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PLUTARCH'S *Life of Agesilaos*

response to sources in the presentation of character

(In Two Volumes)

Volume One

by

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Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in the

University of Newcastle upon Tyne\_

To my wife and son

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## FOREWORD

The work done for this thesis was begun after I retired from teaching Classics at the end of 1983. For five of the six years of study I was enrolled as a part-time student in the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, spending seventeen months in Greece as an Associate Student of the British School at Athens from July 1986 until December 1987. While the Library of the British School was closed for extensions to its building, the American School of Classical Studies gave me very generous hospitality in the use of all its Library accommodation and facilities. During this time in Greece I continued my study of Plutarch, but also undertook topographical work in the relevant areas of Boiotia, Peloponnese, Thessaly, and the Attic frontier, as well as visiting Asia Minor to explore routes from Ephesos and between the valleys of the Rivers Maiandros and Hermos.

In Newcastle I have been privileged to use the University Library and thank the Library Staff for their prompt and willing help in locating and obtaining the books I needed. The members of the Classics Department have very kindly allowed me to take up their time on occasions when I needed help and advice on their specialist subjects and I am grateful for their encouragement. I thank also the University's clerical and administrative staff and those in the book-binding department for their helpful co-operation and assistance.

To Dr H.W.Catling, until recently Director of the British School at Athens, to Mrs Catling, to all the School staff in the academic, Library, administrative and domestic departments, to the members of the Finlay Room, I offer my warmest thanks for making me welcome and ensuring that my stay and travels in Greece were comfortable and profitable.

I express my sincere thanks, too, to the American School and the Gennadion Library for their many kindnesses.

My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Mr John Lazenby. He has guided me throughout the years in every aspect of the study with practical advice and perceptive criticism, and has with unfailing energy and generosity read my many progress reports and the draft versions of this thesis. My contacts with him have been most valuable.

Finally I am grateful to my wife and to my son, without whose patience and encouragement my studies would not have been possible, and to them this thesis is dedicated.

April 1990.

Plutarch's *Life of Agesilaos*: response to sources in the presentation of character.

By D.R.Shipley, M.A., University of Newcastle upon Tyne.  
Ph.D. Thesis, April 1990.

ABSTRACT

This commentary attempts to elucidate Plutarch's authorial intention in this *Life* by studying his response to source material, using topography where necessary.

2 Plutarch admired Sparta and the Spartans in so far as they were loyal to the Lykourgan rules for an ordered society, but identified shortcomings that marred their interpretation of its principles:

(i) They neglected abstract values, mistakenly defining justice as "the best interest of Sparta", and lacking safeguards against excesses.

(ii) They misinterpreted the purpose of their training, using military superiority to control others, not for their own security.

3 Plutarch used manifestations of Agesilaos' character to indicate and explain the decline of Sparta during his reign.

4 Agesilaos received training in accordance with Lykourgan rules and inherited and acquired favourable characteristics. He exemplified the admirable qualities of king and Panhellenist general, and remained a worthy model for the true asceticism of a Spartiate, for devotion to the service of Sparta, and for self-denying obedience to the state and its laws;

5 but his accession was irregular and his conduct of affairs was guided by contention, excessive competitiveness, a distorted sense of justice and limited political judgement.

6 His hatred of Thebes was a personal excess which involved the city excessively in war. Leuktra brought defeat, loss of power and unprecedented humiliation.

7 Sparta declined because of failure to understand and follow the most important Lykourgan principle, which forbade military imperialism (*Lyk.* 28-31).

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1 Plutarch followed Xenophon and other sources selectively for historical events, but imposed his own organization, interpretation and moral judgements on the selected material.

2 Two rhetorical aspects of the *Life* are: the intention to explain Sparta's decline, and the exposition of an ideology. Plutarch has identified unnecessary pitfalls and commends the Spartans' way of life, properly understood.

3 This rhetoric does not entail the falsity of his work.



## Corrigenda

Please read:

### Volume One

#### Page:

5.20 signposts  
47.6 Leotychidas  
56.12 (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.109)  
56.21 G.E.M.de Ste Croix  
57.11 explicitly  
61.29 G.E.M.de Ste Croix  
65.13 pace  
70.1 Mor. 470C  
70.2 Mor. 824C  
92.21 response  
99.19 qualities  
103.11 interpretation  
103.26 inflicting  
108.23 expression  
109.29 Agesilaos I.10-12  
113.3 Nectanebis  
120.31 account  
125.23 Peisandros  
134.15 and character-centred"  
134.18 anticipates  
137.21 Dioskouroi  
140.21 (Hell. IV.ii.1)  
142.6 Herodotos  
145.14 Herodotos  
156.21 A.Weizsäcker  
168.4 praiseworthy  
171.6 in northern Greece  
176.16 Panhellenism  
182.7 Phokis  
182.19 Peisandros [passim]  
197.17 Diod. XIV.83.1  
197.19 Diod. XIV.82.9

### Volume Two

#### Page:

20.11 Peisandros  
21.3 organization  
22.17 announcement  
24.8 incompatible  
27.29 peninsula  
33.31 eastern Arkadia  
34.16 The Achaians  
38.1 Peisandros  
44.6 Isaiah  
49.1 seize  
67.14 ἡμῶν ἕνεκεν  
67.18 , since  
70.16 acquittal  
70.27 interpretation  
71.11 initiative  
72.1 the innovatory strategy  
73.8 Lykourgan  
77.19 themselves may be  
78.17 Erasistratos  
104.30 Apophth.  
117.17 (cf. P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.164).  
118.30 reliability  
133.15 p.10 n.).  
134.27 Εὐθύνοῦ  
141.6 (Diodoros XV.89).  
145.14 non-military  
145.15 Ariobarzanes  
146.27 Herodotos  
153.14 support  
156.9 apparently  
180.8 Cunaxa  
198.11 medizers  
218.24 Phoenix 39  
220.5 Harris  
222.34 Travlos

## INTRODUCTION

This is not a commentary in the sense of a set of annotations designed to assist a reader in the understanding of manuscripts, grammar, text, prosopography and general antiquities. Nor is it a historical commentary, partly because it would be unfair to Plutarch to disregard his statement that he was not writing history, and partly because the historian goes to Plutarch only for occasional support, either for the version of one or other of the ancient authorities, or for his own interpretation of these. The authorities are generally agreed to have given an incomplete and often distorted account of the events of the reign of Agesilaos, and Plutarch, whose sources included some to which we no longer have access, was well situated to make judgements and interpretations that could be corrective of some of these defects.

The evaluation of Plutarch's response to these sources attempted in this study of the *Life of Agesilaos* is largely confined to the authorities named by him and does not contribute to scholarly source research. The study concerns the relation between history and rhetoric, in that it explores the relation between the text which Plutarch has presented to the reader (the rhetoric) and the text (that is, the whole relevant landscape) available to him (the history); but only in so far as it is also available to us. The bulk of it consists of the relevant works of Xenophon, his *Hellenika* and his *Agesilaos*, though there are substantial portions of other works which supplement these.

The study of Plutarch's treatment of this source material offers opportunities to go beyond these texts, and to consider the validity of that material; this is properly the work of the historian. It also provides possible insights into his methodology, which in turn may illustrate the nature, and perhaps the validity, of his own creation; this is properly the work of literary criticism. A definitive exploration of these issues would be an enormous task; its potential range has



recently been indicated in a series of essays (A.D.Cameron (1989) ed.). This is far beyond the reach of the study of a single *Life*, but particular issues are involved even in this limited study.

The study is presented in the form of a commentary, for two reasons. On the one hand, the complexity of a study of Plutarch's interpretation of the source material entails such detailed cross-reference between authors that only continuous progress through the text will allow a thorough examination without confusing fragmentation and excessive repetition. On the other hand, it is primarily a study not of that source material but of Plutarch's text, in which the chronological progression of the *Life* is presented in a developing pattern of significant change, which itself forms part of his interpretation of the sources. Plutarch's narrative and argument - the content and the presentation - are inevitably interwoven, and separate discussion of the subject matter and authorial intention is rarely possible in the commentary.

Proof that the biographer's interpretation contains the truth would require definition of the relation between history and rhetoric - under attack from modern theories of, for example, structuralism and cultural relativism - and this may not be possible to everyone's satisfaction; but belief that truth may at least be approached is a necessary starting-point for a study of this kind, and is a need that also confronts anyone who has dealings with people in real life, continually making the same sort of assessments of situations, attitudes and reactions, of which the causes are unseen. Perhaps as with people in real life, all that the biographer can hope to do - like even the historian, who also faces the lack of much of the evidence he would wish to have, and must engage in the business of interpreting his texts, both literary and non-literary - is to carry conviction. Certainty is not always to be expected.

Plutarch's interpretation of his sources, of course, suffers from



the lack of a rigorous historical method, and while it was not my intention to attempt to give a revised account of the period, it has been possible in several places to suggest tentative explanations of events for which the evidence available has not yet led to agreement among scholars.

The subsidiary historical element in this study will reveal that where Plutarch's account can be shown to be derived from a source, in however modified a form, he does not necessarily provide independent confirmation of that source, but may in some cases give grounds for its rejection. Where Plutarch offers an interpretation of events which cannot be traced to an earlier account, we should not reject it without evaluating the accuracy of his judgement. In the case of the *Life of Agesilaos*, he reveals a shrewd critical judgement which shows up the weakness of some of Xenophon's historical accuracy and justifies, to some extent, his own analysis of Sparta's position in the early fourth century.

Since he is interested not only in events, but also in thoughts, feelings and intentions, and the discovery of these must often necessitate penetration behind the veneer that is ordinarily visible to the outside world, there is a strong interpretative element in his work. Again, in attempting to review, in forty short chapters, the life and career of Agesilaos, who was king for about forty years, and lived for more than eighty, the biographer must make a very limited selection from the available evidence, and must then present the incomplete record that is all he can manage, in a continuous account in which the connections he provides between isolated facts involve the use of some element of fictional creation.

Plutarch provides evidence that he did not just copy, but thought about, what he found in his sources. Often he is concerned to penetrate beyond a superficial account, not only when he substitutes description of a mental process for visual observation, but also when

he finds the received explanation of a motive or an event inadequate. The *Life of Agesilaos* is part of his attempt to understand and explain a larger landscape; the changes in Sparta's position in the world in Agesilaos' lifetime, and how it could have happened that, despite having a much-admired constitution which provided for decency and prosperity, it did not manage to maintain itself.

This, then, forms the subsidiary literary element in the present study, which concerns the discovery of the revealed purpose of Plutarch's analysis of Sparta's character. For this he uses the morals to be drawn both from the character of Agesilaos himself, and from the apparent changes in the attitudes of other Spartans to the original standards of the Lykourgan constitution, which was thought to have created the Spartan character known to tradition. That purpose contributes to Plutarch's explicit undertaking in writing the *Lives*, which was to offer helpful models to his contemporaries as guides for their lives. The Sparta he admired represented the ideals of discipline and self-restraint which he perhaps felt his world most needed, and he seems to have set himself the task of discovering the explanation of what was, to him, its disappointing failure, indicating the pitfalls to be avoided.

The early chapters of the *Life* allow an assessment of Plutarch's understanding of character. His resort to the presentation of character as fixed and unchanging was perhaps determined by the genre, but he explicitly differentiates the qualities that are inherited and those that are inculcated in training as did ancient authorities in other genres. At times he comes unusually close to the approach of the modern biographer in his explorations of the landscape of the mind. His view of the character of Sparta and the Spartans is consistent with the picture presented in his own *Lykourgos*, and significantly different from that of the ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ attributed to Xenophon, and deviation from the ideal of the one to the



corrupted form of the other is for him a significant factor in the story of decline. An impression of independence, objectivity, and impartiality is maintained by presenting judgements, whether of character or situations, indirectly through the judgements and utterances of the people involved in the actions.

Rhetoric provides an important element in the technique of the ornamentation displayed constantly in Plutarch's narrative, but it plays a more fundamental role in determining the large-scale structure of the work. It is seen on a smaller scale in the manipulation of vocabulary and episodes transferred from the original source to produce his often more logical, persuasive or convincing account. It is seen also in the adjusting of the proportions and speed of the narrative, and the highlighting and amplification of details which carry emphasis for the author's purpose. Yet the study will go some way to show that fears that rhetoric necessarily introduces misrepresentation are not well founded, at least in this work. The ultimate value of Plutarch's rhetorical training in the art of communication is evident in the construction of the arguments presented in successive stages, often clarified by the use of key words, such as ἡ φιλοτιμία, ἡ φιλονεικία, ὁ καιρός, and other devices such as digressions, while moral signposts are provided from time to time in the diagnostic powers of oracle and omen, and the certain expectation of divine retribution. 65

A philosophical approach is apparent at several points, one involving especial reference to the theories of the Presocratics. More to be expected, perhaps, is the influence of Aristotle, with reference generally to his condemnation of moral excesses but specifically also to his comments on the constitution of Sparta: Plutarch agrees with the former, but has an independent judgement of Lykourgos' intentions regarding the latter. The lack of a philosophical element in education at Sparta underlies Plutarch's analysis of the difficulties encountered in Agesilaos' reign, but the training in obedience, mainly but not

exclusively civic, which he attributes to the ἀγωγή, meets with his approval and admiration.

This approval of the civic is matched with qualified approval of the military. Like Aristotle, Plutarch sees the need for strength in defence of the state, but regards it as a misuse of force to impose control over others. The Panhellenic crusade against Persia is acceptable, but the hostile attitude of Agesilaos towards Thebes is condemned as contrary to the injunctions of Lykourgos. Lykourgan Sparta is presented as Plutarch's ideal of political efficiency, military security and religious orthodoxy: it evidently corresponds with the picture that has been drawn recently of Sparta as it was - or was at the time imagined to be - under Rome down to Plutarch's own day (P.A.Cartledge and A.J.S.Spawforth (1989) Ch.14).

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Transliteration has been used for Greek names, apart from the most familiar. References to Plutarch's works have not included the author's name and references to other authors give their full name or easily recognizable abbreviations of them. References to the Oxyrhynchos Historian follow the numbering of V.Bartoletti, Leipzig (1959).

The lemmata heading the annotations are taken from Budé (1973) except for the following readings, whose source is as indicated:

c.	5.5	φιλόνεικον (Perrin)	5.7	φιλονεικιῶν (Perrin)
	7.4	φιλόνεικος (Perrin)	8.2	Νῆ Δί' (Ziegler)
	8.6	φιλοτίμου (Ziegler)	11.9	Οὐδέν, ἔφη, δεινόν (Reiske)
	15.4	στρατ[ηγ]οῦς (Ziegler)	16.7	τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ (Ziegler)
	18.2	πώποτε (mss.)	18.4	φιλονεικίας (Perrin)
	18.5	σωτήριος (Ziegler)	26.6	φιλονεικία (Perrin),

**PART ONE**

**FROM EARLY YEARS TO ACCESSION**

**The qualities of leadership**

**(Chapters 1-3)**



## CHAPTER 1

### Ancestry and training: verbal patterning

Plutarch's literary style is perhaps an appropriate topic with which to begin a study of the first chapter, for this study will present him as a craftsman skilled in the deployment of words and one who made thoughtful use of detail for his purpose. In the opening chapter of a work an author will aim to make an interesting start in order to ensure that his reader will continue reading. The start might not always be interesting in the case of a biography, where the conflict between art and life is most acute, especially if the definition - "an account of the life of a man from birth to death" (A.Momigliano (1971) p.11) - were to be followed literally; biography could then rightly be described as the most intransigent of literary forms. "Peripatetic biography followed a fixed formula: the subject's birth, youth and character, achievements and death" (E.M.Jenkinson (1967) p.6). If the biographer's intention is to influence the reader's attitude to moral standards with a clear and convincing exposition of a real life, it may appear to serve authenticity best if he follows the natural chronological order from birth to death; yet his work will be judged also by the artistic standards of other genres, which are not governed by the artless patterns of a real life. A study of the literary qualities of the opening chapter and the way indications of the subject matter are presented will show how Plutarch has met the challenge in this biography. The commentary at this point entails little factual elucidation and is consequently continuous in form.

The first chapter has a clear tripartite structure. The first and third parts, each composed of two sections, are biographical, recording the three stages of life - birth, growth, and maturity - in their natural chronological order, but Plutarch avoids stating any of the simple facts directly. (1) He establishes the chronological context of



the birth of his subject, Agesilaos, at the start, in a statement of his parentage which is related to the time of the death of Archidamos, his father. This gives prominence not to Agesilaos' birth, but to his descent within a Spartan royal family, which is relevant as the permanent, lifelong feature most significant for what will be the main theme, the account of his reign, that is, of the part of his adult life following the death of his predecessor, Agis. Next, Plutarch moves on to the chronologically progressive context of the education of Agesilaos. His juniority is now said to have entailed his upbringing as an ordinary Spartan boy instead of as heir to the throne, and Plutarch selects for mention the features of the *ἀγωγή* that will have significant relevance for his adult career, and are to be crucial later for Plutarch's analysis of Agesilaos' character as king.

(2) In the second, central part of the chapter, the fixed chronological sequences of life are interrupted by the introduction of an ornament, a quotation from Simonides, which forms the second of the chapter's three parts and the third of its five sections. The sequence is not disturbed, however, for the ornament is also functional in setting the scene as the city of Sparta, and characterizing it in a single word, *δομασίμβροτον*.

(3) In the third part of the chapter, Plutarch resumes the biographical sequence in the first section, continuing Agesilaos' typical Spartan upbringing, a feature which made him unique when he became king and which particularly interested Plutarch as his biographer. Then, in the second section of the third part of the chapter, the regal qualities which Agesilaos could be assumed to have inherited by his descent from kings are combined with the Spartan qualities he further acquired uniquely in his upbringing. His reign is now, by implication, established as the subject of the work that follows. Plutarch has throughout the chapter preserved life's chronological progression, but all the early biographical details have been given indirectly, in the

context of the approaching time for the Spartans to make their choice, as they will do in c.3, of the successor to the dead King Agis.

That the detailed presentation of this chronological material is also done with much artistry may be shown by further analysis of the placing of proper nouns. Plutarch has woven the names into two patterns. (1) In the first of the three parts of the chapter, in which the reader might expect the author to reveal first Agesilaos' name and birth, he introduces instead another's name and parentage, Ἀρχίδωμος ὁ Ζευξιδόμου. Plutarch sometimes begins a *Life* with a proper noun which is the name of his subject, as in *Alkibiades*, but here the first name is that of the subject's father. The name of Agesilaos' brother Agis also precedes his own name, which is the last word in the sentence and the seventh name to be mentioned. Thus the first sentence itself has a tripartite structure, marked by these three names: Archidamos, Agis, and Agesilaos. In the first place, framed between subject and verb, are four pieces of information about the father, Archidamos. In the second and third places, joined by καί, are two parallel pairs of accusatives - υἱὸν ἐκ γυναικὸς εὐδοκίμου Λαμπιδοῦς, Ἄγιν, καὶ πολὺ νεώτερον ἐξ Εὐπωλίας τῆς Μελησιππίδα θυγατρὸς, Ἀγησίλαον - each pair framing pieces of information, introduced respectively by the parallel ἐκ and ἐξ, about the mothers of the father's two sons.

This pattern of names encourages the belief that their placing, with that of Agesilaos at the end, may have been deliberate. Thus, in the first part of the sentence, the subject was Archidamos whose death was being recorded. Then, in the second part, the placing of Agis as the first object establishes that Agesilaos, the second object, is in a position of juniority, subordinate to his elder brother, who therefore, in the second sentence, duly becomes king. Indeed, the three men are named in the order of their succession to the throne: father, son, and brother. Plutarch has in this way represented the indirect and



delayed rise of Agesilaos in the patterned grammatical structure of the sentence, which he would not have done if he had placed Agesilaos' name first as the title of the work.

