perception of authenticity in the romantic notions and instead offer the interview scenario as space for the local production of the subject and the co-construction of the conversations meaning. *Postmodern* and *transformative* conceptions present the interview as a dialogic and performative relationship in which one can make new connections and possibilities.

The choreography of the interview itself can often follow a predictable format. This is as follows:

These few exchanges of questions and answers follow a certain conversational flow typical in qualitative interviews. We can divide the flow

into (1) *question*, (2) *negotiation of meaning* concerning the question raised and the themes addressed, (3) *concrete description* from the interviewee, (4) the interviewer's *interpretation* of the description, and (5) *coda*. Then the cycle can start over with a new question, or else—as in this case—further questions about the same description can be posed.

(Brinkmann, 2014, p. 283)

Although this format might reoccur, there are structural differences between interview approaches. These range from unstructured to structured interviews, with little or a lot of pre-set parameters. Semi-structured interviews, the format adopted for this study, are potentially the ubiquitous approach and the approach most associated with qualitative interview methods (Warren, 2012). Kvale & Brinkmann define semi-structured interviewing; they state "It is defined as an interview with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the life world of the interviewee in order to interpret the meaning of the described phenomena" (2015, p. 3). Breaking down the key components of this definition, as Brinkmann (2014) does, offers a strategy for identifying potential issues that might arise during the interview process and how a researcher may address them.

3.3 Introduction to case studies


This section introduces the central case studies used in this project. The case studies used are BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, South London Gallery (SLG), Nottingham Contemporary, mima and Hepworth Wakefield. It will offer comprehensive profiles of these galleries in order to highlight similarities and differences, but importantly offering context to the responses from the participants in the case study aspect of this research. These profiles will consider the quantitative figures found in annual reports, for example, they include, income, expenditure, visitor figures, staffing distribution and senior staff salaries. Furthermore, information related to their geographical location, key stakeholder relationships and their reliance on Local Authorities (LAs). In addition to this, this section will outline their core charitable activities, characteristics of their exhibition programme, the tone of interpretation and design elements that communicate organisational culture.

Researchers have used organisational culture literature as a method for understanding the difficulties and conflicting values in museums and galleries, the poorly articulated expectations of cultural organisations (Cameron, 1971; Kotler & Kotler, 2000) and the increased accountability of publicly-funded bodies (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992). In response to these conditions, research has developed frameworks to understand the organisational responses in museums and galleries. The Museum Values Framework (MVF) (Holden, 2004; MLA, 2006; Moore, 1995; Morris Hargreaves McIntyre, 2007; Scott, 2006) is an adaptation of the Competing Values Framework (CVF) (Davies et al., 2013) and studies have used it as an analytic tool for researching organisations such as galleries.

The application of organisational culture research to museums and galleries is minimal, but existing literature (Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981) suggests organisational culture is a vital element of shaping behaviours, practice and values in museums and galleries. Furthermore, it can help to elucidate the negotiation of conflicting values, for example, the gallery as a 'temple', a forum for debate, a catalyst of social change or a customer-led environment (Davies et al., 2013; Harrison, 2005; Lee, 2007). In developing the MVF framework, Davies et al. (ibid) indicate that there are "three areas where values played a particularly significant role in shaping the nature of the coproduction. The three areas were: who the key audience/stakeholders were, how knowledge was conceptualised (and the museums' role in presenting knowledge) and the perception of the functions of museums" (ibid, p. 348). Based on the identification of these critical factors, Davies et al. developed the following matrix:

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Figure 2.1. The Museum Values Framework



Source: (Davies et al., 2013)

This matrix is useful for interpreting the information gathered related to the galleries and organisations in question, as well as shaping the direction of inquiry. The horizontal axis indicates where organisations position themselves in relation to their primary stakeholders; the vertical axis indicates the modes of communication and the four quadrants indicate the conflicting conceptions of the museum or gallery. The MVF framework has application for planning projects and collaborations, as well as providing a blueprint for organisational structure.

3.3.1 South London Gallery

The South London Gallery (SLG) is a publicly-funded contemporary art gallery in Camberwell, south-east London. William Rossiter founded a college in 1869 which would evolve into a gallery in 1891. The origins of the gallery are rooted in the

opening of the Working Men's College on Blackfriars Road in 1868. The college relocated several times and during that time began to exhibit privately owned work in temporary exhibitions. In 1891, The South London Fine Art Gallery opened on Peckham Road in Portland House, which it would co-occupy with Camberwell College of Art. We can attribute the vision of the gallery's form and function to William Rossiter and to John Passmore Edwards, a newspaper owner whose philanthropy led to the founding of numerous public libraries, galleries and hospitals in London, Cornwall, and Devon. Passmore Edwards donated £3000 to the new site, and a subscription system to the library helped to sustain the site's various functions. However, Rossiter intended the gallery to eventually become absorbed into the growing constellation of national museums and galleries.

Camberwell Vestry took responsibility for the running of the gallery in 1896, and it remained under the council or local authority control throughout the twentieth century. It also developed a significant permanent collection. The gallery's remit and focus shifted significantly with the appointment of David Thorp as Director in 1992. The gallery became focussed on contemporary art and became strongly associated with the Britart and the Young British Artists (YBAs). Thorp was the founding director of the Chisenhale Gallery and developed a programme of exhibitions focussed on emerging artists from the UK. Between 1988 and 1992 he was director of The Showroom, another East End gallery focussed on early-career artists.

SLG's association with Britart and its supporting figures is evident through much of its exhibition programme in the 1990s. The 1995 exhibition, *Minky Manky* curated by Carl Freedman (co-founder of Counter Editions with Matthew Slotover and founder of Carl Freedman Gallery), brought the work of emerging artists, such as Tracey Emin, to public institutions whilst also continuing to give exposure to the artists established through the 1990 exhibitions *Modern Medicine* and *Gambler*. These artists include Sarah Lucas, Gary Hume, Damien Hirst, Mat Collishaw and others. In this period the gallery also made significant additions to its collection, including works by Antony Gormley, Anish Kapoor, and Tracey Emin. The gallery's activity in the 1990s was not limited to a British focus and included solo exhibitions by key international artists, such as Julian Schnabel and Anselm Kiefer.

In 2001, the board appointed Margot Heller as Director and the gallery established a programme where prominent international artists exhibited their work. Early, and mid-career artists have also exhibited, and the gallery has retained its links to the Britart era through financial support from artists (such as Tracey Emin) and through its board of trustees (Matthew Slotover, co-founder of the contemporary art magazine *Frieze*, is chair of the board). The gallery became independent of Southwark Council in 2003, and the board established it as a charitable trust. The Arts Council increased its funding whilst Southwark Council continued to fund the gallery and manage the permanent collection which now forms the basis of the Southwark Art Collection. The gallery expanded into a neighbouring building in 2010 and added further exhibition space, a bookshop and café to its activities. In 2015 the gallery received an anonymous donation of the Victorian Peckham Fire Station which has opened as a multi-use cultural venue programmed by SLG. 2016 saw the gallery open a garden designed by Gabriel Orozco that linked the gallery to a neighbouring housing estate.

3.3.2 Nottingham Contemporary

Nottingham Contemporary is a contemporary art centre in the Lace Market area of Nottingham. It opened in November 2009 as the Centre for Contemporary Art Nottingham (CCAN) with significant capital funding from the now-defunct East Midlands Development Agency (EMDA), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Arts Council England (ACE) and Nottingham City Council (NCC). NCC's capital plan from December 2005 notes the breakdown of funding sources with ACE providing £5,080,000, ERDF £3,000,000 (applied for), EMDA £2,000,000 and NCC £1,000,000. Other sources, such as private donations, trusts, benefactors, and foundations, contributed the additional funds, bringing the total budget to £13,200,000. The project allocated approximately 50% of the capital plan to the construction works and the gallery scheduled its opening for 2008. However, the project overran and was over budget, with the gallery opening in 2009 and costing approximately £20,000,000. As well as exhibition spaces, the gallery includes a shop and café.

The council-led scheme commissioned a new purpose building to house the new gallery and arts centre, with Caruso St John architects winning the international competition for the project. Caruso St John has a practice that is renowned for several high-profile museum and gallery designs. Examples include Damien Hirst's Newport Street Gallery, several of Larry Gagosian's galleries, New Art Gallery Walsall and the Victoria and Albert Museum of Childhood. The architects state that the artistic ambition of the project refers to the artist-run spaces of 1960s New York, and the work of Gordon Matta Clark and Trisha Brown, known for site-specific works and performance, respectively. The architects aimed to create a range of interiors that reference factory or warehouse spaces, as well as creating innovative exhibition and performance spaces. The architects took inspiration from the nineteenth-century buildings of Nottingham and the facades in the Lace Market when designing the exterior of the building.

Nottingham Contemporary's founding Director was Alex Farquharson, and he had this role until 2015. Farquharson had previously been an independent curator, writer, and university lecturer. He co-curated *British Art Show 6* with Andrea Schlieker and was a Tutor and Research Fellow on the Curating Contemporary Art MA at Royal College of Art in London. He had also held the position of Director at Spacex in Exeter, 1994-1999 and Exhibitions Director at the Centre for Visual Arts in Cardiff, 1999-2000. He currently sits on the Arts Council Collection Acquisitions Committee and is a Trustee of Raven Row, London. In 2015, he left Nottingham Contemporary after Tate Britain appointed him Director.

Nottingham Contemporary's current Director is Sam Thorne. Thorne was previously the Artistic Director of Tate St Ives and has a background in art education. He has worked as a visiting tutor at the Royal College of Art in London and has taught art history, activism, and art criticism in 2013 he co-founded Open School East, a free art school in East London. Several publications have published Thorne's writing. He is a contributing editor of *Frieze* magazine and had previously been an associate editor at the magazine. The gallery has continued to exhibit group shows and solo exhibitions. The gallery shows work by established international artists, as well as early and mid-career practitioners.

3.3.3 *BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art*

BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art (BALTIC) is a contemporary art gallery in Gateshead, Tyne and Wear, situated in an adapted former flour mill on the banks of the River Tyne. It opened in July 2002, later than initially planned, following a four-year construction period. Northern Arts (now Arts Council England North East) proposed the idea of BALTIC in 1991, and they declared their ambitions for the development of a contemporary visual arts facility in Central Tyneside. The project cost £50 million, with a significant portion of that, £33.4 million, coming from The National Lottery through Arts Council England. Other major funders include Gateshead Council, Northern Rock Foundation, the European Regional Development Fund and One North East. BALTIC does not hold any collections and has a changing programme of temporary exhibitions, showing national and international artists at various stages of their career, at the main gallery spaces in Gateshead and a satellite gallery, BALTIC39 in the centre of Newcastle upon Tyne. With 2,600 square metres of exhibition space, it is the largest dedicated contemporary art venue in the UK. BALTIC receives continued funding from Arts Council England and Gateshead Council.

BALTIC has been a prominent institution in the national landscape, symbolising the role of arts and culture in urban regeneration programmes and the efforts to create regional cultural networks outside of the capital. The gallery's inaugural Director, Sune Nordgren, oversaw the development and opening of BALTIC, and the first exhibition included work by internationally renowned artists such as Chris Burden, Carsten Holler and Julian Opie. Since then BALTIC has hosted over 190 exhibitions of work by 388 artists from 53 countries and has had more than 6 million visitors. It has hosted significant exhibitions such as British Art Show 6, organised by the Hayward Gallery in 2005-6 and the 2011 Turner Prize, at that point only the second time a venue outside of London hosted the prize (in Liverpool, 2007) and the first time a non-Tate institution hosted it.

The building consists of six main floors with several mezzanine levels housing administrative spaces. There are four primary exhibition spaces, including a double-

height gallery, a performance space, cinema, library, archive, and education spaces. The building also houses a café, gift shop and a rooftop restaurant. Dominic Williams of Ellis Williams Architects designed the building following an open competition. The building retains the north and south facades of the Rank Hovis flour mill and deploys materials that reference the industrial heritage of the region. The use of Corten steel internally and externally is an example of this, and this was also the material used by Anthony Gormley in his public sculpture *Angel of the North* (1998). The design utilises Ffestiniog slate and Scandinavian pine throughout the building for the flooring. Some of the galleries are capable of maintaining climate-controlled conditions, suitable for artworks sensitive to fluctuations in light, temperature, or humidity.

The current Director is Sarah Munro, and she has been in post since 2015. Munro had previously been Artistic Director of Tramway and the Head of Arts for Glasgow Life. Munro was a central figure in the delivery of the Great Exhibition of the North, a city-wide exhibition and event programme celebrating arts, culture, and industry, funded by the central government and strategic partners. Godfrey Worsdale was BALTIC's previous Director from 2008-2015. Worsdale was the Founding Director of mima and is now Director of the Henry Moore Foundation. Previous BALTIC Directors include Stephen Snoddy and Peter Doroshenko. BALTIC states that its mission is to "create greater understanding of the world through outstanding, experimental and inspiring contemporary art which has power, relevance and meaning for individuals and communities" (Davies et al., 2013).

3.3.4 The Hepworth Wakefield

The Hepworth Wakefield is a purpose-built contemporary art gallery in Wakefield in West Yorkshire. Wakefield Council initiated the project to build a gallery in 2003 and opened in May 2011. The gallery has formed a major part of Wakefield's extensive regeneration project and is the largest purpose-built gallery since the Hayward in London, in 1968. The gallery takes its name from the renowned sculptor Barbara Hepworth who was born in Wakefield in 1903. The gallery displays temporary exhibitions as well as housing the Wakefield Permanent Art Collection which

includes work by several prominent British artists. The gallery incorporates temporary exhibition spaces, learning spaces, an auditorium and a café and shop.

Wakefield Council reported that The Hepworth Wakefield cost £35 million for the full development of the site (Art Fund, 2011). The founding partners were Wakefield Council, who contributed £18 million, and The Hepworth Estate. It received major funding from ACE and the Heritage Lottery Fund (HLF) and capital grants from the ERDF, the Homes and Communities Agency and Yorkshire Forward. Additional funding came from many foundations, trusts and donors. The gallery has a close partnership with the organisations forming the 'Yorkshire Sculpture Triangle'; this includes Yorkshire Sculpture Park (YSP), the Henry Moore Institute (HMI) and Leeds Art Gallery. These organisations collectively aim to promote Yorkshire as a centre for sculpture.

David Chipperfield Architects designed the building, located at the headland of the River Calder. The design of the gallery consists of 10 different sized trapezoidal blocks which the architect intends to reflect the industrial past of the area by referencing the roof profile of the surrounding buildings. The galleries are situated on the upper floor and feature extensive natural light. David Chipperfield had worked at the practices of Douglas Stephen, Richard Rogers, and Norman Foster, before starting his practice in 1984. The practice currently has offices in London, Berlin, Milan, and Shanghai.

The founding Director of The Hepworth Wakefield is Simon Wallis. The development scheme appointed Wallis in 2008 after he had previously been the Director of Chisenhale Gallery, Senior Exhibitions Organiser at the ICA, Curator at Tate Liverpool, and Curator at Kettles Yard. Wallis was instrumental in developing the exhibition programme, business plan and gallery specifications before the gallery opened. In 2013 he also oversaw the opening of The Calder, an adjacent arts and events space that The Hepworth Gallery runs. The gallery has become recognised as an important new gallery since its opening. It was the winner of the Art Fund Museum of the Year award in 2017, with the prize givers citing the increase in visitors, a new sculptural prize, and the exhibition programme as a reason for this achievement.

3.3.5 Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art

Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art (mima) is a purpose-built modern and contemporary art gallery in the centre of Middlesbrough, North Yorkshire. Mima opened in January 2007 after a three-year construction period beginning in January 2004. The building cost £14.2 million, funded by Middlesbrough Council and Arts Council England with support from One NorthEast – SRB and Single Programme, Government Office North East, Northern Rock Foundation and The Foyle Foundation. Mima opened following the closure of several Middlesbrough based cultural venues. The Middlesbrough Art Gallery housed Middlesbrough's art collection from 1957 until 2003 when the site closed. The Cleveland Gallery and Cleveland Craft Centre also hosted exhibitions in the city until 1999 and 2003, respectively. Mima consolidated the city's collections and exhibition programme into one primary site. The collections include work from British and International artists from the 1800s to the present day.

In September 2014 mima became part of Teesside University, a public university with its main campus in Middlesbrough. This change meant that the university would take over the day-to-day running of the gallery in place of the council. Middlesbrough Council and Arts Council England would, however, remain mima's main funding partners. The gallery announced this partnership when Mark Robinson was in post as Interim Director of mima.

Erick van Egeraat Associated Architects designed the gallery following an international competition in 2002. The exterior cladding consists of Turkish limestone and the design used Italian slate for the interior floors. The gallery is approximately 4,000 square metres and includes five gallery spaces, two project studios, two collection stores, an education space, an event space, as well as a café, shop, garden, and roof terrace. The architect, in conjunction with landscape architects, also designed Centre Square, a focal point to the urban regeneration project in Middlesbrough.

The current Director is Laura Sillars, who took over from outgoing Director Alistair Hudson in the summer of 2018. Sillars was previously the artistic director at Site Gallery, Sheffield and worked at Tate Gallery, Liverpool. Hudson had previously been the Deputy Director of Grizedale Arts in the Lake District before mima appointed him as Director in 2014. The gallery, under Hudson, asserted itself as having a clear civic and social function. The gallery's website states that they "wish to have an influence on society, taking a leading role in addressing current issues within politics, economics and culture. Our programmes encompass urgent themes such as housing, migration, inequality, regeneration and healthcare" (mima, 2020). The gallery has changing exhibitions, collection displays and a number of educational and public-facing activities.

3.4 Ethical Considerations

From the planning stages through to execution and write up of this research, it was necessary to consider the ethical implications of this work. Firstly, it was essential to establish the boundaries of the ethical stance acted upon during the research process. In this instance, Simons (2014, p. 460) offers a succinct description of her approach. She says her case study research emerges from "a theory of ethics that emphasizes the centrality of relationships in the specific context and the consequences for individuals, whilst remaining aware of the research imperative to report publicly. It is essentially an independent democratic process based on the concepts of fairness and justice, in which confidentiality, negotiation, and accessibility are key principles". These codes of practice translate into actionable processes and considerations whilst conducting research. Although this was a relatively low-risk research process, these considerations were nonetheless important to establishing appropriate safety measures for participants, researcher, and associated institutions.

3.4.1 Ethical approval

Per Newcastle University's Ethical Approval Process, as a post-graduate research (PGR) student, the university requires the researcher to submit an ethical approval form. As this research project does involve human participants but in a non-clinical

setting, the research project needed internal approval from the faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (HaSS). The researcher completed a University Ethics Form and, based on the information provided, the research project was judged not to require the full ethical approval process and the University Ethics Committee granted approval for the project to proceed on 28/11/2017. If the participants in this project were to change and include, for example, children or vulnerable adults, then a reapplication for ethical approval would be required.

3.4.2 Data storage

I kept all information gathered in the case study aspect of the project securely. This included digital and physical information, both of which required basic but effective measures to prevent any unauthorised access. I also kept digital information (audio, transcripts) on a password-protected computer and a password-protected external hard drive. I did not back up data on 'cloud' storage due to the potential risk of data theft. I kept physical documents in a lockable cabinet.

3.4.3 Confidentiality and anonymity

The research project does address an issue participants may perceive as being problematic. They may be reluctant to 'speak out' regarding government policy, financial details, and stakeholder relationships. In order to create an environment that could elicit relevant information, but maintain anonymity where needed, the research treated contentious issues on a case-by-case basis. Negotiation with the participants regarding what responses the research could or could not include, or what it could include contingent on anonymity, took place throughout the data gathering process.

The researcher sent transcripts to participants for approval and then made amendments if the participant made a request. Further to this, the researcher made it clear to the participants that they may withdraw some or all of the information they freely gave.

3.4.4 Responding to changing research contexts

There have been several issues to respond to during this research. One major event was the referendum on Britain's membership to the European Union. The political

forecasts did not tend to anticipate the public vote to support Britain's exit, or Brexit, now the common parlance, and as a result, Britain's political future has remained uncertain since 2016. This issue is still far from resolved, and this has implications for the scope of this study. The timeframe in which I conducted interviews and gathered data was a period where there were two substantial conditioning forces in the arts sector. Firstly, the long-term withdrawal of public spending and secondly, the uncertainty over the impact of Brexit in terms of European funding and the logistics of exhibition-making and staffing.

Instead of shifting the focus of this work to directly incorporate a post-Brexit line of inquiry when conducting the interviews, the questions asked offered space for respondents to discuss this issue without it being a central issue. In order to achieve this, the interview questions encouraged participants to speculate about the potential future of the sector in light of the current political context and the conditioning factors exercised on public contemporary art galleries. At the time of writing (Summer, 2020) the arts sector confronts a new existential threat due to the Covid-19 pandemic. This crisis marks the end of one set of policy conditions, Conservative divestment between 2010 and 2020, and the beginning of another dominated by economic recovery from the pandemic.

Although the questions did not directly address the issue of Brexit during the initial interview process, there was the opportunity to return to this point in the latter stages of the research. I spent six months working with the Contemporary Visual Arts Network (CVAN) in 2019. I worked with colleagues there to carry out a piece of research that questioned how regional identities in the North of England impacted on the art practice there, the common concerns of artists and arts organisations in the North of England and also the perception of larger political events such as Brexit. It also explored political initiatives focussed on the North of England, such as the Great Exhibition of the North, the Northern Powerhouse and the Council of the North. I interviewed approximately twenty individuals who were active in the arts in some capacity, whether at the head of large-scale NPOs or studio holders and artists working with a degree of distance from larger institutions (Hopkin, 2020). This proved

to be an invaluable process in developing a nuanced impression of the factors at play in many diverse levels of arts practice and for arts professionals.

3.5 Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has outlined the methodological approaches and considerations enacted in this research. The methodological approach adopted seeks to balance the practices adopted by research disciplines concerned with cultural policy and artistic practices whilst also incorporating a philosophical framework that explores ontological and epistemological issues associated with art and politics.

Firstly, it is essential to reaffirm *what* this research is studying. This research is a study of cultural production, with the relationship between artistic and political institutions being the thesis' primary interest. Therefore, the methodology adopted for this study incorporates approaches and material that are intrinsic to current discourses in art and politics. For example, this can include policy documents, speeches and press releases from policymakers – but also responses from the arts and culture sector through popular media and sector-specific or professional imprints. These text-based materials offer an insight into the varying positions and responses to the prevailing discourses in art and politics at present, but with a specific focus on the national context explored here.

As this chapter has indicated, this thesis incorporates material gathered from interviews with senior figures in public art galleries in England. The responses from these interviews are vitally important in developing an analysis of the phenomena explored in this research. They provide insight into the specific contexts that arts organisations and institutions operate in and the decision-making processes that take place. Also, with the interviewees being senior staff, such as directors, they occupy an advanced field position, if we use Bourdieu's terminology. This has benefits and limitations; a benefit is that they can give an account of the macro issues and occurrences in an arts organisation whilst also being aware of the structure of the field they and the arts organisation in which they operate. It is also an opportunity to explore the overarching critical positions that organisations take. It

enables us to ask what the primary drivers are for decision-making and what factors inhibit, either internal or external, decision-making.

Again, Bourdieu is a crucial locus point for this approach, and his sociological research methods are evident in much of the practices and research discussed in this chapter. However, much like Chapter Two, I have tried to indicate the use and need for more eclectic and sometimes disruptive practices adopted by Foucault and Rancière. Their practiced caution and sometimes suspicion of institutions, whether art institutions or otherwise, is a crucial factor in avoiding narratives and analyses that simply match official discourses about the role and function of the arts in England and instead encourages critical engagement and identification of what Foucault might call *knowledge-power* and Rancière might call *partage du sensible*.

Chapter Four: Cultural Policy in England – From Independence to Intensified Marketisation?

4 Introduction

The metaphor of a crossroad suggests both challenges and possibilities. The arts have undergone a series of dramatic changes in the last 25 years—including intensive growth of the global art market, significant reductions in public funding, the imposition of neo-liberal models of organization on arts institutions and associations, shifting roles for artists, changing publics, and new modes of participation brought about by the growth of the Internet and other communication technologies.

(Alexander & Bowler, 2014, p. 1)

This chapter intends to illustrate the emergence and evolution of cultural policy in the UK and that there have been numerous times when the arts have been at a 'crossroad'. It will consider the political climate that led to the introduction of state-subsidised cultural funding and then consider the emergence of cultural policy as a surrogate for economic and social policy. A central question running throughout this chapter is whether actors shaped cultural policy through shared (between the state, the public and cultural producers) notions of artistic and creative freedom, or whether policymakers have primarily deployed cultural policy to serve the broader political objectives of the government. Of course, we can see both of these influences at play; both sides enjoy some degree of success. However, the balance of contestation and agreement, resistance and compromise, is not always clear. In the assessment and interpretation of cultural policy, we must consider the inextricable ties to discussions of value. In David Throsby's *The Economics of Cultural Policy* (2010) he asks the question, what values should count in decision-making concerning the production, distribution and consumption of cultural commodities (18). Whilst this chapter does not intend to resolve this question; it does explore some of the rationales informing different notions of value, how the structures of

policy develop and how governments and organisations action policy in these contexts.

Firstly, this chapter will consider the emerging relationship between the arts and government in the post-war era. In the United Kingdom, the legacy of Victorian liberalism and the statism carried over from the pre-war era had created a political context that found the virtues of a welfare state highly appealing. Consequentially, after 1945 the nascent welfare provision took an institutional dimension. Discussing the periodisation of the welfare state, Nullmeier & Kaufmann state: "[t]he end of World War II is an obvious historical juncture in the context of social policy research. It coincides with the years of economic recovery from the Great Depression and with the major social policy reforms inspired by Lord Beveridge's (1942) universalistic reform model... Thus 1945 and the early post-war years may be characterized as the period in which the welfare state became firmly entrenched" (2010, p. 84). This provision also allowed for a degree of state subsidy for the arts. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) would distribute this subsidy to create an arm's-length principle to government funding in the arts.

Secondly, this chapter will offer an overview of the developments that offered a modern blueprint for cultural policy and the tensions this produced. The government demonstrated a commitment to supporting the arts financially but would leave assertions of aesthetics, value, and originality to those with the requisite knowledge. However, divisions between governments, NGOs and the state and differing interpretations of the function of state subsidy in the arts, create an evolving and potentially weakened provision for the arts in the UK. The following analysis of government policy and its application will offer an overview of the logic and reasoning behind arts and culture policy since the 1940s with a particular focus on the 'retrenchment' (Pierson, 1994) of welfare provision in the 1970s and 1980s and the activities and legacy of New Labour's policy (1997-2010). Furthermore, the analysis will explore whether a change is bound to changes in government, or whether 'sub-periods', such as those proposed by Huber and Stephens (2001), better account for periods of retrenchment in welfare provision and cultural funding.

Thirdly, this chapter will discuss some of the primary characteristics of cultural policy over the past twenty years. Commentators suggest that cultural policy is neither fixed nor consistent since its emergence, and there are several interpretations for this. One issue is that there are conflicting notions of value in discussing cultural policy. Dave O'Brien suggests that "[t]here is currently a tension between the way public policy understands value and the way value is understood and created by the arts and humanities" (2015, p. 79). He, and others, point to policy as having value based on economic terms, specifically as market exchange. However, in the arts and humanities, there is no single framework for value. It varies between disciplines but generally resists conceiving cultural practice solely on its market or financial virtues (Belfiore & Upchurch, 2013; Haubrich & Wolff, 2005; O'Brien, 2015).

Another interpretation of the friction between policymakers and cultural organisations is that cultural policy acts as a surrogate for the broader policy arena. Clive Gray states that "cultural policies need to justify their existing levels of state support not through reference to the artistic or cultural benefits that they produce but, instead, to their contribution to other policy concerns altogether" (2007, p. 209). Again, this is a concern with value and the disparity between the practice of a cultural field and the policy that partly supports it. Whereas O'Brien highlights the economic frame of value, Gray presents policymakers as thinking in terms of relational or proxy value. These relational values might be educational, social, but there is undoubtedly an economic concern.

Another reason for the differing opinions emerging from the arts and humanities compared to those of policymakers is the historical principles governing cultural organisations. The origins of national and civic museums in the Victorian 19th century and early 20th century have shaped the professional values within the museum and gallery sector. For example, Nicholas Garnham says "historically there was a clear division between policy towards the arts, based broadly on principles of patronage and enlightenment and on assumptions of an inherent opposition between art and commerce" (2005, p. 16). The enlightenment principles still embedded in many organisations, with a view of culture as being civilising, could be characterised by the private interest for the public good. The increased statism of the mid-20th century

may have altered this balance, but the neoliberal social and economic agendas of the late 20th and early 21st century have attempted to reintroduce the private/public relationship, albeit with a new set of values underpinning it.

Garnham makes a vital assertion regarding the opposition between markets and culture or similar oppositions on this issue. He points out that "differences lie rather in the type of economic analysis made and thus the policy conclusions drawn from it" (Garnham, 2005, p. 19). The point here is that the question of whether we should or should not discuss cultural policy and the value judgements attached to it through an economic lens is largely irrelevant. Economic metrics are a part of the very fabric of the subject matter; therefore, it is more appropriate to focus on and hone analysis, not be dismissive of some aspects.

4.1 Formation of the Arts Council

The origins of the Arts Council England, and indeed the push and pull that has existed between cultural organisations, NGOs, and the state, begins with the founding of the Committee for Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) in 1940. The committee had the brief of promoting British culture and the first chairperson, John Maynard Keynes, used his position to secure generous funding for CEMA and in 1945 it funded 46 art organisations. Shortly after the war, the officials renamed CEMA the Arts Council of Great Britain and Keynes remained chairperson, though he died before the council could sit. Upchurch states that "Keynes was consciously shaping a new organization that could respond with awareness and flexibility to the needs of the country's professional artistic community" (Upchurch, 2004, p. 204). His influence endured beyond his brief incumbency and has proved to be a reference point for future actors in the state, NGO, and organisational levels. The following example is a good indicator of this; "We are all Keynesians in the arts" said Arts Council England chairman Sir Christopher Frayling as recently as February 2005" (Pinnock, 2006, p. 173 cited Frayling, 2005, p. 10).

We must treat this statement with some caution and ask the question, what does it mean to be a Keynesian in the arts? Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that the buoyant fiscal spending associated with Keynes and the reason for the CEMA's

inception is why the arts are Keynesian. However, Frayling is implying that within the arts, Keynes has another voice. He was an ardent supporter of the arts as a leader and educator, as enjoying an arm's-length relationship and rejecting the aestheticisation of politics or the nationalising of culture. Critics of Keynes suggest that his conception of the Arts Council still referenced a hierarchical class system. Pinnock states the following, "the aristocratic patronage function was deliberately reasserted" (Pinnock, 2006, p. 177); the main difference being that the money was now from the public purse. The Keynesian principles Frayling is alluding to are problematic as they are inseparable from a patrician leadership culture that we may view as compromising the social agenda of a Keynesian Arts Council.

Keynes was, in every sense a member of the elite class, and critics suggest the leadership of the Arts Council draws its members from a narrow section of society. Whilst that in itself is not reason enough to discount his objectivity, the distribution of funds in the 1940s through to the 1950s massively favoured organisations he had close ties to, such as the Royal Opera House, and generally organisations in central London. Pinnock goes on to say, "like Keynesian economics, the Keynesian Arts Council was meant not as an agent of wholesale societal change but as a bulwark against it" (2006, p. 177). Conservative economists such as James Buchanan and Richard Wagner (Waligorski, 1994) have identified undemocratic tendencies in Keynes' thought, and they have attributed this in some part to his elitist position. To return to the question of what it means to be Keynesian in the arts, it could be valid to say that it means a council led by a member of the political or intellectual elite directing public money to the cultural organisations forming the backbone of the social lives of that elite. This may be a flippant assertion to make, but it is a recurring theme throughout the history of publicly subsidised cultural activities in the UK.

Whilst events such as the Festival of Britain in 1951, might offer an example of the more democratic and equitable reading of Keynes legacy in the arts, Pinnock again sees reasons for scepticism. Pinnock, referring to Keynes says, "he recommended 'uncalculating expenditure' on 'ephemeral ceremonies, shows, and entertainments' for the working classes, to build a sense of community and help contain their dangerous mass emotions" (Keynes, 1937 in Waligorski, 1994, pp. 173-174). Again,

Pinnock makes a blunt but valid point. Arts council intervention bolstered the institutional resilience of 'high culture' and the council treated other measures as transient or gestural. However, without Keynes' vision, there may not have been an Arts Council and the reforms it has experienced demonstrate the willingness to protect a valuable, albeit flawed, public resource. Keynes' role should not be understated, as Upchurch says, "CEMA's popularity had built momentum for a peacetime organization, and Keynes had the necessary governmental connections, prestige and administrative experience to conceive the new organization and convince the Treasury to fund it" (2004, p. 215). The contemporary landscape of funding is undeniably broader, but distinct inequalities between London and the regions remain. The controversy-ridden 1995 Arts Council of England and Arts Lottery funded the refurbishment of the Royal Opera House (which I will return to later in this text), highlighting just how acutely the questionable facets of the Keynesian arts had endured.

The origins of CEMA echo some of the concerns about the relationship between political power and culture explored by Bourdieu. Bourdieu argued that "modern society is characterized by a ranked diversity of cultural objects, which distinguishes different classes and simultaneously makes some seem superior to others. This hierarchical culture legitimates the unequal distribution of power and wealth by making the dominant class seem more deserving because it consumes the 'right' culture" (Gartman, 2013, p. 1)⁵ CEMA and Keynes indeed established and codified an array of public-funded cultural and artistic practices that were recognisable and familiar to the dominant social class in Britain.

4.2 'Golden Age' and retrenchment

Commentators have referred to the Harold Wilson government of 1964-70 as a golden age due to an increase in the reach and activity of the Arts Council (Sinclair, 1995). The chairperson during this period, Arnold Goodman fostered close ties with

⁵. We can contrast Bourdieu's assertion of culture as class-distinction with the Marxist influenced Frankfurt School that argued that modern society had a similarity and unity of cultural objects "which hides the real class divisions of capitalist society. This mass culture, consumed by all, legitimates inequality by creating the illusion that all members of society are basically equal" (Arts Council England, 2020).

the first Arts Minister, Jennie Lee. Notable activity in this period was the founding of the South Bank Centre and the beginning of regular funding to several galleries and theatres around the country, similar to the portfolio model that ACE currently uses. Andrew Sinclair characterises this period as having a shared vision augmented by experts from art, administrative and policy backgrounds working within the Arts Council (Sinclair, 1995) and this encouraged success in the council's activities. Jennie Lee was effective in promoting the open access principle of the arts, and her role in setting up the Open University illustrates the desire to broaden the arts' role in society. She also initiated the only (before 2016) government White Paper for the Arts in 1965, with the first point stating, "The relationship between artist and State in a modern democratic community is not easily defined. No one would wish State patronage to dictate taste or in any way restrict the liberty of even the most unorthodox and experimental artists" (J. Lee, 1965, p. 4).

The 1970s ushered in a new era for the Arts Council. Throughout successive Thatcher governments, policymakers removed the condition of subsidised arts from an aesthetic arena and placed firmly into policy. The economic uncertainty of the 1970s led to a general shrinking of welfare spending and privatisation of nationalised services. Essentially, the markets would now drive policy, not the other way around. The arts were no exception to expectations of a set of neoliberal reforms that reduced tax, deregulated markets, and advocated privatisation. Sinclair highlights funding as a reason for the decline of the Arts Council's success but also points to the shift from promoting artistic excellence to education and social welfare, and this prompted an exodus of accomplished staff who had made the organisation flourish (Sinclair, 1995). However, Oliver Bennett's review of Sinclair's *Arts and Cultures: The History of the 50 Years of the Arts Council of Great Britain* makes it clear that the criticisms emerge from a rejection of popular culture and an entrenchment of hierarchical cultural forms (O. Bennett, 1996). Irrespective of the reasons why, under the chair of William Rees-Mogg (1982-89) the roles and responsibilities of the Arts Council were slimmed down and the number of organisations receiving regular funding dropped by approximately a half.

The political context the arts found itself in necessitated a new language, a set of justifications for its existence and means of demonstrating value in quantitative terms. This shift has continuing effects, and it still impacts on how we describe value in the arts. The previous justifications of aesthetic quality, national prestige and as a component of the welfare ceased to have traction. As Clive Gray says, "the collapse of these justifications, dating from the 1970s, is seen to have opened the way for the increasingly common view of the arts as simply another policy arena that must be subsumed to the wider, instrumental, interests of governments" (2007, p. 204). The issue here is not just that the arts had to adapt to survive, but the fact that its traditional defences were no longer viable. The value of the arts was now a proxy for economic stimulus, through tourism, as an employer and as a component of a financial market. The language the sector had previously relied on no longer reflected the notions of value the market introduced. This change is significant as it provides a blueprint for how western liberal democracies accommodated the arts in neoliberal social and economic reform. Gray says, "The increasing emphasis that has been placed upon the 'need' for arts and cultural policies to demonstrate that they generate a benefit over and above the aesthetic, has become a major development within political systems" (ibid, p. 203).

The contemporary reactions to this co-opting of cultural policy to serve broader economic agendas were varied. Whilst the political and economic institutions embraced neoliberalism, notably in the form of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, intellectuals from the arts and humanities were critical of the emerging political consensus regarding culture. However, commentators and policymakers would reform the language of this criticism and as it went through a semiotic shift. A notable example of this feature of cultural policy is the origin and appropriation of the term 'culture industry'. Critical theorists Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer coined the term to anchor their belief that mass media and popular culture created a docile and passive society who sought and responded to false psychological needs (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002). Garnham describes Adorno and Horkheimer's motivation in the following way; "they did so for polemical reasons and to highlight what they saw as a paradoxical linkage between culture and industry" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002). The term as we might understand it within the purview of cultural policy, is quite

different to the original intentions of Adorno and Horkheimer, as it ceased to function as a bulwark against the spread of mass media into high art, and instead was deployed as a term encouraging their interaction.

The reuse of the culture industry and later creative industry descriptor stripped its original meaning and policymakers increasingly used the terms to gather economically productive sectors with a cultural element to their work. Commentators have suggested that this change emerged from the entrenched institutional suspicion of the political left during Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister. For example, Garnham states, "This culture industry analysis of the arts and media was marginalised during the Cold War and the long post-war boom as both elitist and irremediably marked by a Marxism that was both subversive and *démodé*" (2005, p. 17). Consequentially, a criticism of the marketisation of the arts and culture constituted opposition to the logic of the market and an endorsement of the ideological pillars that the first incarnation of the Arts Council sought to resist. Of course, the ideological posturing of the Cold War did not wholly dictate the relationship between the arts and government, but the confrontation demonstrated that arts and culture continued to figure in the way that states sought to present themselves on the international stage.

We should not regard the slimming down of the Arts Council's function in this period as efficiency, but a determined effort to reduce the government's obligation to support the various elements of the welfare state. The justification was that the welfare state had failed, and new processes of fiscal distribution were to steady economic turbulence. Gray states, "This 'failure' gave rise to the conditions where not only the underlying models of state economic management were seen to require reform, but so also were the relationships between states and their citizens, and the administrative structures that existed to deliver state services" (2007, p. 208). From this, we can elicit that those structural changes were part of a process of incorporating the practices of private business in cultural organisations. Gray goes on to state that, whilst organisations had to be demonstrably adopting a system of governance that acknowledged the economic and leisure function of culture, in this process, "the actors enjoy a certain degree of freedom and may decide to resort to the externalities of culture" (ibid). This point is valid, but it is worth considering that

agency was still dependent on position and political influence. Structurally, this period shows the still London-centric and relative social exclusivity of culture in the public sphere. The Arts Council selected its leaders during this period from the social elite of the time and the government they served under trusted them. The 1984 *Glory of the Garden* (Arts Council of Great Britain, 1984) report published by the Arts Council, pointed to the vast disparity in funding between London and the regions and the Wilding report (Arts Council of Great Britain, 1984) demonstrated the lack of interest in addressing this imbalance.

Despite attempts to slim down the public commitment to cultural funding, in the 1980s there was a school of thought that ran contrary to the Conservative government's policy and directives. Notably, Ken Livingstone's Greater London Council formed the 'Cultural Industries Unit' that produced the cultural manifesto, *Saturday Night or Sunday Morning?* (Mulgan & Worpole, 1986). This text recognised the vastness of cultural consumption and that not only was it a significant economic base, but governments could utilise it to drive economic prosperity. Whilst this would have little operative impact at the time due to the Conservative government dissolving the GLC in 1986, regeneration initiatives in Sheffield demonstrated the traction of such an idea in post-industrial urban environments (ibid). In this, there was a resolute defence for public subsidy in culture, but there was a significant mitigating factor; the subsidy was dependent on its positive market return. Not only this but, the incorporation of the previously pejorative 'culture industries' into an expanded form of arts and culture, subjected all cultural forms, high or mass, commercial or otherwise, to economic rationales.

Margaret Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister marked a shift in the relationship between the state and culture. Her government's diminished public subsidy, and the number of cultural organisations receiving funding, dropped significantly. In short, her policies severely affected the breadth and depth of cultural funding. We should not interpret this as a negation of culture in the public sphere, but a reorientation of the function it could play in society. Whereas the arts and culture had been mainly celebrated for the romantic notions associated with them and their ability to communicate a sense of national identity, the economic shifts of the 1980s

incorporated cultural activity into the growth and sustainability of local and national economies. The Albert Dock in Liverpool is an example of the culture-led regeneration proponents of the economic and social value of the arts instigated in parts of England in the 1980s. A criticism of these initiatives is the part culture has played in altering the way we engage with our environment and in the case of Liverpool, "the city more broadly has been reinvented as a spectacle for consumption by tourists" (Oakley and O'Connor, 2015, p. 219). This criticism identifies a continuity between Conservative and Labour governments, where the economic function of culture changes city environments.

The economic changes of the 1980s impacted the shift in language when discussing culture and as Jim McGuigan states this occurred "because of the reality-generating power of market reasoning and the new management thinking that was functioning ubiquitously across the institutions of British society and, for that matter, the world at large" (2004, p. 43). The research and initiatives launched under the GLC introduced a redeployment of the culture industry narrative, but one that sought to resist the potential for elitism and utilise cultural spending to solidify dwindling local economies. The narrative differences, emerging from either side of the political divide, crystallised in their understanding of culture in relation to the economy.

Accepting economic forces as a central concern of cultural policy signalled a quasi-consensus between the left-leaning policy associated with the GLC and the market focussed policy of Thatcher and the Conservative party. What separates the two is the nature of the discourse associated with this rationale. Various Labour administrations, seeking to realise the positive impacts of culture in the communities they represented, pursued GLC-inspired policies. However, right-leaning figures such as the former Arts Council chair William Rees-Mogg saw cultural subsidy as a process of investment and return and in a 1985 speech, 'The Political Economy of Art', he discussed the cultural investment as producing a profit (McGuigan, 2004). From this perspective, the idea of arts funding promoting excellence, or social and educational support is mostly absent. Instead, as McGuigan states, "the justification for public expenditure on the arts is given as making money" (2004, p. 44). In the 1980s cultural policy becomes inseparable from

economic concerns, and the Arts Council became adept at deploying an economic rationale for its existence; however, the sentiment would persist across the political spectrum that for the arts to flourish there needed to be a distancing of commercial concerns.