(2) Agesilaos' name occurs three times in the chapter, with increasing prominence. In the accusative case, it is the last word in the first sentence. It occurs next in the nominative case, in the middle of the second sentence, and though he is not yet in the most prominent position, the subject of the biography now becomes the grammatical subject of the sentence. Only at the last, in the third and final part of the chapter, where Agesilaos' coming to power is implied, does his name have full prominence as the first word in its sentence.

At this important point, when Plutarch has revealed his subject in this way, the two strands in the theme of the chapter, Agesilaos' birth and upbringing, are brought together, so that the climax in the last sentence is the twofold catalogue of his essential adult characteristics, both those he inherited from his royal ancestors and those he acquired through his education, which will be important throughout the work.

Two of the names already mentioned, Λαμπιδώ and Εὐπωλία, are also, perhaps, part of the artistic ornamentation. In identifying the two wives of Archidamos, Plutarch evinces an interest in naming the women of the family; explicitly for example again in c.19, where he refers to his researches on the subject ἐν ταῖς Λακωνικαῖς ἀναγραφαῖς. There was a tradition of literary interest in women in Boiotia as early as Pindar, who composed songs for girls' choral performances. Corinna was a Boiotian woman poet, and she mentions another, Myrtis (frags 664a, 665a in D.L.Page (1953)). This provides evidence of the education of women in Boiotia, for the composer may also have trained the performers (N.H.Demand (1982) pp.98-102). Performances of this kind appear to have taken place at Sparta too (*Lykourgos* 14). As further evidence of Boiotian interest in women, there are examples of female

portraits on stelai and pottery from Boiotian artists (N.H.Demand (1982) pp.110, 113; cf. 127-30 and Appendix, especially on Pythagorean influence in Thebes). Plutarch may be following this Boiotian tradition, but may also have in mind Aristotle's remarks about the prominence and influence of Spartan women (*Pol.* 1269a-1271b) and the collection of *Sayings of Spartan Women*.

In the first chapter, Plutarch has not only presented to the reader an elaborate structure, but has also given an indication of his approach to his subject by repetition of key words which denote features that will have special significance in this *Life*. There are, besides the three references to Agesilaos' name, three to νόμος, three to obedience (for which ὀρχεσθαι is used twice), and two to ἀγωγή. The ἀγωγή is prominent early as the educational institution which inculcated Agesilaos' attitude to the two other features, law and obedience. The transition from Agesilaos' birth to his education in the ἀγωγή is made in a key sentence:

2 ἐπεὶ δὲ . . . ἰδιώτης ἐδόκει βιοτεύσειν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, ἤχθη τὴν λεγομένην ἀγωγὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι, σκληρὰν μὲν οὖσαν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πολύπονον, παιδεύουσιν δὲ τοὺς νέους ὀρχεσθαι.

Here four phrases are especially significant: ἰδιώτης, ἀγωγὴν, σκληρὰν καὶ πολύπονον and ὀρχεσθαι. The Lykourgan system is explained at length by Ps.-Xenophon in *Lak. Pol.* and by Plutarch in *Lykourgos*, but recent scholars have corrected many misunderstandings about Spartan society and, in particular, the development of the Spartan ἀγωγή. Views of the Spartan way of life and system of education have been revised, and much that had been attributed to it has been discarded as of late date or even mythical. (W.G.Forrest (1971) p.51; S.Hodkinson (1983) pp.245-51; P.A.Cartledge (1987) Ch. 3). In describing Agesilaos' upbringing here, however, Plutarch selects only what he regards as the most significant features, and, for the elucidation of Plutarch's text, this discussion may be limited in the same way.

The function of the poetic quotation is to introduce literary



support for those features of the ἀγωγή which are selected by Plutarch for mention, σκληρὰν μὲν οὔσαν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πολύπονον. Plutarch's reference to the poet Simonides (c.556-468BC) indicates the need he felt for validation, from near-contemporary evidence, of his description of the toughness and strenuous training involved in the Spartan educational system, claiming that his quotation referred to Sparta in this respect: διὸ καὶ φασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου τὴν Σπάρτην προσηγορεῖσθαι δαμασίμβροτον. The quotation raises the question whether Plutarch relied on his own reading among the ancient authors or on extracts and collections already made by himself or others. With διὸ καὶ φασιν Plutarch refers to the reason given by commentators for Simonides' remark, and φασιν does not prove that Plutarch had not read the work from which he quotes. The quality and range of the references in the *Lives* indicate wide reading and study, even if he did not always have his own copy of his source beside him as he composed. (D.A.Russell (1973) Ch. 3, pp.42-62.) In this quotation, however, Plutarch is still recording only what the poet chose to say, and, as a guest travelling around and commemorating his friends and their cities, Simonides would, no doubt, when in Sparta, receive and repeat the formidable impressions of Spartans that the Spartans wished the world to have of them; for some, at least, of their invincibility in war resulted from the reluctance of their enemies to risk challenging it. Similarly, Aristotle may have recorded what was partly an element of Spartan propaganda when he said that the Spartans were superior because they trained, while their enemies did not (*Pol.* 1338b).

The ἀγωγή was thought to contribute to maintaining the Spartans' dominance over their subject population because it included features that produced superior soldiers: "Lykourgos wished by educating them in this way to make the boys more resourceful in getting supplies, and better at fighting" (*Lak. Pol.* II.7). Thucydides, however, mentioned simplicity and uniformity of dress as other aspects of their way of life:

μετρίᾳ δ' αὖ ἐσθῆτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι  
Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ  
μείζω κεκτημένοι ἰσοδύναμοι μάλιστα κατέστησαν (I.6.4).

Social values, therefore, as well as military, were inculcated in the ἀγωγή, and the influence was continued also in the συσσίτιον, to which men of twenty years of age and over belonged, if they were Spartiates and were admitted. For Plutarch the influence of Lykourgos was important only for the Spartans' citizenship and self-fulfilment, not for their power in Greece, as it was for the author of *Lak. Pol.* (*Lykourgos* 31). Obedience (ἄρχεσθαι), whether to elders in the state or to superiors in the various institutions, is regarded here as one of the chief values of the Spartan system, and as an especially significant feature of Agesilaos' education. Plutarch's explanation, following the quotation, of the significance of Simonides' metaphor δαμασίμβροτον, serves to assign to the strict discipline of the ἀγωγή the habit of obedience acquired by the Spartans, and it also serves to establish recognition, both for the Spartans and for Plutarch, of the principle of the effective formation of character by habituation and training, through their customs, ὥς μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν. Plutarch again stresses the training in obedience in τοῖς νόμοις πειθηνίους καὶ χειροήθεις ποιοῦσαν, where reference to laws seems now to specify the constitutional reforms attributed to the divine, human, or mythical Lykourgos. It is these provisions that won for the Spartans their admirers in other parts of the Greek world and in other times, and Plutarch consistently commends Agesilaos for upholding Lykourgan standards, blaming the decline of Sparta, which in the end marks Agesilaos' reign, on those who neglected them.

νόμος, however, is used twice more, in the singular, where it does not refer to any known legislation. As regards the νόμος referred to in the phrase τῆς βασιλείας Ἁγίδι προσηκούσης κατὰ τὸν νόμον, the meaning is "customary practice", since monarchy, and the arrangements for its inheritance, were survivals from the distant past, and



Lykourgos was believed to have been only the reformer of the laws, not the founder of the monarchy. Similarly, the law referred to in ταύτης ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος τῆς ἀνάγκης τοὺς ἐπὶ βασιλείᾳ τρεφομένους παῖδας is not one otherwise known. It is not improbable that the privileged royal families asserted their exclusive eligibility for the monarchy, in part by ensuring a separate upbringing for a king's heir, free from the general assessment in competition and from supervision by their future subjects. The king's second son, ἰδιώτης, and so not exempt in this way, thus acquired a quality all his own, if he unexpectedly became king. Plutarch's interest is in the Spartans' tradition of obedience, in the form of obedience to the laws and to customary practice, and this is a point of prime importance in this *Life*.

Later he adds the element of leadership, and this was equally involved in the ἀγωγή. Leadership and obedience are linked in the phrase:

ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ ἀπαίδευτον τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι.

The repetition of a word in a different form is ornamental, but here Plutarch also uses a combination frequently expressed, as at *Lykourgos* 30.3 and in the following examples:

οἱ νόμοι δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα δύο μάλιστα διδάσκειν, ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι (Xen. *Cyropaedia* I.vi.20);

τὰ νόμιμα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὰ νόμιμα δ' ἄρχεσθαι  
(Xen. *Agesilaos* II.16);

ἐν ταύτῃ [τῇ ψυχῇ] γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ' ἄρχόμενον  
(Aristotle *Politics* I. 1259 b);

ἐλευθερίας δ' ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν  
(Aristotle *Politics* VI. 1317b).

Both these qualities were developed in the ἀγωγή by the competitive, hierarchic organization of the boys and young men according to age, as the terms used of Sphodrias indicate: παῖς, παιδίσκος and ἡβῶν (Xen. *Hell.* V.4.32); and also by the appointment of supervisors at every stage: οὐδέποτε ἐκεῖ οἱ παῖδες ἔρημοι ἄρχοντος εἴσι (Lak. *Pol.* II.11).

Plutarch may be contrasted with other authorities who concentrate rather on the disadvantages of the competitive element - "winners imply losers" (M.I.Finley (1975) p.165) - but for Plutarch the reverse is also important and obedience implies leadership: the Spartan system gave opportunities for leaders to emerge, establish themselves, and become accepted, but in the process the leaders were trained also in the duty of obedience. For Plutarch, Agesilaos' combination of the two made him unique later as king. The reason for this unusual combination was noted above as Agesilaos' juniority to his brother Agis, the elder son and heir of Archidamos. The combination, perhaps, was also to be a relevant factor in the Spartans' choice of Agesilaos as successor to Agis in cc.3-4.

In this chapter Plutarch gives an insight into an important methodological concept, the twofold basis of his analysis of character, which he regarded as a combination of inherited and acquired characteristics. The most explicit reference here to the two kinds of characteristics, those derived from nature and those derived from training, is in the phrase: τῷ φύσει ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ βασιλικῷ προσκτησάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. Obedience has already been assigned to the training of the ἀγωγή and is thus an acquired characteristic, but the ability to command and to be king is easily recognized as the personal quality of leadership, which is largely inherited, though it may of course be enhanced by training, as is shown in c.20.2: τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ κάλλιστον, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν. The natural, inherited quality of leadership might be one that his royal ancestors would share with him, but the ability to take orders makes him exceptional: Ἀγησιλάῳ δὲ καὶ τοῦθ' ὑπῆρξεν ἴδιον, ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ ἀπαίδευτον τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. Plutarch gives a clear indication of their future importance in his programme and his manner of thought about character.

The controversy over nature and customary practice, φύσις and



νόμος, had been engaging attention in the fifth century and thereafter. The two were reconciled late in the fourth century as guides for behaviour, on the ground that when correctly interpreted, they gave the same answers. For the Stoics, when a man by his rationality, λόγος, sees that it is consistent with his nature, φύσις, for him to follow universal nature, his behaviour will be in accord with the divine reason or universal law, νόμος (F.H.Sandbach (1975) pp.14, 31-2, 53-9; E.Rawson (1969) p.90). For Plutarch, too, there are two elements in a man's character, his nature and his reason, which can be developed by training, and in the perfectly educated man they will not be in conflict, but will complement each other. In some *Lives*, however, these are in conflict, causing disaster, as in *Pelopidas* 32.6: οὐ κατέσχε τῷ λογισμῷ τὴν ὀργήν. It will be seen in the end that for Plutarch, as for Aristotle, a reason for Sparta's decline was that the Spartan training did not provide a complete education, either for Agesilaos or for the other Spartans (cc.33, 37). His moral essays show that for him what was missing was control for the dangerous limitations and excesses of a man's φύσις and ἦθος which only the development of sound reasoning, λόγος, could ensure (C.Gill (1983) p.473).

Plutarch has already established the unique position of Agesilaos as regards obedience. Now, in the phrase τῶν βασιλέων εὐαρμοστότατον αὐτὸν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις παρέσχε, he distinguishes Agesilaos among the kings on a second ground, as being the one most in harmony with his subjects; for he identifies them with him, by a reference to their possession of the same quality of obedience which Agesilaos has been shown to possess, uniquely among the kings, and which therefore unites them to him uniquely. Because of his royal birth and experience of the ἀγωγή, Agesilaos possesses a unique combination of inherited and acquired qualities; to leadership and kingship, his two natural qualities (τῷ φύσει ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ βασιλικῷ), were added two inculcated qualities, τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον. It was from his

training that he acquired the practical ability to get on with people, both in public and in private relationships. Emphatically placed at the end of the chapter, these four words are programmatic for the aspects of Agesilaos' character that most impressed Plutarch.

## CHAPTER 2

### Moral and physical qualities - lameness

The second chapter is not chronologically progressive, but in the first half Plutarch picks up the reference to the ἀγωγή in c.1 and sets out the qualities it developed in Agesilaos' character. In the second half he deals with Agesilaos' physical qualities.

1 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς καλουμέναις ἀγέλαις τῶν συντρεφόμενων παίδων Λύσανδρον ἔσχεν ἑραστήν, ἐκπλαγέντα μάλιστα τῷ κοσμίῳ τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ.

As a boy, Agesilaos, though a younger son by a second marriage, was still a privileged person, a Heraklid and the son of a king, which would give him real advantages in the competitive Spartan system. One advantage was that he had a close association with another Heraklid, and no ordinary young man, but one clearly endowed with special qualities of leadership, Lysander: who, though perhaps suffering some temporary handicap of poverty as a *mothax* (Lysander 2; F.Jacoby *FGrHist* IIb, Leiden (1955) p.174 81 F 43), later became so powerful as to be thought to rival the kings. This connection may have been planned in the initial choice of ἀγέλη and συσσίτιον for Agesilaos, whose family background, though not guaranteeing that he would be leader of his group, would at least ensure that any qualities of leadership he displayed in boyhood would be encouraged, developed, and recognized.

Because of the inevitable distance between the observer and the phenomenon, Greek homosexuality, like the Spartan way of life, has lent itself to much speculative interpretation of the various kinds of evidence. Little or none of this seems to be wholly compelling, since there was no ancient investigation of the subject that can be called thorough and objective. Writers, for instance, often reflected traditional disparagement of remote or rival cities and peoples, such as Boiotians (Plato, *Symposium* 182b; Lak. *Pol.* II.12), and it persisted into

the second century AD in the fable of Valerius Babrius, mentioning a Theban speaker less eloquent than an Athenian, despite his intelligence (μυθόομβοι Αἰσώπειοι 15). Aristophanes' plays and painted vases were often explicit on the subject, but as works of art they must be admitted to be distanced from life. The important thing was that they should please, by making the audience laugh or by satisfying the interests of the owner, respectively. References in legal and political speeches were intended to influence an audience or move a jury, rather than deal objectively with the truth. Plato's use of homosexual love or desire (ἔρως) served to illuminate the philosopher's attitude to the search for truth. Especially in *Symposium*, he presented an ideal emotional attachment which could not be explained by reference to physical acts of consummation, whether homo- or heterosexual, for he insisted on an ongoing, infinite dedication to the search. "Any relationship between an older and a younger male in a Greek community had an educational dimension" (K.J.Dover (1980) p.4), and especially in a military context, there is an ideal element which transcends the physical (id. (1978) pp.191, 202). The relationships encouraged in Sparta were no doubt open to possible fulfilment in other, even physical ways, though the comparative ethnographic evidence illuminates origins rather than practices of *rites de passage* in the Classical *agoge*, and the important feature was that they created political connections (P.A.Cartledge (1981) pp.24, 29), and contributed to hero-worship, *esprit de corps*, and self-sacrificing devotion to the general good of the state, and were expected to do so, clearly with little debilitating deviance. The application to Spartans of the words εἰσπνέω and εἰσπνηλος (e.g. Aelian, *Varia Historia* III.12) points to the inspirational function of their associations. Plutarch has occasion to refer to the subject again (cc.13, 20).

It was a general quality, "the orderliness" of Agesilaos' nature, which attracted Lysander and began the connection with him, though



perhaps it was a matter important enough to noble families to have the opportunity created by them deliberately, and not left to a chance meeting. In the rest of the first half of the chapter Plutarch adds particular qualities to the picture of the broad characteristics given in c.1, by enlarging on the idea of orderliness. He presents this orderliness as a balance between Agesilaos' competitive excellences and his quieter or co-operative excellences (the terminology is taken from A.W.H.Adkins (1960) pp.6-7).

The prominent place, at the start of the *Life*, assigned to this account of Agesilaos' character indicates the importance of the biographer's interest in the subject. The natural arrangement of a life-story places the early life at the beginning, but Agesilaos' childhood presents a problem. Whether and where records of this, adequate for biographical purposes, would have been preserved, even for a contemporary enquirer such as Xenophon to discover, is a question which casts doubt on any of the given details. Since there would presumably be no documentary evidence at the time, it would at best be necessary for Xenophon to rely on the adult recollections of Agesilaos himself, and of those among his family and friends who knew him as a child. Plutarch can have had access to nothing better than this, but only, perhaps, to other sources of the same kind or worse. Otherwise, only generalizations and assumptions could be used to fill in the gaps.

However, Plutarch's interest, as he reveals in setting out his aims in the preface to *Perikles*, is in presenting a model for people to imitate in his day and thereafter. The model must have clarity and definition, if it is to communicate, carry conviction, and guide the reader's way of life. Any attempt to portray a developing, rather than a completely formed personality would be to blur the impact and confuse the reader. Ancient thinkers were divided about the possibility of changes in a man's personality or character during his

lifetime. Plutarch was aware of the controversy, for he says that Theophrastos was undecided about it (*Perikles* 38). However, as he indicates by recording the persistence of certain qualities into Agesilaos' old age, he is at this point presenting the final results of his researches, for his character study will have been completed by the time the composition reached its finished form. Therefore, the traits that had emerged from the study of the mature actions of the man can be presented as already possessed by the child. The gaps in the evidence relating to the early years of his life will then appear to have been filled, and an account composed retrospectively will be presented to the reader in a complete form and as part of a continuous narrative. Whether or not a man changes during his lifetime, for literary purposes the biographer is predisposed "to present a relatively static picture of a person's character" from childhood (C.Gill (1983) p.477). Discussion of the development of character is, perhaps appropriately, confined to the early chapters of a *Life*, but the formative influences are clearly recognized, and Agesilaos' later struggles with features of his character are not ignored (e.g. cc.11.6-10, 33.2).

The danger is that this artificiality, generalization, and use of doubtful evidence will produce a less convincing account. Plutarch overcame this problem by using the means Homer employed when he conveyed the beauty of Helen, not by direct description, but by showing the effect her appearance before the elders of Troy had on them (*Iliad* III.156-8). So here it is the impact of Agesilaos' personality on Lysander ἐν ταῖς καλουμέναις ἀγέλαις which provides Plutarch with the means to integrate into the *Life* a description of his character at the boyhood stage, as an explanation (γάρ) of that impact, thus creating an artistic illusion that evidence is continually available from one stage to the next. The listed features are those later manifested in the man's actions, but they are presented as observations of

Lysander at the time.