Thatcher's successor, John Major, took steps to place cultural policy in a more concentrated ministerial position and seek new ways to drive revenue streams alongside subsidy and sponsorship. The result was the Department of National Heritage, but this would gain little traction and have little sway with the treasury. The most significant funding change in this period would be the founding of the National Lottery, which according to the 1992 Conservative election manifesto, was "to restore the fabric of our nation" (Hewison, 2014, p. 19). The National Lottery Act passed in 1993 and whilst commentators have identified this as a critical aspect in helping to "transform Britain's cultural landscape" (Mirza, 2012, p. 6), it did not immediately produce a complete revolution in funding. The conditions of how the organisations could operate inhibited the distribution of funds by the Arts Council of Great Britain, and then the four national Arts Councils from 1994 (Hewison, 2014, p. 19).

The Lottery money would not be available for the funding bodies to initiate new projects, nor would funding bodies be able to contact potential organisations who would benefit from the investment. The problem here was that the process minimised the potential for a wide-reaching, national, structured platform of funding. The strains felt by organisations with responsibility of managing the increased revenue stream exacerbated the lack of a clear goal or direction in this deployment of lottery funds. For example, the National Heritage Memorial Fund went from an organisation of 7 to 250 in order to manage the Heritage Lottery Fund (Hewison, 2014, p. 19). The funding did help to produce increases in DCMS funding from the early 1990s to the late 2000s, with lottery money forming a significant part of the Arts Council Budget (Mirza, 2012). The increased funding produced problems, but it indeed increased the capacity to realise expansive cultural projects.

Running concurrently with the capital funding available through the National Lottery was the still relative paucity of central government funding in arts and culture. Whilst bodies initiated new projects; existing institutions were facing the recurring problem of sustainability. There are instances where funders denied organisations who now have essential national and international reputations, such as Yorkshire Sculpture Park, as funders diverted Lottery money to other regional projects.

Instead, they had to look to the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to realise the organisation's capital plans (Mirza, 2012). Overarching policy and direction were largely absent at a governmental level, and Hewison suggests that the arm's-length approach was deployed as a foil for inaction by government. It privileged those with the existing social capital to access the arts and the ministerial interest in Lottery funding partly eroded the partial autonomy afforded to non-departmental public bodies (Hanks et al., 2012). Reinforcing the political influence in cultural funding would be a noticeable feature of New Labour, and they would continue a tightening of the relationship between central government, non-departmental public bodies, and the organisations they fund.

4.3 New Labour and instrumentalism

New Labour's successful election campaign was a significant turning point for cultural policy and the position of NDPBs. New Labour demonstrated their commitment to utilising the economic benefits of culture and using cultural policy to contribute to broader social agendas by the formation of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1997. Chris Smith became Secretary of State for DCMS, a senior cabinet post, and senior figures within the Labour party sought to harness the momentum of perceived political change. This meant courting artists and musicians, shortening the distance between the political establishment and the cultural sphere, and evoking a new sense of national youthfulness. National devolution also took place in the early part of New Labour's government, with the Arts Councils of Scotland and Wales splitting from the Arts Council of Great Britain. This left the Arts Council England (ACE), which will be the focus of the following text. Devolution of cultural policy prompted public bodies to pursue national and regional interests through reformed funding structures, and the creative industries were an area where this was particularly acute (Oakley and O'Connor, 2015; Throsby, 2010).

There have been favourable assessments of New Labour's cultural policies, from the mainstream press and within academia. Polly Toynbee of *The Guardian* (Toynbee, 2011) and right-leaning publications such as *The Economist* (The Economist, 2012) have described the buoyant funding climate as a 'golden era'. Academics associated with the Creative Industries Faculty at the Queensland University of Technology have also responded favourably to New Labour's approach (McGuigan, 2004). There have been more critical responses from academics lamenting "New Labour's cultural policies as evidence of their capitulation to neo-liberalism" (ibid, p. 229; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 30). Jim McGuigan (2005) has forwarded this position, receiving support from other academics (Belfiore, 2004; Gray, 2007; Newsinger, 2015). Critical perceptions are also related to the manner of the New Labour approach; critics suggested their promotion of cultural value was a form of cultural appropriation by the political establishment.

New Labour attempted to combine youth and pop culture with political identity, whilst also promoting the financial benefits of cultural investment. Importantly, the wider social impact of culture became an essential measurement of cultural value. The constituent parts of culture were relatively less important than its collective contribution to the central tenets of Labour's economic agenda. Vital to achieving this was revitalising the NDPBs in the New Labour image. O'Brien states that "In cultural policy, public value developed an association with cultural value. The process of public value becoming interchangeable with cultural value is historically specific to a series of cultural organisations in the UK, including the BBC and the Arts Council, alongside the work of think tanks such as the UK's DEMOS" (2015, p. 86). Similar to the early years of the Arts Council, where they invested in the institutional, cultural network, New Labour invested financially and in ideas such as New Public Management.

The difference between the cultural policy of New Labour and its predecessors was that there was a concerted effort to reorder the processes of decision making, to achieve strategic goals at a local and national level. Furthermore, they focussed on the creative industries in an unprecedented way (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015a;

Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 49). Key to this were figures such as Geoff Mulgan, the former strategist under Ken Livingstone at the GLC, who was now an influential figure under New Labour and the formation of a codified set of operative principles for the government's involvement with culture. Related to the creative industries narrative was the effort to entrench state perceptions of value in cultural organisations. O'Brien states, "The value created by cultural organisations takes three forms, including the intrinsic value of the experiences generated by the organisations, the instrumental value created for public policy purposes and the institutional value created by the bonds between organisations and their various publics" (2015, p. 86).

The intellectual influence of Geoff Mulgan and others pushed aside the traditional associations of art and heritage with high culture and elitism. Not only this but the types of culture that could contribute to policy initiatives such as social inclusion and urban renewal were not those traditionally subsidised by the government. The political climate did erode some of the hierarchical distinctions between culture, but only as far as the overbearing metric was a wider societal contribution. This inevitably caused some frictions in subsidised organisations who responded to, "[t]he assertion of the uniqueness or difference of cultural organisations, as compared with other areas of public policy, is grounded in the supposedly unquantifiable nature of the benefits of culture, an unquantifiability often defended by modernist and romantic conceptions of the transformative power of cultural experience" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 86). The transformative experience was certainly skewing towards economic and social change, making culture an attractive option for government and business investment.

There are problems in identifying a series of factors that can neatly explain the origin and implementation of the type of instrumentalisation attributed to New Labour. If we characterise the change as swift or immediate, there is a risk of overlooking the foundational legacy of the previous government. Clive Gray points to two factors that, to a greater or lesser degree, we can identify in the Conservative government under Major. Referring to Gray, Barbieri says there are "attempts to include both exogenous and endogenous factors in the policy change explanation, although this probably occurs more in theory than in empirically supported research. We can

explain the origin of a shift (towards the instrumentalisation of cultural policies) by combining two elements. On the one hand, the expectations and pressures derived from the commodification of policy, and on the other hand, the structural weakness of the cultural policy sector" (2012, p. 15). It is important to note that he argues that these claims rest mainly in theory. An obstacle to the discourses emerging through policy and practice is that they are often difficult to reconcile. Also, the proximity of insider groups such as DEMOS and the nascent projects of museum and gallery building, all contribute to a complex array of actors, structures, and functional theory. What is somewhat more transparent though is that key organisational bodies, such as the Arts Councils, were adaptable due to the lack of a strong institutional identity.

Whilst structural weakness certainly contributed to change, New Labour's expansive brand of social policy is a significant component of the changes to cultural policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Instrumentalisation of cultural policy, as Gray suggests, is symptomatic of the commodification of policy in general, but in the cultural arena, the importance of tackling social exclusion was heavily emphasised. Policymakers presented the creative industries and the knowledge economy as ways to achieve this (Hesmondhalgh, et al., 2015b, p. 55), but that did not stop some of the longstanding issues surrounding cultural funding from persisting. The mismanaged, publicly funded restoration and expansion of the Royal Opera House exemplify these issues. The public perception was so toxic that even the chairperson of the Arts Council, Lord Gowrie, who was a peer of the realm, a former Conservative arts minister and chair of Sotheby's, found the situation indefensible (Hewison, 2014, p. 25). The accusation that cultural funding, particularly the Lottery Fund, was a stealth tax on the poor to fund the leisure time of the wealthy, was evidently a problem for a government who based their political identity on assisting those who had felt marginalised by previous governments.

It is worth returning to the contrasting positions Garnham (2013) identifies with regards to the political function of art in modern society. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Bourdieu saw culture as a mechanism for reinforcing class division, whereas the Frankfurt School suggested that mass culture created the illusion of unity and dissolved class structures in aid of productivity (ibid). If we turn apply these points to

an English context, it is clear that these two poles can begin to elucidate the nature and function of contemporary art in English politics and society, yet the specificity of these contexts means one should make some additional qualifications. For example, in *Culture, Class, Distinction* (Bennett et al., 2009) the text concludes that in a British context there is “the existence of systematic patterns of cultural taste and practice” (251) and that there are “homologies across fields that are indicative of shared styles among groups of people within the population” (ibid).

The study goes on to say:

We might understand the British situation in the following way. First, much of the middle class is not itself strongly attached to, conversant with, or engaged in the activities that mark legitimate culture. Second, since the working class are not marked by a distinctive set of cultural practices, there is no need for the middle classes to define their own culture in relation to it. Bourdieu's middle-class subjects perceived French working-class culture as vulgar, leading them to champion refinement and distinction. (Bennett et al., 2009)

From this statement, it is clear that the relationship between class and culture is highly dependent on specific national, political and social contexts. New Labour actively encouraged a transformation in the role of art in society, from something that was perceived to be exclusive, to something accessible across the population. However, whilst this was notionally for some sort of collective, public good, the policies of New Labour unerringly sought tangential economic benefits, and in this sense are suggestive of the Frankfurt School's suggestion of mass culture as a means of obfuscating the mechanisms of domination and subjectification of the working-class and adding to subjugation.

4.4 Social exclusion

Social exclusion initiatives were not wholly absent from the previous Conservative governments, but the mobilisation of culture, for this reason, was new. The formation of the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997 demonstrated the significance of this policy

agenda. This was a defining feature of New Labour's conception of culture in the public sphere, in that culture was no longer to be understood as the gestation and diffusion of objects and ideas, or as a constituent part of tourism or leisure, but a mechanism to address hierarchical imbalance throughout society. Bennet & Savage summarise this issue by saying, "although references to social exclusion have a longer history in the social policy field, it has become a significant point of cultural policy reference in Britain only since the election of New Labour in 1997. The notion that spreading cultural capital might help to achieve more inclusive forms of cultural citizenship dates from roughly the same period" (Bennett & Savage, 2004, p. 9).

We should not understate the gravity of this policy lynchpin as it remains part of the mechanisms and initiatives of ACE and similar organisations. However, a significant problem was the way in which policymakers conflated attempts to tackle social exclusion (not just in the arts, but in other forms of daily life) with accessibility. The free admission policy is an enduring success but somewhat undermined by expensive ticket prices for temporary exhibitions. Despite this, it "seems now to have attained the status of cross-party consensus" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 85). Removing financial barriers could increase accessibility to the arts, and this could, in turn, engender cultural citizenship that would assist marginalised groups to navigate the social, political and financial obstacles that others may not experience or take for granted. However, it is questionable whether this could have an impact on the scale imagined by Tony Blair, Geoff Mulgan and Chris Smith.

Cultural policy presented options to try and diversify audiences, and this was, according to the logic of New Labour's cultural policy, evidence of increased accessibility and effectively tackling social exclusion. However, critics have highlighted that this did not necessarily address the societal inequalities leading to exclusion. Bennett acknowledges this conflation and suggests that whilst the cultural sector opened up, that in turn could create systemic problems. He says, "such programmes also often sit side-by-side with, and are described in the same terms as, more general attempts to equalize access to publicly-funded cultural resources across all classes and ethnic groups—the reversion to free entry policies for museums and galleries, for instance—with little sense that the problems and issues

that such policies pose are quite distinct" (Bennett & Savage, 2004, p. 9).

Furthermore, there was also the question of what and whose culture the public had access to, as diverse audiences did not mean diverse collections or exhibitions (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 87).

Whilst free access to public galleries and museums is undoubtedly a quality worth protecting; there are questions as to whether the financial barriers were the main obstacle to increased audiences. With regards to Labour's record on this matter Hesmondhalgh et al. states "[t]here was an overall growth in museum visitors as a result of free admission, but less change in the representation of particular groups within that overall number" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b p. 89), though Cowell suggests that free admission was not necessarily intended to diversify audiences, but education and outreach better serves this purpose (Cowell, 2007, p. 222). The financial dependence on subsidy, coupled with the expanded obligation to societal inequality, meant that organisations had to diversify their revenue streams and embrace a commercial awareness that was anathema to more romantic notions of culture. In parallel with the partial reform of managerial practice within high art institutions, there was a more significant move to bring design-led, media and technology industries under the purview of contemporary culture. Commentators collectively describe this as the 'creative industries' and its use can help illustrate the mechanisms of cultural policy under New Labour.

4.5 Creative industries

It is evident that the policy terminology 'creative industries' bears no small resemblance to the 'culture industry'. As mentioned before, the evolution of the culture industry as a concept, starting with Adorno and then co-opted by the socialist metropolitan councils of Sheffield and the GLC, is a significant theoretical touchstone in the understanding of cultural policy in the UK. The creative industries understood in terms of New Labour policy can be defined as the industries "supplying goods and services that we broadly associate with cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value" (Caves, 2000 in Throsby, 2010, p. 89). David Throsby indicates that the creative industries are a defining component of New Labour policy. He points to the "importance of the cultural industries in reorienting cultural policy away from its

traditional focus on support for the arts towards a more economically motivated set of priorities" (2010, p. 89) The term's final evolutionary step would place it firmly within the centrist agenda of New Labour and bearing few of the character traits of its forebears.

There are a variety of interpretations as to why there was a shift from cultural to creative in the nomenclature of cultural policy-making. On the one hand, critics suggest that it signalled the privileging of commercially minded cultural activity, and on the other, some suggest that this signalled a sincere step towards nurturing an inclusive and quality-driven cultural climate. For example, Andy Pratt (2011) suggests that the shift in terminology was an attempt to detach the cultural policy of New Labour from its socialist left antecedents in the GLC and Sheffield. However, figures such as Hughson and Inglis "have hailed creative industries policy as a genuine and promising attempt to marry access and excellence" (Hughson & Inglis, 2001, p. 4). The interpretation of the creative industries is dependent on a wider critical position regarding New Labour and neoliberalism.

Nicholas Garnham has a different interpretation of the shift in the language mentioned here. He argues that the adoption of the term is not neutral and constitutes an accommodation for the "wider context of information society policy" (2005, p. 15). This may include privileging and protecting intellectual property and economic innovation through new technologies rather than government subsidy based on aesthetic or intrinsic value. Creative industries policy signalled accessibility, excellence, education, and economic value as being the policy goals of the subsidised arts. However, he suggests this is, in fact, incompatible with the implications of this new terminology as the commercial aspect of policy dominates all other areas (ibid). McGuigan (2004, 2005), Gray (2000, 2007, 2015) and Newsinger (2015) also identify this criticism.

A development emerging from cultural industries policies is the focus on intellectual property, and innovation rebalances the relationship between production and consumption. Garnham says, "In my view, in the pursuit of these aims the shift from cultural to creative industries marks a return to an artist-centred, supply-side cultural

support policy and away from that policy direction, which the use of the term 'cultural industries' originally signalled, that focused on distribution and consumption. It is for that very reason that the arts lobby favours it" (Garnham, 2005, p. 27). His suspicion of the term hinges on the suggestion that the policy discourse privileges the artist-creator and limits the scope of culture to address entrenched social exclusion. There is a problem here in the over-application of the idea of the artist-creator. The implications of the policy do indeed privilege the creator, but not so much the artist. The language of innovation that is central to the understanding of the cultural industries centres on product and process, not the art object. Whilst there are positive implications of the overt attempts to address the hierarchical conceptions of culture, such as the exchange of ideas between sectors, the process also over-exposes art forms traditionally inhabiting the museum or gallery environment to economic rationales.

The discussion on this matter exposes many points of contention that centrist Labour created with its reforms to cultural policy. The party did not resolve the central characteristics of subsidised culture, and it was still questionable as to whether it should support consumers or producers, excellence, or populism, and draw distinctions between traditional high culture and the creative industries. Garnham recognises the ambiguous and subjective essence of excellence and suggests that elevating this over-popularity prompts a lurch back to the elitism that had characterised many types of cultural participation in the UK. He states, "we are left with the unavoidable conclusion that the term 'excellence' within arts policy discourse can only be a code for exclusivity, for the hierarchy of forms and activities" (2005, p. 28). Whilst Garnham accurately identifies the problematic language and implication of culture through the lens of creative industry policy; I do not believe that this can constitute a complete telling of the nature and identity of cultural policy at this point. Clearly, a notable change was occurring, but the role of culture in daily life and the political arena was still lacking a concrete identity. It simply borrowed factors to please as many actors in the cultural field as possible.

There is an ongoing dispute as to how researchers map and interpret creative industries and the associated policies. Richard Florida has attempted to understand

the phenomenon in terms of a 'creative class' who share an ethos that is fundamental to the spirit of culture (2012). Dave O'Brien points to the fact that this is not a cohesive concept in Florida's writing and goes "beyond the DCMS 13 that are embedded in the British model of creative industries" (2014, p. 56). Another problem is that creative industries policy was enacted at regional levels rather than a national one, and critics suggest that it "served as a glossy piece of political rhetoric, rather than as a solid basis for practical policy activity" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 102). The sheer scale of the expected impact of cultural funding was untenable and necessitated increasingly complex bureaucratic structures to manage and assess an expanding cultural offer and expectation. The first years of New Labour's governance laid the foundations for our current understanding of the arts and culture in public contexts, but the subsequent successes and failures of this model would highlight the fact that this evolution of policy would be much less harmonious and, in many cases, discordant.

4.6 The Arm's-Length principle, structural reform and centralisation

By the early 2000s, it was becoming apparent that the mechanisms of government were not fully compliant with the policy agendas in place. Commentators understood the increased complexity of cultural policy as, "not a single entity but involves multiple components that ramify throughout the structure of public administration in line with the expanding concept of cultural policy in the contemporary world" (Throsby, 2010, p. 28). As a result, there was a lengthy process that assessed the efficacy of government departments and questioned the current structure of decision making and resource distribution for cultural funding. The DCMS underwent a peer review in May 2000, led by Sir Nicholas Montagu of the Inland Revenue. The subsequent report, titled *The Pale Yellow Amoeba* (Montagu, 2000), described a less than favourable relationships between the DCMS and NDPBs, whilst employing processes of assessment that yielded vague or impertinent data.

We might interpret the flaws the report recognised as the negative fallout of New Public Management (NPM) approaches in government and the target-based culture it produced. NPM aimed to produce accountability and transparency, but for many, it embodied a lack of trust through constant monitoring and adherence to Public

Service Agreements (PSAs) and Delivery Service Objectives (DSOs)

(Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b). Nevertheless, it acknowledged that the various tiers of decision-making and practice were isolated and lacking in mobility. The review of the Arts Council in 2005 would suggest that NDPBs were replicating the flaws found throughout the DCMS. In 1998 Gerry Robinson, a confidant of Blair and a shrewd businessperson replaced the outgoing Arts Council chairperson, Lord Gowrie. He described a Kafkaesque bureaucracy and sought to realign the function of the Arts Council towards its artistic goals (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b).

Robinson instigated a series of costly structural changes to the relationship between the Arts Council and the regions. The Arts Council gave the Regional Arts Boards (RABs) many of the responsibilities previously held by the centralised council to create a leaner centralised bureaucracy and create a consistency of procedure across the regions. However, this process led to increased staff at a regional level and a rise in salaries to account for the increased responsibilities. As Gray points out, "limited amounts of money that are available to each RAB severely constrains the extent to which the RABs can operate effectively in achieving their proclaimed aims" (2000, p. 71). The shifting of responsibility did not necessarily represent a passing of power or influence. As a result, "RABs appear to be the distinctly poor relations of the ACE" (ibid). The reforms aimed at cutting costs and creating a leaner, regionally focussed funding structure, did not yield the desired results. The net number of staff did not perceptibly alter, and the operational costs increased between 1997/98 and 2000/01 (Hewison, 2014, p. 98).

The failure of decentralisation to deliver the desired results prompted a complete reversal of Robinson's approach. He would now endorse wholesale centralisations and the transfer of assets, responsibilities, and staff of the RABs to London. This would now mirror the New Labour desire to centralise party organisation in order to maintain clarity in policy delivery (O'Brien, 2014). The declaration, circulated in the form of *The New Arts Council of England: A Prospectus for Change*, was met with hostility from the regions and legal obstacles due to the independent charities of the RABs potentially being absorbed by the government (Arts Council England, 2001a). A softer approach and a document titled *Working Together for the Arts* (Arts Council

England, 2001b) replaced the previous declaration. This document stated unequivocally that the RABs must comply and that their funding would simply cease should they not accept. In their place, the government would set up Regional Councils, but they would be a part of the Arts Council.

A significant difference between the RAB model and the Regional Councils would be that regional directors would sit on the expanded national council. This would create a majority regional voice for influencing policy, at the expense of their organisational independence (Arts Council England, 2001b). April 2003 would signal the 'new' Arts Council of England, promptly renamed, and rebranded to Arts Council England, or ACE. The reorganisational process was costly to the professional and regional faith in the consultative and dialogic relationship between the arts and funding bodies. Not only this but, the financial benefits were over projected, and the rebranding of the ACE image cost a reported £700,000, emblematic of the costly process of reforming a complex structure and addressing damaged public perception (Hewison, 2014).

The creation of ACE and the conflicts that arose from it would resonate across the fluctuating relationships between the ACE chairperson and DCMS minister. The length of the arm was surely shortening and with it the sense that agency could truly exist at a regional level. Though decision making was, to a degree, made by representatives from the Regional Councils, the centralised system placed the DCMS in ever greater proximity. It is debatable how we should understand this shift. On the one hand, it could be an outcome of the general conditions of Treasury funds. O'Brien says, "The Green Book begins with the assumption that reasons for government activity can be understood in terms of markets, whether to correct failures in markets or to encourage specific social goals that might be associated with equality or the distribution of social resources, things which are unevenly delivered by markets" (O'Brien, 2015, p. 87). On the other hand, the points of conflict in the reorganisation of the Arts Council encapsulated issues greater than the logic of the market. Regional devolution and centralisation, artistic autonomy and managerialism, professional representation and cronyism, commercialisation, and subsidy; these were all sticking points that disrupted any clear consensus on the future of public subsidy in the arts. One aspect was abundantly clear, as Pinnock

says, the "long experiment with budget devolution to regional decision-makers ended definitively in 2003 when all 10 of the English regional arts boards were abolished" (2006, p. 177).

With a centralised funding structure established, it is plausible to assume that the deployment of ACE funds to satisfy the instrumental policy goals of New Labour would follow. However, the restructuring of the system did not reconcile the exact purpose or outcome of publicly subsidised arts and culture. Hesmondhalgh et al. point to the discontent from leading figures in the cultural sector and their perception that "culture was being used too much as an instrument to achieve non-cultural ends such as economic and social outcomes" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 94). Media and policy commentators perceived Tessa Jowell's response to the notion of value in arts and culture as vague, highlighting the precarious foundations on which governments built cultural policy rationales (ibid). Political discourse entrenched generalisations about the power of culture to expedite social change yet notions of intrinsic value were unavoidable in any discussion of the merits of traditional artistic forms. Tessa Jowell's tenure at the head of the DCMS illustrates the lack of clarity in political or cultural terms as to precisely what the defining characteristics of the government's interest in arts and culture was.

The Labour party appointed Tessa Jowell in 2001, replacing the sacked Chris Smith, and her tenure attempted to establish the parameters of the political and cultural interest of the DCMS and ACE. However, Jowell invoked the Victorian cultural ideals that seemed slightly alien to the youthful image of the Labour party and the cultural organisations beginning to emerge in the early 2000s. Pinnock states, "UK Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell, endorsed Ruskin's definition of cultural wealth— 'a key to real transformation in society'" (2006, p. 174). Ruskin's humanist and moral stance posited that monetary wealth overshadowed the richness of life that culture could enable (ibid). This is suggestive of an intrinsic value defence of the arts, albeit with the claim that the arts prompt social transformation. However, the conditions of the Ruskin definition require structures to support the arts, not the arts supporting policy goals. Engaging with this definition demonstrated a scepticism

of the target-based culture within the DCMS and ACE, and it showed that the ticklish subject of definition was far from resolved.

Jowell suggested that the target culture was suffocating aspects of the arts that policy should encourage to flourish. Familiar complaints from cultural organisations pointed to the burden of impact reporting and bureaucracy, distracting them from their core cultural provision. As Hesmondhalgh states, "Jowell's concern is that with the exploration of the instrumental value of culture (a topic pioneered by her government department), other values have been lost. In her paper, she seeks to find a position from which to promote what she terms 'complex culture'" (Hesmondhalgh et al. 2015b, p. 10). A plea for complex culture appeared to be a call for intellectually driven, high art, with all the implications of elitism that came with it. A situation exacerbated the impasse between theory and practice in the case of the arts, was that the education system focussed on literary and numeracy skills at the expense of the arts and humanities. Arts and culture seemed to be incompatible in some fundamental way to the political discourse across the centre-ground.

Again, returning to Pinnock, the following statement summarises the problem with Jowell's position. "If today's Arts Council England faces a 'crisis in legitimacy' this is not because its public statements are in any way objectionable, but because its record of delivery contradicts them" and "a direct line of intellectual descent from Ruskin via Keynes to the Arts Council of the present, justifying state subsidy 'for art's sake'—because the arts activity so supported is 'intrinsically valuable'" (2006, p. 174). The problem that Pinnock identifies is that Ruskin conceives a place for culture where education, social life, and political endowment heightens its merits, not that culture alone could create the positive societal change imagined.

Pinnock states, "For Ruskin, wealth equals effectual not intrinsic value; and for policy-makers following Ruskin this has significant implications. If those in authority want to increase the nation's cultural wealth, just increasing the supply and theoretical (take-or-leave) accessibility of art is not enough. Carefully co-ordinated educational efforts will also be required to ensure that more and more people develop the capacity to appreciate it" (2006, p. 174). Ruskin's and Jowell's

conception of the societal role of arts and culture relied on the proviso that these activities operated with political parity to other functions of government. Policies mobilised arts and culture to serve other goals, not necessarily its own. Within the political hierarchies of Whitehall, DCMS could not impose its vision on the Department for Education, nor could it demand more support from the Treasury. For all the public proclamations of support, one might see the DCMS and ACE as being politically isolated and left grasping for an identity that could ensure relevance without compromising their cultural output.

In summarising why cultural policy has been so susceptible to change that its stakeholders do not wholly endorse, Gray, states that, "The instrumentalisation of cultural and arts policies, therefore, develops from a combination of the endogenous weaknesses of these policy sectors in comparison with others, and the exogenous shifts in policy expectations that have arisen from the commodification of public policy" (2007, p. 211). The relative crisis up to 2008 only heightened the sense of institutional weakness in the DCMS and ACE and the difficulties of acting upon the social agenda of government whilst championing a degree of creative independence. Also, the centralising instincts of the Labour government did little to address the deep divide between the capital and the regions. Whilst ACE incorporated regional representatives on the national board, the steady decline of local authority funds left local cultural resources increasingly squeezed and over-dependent on ACE subsidy (Hewison, 2014, p. 119).

4.7 The "Arts Debate."

Tony Blair stepped down as Prime Minister in 2007 and was replaced by Gordon Brown. Blair's departure prompted Jowell to leave her position as culture secretary. Her replacement, James Purnell, offered a new strategy for addressing the persistent identity crisis of subsidised and politicised arts and culture. Whilst he did not seek to diminish the promises of accessibility, he did want to ask what the public had access to. Before this ACE launched its first public value inquiry and from "October 2006 to September 2007, the 'Arts Debate' asked the public, artists, arts managers and other stakeholders in the arts community 'what people value about the arts'" (Rumbold, 2008, p. 189). The notion of value now became a principal concern for policymakers and the organisations they had influence over.

Commentators have identified 'Public value' as another problematic, contested term. With much of the language of cultural policy-making, it emanates from the managerialism that reforms embedded in the decision-making structure, or as Clive Gray puts it, "It might appear that 'public value' is the latest buzz-phrase that can be pedalled as the most modern version of public sector management snake-oil" (2008, pp. 210-211).

Purnell suggested that excellence was at the pinnacle of a cultural policy pyramid, citing participation at the base and education in the middle. An individual navigating the pyramid required cultural capital in the form of education. To promote this model, Purnell enlisted Sir Brian McMaster. The subsequent report, *Supporting Excellence in the Arts: From Measurement to Judgement* (McMaster, 2008), sought to reclaim 'excellence' from the elitist and traditionalist insinuations it held. It also aimed to offer a model of assessment that was non-bureaucratic and resistant to a target-based political culture and "evaluation methods that focus on objective assessments of excellence" (McMaster, 2008). The report still emphasised the transformative potential of culture, and in this sense, it still retained some of the instrumentalist characteristics of previous policy incarnations. However, the emphasis shifted from a generalised audience, public or society, to the individual. This is a significant change as placing the experience, engagement, and transformation of the individual, either as artist or audience, marked a radical shift in the social agenda of Labour (Hewison, 2014).

The 2008 McMaster report drew on responses of arts professionals, and this coloured the nature of the conclusions drawn from it. With excellence at the centre of the inquiry, there was a need to determine how and who would measure quality. A key recommendation was, "that excellence and innovation would best be achieved by peer (i.e., expert artist) judgement" (Hewison, 2014). There are evidently merits to this suggestion in that apolitical assessment could reclaim cultural value from the workings of instrumentalism. However, it also echoed the old Keynesian notion of only 'the great and the good' in possession of the requisite cultural and more often than not, economic capital were in a position to make such judgements.

A further problem with this measurement of excellence is that it provides a top-down version of inclusion and exclusion in the arts. The inception of the Arts Council seemed to represent an alternative to the Academy system for nurturing artistic talent and professionalising the cultural realm. This, however, was not necessarily conducive to encouraging plurality in the discourses related to arts and culture. Pinnock states that "In the Keynesian system there is no room for diversity of (acceptable) opinion about the quality of one and the same art offering" (Pinnock, 2006, p. 178). The language and emphasis of excellence seemed a return to stratification, despite the intent for it to address the target-based structure of the cultural sector.

ACE introduced a pilot scheme to assess organisations based on excellence, following McMaster's recommendations. An issue was that a panel of assessors did not have sufficient time or insight to make robust and assured judgements of excellence (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015). The audit process was problematic as it could not guarantee a realistic and actionable set of outcomes following the process and as Hesmondhalgh states, "[d]emocratic institutions need to be able to assess whether public money has been spent well" (ibid, p. 99). The alternative to NPM was appealing to cultural organisations feeling the weight of assessment and administration, but it did not adequately address the issue of how funding bodies could judge cultural activity as being good value.

Another critical point of the McMaster report was that it identified bloated and dysfunctional links between government and culture. The gap was clearly mutable, and the report implied that the political agenda of Labour, particularly its economic and social directives, had leached through the arm's-length principle. As Gray points out, "'Public Service theory' effectively argues that managers, rather than politicians, are the actors who can most effectively bridge the gap between public sector organisations and the general public" (2008, p. 211). The sentiment of the McMaster report and Arts Debate was that "Such a de-politicised version of public sector management was a continual theme throughout the ACE's research discussions" (ibid, p. 212). The potential to realise this end was, however, limited. This would require not just a reform of the process of developing and delivering cultural policy,

but a wholesale change to the top-down approach used in all policy areas. As Gray says, "To demand that politicians be removed from the system in favour of apolitical technocrats is equivalent to demanding a revolution in the political system" (ibid, p. 211).

Commentators have developed criticisms of the methodologies used by the McMaster report. Both reports at the time sought an original approach to assessing the nature and efficacy of cultural funding and management; however, the consultation took place with individuals already with significant access to the arts. Rumbold states that the "Arts Debate ably demonstrated that people were capable of thinking in different ways in different situations; public and professionals alike appreciate the multiple values of the arts" but it "also demonstrated the limits of the deliberative process: not least that the numbers that can take part in a discussion (the general public consultation involved 170 people)" (2008, p. 193). Gray, however, is more critical and suggests that "Focusing on existing users leaves the ACE open to accusations that 'vested interests' have dominated the system, and that what has been researched is 'personal value' rather any notion of larger 'public value'" (2008, p. 213).

The two reports marked a shift in the way politicians and funding bodies were beginning to think about the lasting impact and relevance of cultural policy. Reflecting on the insights and omissions of these developments Rumbold states, "The challenge for cultural policy – and for arts funding at national and local levels – will be to find a correspondingly sophisticated way to provide for the multiple and fluid values that people place on the arts" (2008, p. 195). The fluid values placed on the arts would, however, become of secondary concern in the larger political climate. Purnell left government in 2009 after an unsuccessful attempt to instigate a leadership bid. His replacement, Andy Burnham would occupy the DCMS post briefly until Ben Bradshaw replaced him in June 2009 (Hewison, 2014).

The Cabinet Office Capability review of 2008 reflected this period of relative instability. It ranked the DCMS as the tenth of twelve departments and the review characterised it as a "post box" between the Treasury and the bodies it funded.

Furthermore, the review suggested it was isolated from the larger workings of government and lacking the political agency to influence other departments or policy areas (Hewison, 2014). The criticisms directed at the DCMS prompted a partial restructuring and the elimination of micro-management that simply mirrored ACE. At this point, ACE itself was undergoing a transitional period.

ACE announced Alan Davey, former chief executive of the DCMS, as chief executive of ACE in 2008 and he continued the centralising trend of his predecessor. Area executives acted as an intermediary for regional offices, creating an administrative barrier between the individual regions and the decision making in London. Davey renamed the national office 'head office' as if to reassert the transfer of decision-making back to London. At Davey's direction ACE produced a report, *What People Want from the Arts* (Arts Council England, 2008), but despite the insistence that it drew on the recent discussions, it made no mention of public value. A critical change that implemented was the use of 'artistic assessors' to report on organisations and projects funded by ACE. Furthermore, the 'Regularly Funded Organisations' would become 'National Portfolio Organisations', with their funding reassessed every three years (Arts Council England, 2008).

Davey realised his restructuring of ACE when Liz Forgan replaced the retiring chairperson, Christopher Frayling. She supported Davey in his vision, and the outcome was the ten-year strategic plan titled *Achieving Great Art for Everyone* (Hewison, 2014). The transparency of this plan and the communication through the application process for NPO status went some way to re-establishing trust between ACE and the organisations it funded. However, the guidance for funding now explicitly stated that organisations must, in some way, contribute to at least two of the five core ACE goals. These goals focused on excellence, accessibility, sustainability, diversity and access for children to museums galleries and libraries. However, commentators have described the ability to marry these disparate areas as a "dubious" claim (Arts Council England, 2013). The strategy made it clear that rather than ACE fulfilling the ambitions of the DCMS, cultural organisations would now fulfil the directives of ACE. Davey claimed that 2010 was a "golden one" for the arts (Hewison, 2014, p. 149); however, the Comprehensive Spending Review of 2011 would foreshadow this. The 24% cut to

the DCMS's budget prompted a 30% cut to the ACE budget, and Hewison describes the programme of *Achieving Great Art for Everyone* as being "launched into a very different world from the one in which the process had begun, in 2008" (ibid).

An assessment of the New Labour period of cultural policy does not produce a simple conclusion. Whilst the expansion of the cultural offer supported by ACE is worthy of mention, the administrative stress experienced by arts organisations had a damaging effect on the morale of the cultural sector. Concerning target culture and NPM, Hesmondhalgh et al. states, "New Labour marginalised political and ethical questions concerning culture to an unprecedented degree" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 191) and this created a system where the competing notions of value in the cultural sphere were increasingly incompatible. The cultural policy under the Conservatives in the 1990s suggests that many of the problematic elements of Labour's policies would have still featured had another government been in power (ibid). Nevertheless, I would suggest that the singular genesis of New Labour's approach (such as the GLC, the relationship with DEMOS) means that the expansion of the cultural infrastructure took on particular qualities. Finally, as Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015b) suggest, the legacy of New Labour has a vastly different perspective when compared to the "savagery of the Conservative attack on the public realm" (ibid, p. 191) following the ascent of the Conservative-led Coalition in 2010.

4.8 Cultural policy since 2010

Chapter One introduced some of the main features of cultural policy and arts funding since 2010. In this section, some of the general factors and features will be highlighted, and we will return to these points throughout the thesis. The 2019 report, *Performance for all: Arts policy 2019* by Equity (2019), a trade union supporting creative practitioners, serves as a comprehensive survey of many of the factors that have shaped the cultural sector since 2010. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, there is the fact that despite the many positives borne from supporting arts and culture, the sector is in a precarious state due to deep and wide-reaching cuts, and that increasingly the sector is becoming fractured due to unequal and uneven

distribution of funds from one area to another. Here we will examine some of the evidence for the damaging effects of marketisation and austerity.

To add to this sense of uncertainty and fracturing, the UK's withdrawal from the European Union in January 2020 will strain institutional links in the arts, and the access to funds through the EU will disappear. These funds have been vital in many capital projects in England, and the lack of access to the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) will no doubt limit the scope and scale of future museum and gallery projects.

A further issue is the centralisation of decision-making in the arts. The Conservative government has signalled its intent to reappraise the function and role of ACE, and whilst it is still notionally an NDPB, its proximity to the DCMS increased in 2010 underpinned by Conservative proposals to potentially abolish ACE. This has, as the Equity report (2019) suggests, brought about less transparency and accountability, leaving many arts organisations and practitioners isolated from the institutions primarily tasked with supporting them. Coupled with this is the over-emphasis on large-scale organisations instead of small and medium-sized organisations. This limits the different points of access for local communities and practitioners to the arts and associated activities.

Another key issue highlighted in the report, and indeed throughout this thesis, is the increased pressure from central government for arts organisations to adopt funding models more reliant on philanthropy and private funding. Conservative policy-makers, such as Jeremy Hunt, have lauded the US model. However, it is seen as an inadequate and problematic model for many arts organisations, especially as their private funding has not been an established element of organisational income for the UK and England, except for high-profile institutions and nationals, such as the Tate galleries.

The report also highlights existing issues within the sector, as well as developments that have come about due to the effects of funding shortages and the organisational responses to them. For example, there has been a persistent lack of inclusive

representation of BAME persons amongst professionals, practitioners and audiences in the sector. Furthermore, there is a culture of low remuneration for workers in the arts sector which presents another barrier to access and progression in the arts sector. These conditions present an environment where, for many, a career in the arts is simply not sustainable. The dwindling access to arts and humanities education due to educational overhauls since 2010 present another related barrier to an art system that is open and accessible to the different national publics.

Furthermore, the absence of arts and humanities subjects in the secondary and primary education system is suggestive of the different fora in which the government is involved in developing a new kind of subject; a productive one engaged in STEM subjects. For example, Foucault suggests a mechanism for altering subjectivity through disciplinary power when, "the composition of *forces* is restructured to maximize the productive effects of people working together, organizing bodies according to their relative position and mutual effects, and redirecting attention to efficient 'tactics'" (Taylor, 2011:162).

Between 2010 and 2015, the public sector experienced significant cuts, creating a financial strain from which organisations and services struggled to recover. In 2015 there appeared to be some stabilisation in the severity of the cuts, but one should not interpret Osborne's softening of the government's austerity programme as an end to it. In fact, there are numerous indicators of its continuation. For example, The Trussell Trust (2020) reported that between 2015-2016 and 2019-2020 food bank use in their network increased by 74%, and they condemned the increase in in-work and child poverty in the UK. Furthermore, in 2016 Theresa May's government introduced a four-year freeze on all working-age social security payments which would impact over ten million families (Cowburn, 2017). The initial deep cuts created a series of aftershocks, for example, the central government cut the DCMS budget in half between 2012-15 and ACE has been cut by 36%, making the task of supporting the arts through grants, advice and guidance, increasingly strained. Furthermore, there is the loss of considerable funding opportunities from the EU due to Brexit, further limiting the scope and ambition of public supported art projects. The cost of this could be as much as £10 billion from 64 EU creative and development funds (Equity, 2019). If we return to Foucault's point that the state is the codification of all

relations of power, we can see that the changes to policy since 2010 have shifted the relations of power. Policy developments have drawn resources, and power from cultural spaces, which in turn reshapes societal perceptions of what can be said, done and thought.

According to DCMS figures, in 2016, libraries, museums and galleries, broadcasting, and funding for the arts was £1.93 billion, with LA spend accounting for around £172 of the total amount. (Equity, 2019). If we compare this to other European countries, it is clear that subsequent Conservative-led governments have fallen well behind the nations who routinely place the arts and culture as part of their political, economic and diplomatic profile. For example, the combined culture spend from DCMS, and LAs is around £2.1 billion, compared to Germany's £10.6b (€11.9b) and France's £8.9b (€10 billion) (Equity surveys of European trades unions, 2018). This is a remarkable difference considering that the UK GDP is approximately £1,985.20 billion and the French GDP is at a comparable level at £1,955.29 billion (ibid)

Local councils and dedicated art departments “are the biggest funder of arts and culture in England” (Harvey, 2016), though London's inclusion slightly distorts these values, due to the concentration of nationals in the capital. Local councils spend £806 million on libraries, £450 million on museums, galleries, arts development and public entertainment, making them an intrinsic component of public arts funding and infrastructure (Local Government Association: The Policy and Funding Landscape for the Arts, 2015). The prolonged reduction in their budgets by central government undermines the significant contribution that local government makes.

Since 2010, the central government has slashed Revenue Support Grants to LAs, which has created a £5.8 billion budget change which amounts to approximately a 60% cut between 2010-20 (Local Government Association, 2018). Cuts from central government grants were more severe in London boroughs and post-industrial cities, whereas ‘middle England’ experienced the lowest cuts (M. Gray & Barford, 2018, p. 558). This is an indicator of the unevenness between regions, major cities and non-

urban localities. The situation is so chronic that some councils have run the risk of bankruptcy and the Local Government Association has predicted that there will be a wholesale withdrawal of local government funding in the arts by 2020. Museum and gallery closures have become a real concern across the country, and the impact on jobs in the art and cultural sector is considerable, with around 8000 jobs lost due to scaled-back staffing or closures (Show Culture Some Love, 2020) Show Culture Some Love response to the DCMS Inquiry on the social impact of participation in culture and sport). The recent general election saw some interest in revisiting arts policies, and the Conservative party announced a £250 million Culture Investment Fund (Department for Digital Culture Media & Sport, 2019) aimed at supporting the Coventry City of Culture programme and other organisations. However, this figure does little to alleviate a decade of deeply damaging cuts. The cuts have affected the nature and role of the state and state power to follow Foucault's logic. However, we can also say that the trends running throughout policy discourse and governance, encapsulate the distinction Rancière makes between democracy and oligarchy. Shrinking public subsidy has the dual effect of intensifying central government power in their ability to alter the conditions of public institutions and the weakening of public institutions emboldens oligarchic rule. Put simply, if public institutions are forced to seek private, commercial sponsorship to survive, then their position as democratic bodies representing the equal interest of all is called in to question. Policy that shrinks the 'public' nature of public bodies inevitably places the economic interests of a select few above the collective interests of a public or publics.