2 φιλονεικότατος γὰρ ὢν καὶ θυμοειδέστατος ἐν τοῖς νέοις καὶ πάντα πρωτεύειν βουλόμενος, καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἔχων καὶ ῥαγδαῖον ἄμαχον καὶ δυσεκβίαστον.

The structure of the list of Agesilaos' qualities that Plutarch has presented here corresponds with the two pairs of key qualities at the end of c.1 (τῷ φύσει ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ βασιλικῷ προσκτησάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον). To the first of these pairs belong the five qualities mentioned in the first half of this list, the practical competitive virtues of the man of action, part of the natural endowment of his royal birth: to the first two, "the desire to win" and "the display of high spirits", Plutarch adds the third, which follows on from these, "the wish to take the lead" among the boys of his own age, all clearly the appropriate qualifications for a general and a candidate for the kingship. The list of the five competitive virtues is completed with two further, even more aggressive, qualities, "impetuosity", and "a violent nature", promising the refusal to give up the fight or be defeated. The last of these qualities is illustrated at *Pelopidas* 1, where for a ῥαγδαῖος soldier "valour had a high value, life a low value", with the careless abandon of a man in poor health. (Cf. below.)

εὐπειθεῖα πάλιν αὖ καὶ πρῶτῃ τοιοῦτος ἦν οἷος φόβῳ μηδέν, αἰσχύνῃ δὲ πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ πραττόμενα, καὶ τοῖς ψόγοις ἀλγύνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς πόνους βαρύνεσθαι.

Plutarch turns now to the social, quiet virtues, of which there are six, corresponding to the second pair of key qualities (those acquired in training). It is evidently paradoxical (πάλιν) that these should now be found in combination with the earlier qualities, but they needed to be inculcated and developed by undertaking the traditional activities of the ἀγωγή. "Obedience" and "gentleness" - perhaps in the sense of "rendering him tame", like the young horse in c.1 - are displayed in his response to the orders he was given, a "fearlessness" in all, and "a sense of decency" in shirking nothing. The list of quiet, acquired



virtues is then completed with "the pained or distressed response to criticism" and "a willingness to accept hardship". Plutarch seems also to have presented separately in these two lists the distinctive qualities to be desired respectively in the character of a general and a constitutional monarch: on the one hand the inherited, competitive virtues, the general's fighting efficiency, on the other hand the acquired, co-operative virtues, ensuring popularity through the avoidance of tyranny in the king's rule.

3 τὴν δὲ τοῦ σκέλους πῆρωσιν ἢ θ' ὥρα τοῦ σώματος ἀνθοῦντος ἐπέκρυπτε, καὶ τὸ ῥαδίως φέρειν καὶ ἱλαρῶς τὸ τοιοῦτο, παίζοντα καὶ σκώπτοντα πρῶτον ἑαυτόν, οὐ μικρὸν ἦν ἐπανόρθωμα τοῦ πάθους.

So far Plutarch has described how Agesilaos was equipped for external relationships. He now completes the picture with Agesilaos' more private world, showing how he met the problems presented to him by his own individual personality. Later (c.11.6) Agesilaos' problem will again be the control of his own emotions: ἐπειρᾶτο νεανικῶς ἀπομάχεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. At this point, the initial phrase introduces Agesilaos' physical disability, his lameness, and Plutarch uses it to reveal his inner spirit. In the first part are the qualities that enabled him to rise above his handicap; these are followed in the second part by the advantages which accrued to the development of his character in consequence of the handicap, advantages which others did not share. In the circumstances, one would think that the lameness was not congenital, if the testing and exposure of infants took place in accordance with tradition, but rather that it was the result of a boyhood injury of the sort any adventurous youth, such as Agesilaos appears to have been, might easily suffer. (See further below, c.3.) That the disability was obscured by "his fine physical condition" incidentally helps to explain how he could be accepted by his fellows and how Plutarch can concentrate on more private reactions, though these are also relevant in the external relationships

of man to man. "Patience" and "cheerfulness" enabled him not only to bear the affliction but to rectify the defect, to some extent. The cheerfulness takes two forms, "playful actions" and "verbal jesting".

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐκδηλοτέραν ἐποίει, πρὸς μηδένα πόνον μηδὲ πρᾶξιν ἀπαγορεύοντος αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν χολότητα.

At this point Plutarch turns from the rather negative surmounting of the problems to the compensatory benefits for Agesilaos' character. His disability induced a positive development in his already existing innate quality of "desire for attainment". The noun φιλοτιμία is often translated as "ambition", but this is generally inadequate for Plutarch's several uses of the word in *Agesilaos* and other *Lives*. It is in the context of the ἀγωγή that its deeper significance can be appreciated. An essential feature of the ritual of supervision and assessment, part of the strenuous training characterized in c.1, was the competitive necessity of achievement, the proving of worth through endurance and enterprise. (S.Hodkinson (1983) p.248.) While acts of heroism and supreme effort were not exclusive to Spartans, it was not common elsewhere that individual self-enrichment was so strongly discouraged as it was, in the tradition, at Sparta, where service to the best interests of the state was substituted as the ideal: ἡ θεοφιλεστάτη τε καὶ πολιτικωτάτη ἔρις (*Lak. Pol.* IV.5). There is in the tradition no sign of desire for wealth in, for example, the motivation of Lysander and Agesilaos. Desire for attainment, on the other hand, so strongly inculcated in the ἀγωγή, continued to be manifested in adult life, in the paramount importance for the Spartans of being known to have acted in Sparta's best interest (cf. c.23: δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτὴν, εἴ τι χρήσιμον ἔχει, σκοπεῖν). Plutarch seems to have recognized, and conveyed, this special nature of Spartan φιλοτιμία. The extraordinary competitiveness of Agesilaos' character is displayed in his refusal ever to make his disability an excuse for not participating. Plutarch seems also to have recognized the strength of psychosomatic interactions. Cf. *Pelopidas*



again for further evidence noted by Plutarch: θεραπευθεὶς ὁ γενναῖος ἐκεῖνος οὐκέτ' ἦν φιλοκίνδυνος οὐδὲ ῥαγδαῖος ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν (1.3) - a physical change induces a corresponding change of spirit. The last words of this section, διὰ τὴν χολότητα, round it off by returning to the topic which introduced the subject, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σκέλους πῆρωσιν. This reference to Agesilaos' lameness provides Plutarch with a bridge to the next topic, his refusal to permit a portrait to be made.

4 τῆς δὲ μορφῆς εἰκόνα μὲν οὐκ ἔχομεν (αὐτὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποθνήσκων ἀπεῖπε μήτε πλαστὰν μήτε μιμηλὴν τινα ποιήσασθαι τοῦ σώματος εἰκόνα).

Descriptions of physical appearance became a regular part of biography (A.E.Wardman (1967) pp.414-20). Here, however, the absence of a likeness makes a first-hand description impossible, but Plutarch seems not to have wished to use Agesilaos' "physical appearance as a guide to his moral personality" (ibid. p.417). He has shown rather the effect of his physical condition on the development of his character. Plutarch seems to link Agesilaos' refusal with a reluctance to have his disability portrayed, so that while he overcame the physical effects of his handicap, it would appear that he felt the mental effect more deeply. Agesilaos' simple life-style and his φιλοτιμία would be incompatible with the ostentation of a statue, and more in sympathy with Tacitus, who at *Agricola* 46 dismisses the value of material images because of their lack of durability. Xenophon records that Agesilaos preferred spiritual memorials: τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς οὐδέποτε ἐπαύετο μνημεῖα διαπονούμενος (*Agesilaos* XI.7). Portrait statues of Lysander were set up at Delphi and elsewhere as part of his deification and heroization, but faithful representation of features was "a thing of the future" (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.86). That a portrait of some kind was made of a king who died away from Sparta is suggested by Herodotos: ὃς δ' ἂν ἐν πολέμῳ τῶν βασιλέων ἀποθάνῃ, τούτῳ δὲ εἰδῶλον σκευάσαντες ἐν κλίνῃ εὖ ἐστρωμένη ἐκφέρουσι (VI.58.3) - but Agesilaos' body was brought



home to Sparta (c.40).

λέγεται δὲ μικρός τε γενέσθαι καὶ τὴν ὄψιν εὐκαταφρόνητος·

Plutarch has explained why he has had to rely on this anonymous report that Agesilaos was small and unprepossessing to look at. His appearance becomes relevant later in the work (e.g. c.36.9), as giving only a distorted reflection of his character. Here the unfavourable impression interrupts the list of eulogistic descriptions, establishing for the author a balanced attitude to his subject at the start. The use of quotation also allows him to remain uncommitted.

5 ἡ δ' ἰλαρότης καὶ τὸ εὐθυμον ἐν ᾧ παντὶ καιρῷ καὶ παιγνιῶδες, ἀχθεινὸν δὲ καὶ τραχὺ μηδέποτε μήτε φωνῇ μήτε ὄψει, τῶν καλῶν καὶ ὠραίων ἐρασμιώτερον αὐτὸν ἄχρι γήρως παρεῖχεν.

Plutarch again looks back to a characteristic he had mentioned earlier, for the first noun here recalls the adverb, ἰλαρῶς, and the third recalls the phrase παίζοντα καὶ σκώπτοντα πρῶτον ἑαυτόν. These had been used to mark the quality that enabled Agesilaos to counteract the physical problems of his disability. The same two qualities, reinforced by a third, τὸ εὐθυμον, are now instrumental in determining his reaction to the social disadvantages of his appearance. Plutarch ends the list with Agesilaos' avoidance of the irritability that might have been associated with the strains of his physical difficulties. The qualities listed did not assist only in the strengthening of Agesilaos' character, for now Plutarch extends their function by reverting to the social factors introduced at the end of the first chapter, in the key words τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον, and also at the start of this chapter, in the key word ἐραστήν, which has the same root as the comparative adjective used here, ἐρασμιώτερον. All these qualities are now given their additional social significance, indicating that they made Agesilaos a popular companion; and that this popularity remained with him until old age suggests the larger context of a lifetime for all the traits of character attributed to him in his youth.

6 ὥς δὲ Θεόφραστος ἱστορεῖ, τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐζημίωσαν οἱ ἔφοροι γήμαντα γυναῖκα μικράν. Οὐ γὰρ βασιλεῖς, ἔφασαν, ἀμῖν, ἀλλὰ βασιλείδια γεννασεῖ.

The anecdote reverts to the description of Agesilaos' unimposing appearance. Plutarch ends the chapter with a reinforcement of the earlier unfavourable judgement, but because it occurs in a quotation, the impression of the author's impartiality is not impaired. Although neither author associates himself directly with the judgement, the ephors are represented as believing that appearance gives a useful indication of character. However, genuine or not, the story should not refer to Agesilaos, who was not born to be heir to the throne (c.1. above).

## CHAPTER 3

### Alkibiades at Sparta: the disputed succession

The first major historical event in the *Life* is the accession of Agesilaos as king, and the account which Plutarch presents may seem to indicate to the reader that Leotychidas was Alkibiades' son, and that he was therefore not the rightful successor to Agis. Thus the scene is set for the start of the new reign with the king and the citizens in harmony, for the account appears to show how, by a majority decision and without violating constitutional procedures, the Spartans obtained desired political advantages, yet managed to maintain their traditional conservatism, observing to their own satisfaction, for the moment, certain relevant religious and other sanctions. However, Plutarch does not give an explicit judgement until *Comparatio* 1.3, where he accuses Agesilaos of wrongfully seizing the kingship; the *Life* proceeds with the Spartans accepting the legitimacy of the accession. Could it be that Plutarch, the artist, presented the Alkibiades connection at this point so that the reader approached the sequel in possession of the same background of scandal that the Spartan judges may themselves have had?

Other ancient authorities give accounts which differ in important details, and the truth is hardly to be found simply by comparing the sources' narratives and seeking to confirm or correct one by references to others. Since it was a controversial event when it happened, the circumstances at the time at which it was resolved must be considered, so that disputed statements may be assessed. Thus two problems must be separated: a historical one of possible manipulation of the constitution, at the time of the death of Agis, and a historiographical one of the possible subsequent accretion of "historical" evidence. Plutarch's account will be considered first, followed by the divergent accounts of Xenophon and Nepos (pp. 41-45



below), so that a possibly more realistic account of the events may be given.

1 Βασιλεύοντος δ' οὖν Ἄγιδος ἦκεν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐκ Σικελίας φυγὰς εἰς Λακεδαίμονα· καὶ χρόνον οὐκ ὀλίγον ἐν τῇ πόλει διάγων, αἵτις ἔσχε τῇ γυναικὶ τοῦ βασιλέως, Τιμαίᾳ, συνεῖναι.

The time is first set in Agis' reign, which began when Agesilaos was perhaps sixteen or eighteen years old. Alkibiades' visit to Sparta on the way back from Sicily was in the twelfth year of Agis' reign, when Agesilaos was approaching thirty, but the relevance to him of the visit is not yet made explicit. The charge of adultery is reported also at *Alk.* 23.1-2 and *Lys.* 22. Plutarch here presents it directly as fact, and has given the statement an independent status, but even if the report is true, incurring the charge is clearly not the same as discovery *in flagranti delicto*. This episode is not given in Thucydides, though the visit is mentioned (VI.88.9). Study of Alkibiades' movements from Thurii has shown that Alkibiades was not in Sparta in Agis' absence (H.D.Westlake (1938) pp.30-40), though this has been denied (A.Andrewes (1981) on Thuc. VIII.12.2, accepting Hatzfeld's objection at *Alcibiade* p.214 n.1). The charge, possible but not certain, would remain unsubstantiated, even if Alkibiades was in Sparta at that time.

καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς παιδάριον οὐκ ἔφη γινώσκειν ὁ Ἄγης, ἀλλ' ἐξ Ἀλκιβιάδου γεγονέναι.

Plutarch has presented this denial, too, as a fact, but has still not indicated any link with Agesilaos' affairs. Pausanias (III.8.7) indicates doubt, by setting Agis' refusal to acknowledge Leotychidas alongside Ariston's rash rejection of Demaratos, which Herodotos mentions (VI.65.3). Pausanias' prejudice in favour of Leotychidas is clear, for it was "malicious providence" that brought Agis' attitude to official attention, and remorse that made him acknowledge his son before he died. Pausanias blames Lysander for the failure of the

Spartans to consult Delphi about the interpretation of the oracle, indicating the expectation, in his (Pausanias') mind, that Delphi would have supported Leotychidas.

2 τοῦτο δ' οὐ πάνυ δυσκόλως τὴν Τιμαίαν ἐνεγκεῖν φησι Δοῦρις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψιθυρίζουσιν οἴκοι πρὸς τὰς εἰλωτίδας Ἀλκιβιάδην τὸ παιδίον, οὐ Λεωτυχίδην, καλεῖν.

Plutarch here changes to an indirect report, in which Agis' wife seems to have confirmed her husband's suspicion that Alkibiades was the father of this child, who is identified by his name, Leotychidas, only at the end of the sentence. Douris of Samos should not be assumed to have been the source for the statements made so far, though his account may have been used here for much of the detail, despite the delayed mention of his name. There is no known source earlier than Douris linking Alkibiades' visit with Agis' wife, and since Douris himself is said to have claimed descent from Alkibiades (*Alk.* 32.2), his testimony is not above suspicion. Plutarch shows himself capable of a rational attitude to the evidence of this Douris:

Δοῦρις δ' ὁ Σάμιος τούτοις ἐπιτραγῶδει πολλὴν ὁμότητα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ Περικλέους κατηγορῶν, ἦν οὔτε Θουκυδίδης ἱστόρηκεν οὔτ' Ἑφορος οὔτ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀληθεύειν ἔοικεν . . .

Δοῦρις μὲν οὖν οὐδ' ὅπου μηδὲν αὐτῷ πρόσσεστιν ἴδιον πάθος εἰωθὼς κρατεῖν τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα δεινῶσαι τὰς τῆς πατρίδος συμφορὰς ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων (*Per.* 28.1 and 3).

However, Plutarch may not always have wished to exercise his critical faculty explicitly. Apart from the unreliability of Douris, this evidence is further doubly suspect, for what took place οἴκοι, "in the house" of the king, was private and unlikely to be reported outside with any authenticity; and besides, the Helot women might be an unreliable source.

καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην αὐτὸν οὐ πρὸς ὕβριν φάναι τῇ Τιμαίᾳ πλησιάζειν, ἀλλὰ φιλοτιμούμενον βασιλεύεσθαι Σπαρτιάτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεγονότων.

Alkibiades has been designated a Spartan name (A.Andrewes (1981)



on Thuc. VIII.6.3; M.B.Wallace (1970) p.197 n.). It could have been used as a complimentary term of affection by a mother; the Spartan use of the suffix appears again in the name of the admiral Eurybiades (Herodotos VIII.2) and Polybiades (Xen. *Hell.* V.iii.20). Douris would wish to enhance both his ancestor's reputation and his own aristocratic descent, to favour his exclusive birthright to the Samian tyranny. The claim is perhaps plausible, for Alkibiades is known to have fathered a child in Samos, and other Samians claimed similar descent (D.G.J.Shipley (1987) p.124 n.56, citing R.Kebric, (1977) *In the shadow of Macedon: Douris of Samos* (*Historia Einzelschriften*, 29) 2).

3 διὰ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνου ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ὑπεξῆλθε φοβηθεὶς τὸν Ἄγιν.

Thucydides (VIII.12), who records no scandal, naturally offers a different reason for Alkibiades' departure from Sparta. There, τῷ Ἄγιδι αὐτὸς διάφορος ὢν refers to a quarrel which Alkibiades had with Agis, at the time when the Spartans were divided over a proposed expedition to Asia Minor to be led by Chalkideus. It was because of this quarrel that he suggested to his family's friend, the ephor Endios, that Agis should be deprived of the credit for the fruits of the expedition. All the ephors were persuaded, and it was as commander of this expedition, with a reduced fleet, that Alkibiades left Sparta. If the quarrel was about the expedition, it will have concerned both Alkibiades and others. Thucydides does not explain, but Plutarch, with his sources, may have taken him to be referring the quarrel to the scandal.

ὁ δὲ παῖς τὸν μὲν ἄλλον χρόνον ὑποπτος ἦν τῷ Ἄγιδι καὶ γνησίου τιμὴν οὐκ εἶχε παρ' αὐτῷ, νοσοῦντι δὲ προσπεσὼν καὶ δακρύων ἔπεισεν υἱὸν ἀποφῆναι πολλῶν ἐναντίον.

Plutarch has introduced his account of Agesilaos' accession ἐξὼ τοῦ δρόμου, as it were, for this reference to the legitimate son's prerogative is his first explicit hint that Alkibiades' visit to Sparta and



the charge of the seduction of the king's wife, which he is said to have incurred there, were relevant to the problem of the succession. If the dispute over the succession had broken out only when the king fell ill, or if its imminence had not been suspected until then, Leotychidas will naturally have now sought this confirmation from the dying king. Clearly Leotychidas was not carrying on the contest alone, but that does not provide further authentication of the recantation, for his supporters or advisers could, even if they arrived after Agis' death, have fabricated his favourable answer, and arranged the presence of "many witnesses". The Spartans evidently disregarded it, though this again proves nothing. While Plutarch gives no location for the recantation, Xenophon says that Agis fell sick at Heraia on his way back from Elis and Delphi, but was still living when he reached home. Pausanias (III.8) says that Agis fell ill as he was returning from Arkadia, and that the people of Heraia in Arkadia who had witnessed the recantation came to Sparta to support Leotychidas. The weakness of his testimony here appears when he relates that Agesilaos referred the oracle to Leotychidas' being "no true son of Agis", whereas legitimacy of birth was a constitutional requirement, independent of the oracle (see below). What Pausanias says seems to stem from what Arkadian guides may have told him, anxious, perhaps, both to please a questioner who asked, "Do you remember when Agis took ill here and recanted?" and also to enhance the part their ancestors had played in history. Agis' denial and recantation are not recorded by Xenophon, and the tale, if not genuine, may have arisen from a chance remark or rebuke, such as "No true son of mine would . . .".

The references to Alkibiades in Plutarch's tradition stem partly from Douris and partly from Xenophon, though he did not name Alkibiades. The reason for Xenophon's omission could perhaps be simply that it was not mentioned openly in the dispute; but other suggestions have been made, e.g. that if he knew of it, he did not

believe in the connection, or that he suppressed it through loyalty to Athens and Alkibiades, or wished to avoid introducing unsavoury or politically dangerous accusations which might tarnish his account of Agesilaos' accession (I.Bos (1947) p.38; R.J.Littman (1969) p.270). Alkibiades' name does not recur in this chapter of Plutarch's *Life*, which, together with the doubts already manifest about Alkibiades' reported involvement, suggests that the public dispute in Sparta may well have been conducted without naming him. Plutarch may have included the episode in order to enliven the start of the narrative; perhaps feeling the need to clarify in advance the precise identity of the supposed father of Timaias' child. The unreliable nature of various pieces of the evidence may have been felt by him to be obvious to the reader, and perhaps to reinforce doubts about the account which follows, of the means by which Agesilaos secured the succession. The important historical fact, for Plutarch, is that the Spartans made Agesilaos their king.

4 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τελευτήσαντος τοῦ Ἀγιδος ὁ Λύσανδρος, ἤδη κατανεναυμαχηκῶς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μέγιστον ἐν Σπάρτῃ δυνάμενος, τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προήγεν, ὥς οὐ προσήκουσαν ὄντι νόθῳ τῷ Λεωτυχίδῃ.

Plutarch marks the move forward in time by repeating the participial form of the phrase at the beginning of c.1, Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου βασιλεύσας, and also that of Βασιλεύοντος δ' οὖν Ἀγιδος at the beginning of this chapter. The genitive absolute closes the reign of Agis and starts the first topic of the *Life*, the struggle for the accession of Agesilaos as king. Both Xenophon and Pausanias put the death of Agis after a journey, which suggests that the danger of death was at the time of his departure not thought imminent, though since he had already reigned for nearly thirty years, if the question of the succession was still open, it will inevitably have been in the minds of some of those concerned. The word κατανεναυμαχηκῶς, with its seven syllables one of the longest used here by Plutarch, is striking.

Lysander had become powerful as a result of his contribution to the defeat of Athens, but he had then met opposition to his policy for handling the victory and, it may be, looked to Agesilaos' accession as a means to re-establish his influence by becoming the new king's adviser. Xenophon is restrained in referring to Lysander (cf. cc.7, 8, 20), and does not give him credit for suggesting the bid, mentioning only his support.

Plutarch, besides having dealt with the suspicions concerning Alkibiades ἐξὼ τοῦ δρόματος, similarly records Lysander's statement alleging the illegitimacy of Leotychidas outside the public debate, and as part of a preliminary private discussion between Lysander and Agesilaos, where it is one of the reasons given for contesting the succession. It seems clear from all the sources that the challenger was Agesilaos and that, in public at any rate, the challenge was made either only when or shortly before Agis died, and took the Spartans by surprise. Plutarch gives no explicit judgement, but seems here to imply a belief that Leotychidas' possession of the prerogative, expressed, as previously at c.1, in προσήκουσαν, was accepted until this challenge was made.

5 πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου καὶ τὸ συντετράφθαι καὶ μετεσχηκέναι τῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐφιλοτιμοῦντο καὶ συνέπραττον αὐτῷ προθύμως.

Plutarch seems to have adapted Xenophon's expression of the grounds for the Spartans' concluding vote:

κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ (*Agesilaos* I.5),

and moved it to serve here as a further encouragement for Agesilaos in making the bid for the throne. The active virtue would be a valid reason why Agesilaos attracted the support of friends, including those of Lysander, whose policies and intentions were more adventurous and expansive, especially in Asia Minor. Their plans would be hindered, perhaps, if they had to manage a youthful king, as yet without



authority and experience, but whose supporters were expected to be intent on the less active policies of the opposing groups, more in agreement, perhaps, with those followed by the other king, Pausanias, after the war. Plutarch also points to the positive results of the unique combination of birth and upbringing which he stressed in the first chapter, and suggests that its popular appeal was recognized and appreciated among the Spartans, too.

ἦν δὲ Διοπεΐθης ἀνὴρ χρησολόγος ἐν Σπάρτῃ μαντείων τε παλαιῶν ὑπόπλεως καὶ δοκῶν περὶ τὰ θεῖα σοφὸς εἶναι καὶ περιττός. 7 οὗτος οὐκ ἔφη θεμιτὸν εἶναι χολὸν γενέσθαι τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος βασιλείᾳ καὶ χρησμὸν ἐν τῇ δίκῃ τοιοῦτον ἀνεγίνωσκε.

Whether the seer resided in Sparta permanently or only temporarily, even, perhaps, brought in for this purpose, is not stated, but he is said to have been highly thought of, and was presumably well enough known there. His name seems appropriate. The formal public debate begins here, with a suggestion that the Spartans should be guided by divine sanction. Such an appeal to the approval or disapproval of the gods carries weight on several important occasions, in this and other *Lives*. In Thucydides, too, the Spartans acknowledged that their reverses early in the Peloponnesian War were the result of divine retribution (VII.18.2; cf. c.30 below). Diopeithes refers to the lameness of the king himself, whereas in the words of the oracle cited here the lameness refers to the kingdom or monarchy. The justification for his taking the lameness personally is diminished by the consistent use in the oracle of the metaphor to describe Sparta in the phrase σέθεν ὀρτίποδος. Diopeithes' interpretation of the oracle points more directly at Agesilaos, and makes Lysander's argument less applicable to Leotychidas, but the inaccuracy renders it vulnerable.

φράζεο δὴ, Σπάρτῃ, καίπερ μέγалаυχος ἐοῦσα,  
μὴ σέθεν ὀρτίποδος βλάστη χολὴ βασιλείᾳ.  
δηρὸν γὰρ νοῦσοί σε κατασχέσουσιν ἄελπτοι  
φθισίβροτόν τ' ἐπὶ κῦμα κυλινδόμενον πολέμοιο.

The court was held apparently in a formal assembly of the people,

if Plutarch's πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν . . . συνέπραττον indicates the involvement of ordinary Spartans in public discussion, and if Xenophon's κρίνασα ἡ πόλις (*Agesilaos* I.5; cf. *Hell.* III.3.4) marks the formal conclusion of the debate. This may also be suggested by Xenophon's reference to the procedure required for the appointment of the king's successor: ἔδει βασιλέα καθίστασθαι (*Hell.* III.3.1), as if it followed a regular ceremonial pattern, as in Thucydides' report of the Delphic instruction for the restoration of king Pleistoanax in 421, καὶ θυσίαις . . . καθίσταντο (V.16), suggesting some of the possible ceremonial perhaps still attached to the appointment.

The procedure adopted when previously a king's accession was the result of disputed legitimacy is described by Herodotos. At VI.63.3, over the accession of Leutychides, he speaks of the concern of all Spartans, perhaps in an act of the Apella (R.W.Macan, *Herodotus*, p.323), or rather the ἐκκλησία (A.Andrewes (1966) p.17 n.3; Thuc. V.77.1), that the king should have an heir:

πανδημεὶ Σπαρτιῆται Ἀρίστωνι, ὡς ἀνδρὶ εὐδοκιμέοντι διὰ πάντων δὴ τῶν βασιλέων τῶν ἐν Σπάρτῃ γενομένων, ἀρὴν ἐποιήσαντο παῖδα γενέσθαι,

and at VI.66.1 it is the Spartiates who decide to consult Delphi:

ἔδοξε Σπαρτιήτησι ἐπειρέσθαι τὸ χρηστήριον.

Herodotos records the similar concern of the ephors over Anaxandridas:

ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τοῦτό ἐστι οὐ περιοπτόν, γένος τὸ Εὐρυσθένης γενέσθαι ἐξίτηλον. σὺ νυν τὴν μὲν ἔχεις γυναῖκα, ἐπεῖτε τοι οὐ τίκτει, ἔξεο, ἄλλην δὲ γῆμον (V.39.2).

At V.40.1 a stronger combination is recorded:

οἱ ἔφοροι καὶ οἱ γέροντες βουλευσάμενοι,

but the final appointment involves the whole citizen body:

οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι χρεώμενοι τῷ νόμῳ ἐστήσαντο βασιλέα τὸν πρεσβύτατον Κλεομένεα (V.42.2).

However, since Pausanias III.5.2 refers to the Spartan court set up for a king's trial as consisting of the twenty-eight elders, the ephors and the other king, it is thought that, while the Assembly may have

ratified the decision, the ruling on legitimacy was more probably given in the Gerousia (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.111; G.E.M.de Ste Croix (1972) p.351 is undecided). Xenophon adds another comment:

τὸ ἐν τῇ κρατίστῃ πόλει ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων κριθέντα τοῦ καλλίστου γέρωσ ἀξιωθῆναι (*Agesilaos* I.5),

but the three superlatives there surely all stress the distinction of the honour of being king of Sparta, rather than of any other state, and Xenophon should not be supposed to refer to the select group in the Gerousia (D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.42f.). It may be that the question of legitimacy was submitted to higher authority, but the king would need to know that he could rely on the army he would be leading, as Homer recorded of Agamemnon (*Iliad* II.73-394). Plutarch and Xenophon perhaps wished only to emphasize that Agesilaos had the unanimous support and approval of all the people. Pausanias, the only other authority who gives the text of the oracle (III.8.10), has usefully drawn attention to the failure of the Spartans to consult the priests at Delphi about the interpretation of their oracle, for which he blames Lysander. Those in opposition to Agesilaos clearly either did not think of it, or believed that they would not receive from the god the answer that suited them.

8 πρὸς ταῦτα Λύσανδρος ἔλεγεν ὥς, εἰ πάνυ φοβοῖντο τὸν χρησμόν οἱ Σπαρτιᾶται, φυλακτέον αὐτοῖς εἶη τὸν Λεωτυχίδην· οὐ γὰρ εἰ προσπαίσας τις τὸν πόδα βασιλεύοι, τῷ θεῷ διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ γνήσιος ὢν μηδ' Ἡρακλείδης, τοῦτο τὴν χολὴν εἶναι βασιλείαν.

This, together with Xenophon's equivalent phrase μὴ προσπαίσας τις χολεύσαι (*Hell.* III.iii.4), seems to be the only evidence which can be used to determine whether the lameness was congenital or the result of later injury. If it was not caused by injury, Lysander's argument would be vulnerable to the objection that Agesilaos' lameness was not in the same category as the example he has given. (See c.2, on πῆρωσιν.) Two separate issues are linked here, since illegitimacy and direct descent from Herakles are not mutually exclusive. Strictly,



the terms of the oracle would present no obstacle if the illegitimate son's father was a Heraklid. Plutarch (*Agis* 11.3) asserts that a Heraklid may not have children by a wife who is ἄλλοδοσής, which he exemplifies immediately with the case of Leonidas, who married abroad. This, then, does not indicate the need for both parents to be of Heraklid families (pace P.A.Cartledge (1987) Ch.7, p.96). Legitimacy would be a constitutional requirement: descent from Herakles is a narrow limit imposed by privileged families who would seek divine or some other sanction for it. This is the fourth reference to the subject of Leotychidas' *illegitimate* birth, but it misrepresents the strict relevance of the oracle to *Heraklid* birth, as it is defined in Xenophon's account in the phrase: μὴ οὐκ ὦν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσειε (*Hell.* III.iii.3).

9 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος ἔφη καὶ τὸν Ποσειδῶ καταμαρτυρεῖν τοῦ Λεωτυχίδου τὴν νοθείαν, ἐκβαλόντα σεισμῷ τοῦ θαλάμου τὸν Ἄγιν· ὃν' ἐκείνου δὲ πλέον ἢ δέκα μηνῶν διελθόντων γενέσθαι τὸν Λεωτυχίδην.

Poseidon, as god of earthquakes, indicates his attitude by the use of his special powers. The indication is not, however, a direct communication, but requires human interpretation, which is subject to query on the very point at issue. Agesilaos' use of the reference to Poseidon would possibly suggest the god's disapproval of the act of seduction; but it was open to the sceptical to comment that, by metonymy alone, the earthquake was a coincidental occurrence which forced the real father to flee the house to avoid detection. The witness who saw the escape is not named, but even if Alkibiades' visit to Sparta was considered relevant at the time of the dispute, up to fifteen years or more have elapsed since then. He may be supposed to have reported the incident and identified the man, too, at the time of the earthquake, but even so, to be seen exiting from a house is far from being a case of *flagranti crimine comprehensus*, as its significance would become apparent only later.

Xenophon at this point does not mention the name Agis, but only

"the man Leotychidas calls his father", and his version avoids the problem of explaining the identity of the fugitive from the earthquake, who is left nameless but is clearly not Agis. It is nowhere made clear why Agis should react in this way, whereas a guilty adulterer, even if not superstitious, might fear exposure, if caught in the aftermath of the earthquake, and would wish to escape undetected. However, his words, τὸν σὸν πατέρα, coming after the reference to Agis as ὃν τὸ καλεῖς πατέρα, could nonetheless easily be mistaken by a hasty reader for another reference to Agis. Xenophon's text at the final point is corrupt: ἀφ' οὗ γάρ τοι ἔφυσε καὶ ἐφάνη ἐν τῷ θαλάμῳ (ἐξ οὗ γάρ τοι ἔφυγεν ἐκ τῷ θαλάμῳ is the conjecture of Hartmann), and is not improved by changing τοι to τυ (= σε Keller; G.E.Underhill (1906) ad loc. and p.360), since the order of events is wrong. The end of the sentence, however, is not in dispute, and the meaning of the whole should correspond to "You were born in the tenth month (δεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἐγένου) after the earthquake", that is, the fugitive was the father. In order to show that the fugitive was not the father, the length of the absence has to be longer than this. In Plutarch's version, therefore, Leotychidas was born "more than ten months after" (πλέον ἢ δέκα μηνῶν διελθόντων), because Plutarch names Agis as the one driven from the apartment. In a similar situation, Herodotos has reported Ariston's calculation, according to Leutychides: ὁ δὲ συμβαλόμενος τοὺς μῆνας ἀπώμοσε, φὰς οὐκ ἑωυτοῦ μιν εἶναι (VI.65.3). The difference in the time scale in the versions of Plutarch and Xenophon is a necessary adjustment between the two cases, according to the interval after which the birth took place: to prove that the adulterer was the father, nine months; to prove that Agis was not, a longer time. The announcement of the decision of the court is delayed by Plutarch until the start of the next chapter.

The accounts of Xenophon and Nepos may now be examined.



## Xenophon

A clear and simple picture is given by Xenophon in *Agesilaos* I.5, making no reference to any debate, or why a debate was necessary, only to the struggle itself:

Ὡς γε μὴν καὶ πρὶν ἄρξαι ἄξιος τῆς βασιλείας ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀγησίλαος, τάδε τὰ σημεῖα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ Ἄγις βασιλεὺς ὢν ἐτελεύτησεν, ἐρισάντων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς Λεωτυχίδα μὲν ὥς Ἀγιδος ὄντος υἱοῦ, Ἀγησιλάου δ' ὥς Ἀρχιδάμου, κρίνασα ἡ πόλις ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ τοῦτον ἐστήσατο βασιλέα.

This brief account leaves out moral aspects of the dispute. The phrase ἀνεπικλητότερον . . . τῷ γένει would seem to imply that the two had been "contending for the office" simply because it was vacant, with no heir apparent available. Xenophon reinforces this impression by making Agesilaos contend strangely as "son of Archidamos" and not as brother of Agis. The claim that Leotychidas, who contends as "son of Agis", was disqualified on grounds of illegitimacy, is not made explicit. Xenophon, perhaps avoiding all mention of the details of the insinuations of illegitimacy, which might be damaging to Agesilaos' reputation, too, in this way obscures this constitutional issue, bringing only the two rivals' fathers into consideration. With the inclusion of the reference to character, τῇ ἀρετῇ, he makes it appear that the contest was judged largely on personal grounds. Indeed, he has used the episode in *Agesilaos* as one of the proofs (τεκμηρίων) of Agesilaos' excellence that did not depend on the achievements of his kingship, τῆς γε πρὶν ἄρξαι αὐτὸν ἀρετῆς, but was made manifest in a majority decision of the Spartans themselves, by which the constitutional issue of finding the legitimate heir to the throne was also settled. Xenophon reports that the city judged Agesilaos "more deserving", as regards τὸ . . . κριθέντα τοῦ καλλίστου γέρωσ ἀξιοθῆναι, and made him king. Thus it was a matter of political importance, and meant that as king Agesilaos could count on majority support for whatever was known of his plans and intentions, as the man judged better qualified to



implement them. Xenophon's words may perhaps be regarded as close to the form of expression used in a public notice probably in circulation at the time of the accession, rather than as a full account of the proceedings.

Xenophon's fuller account (*Hell.* III.iii.1-4) suggests that, even if it was a political issue, it was conducted in other terms, as a constitutional question of legitimate succession. Xenophon begins this version merely with the necessity to appoint a king (ἔδει βασιλέα καθίστασθαι), and after this statement all details are given in the words of the speakers, on which Xenophon makes no further comment of his own to indicate his view of their validity. The two men contend, as in *Agésilaios*, without any preliminary indication of why there should not have been a normal succession, but now Agésilaios' claim is as brother of Agis. The final decision, in favour of Agésilaios, is expressed here in similar terms, τοιαῦτα δ' ἀκούσασα ἡ πόλις ἀμφοτέρων Ἀγησίλαον εἰλοντο βασιλέα, but it is preceded by a public discussion, in three distinct parts. In the first, Leotychidas, υἱὸς φάσκων Ἀγιδος εἶναι, opens the debate by upholding his prerogative, on the grounds that the normal rule (ὁ νόμος) of inheritance is that the king's son takes precedence over his brother. Agésilaios' case against Leotychidas is made in the remaining two clearly defined parts, legitimacy of birth, and eligibility for succession as a descendant of Herakles. The question of legitimacy is conducted by Agésilaios himself, who claims that the man Leotychidas called his father had not acknowledged him, and cites the evidence of the earthquake and the month of the birth in order to set aside Leotychidas' report of his mother's testimony. The question of eligibility is conducted by Lysander, but it opens with the intervention by Diopieithes, who, supporting Leotychidas, Λεωτυχίδου συναγορεύων, mentions Apollo's oracle, but quotes only the warning against lameness, φυλάξασθαι τὴν χωλὴν βασιλείαν (*Hell.* III.iii.3). There is no positive support for Leotychidas here, and if, as Lysander seems

to have assumed, Agesilaos has made his case for illegitimacy, and Agis had had no heir for the whole or the latter part of his reign, Diopeithes' interpretation of the oracle would now only disqualify Agesilaos, without validating Leotychidas' eligibility. Lysander's interpretation of the oracle, ὑπὲρ Ἀγησιλάου, accords closely with the abstract wording:

οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο κελεύειν φυλάσσειν, μὴ προσπαίσας τις χωλεύσαι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μὴ οὐκ ὦν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσειε. παντάπασι γὰρ ὅν χολήν εἶναι τὴν βασιλείαν ὅποτε μὴ οἱ ὅφ' Ἡρακλέους τῆς πόλεως ἡγοῖντο.