4.9 Conclusion

The relationship between the state, DCMS, the Arts Council and cultural organisations have shifted since the post-war provision of cultural subsidy. The relationship has altered and evolved due to the dominant policy paradigm of the governing political party, as a result of national and global economic changes and by cultural organisations having agency at a local and national level. The evolution of cultural policy, both positive and regressive, has also been enabled by the structural and institutional weakness of the cultural policy infrastructure. There are several key areas of tension that have characterised the debate on cultural policy:

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

- Intrinsic value and instrumental value
- Centralisation and regional administration
- Elitism and accessibility
- Creative autonomy and policy delivery
- Public value and individual value
- Creative industries and traditional cultural forms
- Marketisation and art for art's sake

Whilst these do not encapsulate the full range of positions, it does help to illustrate that there are many unresolved issues in cultural policy-making. Hewison characterises the evolution of cultural policy by positing culture in terms of 'official' and 'commercial' culture. Official culture endures through expert decision makers, gatekeepers, and public funding, whilst market forces measure commercial culture. The impact of cultural capitalism is the blurring of any such distinction (Hewison, 2014). Hewison suggests that protecting the significant investment into arts and culture infrastructure is dependent on reasserting the value of public assets. Although market forces exist within this arena, they should not dominate it, just as the government should not dominate it, and instead guarantee its integrity. He also suggests that the cultural impulse is collective and presenting public as a consumer signals an individualistic and utilitarian position. For Hewison, conceiving the public as a collective is fundamental to free access to the arts and the promotion of co-produced culture (ibid).

The development of cultural policy and its relationship with the arts raises many questions about structure and agency in the English visual art field. As Morrow and Brown suggest that "Bourdieu's concerns shift toward the structural side of the agency-structure divide, though he is interested particularly in the processes that mediate between the two" (Morrow & Brown, 1994, p. 133). The processes of mediation have changed over subsequent decades, and with it the degree of agency arts organisations have, and to use Foucault's notion of agency, to be able to modify their standing and interaction with the state.

Hewison also states that turbulence in the development of the UK's cultural infrastructure hampered institutional resilience and trust (Hewison, 2014). Trust must be reasserted to ensure the continued defence of public subsidy. Fostering more robust relationships between the gatekeepers to funding, cultural organisations and the public should be an essential step in the future; finally, he makes the following point about the necessity for fostering cultural capital:

Cultural capital is not an exclusive commodity that can be traded in the market. It is a public good whose value increases when more people possess it, not fewer. The sole purpose of public policy should be to enlarge it, by making it as freely available as possible to as many people as possible. Cultural capital is the knowledge that is gained from engagement with the arts and heritage; it is the emotional and imaginative world of the arts and the collective memory of a shared heritage; it is the expressive cultural capability that results.

(Hewison, 2014)

This is a reasonable and achievable aim for arts and culture policy. It does, however, require a significant cultural shift in the machinations of government and NDPBs. This is probably only possible through upwards institutional and public pressure. This also depends on organisations resisting the pressures exerted on them to restructure to conform to the managerial and administrative models favoured by the state. Navigating these pressures will be a crucial process in shaping the future of the cultural infrastructure.

If we return to Alexander and Bowler's quote at the beginning of this chapter it is clear that since the inception of the Arts Council, there have been numerous points where the arts has been at a crossroad. Deciding 'which way to go'; left, right, dead ahead or back the way you came isn't as simple as selecting the route that most effectively gets to your destination. In fact, the destination is rarely decided by a single agent, but decided by committee, consultation or through some negotiated process. This is an undeniable continuity, from the inception of the Arts Council to 2010 and beyond. But does this mean that the marketisation of cultural policy merely represents another crossroad to be negotiated? I would argue, no; from 2010

onwards the arts have increasingly faced a paucity of options in terms of direction and pace. The arts, and in this case, NPOs, have been given one choice – follow the economic paradigm *ad finitum*. This marks the post-2010 period as unique and no amount of foot-dragging from the sector will dissuade the policy rationales imposed by central government. Victoria D. Alexander in a more recent text (Alexander et al., 2018b) states "the neoliberal ideology of recent governments is embedded". The shift from crossroad to embeddedness is a recent phenomenon, and one particular to the marketisation of cultural policy since 2010. The following chapters will investigate this point further and see where and how changes have occurred at a sectoral and organisational level.

Chapter Five: The Age of Marketised Cultural Policy.

5 Introduction

By treating the arts in just the same way as any other consumer good the publicly supported world of the arts needs to change to fit in with this new conception. The implications of this for artistic production and provision are profound.

(Gray, 2000, p. 7)

This chapter begins the process of identifying critical features of marketisation in England's NPO visual arts organisations. The chapter refers to debates within the broader context of public services as well as cultural policy. Furthermore, it attempts to identify the distinguishing characteristics of, the Coalition government (2010-2015) and the subsequent Conservative governments (2015-present), the cultural policy during this period and establish whether the "elision, of citizen with consumer, is at the heart of the measurement systems that currently confront culture" (O'Brien, 2015, p. 89) and the processes of marketisation in cultural policy. It also draws on quantitative and qualitative data gathered from NDPBs, such as ACE, reports from the case study organisations and interviews with three directors of visual art NPOs. The arts organisations and their senior staff provide a vital insight into how marketisation manifests in the public sector. The qualitative and quantitative data highlights the importance of organisations and individuals, in reinforcing and resisting marketisation. As we shall see, there are shared and divergent experiences and concerns about marketisation, these illustrate that whilst the 'creep' of marketisation is acknowledged as a worrying phenomenon, it structures public organisations in various ways.

The definition of marketisation is broad, but we may understand the term as a process that, "involves introducing competition into the public sector in areas previously governed through direct public control" (Gingrich, 2007, p. 547). Following this definition, marketisation can take several forms, but within the context of this research, one can understand it as, "changes within the public sector, where market

mechanisms and incentives are introduced within public or publicly regulated organizations" (ibid). Features of marketisation include reductions to public funding or subsidy, organisational restructuring, decentralisation, and partial privatisation. This chapter will focus on the first of these processes, reducing public funding in the arts. It will address the Coalition government's post-2008 austerity policies (2010-2015) in relation to the broader context of cultural funding, followed by the differing funding scenarios for local authorities and ACE's regular funding. By reference to these issues and supporting data, this chapter will illustrate the stasis and partial dismantling of public cultural assets, the impact this might have on the artistic freedom of organisations and how this might contribute to a 'democratic deficit'. With reference to the ideas posited in Chapter Two, the discussion of marketisation will continue to present social relations, expressed through policy and practice in the arts, as part of a theory of domination and power.

There are several schools of thought regarding the catalyst for change in cultural policy under the Coalition government of 2010 to 2015. Although the DCMS and ACE appeared to wrestle with their functions, the austerity measures of the Coalition government incorporated cultural policy, and policy in general and as a consequence, served a national economic function first and their own goals second. Commentators identify this feature as the commodification of policy, and they identify it as being a primary driver for policy change. Gray describes it in the following way, "The commodification thesis proposes that a prime reason for this change in governmental perception is that the ideological shift amongst political actors from a concern with use-value towards exchange-value serves to re-focus the attention of policy-makers away from the internal detail of policy itself and towards the manner in which policy as a whole contributes towards commodified forms of exchange relationships and social behaviours" (2007, p. 210).

The institutional weakness of the ACE, the DCMS and the often-poor leadership and decision making shown by Jeremy Hunt's⁶ structural changes firmly entrenched the

⁶ As Secretary of State, Hunt reduced the size of his DCMS staff as part of a hasty restructure of the department. The restructuring weakened the position of the DCMS and prompted criticism from across the political spectrum (Gordon et al., 2015). Evidence of his weak leadership includes his role in preventing Dame Liz Forgan from renewing her position as chair of ACE. Whilst this incident was played down and attributed to a

commodification of cultural policy in the new institutional frameworks of the DCMS and ACE. The chasm between cultural policymakers and cultural organisations seemed vast, with numerous decisions indicating the continued reduction of culture's political capital. For example, the decrease of NDPBs, which Hunt oversaw, abolished the UK Film Council in 2010. In 2011, The House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee commented on the "rushed" and "botched" nature of the report, with a "hopelessly unclear" and "poorly managed" evaluation testing process (Gordon et al., 2015). Furthermore, the reduction of local authority budgets prompted a withdrawal of cultural funding and a further loss of cultural organisations to affect national policy through the channels of local government. The *Rebalancing our cultural capital* (RoCC) report (2013) estimated that by October 2013, 75 per cent of England's decisions on public funding for culture (excluding local authority libraries) were centralised and heavily biased towards London (Gordon et al., 2015). The failings through successive Labour governments (1997-2010), rather than creating a more mature and savvy process of cultural policy-making and funding delivery, seemed to provide a blueprint for the Coalition government to replicate⁷.

Cryptic generalisations about what arts organisations apparently contributed continued to proliferate, perhaps exemplified by Maria Miller in her first speech as Secretary of State, having replaced Hunt in 2013. She said that "British culture is perhaps the most powerful and most compelling product we have available to us" (Gordon et al., 2015). Miller couched her obvious appeal to the commodification of art in nationalist rhetoric that ignores the internationalism in which arts and culture thrive. The irony of appealing to "British culture" at the British Museum which has, or continues, to contest restitution claims from numerous nations across the globe,

continuous process of change in the interest of the sector, some commentators have suggested that Hunt bowed to pressure on the political right of the Conservative party to remove the left-leaning Forgan. One senior figure in the arts sector, who did not wish to be named, stating: "This move is totally political. It is nothing more or less than political." (Higgins, 2012)

⁷ The costly £214 million rebuilding of the Royal Opera House in Covent Garden throughout the late 1990s has loomed large in the memory of cultural policymakers and successive governments. In 1999 the national audit office identified, including the Royal Opera House, 13 out of 15 significant capital projects funded by the Arts Council as over budget and half were behind schedule and asking for further funding. This observation occurred at a time of restructuring at the Arts Council under Gerry Robinson. Robinson's streamlined Arts Council repeatedly approved problematic capital funding applications, exposing a lack of oversight and due diligence in the organisation. Whilst the increased strain of distributing lottery money contributed to these issues; it is also reasonable to suggest that Robinson's initiatives, and the resignations and dissatisfaction of staff they prompted at the Arts Council, impacted the professionalism and capacity of the organisation (Higgins, 2012).

seems to have been somewhat lost on Miller. 'Public good' and 'public value' have persisted as interpretations for the efficacy of subsidy in the arts and despite calls from some quarters to "shift in the focus of such policies away from some generalised conception of 'the public good' and towards an individualised conception of the content and nature of public policy" (Gray, 2007, p. 211). However, under Hunt and Miller, the language surrounding arts and culture consistently evoked its actual, or potential contribution to the economic agenda of the Coalition government. The unprecedented change to cultural policy structures limited the reach of peer review, consultation, and critique.

Hunt, Miller and their successors increasingly saw the success of cultural organisations in terms of more extensive socio-economic projects of the Coalition government; however, this had been a feature, to a greater or lesser degree of Conservative and Labour governments since the 1980s. The spate of museum and gallery building alongside post-industrial urban regeneration projects is a notable feature of New Labour's relationship with the arts. A fundamental justification for the positive impact of the arts in broader regeneration schemes was the so-called 'Bilbao effect', with local governments keen to harness the transformative powers of arts and culture (Mirza, 2012, p. 47). However, ACE and DCMS might overstate the economic importance of arts and culture in terms of long-term importance (Elliott & Atkinson, 2012, pp. 204-206; Mirza, 2012, p. 48). Gray states, "Given that these other policy areas (such as urban development and re-development or social cohesion and inclusion) generally have the structural strengths that the arts and cultural policy sectors normally lack, particularly in terms of political salience and support, it is not surprising to find them in a dominant position in policy terms, with arts and cultural policies adopting a secondary, contributory, position in comparison with them" (Gray, 2007, p. 211).

The contrast between the projected values of arts organisations and the development processes they sit beside can often illustrate the 'secondary', cultural contribution of arts policy, in that its perceived 'use', in terms of broader policy agendas is its bolstering of investment and development initiatives. Critics have attributed the processes of accelerated gentrification, in part, to new museums and galleries through the nascent development opportunities that the surrounding areas

often offer. A built environment that consists of 'highly leveraged' privately funded property developments that form the backbone of property speculation of the past two decades tempers the claims of accessibility, social inclusion, and mobility (Department for Digital Culture Media & Sport, 2017, 2018, 2019). A physical manifestation of sometimes irreconcilable values of arts organisations, cultural policymakers and the private investors affecting the identity of arts organisations occurs through the obfuscated boundaries between public and private space. The constellation of flats, cultural venues, transport infrastructure, plazas, and retail, broadly understood as the constituent parts of an 'urban renaissance' in the United Kingdom (ibid).

Anna Minton discusses the characteristics and flaws of the increasing privatisation of urban space in the United Kingdom since the 1980s, in her book, *Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty-First Century City* (Minton, 2012). She refers to, amongst other places, the Newcastle-Gateshead quayside redevelopment, and the role of BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in this renaissance. Whilst Minton suggests that many of the outcomes of the quayside regeneration from the 1990s onwards are positive, the focus on these successes belies the complete picture. She points out that poverty and deprivation persist in areas adjacent to BALTIC and that the rise in property prices linked to regeneration displaces communities in the surrounding area⁸ (Minton, 2012). In his book, *A Guide to the New Ruins of Great Britain*, Owen Hatherley discusses the impact BALTIC has on the immediate vicinity of the Newcastle-Gateshead Quayside. Significantly, he notes that the structure of BALTIC and the nearby Sage concert hall, "turn their back on Gateshead" and that the "BALTIC's main knock-on effect is the BALTIC Quays flats, arrogantly towering over the flour mills' already domineering mass. Their ineptitude is almost matched by

⁸ Minton's criticism of the 'urban renaissance' narrative also points to the policy areas that created a need for large scale private investment into urban areas. She notes the incentives provided by Margaret Thatcher's governments for developers to seek out of town brownfield sites to build retail parks and supermarkets – the Metro Centre in Gateshead being a prime example of this. This factor was a major factor in the decline of the high street, local authority maintenance of local amenities from the 1980s onwards and the general deterioration of post-industrial urban areas. Importantly, she notes that European countries have long-standing policy initiatives to maintain the vitality of urban areas in the wake of industrial decline, though one should note that suburban poverty remains a significant marker of social inequality (Hencke & Gentleman, 1999). Hatherley also points these factors by identifying the trend of 'exurbanism' in British cities as a symptom of overly relaxed planning regulation and the massive divestment in urban areas throughout the 1980s and 1990s by the local and national government (Hatherley, 2011).

a cliff of poor executive housing on the other side of the Tyne” (Hatherley, 2011, p. 164).

Hatherley and Minton critique the features of contemporary urban spaces, planning and architecture, of which arts organisations and galleries have become a prominent feature. The policy issues they identify have evolved over successive governments since the 1980s, but to return to Gray's (2007) point at the beginning of this chapter, their exchange-value typifies them. The different registers and inflexions of successive governments over this period suggest what the desired outcome of this exchange depends. Since 2010 there has been a definite shift towards government policies and discourses that promote the exchange value of public subsidy of the arts, as wholly economic. This feature has the effect of restructuring the field of visual art in England, reducing the agency of art organisations and in turn expressing the Rancièrian *oligarchic* tendencies in the relationship between art and politics. The rest of this chapter will explore the evidence for this assertion.

5.1 The Marketisation of cultural policy under the Coalition and Conservative governments, 2010-2018.

Here, I will scrutinise cultural policy since 2010 in order to assess its unique features and impact on the visual arts. The overarching narrative of the Coalition (2010-2015) and Conservative (2015-2016, 2016-2017, 2017-2022 (next scheduled general election)) government's treatment of cultural policy was to increasingly frame it and rationalise it in terms of economic impact. Furthermore, funding for arts and culture was even more precarious in an environment where cuts were all the more severe due to "long-standing Conservative antipathy towards the public sector" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015a, p. 194). Although economic justifications existed in previous governments, they existed within a relatively protected public sector. For example, Gordon Brown's 2001 budget stated that not only does "low public investment damage public sector productivity, but it can weaken private sector productivity" (HM Treasury, 2001), suggesting that economic outcomes reflect the effectiveness of government spending. Coalition and Conservative governments indicated that commercial awareness would be increasingly important in the economic future of the arts and culture. Several speeches below illustrate how key

actors in government aimed to appear as patrons of Britain's cultural identity and activities, whilst simultaneously presenting it as like any other economic activity. It also suggests how the Bourdieu's ideas of cultural reproduction and the distribution of power amongst organisations and institutions is understood and enacted by those with political power. The impact of this is significant and concerning. It is suggestive of a reverse engineered analytic tool, that ceases to critique unequal distribution of capital, but create further inequality. Addressing members of the film industry in Pinewood film studios, David Cameron said the following:

Our role, and that of the BFI should be to support the sector in becoming even more dynamic and entrepreneurial, helping UK producers to make commercially successful pictures that rival the quality and impact of the best international productions ... Just as the British Film Commission has played a crucial role in attracting the biggest and best international studios to produce their films here, so we must incentivise UK producers to chase new markets both here and overseas.

(Prime Minister's Office - 10 Downing Street, 2012)

In a more emotive appeal, Jeremy Hunt made the following speech:

That child, student, working parent, retired person or tourist who first falls for art, or who nurtures the spirit of discovery first in a national museum, becomes the cultural consumer of tomorrow. I'd love it if all museums and galleries could offer free entry. But to attack free entry to national collections on the basis that free entry cannot be funded at all collections simply makes no sense. Free entry to national museums aims for a noble goal: bringing our national inheritance – that which literally belongs to all of us – closer to the people who own it.

(Hunt, 2011 in O'Brien, 2014, p. 44)

There are suggestions of access and excellence in both of these speeches, terms that had been a mainstay of New Labour from 1997 to 2010. For example, as Secretary of State for the newly named DCMS, Chris Smith released the book *Creative Britain* (C. Smith, 1998). In it, he discussed the critical pillars of New

Labour's policy agenda, with “*access, excellence, education and economic value*” (ibid, p. 2) being constituent parts of New Labour's democratic agenda⁹. However, the previous speeches are overwhelmingly suggestive of the economic agenda at the heart of Conservative party policy, with arts and culture presented as another sector in which actors should implement it. O'Brien points to the use of the word consumer as a revealing aspect of how the Conservative government understands citizens. He says, Hunt's speech shows, “this same elision, of citizen with consumer, is at the heart of the measurement systems that currently confront culture, education and more widely public services in general in the UK. This system aims to go beyond the limitations of both public value and NPM” (O'Brien, 2015, p. 89). The issue here is that it conceives art as a consumer product, in a marketplace. If there is little to differentiate between these activities and any other, then it exposes cultural organisations to precarity if they cannot demonstrate popularity and sustainability.

The blurring of citizen and consumer is not accidental. Rather, it is the deliberate introduction of policy frameworks that suggest a notion of personal freedom in a political structure. Foucault notes that markets were tightly bound to strict regulation but we can argue that this is, to a point, fictive or illusory (Hibou, 2017, p. 205). Foucault states that governments are concerned with the production and management of freedom, and this came to constitute “the conditions for the creation of a formidable body of legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions to guarantee production of the freedom needed in order to govern” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 64-65). Foucault is identifying a paradox at the heart of the notion of governmental power, particularly in relation to liberal political traditions. This paradox is the practice of ‘producing’ freedom through policy, regulation and bureaucratic structures. As we shall see, this analysis is relevant to the current conditions of marketised policy. Despite evidence to the contrary, marketisation continues to dominate policy initiatives because of a fictive association with freedom

⁹ The democratic agenda, as Hewison sees it, was Labour's attempt to tackle this issue of hierarchies of taste and their links to social and cultural capital (Hatherley, 2011). Smith asserted that “access and excellence go hand in hand” (Smith, 1998: 4) and that they do not “contradict each other” (ibid: 50). However, as Hewison suggests, this created a market based “benign pluralism” (Hewison, 2011: 236) which required economic and social capital to engage with art and “perpetual innovation” (Smith, 1998: 145) in order to achieve excellence. Hewison is critical of Smith's position and argues that in order to demonstrate the economic value of access and excellence a highly complicated and invasive form of measurement and auditing developed which ultimately stifled creativity and ignored developments within arts and culture (Hewison, 2011).

and collective prosperity. The mechanisms producing freedom are in fact mechanisms of political domination.

O'Brien summarises the relationship between marketised policy and more abstract concepts associated with the arts in the following way. He says, "the government has internalised, albeit in an uneven and inconsistent fashion, marketised forms of policy-making and evaluation as the most effective, economic and efficient way to carry out the purposes and foundations of the state. A range of sectors within public life have attempted to adapt to this change, in a variety of ways. In the case of culture, calls for specialness, appeals to aesthetic judgement and demands for recognition of non-economic forms of value have a complicated and ambivalent relationship to the dominant policy paradigm" (2015, p. 92).

The contrasts between the operative language of cultural policy with the public face of arts and culture suggest the complicated and ambivalent relationship that O'Brien discusses. For example, Peter Bazalgette made the following statement in support of ways of conceiving value in the arts, but with other benefits. He said, "The inherent value of culture, its contribution to society, its symbiotic relationship with education and, yes, its economic power (but in that order) ... this is what we call the holistic case for public support of arts and culture" (Bazalgette, 2014). This holistic vision of the arts seems to recycle many of the points that came to the fore under Labour with some extra emphasis on public health and wellbeing.

Furthermore, Bazalgette referred to the creative industries when he said, "In his budget this year, George Osborne introduced a tax credit for the performing arts. This essentially recognised that the arts are part of the creative industries" (Bazalgette, 2014). This point is suggestive of the lasting legacy of New Labour and their shaping of cultural policy. However, it is also vital to acknowledge New Labour's initiating cuts to public spending following the 2008 global financial crash. The arts suffered, along with other public services, as the Labour government reduced budgets.

5.2 Reductions to public subsidy after the 2008 financial crash

The 2008 global financial crash cast a shadow over the final two years of the Labour government. The crisis had global consequences following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. The crisis highlighted how exposed the UK economy was in periods of high public and private debt, and this inevitably resulted in the reduction of government spending. In 2009, Alistair Darling cut £20 million from the DCMS's 2010/11 allocation, and the Arts Council readied an emergency £40 million 'Sustain' fund for organisations suffering from deficits in funding and over-exposure from shrinking commercial activities and sponsorship. Labour's final budget demanded £60 million in efficiency savings as part of an £11 billion saving plan across government (Bazalgette, 2014).

Hewison suggests that whilst the Labour cultural policy agenda faltered and stalled to the end of their government; they succeeded in placing the arts and culture firmly in the policy arena and the public consciousness. However, there was a gathering force of right-leaning commentary calling to reduce the socio-political mobilisation of the arts. Policy Exchange's 2006 pamphlet, *Culture Vultures* (Hewison, 2014) (the lead author Munira Mirza has held positions across the arts, academia, media and politics, including leading on City Hall's cultural planning for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and is Director of the Number 10 Policy Unit under Prime Minister Boris Johnson) was unenthusiastic about the recent impact of cultural policy, and the New Culture Forum described it anathema to personal freedom. Marc Sidwell, of the national daily British broadsheet newspaper, *The Daily Telegraph*, called for the abolition of the DCMS and ACE, and the Adam Smith Institute suggested subsidy should take the form of an annual citizen voucher for cultural activities, to the sum of £11 (Mirza, 2006).

These policy initiatives highlight some of the issues raised in Hibou's analysis of Foucault in relation to "neoliberal bureaucratization" (Hibou, 2017). A point Hibou makes is the mathematization, or quantifying, complex social or cultural experience. Hibou says, "it is an established fact that economic and financial formalization is constantly taken to be a representation of reality—enabling the possibility not only to explain but also reproduce and even anticipate the constitutive events of social life"

(ibid, p. 211). The field of the visual arts and cultural policy is not exempt from this. Whether it is the arbitrary valuation of cultural activity at £11 per citizen, or the categories and subcategories for reporting to ACE, there is an internalised and a-critical assumption that reality and knowledge can be reduced to simple metrics and these can dictate decision-making.

Amid the backdrop of an emboldened critique of cultural policy from right-leaning commentators and the fierce debate over fiscal policy, the Conservative party adopted a relatively favourable position regarding arts and cultural policy, but with critical features that would position access, use and the political capital of the arts in terms of consumption and economic value. The reactions from political actors to the financial crash of 2008 is indicative of the oligarchic nature of supposed liberal democracies. The police order as imagined by Rancière was made visible and intelligible by the extremes of vulnerability and protection persons had in the financial system. Rancière's notion 'distribution of the sensible' was articulated through financial and political systems of inclusion and exclusion, and the impact this has on the making and circulation of culture.

5.2.1 Conservative party cultural policy agendas from 2008

The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession provided ample cover for the Conservative party to pursue an ideological project that aimed to reduce the size of the state. As economist Paul Krugman puts it, "scare talk about debt and deficits is often used as a cover for a very different agenda, namely an attempt to reduce the overall size of government and especially spending on social insurance" (Krugman, 2015). From 2010 onwards, the government imposed aggressive austerity measures, despite these fiscal measures being widely discredited (ibid). A speech by David Cameron in 2013 made explicitly clear the government's agenda to make the state, "leaner... not just now, but permanently" (ibid). Hesmondhalgh et al. identify the political climate of the time as a "shift to a new phase of neo-liberalism" (2015b, p. 192). The party was also careful to preserve its newly crafted identity as a centrist, conscientious political party able to make challenging decisions when required, despite the government's lurch towards Thatcherite policies.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

The appointment of Ed Vaizey, art and culture 'supporter', as shadow minister for culture in 2006 and the party forcing Hugo Swire out of his position as shadow secretary of state for culture following his support for free entry to national museums, demonstrated that the debate over cultural policy was taking place in the parameters of Labour's legacy. In order to establish the Conservative voice in cultural policy with the report *A New Landscape for the Arts* (The Arts Task Force, 2007).

Commissioned by Ed Vaizey and delivered by Jeremy Hunt, the report made the following suggestions:

- a true Department of Culture be established, with sport transferred to a separate office;
- the National Lottery be returned to its core purposes;
- national Regularly Funded Organisations (RFOs) be transferred from the Arts Council to the Department of Culture;
- the Arts Council be slimmed down to a central office to give advice on key issues such as fundraising and technology;
- the Crafts Council be de-merged from the Arts Council;
- national museums be given greater independence;
- a strong cultural element be introduced to local authority performance assessments;
- an Arts and Parliament Trust be established to give parliamentarians an opportunity to work closely with arts organizations;
- three-year settlements be increased to five years;
- tax incentives should be simplified;
- there should be an entitlement to culture for young people, and that the Departments of Culture and Education should work more closely to achieve this.

(The Arts Task Force, 2007)

Though the Conservative party did not necessarily act on these suggestions, the document formed part of a constellation of speeches, public appearances and reports aimed at appeasing the cultural sector. However, issues such as the third bullet point, signal a willingness to reappraise the arm's-length principle. Arguably, the shortened tenure of Liz Forgan as chair of ACE, mentioned earlier in this

chapter, was another means of reducing the gap between DCMS and ACE. In 2009 Ed Vaizey stated the following:

The Conservative party is committed to supporting, nurturing and encouraging the success of the arts in Britain. It will seek to set the direction of travel with the lightest of touches. It will concentrate on creating a transparent, cost-effective framework that allows the sector to thrive and not just survive.

First, there is a commitment to the mixed economy of arts funding, a mix of public subsidy, private philanthropy and commercial ventures. There is no hidden agenda to wean the arts off public subsidy, and there is a recognition that public subsidy plays a vital role in pump priming arts organizations.

(Vaizey, 2009)

Declaring that there was no hidden agenda and that the ambition was to promote a fully integrated revenue stream was notable for its absence of any social narrative and the emphasis on the financial overhauls that were to come. Furthermore, Vaizey insinuates that a mixed economy would naturally occur with the "lightest of touches", rather than the government engineering it through public sector cuts. Vaizey presents this as a prudent funding model neither overexposed to state support, as seen in much of Europe, nor primarily reliant on private support, as is the case in the US. Hibou (2017) points out that part of the rationale of "neoliberal bureaucratization" is built on a paradox. Despite claims of the "lightest of touches" in keeping with laissez-faire tradition, the bureaucracy of marketisation is sprawling and controlling. In Foucauldian terms, we can see how the seemingly unimpeachable power of marketised policy arises from the false knowledge or logic, stating that it is organic and natural, just as markets are, and state intervention erodes freedom. As Hibou says, "one of the key arguments of neoliberals (the well-known slogan 'cut the red tape') turns on the necessary and radical limitation of state interventions. As suggested above however, neoliberalism can certainly not be equated with laissez-faire" (Hibou, 2017, p. 205).

There are further critiques of bureaucracy that contradict the claim that marketised policy strips away bloated state intervention and produces freedom. Oliver Davis

(2020) discusses bureaucracy with reference to Jacques Rancière's conception of the 'police order'. He offers three key components to a contemporary critique of bureaucracy: "(i) that neoliberal capitalism's 'stealth revolution' is primarily effected by way of a proliferation of bureaucracies; (ii) that these bureaucracies reconstruct the world as an array of 'overlapping competitions' (iii) that competitive hierarchisation ('ranking') is the key bureaucratic form, or process, in each of these administrative fiefdoms" (O. Davis, 2020, p. 60). We can use these different points to identify the machinations of policy and rhetoric and how they become embedded in arts organisations.

Many of the statements from government regarding arts policy seem banal or at least uncontentious on a surface level. For example, further to the claims of the "lightest of touches" DCMS also suggested that a mixed funding model would also enhance artistic freedom, but do not offer any expansion as to why this might be the case. Alongside this, there were continuing declarations regarding the need to protect the future of arts and culture, and that the government would continue to champion the country's cultural offer (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011). As we shall see, these statements allude to explicit forms of hierarchisation and competition rather than promoting cultural freedoms.


5.2.2 Initial cuts to arts funding under the Coalition government of 2010-2015

In his first speech as secretary of state, 19th May 2010, Hunt made mention of 'excellence' and 'art for art's sake'. However, the rhetoric of the election campaign did little to guarantee continued state subsidy. Just days later, the government announced £88 million of cuts to the DCMS budget, which in turn led to a 4% cut to the ACE budget. The October 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review reduced the DCMS budget by £400 million by 2014/15, meaning a 29.6% cut for ACE (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011). As the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition began to enact wide-ranging and rapid cost-saving, it was clear that the arts and culture would not be exempt from these cuts. Whilst some public spending, for the National Health Service and Foreign Aid, was ring-fenced and protected, the measures impacted the majority of government spending, though unevenly in terms of departments. As **Figure 5.1** shows, Culture, Media and Sport was amongst the

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

hardest hit by the cuts with departmental spending limited by over 30% between 2010/11 to 2015/16. The same period saw local government spending cut by over 50%, making it the department taking on the most extensive cuts. Government spending adopted austerity policies as *de rigueur*, and these two critical sources of funding for the arts found themselves placed at the very bottom of the Treasury's funding ecology.

Figure 5.1 United Kingdom real-term cuts in departmental expenditure limits, 2010-11 to 2015-16



Source: (Hewison, 2014), 'Recent cuts to Public Spending'. Based on HM Treasury Data (July 2015 Budget).

As austerity measures deepened, DCMS passed on further planned cuts to NDPBs, leading to ACE cuts to NPOs and Museums of £3.9 million in 2013/14 and £7.7 million in 2014/15. The arts and culture vision, shared by Vaizey and Hunt, with its origins in the Thatcher era, was that if the state stepped back, then commercial venture and sponsorship would fill the funding gap. However, the large-scale recession inhibited the willingness for private or corporate philanthropy to direct funds into supporting the arts, especially outside of London. Not only this, but the scaled back public spending was dismantling the precise regulatory mechanisms for promoting such investment, such as the charitable organisation, Art & Business. The total private investment between 2009/10 and 2011/12 raised by £2.5 million to £660.5 million. Accounting for inflation, this meant private investment had remained

flat as public investment dropped (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2015). To further compound this, the reduction in local authority funding caused concern regarding the capacity for 'match funding' where private sponsorship leverages public grants (Hewison, 2014). These issues raised at an early stage of the Coalition government's austerity measures indicate some of the hollow theoretical justifications for scaled back subsidy. Again, referring to Hibou, the political agenda of linked to austerity manifests in the language and logic of bureaucracies. In this sense there assumed knowledge as to what is correct or proper, manifests itself as actual power in a Foucauldian sense. Hibou says, "bureaucratic abstractions, norms, categories, rules, and formal procedures certainly are very useful tools, that also function as codes on which people have agreed at a given moment in order to exchange information, to act, and to guide people's behavior — in short, to govern" (Hibou, 2017, p. 212).

Since 2010, the economic aspect of art in public contexts has dominated the political discourse and the relationship between state, NDPBs and arts organisations. Although it was present under the governments of Thatcher, Major, Blair and Brown, it has eclipsed other policy narratives from 2010 onwards. The government directly references Nottingham Contemporary's nomination for the 'Prime Minister's Better Public Building Award' in 2010, an award that recognises "efficient procurement" and "excellent design" (Department for Digital Culture Media & Sport, 2010), which is suggestive of the government position that considers excellence within the approved parameters of efficiency. O'Brien points out that an outcome of this was those narratives of public value and cultural value, had evaporated mainly through the aggressive pursuit of cost-cutting. He says these notions of value were not resilient "despite several attempts to deploy it as a tool for measuring and managing aspects of activity that went beyond market and business frameworks, including heritage, the arts and public sector broadcasting" (2015, p. 87). By the advent of the Coalition government in 2010, the terms, cultural and public value, "did not seem to have made many inroads into shifting an economic rationality applied to culture." (ibid). He goes on to say, "The equation of government with business and the dominance of a view that sees society as coterminous with a market has continued to shape Coalition cultural policy. Encouraging American models of philanthropy has been an important part of a reduced funding settlement" (ibid, pp. 88-89). The Coalition

government's economic rationale eclipsed pre-existing notions of value that had tempered New Labour's approach to policy-making. From 2010, the rounds of budget cuts made seismic changes to the public arts and culture landscape in England.

5.2.3 Cuts to local authority funding, 2010-2018

The funding crisis affecting the DCMS, ACE and other NDPBs were particularly severe in the way it affected local authority funding. Forecasters projected that the cuts to local government spending would reach 35% by 2015/16, but in fact, it surpassed 50% (**Figure 5.1**). As Hewison (2014) points out, the impact on arts and culture was disproportionately high, with cuts of approximately £100 million. In some high-profile examples, councils announced 100% reduction in their funding of cultural activities, with Somerset, Westminster and Newcastle (though the latter reconsidered) deeming arts and culture expendable in the wave of austerity measures. The removal of regulation and monitoring of local government spending partly enabled the withdrawal of support by local government. In 2010 the Government announced it would remove ring-fences of around £1.7 billion of grants to local authorities in 2010/11, in order to "to give them greater flexibility to re-shape their budgets and find savings" (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011).

One of the dynamics of marketisation, I would argue, is the fact that it presents highly politicised rhetoric as a universal truth. Again, this serves to (falsely) legitimise governmental power and is an example of the Foucauldian relationships at play in analysis of marketisation. Speaking on this issue, Hibou says, "the language of neoliberal formalization (with its endless formalities) proves to be an anti-historical, anti-localized, anti-specific language since, a product of an abstraction with universal pretensions, it actually neglects the radical heterogeneity of the realities it abstracts. It's in this sense that one can speak of neoliberal bureaucratization as a fiction" (Hibou, 2017, p. 212). This is evident when seeing the robustness and inflexibility of marketised policy; it simplifies complex social and political conditions as well as overlooking regional inequalities and the different requirements for local services.

If we consider Rancière we can find similar but different relationships between bureaucracy and the false legitimisation of governmental power. The deliberate deconstruction of democratic politics occurs through bureaucratic-administrative governance and bureaucratic power is adapted to a coercive register. O. Davis (2020) argues that these points related to Rancière's "theorisation of the 'police order' as a spectrum of administrative and coercive powers opposed in their principle to democratic politics in the radical sense of the term" (Ibid, p. 61). Just as Rancière asserts that the presupposition of equality is the foundation of democracy, Davis suggests that heterarchy is another way of orientating radical democracy. As such, hierarchy and the administrative forms are direct manifestations of the police order and un/anti-democratic governance.

However, we should not simply conclude that an absence of government or administrative support equates to freedom or democratic practice. Rather, the phenomenon of marketisation defers responsibility from government down a political hierarchy whilst maintaining political power. In Bourdieu's terms this might constitute significant changes to the social world and fields of practice. With this there is a sudden and uncompromising change to the criteria for 'feel for the game'. For example, the absence of any apparent oversight at a national level of how councils might administer cuts to the arts at a local level raised concerns amongst many campaign groups and professional bodies. For example, The National Campaign for the Arts (NCA) submitted evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee report of funding in arts stating that:

Museums and galleries, for example, are less reliant on subsidy from the Arts Council, and more so on financial support received from their local authorities. Local authorities have flexibility over discretionary budgets and so the impact on arts, and cultural expenditure will vary from council to council, but their budgets are even more vulnerable as all local authorities will be cut by 25%. (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011)

Also submitting evidence, The National Association of Local Government Arts Officers, voiced similar concerns over the lack of oversight in administering cuts at a local level:

Local government funding for arts and heritage underpins the sector in England, but these services are not statutory (excluding some record office obligations and minimum provision of libraries). Consequently, cultural and leisure budgets are under significant threat as councils ask what the minimum is they are required to do. Furthermore, these budgets have already been under pressure for some time - there is little room to manoeuvre.
(Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011)

Despite these concerns being legitimate and acknowledged by the then Minister for Culture, Communications and the Creative Industries, Ed Vaizey, he stated to the committee that:

We can't dictate to local authorities what spending decisions they make within the envelope of spending they are given, but I hope that the signal from us that we want to support arts organisations across the country in terms of their funding will be taken on board. There will be certain local authorities that support their culture and others that perhaps don't support it as strongly as others.
(Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011)


These comments show that there was a distinct awareness of the risks associated with Westminster imposing deep cuts on local government, coupled with the lack of statutory provision of arts and culture. The vision outlined in Vaizey's 2009 document, which called for arts and culture provision as a key performance indicator for local government and proposing that arts and culture should be available to all young people, was clearly being stripped of the components that ensured a protected status in terms of government backing and financial provision.

The broader, national picture is reflected, to a degree, in the individual institutions detailed in this research. **Figure 5.2** (and **5.3, 5.5, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3**) presents data

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

gathered as part of this research. It brings together ACE's qualitative data concerning my case studies and demonstrates the shared challenges of the sector and the particular responses to it. The impact of these cuts at an organisational level is significant, and the responses from the case study participants illustrate how a precarious financial environment affects arts organisations. I find that the decline in LA funding has exceptions, but is generally disappearing, the protection of NPO funding is countered by the wider disappearance of revenue streams, sponsorship has entered as a policy priority but is not a reliable revenue for the majority of arts organisations. Sponsorship and commercial income are highly centralised in London, which is driving a gap between the capital and the rest of England. However, the recent Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the precarity of even 'successful' organisations where stability is dependent on trading and sponsorship. The case studies surveyed in this research, Nottingham Contemporary, South London Gallery, BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, The Hepworth Wakefield, and Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art, all experienced some degree of reduction in terms of their core local authority funding.

Figure 5.2 Local authority funding



Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England RFO and NPO reporting data, 2007-2017. See Appendix A for a chart of this data.

Figure 5.2 shows the changes to LA funding for individual organisations over a ten-year period. 2010 marks a significant turning point for most of the organisations included. In general, there is a decline in funding that correlates with the national picture, but the severity and rapidity of change varies enough to suggest that organisational responses to cuts are highly individualised and specific to local political and economic factors. There has been a gradual drop off in funding for some organisations, such as the South London Gallery, and rapid withdrawal of funding in the case of mima. What is clear, is that the withdrawal of local authority support across different scales of organisation and in different geographical areas has contributed to uncertainty around the future of public contemporary art galleries. Responding to this funding environment, Sam Thorne, the current Director of Nottingham Contemporary, made the following comments as part of an interview for this research:

[R]educed local authority funding for culture has taken a palpable toll. I think we've seen that in the reduction of free to attend educational activities, and there's also been quite a tangible shift in the kinds of exhibitions that happen – and don't happen... [O]ur grant from the city council has been cut by around 50% since 2010... We get an annual set amount from the city council and the cuts from that in recent years have ranged from 4% to 20%, so we've clearly been looking at other ways of filling that gap. That's impacted us massively. I know there are others elsewhere: Towner Gallery in Eastbourne or New Gallery Walsall that have had 100% cuts from the local authority.

(Thorne, 2018, pers. comm.)

Margot Heller, Director of South London Gallery and Sarah Munro, Director of BALTIC, express similar concerns. The following comments are from interviews for this research.

But, then that funding [ACE NPO funding] has been, has flatlined so that in real terms there's been a reduction and then we're very lucky to get support from Southwark Council as well, and that has gradually been reduced... The cuts to funding through local authorities have been devastating, and it's practically impossible for them to support culture in the way that traditionally they have done, which puts regional museums in a particularly very difficult situation. For our part, the pressure to raise funds from alternative sources is ever greater, as it is with all institutions, this really affects the role of being a director of a museum or gallery.

(Heller, 2018, pers. comm.)

Great international art, it's global, it's looking outward but for me, in terms of what that institution now requires is a completely different focus, because actually, the fiscal environment around us is so totally different. So, one point about BALTIC, at the peak of its support from Gateshead Council it received about £500,000 per year. So that's half a million, and over the last five years that's come down to about 200 [thousand pounds], and we are assuming that it will come down to zero soon... Milton Keynes gallery there's a big infrastructure building where then the environment has changed, the money was much harder to get and was much tighter, so suddenly you've got this quite difficult thing.

(Munro, 2018, pers. comm.)

These comments suggest that the reaction to the cuts from the galleries' senior management was not merely imposing financially prudent measures, or altering business plans, but required a fundamental shift in terms of fundraising and the charitable activities within the galleries' remit. Here is a clear example of how the bureaucratic changes at a governmental level quickly manifest changes at an organisational level. Hibou's analysis of Foucault and bureaucracy is relevant here. She argues that advocates of neoliberal and marketised policy suggest it ensures and produces freedom. Yet, the forced changes to organisational structures suggest a coercive exercise of political power. Thorne remarks that this has changed the types of exhibitions developed within public galleries. From thematic exhibitions exploring critical and cultural issues to exhibitions of an individual artist's work

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.