Lysander, by treating the oracle as if it stated a special requirement of eligibility by birth, that only a true Heraklid should rule, invalidates the objection against Agesilaos' physical lameness, though without disposing of any suspicion of a physical disability other than a hypothetical minor accident. Only if the charge of illegitimacy, alleged by Agesilaos, is upheld, would his argument carry weight, and then only further to strengthen the disqualification of Leotychidas, for his claim to be a Heraklid is rejected only along with his status as Agis' son. Lysander says nothing to support that allegation, and if Agesilaos' case for Leotychidas' illegitimacy fails to persuade the Spartans, his eligibility, both as Agis' son and as a Heraklid, is restored.

It cannot be maintained that Xenophon's account of the dispute represents a convincing case, that it is adequate as historical evidence for Leotychidas' status, or that it records word for word the only discussion and the only arguments in the contest. It offers only the unsubstantiated assertions of the two sides, without a coherent structure, until at the end Xenophon reports the decision of the Spartans to prefer Agesilaos. Agesilaos' charge of illegitimacy, intended to refute the mother's claim, is founded on claims capable of no real substantiation, and suffers from imprecision in not naming the seducer. The introduction of the oracle by Diopeithes, said to be in



support of Leotychidas, fails to help him by meeting Agesilaos' charge. It does nothing to reinstate Leotychidas, for it ignores the fact that Leotychidas has already been eliminated. It provides nothing more than an attack on Agesilaos' case, and its attack is flawed, as Lysander points out. Although Lysander's contribution is based on linguistic accuracy, and appeals to the welfare of the state rather than that of an individual, it does not transform Xenophon's account as a whole into a convincing case against Leotychidas. By placing Lysander's argument last, Xenophon appears to have wished to separate it from the argument about illegitimacy and constitutional requirements, but this fails, since Lysander can deny Leotychidas the required descent from Herakles only by relying on Agesilaos' allegation. There is perhaps a ring of braggadocio in the tale which could have been told to Xenophon by Agesilaos years later in explaining how he became king.

### Nepos

Nepos, too, presents his account of the accession in clearly separated parts, giving first the Spartan rules for the inheritance of the monarchy, then the details of the dispute (*Life of Agesilaus* I.2). In giving the rules, he makes a clear distinction between custom (*mos*) and prescription (*non licebat*). However, Nepos is here explaining only the Spartan custom of having two kings, both descended from Herakles (*ex progenie Herculis*) but from two different families, those of Prokles and Eurysthenes, each family retaining its line of descent through the normal rules for next of kin, since it was not allowed to transfer anyone from one family's place to the other's. The rules of inheritance again involve the two issues, legitimate descent and descent within the Heraklid line. The rule, that the direct heir is the oldest son of the king and the next in line after him is the nearest relative, is then applied, as Leotychidas claims in *Hellenika*.



Nepos' account of the dispute, however, is slightly confusing. He first raises a doubt about Leotychidas' birth: Agis "did not acknowledge him at birth, but as he died said he was his own." This, of course, would leave Sparta without an heir apparent from the time of Agis' accession until his last illness. However, Nepos' account involves the use of three phrases which clearly imply an underlying belief that Leotychidas was really the true heir of Agis: cum Leotychide, fratris filio; filium reliquerat Leotychidem; and cum Agesilao, patruo suo. His reasoned account indicates perhaps an independent appraisal of the evidence available. He assigns the reason for the Spartans' preference for Agesilaos to the powerful support of Lysander, and seems to have judged that the rules of inheritance were not properly followed in this case.

#### Evaluation of the accounts of Xenophon, Plutarch and Nepos

Xenophon supplies the essential components for Plutarch's account, but here the parts are given coherent structure, and the imprecision over the alleged seducer's identity has been removed by the preliminary account of Alkibiades' visit to Sparta, supporting evidence, however fictitious, for the illegitimacy charge against Leotychidas. Plutarch has compensated for the unfairness of this with the recantation by Agis, which Xenophon omitted, and which turns the reader's mind at this point towards Leotychidas' innocence. Plutarch follows this with the charge of illegitimacy made by Lysander. Diopeithes' intervention fits well here, for it serves not to reinstate Leotychidas, but to disqualify Agesilaos with the unfortunate physical interpretation of the oracle's abstract "lame kingdom" which Lysander can then challenge. When Agesilaos now refers to the earthquake and the time of the birth, he is strengthening, however fictitiously, Lysander's insinuation, with new support for the charge of illegitimacy.

Plutarch's order of presentation, then, improves the argumentation

and the rhetorical quality of the debate, although he does not provide extra evidence for a more complete and convincing historical explanation of what actually happened than Xenophon's. He does not name Apollo as the author of the oracle and omits to mention that Diopeithes was supporting Leotychidas. No evidence is presented to the court until Agesilaos refers to Poseidon's earthquake afterwards. Plutarch also leaves the reader with only Agesilaos' unopposed case to consider, freed even from the need to solve the mystery of the identity of the suspected real father, by having had the explanation given at the beginning, in the Alkibiades episode.

The developments in the presentation of the three accounts may reflect differences in the authors' attitudes. When Agesilaos died, Xenophon seems to have wished to defend his reputation, perhaps against criticism that Sparta had declined during his reign, and at that time in his *Agesilaos* the defence was that his *ὁρετή* had rendered him *ἄξιός τῆς βασιλείας*. Later, when he wrote *Hellenika*, the criticism seems to have been that Sparta had somehow offended divine providence, and in order to meet this Xenophon now drew attention to the two signs of divine preference, Apollo's oracle favouring Agesilaos, and Poseidon's earthquake disqualifying Leotychidas (D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.46-60). Plutarch, a priest of Apollo at Delphi, omitted the god's name here, and so avoided associating him with the cause of Sparta's decline. He also avoided voicing his own judgements at this stage, for his version provides seeming constitutional validation for the start of Agesilaos' reign, with no explicit acceptance by him of its ultimate legality. After the death of Agis, the question of a successor was settled by majority decision, whatever public or private arguments and political considerations determined the voters' choice. The Spartans are represented as arranging their affairs within the constitutional procedures available to them at the time. Policies with majority support would be executed by a committed leadership, and the

traditional and religious formalities had apparently been preserved. Plutarch's reader, like the Spartans, approaches Agesilaos' reign without the complication of having to resolve doubts about the succession, and, again like the Spartans, will be enlightened later (c.30). Nepos minimizes the effect of Agis' doubts and alone exposes the certain manipulation by Leotychides' challengers from the start.

For a survey of events leading to the choice of Agesilaos as king of Sparta see Endnote 1.



PART TWO

THE CHARACTER OF AGESILAOS AND OF SPARTA

Developing a cohesive constituency

(Chapters 4-5)

## CHAPTER 4

### Courting favour among the powerful Spartans

1 Οὕτω δὲ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα βασιλεὺς ἀποδειχθεὶς ὁ Ἀγησίλαος εὐθὺς εἶχε καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦ Ἄγιδος, ὥς νόθον ἀπελάσας τὸν Λεωτυχίδην.

The reader has expected the appointment of Agesilaos as king since c.1, and so the announcement did not have to come as a necessary conclusion to c.3, but could be reserved to mark at this point the beginning of the main theme, the story of his reign. Plutarch's account clearly owes much to Xenophon's, though it is heavily supplemented, but by omitting Xenophon's ἡ πόλις and by replacing Ἀγησίλαον εἶλοντο βασιλέα, with the emphasis on the last word, by βασιλεὺς ἀποδειχθεὶς ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, he has held back the name of the person appointed, perhaps revealing some unease with the procedure, which illustrated the qualities of φιλοτιμία and φιλονεικία ascribed to Agesilaos in c.2. Indeed, the opening phrase draws attention emphatically to the manner and means of the procedure, without approving them, and Plutarch dissociates himself from any judgement about the fairness of the Spartans' decision by his use of ὥς. The method used to determine Agis' successor as king determined also the inheritance of his estate. Xenophon refers to this only indirectly at *Agesilaos* IV.5, using the sharing of his inheritance of Agis' wealth with poor relatives as an illustration of Agesilaos' justice in money matters. The exceptional wealth of Sparta's kings may be indicated by the large fine imposed by the ephors on Agis (Thuc. V.63).

Approximately twenty years of Agesilaos' adult life are passed over, although Xenophon (*Agesilaos* I.5) says, "There are not wanting signs that even before his reign Agesilaos was deemed worthy to be king." He gives no details there or in *Hellenika*, and Thucydides did not mention him. Plutarch has said only that many citizens were convinced of his worth. One who had training in the ἀγωγή may have

had military service of some sort in the Peloponnesian War, and if, until the birth of Leotychidas, he was being prepared for rule, he may even have been given experience of at least minor command, though in his twenties peace with Athens removed for a time the opportunities for major campaigns. We cannot make assumptions here, for we do not know how these things were managed, but later his son, Archidamos, had command in the "Tearless Battle" in c.33.

ὁρῶν δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ μητρὸς οἰκείους ἐπιεικεῖς μὲν ὄντας, ἰσχυρῶς δὲ πενομένους, ἀπένειμεν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἡμίσεα τῶν χρημάτων, εὖνοιαν ἑαυτῷ καὶ δόξαν ἀντὶ φθόνου καὶ δυσμενείας ἐπὶ τῇ κληρονομίᾳ κατασκευαζόμενος.

Plutarch makes Agesilaos' first act as king a personal one, an act of outstanding generosity which allows scope for his interest in character, moving from the active virtue of c.3, to the quieter qualities here. He particularly illustrates in the first part of this chapter τὸ φιλόανθρωπον attributed to him in c.1, and then re-introduces τὸ δημοτικόν in the second part. The word of seven syllables, κατασκευαζόμενος, is striking, perhaps drawing attention to what Plutarch may have seen as deliberate, even fraudulent means, for the quieter virtues serve to achieve the same ends as the competitive qualities, the winning of influence. Plutarch has not made it clear whether these are the relatives of Agesilaos' or of Leotychidas' mother. Both views have been held. R.Flacelière and E.Chambry in the Budé edition translate "les parents maternels du jeune homme"; B. Perrin in the Loeb has "his kinsmen on his mother's side", perhaps ambiguously. The proximity of μητρὸς to the name τὸν Λεωτυχίδην, and the usual understanding of the definite article to denote the natural relationship of the subject, Agesilaos, seem to permit either interpretation of Plutarch's words. Plutarch sees the generosity as tinged with pragmatism, an enhancement of Agesilaos' position, winning him good-will and credit - εὖνοιαν ἑαυτῷ καὶ δόξαν - instead of envy and hatred - ἀντὶ φθόνου καὶ δυσμενείας. The stress on winning favour,



and especially on avoidance of resentment, seems to be inappropriate unless Plutarch wishes to refer to the relatives of Leotychidas' mother as the beneficiaries of Agesilaos' generosity, for Agesilaos' actions had not deprived his own kinsmen. Xenophon does not mention Leotychidas anywhere in this context, but clearly intends to refer only to Agesilaos' generosity, and so would wish his own mother to be understood: τὰ ἡμίσεα τοῖς ἀπὸ μητρὸς αὐτῷ ὁμογόνοις μετέδωκεν (*Agesilaos* IV.5). The present episode indicates both the contrasting relative poverty that existed in Sparta, and the possibility, not only of accumulation, but also of alienation of property, though not by sale here. We are not otherwise told anywhere what happened to Leotychidas and his mother. The former, presumably deprived of full citizen qualification, now will have belonged to one of the inferior classes, perhaps the Hypomeiones, if that is what Spartans who were not full citizens were called, though again there is little to go on, while the latter, herself of royal stock, may, like Kyniska (c.20), have had resources of her own.

2 δ δέ φησιν ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ὅτι πάντα τῇ πατρίδι πειθόμενος ἴσχυε πλεῖστον, ὥστε ποιεῖν ὃ βούλοιτο, τοιοῦτόν ἐστι.

Plutarch refers to Agesilaos' obedience again, moving from φιλόανθρωπον to τὸ δημοτικόν at this point, from private relations to public, and associating these with the acquisition of power. He also moves on from the time of the accession, to give a prospectus of the *Life* against a relevant historical background. The passage may be traced to Xen. *Agesilaos* VI.4, where Plutarch seems to have noted a paradox in Xenophon's statement that by means of the quieter virtues, such as obedience to his country in the highest degree, Agesilaos won in return important political influence:

ὃς τῇ μὲν πατρίδι οὕτως ἐχρῆτο, ὥστε μάλιστα πειθόμενος  
[. . .] ἐταίροις δὲ πρόθυμος ὢν ἀπροφασίστους τοὺς φίλους ἐκέκτητο.  
τοὺς δὲ γε στρατιώτας ὅμα πειθομένους καὶ φιλοῦντας αὐτὸν παρεῖχε.

Plutarch's quotation is used by editors to fill a lacuna found there.

Xenophon is giving evidence for Agesilaos' σοφία in a list of virtues: piety, justice, self-control etc. "He took part in the affairs of his country in such a manner that being especially obedient [. . .] and being zealous for his companions he found friends ever-ready; and he made his soldiers obedient and fond of him." Editors transfer Plutarch's ἰσχυε πλεῖστον to fill the gap: "he won very great power". If this is the right place in Xenophon, Plutarch has made changes, putting τῇ πατρίδι with πειθόμενος and πάντα for μάλιστα. He has also apparently added three words to the quotation, ποιεῖν δ βούλοιτο, and has thus, perhaps, changed the sense here and in the rest of the chapter, for whereas Xenophon eulogizes, Plutarch seems to find cunning. Even in Plutarch, Agesilaos does not ever do freely "what he wished" - much less in Xenophon, who might, however, have said: ὃς τῇ μὲν πατρίδι οὕτως ἐχρῆτο, ὥστε μάλιστα πειθόμενος ποιεῖν δ βούλοιτο ἰσχυε πλεῖστον, "so that being especially obedient he won maximum strength to do whatever it wished". Actual consequence, not the natural consequence of Plutarch, here matches the following clause. Xenophon's meaning may be illustrated from *Lak. Pol.* VIII.2:

οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπέρχονται μάλιστα τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τῷ ταπεινοῖ εἶναι μεγαλύνονται καὶ τῷ ὅταν καλῶνται τρέχοντες ἀλλὰ μὴ βαδίζοντες ὑπακοῦειν, νομίζοντες, ἦν αὐτοῖ κατάρχῃσι τοῦ σφόδρα πείθεσθαι, ἔψεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους.

The author does not specifically include the kings among οἱ κράτιστοι, for he is comparing Spartans with the δυνατώτεροι in other cities, that are not necessarily monarchies, but Lykourgos was introducing obedience-training by example, and Plutarch presents Agesilaos as exploiting the method to make himself a more powerful king.

"What he wished" is not explained until the final sentence. Agesilaos' obedience to the ephors and the elders is first illustrated at length. Xenophon refers to Agesilaos' deference to the state on his recall from Asia (*Agesilaos* I.36 and *Hell* IV.ii.3) when he sacrificed his own interests and made his military skills available at home (see c.15).



It is in *Lak. Pol.* XV.6 that he - if it is Xenophon - talks about the courtesies and protocol surrounding the Spartan kings and magistrates: all rise when the king enters, except the ephors in their ephoric seats (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορικῶν δίφρων). Clearly Plutarch has gathered scattered references together from *Agesilaos*, *Hell.*, and *Lak. Pol.*, if the similarity between the phrases is significant, ἐν τῷ βασιλικῷ θώκῳ matching ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορικῶν δίφρων, and θᾶπτον ἢ βᾶδην matching μὴ βοδίζοντες. Here Plutarch is beginning to give an independent interpretation of reported facts and presenting a hostile portrait, though it is in the last section that the hostile interpretation is most explicit, and it is in explanation of the citation from Xenophon, whose assessment is the reverse. (See below.)

3 τῶν ἐφόρων ἦν τότε καὶ τῶν γερόντων τὸ μέγιστον ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κράτος, ὧν οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν ἄρχουσι μόνον, οἱ δὲ γέροντες διὰ βίου ταύτην ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν, ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ πάντα τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν ἐξεῖναι συνταχθέντες, ὥς ἐν τοῖς περὶ Λυκούργου γέγραπται.

With the kings and the Assembly these two groups make up the four sections of the full citizen body in Sparta. That the ephors, who held their office for one year, and the councillors, who held theirs for life, together had the greatest power in the state, is an over simplification - some of their powers extended over the kings, but in command of the army the kings were supreme (Herodotos VI.56; Aristotle *Pol.* 1285a8), and their prerogatives were extended "in direct proportion to the kings' personal ability and willingness to meet" the military needs of the state (C.G.Thomas (1975) p.263; A.Andrewes (1966) p.9). In this *Life* the ephors wield judicial, military and religious powers: they fine the king (c.5) and an errant warrior (c.34), recall Agesilaos from Asia (c.15), order attacks on Boiotia (c.17) and Thebes (c.28), assemble the allies (c.28), control the gymnopaediai (c.29), authorize executions (c.29). An elite council is known in the Homeric world: at Sparta it was elected from among sixty-year-old men, in fierce competition for the honour (*Lak. Pol.* X.1-3). One member



advised Agesilaos about Lysander's speech (c.20). Plutarch omits the assembly here, but at c.6 it voted for the expedition to Asia Minor, and at c.30, on the advice of Agesilaos, it allowed the laws to sleep for a day.

The statement that the ephors were instituted to restrain the power of the kings refers to a time for which there are no contemporary records to support the suggestion (P.A.Cartledge (1987) pp.103, 125). "Were the first Ephors merely agents of the kings, as some claimed, or checks on them, as the majority thought?" (W.G.Forrest (1971) p.77). That the office was intended to support the kings may be suggested by the oaths exchanged by kings and ephors each month, pledging respectively to uphold the law and the monarchy (*Lak. Pol.* (XV.7); P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.125). Plutarch dissociates Lykourgos from the initiation of this office (*Lykourgos* 7; cf. Aristotle *Pol.* 1313a25-30), quoting Plato: οἷον ψάλιον αὐτῇ ἐνέβαλε τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν (*Laws* p.692a), which may seem to imply a single concept of a structured pattern of reform, rather than a continuing piecemeal process of development to meet circumstantial needs. The limitation of the kings' powers, as those of the ephors grew, may rather be attributed to a series of reforms (M.I.Finley (1975) pp.162-3), which left them privileges and duties, mainly religious, at home, and supreme power in the conduct of war when they were abroad on campaigns, though it was not always within their competence to settle the terms of peace. Influence based on institutional powers often extended beyond the specified field into general processes of decision-making behind the scenes, and reflected an individual's status and achievements, as well as inherent features such as the elective nature and tenure of office. Annual election of ephors could indicate popular reaction to policies, whether already operating or as yet only being proposed, and bestow powerful support for the moment, while the short tenure prevented long-term programmes and growing influence. The competition among

elders for selection as councillors favoured men who had maintained leading status for a long time, acquiring experience and prestige over the years, along, perhaps, with cautious, conservative attitudes (S.Hodkinson (1983) p.281).

4 διὸ καὶ πατρικὴν τινα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ διετέλουν εὐθὺς οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλονεικίαν καὶ διαφορὰν παραλαμβάνοντες.

There is not the detailed information needed to justify speaking about continuous disagreement between ephors and kings (W.G.Forrest (1971) p.76), as Plutarch does, but there were occasional differences (see Endnote 1). Furthermore, the ephorate itself was not always of one mind. King Pausanias had the support only of the majority in disallowing Lysander's handling of the terms of peace with Athens in 403. There were other offices, too, in Sparta's government, and the personal influence of a Lysander at his peak was a threat to the establishment and resulted from his long continued success, whether he was in or out of office. Plutarch attributes the two aggressive qualities to the earlier kings, seeming to create a contrast with what he says next about Agesilaos' way of handling the ephors and councillors, although if earlier kings had had their Xenophon to record this aspect of their reigns, it might not have appeared innovatory. The competitive element in the ἀγωγή and elsewhere (*Lak. Pol.* IV.2) is stressed in cc.1 and 2, and in c.5 its introduction is associated with the constitutional reformer. Plutarch's strong words make a significant contrast with Agesilaos' manner, but this would have been adequately achieved, perhaps, in more moderate terms.

5 ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδὸν ἦλθε, καὶ τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ τὸ προσκρούειν αὐτοῖς ἐόσας ἐθεράπευε.

This makes explicit the move away from the competitive, inherited, virtues. The special combination of these with the acquired characteristics is consistent with Plutarch's earlier study of character



at the end of c.1, particularly the final phrase, προσκτησόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγωγῆς τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. If Agesilaos experienced the full term of the ἀγωγή, his attitudes would be firmly established, and perhaps Plutarch justifiably assumes that they could be displayed convincingly.

ὁσάκις δὲ τύχοι καθήμενος ἐν τῷ βασιλικῷ θώκῳ καὶ χρηματίζων, ἐπιούσι τοῖς ἐφόροις ὑπεξανίστατο, τῶν δ' εἰς τὴν γερουσίαν δεῖ καταταττομένων ἐκάστῳ χλαῖναν ἔπεμπε καὶ βοῦν ἀριστεῖον.

Plutarch may have adapted *Lak. Pol.* XV.6: καὶ ἔδρας δὲ πάντες ὑπανίστανται βασιλεῖ πλην οὐκ ἔφοροι ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορικῶν δίφρων. The reversal of the compliment in rising from the official seat would be a most impressive and significant mark of respect (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.109. Acts of generosity are recognized in *Lak. Pol.* XV.4: under the Lykourgan constitution the kings, in their public mess, received double portions at meals, "not that they might eat enough for two, but that they might have the wherewithal to honour anyone whom they chose". Sociology now provides other evidence for this use of wealth to maintain or win power (M.Sahlins (1974) p.133 and Ch. 4). Gifts in kind, rather than money, would be appropriate in Sparta, and the generosity displayed at the time of appointment to the Gerousia would perhaps serve long into the future, especially in legal cases tried before it, the most important court at Sparta (G.E.M.de ste Croix (1972) pp.132, 349-54). Although in general Plutarch seems to have regarded the Gerousia as more important than did Thucydides, who never mentions it, and Xenophon, who mentions only the *gerontes*, it perhaps had wide informal influence also, and if Agesilaos was the first Spartan king to practise this generosity widely, he was developing a cohesive constituency in a city that already had a strong sense of unanimity in one political aim, the need to ensure the survival of a relatively small number of citizens in a relatively large geographical and demographical context.



6 ἐκ δὲ τούτων τιμᾶν δοκῶν καὶ μεγαλύνειν τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἐκείνων ὀρχῆς, ἐλάνθανεν αὖξων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν καὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ προστιθεὶς μέγεθος ἐκ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοίας συγχωρούμενον.

Decision-making at Sparta is rarely open to inspection in the available literary evidence, and since this evidence is largely of a biographical nature for this period, it is, perhaps, inevitable that it is Agesilaos who often appears to have determined Spartan policy during his reign. The power of Spartan royal patronage to which Plutarch has drawn attention is, however, now recognized (S.Hodkinson (1983) pp.263-4; P.A.Cartledge (1987) Chs. 7 and 8). Plutarch introduces an explicitly critical tone in attributing duplicity to Agesilaos. Analysis of his methods is a proper subject for the biographer, involving his presentation of the relevant facts of Agesilaos' career, and his interpretation of them in that impenetrable area of intention and private communication. He has, of necessity, not just followed the sources, but has imposed his own interpretation. His character study may be judged by the actions portrayed hereafter, revealing, in the conflict between history and rhetoric, whether modification of the words in the sources has led to distortion of the truth.

## CHAPTER 5

### Courting favour among the Spartan citizens: the danger of tyranny

The chapter is in two distinct parts: a highly ornamented continuation of the analysis of Agesilaos' character begun in the previous chapter, and an elaborate analysis of the putative philosophical influence on the making of the Spartan constitution. In both parts Plutarch reveals his disapproval of the aspects concerned. He is proposing a causal link, therefore, between Agesilaos' conduct of affairs and the apparent decline in Sparta's fortunes.

1 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας ὁμιλίαις ἐχθρὸς ἦν ἀμεμπτότερος ἢ φίλος. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐχθροὺς ἀδίκως οὐκ ἔβλαπτε, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις καὶ τὰ μὴ δίκαια συνέπραττε.

In c.4 Plutarch dealt with Agesilaos' private courting of relatives, and gave an analysis of the relationships he forged with other Spartans in powerful offices. He now discusses how Agesilaos acquired influence among ordinary citizens, thus in three groups accounting for all the Spartans. It is better not to translate ἐχθρός here as enemy: rather it is "political opponent", although the familiar definition of justice as rendering good to friends and harm to enemies springs to mind as the source of Plutarch's thought and phrasing. This is expressed by Polemarchos: ἡ τέχνη . . . ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδούσα, and in Socrates' subsequent query, τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς; (Plato *Republic* I.332D.) That discussion leads to agreement that it is never just to injure any man: οὐδομοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὃν βλάπτειν (335E). (See R.C.Cross and A.D.Woozley (1964) pp.20-2 for criticism and analysis, noting the changes in terminology.) Plutarch does not present a picture of the justice of Agesilaos, but explains how he here made some significant modification of such principles in his treatment of people as supporters or opponents, so that he "renders good" to both, in some sense, and harm to neither.

Plutarch clearly uses the verb ἔβλαπτε in the above sense of τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς ποιεῖν, to do harm to one's enemies with the effect of baffling their designs. There are, in what follows, two categories of enemies. Agesilaos' general rule would seem to be to avoid causing resentment by injustice, since he would not wish to antagonize his opponents, as others less wise might, by using even unfair means to defeat them. Presumably, then, if he found he could not defeat them fairly, the prohibition would take effect. They would then have to be courted differently. (See below.) This was not always obviously or immediately the case in Agesilaos' behaviour, however, as in the dispute over the succession to the throne in c.3, except that it was conducted ἐν τῇ δίκῃ, and so, in a sense, not ὀδίκως. See also his handling of revolts at c.32.

Friends are in three categories, of which two are mentioned. Friends who were not doing wrong are not directly involved, but that he worked with these is understandable. In the first included category are those friends who were doing wrong. He assisted these, even joining in their efforts. Thus his rule was never to refuse to co-operate with friends, whether they were right or wrong, or, to put it another way, even his wrong-doing friends were not punished, and so he avoided causing resentment. The treatment of Phoibidas and Sphodrias by Agesilaos, described in cc.23-25, illustrates the principle, and Plutarch reveals his disapproval. Doing good to friends is not directly mentioned, but it is implied below: οὐδὲν γὰρ ᾤετο τῶν φιλικῶν ὑπουργημάτων αἰσχρὸν εἶναι. Similar terms are found in alliances between a dominant city and a subordinate city, where sometimes the subordinate ally was required to have the same friends and enemies and to go wherever he was led, regardless of rights and wrongs. Two examples are the alliances of Sparta with Athens in 404, and with Olynthos in 379 (Xen. *Hell.* II.ii.20, V.iii.26), but at Thucydides VIII.18, 37, and 58 the texts of the treaties made with Persia do not include



such terms. At Thucydides V.23 the Athenians and the Spartans, as equals, promise to come to each other's defence.

2 καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς ἡσχύνετο μὴ τιμᾶν κατορθοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ φίλους οὐκ ἠδύνατο ψέγειν ὁμαρτάνοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ βοηθῶν ἠγάλλετο καὶ συνεξαμαρτάνων αὐτοῖς· οὐδὲν γὰρ ᾤετο τῶν φιλικῶν ὑπουργημάτων αἰσχρὸν εἶναι.

Plutarch introduces another modification of the traditional form of the definition to show how Agesilaos behaved towards successful opponents, here in the first category of enemies, the opposite of τοῖς δ' αὖ διαφόροις πταίσασι, mentioned below as the second category. The present participle shows that he did not wait for the final outcome, but he honoured them, "recognized their worth", as their success became inevitable. Thus, presumably, in the case of successful opponents, those whom he had not been able to defeat fairly, he ceased to oppose them, congratulated them on their victory, and avoided further resentment. The Peace of Antalkidas comes to mind, c.23.

Friends in the second category are not acting unjustly, as those in the first category, but are here simply in error, mistaken. Instead of pointing out their fault, and causing resentment, Agesilaos was delighted to have the opportunity to help them recover, and to err along with them: "Yes, I thought that, too!" Perhaps his treatment of Lysander in Asia Minor was in Plutarch's mind (c.7): Agesilaos is said to have dealt with the problem indirectly, without confrontation. Sphodrias is very relevant here, c.25.

3 τοῖς δ' αὖ διαφόροις πταίσασι πρῶτος συναχθόμενος καὶ δεηθεῖσι συμπράττων προθύμως ἐδημαγώγει καὶ προσήγετο πάντας.

In the second category of enemies are Agesilaos' opponents who have been defeated, presumably by fair means. On their defeat, or failure, he first gave them sympathy, and then, if they asked, assisted them, joining in their efforts wholeheartedly. If Plutarch intended in c.4 that Agis' estate was shared with Leotychidas' family, Agesilaos' action in avoiding resentment might be put into this category, for the

defeat of Leotychidas was not yet accounted unjust.

Plutarch's verb, ἐδημαγωγέει, summarizes what he has shown to be a very effective way "to curry favour" in political life, or "to maintain oneself as leader of the people" (LSJ), and is suggestive of one of the qualities attributed to Agesilaos in c.1, τὸ δημοτικόν. The second phrase, προσήγετο πάντας, summarizes the achievement of Agesilaos' purpose, to win the support of everyone and so to increase his power, as stated at the end of c.4. Although Plato's Socrates avoided politics (*Apology* 32), he might have approved the treatment of enemies by Agesilaos, provided that absolute values were not abandoned, but he could not have compromised in order to win support. He might have queried whether the wrong-doing friends should not be re-defined as, more truly, enemies, and treated as such. The erring friends, on the other hand, should, perhaps, have been taken aside, admonished, and instructed (*Apology* 26).

4 ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ ἔφοροι ταῦτα καὶ φοβούμενοι τὴν δύναμιν ἐζημίωσαν αὐτόν, αἰτίαν ὑπειπόντες ὅτι τοὺς κοινοὺς πολίτας ἰδίους κτᾶται.

Plutarch's analysis seems to fit a charge of attempted tyranny, not made in c.4, though the word δύναμιν was used there, too. It is, perhaps, not strange that there, since the ephors were receiving the benefit, they were said to have been unaware that Agesilaos was wooing them, yet here they noticed his attempt to woo others, and fined him for it. Another fine was reported (c.2) by Theophrastos, and both may be illegitimate inferences easily made, but here there is a more serious case, suitable for notice by the ephors. That Xenophon does not mention it is only to be expected. More precise details are given at *Mor.* 482c which correspond to gifts described at c.4 above.

At Sparta slaves were mostly helots, "undoubtedly state serfs" (G.E.M. de Ste Croix (1972) pp.90, 352-3; id. (1981) p.149), the common property of the state, which is not the required sense here. The influence of the family was weakened by the Lykourgan constitution,



and the ordinary members of all citizen classes "belonged" to the state because of the loyalty they were encouraged to share as ὅμοιοι, in common with everyone else (S.Hodkinson (1983) pp.242-6); but they were free to transfer their political support in response to the essential competitive processes. That they should have been bound irrevocably to Agesilaos by the ties he was forging, of loyalty to him personally, would deprive the state of their loyalty, and inhibit the competition.

5 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ φυσικοὶ τὸ νεῖκος οἴονται καὶ τὴν ἔριν, εἰ τῶν ὅλων ἔξαιρεθείη, στήναι μὲν ἄν τὰ οὐράνια, παύσασθαι δὲ πάντων τὴν γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς πρὸς πάντα πάντων ἁρμονίας.

In a clearly indicated start to the second half of the chapter, Plutarch issues an indictment of the deliberate weakening of the Lykourgan constitution, in which he explains (γόρ) - and goes on to justify - the reasons for the ephors' punishment of Agesilaos. καθάπερ is frequent in legal documents: "even as . . . " Plutarch has presented a criticism of Agesilaos indirectly (ὁμηρικῶς) by using the ephors' fine as the conclusion of the account, begun in c.4, of the tenor of the reign. There, continuing the theme indicated in his key words, Plutarch referred to the king's innovatory method of pursuit of power, not following traditional competition as his predecessors did, οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλονεικίαν καὶ διαφορὰν παραλαμβάνοντες, but, ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ὁδόν, exploiting his own special qualities, τὸ δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλόνητον. The ephors have now been shown to have feared the emergence of the excess of power which the essential Lykourgan virtues of τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόνητον were designed to prevent.

The indictment, occupying the rest of the chapter, is in the form of an analysis of the philosophical theories which supposedly illustrate the structure of Spartan society, exposing the threat to the Spartan character as it was intended to be developed under the traditional, that is the Lykourgan, constitution. That Plutarch should refer to



philosophy to justify his criticisms indicates their prime importance for him. The origin of the constitution itself is set in a context of the theories of the Presocratics. The source of much of this note is Edward Hussey (1972). It is usual to place lawgivers in the seventh and sixth centuries, Lykourgos in Sparta (W.G.Forrest (1971) p.60), Solon in Athens. On the other hand, the Presocratics are placed in the sixth and fifth centuries, when they systematized their thoughts on cosmology and politics, exploiting the terms used in the theories of medicine, cookery and metallurgy. Political evolution was a necessary condition for their sense of awareness of questions about origins, and an important factor in determining their terminology. Plutarch's suggestion of a model for the constitution is on this reckoning anachronistic; but perhaps it records an interesting parallel observed by later theorists. The name, οἱ φυσικοί, should indicate the materialist philosophers who concerned themselves with φύσις instead of with the earlier cosmogony, and it strictly refers to the earliest enquiries of the cosmologists into the nature of things. At this point the answers given to the question, What is the underlying substance or support of everything? included "water" (Thales) and "air" (Anaximenes), suggested by wider evidence of creative processes, not only, as before, by knowledge of animal reproduction. The term, however, is here made to include later thinkers who discovered more abstract laws or principles such as those concerning the "opposites within the unity" (Herakleitos: E.Hussey (1972) p.41), or "Love and Strife" (Empedokles: ibid. p.130), and the ἀρμονία combining things into compounds according to the divine, universal λόγος and νόμος. The latter dealt in ideas, and might rather, therefore, have been distinguished by a different name, such as νομικοί; even Aristotle's categories were puzzling (ibid. p.20).

The philosophers' metaphors, including the first two used here, clearly came from the names of human functions found in ordinary

speech, and were transferred to the functions of things by thinkers who would not be able to communicate their new ideas without borrowing the familiar words. Conversely, other words, such as ὀμνόνια and κρᾶσις, used of material things by Herakleitos and medical writers, seem to have been transferred as metaphors, in their turn, to human functions, social and medical. In Homer, ὀρμόζειν was used of forming a carpenter's joints, and κρᾶσις was familiar in cookery and metallurgy (ibid. pp.43, 131). The theorists who discussed developments in city organization and administration, with associated political conflicts, then applied the human functions as analogies in their political models. Alkmaion of Kroton used κρᾶσις in expressing an analogy between medicine and politics (ibid. p.74).

Plutarch explains that the function of strife is to make things happen. "The working of each of the opposites is thought of as a continual struggle against its opposed twin" (ibid. p.23). Without this struggle, nothing would happen, nothing would have been created. This is the motive power. For Anaximander and Anaximenes, the Unbounded surrounding the *kosmos* is the divinity which supplies the motive power for the "separating out" of opposites. It is like the bark round a tree (Anaximander: ibid. pp.18, 22), keeping the world-order in place, and is, perhaps, Plutarch's τὰ οὐράνια. A hendiadys, τὴν γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν, signifies that reality, one thing, has two aspects, the creation, and the function of the created thing. Herakleitos introduces strife as the creator: πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, πάντων δὲ βασιλεύς (ibid. p.49: fr 53). In a city, using Alkmaion's analogy of κρᾶσις between medicine and politics, also in Herakleitos and Empedokles, the various factions and interests, the rich and the poor, are in a delicate balance, and there is danger to survival if the balance is disturbed. Empedokles puts Love and Strife in control of the opposites, responsible respectively for the formation and dissolution of κρᾶσις



(Herakleitos' ἀρμονία), in other fields, but also in households and larger communities. They alternate in prevalence, and it is when Love predominates completely that the elements form a spherical deity, pure mind that does nothing but think. This state of things seems to correspond with Plutarch's expression; "If strife and discord were removed, the heavens would stand still and creative movement would cease, because of the universal harmony."

Plutarch seems to require the harmony caused by the removal of strife to be a stationary arrangement of all the component parts, one with another. Herakleitos saw that in a single subject (a bow) there coexist opposites inextricably bound up to form a unity - "as a road is, upwards and downwards, one and the same thing" (ibid. pp.41, 45). The ἀρμονία of the lyre may, pace Hussey, be the same as that of the bow, in that the tension between the string on the one hand, and, on the other hand, either the arms of the bow, when it is ready for use, or the frame of the lyre, when it is in tune, is stable. Both parts are always straining, but too much tightening of the string will cause a breakage in either case, too little will preclude its proper functioning. The expression "opposites ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ" in the Presocratics is taken to refer to their structure or the mutual arrangement of their parts, as Homer's ἀρμόζειν was used of forming a carpenter's or stone-mason's joints in fitting the pieces together into a unit (ibid. p.43). The theorists claimed that their expression explained this structure; their account described ὁ λόγος, the law of the universe. "The perpetual struggle of opposites and the justice that balances them are indistinguishable" (ibid. p.49). For Herakleitos, "Justice is strife". The outward appearance of unity is created from the striving parts. Many details of this picture are recognizable in the Sparta of the traditional Lykourgan constitution, though, again, this is not to say that it provided the model for the constitutional reform.



οὕτως ἔοικεν ὁ Λακωνικὸς νομοθέτης ὑπέκκαυμα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόνεικον, ἀεὶ τινα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διαφορὰν καὶ ὁμιλλαν εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους βουλόμενος.