(though this is more of a general remark rather than referring to Nottingham Contemporary specifically) and Heller points out that local authorities can no longer perform the function they did in terms of supporting the arts. Filling the funding gap is a challenge acknowledge by all, and this changes the role and focus of directors in arts organisations, as well as highlighting the precarious situation they find themselves in and the genuine risk of closure for other galleries in England.

These senior professionals, and others in the public funded arts, is engaged in navigating and affecting a field practice. They describe the formative role they have in addressing the tensions and struggles for individuals, or organisations, to assert their position in the field of public funded arts. The absence of economic capital reshapes their field position, however, there is a doubling effect here. As they make decisions within the context of financial and social hardship, they also shape their position as effective administrators in accordance with the demand of neoliberal capital. As art institutions adapt their practices to survive the extremes of austerity, they become unwitting agents of the police order and oligarchy, rather than the vectors for emancipation they might imagine.

The withdrawal of financial support from the case studies shown in **Figure 5.2** reflects a trend seen across NPO visual arts organisations. **Figure 5.3** shows the increase in local authority funding as the portfolio expanded and visual arts organisations were either bolstered or indeed founded, amid numerous culture-led regeneration projects realised in the 2000s.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Figure 5.3 Local authority & public subsidy



Source: Hopkin, based on ACE Statistics Report No. 1-8; Regularly funded organisations: Key data from the annual submission, 2005 -2011; Annual submission headline statistics, 2011-2018. See Appendix H.

Note: No report was available for year 2004/05; therefore, the figure is from the constant sample comparison in the 2005/06 report. Separate data for local authority funding and other public subsidy was not available before 2007/08.

After a considerable rise in the early 2000s, the increase in support for visual arts organisations elevated and stabilised between 2007 and 2009, before a relatively steady drop coinciding with the Coalition government of David Cameron and Nick Clegg. It is significant that whilst there has been public subsidy available at various points throughout the past decade, the long-term commitments of local authorities to fund visual arts organisations has dwindled, and another public subsidy has not filled the gap left by this downturn. Moreover, the use of one-off public grants or short-term subsidy in place of long-term local authority support creates a lack of consistency in the amount of support for which organisations can expect or plan.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Under Maria Miller (2012-2014) the DCMS continued to focus on the financial justifications of cultural support, whilst simultaneously slimming down the financial aid available. However, these were justifications and practices had a relatively strong correlation with New Labour's cultural policy agenda, pursued further. The existing structural makeup of the cultural policy world enabled increasingly extreme adoption of economic justifications. O'Brien states that "New Labour's use of economics and other managerial forms of social science to measure performance has been allied with Miller's redoubled stress on culture's contribution to the economy" (2014, p. 44). In this sense, the mixed funding model of the Coalition and Conservative government, the justifications for it and how they would measure it, mirrored the ecology of New Labour's support for arts and culture, particularly the economic element of it.

However, the focus on the social benefit or a sense of public value diminished. Hibou identifies "the critique of state administration" and "interventionism that respects the framework, and conforms to the market and to enterprise" (Hibou, 2017, p. 206) as instilling a new type of bureaucracy that is typical of marketisation. Here Hibou begins to present a genealogical or Foucauldian evolution of bureaucracies and how they are instilled in political practice. Whilst there are continuities from one government to another, the shift to wholesale marketisation since 2010 manifests particular dynamics between knowledge and power.

We can also look at marketisation as being a product and producer of sprawling administrative and bureaucratic measures. Whereas Foucault might look at this in terms of the power/knowledge, Davis suggests that many of our conceptions of bureaucracy might be historically contingent, but they still share an irrefutable waste of time. Whereas the placating of officials through "lurking ever-so-humbly outside dingy offices" "constitute our cultural understanding of the bureaucracy of an earlier era as it was formed by the novels of Dostoevsky, Bulgakov and Kafka" (Davis, 2020, p. 61), our current understanding refers to call centres, prescribed questions and interminable hold music. However, the nature of a public sector crisis means that public funded arts navigate both these registers – the lobbying for access and support, as well as navigating subcontracted support structures.

Miller received criticism for adopting a simplistic view of the function of arts and culture. In her time in office, she routinely referred to arts and culture in relation to tourism and leisure. O'Brien says of a 2013 speech by Miller that it, "outlines culture's role as almost solely economic, suggesting it can have an economic impact by encouraging tourist spending or helping with trade deals. This reference to tourism is a return to the well-trodden tropes of cultural policy from the 1980s in the UK, whereby arts organisations were explicitly commanded by government ministers to prove the return on the subsidies offered by the state in terms of their contributions to British GDP" (2015, p. 88). This issue is indicative of the regressive trend in cultural policy under the Conservatives. Labour had acknowledged the complexity of public cultural offer by implementing sometimes convoluted policy initiatives and incorporating generalised terminology. Despite these faults, there was at least some acknowledgement of the complex function of arts and culture in contemporary society. Under successive Conservative secretaries of state, the economic arts and culture paradigm has become firmly entrenched policy whilst the local government has lacked the resources to pursue more expansive policy agendas. The entrenchment of the economic paradigm is symptomatic of the "intensification and spread of government by neoliberal abstraction" (Hibou, 2017, p. 211). This abstraction occurs through the denial of concentrated political and economic power whilst encouraging this very phenomenon. This creates dissonance between actual and perceived reality and it effectively distorts the genealogical roots of political rationales. For example, there are undoubtedly echoes of the Thatcherite arts agenda of the 1980s in the post-2010 policy narratives (Hewison, 2014), but a key difference is the scale and reach of cultural infrastructure in the 2000s and 2010s compared to the 1980s. The ramifications of change, and, indeed, the methods of instituting it, are vastly more complex than in previous decades, which only compounds the sense of dissonance.

Arguably, presenting arts and cultural policy in an economic frame is manageable so long as the sector can pursue its artistic, cultural and policy ambitions simultaneously. However, Gray identifies several issues with what he characterises as 'policy attachment'. Warning of the process of policy attachment, he says:

The potential costs that could develop from this ranged from an instrumentalisation of the arts such that they were no longer concerned with their own policy interests but only with those of other sectors, to the risk that evidence to support such attachment was rather thin on the ground, and, without such evidence, there were consequently severe risks for the survival of the sector as a local government function in times of financial austerity. (Gray, 2017, p. 316)

Developing this argument further, Gray establishes a distinction between the mechanisms of instrumentalisation and attachment, which occur in the arts policy sector. Exogenous instrumentalisation has continued over recent years, through a process of top-down political power. Political actors from other policy sectors with more considerable political capital than their arts policy counterparts encourage and enact instrumentalisation. Alongside this, endogenous attachment has taken place within the art policy sector as a bottom-up process that presents activities and ends as conforming with the goals of other policy sectors. The exogenous process is concerned with results, whereas the endogenous process is concerned with the means, the end, and the relationship between them (Gray, 2017). The dynamic of this construction and alteration of arts and culture policy is key to recognising the different political actors involved and the various positions they represent.


An issue with the reconciliation of policy attachment within the arts is that it creates an unequal and distorted notion of the 'rules of the game'. The cultural and symbolic 'distinction' public galleries accumulate is not then shared and redistributed, rather it solidifies their dated and disingenuous guarantors of social cohesion through submission. Like Rancière's critique of Bourdieu and the sense that the vaunted role of the sociologist is dependent of subjugated, unknowing populace, policy attachment repositions the relevance of public funded arts in terms of an unequal and disenfranchised society.

For local authorities, there were much starker realities to face, and their withdrawal of cultural funding underlined the fact that local authorities consider arts and culture another front-line service. The crisis facing cultural funding was two-pronged, and the relationship between the DCMS, ACE and cultural organisations had

overshadowed the vital role local authority funding had played. As Vickery says, "in the last two decades local authority (i.e., city council) expenditure on art and culture has far exceeded that of the national funding agencies and quangos (from Arts Council England downwards). This comes as a surprise to many, who when thinking of art or culture immediately refer to either the 'art world' (international art markets and art patronage) or national government funding bodies. City authorities are, in fact, the prime spenders on culture" (2011, p. 3). It is important to note that the severity of local authority cuts has not been even across the UK. **Figure 5.4** highlights the extremes of this disparity.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Figure 5.4 Map of change in service spending in Wales, Scotland, and England, 2009-10 to 2016-17



Source: (M. Gray & Barford, 2018). The map uses data sourced from the Institute of Fiscal Studies, Amin-Smith et al. (2016).

Vickery makes a key observation about the reason local authorities have been partially side-lined in the arts and culture policy debate. Despite their crucial role in providing contemporary models for a civic relationship between councils and culture, particularly in the case of the GLC and in Sheffield, arts organisations' fundamental relationship was with ACE, not the localities they occupied. "The 'art world'", says

Vickery, "and its national sponsors are once-removed from 'the city', whose economic life and intellectual discourse are not embedded within it – however much they benefit from its cultural facilities, platforms or locations" (2011, p. 3). This analysis may explain some of the drastic decisions made by councils following the budget, in that arts and culture had interests that did not necessarily correspond with local authorities and a lack of embeddedness of new organisations within the locations they occupy.

The case study responses reflect this point to a greater or lesser degree. Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) reflected on his experience working for Tate and as director of Nottingham Contemporary and noted strong relationships between Tate and DCMS (DCMS directly funds Tate) that does not exist at Nottingham Contemporary, but "we [Nottingham Contemporary] have pretty close ties. Their CEO, Darren Henley CEO, and I have had a number of meetings, and their new chair, Nick Serota, was my boss at Tate. Then we have more regular dialogues with area leads, relationship managers, and so on". This relationship sits in contrast with the reduction in funding from the local authority (**Figure 5.2**). Heller also cited a strong relationship between the South London Gallery and ACE. "I've always felt able to put forward suggestions or ideas", she said, "or to ask questions with regard to wider policy and things that I feel would be helpful or needed" (2018, pers. comm.). Like Nottingham Contemporary, South London Gallery has also seen a reduction in local authority funding, but we should not understate the embeddedness of the organisation in the local area. It runs several community engagement projects and is notable for being adjacent to the Elmington, Pelican and Sceaux Gardens housing estates in South London, working with residents from these estates it has initiated the programmes 'Open Plan' and 'Art Block' (South London Gallery, 2019), which focusses on the gallery's immediate residential neighbours and schools. BALTIC follows a similar funding pattern through its relatively substantial ACE funding and diminishing local authority funding (**Figures 5.3, 5.5**). Interestingly, Munro (2018, pers. comm.) pointed to financial support from local business, school visits and a shift in language, from visitors to 'constituents' as an example of the embeddedness of BALTIC at a local level.

However, it is reasonable to suggest that the observation Vickery (Vickery, 2011) makes, regarding the art world being removed from city economics and discourses, takes on a different dynamic if we take the more recent developments in local authority funding of arts and culture into account. As **Figure 5.4** shows, major urban areas, often correlating with Labour-led councils in the UK, tend to have been dealt the most severe funding cuts since 2009/10, suggesting a party-political element to the implementation of austerity measures. These areas also tend to be locations where visual arts venues are reliant on public subsidy.

Although the differences in outlook between local authorities and arts organisations may exist, the inability of local authorities to continue their financial support of arts and culture is perhaps a more significant reason for local authorities being increasingly side-lined in the debate around cultural policy and funding. We must contrast the positions of local authorities with that of ACE and the DCMS. Both of these bodies came under scrutiny and experienced changes to their funding and their political capital; however, it is clear that the severity of cuts and restructuring affecting them was less than that of local authorities.

This is emblematic of the fictions the government postulated regarding the collective responsibility for austerity and the necessity of marketisation. Hibou refers to Foucault's Lectures at the Collège de France, *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres* and states that there is no single truth but, "truths constructed by means of the norms and values proper to the society in which they are uttered" (Hibou, 2017, p. 213). In this sense, we can view the logic of marketisation as containing multiple truths alongside its numerous fictions, and with this a corrosive epistemological dissonance. Proponents of marketisation present it as a self-evident truth. However, as Foucault says, anything presenting itself as a discourse of veridiction (*discours de véridiction*) and "transforms its own truth into a norm can be interpreted as a fiction. 'Reality' and 'rationality' are shaped by social actions and also by this discourse of truth. Neoliberalism must be understood as a 'game of veridiction'" (ibid). We can follow this and say that marketisation narratives and discourse echo this game of veridiction.

5.2.4 NPO funding and Conservative cultural policy, 2010- 2018

The 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review offered some reprieve for arts funding. The DCMS overall budget saw a lower than expected 5% cut, with much of the cost absorbed by reducing administrative costs by 20%. The Chancellor, George Osborne, also stated that national museums and galleries would receive increased funds between 2015 and 2020. The BBC report on the announcement outlined the response from the DCMS:

Ed Vaizey, the Minister of State at the DCMS, said the Comprehensive Spending Review settlement for his department was 'the best news the [subsidised] arts have had for six years,' adding: 'The arts have proved their worth to The Treasury. Ask any visiting dignitary or tourist in the street, and they want to go to our museums and theatre.'

(Gompertz, 2015)

The response from Peter Bazalgette indicated that ACE was:

'slightly ahead in cash terms', when taking into account the negative impact of inflation and the positive impact of new 'parcels' of money. Bazalgette said the Treasury had listened to and recognised the arguments made to it over the past five years by the arts sector, which were based on the 'positive benefits the arts confer on society in terms of education, tourism, regeneration, economic impact, quality of life and Britain's brand abroad'.

(Gompertz, 2015)

Despite the positive response from the DCMS and the ACE chairperson, the funding stasis could do little to alter the already withdrawn funding at a local level.

Organisations such as the New Art Gallery Walsall continue to face an uncertain future without support at a local level. In the case of the New Art Gallery Walsall, ACE portfolio funding, totalling £3.5 million between 2018-2022, secured the future of the gallery after the local authority had previously stated it would close the gallery due to ongoing austerity (Gompertz, 2015). There have been some recent attempts to reinvest in the regions and ensure that the funding system is not London-centric. The current chief executive of ACE, Darren Henley, announced in October 2016 that

ACE would distribute an extra £37 million each year between 2018 and 2022 to boost regional cultural activity. He said:

We've planned a budget that lets us reach more people in new ways. We'll increase investment outside London without damaging the capital; fund more new, small and diverse organisations. And museums, libraries and arts organisations will apply to us on a more level playing field. Everybody deserves to benefit from Arts Council investment, wherever they are, whatever their background. Our plans through to 2022 show we mean it when we talk about great art and culture for everyone.

(BBC, 2017)

The case studies in this research all have NPO status and funding arising from that has been relatively well protected when contrasted with the uncertainty or withdrawal of local authority funding. **Figure 5.5** outlines the NPO funding of these case studies since 2007/08, and whilst there has been some flattening or stasis in some instances, it shows a relatively stable income for these organisations. The graph adapts headline statistics published by ACE and it shows a marked difference to LA funding. In fact, BALTIC have significantly increased their NPO funding over a ten-year period and The Hepworth Wakefield have entered the portfolio as part of the gallery's opening in 2011. The Hepworth is an outlier in that it has enjoyed relative stability from both its main funders. SLG, mima and Nottingham Contemporary represent more familiar situation for the sector; a significant drop in LA support that cannot be plugged by existing NPO funding. **Figure 5.5** suggests that NPO funding does offer some medium-term financial guarantees but stability is, however, entirely contingent a gallery's status as NPO and their ability to deliver the necessary outcomes and reporting required by ACE.

Stability is an issue for some smaller-scale organisations, as Thorne points out:


We [Nottingham Contemporary] are what's known as a Band 3 organisation, that is, we are in receipt of more than a million a year – but by a whisker. We have all of the responsibilities and monitoring requirements of a much larger organisation.

(Thorne, 2018, pers. comm.)

This comment illustrates an issue that has sometimes been side-lined in the current debate around cultural policy and public funding, specifically instrumentalisation and the accompanying administrative and bureaucratic oversight. Much of the criticism of New Labour's cultural policy orientated around the instrumentalisation of culture and the concern over the allocation of resources for and within the visual arts sector (Arts Council England, 2016). Thorne is indicating that the changing funding landscape has not mitigated any of the reporting requirements of organisations, and it remains a significant challenge to managing an NPO. One of the problems faced by the sector is the weight of bureaucratic responsibility – a message consistently expressed by the professionals spoken to in this research is that the onerous demands of funding and fundraising inhibits their role as leaders. Foucault acknowledges the exceptionalism to certain cultural forms, that are not discursive. These include art and music, suggesting that the treatment of these forms in social or political contexts is intrinsically different. It suggests that policy and governance should not treat art as one of many practices in the 'creative industries'.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Figure 5.5 NPO funding of case study organisations



Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017. See Appendix B.

Whilst larger organisations, such as BALTIC, with a larger workforce, can have more specialist support roles; smaller organisations may find the reporting requirements more burdensome. However, as Heller (2018, pers. comm.) points out, the benefits of NPO status are significant in terms of recognition and financial security. She says, “in terms of the South London Gallery, we had a major uplift to become an NPO, to be recognised at the level that we are operating at now”. The expansion of the portfolio has incorporated a greater variety of arts organisations and allows them to pursue ambitious and wide-reaching exhibition programmes. In 1995/1996 there were 66 regularly funded visual arts organisations in the portfolio, and by 2005/2006 this had expanded to 195. The portfolio has since contracted, and as of 2017/2018, there were just 115 visual arts organisations receiving regular funding.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

The changes in the scale of the portfolio since the 1990s has had varying effects on the cultural infrastructure of England and the exposure it faces during times of uncertain funding. For example, Munro points out that capital funding drove new venues, but they now face a degree of difficulty as they currently operate in a rapidly changing funding environment. She says, one characteristic of public funding in England "was the relatively rapid expansion of the portfolio, so more galleries coming in with large buildings that were funded by the lottery, that cost more money to keep running" (Munro, 2018, pers. comm.). This comment suggests that the policy initiatives that promoted a broad cultural offer, capital investment and sustained public funding proceeded rapidly with an element of jeopardy and risk attached.

However, the notion of 'excellence' is also attached as a justification for both the expansion and contraction of cultural infrastructure. Hibou identifies the presence of excellence in contemporary bureaucracies as another example of the abstraction of concepts underpinning and rationally informing policy. Hibou is astute at highlighting the "interplay of power" (Hibou, 2017, p. 210) in contemporary bureaucracies. She uses 'excellence' as an abstract concept informing policymaking and legislation. She says, excellence "took shape in industry around questions of quality/price, and the efficient allocation of resources and evaluation, and now applies to the world of knowledge, of information, and research as much as to that of public health" (ibid, p. 211). She goes on to say that this informs the "definition of strategies in a world made up of competition, but also of alliances and tactical games, and political ambitions driven by the desire for profit" (ibid). Or, as Rancière would suggest, the drive for excellence is a mask for oligarchy, as it is another elusive and elastic concept, defined and designated by and existing socio-political order.

The narrative of excellence is a structure of cognition according political prioritising of marketized logics over presupposed equality. Excellence is a conduit for excusing and rationalising persistent inequalities, whether they be social, economic or political. Just as excellence takes a subjective formulation, so do the measures of inclusion and exclusion rife in contemporary society. Visual art prioritised and distributed according to excellence is not merely a representation of the speech, thought and practice conditioned by the distribution of the sensible, but a manifestation of

oligarchic rule. However, the omnidirectional nature of the aesthetic regime means that it can have an opposite, if unequal, impact.

Here we see the logic of markets appearing under another guise in the realm of public policy. Excellence is presented by policy-makers as a politically neutral term, yet a simple application of Foucauldian genealogy reveals it to be something quite different. Rather than critique the notion of excellence as another aspect of marketisation it more often seen as “a guarantee of reform and improvement of the quality of their own professional practices” (ibid) but is in fact a coercive market force causing organisations to “change and mutate” (ibid).

The Public arts centre in West Bromwich, which closed in 2013 after opening in 2008, and The New Art Gallery in Walsall, which was threatened with closure after the local council withdrew funding, are both examples of large capital projects where economic shifts threatened their existence as local government and NDPBs quickly responded to the dwindling resources available to them. All of these projects were seen as containing a quality of excellence in terms of their adding to the local cultural offer, yet this was not enough to make the case for their survival – funding is the final arbiter.

As **Figure 5.5** indicates, some organisations, such as BALTIC, have seen a considerable increase in funding from ACE as part of their NPO status. This suggests that ACE is responding positively in some instances to support some of the flagship organisations represented in the portfolio during an uncertain funding environment. However, this is not the case for all galleries, with organisations such as Nottingham Contemporary seeing their ACE support flatline over the past decade. Thorne states, "since 2010 [...], Arts Council funding has remained basically at a standstill. I'd say that there are probably some NPOs who when funding was frozen, they were quite fortunate where the funding was frozen at, and I would say there were other organisations, like us, who were less fortunate" (2018, pers. comm.). Again, this characteristic may be an issue of scale, where larger organisations can develop more robust funding arrangements, and smaller organisations are more vulnerable than their larger counterparts.

However, Thorne also alludes to further ACE investment in Nottingham and that the breadth of cultural offer is still a key concern in the area. He says:

Several new NPOs were established for this new funding cycle, and they included artist-run spaces like Backlit and Primary, both of whom do super interesting programmes. It's a place where cultural engagement as a whole city is on balance relatively low, but the cultural offer is pretty broad. So yes, there's definitely an imbalance there between Arts Council investment and City Council investment.

(Thorne, 2018, pers. comm.)

The scenario Thorne presents here regarding funding distribution is typical of the varying local contexts the arts operate. It suggests the particular strain that arts organisations are experiencing whilst there also being some significant support and incorporation of smaller, artist-run initiatives (ARIs) into the portfolio. These differences in scale, the age of an organisation and the relationship with local and national funders, are not equal across all localities. Whilst funding cuts have undoubtedly weakened and limited the entire public art infrastructure since a peak in the mid-to-late 2000s; there is still relative depth and breadth to the portfolio compared to the 1990s and before. Whilst there was only a little over 100 NPO visual arts organisations in 2018, this still exceeds levels from 2002/2003. This figure is not to understate the severe contraction that has taken place but to signal that there is still a significant visual arts infrastructure ensured by NPO status.

In some ways, this is a scenario typical of the initiatives instigated by Theresa May to distribute investment across the country rather than focus on London and the South-East of England. Centrally located NDPBs, such as ACE, have continued to support the regions whilst there simultaneously being aggressive cuts to local authority budgets. A consequence of this is the concentration of political agency and political influence in bodies intrinsically tied to the sitting government's interests. In a parallel policy area, transport, there has been recent controversy regarding the founding of the first sub-national transport authority, Transport for the North. The government intends for the body to drive the strategy of improving transport infrastructure but lacks the power and funding to initiate projects without treasury approval (Gray,

2007). This strategy of long-term, public-private capital projects at least gesturally indicates plans for economic redistribution, but they continue to ignore the crisis at local government level because of savage austerity measures.

Writing in *The Art Newspaper*, James Doeser (2018) refers to the present composition of arts funding as being "an austerity-induced accounting trick". This point is referring to an increasing portion of ACE funding coming from National Lottery, which presently stands at around 20% of the total Lottery Good Causes funding (ibid). Although National Lottery funding has played a vital role in the arts since its introduction in 1994, it has shifted from supporting capital projects to supplementing shortfalls in existing organisations (ibid). Doeser points out that since 2016, ACE followed altered government guidelines "in effect now give[s] ACE enough latitude to spend however it fancies" (ibid). Although some might see this as a progressive move in terms of sustaining arts funding, it raises the question as to the ethics of supplanting arts funding through taxation with a system of gambling.

In 2003, the National Lottery Commission researched the profile of those participating in gambling and found a strong inverse relationship between an individual's level of education and participation in gambling (Bickley, 2009). Furthermore, a survey by the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) showed that past year gambling prevalence, in general, was highest for those from lower supervisory and technical households (75%) (ibid). This situation is problematic as these are social groups that have lower participation in publicly-funded arts and culture provision; however, the perception of the National Lottery tends to be sympathetic, and distinct from for-profit gambling companies and their activities. As Doeser puts it, "[s]ponsorship from the betting companies, Ladbrokes and Coral feels problematic in ways that a grant from ACE or the Heritage Lottery Fund does not. A collective cognitive dissonance has put the lottery into the category of both virtue and vice" (Doeser, 2018).

In March of 2016, the DCMS demonstrated that despite the uncertain funding environment, the government was committed to codifying cultural policy in some way. The *Culture White Paper* (Department for Culture Media & Sport, 2016) was the first since Jennie Lee's in 1965, and the timing meant that if well received it could

calm the fears of the cultural sector. However, the paper contained few initiatives that were not already in some way in use and identified problems that were already a staple of the cultural debate. A notable omission is any developed notion of how an education at a classroom level can complement cultural policy. Arts and humanities subjects have become less central in education with the elevation of STEM subjects, and this is fundamental oversight that hinders the potential to realise the transformative potential of the arts.

Between 2010 and 2018, the number of pupils taking a creative arts subject as a GCSE dropped by 35%, and by 24% at A-Level (Cultural Learning Alliance, 2018), with this drop largely accounted for in state schools and academies, the latter of which is not obliged to provide arts education as a statutory requirement (Jeffreys, 2018). As a sidenote, Ranci re suggests that one impact of schooling as we understand it is "the social reproduction of hierarchy's mystique" (O. Davis, 2020, p. 70). In the UK's education system there has been a clear hierarchisation of subjects – diminishing the political relevance for the arts and humanities across the current population.

The white paper says, "Culture has the potential to transform communities," and that "We will push for new cultural partnerships to include a range of national and local partners" (Department for Culture Media & Sport, 2016). It seems to imply that cultural partnerships will, in fact, be commercial partnerships, in keeping with the general marketisation of cultural policy. Here, again we see the use of relatively benign language – 'partnerships' like 'excellence' implies a neutral position but in fact abstracts a set of policy angles informed by market forces and logics (Hibou, 2017). Although there were voices from opposition political parties, such as Labour, the cogency and clarity of argument made by these opposition groups was strongest when focussed on the very nature of an economic project based on austerity. The arguments in favour of arts and culture funding were somewhat muted compared to those opposing austerity. The Labour party Manifesto of 2017 offered the indication of a focussed opposition arts agenda that would redress the damage done since 2010.

5.3 Labour cultural policy under Ed Miliband and Jeremy Corbyn

Labour, between 2010 and 2015, had not offered any firm indications of alternatives to the policies that typified New Labour, or creative industries focussed Conservative policy. Beyond opposing the severity of the cuts, Labour under Ed Miliband showed "little fundamental difference" from what preceded him (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 199). However, the current discourses in Labour's policies under Jeremy Corbyn suggest a re-engagement with social democratic principles, and this appears to be a more productive environment to develop "cultural policy itself and in other related policy domains, policies that are meaningfully egalitarian" (ibid, 200). The former Shadow Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, (previously Culture, Media and Sport), Tom Watson, indicated that he would examine the impact of austerity and Brexit on the arts as part of an initiative to devolve decision making to local areas (Snow, 2016).

In the lead up to the 2017 general election, Labour's draft manifesto outlined several policy areas that would help to achieve their goal of 'culture for all', with the main policy point being a five-year investment strategy 'Cultural Capital Fund' of £1 billion (The Labour Party, 2017). Although the manifesto does not state that Labour would reverse the cuts to libraries, museums, and gallery budgets, despite suggesting they would in earlier speeches (ibid). However, it did say it would end cuts to these services, suggesting local authorities may have a statutory responsibility to protect cultural assets. Non-partisan positions are included, such as the maintenance of free museum and gallery entry, as is the mention of the link between arts, culture, tourism and the desire to put "put our world-class creative sector at the heart of our negotiations and future industrial strategy" (Hill, 2017). These policy points are suggestive of the relatively broad middle ground cultural policy has occupied under successive governments. However, Labour does have a significant policy focus in its aim to "stop the arts being side-lined from secondary education" (ibid), as has been the case with Conservative promotion of STEM subjects.

Labour's position also partially accounts for the uncertainty surrounding the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union and the separation from supranational funding streams. For example, the manifesto guarantees any shortfall in the EU Structural Funding as a result of Brexit will be covered by a Labour government;

however, Creative Europe, the European Commission's seven-year funding programme for the cultural and creative sectors, is not covered by this guarantee (The Labour Party, 2017). The manifesto also addressed the casualisation of labour in the cultural sector, the precarity of freelance workers and the lack of diversity within cultural workforces (ibid). These points indicate a more nuanced understanding and recognition of some of the ill effects of marketisation. Labour's position suggests that the government cannot address problems facing public-funded galleries through financial measures alone, it requires a reappraisal of the relationship between organisations and their funders, as well as their audiences, artists, and employees.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced some of the critical data that illustrates the changes to arts and culture policy, funding, and how this is indicative of the dynamics of marketisation. Since 2010, the general funding climate, local authority funding and ACE funding have had atypical features and changes, but there has been a general stasis in ACE funding of visual arts organisations, and local authority funding has dropped dramatically. As well as providing evidence for the funding changes and the associated responses from the public arts sector as a whole, this chapter has also demonstrated some of the individual impact felt by galleries in various parts of England. The data and responses from South London Gallery, Nottingham Contemporary and BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, highlight the diverse contexts in which organisations manage economic and political uncertainty.

This chapter continues to critique the nature of contemporary bureaucracies and political agendas with reference to the visual arts. Foucault's concepts of power and knowledge and the genealogy of certain socio-cultural phenomena enables a reading of policy change. Subtle shifts can be understood as significant negotiation or imposition of changing power dynamics. Furthermore, Rancière's notion of the police order and oligarchy highlights how the threats to our shared cultural infrastructure are representative of the lack of radical democratic possibilities in our current systems of governance.

The case studies show clear distinctions in terms of the rate of withdrawal of local authority funding, the scale of NPO funding they receive and the viability of generating revenue through sponsorship and commercial operations. Chapter Six will discuss this latter issue in more detail. A recurring concern for these organisations is also how funding impacts the ability for arts organisations to be engaged in a meaningful way at a local level and not merely representing a national, or government art approximation of what the arts should do, or might do for the localities they inhabit. This point and the ramifications it has for understanding the dynamics of power and capital in England's art world will be explored further in Chapter Seven. Decentralisation - another aspect of marketisation, will frame this discussion.

In Chapter Six and Seven, the thesis will discuss some of the other features of marketisation, such as the increased organisation and sector restructuring, the prevalence of decentralisation and partial privatisation. This chapter has mainly focussed on the political and economic conditions that contributed to various rounds of public sector cuts and the profound impact this had on arts organisations. Not only this, but political actors conducted the Conservative-led fiscal measures alongside a party narrative that suggests we should understand the success and longevity of arts organisations in terms of their economic contribution. This issue also reclassifies the public's nature of engagement with contemporary visual art. This feature is the very elision "of citizen with consumer" (O'Brien, 2015, p. 89) that stands at odds with the perceived values of a free, public arts and culture infrastructure. A discussion of these points across the next two chapters will contribute to an analysis of the intensification of marketisation in the case study organisations and to an extent, the public-funded visual arts sector as a whole. Following this, there will be a discussion of the current and future issues arising from the relationship between arts organisations, their stakeholders, and the wider art world.

Chapter Six: Marketisation and Sponsorship - Prevalence and Problems for NPOs.

6 Introduction

It is only in a literary and artistic field which has achieved a high degree of autonomy [...] that all those who mean to assert themselves as fully fledged members of the world of art, and above all those who claim to occupy the dominant positions in it, will feel the need to manifest their independence with respect to external powers, political or economic.

(Bourdieu, 1996, p. 61)

This chapter will continue the discussion of marketisation developed over the previous chapter (Five). In order to advance this debate over the prevalence and nature of marketisation in cultural policy and public contemporary art galleries, there will be micro and macro analyses of private sponsorship of the arts in England. This discussion will incorporate several perspectives to indicate the variety of positions regarding sponsorship and to position this issue within the context of global political-economic discourses of business, capital, and public policy, as well as specific English contexts. The discussion in this chapter touches on some of the issues of 'autonomy' in the arts introduced in Chapter Three, where the term is shown to be nuanced and contested. In the context of this research, terms like 'autonomy' and 'artistic freedom' are essentially terms others use to describe the relationship between the arts and overlapping political, economic and social fields. Furthermore, the theoretical assessment of political power posited by Rancière and Foucault are explored.

Like the previous chapter, interview responses and data from the case-study organisations (BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, South London Gallery, Nottingham Contemporary) will be used to demonstrate that organisations address the question of sponsorship in several ways. Despite the UK central government promoting it as a primary policy area, it does not necessarily figure so highly in the mechanisms and practices of individual organisations. This chapter will also explore

the consequences of this gap between the primacy of certain policies over organisational concerns. Finally, a recurring question throughout the chapter, and indeed, this entire piece of research, will be, to what extent is this current moment in arts funding problematic and bound to the ideological agenda of Conservative party policy?

The language surrounding sponsorship varies significantly; however, much of the recorded material from government sources evades any notion of a controversy. See, for example, this summary a of England's mixed funding model from the commons select committee concerned with arts funding¹⁰:

The Arts in England are funded through a wide variety of sources, which include earned income, Government subsidy, private donations and business sponsorship. Funding the Arts in this way can be beneficial to artists and arts organisations, as relying on a single funding source can be risky. A variety of funding sources also gives greater artistic freedom and financial flexibility. (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011)

The Culture Media and Sport Committee declare that the presence of private and corporate funding in the arts is not only beneficial but in fact, enhances '*artistic freedom*'. This is a bold claim, delivered in a rather pragmatic and matter-of-fact tone, suggestive of the general perception at a parliamentary level that the benefits of private and corporate funding are not up for debate. This pragmatic tone is disarming to critics of private and corporate funding as it denies that there is a space in which constructive criticisms can circulate at a policy level. This is the case even though there have been numerous, high-profile campaigns aimed at highlighting the concerns with private and corporate interests represented in public spaces.

For example, there has been ongoing controversy over BP's sponsorship of the Tate galleries. BP is a multinational oil and gas company and one of the world's seven oil and gas 'supermajors'. Aside from the discussions of continued fossil fuel use and

¹⁰ The committee was renamed the 'Digital Culture Media and Sport Committee' in 2017, to reflect the change of name to the DCMS. The addition of 'Digital' to the department's name is indicative of the expanded remit of the department and arguably a sharper focus on broadcasting and internet safety.

the impact on global warming, BP's operations have led to several significant environmental disasters in recent years, including the *Deepwater Horizon* oil spill in 2010. In 2015 it was revealed that the BP sponsorship of Tate and its galleries amounted to £3.8 million between 1990 and 2006 – a figure that many considered to be particularly low considering the visibility of BP across the Tate organisation (Rustin & Arnett, 2015). BP claims that its support of the arts and culture emerges from its desire to “bring about a healthier, smarter, more cohesive and happier society, making a difference to people's lives” and supports the British Museum, the National Portrait Gallery, the Royal Opera House, the Royal Shakespeare Company and recently, the Hull UK City of Culture in 2017, in order to achieve this (BP, 2020).

If in this example, we take BP's commitments to the arts at face value, then we make a case for the business and philanthropic endeavours of the corporation to be simultaneous but separate endeavours. Furthermore, BP states, “our long-term commitments ensure that new performances, special events, exhibitions, awards, grants, lectures, and access to works of art can continue to reach an ever-growing audience, bringing art into the public domain in ways that wouldn't otherwise be possible without bp's investment” (BP, 2020). Both of these points are highly contestable, as both assume an equitable and mutual exchange whereby neither the donor nor the art institution compromises their ethical, aesthetic, or operational standards. This chapter will argue that whilst there are different degrees of sponsorship and varying contexts in which it exists, it inevitably impacts the creative freedoms of cultural institutions, artists and subjectifies the exhibition or art engagement experience. Furthermore, the relationships between business and arts organisations are imbalanced and predicated on market interests.

6.1 Why do businesses sponsor the arts?

Here, I will explore some of the reasons for sponsorship, its prevalence and the impact it has on the visual arts sector. BP suggests that business sponsorship of the arts, is motivated by a simple matter of trying to make a “happier society” (BP, 2020); however, we must be cautious of this benign characterisation. Instead, as Jim McGuigan suggests, “arts sponsorship is concerned with fostering an 'enlightened' corporate image for political purposes, particularly if the corporation is vulnerable to

criticism." (McGuigan, 2004, p. 45) Sponsorship, for McGuigan, reverses the presupposed dynamics of the exchange between arts organisations and businesses. Instead of arts organisations *receiving* support (financial, material, infrastructural or otherwise) from businesses, it is a calculated investment or order to serve the PR and marketing interests of that business. To expand on this further, van Maanen states that businesses, "base the selection of what they choose to support on the extent to which the chosen institutions, works or events are able to serve those interests, such as expanding product recognition or company familiarity, positive image-building or reaching particular groups of potential buyers." (van Maanen, 2009, p. 213). In this more expansive version of the sponsorship dynamic, it is clear that businesses see the institutions in receipt of sponsorship as a means to enhance their commercial interests. Not only this, but businesses perceive arts organisations as an extension of the markets businesses operate. It is these issues that distinguish sponsorship from philanthropy, in that sponsorship serves a tangible commercial interest, whereas philanthropy tends to occupy a position once removed from commercial interests; however, the distinction between philanthropy and sponsorship can often be blurry.

David Throsby elucidates this distinction in his book *The Economics of Cultural Policy* (2010). He states:

In considering private support for the arts, it is vital at the outset that we distinguish between sponsorship and philanthropy. [...] a sponsorship deal is a purely commercial transaction, in which the recipient arts organisation gains financial or other benefits, and the sponsoring firm enjoys some advertising or marketing advantage. Philanthropy, on the other hand, refers to donations in cash or kind that are untied as to their use [...] However, the flow of benefit is not entirely one-way; apart from the desire to do good, a philanthropist is also likely to be motivated by the prospect of some tax relief flowing from his or her donation.

(Throsby, 2010, pp. 73-74)

It is worth considering that philanthropy through foundations may not exhibit overt business or commercial interests; they are often intrinsically tied to corporations and

their interests. The Sackler Trust is a prime example of this, and the criticism of the Sackler family's alleged complicity in the US opioid crisis through their ownership of Purdue Pharma has directly impacted the trust's operations. Some high-profile arts organisations, including Tate, have stated that they will not receive any further funds from the trust (Badshah & Walters, 2019; Chrisafis & Walters, 2019; Walters, 2019a, 2019b).

The distinction that Throsby makes between philanthropy and sponsorship is not quite as clear or robust as he might suggest. Instead, one might suggest that sponsorship has supplanted many aspects of philanthropy yet signals a philanthropic motivation rather than business motivation. Statements, such as those made by BP, and organisations concerned with fostering more significant relationships between culture and business demonstrate the blurriness, or mixed messages bound up in the sponsorship debate. As mentioned before, BP claims to sponsor the arts in order to improve society. However, the organisation Arts and Business – an advocate for corporate sponsorship – frames the issue of sponsorship in terms of 'corporate affairs'. This includes marketing, enhanced corporate image, entertaining clients and crucially, direct access to a target market (Badshah & Walters, 2019; Chrisafis & Walters, 2019; Walters, 2019a, 2019b). The guidelines from Art and Business are suggestive of a trend over the past 30 years in England, whereby the relationship between arts organisations and corporate sponsorship has favoured business interests over artistic interests. The role of the central government and cultural policy has been a vital guarantor of this imbalance since the 1970s.

The relationship between sponsors, philanthropists and the arts can be interpreted through a Foucauldian notion of power. Power produces different types of knowledge, which in turn is imprinted on one's activities. The accumulation of this knowledge has the cyclical effect of reinforcing the exercise of power. Harnessing the hierarchical nature of material and artistic culture is a means of consolidating further power by being an arbiter of the knowledge producing and being produced through cultural activities. Although there are many features of the visual arts in the cultural sector that are laudable, we must not ignore the disciplinary power at play. The visual arts have and are conditioned through the infrastructure, funding cycles and professional behaviours now seen as intrinsic to the very notion of culture.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Private funding and marketisation is in many senses an extension of this, but it is also transformative and presents conditioning factors which enter into the realm of coercion.

It is important that the relationship between public organisations and private funders is not excluded from a discussion regarding bureaucracy. Indeed, one important fiction to acknowledge is the notion that public administration is the only perpetrator of excessive bureaucratic processes. Instead, the abstraction of any boundary between public and private interest is symptomatic of what Hibou calls “neoliberal bureaucratization” (Hibou, 2017, p. 204) and is a contemporary iteration of the dynamics of knowledge, power and biopolitics explored by Foucault (ibid). Hibou states that it is “diffuse, dispersed, and often elusive. It is not an administrative arrangement, nor is it an institution or an administration, let alone an organizational structure. It is a social form of power” (ibid). Here is an important point – while we can and do discuss the phenomena of marketisation in the arts in relation to political and administrative phenomena, it is always an exploration of the forms of power exercised in contemporary society and how this manifests or distorts knowledge.

Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA)

The call for businesses to support the arts has been a feature of arts funding for several decades, but a number of commentators point to the 1970s and particularly the founding of the Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA) in 1976 under the then Labour Government (Arts & Business, 2009). This organisation introduced formal structures to facilitate the interaction between cultural organisations and prospective corporate funders. The Labour Government funded the organisation amid cuts to public expenditure in the mid-1970s and as a consequence “ABSA could, in this light, be seen as a mechanism for the substitution of public expenditure by private expenditure” (Gray, 2000, p. 119). It is clear then that a significant reason business has sponsored the arts in England is because of direct efforts from the central government to instil corporate cultures of 'giving'. This rise of business sponsorship of the arts in the UK has been significant since the Labour Government founded ABSA in 1976.

Art and Business, the iteration of ABSA currently functioning, claims that “business sponsorship of the arts in the UK increased between 1976 and 2009 from £600,000 per year to £686 million per year” (Arts and Business, 2015 in Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015, p. 81). Many national museums and galleries also set up their dedicated fundraising departments, setting a precedent for the professional composition of cultural organisations (Mirza, 2012, p. 45). Whilst this might be seen as a success in terms of diversifying the funding ecology in the UK, Chin-Tao Wu in her book *Privatising Culture – Corporate Art Intervention since the 1980s* (Wu, 2003), suggests that this development is representative of a broader ideological programme aimed at significantly reducing the public sector. The stringent liberalisation and then aggressive neoliberalism that followed under Reagan and Thatcher expanded the influence of business into the public sector, and some Conservatives even called for the abolition of the Arts Council in order to usher in a business-led model of arts funding (Wu, 2003). We can hear echoes of these debates in recent Conservative discourses on arts funding, such as the recommendations made by Ed Vaizey (2009) mentioned in [Chapter Five](#).

We could say that the changing relationship between the arts and business mirrors broader societal changes. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, public institutions were privatised, or part-privatised and organisations that remained within public ownership or administration were and are "often required to follow the same operating principles as private enterprises" (Alexander et al., 2018a, p. viii). Although there have been similar shifts in education, healthcare and welfare in the UK, visual arts remain somewhat of an outlier to these statutory provisions. The arts have longstanding proximity to markets in terms of the art market or luxury goods markets; furthermore, the arts are intrinsically bound to philosophical and aesthetic notions that stand in stark contrast to the language of policy and measurement. As Alexander et al. (2018a) say, “[o]wing to changes such as marketization and managerialism, individual creators and arts institutions must consider the production and display of works as part of a larger commercial whole, considering sponsorship, market attractiveness, and ancillary products, along with (or in some cases, instead of) aesthetic excellence” (viii). Alexander et al. may differ here slightly Hibou’s (2017) reading of excellence. The former refers to aesthetic excellence whereas the latter discusses is in terms of quality and price – whereas aesthetic excellence might be

redeemable within the arts, the excellence Hibou speaks of is stripped of any such pretensions.

We should not view the rise in business sponsorship of the arts, as published by Arts and Business, in isolation of the public funding contexts it sits beside. Decreased public funding and increased private funding has a vastly different impact on the dynamics of power and influence in the art world(s) than a situation where public funding is stable. The previous chapter indicated the shortfalls in public funding and the need for arts organisations to fill significant funding gaps. In this context, it is reasonable to suggest during a healthy period of public funding; there is less pressure to pursue specific private funding arrangements. It is in this manner that Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015a, 2015b), in their discussion of New Labour's cultural policy and whether we might consider New Labour's policies as 'neoliberal', suggest that one should draw clear distinctions between the funding contexts before and after 2008.

For example, Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015a, 2015b) state that "while no government would have maintained public expenditure at pre-2008 levels following the global financial crisis" (2015b, p. 110), the severity of the cuts to various public services, including the sharp decline in local government funding, marks the period under the post-2010 Coalition government in sharp contrast to the financial commitment to arts and culture under New Labour. They suggest that this demonstrates that whilst there are incontrovertible examples of the marketisation of cultural policy and cultural infrastructure under New Labour, "the UK is currently experiencing a rather different version of neo-liberalism" (ibid, p. 110). Furthermore, the authors go on to say that, "arguments over public funding from general taxation versus corporate sponsorship ultimately do matter – perhaps more than disputes over the meaning of words and phrases such as 'neo-liberal'" (ibid, p. 110). This point is vital, in that it suggests that critiques of the infiltration of market forces, private-sector practices and corporate governance into public art spaces can tend to move away from the realities of this phenomena and towards a discussion over the appropriate terminology(ies) of it.

However, we must acknowledge that an exploration of marketisation is often, at least notionally, a tangential discussion of neoliberalism. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter

Two, the malleable usage of the term does not preclude a contained, operational definition that acknowledges both a progression of visible socioeconomic policies throughout the 20th and 21st centuries and an ideological framework codified in party political discourse, corporate practices and inequalities produced within and between nations. Victoria D. Alexander and her co-authors in *Art and the Challenge of Markets Volume 2* (Alexander et al., 2018b) assert that "the neoliberal ideology of recent governments is embedded" in UK cultural policy and that this has produced an "enterprise culture in the arts" (86). Although some might consider this enterprise as a social enterprise, it nonetheless indicates that the relationships shaping arts and culture have changed since the 1980s with the governments since 2010, encouraging the increased presence of business interests.

In **Figure 6.1**, there is a clear, recent spike in the amount of business sponsorship entering the arts. These figures represent business sponsorship of NPO visual arts organisations and exclude national institutions, such as Tate. As the chart indicates, there is a noticeable drop in the years following the 2008 global financial crisis, as businesses, as well as governments, responded to economic uncertainty.




Figure 6.1 NPO Sponsorship income chart

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2008-2017. See Appendix F.

The graph shows relatively modest levels of sponsorship, with the total value of sponsorship per-year over a seven-year period fluctuating between £2.5 and £5 million. The dramatic rise to nearly £10 million in 2016-2017 is suggestive of arts organisations' decision to focus professional resources on the attainment of sponsorship. There was some gradual, but by no means stable, increase, from 2010 onwards and from 2015/16 a sharp increase in the value of sponsorship in visual arts NPOs. One could argue that the sponsorship trend shown in **Figure 6.1** represents a 'success' of the mixed-funding model; private sponsorship fills the gap left by reduced LA funding. However, the national picture shown here is by no means representative of organisations' shared fortunes regarding the increase in sponsorship funding. This chapter establishes the highly stratified nature of sponsorship and argues against its adoption by the cultural sector because of the compromising effect on the production, display and reception of art and also due to the fact that sponsorship does not offer the much sought after 'resilience' and 'sustainability' that mixed-funding claims to provide.

This development manifests itself subtly as there are not headline statistics to detail the nature of sponsorship, rather, arts organisations need only declare that it exists and the value of it. The drawn-out process in discovering the details of Tate's relationship with BP called into question notions of transparency and accountability in public institutions with close ties to businesses. As Alexander et al. (Alexander et al., 2018b) suggest, "[a]rts organizations seek funding (government grants, match-fund-leveraged sponsorship, and corporate and individual philanthropy). But in doing so, they are forced to accept a bargain and must trade their autonomy for a neoliberal frame of reference. The benefits of funding come with a high price" (86).

The issue of autonomy, or specifically, the ability to self-determine organisational identity and associated activities, alluded to here is a vital issue that commentators express in several ways. The beginning of this chapter included a quote from a report by the Culture Media and Sport Committee, where they suggest that mixed funding, including business sponsorship, can enhance creative freedom. However, as Alexander et al. (Alexander et al., 2018b) says, creative freedom or autonomy is, in fact, something that organisations must exchange in order to gain access to both public and private sources of funding. It is this exchange that which prompts consideration of Bourdieu's Field Theory and apply it to the subfield, NPO visual arts in England, under scrutiny in this research. Chapter Two discusses the constituent parts of Bourdieu's Field Theory and its application to the study of visual arts fields - in this chapter the intention is to identify the mechanisms and structure of a subfield in relation to the primary case studies and their sources of private funding.

As Bourdieu states in *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field* (1996), "the threats to autonomy result from the increasingly greater interpenetration between the world of art and the world of money. I am thinking of new forms of sponsorship, of new alliances being established between certain economic enterprises" and he draws comparison to the world of art and that of education where there has been "the creation of educational institutions directly subordinated to business" (344-355). Bourdieu's references here are from German and French contexts, but there are clear parallels with the discussion of English and UK contexts. However, as Hesmondhalgh asserts, Bourdieu's concern here is with the

world of literature and the arts, "rather than the media and cultural industries" (Hesmondhalgh, 2006, p. 221), and as such, will not extend into a broader discussion of the visual arts and the cultural industries.

Sponsorship is undoubtedly a concern if we follow Bourdieu's theory of artistic autonomy. However, the practices and comments of many institutions and leading figures in the world of visual art in England suggest that this is not as great a concern, in theory, or practice. What will follow is a discussion of how arts organisations in England, including the case studies explored throughout this research, can be seen to either embrace or reject sponsorship and the implicit question of the importance of the "interpenetration between the world of art and the world of money" (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 344).

6.2 Sponsorship of public art organisations in England

So far, this chapter has introduced several mechanisms, policy incentives and socio-political contexts that have led to business sponsorship of the arts. It has also offered an overview of some of the critiques of this component of arts funding. At this point, it is vital to introduce voices from within the subfield discussed here, particularly those who advocate sponsorship, embrace it, or at the very least, downplay the detrimental impact it might have. This discussion will include responses from the case study interview, as well as responses from the wider sector. Where appropriate, the discussion will give some further historical context to demonstrate how actors and commentators broached the subject in various places and periods.

One vocal and prominent supporter of sponsorship in the arts is John Tusa, the former managing director of the Barbican Arts Centre, London. In his book *Engaged with the Arts* (Tusa, 2007), Tusa makes a direct defence of the role of business sponsorship of the arts but also makes the somewhat sweeping claim that behind the criticisms of the interpellation of business interests in the arts lurk "a deep and shoddy vein of sheer snobbery" (ibid, p. 75). Tusa goes on to suggest that the criticisms of business sponsorship seem to circulate as a subtext to the practical machinations of sponsorship and funding. He says, "these submerged private prejudices are never admitted, never acknowledged, never explored or justified in

public. But they exist and confuse the whole debate about the private and public funding of the arts" (ibid, p. 76). The beginning of this chapter has presented several ways in which the criticisms of business sponsorship *have* played out in public, whether it be through journalism, artistic responses, or academic inquiry. Tusa's point here seems to tread a well-worn path and an a-critical defence, where he dismisses criticisms of capital as woolly, esoteric theory – a form of escapism for 'fellow travellers'.

To reiterate, business sponsorship is a means of affecting public opinion and the use of artistic spaces to fulfil the marketing and PR objectives of for-profit enterprise is hardly a conflict that is private or abstracted. After stating that sponsorship is benign, enlightened and does not represent the exercise of ego by donors, corporations, Tusa then has the temerity to say, "[o]f course, some donors do want naming rights, especially in connection with big capital gifts. It is hard to see this as an impossible or unreasonable part of the deal" (Tusa, 2007, p. 76). Quite how Tusa reconciles these positions is difficult to comprehend. Tusa uses examples from theatre and classical music as an example of the positive effect of sponsorship ('Jerwood Hall at the UBS LSO St Luke's Education Centre', for example) he does seem to ignore the dynamics and demonstration of power and capital inherent in renaming or naming rights.

A recent example of this perception of sponsorship came from former ACE chairperson, Prof Christopher Frayling. Reacting to news in 2019 that a number of cultural organisations were severing ties with The Sackler Trust, Frayling stated "I'm worried that it'll lead to a sort of moral panic in the arts world where lines are drawn" and that "I think it is one of the iron rules of fundraising that companies with an image problem are the people you go to first of all because they're the ones who have some ground to make up" whilst also suggesting the arts "have to accept that some of these companies smell a bit and isn't it great that they are giving their money to the arts rather than to anything else" (Perraudin & Neate, 2019). What is remarkable about this statement is quite how blasé Frayling is about the ethics of sponsorship; that the most unscrupulous donors are often the most lucrative. Given Frayling's stance in the arts sector, his comments may compound the lack of faith that many arts organisations have with national policymakers. Figures like Munro highlight the

gap between centralised policymakers and regional concerns. Although sponsorship in itself is not new, I would suggest the reaction to the Sackler issue demonstrates that whilst the very notion of sponsorship is not outright rejected by the arts sector, there are limits to what it will permit to be associated with. Whilst figures such as Rancière see localised acts of resistance being consistent and imperative to emancipatory politics and his formulation of power, Foucault is a little more ambiguous. Pickett (1996) criticises the absence of moral or ethical consideration in the challenge to power. Although I do not fully agree with Pickett's characterisation, I agree that with issues such as sponsorship there is a dual resistance and counter resistance at play – on the one hand public arts organisations will seek and receive private money, on the other hand, there is a sectoral moral and ethical compass, articulated in some, but not all, situations.

However, another recent example sponsorship controversy, or lack of, relates to Tate Modern and the renaming of the new wing, previously known as 'Switch House', as the 'Blavatnik Building'. In this case, the country's leading public modern and contemporary art gallery shows a remarkable vacuum of ethical sensibility, which in turn, sets a nauseating precedent regarding what is knowable and sayable when it comes to sponsorship. The new Tate wing now bears the name of the wealthy donor Len Blavatnik, and the one-time richest man in the UK made a substantial part of his fortune through the petrochemicals industry, finance and the privatisation of state assets and industry in Russia (Ellis-Petersen, 2017b). Critics accuse him of being an associate of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was implicated in the Mueller Report and has made significant contributions to Republican and Democrat political campaigns in the US, including a \$1 million contribution to Donald Trump's inauguration committee. This association led to resignations at the University of Oxford, where Blavatnik had funded a new school of governance (ibid). The question of academic freedom was fundamental to the debate over the ethics of accepting funds and valorising figures such as Blavatnik; the same debate was somewhat absent from figures within the Tate organisation. Blavatnik is an apt example of the overlapping political powers of elected officials, public organisations and private business. Sponsorship and the dynamics of power inherent to it suggest the "increasing ubiquity of market and business norms, the formalization of a government at a distance, and the intensification of a specific kind

of operations of abstraction" (Hibou, 2017, p. 204). Further to this, the repeated claim that the political Right facilitate deregulation is a fiction which enhances marketisation. As Davis (2020, p. 62) points out, neoliberal hegemonic governance is in fact underwritten and codified in minute detail.

To give another example, albeit one somewhat removed from this debate, is the renaming of stadia of sports venues. Although these spaces are fundamentally different, to say, galleries, it is not beyond reason to suggest that the efforts of ACE, public gallery trustees, directors and local government, is to have arts and culture as ingrained in the fabric of cities, towns and other environments, like other aspects of social life. When Mike Ashley, the owner of Newcastle United Football Club and sports retailer 'Sports Direct', renamed St James' Park to the 'Sports Direct Arena' as part of a self-serving sponsorship deal, the football media and fan groups expressed palpable disgust for this move. David Conn said the 'rebranding' signalled that "another sliver of football's soul has been lost" (2011) lamenting that this name change incontrovertibly tarnished a site that is "an evocative, historic and wonderfully located football ground, [...] Newcastle United's home for 119 years" (ibid). The point here is that the names of public spaces or places relevant to collective histories and imagination, hold deep significance for how a locality or society engages with or perceives that space. Of course, the comparison between football and art might be blunt; if we conceive the parallel as spaces with a highly invested public interest, the two might coalesce. Although we should not take Tusa's views to represent the sector as a whole, responses from the case study interviews suggest a wariness of the subject.

6.2.1 Case Study Organisations

All the case studies researched in this project received some degree of sponsorship within the parameters of this study. However, the degree of sponsorship varied greatly, as did access to potential sponsors. For the case study organisations, there were concerns about the role sponsorship played and how organisations might pursue private funding. However, a more fundamental concern was how the pressure from central government to replace public funds with private funds would exacerbate inequalities in the public art infrastructure. This chapter has discussed the notion of sponsorship in terms of totality, rather than by degrees. Sponsorship at

Tate Modern elicits different discussions from say sponsorship at a regional museum or gallery. Not only is sponsorship unequal across the arts, but it does not provide the financial flexibility the Culture Media and Sport Committee claims (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011).

In **Figure 6.2** we can see that the sponsorship income of the five case study organisations¹¹ is highly variable, with only BALTIC demonstrating a relatively robust and consistent flow of sponsorship income. The ten-year period covered in the graph shows sponsorship to be inconsistent income for many organisations, not only this, but it provides negligible relief from the financial pressures from LA cuts. Another characteristic of the revenue from sponsorship in these five organisations is that there are spikes in sponsorship, often linked to specific exhibitions or projects, which yield significant visibility or coverage. For example, we may be able to attribute the spike in sponsorship income for the South London Gallery in 2011/2012, and 2012/2013 to the launch of the 'SLG Local' project which was sponsored by Bloomberg¹² (SLG, 2019). A feature that is also visible is that most organisations saw some increase in 2015-2017, similar to the general trend seen in the cumulative sponsorship income of visual arts NPOs illustrated in **Figure 6.1**.

¹¹ It should be noted that Nottingham Contemporary (2009) and The Hepworth Wakefield (2011) opened within the range of time covered by this chart and as a result, their income will be significantly limited before these dates.

¹² Bloomberg is the philanthropic foundation funded by Michael Bloomberg – a businessperson and former mayor of New York, he made his fortune in the financial sector, developing analytics and equity trading software)




Figure 6.2 Case study Sponsorship income

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017. See Appendix D.

There are also indications of the varying success in developing sponsorship income amongst similarly sized organisations. **Figure 6.2** show that some organisations, such as mima, Nottingham Contemporary having zero sponsorship income in some years.

Responses from the case study interviews indicate a sense that changing funding conditions arise from a combination of reduced public subsidy and pressure to seek diversified revenue. For example, Heller of South London Gallery stated that an issue in the current policy climate is "the amount of time and resource that is dedicated to raising funds from alternative sources... and that that does obviously shape the way that you approach the organisation" (2018, pers. comm.). Munro, of BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, echoes this point, but she places this within a more extensive, gradual change over many decades. She says, "going on for almost 20 years now, was this sense that we are businesses that have to generate their

own income and almost this increased role of the commercial" (2018, pers. comm.). Munro goes on to say that the arts sector should treat the commercial aspects of galleries with caution and with a clear understanding of the potential ramifications for how public galleries include or exclude audiences. She says, "so, you've got this really interesting tension because that puts pressure on us to generate more income and generating more income can be done at the exclusion of actually those that need us, or that we have a different responsibility to because that fiscal environment is totally changing for our constituents" (ibid).

The responses from Heller and Munro highlight the organisational pressures that the drive to diversify funding creates. The case studies discussed here and the broader concerns of the sector point to a fundamental opposition to sponsorship as a means of filling the gap left by shrinking subsidy. One issue that is visible in **Figure 6.2**, and that McGuigan highlights, is that simply, "you cannot rely on it" (2016, p. 192).

McGuigan quotes Philips and Whannel whose 2013 book *The Trojan Horse: The Growth of Commercial Sponsorship*, outlines the emergence and consolidation of sponsorship as a significant component of cultural funding. They say:

Sponsorship is an unstable form of funding and can appear and disappear as a result of commercial decisions which have no relation to the benefit of the public in the long-term future of the sponsored events or institutions. Income from sponsorship is not subject to planning or policy and dependence on sponsorship makes any long-term planning difficult, as sponsorship arrangements tend to last only 2 or 3 years.

(Phillips and Whannel, 2013 in McGuigan, 2016, p. 192)

This point highlights the precarious position that overreliance on sponsorship can create. It tends to create short-term, disjointed income streams which may or may not have certain conditions and stipulations attached to it and what additional benefits the commercial sponsor might garner from the transaction. McGuigan also suggests that the critique of commercial sponsorship as a component of cultural funding is distinguishable from the organisations that seek it. This research positions sponsorship firmly within the context of reduced public funding in the arts and government pressure to pursue private partnerships. Therefore, the measures taken

by arts organisations to navigate these exogenous forces are often, though not always, reactionary.

McGuigan says that it is “fruitless to complain simply about the commodification of art, which in itself is not inherently at fault, but it is reasonable to critique the absolute reduction of cultural value to economic value” (2016, p. 184) and in the context of commercial sponsorship and the philanthropic foundations, it is crucial to make abundantly clear the damage that a concession of independence to the commercial sphere creates. As McGuigan puts it, sponsorship in its various forms has “contributed greatly to capitalism’s overwhelming colonisation of cultural practice” (ibid). This act of colonisation in a public context, of course, relies on organisations developing transactional relationships with private funders and in this sense, they reinforce and grant this colonisation.

Rancière talks less in terms of colonisation but there is a strong parallel between the forces of power McGuigan describes and the system of distribution known to Rancière as “the police”. Rancière uses the phrase “police order” to refer to hierarchical social order – this hierarchy may exist in explicit legal terms, such as a local or national police force, or it may exist in socio-cultural terms, such as in highly selective schools and universities. “Policing” refers to policy-making – but also the wider machinations of official and unofficial decision-making and enforcement. (Chambers, 2010). The relevance to this concept of power and governance to the subject of this thesis is as follows: what we might view as politics is actually policing. If public-funded galleries are a representation of contemporary politics, both positive and negative, then they are also a manifestation of the police order.

However, the degree to which this occurs can vary greatly, and organisations can still scrutinise their existing and potential relationships with funders and consequentially be selective. Furthermore, organisations can actively resist the commercial sponsorship conditions they find themselves in. In order to assess the commercial sponsorship as a composite part of cultural funding, it is also important to assess how cultural organisations adopt commercially minded approaches. In order to do this, this section will discuss how the three primary case studies either embrace or resist sponsorship.

6.3 Do public art organisations in England embrace sponsorship?

The responses to the question of sponsorship showed varying ways in which the case study organisations developed a mixed funding model. One approach shared by both Nottingham Contemporary and BALTIC is to focus on garnering support from a wide range of smaller, local businesses rather than larger, arguably more commercial, funding options that organisations such as Tate pursue. Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) stated that "one thing I did was to start a gala dinner in 2017, which we are planning to do every two years to raise funds for the programme". This, he suggests, is a departure from the more conventional methods in the UK of developing a network of donors. He said that the gala dinner is, "an explicitly New York model. We honour an artist; there is an auction, there's dinner for 150 people, and that raised a substantial, I mean, that allowed us to break even this year. And we'll do that every two years. Yeah, and I think to my knowledge we're probably the first outside of London who started that." In this sense, what Thorne has adopted is not strictly a sponsorship transaction, but it does rely on similar transactional principles, whereby one can exchange economic capital for social and cultural capital (to use Bourdieu's terminology).

The event Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) described had in attendance "150 [people], about half were from Nottingham, half were from elsewhere. And it was ten auction lots, and we honoured Glenn Ligon who'd had an exhibition here a few years before". This format relies on a shared focus for those in attendance and a sense of occasion, or prestige, provided by the gallery itself and exclusivity of the gala dinner format. For these reasons, we might say that this kind of event mitigates the potential for private funding to impact on aesthetic or programme decisions (although an argument could be made for a more cynical programming approach to attract a more pliable audience). However, there is a clear barrier to this being a replicable and reliable format for other organisations who may be one of several arts organisations in a city or region.

At South London Gallery, Heller indicated that part of the nature of sponsorship in their recent experience was to facilitate the gallery's expansion. An anonymous

benefactor donated the new building of the gallery, housed in a Victorian fire station, to South London Gallery in 2014. The site partially opened in 2016 with the exhibition *Under the Same Sun*, and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation supported it. However, as Heller (2018, pers. comm.) stated, the "Fire Station had been given to us but was derelict and not fit for use, and so I then negotiated separately with UBS [a Swiss bank] to fund making that ground floor space safe, so that we could then show the exhibition across both spaces [the main gallery and the fire station]." In this instance, the support from UBS and the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation acted differently; the first paid for structural costs and the latter for exhibition costs. Importantly, as Heller asserted, "it was a fantastic opportunity to be able to test out those things which we simply would not have been able to do without external funding" (2018, pers. comm.). This kind of sponsorship can be seen as part of a trend of smaller, one-off financial support, without any long-term implications in terms of the naming rights of buildings, exhibition spaces, education resources and so on. Although this commercial presence appears to be relatively benign, we should view it within a constellation of other examples to indicate the pervasiveness of this practice and its inherent problems.

For example, earlier this chapter mentioned Michael Bloomberg, who through his foundation, was a supporter of SLG's programme and SLG also hosted the *New Contemporaries* exhibition in 2018, which showcases new and emerging artistic talent. Bloomberg has sponsored it since 2000. Through individuals such as Bloomberg, or ostensibly philanthropic foundations, such as his own, and commercial enterprises, such as UBS, it is clear that the financial security public galleries can establish through private support is patchy and irregular. However, the presence of private interests in public space is nearly ubiquitous, and with that, there are considerable concerns about how the public and private interact, and the nature of that power dynamic.

To return to Rancière's understanding of the police order, he asserts that it is "an order of the visible and the sayable" (2004, p. 29). As we have seen, the interests of private funders are not benign and their interaction with the arts and culture cultivates a space to control what is 'visible' and 'sayable', about both themselves and the cultural forms they have invested in. If we think about the cultural sector's startlingly

narrow demographic when it comes to figures in leadership roles (see *Equality Analysis: Development of Arts Council England's 10-year strategy, 2020-30*, 2018 for details of sector demographics), and the correlation of wealth, class and nationality, we can begin to see how a cultural sector dominated by private wealth is also a cultural sector dominated by the same social or class interests. As Chambers (2010, p. 61) describes, position and status in the police order is dependent on being intelligible within it. The social dynamics of sponsorship and philanthropy in the arts is predicated on a shared intelligibility between a commercial and aesthetic sphere. The coding of this intelligibility is socio-culturally exclusive, following and exacerbating existing hierarchies, making voices unintelligible, making people invisible.

In *Neoliberal Culture* (2016) Jim McGuigan highlights Charles Saatchi as an example of how wealthy individuals translate financial power into other spheres of influence. The issue is not merely that he made a considerable profit from his art world transactions; instead, it is the excessive power he was able to wield. McGuigan refers to a study of Saatchi¹³ and his position within the cultural field and suggests that his "power is threefold: first, economic; second, ideological/political; third, aesthetic/cultural/semiotic" (Hatton and Walker in McGuigan, 2016, p. 64) at a time when "public sector institutions in the cultural field were required to rely much more on the private sector through sponsorship and to be more business like generally" (McGuigan, 2016, p. 64) and this does, in fact, bear a striking resemblance to the "wholesale corporate takeover of culture" seen in the USA (ibid). Although Saatchi may be an extreme example, he represents the connection between commercial interests and aesthetic judgements and preferences. This can occur through dominating an art market, as Saatchi did, or a more incremental 'colonisation'. How this colonisation occurs can take several forms, as the previous examples suggested, but there are clear, recent examples of prominent commercial sponsors using their financial position to impact what galleries show. For example, the Tate Modern had a controversial deal with UBS to support the rehang on the Tate collection in 2006. This deal included the stipulation that there would be a special

¹³ Saatchi does have a historical connection to the South London Gallery as the gallery was the site of several significant exhibitions of YBA artists during the mid-1990s. This period is considered a foundational time for the gallery's development as a vital contemporary art venue. SLG's connection to this continues through the proximity of figures such as Matthew Soltover, the co-founder of *Frieze* magazine, and a board member SLG.

exhibition of UBS's collection of photographs, which would "be expected to grow in value as a result of such exposure" (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015, p. 83), but there were no clear indications of the scale or nature of the donation, similar to other sponsorship deals (ibid). This is reiterated by Grenfell and Hardy to state that "from the start, social controversy, fuelled by active press engagement, industrial sponsorship and high levels of public participation, were features of the Tate's functioning within the cultural field" (2007, p. 88). This is a clear example of the willingness of sponsors to affect the gallery space and to promote their image alongside potential avenues for commercial gain. Of course, not all arts organisations would be comfortable or capable of entering into such an arrangement. However, this example sets a clear precedent for public and private relationships in the arts, particularly as Tate Modern holds considerable influence in the English cultural field.

There are further examples given by Hesmondhalgh et al. (2015b). They say we might summarise the tone of the sector's response to the rise in sponsorship with a 2001 article in an economically liberal, politically conservative newspaper, *The Economist*, that said "what was off limits yesterday can become tomorrow's norm" (The Economist, 2001, p. 90 in Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015b, p. 84). Corporate intervention through sponsorship, aggressive marketing or similar transactional relationships are "part of a broader problem of commercialisation and commodification in the arts, including the increasing presence of businesspeople on boards, and an increasing reliance on revenue from cafés, museum shops and so on to supplement other sources of income" (ibid). However, it is reasonable to suggest that whilst we can think of these practices as examples of commercialisation, or as this research suggests, marketised organisational practice, the opaqueness of corporate sponsorship is a starkly different prospect to the rise of shops and cafés in public galleries.

One way we might articulate this difference is to frame the competition for sponsorship against the competition that a gallery-based café or shop faces locally or on-line. The gallery-based café or shop has tended to position itself in opposition to the high street, with an offer that is unique and supports the activities of that gallery. Sponsorship and philanthropy, by contrast, positions galleries and cultural

organisations against one another. This is an issue highlighted by Munro (2018, pers. comm.) at BALTIC. She says, "[t]he issue with the philanthropy thing is going to be increasing. I think it's very much like the American model. When I spoke to a lot of quite radical museum colleagues in the States, there are things that can work about it, and there are things that are deeply problematic about it. The difficulty is, what I most dislike, is that we're forced into competition for it". Munro identifies an evident anxiety shared by herself and international colleagues which is suggestive of the adverse conditions market forces create in a sector that has, at least in a UK context, promoted competition over collaboration.

The additional concern for a large institution like BALTIC is that they find themselves competing locally, nationally, and internationally should they aggressively pursue potential sponsorship. This is a condition of the 'superstar' museum, or to phrase it another way, prominent regional galleries with a robust international outlook. As Frey points out, their reference point shifts from other museums in the city or region to other superstar museums. "Whilst there has always been a feeling of tacit competition between the directors and administrators of major museums with respect to art, there is now direct competition between the superstars extending over a much broader area, including visitors, commercial activities and sponsors" (2000, pp. 57-58). A discernible shift that has occurred since Frey was writing in 2000 is that the tacit competition has mutated into an acute, implicit competition.

Munro (2018, pers. comm.) also identifies this implicit competition is increasing and with it an additional level of bureaucracy. She says, "if someone is super-rich and they want to give an institution some money, just go and give them it! What I really object to its being forced into situations where we have to compete for it, and I think that's going to increase." She goes on to say that "I think what's important for those sorts of situations is that there's real clarity, in terms of ethical policies, that there's clarity about what your staff think about it, what your audiences feel about it, what does your board think about it". There is evident concern about the opaqueness that surrounds corporate sponsorship as well as a rebuke of the processes it elicits. A criticism of applications for public funds and the reports required for a successful organisation is that they create a substantial administrative task that can be an

additional squeeze on resources. Sponsorship, rather than limiting this issue can, in fact, exacerbate it.

Munro (2018, pers. comm.) proposes an alternative which aims to develop a highly localised approach at securing private support, albeit in a manner quite different from Nottingham Contemporary. BALTIC has developed a patron scheme based on "quite small amounts, very small local business, there's a car and van hire, it's small businesses. They genuinely, really want BALTIC, they want you in the region, they can see the impact of what you're doing" (ibid). This approach is localised and personalised, but rather than using a format such as a gala dinner which arguably seeks to simulate the elite, socialite relationship with the cultural field, it appeals to a sense of local pride and identity. This is not a retreat from an international outlook, but an attempt to reposition the gallery in the context of other organisations, commercial or otherwise. She says, "up here [the North East of England] we don't have the philanthropists with lots of cash, but what we do have is people that really keenly wants to be part of the story because they want to be part of that broader shared social vision and that's something that is great and is quite empowering, and I'm all for collaborating with all sorts of different people" (ibid).

Rancière would undoubtedly be sceptical of this comment, as it reflects the liberal misinterpretation that by working with others, we produce a version of democratic governance. Rancière would say this is not democracy, simply another guise of oligarchy. Resistance and a concerted deliberate invocation of *dissensus* is one step of a continuous process of agitating for democracy based on presupposed equality. For galleries, there should not be an imperative to hand over power to the breadth of communities and activities otherwise invisible to the police order, it is to act as if these communities are equals, not subjects. One of the great obstacles to breaking from the performative aspects of 'democracy' articulated in its liberal guise, or oligarchy, is that the status and position of actors is deeply entrenched through the cultural capital they possess.

Within the context of the arts this takes the form of knowledge borne from culturally dependent upbringing and education, but it is also coded through language, lifestyle, clothing, consumption and so much more. Whilst this is not specific to the sector, it

also makes clear the size of the gap between the visible and invisible and how the consolidation of a professional identity through shared cultural capital is and will remain to be, exclusionary. Cultural capital can take different forms and Bourdieu identified *objectified* cultural capital as one form. If we think of a public space, such as a gallery, as objectified cultural capital, can we say that its objecthood and materiality is truly public or representative of various publics? I would say no, it remains a manifestation of the police order and oligarchy. A cynical extension of this point, which Rancière calls stultification, was initially deployed to critique Bourdieu's approach, citing the exclusion of the disenfranchised as a necessary condition for the status of the sociologist. I do not follow Rancière to this end, as I do not think that the making, circulation and interpretation of visual art in a public context is *dependent* on hierarchical exclusion. However, at this present moment this is undoubtedly a feature of the sector.

However, the question remains, how do the arts encourage different types of participation and support? I differ with Hibou slightly on this point as the dynamics of power are markedly different depending on one's navigation of market bureaucracies and the allowances these bureaucracies deliver. She says "the hierarchical exercise of authority, and the obligation to comply with orders coming from a certain outside (that are given as if from on high) is, to a great extent, replaced by *incentives*" (Hibou, 2017, p. 211). I'd suggest the hierarchical exercise of authority is ever-present in the current bureaucracies responsible for the arts in England. The incentives exist for external private funders and patrons of the arts, even if these are not readily taken up outside of certain prestigious locations. Therefore, the power dynamics in these bureaucracies is both flawed and unequal.

This issue of sponsorship also raises questions as to the conflicting professional responsibilities of those working in the arts sector. As Oliver Davis says, "Marketisation – seeing as and governing as if the world were a set of markets – requires 'new breeds of expert coach, regulator, risk manager, strategist, guru' who are 'able to represent the world in numerical hierarchies of relative worth' and who thereby 'construct and help navigate a world of constant, overlapping competitions'" (2020, p. 63). The issue of sponsorship further prioritises these professional

registers, transfiguring arts organisations into extensions of marketised bureaucracies.

The examples and responses that are given here offer some consideration as to how organisations navigate the issue of sponsorship and philanthropy but also elucidates how the museum and gallery continue to be a:

site of field transactions where economic capital from the field of commerce can be reconfigured into more highly consecrated personal and institutional capital. Thus, the donation of economic capital in the form of artworks (for example, Henry Tate's donation or Volkswagen's sponsorship of a Tate exhibition) or national grants and funding for buildings (for example, Mitterrand's support of the Musée d'Orsay project) has been transmuted into increased and consecrated habitus (sociocultural capital for the donor), whilst augmenting the museum's own economic and cultural capital (Grenfell & Hardy, 2007, p. 102).

In *Art Rules: Pierre Bourdieu and the Visual Arts*, (2007) Grenfell and Hardy extend Bourdieu's theory to account for and analyse developments in the visual arts. They recognise, even before the Conservative-led coalition, the greater influence of business and sponsorship, but also the diverse role cultural organisations have and the complex position they have within the cultural and political fields, as well as navigating changing relationships between the fields of artistic consumption, the field of commerce and the field of political power (Grenfell & Hardy, 2007). Although there are indicators that this continues to be the case, the diffuse political sub-fields that form the backbone of social care, health and education, and had enjoyed robust relationships during the New Labour years, have arguably been subsumed by the field of commerce and this trend has accelerated.

6.4 Do public art organisations in England resist sponsorship?

The previous section of this chapter outlined some of the ways in which organisations adopt commercial measures in their operations, particularly in relation to the political pressure to seek sponsorship and philanthropy. This section will

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

discuss some of the positions and methods that represent resistance to commercial measures. A criticism of acts of resistance to marketisation is that they are often difficult, or indeed impossible, to reconcile with the actions and practice of cultural organisations. For example, at the South London Gallery, a recent exhibition celebrated the socialist origins of the gallery (*The Source: Works From The South London Gallery Collection*, 2019), in a building that a large investment bank partly funded.

These contradictions have prompted radical positions and opinions to form where critics see the structural flaws of the cultural field to be so exposed that it must contract in order to reclaim a sense of independence and integrity. Andrea Fraser is one figure who makes this claim. She says that direct public subsidy is a great asset but that there is political pressure to adopt US models. Her warning is emphatic:

Don't do it! Let this tale of inequality and crisis in the US be a cautionary one. Rather than turning to collectors to subsidise the acquisition of art works at grotesquely inflated prices, European museums should turn away from the art market and the art and artists valorised in it. If this means that public museums contract and collectors create their own privately controlled institutions, so be it. Let these private institutions be the treasure vaults and theme-park spectacles and economic freak shows that many already are. [...] We must insist that what art works are economically centrally determines what they mean socially and also artistically.

(Fraser, 2011, p. 126)

Fraser's analysis draws a clear line between the conditions of funding in the arts and the efficacy of art and the artist's ability to commentate and critique the structures in which they operate. However, there is some contention over what is meant by American-style philanthropy, or commercial sponsorship. Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) of Nottingham Contemporary disputes whether the condition Jeremy Hunt advocated and Fraser critiqued, is actually as prevalent in the UK system as some might suggest. He stated, "what I would understand by US-style philanthropy is having a board where there is an expectation that trustees pay for their places. To my knowledge that doesn't happen anywhere, yet, in the UK and I can't quite

imagine it happening any time soon, in part because of the tax breaks". Again, we can look to Hibou's (2017) notion of incentivised power for how this is an emerging paradigm for determining the register of authority in different situations. For Thorne, the US system imagined by Hunt is one in which a financial elite can exert long-term, continued influence on an art organisation. The Serpentine Galleries may represent an example of where the public and private divide is exceptionally blurred, but this is at present, an exception.

Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) does identify the introduction of market forces into the public sector as being an issue within the cultural field. However, he implies that these are relatively separate forces not necessarily transforming the governance and structure of art organisations, remoulding them in a US form. He says, "on the other hand; there is a shifting proximity in relation to commercial galleries or to corporate sponsors. Right now, that's more of a London problem than it is for the rest of the UK." As well as this being an issue more prevalent in London, Thorne also suggests that Hunt's invocation of US practices implies a change in the professional practice of workers in the cultural field. Thorne (ibid) states, "I'm not sure if much of what we do in that regard would echo what happens in the US. You know actually, I talk to curator friends there and they spend 90% of their time with benefactors – taking them to art fairs, that kind of stuff. Our curators spend almost 0% of the time doing that, but a significant percentage on fundraising applications." Therefore, we can use the workplace expectations of arts professionals as an indicator of the influence of philanthropy and sponsorship in the cultural field.

However, Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) is clear that this is an evolving situation and states that, "I sympathise with the line that there is this kind of creep here, but I think we're really seeing it in the London based National Museums, I don't see it so much elsewhere." This may be the case that these organisations are at the forefront of the 'creep', but as Heller (2018, pers. comm.) states, fundraising through sponsorship or similar measures is also impacting smaller organisations. She says, at "South London Gallery our relative 'success', in inverted commas, in fundraising has been acknowledged by the Arts Council and others as being something to be applauded and something to be rewarded. But there's this danger that you then become, come to be perceived as being too successful at fundraising and then, in turn, you have

less, your need for public funding is less". This condition of successful fundraising also being a harbinger of reduced public funding is not only a concern for public organisations, but there may also be a lack of public awareness about the potential ramifications of a commercial, privatised gallery system. For example, the 2007 ACE consultation, *The Arts Debate*, some suggestions for making arts and culture more sustainable included, "withdrawing funding once an organisation becomes self-sustaining, and helping funded organisations to be more entrepreneurial and develop other sources of income, for instance through sponsorship, building hire and ticket sales" (Keaney et al., 2007, p. 70).

Although there have been more direct and concerted efforts for public art organisations to communicate their value as public spaces, outside of the overt influence of exogenous forces, there is clearly a need to find far and wide-reaching channels of communication to assert the need to protect public infrastructure, cultural or otherwise, in a hostile environment. Simultaneously there also needs to be greater transparency and awareness of the commercial sponsors and donors that the Conservative-led cultural policy initiatives have encouraged galleries to pursue. Heller (2018, pers. comm.) states that "the pool of donors seems to be relatively limited across the sector; you see the same people's names popping up all over the place. And at the South London Gallery over the past year, we've worked very hard to try and introduce people who were not established donors of contemporary art spaces, with, with some success but it's a slow and a long slow process". Here there are two key issues, firstly, that there is a focussed cadre of donors and secondly, it is difficult to expand beyond this.

We could say that Foucault would present this issue as part of the elaboration and transformation of the discourse regarding sponsorship and philanthropy (Hibou, 2017). There is a doubling of this discourse, each opposing part contradicting the other. The push to private funding is predicated on the notion that there is an abundance of disposable wealth from individuals and corporations, and that altruism is abundant across all sections of society. Yet, wealth disparities continue to grow, philanthropy is focussed in financial and political centres and deregulated financial sectors enable wealth to be hidden from national governments. As Foucault says, "the market must tell the truth (*dire le vrai*); it must tell the truth in relation to

governmental practice. Henceforth, and merely secondarily, it is its role of veridiction that will command, dictate, and prescribe the jurisdictional mechanisms, or absence of such mechanisms, on which [the market] must be articulated" (Foucault, 2008, p. 32). In this sense the market is the lens for reading government action and intent. As there is a relatively limited pool of donors is suggestive not only the limitations of pursuing philanthropy or sponsorship as a means of propping up the organisations hit by the withdrawal of public funding but it is also suggestive of the government's weakness in fulfilling obligations dependent on the will of financial markets.

A recurring issue about the philanthropic culture, or lack thereof, in the United Kingdom, is the relatively underdeveloped tax incentives for supporting the arts. Heller (2018, pers. comm.) states that a limit to the potential income from sponsorship is because of a "different taxation system" in the UK and that, "there are from some quarters there are calls for a change in the taxation system to be more like the system in the U.S., but personally I think that the power that therefore invests in the donors becomes skewed in a way that I am not supportive of because I believe in public funding for the arts". There are several ways to interpret this statement. It might simply imply that the success of public arts organisations in England has coincided with more significant funding and policy focus; therefore, a belief in public funding for the arts is simply a belief in the maintenance of a successful, supportive, and sometimes flawed system. Another conclusion one might draw is that public funding is an essential bulwark against the field of commerce dominating the cultural field, which in turn impacts artistic practice and the audiences engaged in the production and reception of visual art. The tension between these interpretations exposes the difficulty of organisations to assuredly resist the creeping presence of commercial interests – advocacy of an idealised version of the public funding system does little to reverse dwindling public funds and outright condemnation of the promotion of opaque sponsorship and philanthropy risks isolation, or closure.

Munro (2018, pers. comm.) also makes a similar point about the perception of many gallery professionals having a strong identification with the importance of the public sector and the arts' role in it. She says, "when you've grown up like me, and you're a product of working in the Arts in the past ten years, and you felt like you were

applying for public funding because you believe this is a society where culture was an important part. We knew it wasn't perfect, that there was lots to be worked on, but fundamentally the public money was used to create a public service, and I come from that context". Munro, like Heller, regards herself and the role of the gallery as being part of a foundation of the public sector, but it is a sector under threat. What has become clear of the course of this research is that galleries and professionals view the nature of this threat slightly differently depending on the scale of the gallery or museum, or the location of it.

What is also interesting is the perception from outside of London that there is a fertile environment for sponsorship or similar opportunities are plentiful. However, Heller (2018, pers. comm.) indicates that this is not necessarily the case and that regional variations may hold different appeal. She says, "I think with corporate sponsorship we struggle at South London Gallery with corporate sponsorship and perhaps there are more opportunities outside London, where there is a different offer, but it tends to be, with corporate sponsorship, the scale of organisation, in terms of benefits that can be offered at the forefront of sponsors minds generally and so it's very difficult for small organisations to compete with nationals." What this suggests is a sense amongst many organisations that sponsorship is an opportunity or an issue that is 'just over there'. Foucault states that "[one] 'fictions' history on the basis of a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics not yet in existence on the basis of a historical truth" (Foucault, 1980, p. 193). If applied to sponsorship we might say that because sponsorship works for some either presently or elsewhere, it becomes evidence for a political programme or reality. This occurs in spite of the concrete evidence showing a highly selective ecology of sponsorship rather than a broader actionable truth. The private funding available is highly concentrated in larger organisations and geographically in London, as **Figure 6.3** shows. This figure shows a distinct dominance of London's ability to attract sponsorship income, and these figures exclude the Nationals as the DCMS funds them directly. What is striking is not only how London dwarfs the other regions, but the rate in which it is increasing. This is an indication that the drive for sponsorship is creating a two-tiered funding system that privileges London based organisations with their unique access to

extreme wealth and cultural venues with high visibility and consecrated symbolic capital.