The similarity has been observed by Plutarch, and is not attributed to deliberate imitation by the lawgiver, and, as in the first part of the sentence Plutarch brought into consideration only the *removal of the element of strife* from within the whole assembly of constituent parts, εἰ τῶν ὅλων ἐξαιρεθείη, so here he mentions only the *introduction of the element of strife* into the constitution. That the strife was to be citizen against citizen is indicated by εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν and πρὸς ἀλλήλους, and the lawgiver's intention is said to have been the stimulation of courage. *Lak. Pol.* IV.2 records the link between strife and courage:

ὁρῶν οὖν, οἷς ἂν μάλιστα φιλονεικία ἐγγένηται, τούτων καὶ χοροὺς ἀξιακροατοτάτους γιγνομένους καὶ γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀξιοθεατοτάτους, ἐνόμιζεν, εἰ καὶ τοὺς ἡβῶντας συμβάλλοι εἰς ἔριν περὶ ἀρετῆς, οὕτως ἂν καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀνδραγαθίας

Courage as an individual trait is also developed in a person through strife, in the form of an inner conflict with its opposite, fear. The removal of strife, which leaves the heavens of Plutarch stationary, could for cities elsewhere be regarded as desirable, but for Sparta it was different. The Spartans' approval of these qualities was referred to in cc.1, 2, φιλονεικία and πάντα πρωτεύειν (cf. αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν below). Ambition is again a poor rendering of τὸ φιλότιμον in this context, as often in Plutarch's *Lives*, where it is rather the Spartan's "desire for significant achievement for the benefit of the state", with no implication of personal gain. Here, then, the strife which creates the harmonious internal structure of the state also supplies its need for courageous citizens in its defence. It was after the acquisition of Messenia that the elements of competition at Sparta, in the ἀγωγή and in the determination of policies, were recorded as part of the means of ensuring survival, "a provocative incentive", ὑπέκκαυμα. This metaphor, whether Plutarch's own or found in the Lykourgan literature, is from

combustible matter, fuel, food. At *Lak. Pol.* VII, Lykourgos prescribes devotion to the things that make cities free, ἐλευθερία ταῖς πόλεσι, as the sole concern of the Spartans and at XI his concern is for the organization of the army to be superior. Agamemnon and the Greeks at Troy, introduced below, were in a similar situation, a wholly military organization for the purpose of survival amid enemies, where the quieter, non-competitive virtues were not relevant to the wartime conditions Homer was describing in the *Iliad*. A.W.H.Adkins (1960) does not give sufficient weight to the military context of the *Iliad*, and so seems to give a chronological explanation of the change to the different values of the *Odyssey*, where it is the quieter virtues which are appropriate to the domestic context, not the competitive ones of the *Iliad*. (For Aristotle's analysis see c.33.)

According to the parallel of the earlier systems of Anaximander and Anaximenes, what the Spartans did by introducing competition and strife, διαφώραν καὶ ἄμιλλαν, would be, in the community, to decide between opposing individuals, factions, and leaders, in order to achieve ὁμονία, the unanimous pursuit by the best leaders of policies designed in the best interests of all the Spartan peers. This served incidentally to activate and perpetuate the military virtues in the individual. On the other hand, according to Empedokles' theory, since κρᾶσις, in the *kosmos* or the community, means that individual interests are subordinated to the common good, when strife predominates, it leads not to ὁμονία, but to the dissolution of κρᾶσις or harmony, and this would mean the end for the Spartans of their unanimity of purpose; by contrast, if strife is in decline, or when Love predominates completely, the elements form a spherical deity, pure mind that does nothing but think. Agesilaos was removing strife completely, and this would lead to inactivity, and to the end of Sparta's means of survival. For Plutarch, Agesilaos puts Sparta at risk in both ways at different times.



τὴν γὰρ ἀνθυπείκουσαν τῷ ἀνελέγκτῳ χάριν ἀργὴν καὶ ἀνανταγώνιστον οὔσαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁμόνοιαν λέγεσθαι.

The descriptions of this undesirable complaisance clearly indicate a correspondence between the Spartans and the philosophers in their view of ὁρμονία. The concord in each case does not follow from the removal of one of the conflicting elements, but is the state of equilibrium achieved by the continual struggle for supremacy. This may seem to be at variance with the ὀρχεσθαι element in the ἀγωγή of c.1, but, continuing the philosophical metaphor, in the ἀγωγή, where both qualities, ὀρχειν καὶ ὀρχεσθαι, were encouraged, the conflict of opposites would create the required balance, or ὁρμονία. The attempt to relate the Spartan competitive system to cosmological theories faces well the dilemma that in Sparta the internal harmony of policies for survival requires the continuation and redirection of the predominance of strife in order to ensure military superiority in the face of the enemy.

There is, however, a further link between natural and political philosophy. Anaxagoras retained the vortex of Anaximander (ibid. p.134), but put Mind as the creative and ordering power that withdrew once the process was under way: so Solon went abroad, leaving the Athenians to follow his rules in his absence, and the Spartans followed Lykourgos' rules for centuries, after he left the earth: he was said to have ensured this by committing suicide, and by having his ashes scattered in the sea, so that the Spartans' oath to observe his constitution until he should return would never be cancelled (*Lyk.* 29, 31).

6 τοῦτο δ' ὁμέλει συνεωρακέναι καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον οἶονταί τινες.

"At any rate, some people think that Homer also thought the same (as Lykourgos)" seems to be better here than "of course, actually" (LSJ). The introduction of an example from literature (*Odyssey* VII.75) is part of the rhetorical technique followed by Plutarch to support an



argument. Here he has τινες support their argument, but he in the end rejects the extreme form of the principle.

οὐ γὰρ ἄν τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιῆσαι χαίροντα τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος καὶ τοῦ Ἀχιλλεύος εἰς λοιδορίαν προαχθέντων "ἐκπάγλοις ἐπέεσσι", εἰ μὴ μέγα τοῖς κοινοῖς ἀγαθὸν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ζῆλον καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀρίστων.

Homer is presented as if he were not recording Agamemnon's motive as a fact of history, but instead composing an effective fictional motive for his own selected didactic purpose. The didactic value stems from the fundamentalism seen in his poems, though denied in Plato's *Ion*. The competition was αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν (*Iliad* VI.208); in Sparta the quarrels among citizens developed their fitness to carry out agreed policies where virtue could be displayed competitively in securing Sparta's survival; it seems to have been thought possible because from boyhood they were πολεμικωτέρους (*Lak. Pol.* II.7).

7 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄν οὕτως τις ἀπλῶς συνχωρήσειεν· αἱ γὰρ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν φιλονεικιδῶν χαλεπαὶ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ μεγάλους κινδύνους ἔχουσιν.

Plutarch follows the maxim μηδὲν ἄγαν, but does not quote it. Political strife at Sparta is not easily traced in detail, or to the same extent as at Athens in the fifth century, or at Rome in the late republic and early empire. The danger of the excess of strife which destroyed cities is illustrated at c.8. The removal of strife and the resulting contentment was the doctrine of Epicurus, which Plutarch rejected (D.A.Russell (1973) p.67, quoting *Mor.* 1086C, 1107D, and 1128). Horace frequently expressed Epicurean ideals of ἀταραξία in connection with a refusal to take part in public life. He urged Maecenas in *Odes* III.viii: mitte civiles super urbe curas, and warned of violence at III.iv: vis consilii expers mole ruit sua. The philosophical discussion of strife has enabled Plutarch to express in his conclusion a lesson relevant to readers of his own time and place. He is more explicit elsewhere in recommending Greeks to serve Rome but not to seek aggrandizement

for themselves. At *Mor.* 470C he urges that they should be content with local power, and, at *Mor.* 824C, that the aim of the Greek statesman could be only concord. The relevant objection to Epicurianism is in its desired withdrawal from public life, which Plutarch does not advocate.

He also indicates his clear disapproval of the aspects both of Agesilaos' character, given in the first half of this chapter, and of excesses in the application of the principles of the traditional Spartan constitution, mentioned in the second half. Agesilaos' acquisition of excessive powers, punished by the ephors, is seen as injurious to the state, as is the introduction of excessive difference and conflict into the Spartan constitution. The removal of the competitive element destroyed what Plutarch thought best in Sparta, and deprived its policies of true ὁρμονία, substituting an unacceptable form of γόρις. Like Aristotle, Plutarch does not name Lykourgos here, but speaks only of ὁ Λακωνικὸς νομοθέτης, avoiding direct criticism of him by name, for at *Lyk.* 29-30 he greatly admired him. (R.A.de Laix (1974) p.27). Here, too, he speaks only of αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν φιλονεικιῶν, leaving out τὸ φιλότιμον, paired with it above as introduced by the lawgiver. Plutarch's rejection of the extreme argument, then, strictly refers only to Homer's τὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ζῆλον καὶ τὴν διαφοράν, and does not include τὸ φιλότιμον. This element in the Spartan constitution is reserved for consideration in cc.7 and 8.

Plutarch's political theory, beginning to be revealed here, perhaps illustrates the dilemma of government, and the conflict between leadership and freedom. Agesilaos' developments are here criticized because of the means he used to introduce them, but in other respects are not much different in degree, extent, and intensity from the necessary activity of winning support for a policy. An English judge in 1986 defined national interest as "what the government says it is". This will be seen to be the form in which Agesilaos wished to define

justice as the interest of Sparta, and so justify his own actions. If Agesilaos was in a position to impose his leadership in an innovative way, what needs to be considered is *what* national interest he should have used his powers to achieve. Plutarch's answer is given at *Lykourgos* 30: good order and justice, under the Spartan constitution of Lykourgos. Aristotle saw also the need for the state to ensure its survival (*Pol.* 1265a). But if Agesilaos' policy was aimed towards control of others beyond the borders of Lakonia (G.L.Cawkwell (1976) pp.62-84), Aristotle would disapprove. Perhaps this is what *Agesilaos* is about?



PART THREE

THE CAMPAIGNS IN ASIA MINOR

(Chapters 6-10)

## CHAPTER 6

### Assembling the expedition: an ill-omen

1 Τοῦ δ' Ἀγησιλάου τὴν βασιλείαν νεωστὶ παρειληφότος, ἀπήγγελλον τινες ἐξ Ἀσίας ἦκοντες ὥς ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς παρασκευάζοιτο μεγάλῳ στόλῳ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐκβαλεῖν τῆς θαλάσσης.

Plutarch gives only a vague indication of the interval of time since the accession, but although it may be regarded as rather too short, it should be remembered that he has traced the development of Agesilaos' power well into his reign before returning to the early years. In *Agesilaos* Xenophon's phrase is ὅρτι δὲ ὄντος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ὁρχῇ (I.6), and he omits the incident which he records as the reign's first event in *Hellenika*, the affair of Kinadon, placed before the end of the first year of his rule (*Hell.* III.iii.4). Plutarch also omits this incident, perhaps because in Xenophon's account, although Agesilaos had had a share in exposing it, it was not said to have been directed against him personally, and it was the ephors who took all the counter-measures. Xenophon (only at *Hell.* III.iv.1) names a Syracusan, Herodas, as informant. It is perhaps surprising that the Spartan admiral Pharax, who was operating in the area (Diod. XIV.79.4), had not himself sent word. Preparations for the transport of 8,000 men by sea begin in *Hellenika* only after this episode, and would have occupied several months.

2 ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος ἐπιθυμῶν αὖθις εἰς Ἀσίαν ἀποσταλῆναι καὶ βοηθῆσαι τοῖς φίλοις, οὓς αὐτὸς μὲν ἄρχοντας καὶ κυρίους τῶν πόλεων ἀπέλιπε, κακῶς δὲ χρώμενοι καὶ βιαίως τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξέπιπτον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ ἀπέθνησκον, ἀνέπεισε τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ στρατείᾳ καὶ προπολεμῆσαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπωτάτῳ διαβάντα καὶ φθάσαντα τὴν τοῦ Βαρβάρου παρασκευήν.

Plutarch has given two motives for the Asia Minor expedition: Spartan imperialism and the Panhellenist defence of Greece. The Panhellenist motive is the only one given in Xenophon's *Agesilaos* I.6-8. He has expressed Agesilaos' intention as, first, to try to make peace, πειρόσθαι εἰρήνην ποιῆσθαι, but if the Persian wished to make war, to

hinder him from attacking the Greeks. This intention is then given emphatic expression as revengeful and aggressive, contesting possession of Asia at Persian expense, and entirely Agesilaos' own initiative. The omission here of Lysander's part enables Xenophon to show that many were pleased by Agesilaos' eagerness to undertake the expedition, fight Persia, and protect Greece. In *Hellenika*, the initiative is Lysander's. He advises Agesilaos to undertake an expedition to Asia, confident in Greek naval superiority, and in the example of those who had safely accompanied Kyros. To this, however, Xenophon adds Lysander's further wish to reverse the ephors' anti-imperialist policy, and the proposed strategy is only to undertake the campaign (III.iv.2), with no mention of peace. Lysander is mentioned here, perhaps, so that he may take responsibility for his false expectations, and the failure of the attempted restoration of the dekharchies. That Xenophon was not a whole-hearted admirer of Lysander appears at *Hell.* I.v and vi, where he seems to favour Kallikratidas; at II.1.28, where the significance of his victory at Aigospotamoi is not assessed; at II.iii.13, where his co-operation with the Thirty links him with their injustices; and at III.v.19, where the report of his death at Haliartos is uncomplimentary, marked by the flight of his troops and the Thebans' pursuit:

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀποθανόντος Λυσάνδρου ἔφευγον οἱ ἄλλοι πρὸς τὸ ὄρος,  
ἐδίωκον ἐρρωμένως οἱ Θηβαῖοι.

The changes in Xenophon's accounts of Agesilaos' intentions may be illuminated by reference to the end of the Asia Minor campaign: in *Agesilaos* an interruption to a glorious scheme of conquest (I.36), in *Hellenika* an interruption to Agesilaos' more modest plan to detach tribes from the King, after the larger ambitions of Lysander had not been fulfilled (IV.i.41). Xenophon the historian is more restrained in his assessment of the eventual success of the campaign and so would not wish to give the original initiative exclusively to Agesilaos.



Plutarch, like Xenophon in *Hellenika* but not in *Agésilas*, needs Lysander in the quarrel which takes place immediately after the arrival in Ephesos, and his initial influence is needed to decline as Agésilas enhances his own authority.

The literary stances of the two authors necessitate a brief consideration of the historical background. The expansionist activity of Sparta in Asia and elsewhere has been traced to Lysander (S.Hornblower (1983) pp.181-90), attributing the Spartans' special interest in Asia Minor to the need to control the harbours in order to hold down mainland Greece. Lysander had been admiral in his own right in 407, and then, in 405 (*Hell.* II.i.7), because a second term in the same office was not allowed at Sparta, he was given a nominal admiral to allow him to go again to take command, illegally (W.G.Forrest (1971), p.120), at Aigospotamoi, as ἐπιστολεύς, "secretary". He had established a close relationship with the satrap Kyros, and built up Spartan naval strength, paid for by Kyros' Persian money, which had been vital in winning the Peloponnesian War. Lysander's subsequent settlement of Asia Minor had involved setting up oligarchies in the cities with a Spartan Harmost or garrison commander and the dekarchies - his friends - attested by Diodoros: δεκαρχίας . . . ὀλιγαρχίας καταστήσας (XIV.13). The Spartan enterprises undertaken not only in Asia Minor, but in northern Greece, in Sicily and in Egypt, with Lysander prominent in all, were eventually curtailed when in 403 or 402 the ephors restored ancestral constitutions in the cities, and presumably cancelled the policy of installing harmosts which had become unpopular in the cities, though it is not stated whether this ruling was actively enforced (*Xen. Hell.*, III.iv.2: ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους). There was thus opposition in Sparta to the expansionist policy, perhaps from those who thought that it ran counter to the first priority of many Spartans, internal security; and the Kinadon episode will have emphasized the dangers at home, though for the moment the

problem had receded. The ephors had proclaimed τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας for the Ionian cities, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.2), for whom the phrase usually indicates some form of aristocracy.

The events leading to the expedition are given by Xenophon (*Hell.* III.i.3ff.). After repaying Kyros for his help against Athens by supporting his unsuccessful bid for the throne until his death at Cunaxa, the Spartans were involved again in Asia Minor in response to the Ionian appeal for assistance against Tissaphernes, who had been sent by Artaxerxes to recover for Persia control of his former possessions there. Thibron and Derkylidas, sent out during and after the last years of Agis' reign, in 400 and 399-397 respectively, had achieved little of the intended liberation, but had not been eliminated by the limited resources of Tissaphernes (*Diodoros* XIV.36-38). Although Lysander's plans had been interrupted by the ephors in 403/2, the Spartan fleet would remain dominant until the battle off Knidos, and enable Sparta to continue to use the Aegean Sea for transporting troops. The King of Persia now agreed to Pharnabazos' plan to build a fleet, no doubt making a determined effort to stop Spartan intervention in Asia Minor, and perhaps to punish Sparta for helping Kyros. Pharnabazos' main concern was no doubt for the coastal cities of northern Anatolia where Xenophon and the remnant of the Ten Thousand had ended their march. It would take some time to build and support the fleet, and to hire and train the crews. Konon, the former Athenian general, who had been with Evagoras in Cyprus since he had escaped from Aigospotamoi, was now made admiral of the Persian fleet, appointed by Pharnabazos (*Diod.* XIV.39), though it apparently was not ready in time to intercept Agesilaos, and would sail only in 396.

The Spartans are represented as responding to this threat, and with the divergent interests involved in their political decisions concerning Asia Minor, it is unlikely that Lysander would make public



his aim to help his former friends there, and that would explain why Xenophon merely appended this suggestion to the end of his list of motives. Plutarch may have been justified in elevating it to first place, and, if so, the Panhellenist gesture of the visit to Aulis would then be intended in part to obscure this aspect of the mission's purpose.

3 ὅμα δὲ τοῖς ἐν Ἀσίᾳ φίλοις ἐπέστελλε πέμπειν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα καὶ στρατηγὸν Ἀγησίλαον αἰτεῖσθαι.

Secret arrangements, naturally, are mostly uncorroborated. Xenophon records the similar request made by the Ionian allies at *Hell.* II.i.6 for the return of Lysander. At *Hell.* III.iv.7 Xenophon reports confusion in the cities, which were not democracies, as in the time of Athenian rule, nor under dekarchies, as in the time of Lysander. Some form of oligarchy is indicated, probably moderate (W.E.Thompson (1973) p.50). Plutarch seems to be referring to this situation when he speaks above of the violent reaction of the citizens to the unjust rule of force, which would no doubt be a chance for a greater element of democracy - of a kind - to emerge. Even so, the leaders were no doubt of the same class as their predecessors, but with a less unpopular rule. In c.7.3, Plutarch says the petitioners preferred to approach Lysander when they saw that Agesilaos was, in contrast to Lysander, δημοτικός. It was the extreme oligarchic element that Lysander had it in mind to strengthen, and it is clear from their requests that they were not at the moment in power in their cities. From 404/3, Lysander's men, who had no doubt been approved by Kyros, may well have been the ones who are said to have co-operated with him against Tissaphernes in their disputes over the control of their satrapal areas (*Hell.* III.i.3), and feared the latter, when in 400 Artaxerxes had appointed him as satrap of his own and Kyros' provinces.



4 παρελθὼν οὖν εἰς τὸ πλῆθος Ἀγησίλαος ἀνεδέξατο τὸν πόλεμον, εἰδοῖεν αὐτῷ τριάκοντα μὲν ἡγεμόνας καὶ συμβούλους Σπαρτιάτας, νεοδαμώδεις δὲ λογάδας δισχιλίους, τὴν δὲ συμμαχικὴν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους δύναμιν.

Plutarch used the phrase ἐν τῇ δίκη in c.3.7 over the succession. Here a similar procedure shows an appeal for the approval of the people before the undertaking of war. This is reminiscent of Homer (*Iliad* II. 73-75), where it was sensible for a king, Agamemnon, to invite his army to demonstrate their approval of a major operation in which the willingness of troops to follow the leader was essential. The harangue before going into battle is similar. Xenophon, however, records the proceedings of a meeting of the allies:

ἀνεπτερωμένων δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους συναγόντων καὶ βουλευομένων τί χρὴ ποιεῖν (*Hell.* III.iv.2).