Figure 6.3 represents perhaps the most dramatic quantitative dataset gathered. The data clearly shows that London has vastly higher income through sponsorship than any other region. **Figure 6.4** details the same data, minus London. It is evident that whilst sponsorship is a component of other regions' income, it is inconsistent and only a fraction of what the capital generates. London also has a much stronger and forecastable trend for sponsorship income. All other regions generate less sponsorship income and tend to have very weak trends. For example, London has an R^2 value of 0.834. Although this does not guarantee continued growth in sponsorship income, the R^2 value suggests that sponsorship will continue to grow and may be relatively stable in London. The R^2 value is considerably lower for other regions. The South West has the weakest value at 0.149, but this is not an outlier. Low income and weak trends demonstrate how sponsorship is not a viable financial alternative to LA funding for almost all visual arts organisations. Although there may be occasional windfalls, sponsorship in England appears to be inconsistent and unreliable, it does not support long-term planning, nor does it support the operational side of arts organisations. **Figure 6.5** shows that the size of the gap between London and the rest of England is vast. The sum of all sponsorship income outside of the capital consistently falls short of the sponsorship income London generates. The data shows that the gap is widening; as sponsorship income increases nationally, London is the only beneficiary.

There does not appear to be a corrective to this. If cultural policy pushes mixed-income with an emphasis on developing sponsorship, the majority of arts organisations will fall short of this expectation. If this becomes a determining factor for who and where receives ACE NPO funding, there could be a terminal crisis for the arts in England. The viability of sponsorship on a national scale is dependent on the decentralisation of individual and commercial wealth from London and the South East to the rest of the England. This is, of course, a historic socio-economic point of contention, and one that the visual arts sector cannot be expected to drive significant change.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Sponsorship may be unequal in its distribution and availability, but there are commercial recourses, such as a café or a shop, that many public galleries have adopted, or organisations have built with these areas of commerce in mind. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, proponents of visual arts organisations often position these areas in opposition to the high street, but that may not mitigate the perception from some quarters, such as Fraser, that commercial enterprise in all forms is best kept separate from artistic endeavours. However, Munro indicates that the queasy feeling of asking for donations and generating income internally is something that arts organisations should overcome and actually has tremendous benefit. Munro (2018, pers. comm.) says, "I used to feel quite awkward about asking for donations or the old cliché like a cafe or a shop, but I love those things now because that's the cleanest goddamn money that we can generate! We've generated it; it's our labour, it's our toil."


Figure 6.3 NPO Visual Arts Sponsorship income by region



Source: Hopkin, based Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017. See Appendix E.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.


Figure 6.4 NPO Visual Arts Sponsorship income by region (excluding London)



Source: Hopkin, based Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017. See Appendix E.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Figure 6.5 NPO Visual Arts Sponsorship income: London vs Rest of England



Source: Hopkin, based Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017. See Appendix E.

Munro’s comments echo some of the sentiments felt across the museum sector. For example, Sharon Macdonald’s influential book *Behind the Scenes at the Science Museum* (2002), Neil Cossons, the recently appointed director of the Science Museum at the time of the study argued that “money from government and money from sponsors inevitably carries strings. It is a peculiar paradox that money from the user is, in effect, some of the cleanest money on which museums can lay their hands” (1989, p. 21 in Macdonald, 2002, p. 56). Although Munro and Cossons allude to slightly different reasoning as to why income from users, or visitors is ‘clean’, they perceive this type of income as one where the organisation maintains control. However, market forces still govern these types of income and rely on visitors willing to spend money in the context of free entry to a gallery. What is interesting is the perception that the market forces where one can modify the reality, to use Foucault’s

terms, of the experience and interaction is preferable to one where marketisation is shrouded and obscured through legislative and, or incentivised power. However, this produces a further need to seek balance between different organisational directives.

This is something that Munro (2018, pers. comm.) acknowledges and responds to. She argues that the gallery "cannot be self-generating income to the point where it excludes certain people because they say, I can't afford anything in the shop, and I can't afford anything in the cafe. That is constantly something we have to think about." This is suggestive of the tension between being able to sustain user-generated income and entrench public galleries as vital parts of public infrastructure and public space. Munro (2018, pers. comm.) goes on to say, "if you want a social fabric, if you want equality, if you want social and economic justice then that's [arts and culture] part of what you fund as a civic state. So, I find it much easier to go; it is absolutely essential that BALTIC has this money to do this and this because it feels clean, and I feel accountable for that." In this regard, Munro indicates that visitor generated income and donations are an essential facet of the operations of a gallery such as BALTIC, but this can only occur when there is a reliable and robust system of public funding that ensures public and to use Munro's term, civic standing.

BALTIC then, although in receipt of sponsorship and benefits from commercial revenue, does acknowledge that public gallery spaces must maintain their publicness and resist their colonisation by market forces. Furthermore, galleries are a vital part of public, or civic, life and in that sense act as in important front in which to resist the dominance of the market, or as McGuigan (2016) and David Harvey (2005) would say, neoliberalism, which aims for "the commodification of everything" and "distorts ordinary human social relations" (D. Harvey, 2005). Not only this, but market forces and the neoliberal culture promoted under the Conservative and coalition governments contains an inherent contradiction where "individual freedom is constantly extolled yet, in practice, neoliberal regimes are authoritarian" (ibid). The issue of commercial sponsorship and philanthropy continues to return to the issue of individual freedom and perceptions of whether the state or the market is best placed to provide this.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Further to this, Davis argues that the present changes to governance and policy, such as the arts, constitute “the transformation of political debates into managerial problems, or in Rancière’s terms the absorption of democratic politics into the police order.” (O. Davis, 2020, p. 64). Part of the success of the marketised political rhetoric and practice is that it has spread into areas previously governed or highly leveraged by forms of value other than financial or economic value. Public funded arts are a prime example of this. Furthermore, Davis says, “‘Governance’ is administrative and managerial – bureaucratic – in concept and practice: it relies on the transmission of instructions down a fixed hierarchy of command which it establishes, codifies and regulates” (ibid). The issue that Davis identifies is based on Rancière’s observation that liberal democracies should be better understood as a police order, absent of the virtues of presupposed equality or heterarchy.

However, it is important to note that the seemingly endless balancing and compromising of conflicting agendas is not a new phenomenon, rather one that adapts and changes shape across space and time. As Davis says:

Consequently, while some of the techniques and combinations thereof which constitute neoliberalism’s regime of ‘governance’ may be novel and while the proliferating expansionism of its bureaucracies may be unprecedented, democratic politics in the radical, rather than the merely representative, sense has always and everywhere existed in tension with the administrated distribution of places and parts which the police order names. (Davis, 2020, pp. 64-65)

Davis’ point is useful, as it points to the fact that previous structures of governance and policy are not without their own problems. However, the extreme nullification of radical potential is unique to the present moment. Munro (2018, pers. comm.) continues her argument in favour of public funding over wholesale philanthropy or sponsorship by stating, “I would say that I would much rather those philanthropists paid their taxes properly and we were entitled to money through taxation for the public good, for public benefit so that's what we should be doing". The implicit statement here is that individuals and organisations who wish to fund the arts can do so already if they follow more transparent methods of taxation and that attempts to

fund directly can often manifest as an attempt to circumvent the professional standing of curators and programmers. To phrase it another way, "patronage and sponsorship are typically forming in which the aesthetic freedom is an issue to be negotiated. Sometimes the aims of both parties match completely, but in many other cases, one of the parties, or both, have to compromise" (van Maanen, 2009, p. 21). Therefore, sponsorship and philanthropy are representative of processes in the field of culture where forms of capital can transmute into one another. These processes have distinct characteristics and features and can be controlled to a degree by the arts organisations involved in them, but this cannot fully account for the erosion of aesthetic freedom, whether it be subtle or overt.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed an element of marketisation that is increasingly present in policy debates about the funding of the arts. Sponsorship and philanthropy have become a central component of policy discourse in the arts, and they are issues that have prompted controversy as well as misunderstanding. Public discourse often conflates and misinterprets these terms partly because of the lack of definition within policy documents on the issue. As this chapter has indicated, sponsorship serves a tangible commercial interest, either through advertising or 'art washing'. On the other hand, philanthropy tends to occupy a position once removed from commercial interests. The presence of overt sponsorship in galleries or attached to their practices is hugely variable, and this chapter has shown that whilst being a consecrated institution in terms of its reception from the art world and business world, is important, geography is a huge determining factor. The focus of sponsorship, and philanthropy, in London institutions, suggest that under the new pressures to increasingly seek private funding income, being outside of the capital is and will continue to be an insurmountable disadvantage.

With private and public funding, contemporary visual art in the public context can sometimes struggle to assert its importance or relevance. Woodward (2019) asserts that the aesthetic regime of the arts embodies a paradox in that it positions itself as a special activity but cannot provide any criteria or definition to distinguish it from other kinds of activity. In this void there is a seedbed for speculation and an articulation of economic logic.

With reference to Foucault, sponsorship constitutes a further social form of power. Just as the various levels of government and NDPBs may leverage their ability to withdraw support or funding to exercise their power, private funders exert social power by conditioning public, cultural spaces. Furthermore, Davis' reading of Rancière expands on the link between police order and bureaucratic systems. We see traces of competition and hierarchy throughout political and social life – where the arts might offer some respite from this, it is in fact another site where the administration and bureaucracy produce inequality.

When sponsorship does exist, particularly in larger institutions, there have been many controversies that have played out in public. The BP sponsorship at the Tate is a notable example, but until the past eighteen months or so there has been little appetite from leading institutions to reappraise their relationships with sponsors and the nature of the transactions that are taking place between galleries and individual and commercial support. We might typify the resistance from the art world to soberly assess the issues concerning sponsorship with the attitude and comments of figures such as John Tusa who have dismissed the criticisms of private funding as hollow, unrealistic and couched in theory as opposed to the practice and the 'reality' of arts funding and support.

The responses from the case study interviews are suggestive of the pressure many organisations find themselves in. The reduced funding from LAs has meant that there is a general squeeze on resources, which has, in many cases, meant that there are fewer specialised staff to seek and generate funds from sponsorship and philanthropy. Heller (2018, pers. comm.) suggests that this changing funding landscape has required organisations, such as SLG, to change the way they operate and go through a shift in their professional composition. Munro (2018, pers. comm.) is also assertive about this trend in arts policy, but she suggests that it is part of a long process of commercial pressure from successive governments over the past two decades. The different perceptions of how the commercial or marketised elements of arts policy have entered the sector are revealing. It shows that the composition of funding in England is not equal from organisation to organisation – if an organisation is weighted towards reliance on LA funding; the funding and policy

shifts will seem sudden and extreme. However, those who have a more substantial reliance on ACE funding may be more insulated from the suddenness of austerity, but still experiencing the collective turn towards a more marketised arts policy.

In *Neoliberal Culture* (2016) Jim McGuigan points to figures such as Charles Saatchi as an example of how to translate financial power into other types of power, or capital. The interaction between the commercial interests of an individual or organisation and aesthetic judgements, preferences and tastes. This interaction has historically played out in private or commercial settings, yet public spaces are increasingly being subject to this same relationship. This is why figures such as McGuigan find the trend towards marketisation to be alarming and incompatible with the notion of artistic production and reception as something that is, as much as possible, carried out in a semi-autonomous environment. The concerns about the presence of sponsorship and philanthropy as a replacement for public funding are warranted. Whilst some organisations and practices will simply cease to exist if this trend continues, others will exist but with financial dependency on a pool of wealthy individuals and organisations whose interests in art, its production and reception, cannot be fully extricated from their financial interests. The idea of the public gallery as an essential component of democratic practice and as an incubator for creativity outside of financialised production is clearly incompatible with this trend. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, the contexts differ depending on location, and the tendencies to restructure the arts funding system and its governance over the past two decades has created a fractured system. For many, the notion of a 'future' for the arts in which they play a fundamental role, is hard to envisage.

Chapter Seven: Marketisation - Centralising Power, Decentralising Accountability.

7 Introduction

[A]nalysis also points up exploitable contradictions within the neoliberal and neoconservative agendas. The widening gap between rhetoric (for the benefit of all) and realization (the benefit of a small ruling class) is now all too visible. The idea that the market is about competition and fairness is increasingly negated by the fact of the extraordinary monopolization, centralization, and internationalization of corporate and financial power.

(D. Harvey, 2005, p. 203)

A facet of marketisation is decentralisation, however figures such as Harvey argue that neoliberal agendas typically radically centralise power. The interplay between centralisation and decentralisation is central to this chapter. I argue that a particular feature of marketised cultural policy in England is that it has *decentralised* political responsibility whilst *centralising* powers. Thus, arts policy exhibits rhetorical gymnastics that once again limits what is knowable and sayable in the arts sector.

In chapters Five and Six, this research has argued that there several critical features of marketisation. These chapters argued, firstly, the reduction of public subsidy in arts funding and secondly the associated pressure to seek privatised income, represents both a challenge to organisations in terms of their ambition but also acts as a conditioning factor for what artwork or artists they display. If we return to the definition of marketisation posited in Chapter Five, there is another crucial feature related to the phenomena discussed so far. Gingrich (2007) says marketisation manifests as "changes within the public sector, where market mechanisms and incentives are introduced within public or publicly regulated organizations" (547). This chapter will discuss the instances of decentralisation and organisational restructuring in public funded contemporary art galleries in England. What is interesting about the binary centralisation/decentralisation discourse in the arts is that it sometimes belies the typical left-right political spectrum in English politics and

cultural policy, at least at first glance. What is important is that we clarify *what* is being moved away from or towards an institutional centre. Again, we can think about this in terms of fictions as Foucault (1980, 2008) and Hibou (2017) discuss.

"Resorting to legal fictions", Hibou says, "enables certain facts to be concealed, so as to consolidate a status quo and foster a development (e.g., the superiority of private over public management) and to assert certain truths ('to quantify is a proof of rationality and efficiency'; 'there is no alternative'; 'the economic consensus is a reality')" (Hibou, 2017, p. 214). We can add to this, the assertion that programmes of apparent decentralisation produce freedom. As we shall see, the meaningful transfer of power, as opposed to deferring responsibility, is contingent on economic infrastructure and decentring political agency.

Arts policy in England has gone through many periods of centralisation and decentralisation, but not necessarily due to issues such as marketisation or similarly prescriptive political moves. For example, *A Policy for the Arts: The First Steps* (J. Lee, 1965) supported the decentralisation of cultural policy as a means of attending to inequalities in the artistic provision and recognising that political institutions may not be in the best position to respond to the changing tastes and cultural influences in Britain at the time. Hesmondhalgh et al., make this observation, and suggest the positive, rather than reactive nature of the suggestions. They say, "This reflected the increasing concern of the left in the 1960s with cultural issues, hard to ignore in the face of massive socio-cultural change. The White Paper laid the ground for decentralisation of arts funding, based on the further development of the regional arts agencies that had started to spring up at local government level from the 1950s onwards, and an extension of definitions of the arts that included relatively 'new' media such as photography and genres such as jazz" (2015b, p. 21). Here we can see that a decentred art world, is in many ways desirable, but whereas this proposition was redistributive and expansive in its vision, since 2010 the issues of centralisation and decentralisation have manifested with very different motivations.

Similar discourses around decentralisation existed during the New Labour governments, who undertook a number of devolution initiatives. However, the register of the debate had shifted significantly and was less concerned with representing cultural forms outside of traditional, institutional support and more

focused on developing an economically productive structure to support the 'creative industries'. Writing in 2001, Hughson & Inglis pointed towards what would remain an unresolved tension. They said a "continuing problem for New Labour will be in reconciling initiatives towards the decentralised administration of the arts with a centralised policy overview. The key themes within the creative industries agenda carry the hope for a resolution of this tension and, accordingly, will appear within the range of policy documents relevant to the arts" (2001, p. 462). Labour's much-maligned decision to abolish the RABs and restructure ACE, is suggestive of the paradox in much of cultural policy discourse; on the one hand, there is the desire to delegate the responsibility of supporting the arts to those who are in the best position to do so, on the other hand, the tools and resources to carry this out are reduced and centralised.

D. Lee et al (2014) make a similar, supporting observation. In this instance, they are discussing the nine Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), which the Conservative-led coalition government abolished in 2012 and they then apportioned some of their function to Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and LAs. Hesmondhalgh et al. state, "ultimately, the RDAs struggled with a lack of political legitimacy. The failure of the North East referendum was indicative of a broader failure of New Labour's decentralising tendencies (ibid, p. 228). Again, this is suggestive of an uncertain current in the structure and division of power in the cultural policy arena. If we compare an English context to other nations, then we see a remarkably opaque project of decentralisation, both before and after 2010. Hall et al. detail the robust models of national arts funding in several countries. Saying robust is intended to signal how entrenched they are in a policy arena and does not necessarily signal their desirability. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, marketising the arts damages it, therefore, we must look to other models policymakers and arts organisations deploy. Hall et al. contrast the features of funding for the arts in the USA, the 'Anglo-Saxon' model, the Continental model and the Nordic model:

The United States government spends a relatively paltry sum on direct financing of the arts and culture, compared to other developed nations.

However, the American tax system, along with a strong philanthropic tradition, encourages individual and corporate patronage of the arts. [...]

The Continental model, as typified by France, is a centralized, top-down, bureaucratic system in which the state plays a central role in the provision of culture, especially high culture. [...] The Nordic model, as typified by Sweden, is a decentralized, corporatist approach in which national government takes responsibility for financing the arts and culture, but devolves decision-making to regional and local institutions.

(Hall et al., 2010, p. 271)

There are familiar elements of all of these models in the current English system, but what is notable about the period from 2010, is that a forced restructure of arts funding has taken place under the insistence by the Conservative government that philanthropy would replace the funding and support lost at a local level. Regardless of the virtues or lack thereof, of an increasingly privatised system through mixed funding models, the primary achievement of this policy initiative is to create a vacuum in which the arts struggle to function.

Decentralisation following liberal political rationales also creates conditions where marketisation is difficult to resist or counter. We can extrapolate from national cultural policy, look to historic labour relations, and state power. In the passage below, John L. Campbell illustrates how the functioning of political institutions is relative to historical conditions in which they were founded:

[US] Workers could obtain social services and other benefits through community-based political machines that traded patronage for votes and that typically organized workers along racial and ethnic rather than class lines. [...] In contrast, the British working class had to struggle for the vote and had to cope with a more centralized national government to obtain government services and protections. As a result, British workers formed a national labor party. Consequently, the presence or absence of a labor party had profound long-term effects on national policy-making in both countries.

(Campbell, 2004, p. xxv)

If we take this point and apply it to a specific context, such as the influence of art institutions, arts professionals and artists on cultural policy-making, we can see that weakened organisational structures and a weakened professional field can find itself in an ever more fragile bargaining position. As a result, decentralisation can be an effective method of reducing agency, rather than ensuring it. In this instance we can look at decentralisation in terms of it being an apparatus. Foucault states that, "the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it" (Foucault, 1980, p. 198). Of course, in the course of artistic development, there is often the deliberate altering of apparatus, where challenges to institutional centrality can create shifts in conventions and practices. Smith and Wilde (2002) use the example of the increased presence of black British female artists from the 1980s onwards:

Passion, published in 1990, documented the movement and displayed its innovatory, decentralizing politics. The volume was edited by Maud Sulter and consists of a number of different yet interconnected strands by artist/theorists such as Lubaina Himid, Ingrid Pollard and Sutapa Biswas. Scholarly texts, poetry, photo-essays, documentary images and press releases all find a place within the volume as part of a multi-layered mode of enunciation. These strands reinforce the most determined political point of the movement, namely that 'black' women in Britain are a heterogeneous group comprising women, for example, of African, Caribbean and/or Asian origins, coming from various religious traditions and multiple class and regional affiliations. The diverse artistic and theoretical voices of black British women artists were accommodated in the movement by an explicit politics of difference. (P. Smith & Wilde, 2002, pp. 387-388)

Here we can see the mechanism of decentralisation taking on a very different form to the previous example. Rather than it being a condition of maintained subjugation, it

is a register of anti-marginalisation. Within the context of the arts, it is important to note the dynamics of this power distribution – who gains it? Who is it given from, to? What are the conditions of this transaction?

One of the issues contained in a spatial political discussion of public-funded arts is the ethics of unequal funding and access. However, for Rancière, ethics is less about the formation of the subject (Foucault), or the conventions of practices (Bourdieu), register of political activity. Rancière's presents *partage du sensible*, is the tension between a specific act of perception and its reliance on prescribed objects deemed worthy of perception (Deranty, 2010). Conceptually, it accounts for participation and exclusion. Rancière's concept of dissensus expresses this tension, and presents dissent as disruption of structural inequality. Throughout this chapter, we will attempt to address how inequality in the arts is entrenched or inhibited in relation to the changes to the policy and funding structures of the visual arts in England.

7.1 Culture as a component of public provision

Throughout this chapter I will explore instances of centralisation and decentralisation in order to establish the continued impact on the visual arts sector. Throughout the previous chapters, this research has considered how marketisation has become more prevalent in cultural policy and the visual arts. Across the case studies used in this research, respondents have consistently stated their belief in public support for the visual arts and a preference for models based on the long-term subsidy with minimal political interference. There are arguments for and against different funding models, some of which Jennifer Craik details in her 2007 monograph, *Re-Visioning Arts and Cultural Policy: Current Impasses and Future Directions*. For example, she acknowledges that arm's-length approaches are susceptible to peer review bias and closed-shop mentalities (pp. 25-30). Given these enduring issues it is tempting to dismiss arm's-length models as outdated, but as Craik asserts and this research confirms, the alternatives do not eliminate these features. In fact, they exacerbate them.

Although this section is not explicitly about funding and revenue streams for the visual arts, these factors have a bearing on ideas of centralisation and decentralisation, as well as on the shape and structure of the public-funded visual

arts field in England. As Sarah Munro of BALTIC said, "in an ideal world, I'd rather apply for public funding to provide this public service. At the moment there's a conversation, so I'm prepared to have it, but there are lines that we do not want to cross" (2018, pers. comm.). Munro clearly states a preference for a particular model of arts funding but acknowledges the necessity of compromise, to a point. However, it is difficult to separate the notion of centralisation and decentralisation from a party-political spectrum; hence the actors are couching the debate with reference to political ideologies rather than 'best practice' administration. The question remains how bureaucratic apparatus might change with a change in government, or rather, a change to the homogenous truths and fictions in contemporary politics. Foucault warns against falling back on ready-made choices and institutions (Foucault, 1980, p. 190) and instead asserts that "techniques of power correlated with multinational economies and bureaucratic States, one must oppose a politicisation which will take new forms" (ibid). In short, whilst the centralisation or decentralisation dichotomy is useful, one should not assume that the alternatives are necessarily preferable.

Throsby (2010) goes into detail about the rationales espoused by supporters of decentralised funding and decision making. He states:

There is an obvious ideological justification for favouring a decentralised decision process; those who generally advocate consumer sovereignty and a reliance on the market in preference to the allocation of resources by government will see virtue in the indirect system for arts support. Such a system, they will argue, diversifies not only the range of preferences that are expressed in arts funding allocations, but also opens up a wider range of financial sources for individuals and organisations than is available if there were only a single public-sector provider.

(Throsby, 2010, p. 76)

The features Throsby describes, such as 'consumer sovereignty' are key elements of liberal political and economic discourse and the policy documents and speeches mentioned at the beginning of this research (Jeremy Hunt and Ed Vaizey being two notable figures to circulate this rationale for a mixed funding model). The claims and suppositions made by advocates of mixed funding models seem to equate artistic

and creative freedoms with consumer choice – this rather spurious claim seems to expose a fundamental misstep in this discourse. It suggests that 'excellence' is subjective, but the market ultimately decides and elevates, what or who, to that level of prestige. We can extend this implication a little further – if the market is the final arbiter of excellence, then surely those with the financial means to make philanthropic donations or purchase artwork on the art market, are the aesthetes *par excellence*. As Hibou (2017) points out through her genealogical exploration of 'excellence', the notion is explicitly tied to the logic of markets. We might assume excellence is a question of aesthetics, but the reality is that it is a question of capital. Of course, drawing a line between wealth and a grasp of aesthetics and knowledge of the historical and contemporary discourses that inform the production and reception of visual art is a laughable claim. However, the very notion of marketising cultural funding and policy implies this formulation. This, in turn, prompts a reassessment of the structure of the visual art field this research is concerned. In such a system, those with financial capital have fewer obstacles in circumventing the artistic and professional discourse of the field and elevate their field position.

Throsby goes on to acknowledge the problems intrinsic in a marketised funding system. He says:

On the other hand, the transfer of decision-making power in relation to arts policy from government to private individuals may make the achievement of some aspects of public policy more uncertain. This uncertainty may affect both quality and access dimensions of policy. In the first place, as noted earlier, there may be little public interest in providing philanthropic support for the sort of innovative work that is the research and development laboratory for future artistic growth, and whose encouragement is always an important art-policy objective.

(Throsby, 2010, p. 76)

Throsby highlights that the introduction of private finance into arts funding and policy shifts the balance of decision-making power. This can be a destabilising change. Not only because of the lack of clarity as to actors' position in the visual arts field but also because artistic progress may become contingent on the health and level of interest

of a financial class. These circumstances clearly compromise the potential for meaningful critique, experimentation and multiple audiences.

Another way in which this mixed model is destabilising is the fact that the transfer, or dissolution, of resources and power from the public sector to private organisations or individuals occurs to varying degrees and at different rates of acceleration. M. Gray & Barford (2018) have highlighted how public spending cuts are uneven and how this creates inequality whilst the transfer of power away from the state to private entities limits the capacity of government in addressing these inequalities.

[The] reconfiguration of the local state is fundamentally spatial as the uneven distribution of public resources results in variable access to local state public services. We show that increased decentralisation in revenue raising and responsibility for the provision of public goods, together with an aversion to increased taxation, has led to a sharp shift away from discretionary spending—what Streek (2014) calls the social and physical infrastructure—and towards mandatory spending. Thus, austerity pushed down to the level of local government in the UK has resulted in (i) a shrinking capacity of the local state to address inequality, (ii) increasing inequality between local governments themselves and (iii) intensifying issues of territorial injustice. (M. Gray & Barford, 2018, p. 543)

M. Gray & Barford (2018) make an important observation in that they link processes of decentralisation with inequality rather than providing the opportunity for progression. Furthermore, they point out that whilst there are precedents for significant restructuring of the state in the 1980s and 1990s, this often took place under the auspices of evolving the nation-state beyond conventional conceptions of it. These changes are achieved through new and diffuse apparatus of power, such as public and private bureaucracies. As Foucault (1980) has said, the changes to these structuring logics and fictions also creates or mutates knowledge. M. Gray & Barford say that the advance of the 'Neoliberal state' was backed up by the "dominant view was the nation state was firmly on the retreat—challenged by globalisation, supranational institutions and by demands for power to be shared with the subnational state" (2018, p. 544).

M. Gray & Barford (2018) make it clear that this conception of decentralisation, whereby there is a relatively concrete notion of 'what comes next' in terms of the primacy and relevance of the nation-state, is not compatible with the contemporary conditions of the UK government and the austerity programmes they have initiated. They say, following recent analysis "it became clear that the nation state remained a potent force and that actual evidence for decentralization of any significance is only partial and often contradictory" (ibid, p. 544). This observation speaks to the inconsistency in how local and national government and public bodies have responded to cuts in spending and the associated push towards private funding alternatives. For example, whilst we still have large sectoral institutions such as ACE, the NHS, but within them varying initiatives or policies that encourage further decentralisation. Again, if we look at the increase in Academy schools and trusts in the education system, we see evidence of decentralisation but not a wholesale transformation. That is not to say these trends do not have a tangible impact, but they may not define a sector.

Commenting on this inconsistency and the difficulty in defining the nature of a sector when there are various competing forces, M. Gray & Barford (2018) say that "the nation state is not a static territorial entity, but is instead constantly being produced and reproduced, and changes in the spatial scale at which it operates are a fundamental part of this constant transformation" (ibid, p. 544). However, an important note is that within cycles of production and reproduction, there will be a shift in the field position of the institutions and actors concerned with any one sector. The respondents to this research signalled the sense that these processes were weakening the position of public-funded contemporary art galleries and the professionals involved in the production and reception of art in that context. Furthermore, this transferal of power and position is not omnidirectional, in fact, it gravitates up, towards a financial and political class who simultaneously extol the virtues of small government, decentralisation and the apparent redistributive potential of that formulation.

Sarah Munro acknowledged that the financial circumstances BALTIC navigated played a significant part in how the organisation has changed – both in the short-

term and the long-term. She stated that there is a “sense of how an institution can be renewed and changed by the environment around it and that environment is partly our own financial environment, in terms of how we have to generate income, but it is also the different financial situations of a lot of our communities” (2018, pers. comm.). Munro signals the importance of being responsive to the particular conditions of the communities BALTIC neighbours and serves in a broader sense. Gateshead has undergone considerable change over the past two decades. BALTIC is one of several large capital projects that have reshaped the Gateshead Quayside. Sage, the Foster + Partners, designed concert hall, the Millennium Bridge, the Trinity Square development and proposals for a large conference venue and further redevelopment of Gateshead centre, all point to the changing function of the area. Gateshead Council has proactively sought external funding and has indicated that new private funding streams can bring more jobs, services and housing to the area.

However, there are several indicators to suggest that the balance Gateshead Council has sought, between managing a shrinking budget due to central government-imposed cuts and private investment into the area, has been problematic. For example, the levels of child poverty in Gateshead have risen since 2015, after many years of decline (Gateshead JSNA, 2019), the council has also cut 2,400 posts since 2010, has initiated a 3.99% council tax increase and continues to wrestle with the £157 millions of budget cuts since 2010. This has resulted in citizens losing numerous front-line services and a cumulative retreat of the civic presence of the council and its services (Gateshead JSNA, 2019). Owen Hatherley, who has written on modernism, the built environment and British urban spaces, has pointed out the North East has a rich tradition of experimentation and progressive approaches to housing, public spaces and infrastructure. The Trinity Square Car Park (demolished 2010), the Dunston Rocket (demolished 2012), the Apollo Pavilion (Grade II Listed) and Dunelm House in Durham are all lauded examples of modernist architectural projects that have positively shaped localities and communities. Hatherley suggests that the loss of these buildings is not just a loss of places of architectural importance, but also a loss of local government as a potent element of social cohesion and social mobility.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

In this example, we see that decentralisation through financial devolution is not an alternative to healthy local government. As local governments have seen a significant dip in funding the loss of services, jobs and public building projects have declined sharply – while we can call this decentralisation this slightly misrepresents the dynamics of this change. Rather than shifting decision making and power from one entity to another, national obligations and commitments to local communities simply disappear. In conditions such as this, we see the vague dividing line or, *partage du sensible*, shaping a political community and its dissensus (Panagia, 2010, p. 96). The sites, of which galleries are or can be, are being deliberately dismantled, therefore the physical structure in which one can “generate politics” (Ross, 2010, p. 152) disappears. The opportunity for acts of dissent melts away withit.

However, Rancière posits the aesthetic image as encoding a history or as Rancière says, “the unfolding of inscriptions carried by bodies” (Rancière, 2008, p. 14). For Rancière, the aesthetic image is a component of political acts of resistance through disruption and disobedience. Therefore, we can make a case on these lines for the potential of public galleries to confront, disrupt and disobey. Despite the fact that the current neoliberal hegemony has adroitly adopted and deployed images for the purposes of consumption and capital accumulation, artists and any person involved in the coding and decoding of images, has the potential to arrange and rearrange images to disturb and reimagine the dominant narrative of neoliberal capital and marketisation.

How art organisations navigate this changing local context, or indeed, how they acknowledge their role in these changes, is crucial to their role and relevancy in periods of sustained social deprivation. This is an aspect of their own dissensus. Indeed, we see aspects of this in exhibition making that engages with local to transnational subject matter. That may be artistic engagement with colonial histories or explorations of identity politics. Munro says, “it's not a static thing that says this is what a gallery is in a situation, but I think the kind of challenges affecting institutions like this in the 21st century is way beyond any level of complexity that we've had before” (2018, pers. comm.) A significant obstacle is the ability to identify the structure of power and responsibility when economic hardship strips an organisation

of its ability to perform vital roles and duties. M. Gray and Barford write that, "Cochrane reminds us that 'financial devolution at a time of fiscal stress means the devolution of responsibility without an equivalent devolution of power: decentralised decisions take place determined within centrally (and narrow) budgetary constraints'" (Cochrane, 1993 in M. Gray & Barford, 2018, p. 547). This succinctly describes the dynamic of centralisation we are witnessing in England, and this has a significant impact on the types of funding and decision-making powers that exist at a local level. However, it also refocuses a hegemonic cultural, social and political project conceived and imposed from central government.

M. Gray & Barford (2018) are critical of this process and the deferred responsibility of service provision and social welfare. They reiterate that "although initiated at the level of the national state, this sharp reduction in service provision is pushed to the local level" (559). Furthermore, since 2010, successive governments have propagated a narrative based on a notion of pragmatic fiscal and monetary policy – despite many acknowledging the myth of necessary austerity (see Krugman, 2015). M. Gray & Barford (2018) instead, they point to the link between austerity measures and a broader political project aimed at restructuring public services. They state:

[I]ncreasing decentralisation—both in revenue raising and in the provision of public goods—together with an aversion to tax increases, has led local governments to shift away from discretionary spending, such as social and physical infrastructure, towards mandatory spending. As part of this, we see that the reduction in local public services targets many universal benefits, which functions to undermine broader political support for a more redistributive local state (Larson, 2008). As such, austerity at the local level is part of a longer-term political project to reshape and redefine the welfare state at a national and local level; even if this is marked by complexity, fragmentation and incoherence.

(M. Gray & Barford 2018, p. 559)

'Complexity', 'fragmentation' and 'incoherence' is undoubtedly a condition we can identify in the developments in cultural policy and the new funding environment galleries, and art museums find themselves in. What exacerbates this situation is the

fact that the presiding narrative from the national government is that local authorities have greater freedom in their decision making as the traditional bureaucratic structures become leaner (to borrow a term from David Cameron's parlance) and less prescriptive. As Hibou (2017) points out though, bureaucracy is not limited to state administration – the reality is that ever more prevalent and convoluted private bureaucracies enter into the space left by state entities. The Culture Media and Sport Committee demonstrate a remarkable level of political ignorance in the recommendations they make in the 2011 *Funding of the Arts and Heritage* report. They stated that:

The trouble with centralisation is depersonalisation - there needs to be more funding at a local level, and more distribution at a local level, with more local say in how funding is spent - rather than large anonymous bureaucratic structures, where you are just a reference number on a piece of paper, and if you don't put the right words on the paper, you know that really good projects that are in response to a very local need, will just get thrown out. The Arts Council have shifted the emphasis on supporting and advocating for the work that the arts community want to do, in favour of dictating what we should be doing, how we should be doing it, and being policed by this ever changing and shifting body.

(Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011, p. 6)

There is no mention of the fact that arts funding falls under discretionary spending or that funding at a local level was fast disappearing during the early 2010s onwards. Instead, it positions the bureaucracy of the arts as the primary obstacle to a vibrant and wide-reaching arts sector. Of course, there are issues related to the application procedures (time-consuming, lack of clarity and feedback on applications) at ACE and the fact that it no longer has RABs (see Gray, 2000, pp. 143-154) as a point of contact – but the characterisation above goes further than this. It suggests a lack of care and 'bureaucracy for bureaucracy's sake' rather than 'art for art's sake'. The suggestion that the Coalition and Conservative governments could help forge robust and semi-autonomous regional power was debunked by the 'paper tiger' local governments that have been promised greater powers but are in fact paralysed by the scarcity of public funds they can invest in the arts.

Munro echoes the lack of faith in the central government's ability to either grasp or acknowledge the impact of this fragmentation. She says, "I think this government's trying to simplify things and culture is very complex and nuanced, and it needs to be able to have experimentation, and needs to be able to be radical, and it needs to be broad - but it's not entertainment it is different" (2018, pers. comm.). From this comment, we can see that the perceptions of these changes from within parts of the arts sector, compared to policymakers in government, are very different. This pattern of fragmentation is not new in eroding trust between arts professionals and the political bodies that represent them.

Clive Gray (2000) discusses the dynamics of *centralisation* under the first Labour government, from 1997, and how this created a different register to the challenges described above. Whilst the premise of centralisation is markedly different (reduced local authority support for RABs, increased reporting to ACE, formalisation of the funding system and regular financial planning) the impact on the sector in terms of the confidence in political institutions is quite similar. Gray goes on to say that the:

Financial changes that have taken place have been externally driven by the requirements of central government rather than being derived from internal views of the need for a longer-term planning of expenditure within the arts sector itself. The weaknesses of the arts sector as a policy arena, being perceived as politically relatively unimportant and a minor area of state concern, have contributed to a position where the arts have not really been able to mount any form of meaningful dialogue about what is appropriate to the sector in its own terms and, instead, have been slotted into a framework derived from the concerns of the centre, particularly when the centre itself has become more powerful in policy and oversight matters.

(Gray, 2000, pp. 153-154)

What we can see from recent examples from the past two decades is that there is a palpable disconnect between the arts sector and the different levels of government, but, in particular, central government. Part of the reason for that may lie in the fact

that museums and galleries typically belie the traditional management structures seen in other professional bureaucracies. For example, Gray (2015) suggests that the sector traditionally expects museums and galleries to support professions "functioning through a standardisation of skills, horizontal job specialization and a high degree of decentralization" (110). However, this is an over-simplification of the nature of the professional fields within museums and galleries. Gray goes on to say that, "instead of there being a single core professional basis to museums based around, for example, the 'curator' their multi-functionalism leads to a much more complex mixture of core competencies which contributes to the decentralised autonomy of professional action, but which runs directly counter to the idea of a standardisation of skills and is an example of vertical rather than horizontal specialization" (ibid). This is suggestive of the need for institutions where creative practice is an essential element of their public-facing work, to be able to be reflexive in their ability to perform their obligations as public institutions and the need to be unconstrained in formulating the primary and attendant functions of the gallery or museum. Gray goes on to suggest that the tension between these two traits is a reason organisational fragmentation is more common than one might expect (ibid).

So far, in this chapter, we have seen that the centralisation and decentralisation occur in cultural policy and funding structures. However, we have also seen how neither binary is particularly useful in trying to prescribe an approach to arts funding that is desirable to the sector and different levels of government. Instead, it is perhaps more pertinent to explore other possibilities in the structure and shape of public policy, and in the case of this research, the visual arts. Mark Fisher and Jeremy Gilbert make this point in their text *Reclaim Modernity: Beyond Markets, Beyond Machines* (2014). Fisher is known for his 2009 text *Capitalist Realism* (2009) in which he describes an ambience to contemporary capitalism that forecloses any imagined alternative to that socio-economic system. Furthermore, his concept of hauntology, developed from Derrida's use of the term in *Spectres of Marx* (2006), is a device he uses to illustrate the cultural production that is preoccupied with a cancelled future and the abandonment of the modernist socio-political project (Derrida, 2006; Fisher, 2012, 2013, 2014). Fisher and Gilbert articulate the sense of a lack of viable choices for governance in the present moment:

Our approach is particularly informed by attention to the implicit possibilities of new political, cultural and technological trends. We argue that the current political moment is characterised by widespread disillusionment with both the centralised, paternalistic, bureaucratic state and the neoliberal, market-led policies that have dominated politics across much of the world in recent decades. Our argument considers the various ways of understanding the nature of the modern world which have shaped recent political tendencies, and asks whether there are not trends in contemporary social change which should be welcomed for their creative and democratic potential.

(Fisher & Gilbert, 2014, p. 5)

What Fisher & Gilbert identify is the disaffection that has been palpable over the last decade. The reactionary politics of UKIP and sections of the Conservative party has seen a response on the political Left through Jeremy Corbyn's tenure as Labour party leader (2015-2020). Furthermore, the EU Referendum and the subsequent leadership changes across the two main parties as well as periphery political groups, communicate a sense of rapidly unfolding chaos. Fisher & Gilbert attempt to illustrate that the problems associated with the present 'neoliberal' political structure are not just limited to the fact that it is ideologically opposite radical left politics, but that it is ineffective at what it claims to do. They say:

There is a critical point to grasp here. It is not only that neoliberal mechanisms of administration, centralisation, micro-management and ranking are distasteful. They are also unable to carry out the functions that they claim to fulfil. [...] The problem is that neoliberal solutions to such problems simply do not work. Their effect is merely to privatise such risks [...] Only the democratisation of social problems - socialising risks, enabling the whole community to share them, and therefore lifting the burden from the weakest, whilst also collectivising and distributing decision-making - can actually generate mechanisms and solutions which are themselves sufficiently complex to address such issues

(Fisher & Gilbert, 2014, p. 19)

There are some points to pick out of this passage, but first, it is worth acknowledging that Fisher & Gilbert see *centralisation* as the dominant trend in the structure and organisation of political decision making and resourcing in neoliberal political cultures. This signals their reading of the centralisation-decentralisation dynamic as being the decentralisation of responsibility from the state to the individual, but the centralisation of economic and political power. In a sense, it is this simultaneous decentralisation and centralisation that performs the illusion of neoliberalism being for and of every individual. Secondly, the idea of privatising problems rather than addressing issues resonates directly with the presiding attitudes towards arts funding seen in government and ACE. The push by DCMS towards private funding, philanthropy and selling assets, such as artworks, is all indicative of a process where decisions affecting the services and provision for citizens is passed out of democratic frameworks and into private, often financially motivated interests. Finally, Fisher & Gilbert identify collectivising and distributing decision making as an effective process of addressing the harmful democratic deficit developing in our current political system.

The question of how this plays out in the context of public-funded contemporary art galleries requires a degree of speculation, but there are instances of how there is some movement away from an institutionally prescriptive model. For example, Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) mentioned in his role as director of Nottingham Contemporary, "part of what I've been trying to do in the two years I've been here is to establish a kind of relationship with, I would say, like-minded museums and institutions around the world. So, last year we did a project with the Van Abbemuseum in Eindhoven. Next year we're doing a project with Haus der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin." Furthermore, Thorne goes on to state that, "for me, curatorially or critically I often tend more to think of institutions as defined by those networks within which they operate in as much as the local context" (ibid). Here, I think there are a few issues with the dynamics of the networks Thorne describes. Firstly, whilst comprehensive international networks are a vital support structure for arts institutions, this simply creates a lateral network – which is advantageous to the field position of those institutions. However, there is no implicit incentive to enact the kind of collective decision making that Fisher and Gilbert describe. In fact, Thorne sees international networks as equally important to local contexts. This is not in itself an

issue, as parity does not suggest preference, but the specific dynamics of the democratic deficit in the UK requires a specific and concerted focus. To reiterate Foucault (Foucault et al., 2008), governments are concerned with producing freedom, or at least appearing to. The apparatus, not the narrative, adopted to carry out this process is fundamental to the nature of the product. Thus, marketised bureaucracy produces options and possibilities within the rubric of market logics not with reference to the values and practices of individual sectors. As nominally public spaces, galleries play an implicit role in the local and national politics, if not in a party-political register, then in the constellation of civic space, which is under threat.

The threat to notions of civic or democratic spaces is evidenced by the widening inequality driven by marketised policy. In Davis' words, "In the applied phase of neoliberalism the most flagrant inequality has become deeply entrenched in public and private organisations alike, where it directly expresses – and is a less palatable synonym for – neoliberalism's ruling ethic and primary mode of operation: competition" (2020, p. 67). Davis further qualifies this by stating this is competitive hierarchisation and economic inequality is the principle and product of it (ibid). The fact that governments produce inequality through their actions is why Rancière equates them with the police order and why centralised power continues to grow despite the dispersal of political responsibility.

However, it is essential to exercise caution when advancing towards the kind of localism that has been a feature of the recent reactionary political movement in the UK. Fisher & Gilbert address the implications of resorting to localism over nationalism or decentralisation over centralisation. Their point is that these binary formulations curtail any discourse that attempts to move beyond these parameters. They state:

And do we share the widespread belief that decentralisation is an inherent good, that 'localism' is necessarily the best way to organise all public services? The answer to both questions is 'no'. This is firstly because the problem of management - of how to execute decisions - does not go away even if those decisions have been arrived at democratically. Democratic institutions desperately need effective, dedicated, innovative managers. But

there is all the difference in the world between effective management - or good governance - and managerialism.

(Fisher & Gilbert, 2014, pp. 27-28)

They go on to state the importance of decision-making and governments should not delegate this political act but be a process of collectivity:

This space of strategic decision-making is precisely the domain of politics as such; but what neoliberal, market populist, centralising and managerialist fantasies all imagine - in slightly different ways - is that the inherent difficulty and inconclusiveness which characterise this domain could somehow be done away with, if some logic other than that of deliberation and political negotiation could be allowed to govern instead. The only effective response to these anti-political and anti-democratic fantasies is to insist that there is simply no substitute for democratic politics (by which we mean collective participation in decision-making, not just the delegation of all authority to elected representatives) as the only legitimate means by which the different interests and opinions in play in such contexts can be negotiated.

(Fisher & Gilbert, 2014, p. 29)

Following the logic of Fisher & Gilbert, galleries must reassert their potential as sites of democratic collectivity, rather than agents of the very structures of power they can critique yet adopt a state of paralysis. Part of the role of museums and galleries is to actively challenge notions, such as "contemporary creative placemaking" which "envisions a more decentralized portfolio of spaces acting as creative crucibles. In each, arts and culture exist cheek-by-jowl with private sector export and retail businesses" (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010, p. 3). In these instances, cultural spaces inevitably reinforce the cultural and social capital of those already with an advantageous field position. This is the flaw in the neoliberal logic Fisher & Gilbert critique. In essence, many initiatives do not address social inequalities through the current logics and processes we see in trends like 'contemporary creative placemaking', it simply defers the responsibility from one entity to another, and then the individual.

Furthermore, for individuals and organisations, the bureaucratic maelstrom that is much maligned by those who extol the virtues of neoliberal socio-economic structures is, paradoxically, more abundant. Not only are they more abundant, but they also do not necessarily conform to particular conventions or registers that organisations may be able to navigate through prior experience. Again, this is a condition observed and warned against by Foucault (1980). The neoliberal bureaucracy is idiosyncratic, diffuse and requires a 'feel for the game' that is socially and culturally contingent. Mark Fisher, with a diagnostic eye, elaborates on this paradox at the heart of the neoliberal project. He says:

Initially, it might appear to be a mystery that bureaucratic measures should have intensified under neoliberal governments that have presented themselves as anti-bureaucratic and anti-Stalinist. Yet new kinds of bureaucracy - 'aims and objectives', 'outcomes', 'mission statements' - have proliferated, even as neoliberal rhetoric about the end of top-down, centralized control has gained pre-eminence. It might seem that bureaucracy is a kind of return of the repressed, ironically re-emerging at the heart of a system which has professed to destroy it. But the resurgence of bureaucracy in neoliberalism is more than an atavism or an anomaly.

(Fisher, 2009, p. 40)

What Fisher shows us and what has been discussed throughout this chapter so far, is that the received wisdom of neoliberal, or marketised policy initiatives is that they rely on a degree of misdirection. The cumulative impact of the contradictory moves of decentralisation and centralisation of public institutions is that the upper echelons of traditional social hierarchies entrench political and economic power. For organisations, as well as individuals, this means a democratic deficit and reduced agency in affecting one's future and security.

7.2 Centres and decentres

So far, this chapter has discussed centralisation and decentralisation as a component of marketisation. The dynamics of these processes are convoluted and present themselves in lateral, vertical and omnidirectional formulations – in other

words, a top-down survey of this phenomenon presents a tangled, difficult to decipher picture. To clarify the nature and dynamics of this phenomenon, researchers such as van Maanen (2009), have referred to the categories suggested by Nobuko Kawashima (2001 in van Maanen, 2009; see Kawashima, 1997). The figure below, 7.1, outlines the different elements of Kawashima's model:

Figure 7.1 Nobuko Kawashima's three types of decentralization

Type of decentralization	Cultural	Political	Fiscal
1) what to decentralize	cultural opportunities	decision-making power	resources for the cultural sector
2) with who to be concerned	consumers, but also cultural producers	public authorities	fundors, funded institutions
3) policy goal or measure?	policy goal	policy measure, but also, as a goal	policy measure

Source: Nobuko Kawashima, 2001 in van Maanen, 2009, p. 237.

Van Maanen (2009) points out that in order to ascertain what makes these different types distinctive; cultural, political and fiscal, is to ask the question of what is decentralised? Cultural, political and fiscal decentralisation do not necessarily co-occur – van Maanen points to the fact that we can locate cultural institutions across a country, but there is a centralised decision-making body. Conversely, the local government may own the building a venue uses or be able to dictate how a site is used (ibid). Van Maanen criticises Kawashima's imprecise use of the term 'culture' and instead situates the model with a tighter definition related to visual art in mind, or what he flexibly calls 'aesthetic communication'. Here van Maanen expands on the implications of a genuinely decentralised cultural project:

If, for instance, everyone should have an equal chance to develop his imaginative capacities by participating in artistic communication, much more cultural policy has to be committed than the distribution of artists and

institutions all over a country [...] It has to be said that the presence of art organizations and artists will be a necessary condition for a population to develop the capacities mentioned. In this sense, cultural decentralization can be considered a condition, albeit an insufficient one, to realize aesthetic values within a community.

(van Maanen, 2009, p. 239)

What van Maanen attempts to display here is that meaningful attempts to decentralise culture or art institutions, in order to support an equal public art system, requires an expanded network of art institutions and practitioners outside of urban centres. Not only this, but it also requires a related complementary expansion of education systems to encourage reading and to engage with artistic communication. If we take this point and apply it to the English context of this research, we can see that there are shades of these features, but there is little to suggest that there has been the degree of arts-led decentralisation that could indicate process imagined by van Maanen. Whilst arts infrastructure expanded from the late 1990s to the late 2000s, this has slowed considerably or in some instances declined. The decline in arts and humanities is a much-publicised feature of educational policy since 2010, and these two features are suggestive of the lack of decentralisation in England since 2010 that could advance the access and engagement with artistic, aesthetic communication.

Van Maanen (2009) goes on to question where decision making for arts policy should or should not take place. He points to central, regional and local levels of government as arenas where there is a reason for arts and culture decision making to take place. Though, inevitably, "opinions differ seriously on this point" (ibid, p. 239). He surveys some of the features of these levels of political power and states that "the decentralization of decision-making power in cultural matters does not necessarily do this [...] just because the smaller a population is, the smaller the autonomy of the aesthetic system will be as well and hence, the bigger the influence of the political system" (van Maanen, 2009, p. 239). Van Maanen draws a correlation between the scale of a city or region and the degree to which meaningful decentralisation can take place – partly due to a local population's demand for local 'artistic communications' but also because the scale of the city or region demands a

degree of political autonomy or influence. He suggests that only at this level is there the political expertise and the managerial expertise (also an essential component for Fisher). There is some evidence that this assertion is true, for example, in England, Manchester has seen high profile multi-arts venues such as Home open in the 2010s and their arts and culture funding has been well protected when compared to other cities or regions. Arguably, this because of the factors listed above. However, there is a risk of assuming that only expanding urban environments can sustain relatively autonomous art practices. Furthermore, if the profile of a city or region is so elevated when compared to their neighbours, then this soon becomes at least perceived as another centre (van Maanen, 2009, pp. 237-239).

If the tensions of decentralisation, real or imagined, are taken to have palpable destabilising effects, then it is reasonable to ask why it remains a potent part of the rhetoric of contemporary politics in England. Mark Fisher, in his 2009 text, *Capitalist Realism*, argues neoliberal political actors tend to present it as an antidote to 'big government', and in this way decentralisation acts as an important rhetorical device. Fisher makes a similar observation to Foucault (1980) and Hibou (2017) in that the scale of state bureaucracies is presented as an apparatus of domination, yet this overlooks the dizzying impracticalities of private bureaucracy. He says, "although excoriated by both neoliberalism and neoconservatism, the concept of the Nanny State continues to haunt capitalist realism. The spectre of big government plays an essential libidinal function for capitalist realism" (Fisher, 2009, p. 63). This is the opposite to what Baudrillard called the "immense mother-image" that typified nation-states in the twentieth-century (Baudrillard, 1996, p. 176). Not only this, but it can act as a useful foil for the missteps in government policy, again, it can function as a means for deflecting responsibility and culpability. Fisher again, says, "James Meek observed in an LRB piece on water privatization in Britain, 'Conservative and Labour governments have discovered that when they give powers to private companies, and those private companies screw up, voters blame the government for giving the powers away, rather than the companies for misusing them'" (2009, p. 63). Although this example is referring to slightly different circumstances, we can see comparable instances in arts and cultural policy. For example, Newcastle City Council announced 100% cuts to its arts budget, partly to agitate a debate about the severity and depth of cuts handed down by the central government. However, this gambit did

not seem to highlight the extreme agenda of the Conservative-led governments since 2010, but was represented in the press as apparent poor leadership.

The fact that large, domineering institutions loom so large in some sectors, means that they are a more identifiable target for criticism by organisations who do not feel best represented by them. Here, Heller shares her criticism of the funding system in England; "the whole system is about being very prescriptive, about having to do this, it's going to cost this much money and can I have the money, which can be, it can be an impetus for creativity. But it can also be restricting, in terms of offering that freedom of well, what would you do if you this much, there's a different mindset associated with that position. I don't think that is ever going to happen" (2018, pers. comm.). This point is echoed by Munro, who states, "I would like our Arts Council to be bolder in its vision. I'd love to see that, and I'll happily work with them in that way" (2018, pers. comm.). Both of these points are suggestive of how many perceive centralised policymaking as being restrictive and cumbersome. However, the real issue here is the accompanying, cumbersome bureaucratic processes. Munro and Heller see the strains on arts organisations in terms of being overburdened with reporting processes as being directly linked to the inhibited creativity of arts organisations.

The fact suggestion that central bureaucracies have become more complex, bloated and demanding, is perhaps a symptom of the diffuse ways in which contemporary society collates and exchanges information and data. Hibou suggests that "figures are indices that impoverish reality insofar as they emerge from a process of aggregation" (Hibou, 2017, p. 210) so that they mask as much as they reveal. Franco Berardi draws a line between the proliferation of digital technologies and the inability of states to govern effectively from the centre. Berardi (2014) says, "because of the proliferation of information exchange, the intensity and speed of circulation of social information has grown too fast for centralized knowledge and political control" (171). In the reporting culture of England's visual arts sector, this has repeatedly been highlighted as an issue that stifles creativity and independence for arts organisations and practitioners. Berardi goes on to highlight that this data-obsessed political culture erodes the ability for acceptable democratic systems. He says, "rational government is therefore impossible, as a critical discrimination and

determination of the sequence of events and information is impossible. Here comes the governance mode: the abstract concatenation of technical functions replaces conscious elaboration, social negotiation and democratic decision" (ibid, p. 171). Berardi helps to illustrate the incongruous formulation of centralised power and resources but wholly diffuse data systems further ingrained in the mechanisms of government. The technological advances of the last decade (high-speed broadband, smartphones and devices) are worth highlighting briefly if only to indicate that the ability to collect data and exchange it has accelerated rapidly. This has changed the relationship between the citizen-consumer and the nation-state in a fundamental way, as individuals are no longer in a loose transactional relationship with the state as a service provider and the individual as a taxable entity with a degree of power to hold the state to account. However, citizens are a resource that generates data through their activities, behaviours and consumer habits. The bureaucracy of neoliberalism, or capitalist realism as Fisher would call it, is deliberate and tangible as a set of procedures and conventions to observe consciously, but it is also an unconscious procedure of digital interactions and transmission.

Again, Fisher makes a cogent point about the experience of bureaucracy in everyday life, despite the apparent objections by neoliberal and neoconservative about top-down government administration. He says:

Neoliberal ideologues often excoriated the top-down bureaucracy which supposedly led to institutional sclerosis and inefficiency in command economies. With the triumph of neoliberalism, bureaucracy was supposed to have been made obsolete; a relic of an unlamented Stalinist past. Yet this is at odds with the experiences of most people working and living in late capitalism, for whom bureaucracy remains very much a part of everyday life. Instead of disappearing, bureaucracy has changed its form; and this new, decentralized, form has allowed it to proliferate. The persistence of bureaucracy in late capitalism does not in itself indicate that capitalism does not work - rather, what it suggests is that the way in which capitalism does actually work is very different from the picture presented by capitalist realism. (Fisher, 2009, pp. 18-20)

If the self-image of neoliberal bureaucratic systems are not as they are presented or in keeping with the nation state's presiding rhetoric, then it is reasonable to ask, what form does it take? Is there any analogue or do these structures represent something specific and unique to this time and context? Furthermore, what is an effective antidote to these conditions? Again, Fisher (2009) responds to these issues. He says, "Žižek is right to argue that, far from constituting any kind of progressive corrective to official capitalist ideology, liberal communism constitutes the dominant ideology of capitalism now. 'Flexibility', 'nomadism' and 'spontaneity' are the very hallmarks of management in a post-Fordist, Control society" (ibid, p. 28). Since 2009, these conditions have intensified – the Conservative government's celebration of low unemployment is countered with the rise of in-work poverty and casualisation. The issue, as Fisher correctly diagnoses, is that the binary discussions of centralisation and decentralisation forecloses collective opposition – "But the problem" says Fisher, "is that any opposition to flexibility and decentralization risks being self-defeating, since calls for inflexibility and centralization are, to say the least, not likely to be very galvanizing" (ibid, p. 28).

This section's discussions have moved towards an expanded assessment of the role and location of bureaucracy in contemporary societies. However, it is worth considering these issues regarding an art museum and gallery context. On this point, Frey (2000) offers a comprehensive overview, although it is important to note that in the two decades since publication, cultural policy and arts infrastructure in England has experienced significant highs, but also unparalleled lows. Frey first acknowledges that the diverse functions of a museum or gallery mean that a "centralized bureaucracy organized along a functional division of tasks is ill suited to provide a 'total experience' for the visitors. It is difficult or impossible to efficiently coordinate functions such as the classic curatorial activities, renovation of paintings, upkeep of the buildings or ticketing by a central directorate" (ibid, p. 60). Instead "process orientated" organisational structures are preferable. However, these are not "exogenously given" processes, "rather, the management has the crucial task of determining what these processes are for a particular [...] museum" (ibid, p. 61).

The degree of decentralisation of museums, Frey suggests, is also dependent on the amount of tacit knowledge that flows between activities. Frey indicates that tacit

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

knowledge takes different forms, and its form impacts on its transferral. Frey says, "activities which depend strongly on such tacit knowledge (such as the organization of special exhibitions) should therefore be kept within the organizational structure, while activities where the transfer of tacit knowledge is less important (such as the museum restaurant) can well be decentralized in the form of a profit center" (2000, pp. 63-64).

If we expand beyond the organisational structure of museums, then we can see some of the underlying mechanisms seen in centralised and decentralised states with regards to arts funding and cultural policy. Frey (2000) succinctly summarises two archetypal systems; "A centralized government, on the one hand, is a monopolistic supplier of publicly provided goods and services. In a decentralized system, on the other hand, there is a differentiated supply from which citizens and firms may choose. These institutional differences strongly affect the supply of art" (ibid, p. 133). Frey suggests that the centralised system requires greater conformity to the "formal requirements" set by the state and that it can limit artistic freedom due to the prescriptive, aesthetic positions the nation-state holds (ibid). I would suggest that this is less to do with the inherent constraints of a centralised system but more to do with entrenched conservatism in political systems coupled with their suspicion of the political implications of expansive and experimental modernist projects.

Frey also suggests that federal systems or other forms of decentralisation can provide other options for creative freedoms. He says:

Artists and art groups out of line with what is defined as "good art", or even as "art", by the government find it most difficult, and even impossible, to get public support. If their art is not, or not yet, marketable, they have to emigrate or to wait until a government comes to power with an arts policy that suits them better. In a federal system of government, an artist has alternative sources of government support to turn to. The possibility of tapping funds by geographically moving enlarges artistic freedom.
(Frey, 2000, p. 134)

The corrective Frey identifies is recognisable at present, but I would contest that this is particularly desirable. Much like Fisher's reference to Žižek's likening of liberal communism to the demands of capitalist realism, Frey's nomadic artist becomes akin to the journeyman footballer – professional, nomadic and somewhat disconnected from the communities they inhabit. In this sense there is another register of artistic compromise taking place – creative practice is not just the product of effective manoeuvring in the cultural field – its reception is also highly dependent on the context in which it made. To give a recent example, artist Rachel Horne has written on the process by which an established artist, Laurence Edwards, was commissioned to make a series of works dedicated to miners and their families in Doncaster. Some of the works subsequently went on sale in a Mayfair gallery, including a bronze of Rachel Horne's head. To this, she said, "If Laurence and the gallery man actually listened to our culture and story they would understand the last place my dead grandad would want his granddaughter's head to be, would be in Mayfair? This is not the right context for our story. This is your middle-class culture, your way of making art, and your banking system for rich people" (Horne, 2020). What Horne has aptly identified is a dissatisfaction with the movement of cultural capital in situations such as this – while the project initially signals a desire to encourage artistic communication to address the narratives and experiences of communities outside of traditional art institutions, it undoes this intention by returning a commodity to the centre and capitalising on the cultural capital that such a project engenders for the artist. These processes cut the community out of any such benefit.

7.3 London vs Regions

The incident described at the end of the previous section alludes to a recurring tension in the discussion of centralisation and decentralisation – the tension between a centralised field of cultural production, London and the rest of the country. One of the issues that persist is that despite the apparent attempts at decentralising the London-centric arts, in times of economic hardship, regional museums and galleries have to make greater justifications for their practices than similar organisations in the capital. Sarah Munro comments about this dynamic; she says, "one of the things I found quite interesting around the BALTIC is that is very respected amongst a lot of very different gatekeepers and players, so it's all about the how you use the thing

that you have regardless of scale or size. So, looking across the North as a whole, why shouldn't we have a big institution? It shouldn't just be focused in London" (2018, pers. comm.). This is, of course, correct, but the issue has developed from asking 'why shouldn't we', to 'how can we'. The drastic cuts to local authority funding and the push towards private funding offer a different set of challenges to regional galleries than London institutions, as has been discussed in previous chapters.

Part of the process of decentralisation, at least in an English context, is the significant reform of local government. Whilst the implications on discretionary spending have already been mentioned – it is worth highlighting the fact that the central government is pushing councils towards being increasingly self-funded and shouldering higher risks. It is imaginable that in such conditions, public assets, such as gallery and museum spaces will pass out of the hands of local councils. This has already happened to a degree, with organisations such as mima and Nottingham Contemporary seeing their primary supporter (locally) shifting from the local authority to universities. Smith et al. comment on these trends at a local government level:

The local government finance system in England is undergoing genuinely revolutionary change. A highly-centralised system of funding, with central government grants allocated on the basis of councils' relative spending need, is set to be replaced by a system where councils as a group are self-funding and individual councils bear far more spending and revenue risk. The aim of all this is to give councils stronger financial incentives to grow local economies and address underlying spending demand pressures. Accompanying this change will be simplified powers for councils to cut business rates.

Decentralisation will be incomplete though – central government plans to keep a tight rein on councils' ability to increase council tax and business rates bills. In Scotland and Wales, little has changed so far, but the next few years could see significant reforms to local tax bases.

(N. A. Smith, Phillips, Simpson, Elser, & Trickey, 2016, p. 1)

For Munro, she suggests that the decentralisation of art institutions, as it stands, does not constitute devolved powers to affect policy and the future of the sector in a broader sense. She says, "the majority of the decisions surrounding policy are very

much influenced from out of London. I think it's really challenging for the North East to feel that influence and have those conversations in the way that in Scotland I felt we could" (2018, pers. comm.) furthermore, she suggests that losing regional decision-making bodies limits the scope for a diverse art infrastructure in the North East – "with Northern Arts what you can see when there was really powerful devolved leadership in the North and in the North East" but in their absence, "I do feel that there hasn't been any power shifted out of London" (ibid).

Interestingly, Thorne (2018, pers. comm.) does not display the same concern with the London-region divide. He says, "I'd never given much thought to a London non-London split. Maybe it was just because I didn't know much about the funding situation. I tend to think more in terms of networks. So not only would the ways in which some of these institutions networked within the UK, but the kind of networks that are operating within internationally". Whilst Thorne is speaking from the position of his role and institutional position, it is hard to conceive of the visual arts in England without the wealth, education, art market, public and private galleries, employment opportunities, without acknowledging that London operated in conditions unique to itself. Understandably, discussing these issues can compound the sense that London is the only guarantor of artistic excellence. However, there has to be some responsibility and awareness of galleries inside and outside of the capital to deliberate and engage with a cultural field that is so completely overshadowed by one space.

Not only has the power not shifted away to London, but Munro also suggests that the policymakers have reduced arm's-length principle to the point it is no longer operative. She says, "now there is virtually no arm's-length principle anymore. I'm going back to my experiences more in Scotland, used to be a very strong arm's-length between the body that was developing culture in Scotland and a more political processes of government and now they're not" (2018, pers. comm.). Under a less convoluted centralised system, the arm's-length principle allowed for (a degree) of creative and artistic autonomy. Without a sense of that existing, Munro is suggesting that cultural policy has become more prescriptive.

Furthermore, the conditions of a neoliberal state, as opposed to liberal democracy, inhibit the capacity for groups to modify their own experiences outside of marketplace logics. Foucault speaks of the role modification in the development of functional societies. He says, "one finds all sorts of support mechanisms (unions of employers, chambers of commerce, etc.) which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place - so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it" (1980, p. 203).

However, it is vital to stress that whilst there are concrete figures to suggest an imbalance between London, the South East and the rest of the country, this affects organisations in various ways. For example, the recent research report commissioned by CVAN (see Hopkin, 2020) engaged with a number of arts organisations and practitioners across the North of England. Although there was a general understanding that funding and opportunities are unequal when compared to the capital, there were many responses to this issue. Whereas some larger organisations felt the pressure to mirror the 'excellence' of major institutions in London, many found it more productive to respond directly to local contexts, to use their position to respond effectively to regional concerns and not to emulate what is *de rigueur* in the London-centric art practices. In short, there is a palpable concern about the difficulty in participating in the national conversation from a regional or local position, however that has not prevented vital and resourceful practices taking place outside of the capital.

7.4 Structure of the field of public art organisations

In the final section of this chapter, we will explore what the lasting impact of decentred public responsibility but concentrated political and economic power has on the structure of the field of public art and the practices occurring within this field. David Beech has written on the relationship between art and value from a Marxist economic perspective. Here he questions the ontological nature of art, artists and art institutions in a hegemonic neoliberal political structure:

Are artworks subsumed, or have artists been subsumed? Have art's institutions been subsumed, and can institutions of counter subsumption be built? Such questions might prove to be fertile grounds for further research, but they must first overcome a fundamental indeterminacy. How does the real subsumption of art explain how art is or is not transformed by the processes of industrialisation, centralisation, technologisation, the division of labour and the conscious application of science that characterises the capitalist mode of production?

(Beech, 2015, p. 17)

It is clear that whilst there are myriad critiques of the current trends in the structure of the field of public art, it would be amiss to suggest that all forms of cultural production, including visual art in public galleries, is wholly subsumed by capitalist structures. One should pursue critiques that exist, and one should confront the fragmentation of state support for a semi-autonomous artist production. The present moment poses an acute threat to how we produce and receive art, but at this moment, it is not terminal. Beech goes on to point out that, "for Marx, 'genuinely artistic (and scientific) activities can never come to the situation of 'real subsumption under capital'. As he repeatedly stressed, they can be 'formally' subsumed under capitalist relations of production only to a limited degree" (Beech, 2015, pp. 244-245). Here, we are, of course talking about the *total* subsumption of art under capital – a point of no return. Whilst we are not there, it does not mean that the trajectory of the state's relationship with art is not heading towards this point.

Part of the difficulty in arresting such a trajectory is the combination of sectoral weakness of the arts in England and precedents set regarding accountability for neoliberal economics and the marketisation of all aspects of the lived experience. Berardi uses the example of the 2008 financial crash and the disruption seen in Greece in 2010 to illustrate the fact that in a system beyond regulation and accountability, this system can short-circuit reformist agendas.

This is the perverse logic of meritocracy. Once a system grows sufficiently complex, it doesn't matter how badly our best and brightest foul things up. Every crisis increases their authority, because they seem to be the only ones

who understand the system well enough to fix it. But their fixes tend to make the system even more complex and centralized, and more vulnerable to the next national-security surprise, the next natural disaster, the next economic crisis.

(Berardi, 2014, p. 181)

The crises that will affect England and the UK political system are relatively predictable. In essence, the issue of Brexit, Scottish independence, climate change, social inequality and the casualisation of labour are several issues that can further condition the dynamics of power throughout the 2020s. One of the outcomes of this uncertain future is the fact that long-termism is disappearing from the register of daily life and the function and role of public institutions. Fisher's concept of capitalist realism takes cues from Foucault et al. (2008) and Hibou's (2017) observation that the excesses of marketisation produce a sense of inescapable participation in a politicised, capitalism apparatus, thus making any alternative unthinkable and unimaginable. He makes a point of acknowledging the fragmentation such labour conditions create:

The slogan which sums up the new conditions is 'no long term'. Where formerly workers could acquire a single set of skills and expect to progress upwards through a rigid organizational hierarchy, now they are required to periodically re-skill as they move from institution to institution, from role to role. As the organization of work is decentralized, with lateral networks replacing pyramidal hierarchies, a premium is put on, flexibility.

(Fisher, 2009, p. 32)

As museums and galleries pursue further cost-saving measures, the prevalence of insecure employment has become endemic in the cultural sector. Furthermore, the professions that are required to aid the financial stability are themselves often sectors where flexibility is a contingent part of the job role. For example, Heller points out that, "the recruitment of fundraisers is not always easy and often fundraisers move quite frequently from one organization to the next, because the demand is so great and that they can afford to do that" (2018, pers. comm.). Whilst in individual cases this may be of mutual benefit, it also signals a lack of continuity and the

inability to plan even in the medium-term for ensuring the necessary professional roles are supported within an organisation "what you can't get money for, is the kind of core admin staff; finance, marketing or these kinds of services [...] and that has been a constant pressure and strain and continues to be so, and I think it can be quite restricting to creativity" (ibid). This paints a picture of a de-professionalised sector in which the core staff have to cover numerous specialised professional roles. Whilst this does not extend to curatorial and programme staff (although low pay and instability affect these roles as well), it is suggestive of the sectoral weakness at this present time.

It is worth noting that SLG is a London-based gallery, of a medium size but with a well-respected history and exhibition programme. Of course, there are disparities and unevenness in the capital, but the concentration of audience, resources, national and sector-specific media evidence the recourse for sustainable organisations in the arts. As Kate Oakley et al., state, "a city whose fortunes have long been decoupled from that of its host nation, London is the financial, political, educational, and cultural capital of the United Kingdom. It represents a degree of centralization which has, wisely, not been replicated by most other countries" (2017, pp. 1510-1511). If the conditions in London are such that organisations cannot employ sufficient staff, then this a suggestive barometer for the rest of the country. Whilst there are exceptions and highly contingent local contexts, the national picture for the future of the arts and public galleries is grim. Not only have resources disappeared, but political developments have also restructured the field of public art organisations to the point that change can only be made by subtraction rather than addition. This has weakened the sector and taken the future of many public-funded art organisations outside of the responsibility and support of democratic structures.

7.5 Conclusion

Chapter Seven has brought together an analysis of the centralisation and decentralisation of power and capital in the arts. The trends in England since 2010 partly reinforce the notion that decentralisation is a feature of the marketisation of cultural policy, but this only illustrates one aspect of the dynamics of power and capital. The processes of decentralisation that occurred since 2010 are typified by

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

the transferral of responsibility from centralised institutions, such as the national government, to local or regional bodies, such as LAs. However, political and economic capital has not followed this transferral of responsibility. These trends suggest the shifting nature of cultural policy and arts funding, and how the recent political programmes of the Coalition and Conservative governments have disrupted continuity and connection between practitioners, art organisations and policy-makers or funding bodies. City institutions assume a representational role, yet the depth and relevance of this representational role is challenged by the longstanding weakness of the sector in terms of who is included and excluded in this representation and how policy and funding crises add to this weak representation. Arts organisations and arts professionals respond to and understand the meaning of representation in various ways. As we have seen, they offer a cogent insight into marketisation. Their experiences demonstrate the ways in which political and economic programmes filter from the national level to organisations, publics and individuals.

As this chapter has indicated arts policy in England has gone through many periods of centralisation and decentralisation, but these are not all indicative of a longstanding trend towards marketisation. For example, *A Policy for the Arts: The First Steps* (J. Lee, 1965) suggested decentralisation of cultural policy to respond to the changing tastes and cultural influences in Britain at the time. This is an example of how decentring the art world or field of cultural production is possible outside of the rubric of marketisation, but also how it is desirable. However, this depends on a programme of decentralisation that is redistributive across political, cultural and economic components. The processes of decentralisation in England since 2010, encapsulated by the distancing of local government from the central government show no such positive or progressive redistribution. The impact has been the isolation of localities and regions from decision-making and the lack of ability to make meaningful long-term plans for the arts.

The features of marketisation, such as the idea of 'consumer sovereignty' are key elements of liberal political and economic discourse and Conservative politicians such as Jeremy Hunt and Ed Vaizey, amongst others have forwarded this narrative. The mixed-funding models supported by this theory profoundly impact on how art is produced and received. It equates artistic and creative freedoms with consumer

choice – this is, of course, anathema to many artists and organisations who are concerned with the critical discourse of visual art. The 'consumer sovereignty' trend further reinforces the sense of isolation of arts organisations from policy-making and decision-making, as it implies that there is a single, overriding narrative that subsumes others – the market will decide what is shown and seen.

Over this chapter and previous, I have attempted to show how Rancière's idea of the police order is relevant to understanding the coercive elements of policy and administration in the visual arts sector. Arts organisations are coerced into observing and then adopting marketised logics and professional practice. Increasingly, the bureaucratic structures governing the arts in England assess success in economic terms. These bureaucracies are constituent parts of the police order which "undertakes the mass surveillance and 'profiling' of its citizens in an attempt to govern not only the present but the future" (O. Davis, 2020, p. 75).

The processes of centralisation and decentralisation in England since 2010 have added emphasis to the importance of private wealth in public funded arts. This issue has led to a reassessment of the structure of the visual art field. Despite the efforts since the 1990s to open up meaningful participation in the arts, more than ever, those with high levels of financial capital have fewer obstacles in circumventing the artistic and professional discourse of the field and elevate their own field position.

Figures such as van Maanen suggests that meaningful attempts to decentralise culture or art institutions need an expanded network of art institutions and practitioners outside established centres of the practice and reception of the arts. He also stresses the importance of education systems to complement traditional arts infrastructures, such as galleries and studios. In an English context, it is clear that the expansion of art infrastructure during the 1990s and 2000s conforms to the idea of decentralisation van Maanen supports. However, the austerity programmes of the past decade reduced the capacity of arts organisations to develop and mature or have led to the closure of some spaces. Furthermore, the educational reforms since 2010 have reduced the opportunities for arts and humanities education across all levels of education. Therefore, the idea and potential of positive decentralisation have been hindered significantly by the funding decisions and policies of successive

governments since 2010. This is also linked to the idea Foucault forwards about the importance of being able to modify one's experience and promote functional societies (Foucault, 1980). In a scenario of reduced funding, withdrawn political influence and a weakened decision-making apparatus, the options for engineering positive institutional change narrow. If galleries, artists and audiences have a dwindling ability to modify the practices they engage in, then the potency and criticality of visual art is diluted.

Another outcome of marketisation is the instability of employment in the arts. Cost-saving measures have impacted workers in the cultural sector considerably. The push for leaner and more competitive organisations has had the effect of creating a de-professionalised sector that expects workers to take on numerous specialised professional roles. The curatorial and programme staff remains a necessary corrective to this trend, though the disruption to arts education means that there will be arts professionals drawn from an increasingly narrow section of society. The features of marketisation discussed here are suggestive of the sectoral weakness at this present time. However, there is also an awareness within the sector of these trends, and there are moves or attempts to modify these conditions rather than rigidly following the marketisation narrative imposed by central government.

Chapter Eight: Conclusions - Resistance, Agitation, Criticality.

This thesis demonstrates that the presiding narrative of funding cuts being the main issue impacting the arts sector overlooks many crucial details of cultural policy. By exploring visual arts NPOs and the responses of senior arts professionals through the lens of marketisation, we can see the visual arts field changing through Conservative public policy's direct influence. The cuts to public spending are, of course, the most directly affecting conditions that organisations face, and their depth and severity should not be understated. However, I have shown that this is part of a broader political project that undermines public access to the arts. It is my view that since 2010 there has been a unique sense of paralysis as the national government has divested itself from the responsibility of supporting the arts and local government. Furthermore, the national government has simultaneously reduced and centralised the remaining decision-making power and resources for public contemporary visual art galleries which could otherwise enable them to enact positive and ambitious programmes. The Conservative party has insisted on passing responsibility from the government to the individual, conversely, public galleries promote ideas of collective responsibility between public institutions and the public.

Throughout my research, I have posited public-funded arts organisation as one type of many public institutions crucial to our deliberate, incidental but, more often than not, collective engagement with politics and democracy. With this in mind, I suggest that the visual arts are not a *guarantor* of democracy based on equality, but they are certainly a *barometer* of this condition. M. Gray & Barford say, "austerity pushed down to the level of local government in the UK has resulted in (i) a shrinking capacity of the local state to address inequality, (ii) increasing inequality between local governments themselves and (iii) intensifying issues of territorial injustice" (2018, p. 543). For many public institutions in England, including the arts, this has eroded any sense of a positive turn in the future and is nothing more than a cynical brand of faux sustainability. As Fisher (2009) says, "[t]he slogan which sums up the new conditions is 'no long term'" (38).

One recurring issue in my research is how to make clear demarcations between 'then' and 'now'. How do we account for the present moment's singular features

whilst also acknowledging a genealogy with previous political phases? If it is possible to assert a distinction between pre-and post-2010, I will lean towards Fisher's quote above. Fisher was writing in 2009 about the generalised condition of late-capitalism and the arts sector was absolutely part of that rubric then, as it is now. However, I believe that the aggressive, enforced changes to the arts sector are clear and abundant. Funding changes, the narrative and influence related to private funding and power dynamics are demonstrable, palpable shifts.

However, that is not to say that there are no critical continuities with previous cultural policy phases. The Arts Council has particular cultural traits that endure. Some of these are positive, but the body is also deserving of criticism. There are also precedents for the successes and failures of policy and funding devolution, as well as a sustained history of business involvement in the arts in England. For example, ASBA, the organisational culture promoted by Keynes, or what Pinnock (2006) calls, "the aristocratic patronage function" (177) all point to existing structural issues in the arts in England. It is clear that the arts have always had to manage flux in terms of their political standing and funding. Furthermore, it has always navigated the gap between the self-declared enriching or democratic function of the arts and the reality that a narrow section of society is influential in this arena.

With reference to Foucault and Rancière's ideas of power, knowledge and governance, this work explored how the administration and bureaucracy of the visual arts in England is a key vector for marketisation. Oliver Davis (2020) three components of marketised bureaucracies draw on these ideas. He says:

(i) that neoliberal capitalism's 'stealth revolution' is primarily effected by way of a proliferation of bureaucracies;

(ii) that these bureaucracies reconstruct the world as an array of 'overlapping competitions'

(iii) that competitive hierarchisation ('ranking') is the key bureaucratic form, or process, in each of these administrative fiefdoms"

(O. Davis, 2020, p. 60).

Rancière's concept of the police order links to his critique of liberal representative democracy and the mechanisms of coercion engrained in everyday life. When applied to the visual arts sector, it is clear that programmes of marketisation are indeed prevalent forms of coercion in this sector. Arts organisations are either incentivised or coerced into adopting marketised logics and professional practice. As we have seen, the bureaucratic structures governing the arts in England assess success in economic terms. Theories of power emerging from the work of Foucault, helps to elucidate how issues such as sponsorship are a social form of power. Marketisation opens the doors for private entities to exert influence and power by conditioning public, cultural spaces. This has implications on the self-determination of the visual arts, or to use Foucauldian terminology, the dwindling ability to 'modify' one's reality.

There is a deliberate distancing of arts organisations from decision-making, which severs the arts' capacity to modify the social experience at a local and national level. The antidote is not just a question of funding; it is a question of reformulating arts infrastructure, not in the models that have been adopted since the 1980s, altered under New Labour and weakened by the Coalition and Conservative governments, but as spaces that support artists and communities. This process requires understanding the essential and uncompromising link between sites of artistic experience and the democratic functions of the local and national government. Democracy is a vast, amorphous concept; public galleries actualise democratic values and put them into practise.

I have tried to address the relationship between government and the arts by looking at the tension between public and private interests in the cultural field. I began this research with a partially informed mistrust of art-business relationship, I have ended this project convinced that this relationship causes far more harm than good. However, this project's more personal aim was to understand and articulate what is theoretically and practically problematic about how and why art and money meet. I have worked in the arts sector and experienced the positive critical environment that this offers, but also the worry and precarity of a zero hours contract. My work impacted my perception of the sector and led me to question if a highly stratified

organisation is the best vehicle to display art and promote ideas of participation and inclusivity. This experience was undoubtedly a motivation for this research, however, as the research progressed, I was able to move from my position as an 'employee' to researcher concerned with the interaction between socio-economic issues and public-funded visual arts.

There are relatively direct theoretical routes to elucidate this issue. For example, in *Neoliberal Culture* (2016) Jim McGuigan points to figures such as Charles Saatchi as an example of how to translate financial power into other types of power, or capital. This exchange is also an interaction between an individual or organisation's commercial interests and their aesthetic judgments, preferences, and tastes. This interaction has historically played out in private or commercial settings, yet public spaces are increasingly subject to this same relationship. This is why figures such as McGuigan find the trend towards marketisation to be alarming and incompatible with the notion of artistic production and reception as something that is, as much as possible, carried out in a semi-autonomous environment.

The concerns about the presence of sponsorship and philanthropy as a replacement for public funding are warranted. Whilst some organisations and practices will wilt and cease to exist if this trend continues, others will operate but with financial dependency on a pool of wealthy individuals and organisations whose interests in art, its production and reception, cannot be fully extricated from their financial interests. The idea of the public gallery as a critical component of democratic practice and as an incubator for creativity outside of financialised production is clearly incompatible with this trend. However, contexts differ depending on location, and the tendencies to restructure the arts' funding and governance over the past two decades has created a fractured system. For many, the notion of a 'future' for the arts where they play a fundamental role, is hard to envisage.

Intensified marketisation has created a new set of *demands* for public art galleries. Public-funded contemporary art galleries and their sister cultural organisations have always had some obligation to fulfil policy initiatives in exchange for public money. However, since 2010, the national government has demanded that the arts sector seek increasingly diverse funding sources, with their success or failure to meet this

demand being a key metric in their perceived 'value'. I believe that this aspect of marketisation is corrosive and that we must find ways of distancing ourselves from notions of 'consumer sovereignty'. The repackaging of citizens as consumers is a critical element of liberal political and economic discourse, and Conservative politicians such as Jeremy Hunt and Ed Vaizey, amongst others, have forwarded this narrative.

Mixed-funding models have bipartisan support in English politics (though the weighting differs), which profoundly impacts how art is produced and received. The Conservative party preference for heavy private to minimal public investment equates artistic and creative freedoms with consumer choice – this is, of course, anathema to many artists and organisations concerned with the critical discourse of visual art. The 'consumer sovereignty' trend further reinforces the sense of isolation of arts organisations from policy-making and decision-making, as it implies that there is a single, overriding narrative that subsumes others. In essence, the market will decide what galleries show and audiences see.

An important impression from this research is the difference between austerity and marketisation. In English politics and policy, these two phenomena are deeply entwined. Austerity withdraws money from public services – marketisation is a larger economic policy framework where profit is extracted from public services. Both of these phenomena restructure socio-political relations. For example, I concurred with McGuigan's analysis that marketisation and the neoliberal culture promoted under the Conservative and coalition governments contain an inherent contradiction where "individual freedom is constantly extolled yet, in practice, neoliberal regimes are authoritarian" (McGuigan, 2016, p. 21). Furthermore, I suggested that this contradiction has fed into cultural policy and the promotion of privatised funding in the arts. As I evidenced, the DCMS and its proxy, ACE, have refuted privatisation criticisms and insisted that private money *promoted* artistic freedom, rather than inhibiting it (Culture Media and Sport Committee, 2011, p. 2). However, there is theoretical and practical evidence to the contrary. As van Maanen says, "patronage and sponsorship are typically forms in which the aesthetic freedom is an issue to be negotiated. Sometimes the aims of both parties match completely, but in many other cases, one of the parties, or both, have to compromise" (van Maanen, 2009, p. 21).

The Coalition and Conservative governments since 2010 have asphyxiated the arts by denying financial oxygen. The evidence for this is clear and abundant. The harsh financial climate has left Local Authorities with scant resources to provide even statutory services, and their prioritising of the arts is, understandably, uncommon. DCMS has cut its core funding to ACE, and whilst NPOs have not incurred the bulk of those cuts, it does leave them with a weakened national body representing their interests.

Furthermore, the processes of centralisation and decentralisation in England since 2010 have added emphasis to the importance of private wealth in public-funded arts. This issue has led to a reassessment of the structure of the visual art field. Despite the efforts since the 1990s to open up meaningful participation in the arts, more than ever, those with high levels of financial capital have fewer obstacles in circumventing the artistic and professional discourse of the field and elevate their field position. One of the outcomes of financial restructuring is the erosion of the 'arm's length' principle – it is through this mechanism, the 'rules' become 'demands'.

Furthermore, as financial strife consumes the arts, their imaginative, creative and social potential dwindles. Although my interviews highlighted the positive aspects of galleries and their relationship with artists and their publics, there was a clear sense that policy and funding concerns were taking a significant toll. As Conservative cultural policy forced galleries to seek alternative funding sources, galleries' organisational structure changed. This shift has occurred at the expense of experimentation, risk-taking and the potential for long-term strategies. Mark Fisher (2009) points to an inherent contradiction in the prevailing narrative of contemporary politics. Changes to the public sector with marketised inflexions are presented by proponents of this economic framework, such as the Conservative party, as revolutionary with the potential to advance social progress.

Nevertheless, time and again, they have regressive outcomes – marketisation is not a means for innovation; it is purely reactionary. As marketisation shrinks access to arts and culture, the beneficiaries of this economic formulation still have the ability to access elite, class-bound cultural experiences. In this way, the experiential cost of

marketisation is always borne by the public. Fisher says, "such innovations are unthinkable now that the public has been displaced by the consumer. The effect of permanent structural instability, the 'cancellation of the long term', is invariably stagnation and conservatism, not innovation. This is not a paradox" (2009, p. 76).

What is singular about the post-2010 era is that paralyzing contradictions are embedded in the register of cultural policy and arts funding. Of course, contradictions are not new in themselves, in the mid-2000s many critics identified "the widening gap between rhetoric (for the benefit of all) and realization (the benefit of a small ruling class) is now all too visible" (D. Harvey, 2005, p. 203), but we can see that this is not only visible, but alternatives are unimaginable. This is how marketisation is not only embedded in the practices of government departments, NDPBs, public galleries and their agents; it is embedded in the very register of thought in these different arenas.

In my thesis, I identified several critical aspects of marketisation in England and how these shape public-funded arts organisations. As I have mentioned, reductions to public-funding and organisational restructuring are visible aspects of marketisation in public-funded galleries. However, these features only partially account for corrosive changes within the arts sector. The pressure exerted by the central government to seek sponsorship signals an attempt at covert partial-privatisation. Furthermore, the government's decentralisation narrative masks the very real centralisation of political and financial power in the capital.

I offered a variety of evidence for my argument throughout this research. Firstly, I collated and presented pertinent data from ACE NPOs concerning their funding arrangements and the visual arts portfolio's contraction. With reference to this data, I interviewed three directors from ACE's visual arts portfolio. This offered individual responses to the nature of policy change in England and organisational responses to change, especially fundraising and organisational structure. I also referred to government documents, briefings and policy to illustrate the deliberate and intense promotion of marketised policy. Also, I considered broader trends, controversies and points of contention regarding funding and management in the visual arts.

The data I presented in chapters Five, Six and Seven showed some expected and unexpected trends. For example, LA arts support has dropped dramatically, but funding for ACE NPOs has remained relatively stable. This feature somewhat masks the fact that the ACE visual arts portfolio has continued to shrink since 2010. The data I collated and presented highlighted just how unreliable sponsorship is as a funding source for the vast majority of arts organisations in England. Some of the case studies, such as BALTIC, had some success and consistency from sponsorship income, but this was not representative of the case-studies in general. They tended to show some occasional spikes, but overall, low levels of sponsorship income.

Furthermore, there is a massive regional divide between London and the rest of the country in terms of sponsorship. London almost wholly accounts for the national rise in sponsorship amongst visual arts NPOs (see Figure 6.5, p. 235). The capital has a remarkable concentration of private money in the arts, and unlike other parts of the country, it continues to rise. In short, the mixed funding model promoted by the Conservatives may be a realistic economic proposition, but only if an arts organisation has a London postcode.

The funding changes and policy pressures are not only statistical points, but they have tangible effects on how senior staff run arts organisations and the prevailing professional cultures. For example, Margot Heller references the fact that a significant change is "the amount of time and resource that is dedicated to raising funds from alternative sources... and that that does obviously shape the way that you approach the organisation" (2018, pers. comm.). Sarah Munro suggests that the national government views arts organisations as "businesses that have to generate their own income" (2018, pers. comm.).

I have contributed to several areas of study with this research. Firstly, I have brought together the features of cultural policy since 2010 and analysed it with reference to the visual arts and art galleries. The specificity of this approach contributes to both cultural policy studies and museology. Furthermore, I applied the critical frameworks of Bourdieu and Rancière at the contemporary conditions in which galleries in England operate. This enabled an analysis of cultural policy that was not bounded by the metrics used by cultural policy-makers.

There are several applications for this research. For example, there is a clear academic audience for the intersection between art, politics and sociology explored in this thesis. Arts professionals may also find aspects of this work useful. As I have tried to balance the theoretical and practical aspects of the subject, arts professionals may find actionable strategies, common sectoral concerns and an understanding of the shifts in English cultural policy before and after 2010.

There is the potential to expand the case-study aspect of this research and employ comparative studies of English and European arts policy. The national government has repeatedly signalled the United States' philanthropy model, sponsorship and commercial revenue as examples for England to follow. My critique of marketisation largely debunks this direction, yet there are nearer neighbours to whom we might look. The Nordic Model of governance would be a pertinent counterpoint (Røyseng, 2008). This model has promoted a robust public sector, and the countries are well regarded in terms of their support for artists and the importance of the arts across different communities.

Another potential development for this research is to look at alternative models of governance and organisational structures. For example, artist co-operatives are not uncommon but are not necessarily considered something translatable to a large public gallery's scale and scope. There are, of course, complex differences between these two types of organisations, but I believe that there is a debate to be had about how public institutions recognise and incorporate their publicness. Public galleries often communicate the fact that they want their public and publics to have a *sense* of ownership. Perhaps we should shift the narrative to *actual* ownership. In financial terms, this would require the transfer of significant levels of art funding from centralised decision-makers to the local level. Furthermore, there would need to be expanded public consultation on issues impacting galleries as an exhibition space, as a public asset and as an employer.

The trajectory of public arts organisations is uncertain. On the one hand, we might see the collective power arts organisations directed at preserving their public status. On the other hand, there is the very real potential that private money will dominate

the arts through governance structures comparable to the US. In the bleaker of these propositions, there are visible foundations in place. If we look at the Tate model with its advocacy of high-profile sponsorship, commercial revenue and courting insalubrious characters such as Len Blavatnik, it is clear that this is not widely replicable. If these are the characteristics demanded of a marketised arts sector, and with former Tate Director Sir Nick Serota Chairman of ACE, we see a tacit understanding that this is the case, we will likely see an arts sector contract geographically, with London as the only location able to sustain galleries with a national or international presence. Of course, there will be exceptions, but the idea that visual art is a potent and essential part of our public social lives, regardless of geography, class or ethnicity, will be put to rest.

An ideal future for public art galleries depends on policy initiatives that support the critical aspects of production and display. It also depends on governance that incorporates the public and workers at all levels of the arts. Firstly, secure, revenue funding would have to be protected *and* expanded to relieve the pressure to fundraise. With this foundation, public-funded contemporary art galleries could pursue an ambitious arts programme and expand its remit as a public asset. I believe that the long-term relevance of cultural institutions is through their potential as sites for participatory democracy. As organisations, they should encourage deliberative decision-making by stakeholders. Again, I believe expanded, inclusive and acted upon consultation is a vital feature of any future role for galleries. Consultation should not be used as a tool to legitimise decisions that are already made, but an exercise in collective power and democratic equality.

Furthermore, limiting the sector's regulatory requirements, such as submitting ACE reporting data, can also free up valuable time within organisations. Finally, public-funded galleries would be best served in a system of collective power within the arts sector and with other adjacent public institutions. This would enable greater political participation in support of a radical democratic agenda. Part of the challenge of future research is clearly defining and shaping what collective power looks like and how it operates. This calls in to question issues of governance and once again, issues of power. I believe, in its most basic form, that an expanded and coordinated process of public consultation can begin to actualise the desirable features

mentioned above. The gallery can function as a forum and as a space that publics associate with the exchange cultural ideas but also societal concerns.

We may already have the ingredients to effect positive change. However, the arts sector needs to enact criticality, agitation and resistance collectively. Criticality is a condition a gallery can adopt. They can direct their grievances outwardly to policy-makers, but they must also reflect on how they reproduce aspects of marketisation. For example, arts organisations may criticise the push for private funding, but it must also confront the fact that 'art washing' is not a new phenomenon. The art world has an uncomfortable relationship with the worst excesses of capitalism, elitism and oligarchy (Steyerl, 2017). Part of a critical art world is the sense to recognise one's failings and limitations.

Another tactic is agitation. Agitation is the practice of focussing on an event, entrenched contradiction or injustice that highlights the fundamental inequality of contemporary society. Art, of course, can and does perform this function. One of the idealised qualities of public-funded arts is that it can use public resources to address the harmful aspects of the political system it operates in, without fear of reprisal. Whilst this level of freedom does not exist in practise, galleries can be critical spaces in spite of internal and external pressures. The gallery is an integral part of this process by supporting the artists involved and circulating the ideas that inform an artwork's production and display. However, by engaging in agitation, the gallery must be dogged and persistent in promoting radical democracy based on equality. In England, it is relatively commonplace for public-funded galleries to support salient social causes. LGBTQ+ support and campaigns backing the Black Lives Matter movement (or analogous anti-racism messages) are part of the current art world discourse, which is a positive for those who support progressive, inclusive social causes. Highlighting and supporting these issues is a form of agitation, as they are communicated routinely, clearly and to a variety of audiences. However, I would argue that galleries should also utilise agitation to clarify the intolerable situation of a national government that willingly perpetuates inequality and seeks opportunities for a select cadre to profit from others' desperation. However, in England, there are very deliberate efforts by the government to pull the museum and gallery sector in line with Conservative party cultural values.

At present, there is a hostile environment for museums, galleries and other cultural organisations to adopt politically sensitive positions. For example, in England racial equality activists have called for the removal of statues and the altering of street and building names that celebrate historic figures with direct links to Britain's overtly racist colonial past, Britain's Atlantic slave trading, or amassed personal wealth from the slave trade. On June 7th, 2020 a statue of the Bristol-born merchant Edward Colston was toppled in protest against his history as a slave trader, his legacy articulated through place names in Bristol and repeated instances of state-violence against non-white ethnic groups in the UK and USA.

The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Oliver Dowden, responded to the debate over 'contested heritage' and warned arm's length bodies that "the Government does not support the removal of statues or other similar objects" and that engaging in politicised, or activist led decision-making would have direct repercussions in terms of funding (Hewison, 2020). The silent, tacit approval by ACE, its chief executive Darren Henley and chairperson Sir Nicholas Serota is indicative of the institutional weakness of NDPBs and the willingness of the Conservative government to flagrantly encroach on the 'arm's length' principle (ibid). This makes agitation risky for public galleries, yet it is also why it is urgent that the sector organise in a politically incisive manner.

This brings us to the final aspect of this agenda for change; resistance. Resistance is not an unlikely companion to the arts. Protest art and the ambition of social transformation through modernist art and design are familiar parts of art history. However, museums and galleries tend to historicise these points rather than deliberately confronting them through politics. Resistance can take many forms, but as public spaces, galleries can facilitate worker organisation, public participation in local politics and publicly challenging the regressive policies borne from marketisation and the political ideologies that inform it. I do not believe it is hyperbolic to say that this is a critical time in determining the direction of our shared democratic values. Immiseration brought about by austerity is an entrenched part of society, and according to recent statements from the independent race equality think tank, the Runnymede Trust, so are narratives of white nationalism, emanating from

the very highest elected offices in the UK (Siddique, 2020). The arts sector is not a democratic silver bullet, but it can draw from the people, skills, and language of words, images, and signs to interrogate our sitting governments' legitimacy, rather than defend their value.

A key site of resistance *is* the gallery – however, it relies on the kind of experimentation of adventurousness that marketisation nullifies. Mark Fisher suggests that our desires are often concealed from us – basically, we do not always know what we want (2009, p. 75). Marketisation conceals desire by financialising the components of a bound system. The inculcating pseudo-logic of marketisation is an attack on the imagination as much as it is a restructuring of socio-political systems. However, like myself, Fisher sees some hope in how we make and share a visual language. Fisher says, "the most powerful forms of desire are precisely cravings for the strange, the unexpected, the weird. These can only be supplied by artists and media professionals who are prepared to give people something different from that which already satisfies them; by those, that is to say, prepared to take a certain kind of risk" (2009, p. 75). Imaginative, disruptive and de-marketised risk must become the common language of public art galleries and the creative endeavours that contribute to art's ineffable characteristics.

Despite the evident issues facing public-funded contemporary art galleries, there are strategies akin to Rancière's notion of politics available to us. As I have outlined, these include criticality, agitation and resistance. The problem remains one of how we seed a radical agenda in a sometimes stodgy, hobbled public arts system. Again, I believe that the foundations are there. Writing in the conclusion of *Cultural Capital* (2014), Robert Hewison points to the titular concept as a means to articulate the importance of the arts. He says, "Cultural capital is the knowledge that is gained from engagement with the arts and heritage; it is the emotional as well as intellectual intelligence developed through access to the imaginative world of the arts and the collective memory of a shared heritage; it is the expressive cultural capability that results" (ibid, p. 234). I agree with Hewison and his reading of Bourdieu, but I would like to add a final qualification. The arts depend on a feel for the uncanny; arts organisations can utilise this quality to develop alternatives to the current constraints of marketisation. It is undeniable, the current political conditions are stifling.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Government funding, policy and rhetoric do not favour the arts sector, they hinder it. There are not simple solutions to this problem and there is no clear sense of when the politics and policy of the UK and England will shift to something supportive and responsive to the arts sector's core functions. Until this happens the sector must be unerring in its demand for something better. It should push for democratic equality as a guiding principle for policy; the logic of marketisation is cracked. A collective push for something different is imperative and urgent as the cracks soon become chasms.

Afterword – The New Paranormal

Whilst writing my thesis, the events of 2020 signalled a significant break in the context and phenomena explored in my research. The Covid-19 crisis is a global issue that has impacted the physical health and mental well-being of people near and far from the focus of my research. The crisis has also prompted unprecedented regulation on the use of public and private space. Covid-19 has affected the arts sector in England and the difficulties faced by many galleries is indicative of the structural weakness of the sector and the cumulative impact of cuts to public funding. The 'new normal' is used to describe the way we live now.

However, our daily lives are haunted by ineffective decision-making and the decades of chipping away at the public sector. In this sense, the new normal is, perhaps, the new paranormal, where vampiric political neglect has resulted in our daily news reporting staggering hospitalisations and death tolls. In contemporary, developed nations, usually insulated from the ravages of disease and war, there is a thinness between everyday life and the potential of death. So, the new paranormal does not describe a renewed belief in ghosts and ghouls, but normalised daily reflection on the grave consequences of the mundane and prosaic.

There are two critical aspects to highlight; the initial government response to the impending crisis and the specific context and measures related to the arts in England. Firstly, it is worth noting that there was an initial, tentative approach to managing the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. *The Guardian* reported that "[Boris] Johnson's government reconsidered its previous light-touch approach, which had envisaged 60% of the population – 40 million people – would become infected, and while many would die, the majority would recover and attain 'herd immunity'" (Conn et al., 2020)

On 23rd March, the UK entered into a 'lockdown'. The lockdown meant that schools, many shops and places of work closed. Exercise and shopping for food were the only permitted activities for much of the population. This was an unprecedented

change to public life and a change that is far from resolved at the time of writing (December 2020).

Closure of galleries

Following the temporary closure of galleries and museums across England and the rest of the UK, the arts sector has faced considerable uncertainty. The uncertainty was not just a matter of resolving a date to reopen sites but the manner of reopening. Regarding ACE visual arts NPOs, there is a variance in organisations' size, the type of buildings that house arts organisations, the internal infrastructure to manage visits, disruption to exhibition programmes and significantly, the balance of public funding and self-generated funds.

For example, Andrew Nairne, the Director of Kettle's Yard in Cambridge, stated that "we are like Nottingham Contemporary and the Hepworth Wakefield, places like that [...] Then I remembered that the others don't have a little cottage with tiny rooms and narrow corridors" (Higgins, 2020). Nairne points out the logistical difficulties of reopening spaces that do not follow the airier purpose-built gallery blueprint that many NPOs have, such as Hepworth Wakefield, Nottingham Contemporary and BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art. Spaces like South London Gallery and Kettle's Yard have internal spaces that mean visitor numbers would have to be significantly reduced or visit by appointment to make reopening plausible.

Months of closure and reduced visitor numbers will inevitably be a sustained financial burden. Whether it is reduced income from ticket sales or the lack of income from shops and restaurants, the mixed-funding model has exacerbated the sector's difficulties. Kettle's Yard stands to lose £400,000, on a turnover of £1.8m-£2m and their experience is by no means unique (Higgins, 2020). Although a government rescue package is available, this has predominantly favoured larger institutions, and £100m of it is ringfenced for the nationals. Maria Balshaw, director of Tate galleries, stated that the package was welcome but not necessarily a 'silver bullet'. "We earn 70% of our income," she says. "We are a £100m turnover business. We can't manage being closed for a third of the year and then opening to a third of our visitors. It is a cliff-edge" (ibid). One of the ironies the sector faces is that the more commercial organisations may have a more uncertain recovery.

Government rescue package

The government announced A £1.57bn emergency support package to help protect the future of theatres, galleries and museums in July 2020. However, the culture secretary Oliver Dowden stated that this would not save every job but would aim to preserve "crown jewels" in the arts sector, and many local venues.

The BBC News Arts editor Will Gompertz made this analysis of the announcement:

The rescue package has been warmly welcomed by many arts leaders, some of whom said they thought it to be at the upper end of what had been hoped for. Culture Secretary Oliver Dowden, who has been under pressure from the arts and heritage sector to deliver a meaningful funding solution to a crisis brought about by Covid-19, feels vindicated that his behind-closed-doors approach to negotiations with the Treasury has paid off.

As always, the devil will be in the detail. The government has not specified how the money will be divided between competing art forms or regions, nor how the application process will work. There will be winners and losers.

(Gompertz, 2020)

Arts Council chairperson Sir Nicholas Serota stated that the funding was "a very good result [...] Now it's up to the arts organisations and the Arts Council to make best use of this money and bring the arts back into communities across the county. This announcement gives us the tools to help build a recovery" (Gompertz, 2020). However, as the former director of Tate Galleries made this statement, the gap between the perception and action of leaders in the arts sector and many cultural workers became apparent. Balshaw and Tate galleries announced 313 redundancies across the Tate Enterprises operations, which has prompted a significant backlash from Tate employees and the broader arts sector.

Tate strike

The Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS) began strike action on the 18th August 2020 in opposition to the Tate redundancies and had three main demands and have commented on the support from other areas of the sector:

That 10 per cent of an anticipated £7 million in government aid be invested in TEL [Tate Enterprises Ltd], that no job cuts are made while senior staffers still earn six-figure salaries, and that the museum joins the union in demanding increased government aid if bailout funds aren't sufficient to meet their needs.

The government scheme was made to save jobs. But now it's going to be used to pay for our redundancy notice," said the PCS representative, explaining that these funds intended to prevent unemployment will now be used as severance pay.

TEL employees also argue that their commercial arm is an integral component of the galleries and a significant income source, one that Tate acknowledges on its gift shop website. "The profits that are made by Tate Commerce are directly covenanted to Tate," the website implores shoppers. "Your purchase plays a vital part in enabling Tate to continue its ambitious programme and activities."

We've received statements of support on our strike action from artists that Tate exhibit in their galleries like Mark Leckey, Jeremy Deller, Hannah Black, Andrew Grassie, Hito Steyerl, Liam Gillick and many more," shared a Tate Modern retail assistant, who is also a PCS union representative. "We've received messages of solidarity from twelve Turner Prize winners, we've received endorsements from writers whose books we sell, from politicians like Jeremy Corbyn and from Tate's members, visitors and other constituents (Chernick, 2020).

The course of action adopted by Tate will have implications for the broader sector. It indicates that workers on the lowest rungs in the sector shoulder the cost of marketisation. It legitimates uncertainty and precarity due to its status and proximity to the government and ACE. "The culture sector, specifically, right now we're the

canary in the mine. Because if we go, it will be much easier for all the other institutions to follow," warned the Tate PCS representative. "It seems very clear that right now, across these cultural institutions, that the working class is going to pay the price of this pandemic" (Chernick, 2020).

If there are positives we can take from this situation, it is the renewed focus on income disparity in ACE NPOs and nationals. The Instagram accounts for the PCS Tate strike, an account publishing senior staff salary, "Department of Accountability", and highly circulated content from the White Pube's critical platforms, raise awareness and the possibility for active resistance to stratification in the arts sector.

The Covid-19 crisis does intensify many of the issues I have explored in this research. Funding for the arts remains uncertain and the potential for long-term planning nearly impossible. England's erratic political leadership has lurched from one false dawn to another. This has come at the cost of lives and livelihoods, security and support. However, there is an issue highly relevant to this research and how we critique our democratic system. The term 'chumocracy' has entered into popular parlance to describe the personal relationships between senior Conservative party MPs and their associates, friends and family, which have led to procurement contracts and influential public posts aimed at combatting the pandemic. In November 2020, the National Audit Office published a report on this issue and found that in some instances there was insufficient documentation to account for key procurement decisions (National Audit Office, 2020).

Whether we describe this unsurprising disaster capitalism as a 'chumocracy', 'cronyism' or simply 'corruption' is not the primary concern. What is important is that we expose and hold to account this brazen and self-serving manifestation of *oligarchy*. Rancière's critique of contemporary representative democracy tells us that political and economic power is held tightly by those in possession of it. Decisions with national and international implications are made with the interest of a select few taking precedent. This is an oligarchic system, not a democratic one. Oligarchy parades and celebrates its undemocratic ideal – but the global pandemic also increases the focus and scrutiny.

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

The Covid-19 crisis affects all of us in some way; it is not a partisan issue. A deliberate and sustained attack on oligarchic decision-making during and, hopefully after a health crisis can translate into a broader reappraisal about the function of government, how it shapes arts policy, the public sector and the values we wish to celebrate. I believe the arts will be a part of this reappraisal – it can circulate the images, signs and language of criticism but also open the imaginative conditions for radical alternatives. The story of public funded arts organisations over the past decade exposes the fault lines in contemporary English society. Whilst this has occurred in sometimes subtle and elusive ways, the story of Covid-19 exposes similar divides but this time in an undeniably stark and arresting manner. The pandemic has highlighted the tangible erosion of public services through sustained and intense marketisation. The NHS, primary to higher education and the arts share common grievance; only through mutual support, cooperation and large-scale organisation can the public sector secure a future that unerringly supports democratic equality.

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Appendices.

A. Local Authority Funding – Case Studies.

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England RFO and NPO reporting data, 2007-2017.

	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
Nottingham Contemporary	£ 352,510	£ 312,676	£ 265,773	£ 236,540	£ 225,088	£ 204,219	£ 183,797
South London Gallery	£ 130,000	£ 120,000	£ 110,000	£ 110,000	£ 117,319	£ 97,931	£ 93,392
The Hepworth Wakefield	£ 846,869	£ 1,961,000	£ 1,743,032	£ 1,636,970	£ 1,240,000	£ 1,240,000	£ 1,240,696
BALTIC	£ 502,470	£ 502,470	£ 477,387	£ 385,387	£ 327,578	£ 260,310	£ 234,309
MIMA	£ 1,213,567	£ 1,163,555	£ 1,257,455	£ 1,163,000	£ 940,906	£ 500,000	£ 500,000

B. ACE NPO Funding – Case Studies

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017.

	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
Nottingham Contemporary	£ 1,026,168	£ 955,363	£ 1,000,000	£ 1,001,731	£ 1,005,796	£ 1,005,796	£ 1,005,795
South London Gallery	£ 372,451	£ 346,752	£ 646,752	£ 731,226	£ 811,415	£ 811,415	£ 811,415
The Hepworth Wakefield	£ 600,654	£ 64,844	£ 900,000	£ 902,436	£ 906,101	£ 906,101	£ 906,101
BALTIC	£ 2,272,004	£ 2,115,236	£ 2,963,000	£ 2,971,030	£ 2,983,086	£ 3,158,000	£ 3,158,000
MIMA	£ 199,012	£ 185,280	£ 500,000	£ 505,272	£ 510,757	£ 510,757	£ 510,756

C. Total Income – Case Studies

Source: Hopkin, based Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017.

	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
Nottingham Contemporary	£ 2,020,636	£ 1,932,336	£ 1,898,600	£ 2,030,341	£ 1,942,469	£ 2,415,674	£ 2,191,604
South London Gallery	£ 1,432,600	£ 1,365,477	£ 1,731,532	£ 1,544,122	£ 1,348,252	£ 2,094,138	£ 2,283,640
The Hepworth Wakefield	£ 1,447,523	£ 3,664,523	£ 3,517,364	£ 3,535,868	£ 2,789,378	£ 2,991,554	£ 3,854,185
BALTIC	£ 5,058,820	£ 5,439,979	£ 5,386,978	£ 5,472,603	£ 5,468,385	£ 5,649,330	£ 5,539,955
MIMA	£ 1,579,713	£ 1,608,204	£ 2,114,284	£ 2,256,784	£ 2,133,685	£ 1,786,989	£ 1,755,996

D. Sponsorship Income – Case Studies

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017.

	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
Nottingham Contemporary	£ -	£ -	£ -	£ -	£ 8,000.00	£41,983.00	£ 31,240
South London Gallery	£ 120,000	£ 327,729	£ 458,724	£ 6,000	£ 27,000	£ 54,400	£ 66,911

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

The Hepworth Wakefield	£ -	£ 9,000.00	£ 5,000.00	£ 5,000.00	£ -	£ -	£ 360,194
BALTIC	£ 61,817	£ 223,623	£ 122,458	£ 157,208	£ 130,753	£ 182,220	£ 188,936
MIMA	£ -	£ 2,450	£ 10,138	£ 39,464	£ 7,095	£ 5,000	£ 4,000

E. ACE NPO Visual Arts Sponsorship by Region

Source: Hopkin, based Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2007-2017.

	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
East	£7,500	£100,550	£557,791	£75,329	£9,762	£5,750	£10,703	£9,500	£4,000
East Midlands	£27,808	£15,422	£26,297	£49,744	£103,285	£49,972	£65,964	£42,608	£31,240
London	£3,618,410	£1,893,537	£2,354,607	£2,579,000	£4,298,818	£2,310,702	£3,418,532	£6,953,272	£8,640,296
North East	£124,850	£40,820	£68,762	£236,387	£182,468	£323,037	£254,680	£214,266	£208,533
North West	£178,042	£577,631	£287,015	£126,095	£160,200	£129,124	£315,776	£67,924	£107,509
South East	£29,726	£56,368	£125,904	£126,319	£77,830	£64,433	£115,535	£151,355	£244,066
South West	£71,866	£101,172	£10,302	£9,963	£43,611	£73,916	£111,388	£59,877	£54,977
West Midlands	£58,794	£69,937	£45,642	£56,244	£97,459	£85,044	£79,246	£88,754	£84,162
Yorkshire	£63,960	£111,162	£388,275	£186,013	£53,956	£111,279	£282,509	£90,891	£504,144

F. ACE NPO Visual Arts Sponsorship Income

Source: Hopkin, based on Arts Council England, Annual submission headline statistics, 2008-2017.

	2010-2011	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017
Income	£ 143,357,358	£ 134,459,365	£ 137,757,226	£ 139,554,915	£ 146,195,729	£ 142,660,250	£ 142,755,049
Sponsorship	£ 3,864,595	£ 3,445,094	£ 4,519,729	£ 3,614,378	£ 4,654,333	£ 7,678,447	£ 9,878,927
As % of Income	2.70%	2.56%	3.28%	2.59%	3.18%	5.38%	6.92%

G. ACE Portfolio LA Subsidy and Other Public Subsidy.

Source: Hopkin, based on ACE Statistics Report No. 1-8; Regularly funded organisations: Key data from the annual submission, 2005-2011; Annual submission headline statistics, 2011-2018.

	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006	2006/2007
LA Spending	£3,131,000	£3,256,000	£2,809,000	£2,700,000	£3,889,000	£4,349,000	£4,889,000	£11,198,000	£14,689,000	£15,579,000	£18,600,000	£15,708,000
Other Public Subsidy												
	2007/2008	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012	2012/2013	2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	
LA Spending	£12,075,537	£14,097,668	£14,150,112	£15,680,141	£16,241,000	£15,164,000	£14,289,000	£13,012,000	£10,153,000	£10,087,000	£11,070,000	
Other Public Subsidy	£14,258,463	£12,379,332	£9,752,888	£13,540,859	£7,213,000	£5,781,000	£8,254,000	£11,088,000	£8,388,000	£11,235,000	£5,270,000	

H. ACE NPO Visual Arts Full Data Set

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Source: Hopkin, based on ACE Statistics Report No. 1-8; Regularly funded organisations: Key data from the annual submission, 2005-2011; Annual submission headline statistics, 2011-2018.

	1995/1996	1996/1997	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	2004/2005	2005/2006
Full Sample - Visual Arts											
Turned income	£7,845,000	£8,666,000	£11,470,000	£9,917,000	£14,850,000	£13,858,000	£13,535,000	£16,683,000	£22,807,000	£22,807,000	£26,387,000
ACE/RAS subsidy	£10,504,000	£10,174,000	£10,776,000	£10,381,000	£16,759,000	£17,759,000	£20,535,000	£26,345,000	£30,354,000	£30,354,000	£46,827,000
LA other subsidy	£3,130,000	£3,356,000	£2,809,000	£2,700,000	£3,889,000	£4,346,000	£4,889,000	£11,198,000	£7,850,000	£14,680,000	£18,600,000
Contributed income	£1,910,000	£2,193,000	£2,029,000	£2,665,000	£2,897,000	£2,549,000	£3,258,000	£6,062,000	£7,850,000	£7,850,000	£9,074,000
Other public subsidy	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0
Total subsidy income	£23,392,000	£22,289,000	£27,084,000	£25,840,000	£37,843,000	£37,415,000	£43,935,000	£60,308,000	£77,850,000	100%	£100,338,000
Artistic programme costs	£8,325,000	£7,124,000	£8,827,000	£9,575,000	£14,854,000	£13,340,000	£13,873,000	£18,098,000	£21,675,000	29%	£45,351,000
Education costs	£553,000	£453,000	£747,000	£679,000	£1,133,000	£1,203,000	£1,375,000	£2,055,000	£2,790,000	4%	£4,070,000
Marketing costs	£1,437,000	£1,570,000	£1,584,000	£1,429,000	£1,874,000	£2,418,000	£2,759,000	£3,726,000	£4,530,000	6%	£4,887,000
Costs of generating funds											
Overheads											
Other Costs	£12,824,000	£12,443,000	£15,699,000	£13,941,000	£19,693,000	£20,975,000	£24,973,000	£34,629,000	£46,794,000	62%	£43,794,000
Collections - care and conservation											
Collections - acquisitions											
Pay											
Total Expenditure	£23,171,000	£21,792,000	£26,857,000	£25,704,000	£37,766,000	£37,938,000	£42,912,000	£58,508,000	£75,789,000	100%	£98,072,000
Surplus/deficit	£221,000	£497,000	£613,000	£1,133,000	£784,000	£477,000	£1,023,000	£1,800,000	£2,061,000		£2,766,000
Accumulated surplus/deficit	-£171,000	£787,000	£1,465,000	£2,598,000	£3,382,000	£2,749,000	£3,772,000	£5,572,000	£7,633,000		£14,472,000
Exhibition attendance (est)	5,029,784	6,003,678	4,551,000	3,865,000	1,415,000	2,723,000	1,807,000	2,186,000	1,653,000		5,279,000
Organisations reporting	395/1192	44	67	68	68	74	88	99	136	164	155
Constant sample - All Galleries											
Turned income	(no data)	£1,723,000	£3,781,000	£4,048,000	£5,569,000	£5,891,000	£8,543,000	£9,447,000	£13,908,000	£13,908,000	£24,600,000
ACE/RAS subsidy	(no data)	£1,723,000	£3,781,000	£4,048,000	£5,569,000	£5,891,000	£8,543,000	£9,447,000	£13,908,000	£13,908,000	£24,600,000
LA other subsidy	(no data)	£1,447,000	£946,000	£1,315,000	£1,275,000	£1,310,000	£2,889,000	£3,378,000	£8,139,000	£15,579,000	£14,407,000
Contributed income	(no data)	£903,000	£946,000	£1,315,000	£1,275,000	£1,310,000	£2,249,000	£2,095,000	£3,335,000	£9,573,000	£7,763,000
Other public subsidy	(no data)	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0
Total subsidy income	(no data)	£8,658,000	£7,982,000	£8,874,000	£13,282,000	£13,699,000	£17,593,000	£19,991,000	£35,508,000	£88,440,000	£91,324,000
Artistic programme costs	(no data)	£2,454,000	£2,498,000	£2,876,000	£3,334,000	£3,544,000	£4,164,000	£4,579,000	£7,408,000	£40,367,000	£42,000,000
Education costs	(no data)	£272,000	£241,000	£302,000	£451,000	£443,000	£494,000	£480,000	£1,070,000	£3,129,000	£3,636,000
Marketing costs	(no data)	£518,000	£477,000	£597,000	£670,000	£825,000	£1,116,000	£1,048,000	£1,949,000	£4,902,000	£4,468,000
Costs of generating funds	(no data)										
Overheads	(no data)	£4,865,000	£5,040,000	£5,329,000	£8,919,000	£9,995,000	£11,418,000	£13,329,000	£24,192,000	£37,201,000	£38,814,000
Other Costs	(no data)										
Collections - care and conservation	(no data)										
Collections - acquisitions	(no data)										
Total Expenditure	(no data)	£8,091,000	£8,256,000	£9,104,000	£13,344,000	£13,819,000	£17,192,000	£19,456,000	£34,587,000	£85,599,000	£88,840,000
Surplus/deficit	(no data)	£333,000	£274,000	£768,000	£945,000	£872,000	£1,401,000	£1,535,000	£2,921,000	£2,861,000	£2,466,000
Accumulated surplus/deficit	(no data)	-£274,000	-£1,000	-£220,000	-£102,000	-£450,000	£1,777,000	£2,332,000	£4,056,000	£29,346,000	£33,079,000
Exhibition performance attendees	(no data)	1,264,000	1,302,000	1,151,000	258,000	1,514,000	1,479,000	1,209,000	880,000	3,624,000	5,120,000
Organisations reporting	0	23	19	19	26	26	34	34	46	164	164

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

1. Key Actors and Transitions to Cultural Policy in England.

Year	Arts Council NPO/RFO Funding Cycles	Key Dates for ACE	Chairs of ACE	Executive Officers of ACE	UK Governments	Secretaries of State		Case Studies						
2021/22	Current Funding Cycle (4 years)													
2020/21														
2019/20														
2018/19				Sir Nicholas Serota	Darren Henley	Theresa May	Conservative (minority)	Jeremy Wright	Digital, Culture, Media and Sport	SLG Peckham Fire Station opens				
2017/18	3 years			Theresa May		Conservative	Matt Hancock	Culture, Media and Sport						
2016/17			Sir Peter Bazalgette	David Cameron		Conservative	Karen Bradley							
2015/16							John Whittingdale							
2014/15	3 years		Sir Peter Bazalgette	Darren Henley	David Cameron	Conservative	Sajid Javid	Culture, Media and Sport						
2013/14										Maria Miller				
2012/13		National Portfolio funding begins		Alan Davey	David Cameron	Conservative	Jeremy Hunt	Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport	BALTIC39 opens					
2011/12	Transitional Funding Agreement	Regular Funding Programme ends	Dame Elizabeth Forgan								Hepworth Wakefield opens			
2010/11	3 years		Dame Elizabeth Forgan	Alan Davey	Gordon Brown	Labour	Ben Bradshaw	Culture, Media and Sport	SLG expansion completed					
2009/10									Andy Burnham	Nottingham Contemporary opens				
2008/09							Statistics and Registration Act (ACE now a provider of official statistics)		Sir Christopher Frayling		Tony Blair	Labour		mima opens
2007/08	3 years		Sir Christopher Frayling	Peter Hewitt	Tony Blair	Labour	Tessa Jowell	Culture, Media and Sport						
2006/07														
2005/06	3 years		Sir Gerrard Robinson	Peter Hewitt	Tony Blair	Labour	Chris Smith	Culture, Media and Sport						
2004/05														
2003/04									Merger with 10 Regional Art Boards, renamed Arts Council England					BALTIC opens
2002/03	3 years		Sir Gerrard Robinson	Peter Hewitt	Tony Blair	Labour	Chris Smith	Culture, Media and Sport						
2001/02														
2000/01														
1999/00														
1998/99	1 year													
1997/98	1 year	DCMS forms, Arts Council operates as Arms Length Body												
1996/97	1 year			Mary Allen	John Major	Conservative (minority)	Virginia Bottomley	National Heritage						
1995/96	1 year				John Major	Conservative	Steven Dorrell							
1994/95	1 year	Arts Council of England formed (formerly Arts Council of Great Britain)							South London Gallery's modern phase (1992-)					

- J. Examples of Case Study Information Sheets, Consent Forms and Interview Structure.

Marketisation, Cultural Policy and Contemporary Art Galleries. INFORMATION SHEET

This research is concerned with cultural policy, public funding and the arts in England. It aims to identify trends, perceptions and potential changes in the cultural sector since 2010. This research project has a specific focus on contemporary art galleries and the conditions in which they operate. The project aims to incorporate the opinions and observations of those working in a number of public funded contemporary art galleries in England in order to convey the successes, concerns and the future ambitions of the sector.

Why is this important?

This research project aims to address a 'live issue' that has had a significant impact on arts and culture. I am interested in how this issue is perceived by professionals working in the arts and how they manage organisations in these conditions. By discussing these issues this research adds to the debate about the future of cultural funding in England, the role the arts play in society and the nature of 'cultural work'.

Contact details

I am contactable via email at, thomas.hopkin@ncl.ac.uk and I am happy to respond to any queries about the research project.

For telephone interviews I can be reached on the following number, [REDACTED]

My name is Thomas Hopkin and I am a Post-Graduate Research student in Media, Culture & Heritage at Newcastle University. I am funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

What happens next?

If you agree to take part I will ask you to sign an Informed Consent Form to show that you have been briefed. We will then agree a suitable date, or dates for interviews to take place. In the lead up to the interview you will have the opportunity to contact me if you have any questions.

What will happen during the research period?

I will conduct an interview with the participants who have agreed to take part, asking questions that relate to the research aims and objectives. The interview will be recorded (audio only) and then transcribed. Once this has been done, I will send a

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

copy of the interview transcript to you and you will have the opportunity to point out

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

any sensitive or confidential information that may need to be redacted, or offer additional information if desired. As this project is time sensitive, I would ask that any requests for redaction take place within nine months of the initial interview.

Who will get to see my responses?

My academic supervisors at Newcastle University will see the transcript once it has been completed. My thesis will be published upon completion and at that point content from the interview, included in the thesis, will be publicly available. Sensitive or confidential information may be redacted from the transcript at your request prior to publication. I will store any records of your participation (text, recordings) on my personal, password protected computer and external hard drive.

Will I be identified?

It is up to you whether you and the organisation are identified by name. A pseudonym can be used in the transcript and thesis if that is your preference.

What will happen afterwards?

I will consider your responses in conjunction with the other data and literature I am using in my research. I will use your responses in my PhD thesis which will be publicly available through Newcastle University library. I am happy to share my findings with you throughout my research and writing up process, and keep you informed about any future work that may refer to your responses.

Do I have to take part?

Participation is entirely optional. Your participation is valuable to this research project and I hope that this process will be beneficial to yourself and the wider sector. However, if you wish to withdraw then please let me know within nine months of the initial interview.

Informed Consent Form

This agreement relates to the PhD research undertaken by Thomas Hopkin working in the department of Media, Culture, Heritage at Newcastle University under the supervision of Professor Rhiannon Mason.

The researcher:

- Will mention the participant or organisation by name, unless otherwise agreed.
- Will store data securely on a password protected private computer and use it for academic research only. Data will be accessible to the researcher's academic supervisors who will store the data in the same manner.
- The data will be published as part of the researcher's thesis which will be available online via Newcastle University's library.
- Will provide a nine-month window from the date of the initial interview in which the participant can add or redact information (see below) or withdraw all data from the research project.
- Will provide a written transcript of the interview and the participant will be able to contact the researcher in order to add comments or redact information.
- Will respect the confidentiality of the information given.

The participant:

- Has granted the researcher permission to conduct an interview on the agreed upon date.

Dates for research:

Researcher's signature:

Participant's signature(s):

Interview Questions and Structure.

Part 1: Introduction and Research Agreement

*I will outline the basic details of the research project and why I am reaching out to individuals in organisations such as **BALTIC** etc.*

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

Do you have any questions you would like to ask about this process or the research project?

Did you have any questions about the Informed Consent Form?

Part 2: Contextualising the gallery and participant

These questions are concerned with your perception of the sector.

How do you feel about developments in England's public funded gallery sector in recent years?

- Do you believe that these developments are having an even impact across the sector?
 - Could you expand on ...?

Can you describe how these developments have affected BALTIC?

- In terms of its arts programme...
- In relation to the wider 'art world'...
- As a public space...
- As a functionary of local and national cultural policy...

Part 3: Addressing research questions

These questions are concerned with the relationship between BALTIC and policy making.

How would you characterise the relationship between galleries (such as NPOs) and cultural policy makers (DCMS, ACE)?

- Is it positive...?
- Is it 'top down'/'bottom up'...?
- Do you believe this relationship has remained stable or changed during your time as Director at SLG?

These questions are concerned with the organisational identity of BALTIC.

How would you describe your role in shaping the organisational identity at BALTIC?

- Is this something that has evolved naturally, or is the result of deliberate processes...
- How does this impact the following areas...

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.

- Exhibitions...
 - Education...
 - Outreach...
 - Commercial activities...
 - Revenue development...
- What other factors affect the organisational identity of BALTIC...

These questions are concerned with issues affecting the sector.

Cultural funding has been hit by cuts to LA budgets and this has tended to be more severe where the cultural offering is already weak. Do you recognise these issues as impacting BALTIC, and public galleries in general?

- Do you think that this/these issues have developed over time or are something new...
- What, if any, changes to BALTIC's operations have had to be made in response...
- Do your concerns, and the concerns of the sector, go beyond a question of resources...

Part 4: Future ambitions and concerns

These questions are concerned with the future of BALTIC and the wider sector.

There has been a push towards alternative income streams (sponsorship, 'US style philanthropy') in the cultural sector, what impact, if any, do you think this is having on public galleries in England?

- How do you think this will impact the sector...
- Are there ethical/moral concerns with this...
- How might SLG negotiate these changes...

What do you think the key features are of future cultural policy that will best support the ambitions of BALTIC?

- Are these possible...
- Do you believe that galleries can affect positive change in cultural policy...

Part 5: Closing remarks

Thank you for taking the time to help me with my research. Before I go is there anything you would like to add / ask me?

Contemporary Art Galleries and Cultural Policy in the Age of Intensified Marketisation: The Case of England's Public-Funded Arts Organisations.