Kings were accompanied by "advisers" for the first time when in 418 Agis was given a commission of ten at the battle of Mantinea. It was not uncommon, however, in the case of other commanders at sea and on land (A.W.Gomme (1959-81) on Thuc. II.85.1 in 429, III.69.1 in 427, and VIII.39.2 in 412-411). The identity and status of the νεοδαμώδεις is obscure. 700 helots were enrolled as hoplites in Brasidas' army in 424 (Thuc. IV.80), and in 421, after they had returned from Chalkidike, the name is used, for the first time, of the people they joined, apparently as a frontier garrison (Thuc. V.34.1). The fact that Brasidas' helots, now liberated, were settled together with colonists who already had the status of νεοδαμώδεις, at Lepreon on the Elis border, suggests the similar helot origin of these two groups, but whereas the helots were given freedom after hoplite service, νεοδαμώδεις were already free when they were serving (P.Oliva (1971) pp.165-71). λογάδας may indicate exclusive training as hoplites. The "Spartan" armies often contained Spartan generals, and mainly non-citizen and non-Spartan troops, far out-numbering the Spartiates (A.Andrewes (1978) p.99). Thucydides IV.80 describes the similar make-up of Brasidas' army in Thrace. Xenophon includes νεοδαμώδεις

in Kinadon's list of discontented (*Hell.* III.3.6), placing them between helots and ὑπομείονες, and since the ephors' enquiry about the source of the conspirators' arms may suggest that they knew that the majority were not regularly in possession of weapons, it would give evidence, perhaps, if the list is in ascending order of status, that only ὑπομείονες and perioikoi were, in Kinadon's words, οἱ μὲν δήπου συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν, and fully armed.

5 συμπράττοντος δὲ τοῦ Λυσάνδρου, πάντα προθύμως ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐξέπεμπον ἔχοντα τοὺς τριάκοντα Σπαρτιάτας, ὧν ὁ Λύσανδρος ἦν πρῶτος, οὐ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν καὶ δύναμιν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν Ἀγησιλάου φιλίαν, ᾧ μεῖζον ἐδόκει τῆς βασιλείας ἀγαθὸν διαπεπραχθαι τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐκείνην.

The vote will have authorized the pay for troops until they could live by plundering enemy territory in Asia Minor. In Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.3) the Lakedaimonians give provisions for six months. Plutarch shows Agesilaos' consistent attitude to friendship, in that Lysander's personal influence reinforced his official status and recognition by repute, to make him the closest and most senior adviser. The debt of gratitude may have been among Agesilaos' feelings, or it may be the conjecture of the author, who perhaps stresses the obligations of friendship in readiness for the coming quarrel. Having procured the kingship, Agesilaos would need to have command in a military campaign arranged, too, in order to make something of it. Xenophon uses the same verb in his phrase ταῦτα διαπραζόμενον (*Hell.* III.iv.5) in Tissaphernes' speech urging Agesilaos to arrange the armistice with him. Plutarch seems to take a word and use it in a different context while it is in his mind. The powers of the Spartan kings have been newly assessed (P.Cloch  , (1949); W.G.Forrest (1971) p.76 and *passim*; C.G.Thomas, (1974) pp.257-70; P.A.Cartledge, (1987) pp.99ff.). It seems still to be true that the power of any king depended in the first place on his duty to lead the Spartan army in war, and in the next place on how competently he did this. The reputation and experience Agesilaos



obtained would be the foundation on which he was to build his special influence and authority in other fields, such as policy-making, within the limitations nevertheless of certain specified restrictions operating through the ephorate, council and assembly, unless he could out-manoeuvre them.

6 ἄθροισμένης δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Γεραιστόν, αὐτὸς εἰς Αὐλίδα κατελθὼν μετὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ νυκτερεύσας, ἔδοξε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους εἰπεῖν τινα πρὸς αὐτόν.

The harbour at the southern end of Euböia is a convenient departure point for Asia Minor and for the regular base at Ephesos, via the Aegean islands, and, being at the extremity of the safe home waters, a suitable assembly point for a naval expedition whose units made their own way there from other parts of Greece. Aulis, on the mainland of Greece, opposite Chalkis in Euböia, was a less exposed assembly point, used for Agamemnon's Trojan expedition in Homer, but it was not available to Agesilaos. Spartan relations with Thebes had begun to deteriorate soon after the Peloponnesian War, because controversy had arisen over the booty at Dekeleia (Xen. *Hell.* III.v.5) and the treatment of Athens (II.ii.19). The Thebans had helped the Athenian exiles in 404-403 at Phyle, had harboured them in Thebes, and had refused to contribute troops for the Elis expedition in 401 and, more recently, for Agesilaos' present Asia Minor campaign (Xen. *Hell.* III.v.5).

Xenophon has no reference to this dream in *Hellenika*, and in *Agesilaos* no reference at all to Aulis before the departure for Asia Minor; at *Hell.* III.iv.3 Agesilaos makes the visit, in imitation of Agamemnon, with the sacrifice in mind as the original purpose. Plutarch gives no initial reason for Agesilaos to go and spend the night there. Since he preferred to include the dream, he had to suppress the initial intention. Only after the dream is there a purpose in the visit, according to Plutarch. Dreams lend themselves as



ornaments - for the dreamer in the original propaganda, or for the author in the later record, though for the historian they are another instance of evidence which cannot be substantiated: only the dreamer knows what, if anything, was in the dream, and no one can prove a fabricated dream false. Dreams are a recognized vehicle for divine communication, and may be used, like oracles, to reveal or deny support for action, and it may be Plutarch's intention to portray this here. Greater verisimilitude might have been secured by placing the dream at Geraistos, for a planned visit involving sacrifice seems the more likely, and the spread of news of the intention would explain the timely arrival of the Boiotians, as in Xenophon's account. It is not entirely possible to read Agesilaos' mind in going to Aulis, whether he wished to impress the Thebans, announce to the rest of Greece the scale of his ambitions, frighten Persia or stress the Panhellenist purpose, obscuring Lysander's aims. Agesilaos was not alone in wishing to pay respect to heroes by making a visit to Homeric places - Alexander visited Troy. Agamemnon had sacrificed to Artemis to obtain a favourable wind at Aulis, and it would be blameworthy not to do the same, particularly if the wind was later to be adverse. Yet Xenophon has not exploited the episode, concluding it only with Agesilaos' anger, presumably directed, but not explicitly, against Thebes. It may be that he realized that there was a bad omen here for the expedition, which is surely the point for Plutarch, compounded by the suggestion in the dream of divine motivation.

7 Ὡ βασιλεῦ Λακεδαιμονίων, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὁμοῦ συμπάσης ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγός ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ' ἐκείνον, ἐννοεῖς δήπουθεν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ὄρχεις ἐκείνῳ, τοῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς πολεμεῖς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον, εἰκός ἐστι καὶ θῦσαι σε τῇ θεῇ θυσίαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἐνταῦθα θύσας ἐξέπλευσεν.

The address begins with the first three-and-a-half feet of a dactylic hexameter, with diaeresis in second and fourth feet, which lends dignity to the communication, and honours the recipient. The

modern reader will think of Agesilaos, the first narrator of the dream, as the author of the verse, or suppose it to have been a quotation recollected in the dream from other oracular utterances. Agesilaos is further honoured in the recounting of this version by being linked to the literary hero, Agamemnon, more objectively than if it had been presented as his own wish to imitate the performance of the sacrifice. The triplet is again a formal feature in the expression, with alliteration and anaphora adding to the formality.

8 ὅμα δέ πως ὑπῆλθε τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ὁ τῆς κόρης σφαγιασμός, ἦν ὁ πατήρ ἔσφαξε πεισθεὶς τοῖς μάντεσιν.

Plutarch names neither Artemis, the deity, nor the victim, Iphigeneia. Homer has Kalchas as the prophet at Aulis and at Troy, but does not name Iphigeneia, though Aeschylus does (*Agamemnon* 389). A similar situation arises before Leuktra, when Pelopidas dreams that he is commanded to sacrifice παρθένον ξανθήν, if he wishes to win victory (*Pelopidas* 21-22). Human sacrifice is thought to explain marks on childrens' skeletons found at Knossos, which caused excitement in the Finlay Library of the B.S.A. in 1986, dated to the fifteenth century BC (S.Wall, *BSA* 1986), but the report by the Lesbian philosopher, Phantias, of sacrifices before Salamis (*Themistokles* 13), seems not to have convinced Plutarch, and is not mentioned by Herodotos.

ἀλλ' ἀναστὰς καὶ διηγησάμενος τοῖς φίλοις τὰ φανέντα τὴν μὲν θεὸν ἔφη τιμήσειν οἷς εἰκός ἐστι χεῖρειν θεὸν οὔσαν, οὐ μιμήσεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀπάθειαν τοῦ τότε στρατηγοῦ.

Once Agesilaos has told of his dream, the story can enter the stream of tradition and be passed down as can any other event, such as his immediate intention to honour the goddess, observed and related by the friends. Presumably a king's priestly office would give him the authority and experience to make this decision, without the necessity of consulting an interpreter.



9 καὶ καταστέψας ἔλαφον ἐκέλευσεν ἀπάρξασθαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ μάντιν, οὐχ ὥσπερ εἰώθει τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν Βοιωτῶν τεταγμένος.

Agesilaos is portrayed as more civilized than Agamemnon, as was Pelopidas, who sacrificed a chestnut filly. His seer is present but rather than consult him, Agesilaos directs him about the procedure he is to follow. One would expect the use of a shrine to be regulated and controlled by the authorities of the place, such as those who quickly appeared in Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus* (117) to protect their shrine, in order to avoid the undesirable consequences of the deity's displeasure caused by inadvertent or deliberate misunderstanding of local ritual. Rather than have his own man officiating, Agesilaos might have employed the official custodian of the site, if he was available, but, of course, relations with Thebes precluded that. This is a typical situation for tragic history (F.W.Walbank (1955) pp.4-14, and (1960) pp.216-34), when a necessary religious function cannot for religious reasons be performed properly. The outcome may be expected to be serious, both for the expedition, because of the unfulfilled ritual, and for the Spartans, because of the sacrilege.

10 ἀκούσαντες οὖν οἱ Βοιωτάρχαι πρὸς ὀργὴν ἔπεμψαν ὑπηρέτας, ἀπαγορεύοντες τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ μὴ θύειν παρὰ τοῦς νόμους καὶ τὰ πάτρια Βοιωτῶν.

This version of the intervention of the Boiotians may have come from local tradition. At this time the Boiotian Confederacy managed common interests through eleven officers, the Boiotarchs, four of whom were elected by Thebes, the most powerful state in the league, and the rest distributed for election among the lesser cities or groups of cities. (J.Buckler (1980) p.23; J.A.O.Larsen (1955) pp.40-50). Anger is usually not accounted a good guide for action, but here, clearly, it is righteous anger, and the decisive intervention of the Boiotians in an affair of this kind reveals their great determination to demonstrate their independence. Plutarch, as a Boiotian and a priest of Delphi, would be sensitive about the violation of the territory and the sanctity



of the shrine, and he stresses the Boiotarchs' concern for local laws and customs, omitted by Xenophon. The Corinthian War was to begin in Agesilaos' absence.

οἱ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀπήγγειλαν καὶ τὰ μηρία διέρριψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ.

Xenophon says horsemen were sent, which may indicate that they came from a distance, perhaps from Thebes. They first issued a verbal warning, and then "threw the victims from the altar, already offered - οἷς ἐνέτυχον ἱεροῖς τεθυμένοις", as if part of the sacrifice was considered to have been completed (*Hell.* III.iv.3). Plutarch perhaps indicated by the omission of the participle that he wished it to be considered that the interruption had come before the completion of the sacrifice and it was therefore not valid.

11 χαλεπῶς οὖν ἔχων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἀπέπλει, τοῖς τε Θηβαίοις διωργισμένος καὶ γεγονῶς δύσελπις διὰ τὸν οἶωνόν, ὥς ἀτελῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων γενησομένων καὶ τῆς στρατείας ἐπὶ τὸ προσῆκον οὐκ ὀφειζομένης.

Agesilaos evidently wished to do something about it but could not enforce his will, with only his few friends there. He, too, is portrayed as clearly regarding the sacrifice as incomplete. The reader's expectations are thus prepared for a lack of complete success at the end of the expedition, and the judgement of the final result of the whole Asia Minor episode should eventually take this passage into account.

## CHAPTER 7

### A question of protocol

Plutarch devotes this chapter and the next to the description of a quarrel between Agesilaos and Lysander. Several features seem to cast doubt on the authenticity of the available accounts of the quarrel. Clashes of personality are used to explain events in other *Lives*, notably in *Alexander*, but here there are signs of possible major political issues in the background, for at this time, Lysander was likely to have been investigating the restoration of his friends to power in the cities. The winning of Spithridates described in c.8 could also be interpreted more meaningfully as a deliberately planned diplomatic enterprise, rather than the chance solution to the breach of a friendship. The wider issue of conflict in Spartan society, or, as Aristotle put it (*Pol.* 1306b31-3), the dishonourable treatment of men of virtue, specifically Lysander, by those with more honourable status, specifically the kings, also comes into question, if his evidence for it lies to any extent in the personal terms used in the record of a political dispute. (See M.I.Finley (1975) pp.168-70.) Detailed interpretation and comparison of the accounts given in Plutarch and Xenophon indicate that certainty in this instance is far from possible, but further reason for doubt comes from the attempted and presumably successful major destruction of Lysander's character after his death, which may suggest that, at that later time, Agesilaos or his friends found or invented damaging evidence of aggrandizement in this earlier episode (see c.20). If it is true that character is displayed by actions, it is these which are the proper study to engage in, rather than the personal terms used in the record.

Since Xenophon had only recently joined this force, he perhaps witnessed the episode, but from a distance. After his arrival, there had been some explaining to do about the earlier behaviour of Kyros'



former troops, before the intimate friendship began with Agesilaos. Lysander's departure to the Hellespont, perhaps on a mission which was kept secret, may have given rise to speculation among the thirty about a rift, and Xenophon's personal element may have resulted from their jealous talk; or it may have been the later discrediting of Lysander that coloured Xenophon's view (see on c.6). He first describes the governments in the cities while Agesilaos was at Ephesos as "in a state of confusion", συντεταραγμένων (*Hell* III.iv.7): "It was not a democracy as in the time of Athenian rule, nor dekarchy, as in the time of Lysander." This would seem to indicate a political dimension in the disputes. The new overlords had taken over after, perhaps long after, 403/402 (D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.71ff.), and there were now likely to be claims for repossession of confiscated property and redress of alleged injustices committed in the intervening years under their regime, which would be achieved by the restoration of Lysander's friends to power. In the light of the reason given by Lysander for his coming to Asia Minor, the petitioners will mainly have been his supporters, the former extreme oligarchs in a political rather than aristocratic sense, for a definition of their class is difficult to establish (D.M.Lewis (1977) p.116). Yet at *Agesilaos* I.37 Xenophon seeks praise for Agesilaos on the ground that he brought constitutional harmony and prosperity to the cities that had suffered from factional strife since the end of the Athenian empire, and had achieved this without banishment and death. This suggests that there was a settlement of the differences in the cities on Agesilaos' terms, and a settlement, too, of the differences in Spartan policies, which had been divided between support for the extreme oligarchies which Lysander desired to reinstate and support for the more moderate and stable regimes desired by his opponents. If Lysander was now convinced that resistance to the extremists would prevail, he would wish usefully to employ his experience and influence elsewhere before the expiry of his



year of office, which would seem to be wise. At Xen. *Hell.* III.iv.13 Agesilaos makes his first military expedition to the north, reaching Daskylion, near the Hellespont, presumably using intelligence provided by Spithridates. Although Xenophon's account, which Plutarch broadly follows, may yet be thought largely acceptable, a more coherent design at the highest level may have been withheld from him at this early stage in his service with the Spartan expedition, when he perhaps had access only to less privileged and less reliable informers.

1 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἦκεν εἰς Ἔφεσον, εὐθὺς ἀξίωμα μέγα καὶ δύναμις ἦν ἐπαχθῆς καὶ βαρεῖα περὶ τὸν Λύσανδρον, ὅχλου φοιτῶντος ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἐκάστοτε καὶ πάντων παρακολουθούντων καὶ θεραπευόντων ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὄνομα μὲν καὶ σχῆμα τῆς στρατηγίας τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ὄντα διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἔργῳ δὲ κύριον ὁπάντων καὶ δυνάμενον καὶ πράττοντα πάντα τὸν Λύσανδρον.

Ephesos had been made a Spartan base long before. Plutarch describes it at *Lysander* 3 as a city well disposed to Sparta when Lysander arrived as admiral with his fleet towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, but says that it was then poor and, since it was the Persian headquarters, it was adopting Persian customs. Lysander made it his base and transformed it into a busy and prosperous port, with shipbuilding facilities, and this will have brought him the undoubted popularity referred to in this chapter. The area of the three rivers, Maiandros, Kaÿstrios and Hermos, is depicted on coins of a series of Ionian tetradrachms in the earliest preserved Greek map (A.E.M. Johnston (1967) pp.92-3; Pl.IX). In an area renowned for competent cartographers (ibid. p.93), travellers were not entirely dependent on guides, for the engravers will have worked from existing sketches.

Plutarch suggests that Agesilaos was displeased with the high regard and power enjoyed by Lysander, though at *Lysander* 23 he refers more pointedly to Lysander's excessive φιλοτιμία. He has not explained here the reason for Lysander's prominence, which he gave at *Lysander* 23 as ἐκ πολλῆς τῆς πρόσθεν ὁμιλίας. However, Agesilaos will

have been at the outset perfectly aware of Lysander's long-standing associations with his friends in the cities, since he no doubt knew his purpose in visiting Asia Minor again. Despite Xenophon's use of πάντες at *Hell.* III.iv.7, the sort of person who would consult at this level would be largely the wealthy and aristocratic (see above and c.6), and it was only to be expected that they would welcome the opportunity to renew contact with him, knowing by their past experience how to get on with him and confident that he was familiar with the problems that they faced from his former experience. Lysander was also the older man, of course.

Although Xenophon's attitude to Lysander is often restrained (see on c.6), his account of the episode begins without personal animosity (*Hell.* III.iv.7). He points out that because Lysander was already known, people asked him to obtain from Agesilaos (παρ' Ἀγησιλάου) what they wanted: he was not asked to grant it in his own right. It was the crowd of petitioners regularly attending on him that presented the problem: ὥστε ὁ μὲν Ἀγησίλαος ἰδιώτης ἐφαίνετο, ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος βασιλεύς. There is no suggestion that this exclusive consultation was encouraged by Lysander, but it annoyed first the rest of the advisers, and then Agesilaos himself, only later: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔμηνε καὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ταῦτα ἐδήλωσεν ὕστερον. It was thus, for Xenophon, the situation (ταῦτα) that enraged Agesilaos, while in the first place the other Spartiates had been motivated by jealousy (ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου) of Lysander personally. However, when they complained to Agesilaos, he remained concerned only with the situation, and dealt with the errant petitioners.

Plutarch has augmented Xenophon's description of the situation with rhetorical *amplificatio*, using a stronger expression for ἰδιώτης, enlarging on βασιλεύς, and adding "(only?) because the law says so" - as if it seemed to the petitioners that, if Lysander cared to, he could change that, too! With ὥς, he has put these words into the minds of



those mentioned immediately before, the petitioners, as the explanation of why they consulted Lysander, although in reality they already had, in their previous acquaintance with him, more positive reasons for going to Lysander and no reason to insult Agesilaos. The words comparing apparent status in Xenophon's account express the complaint made to Agesilaos by Lysander's opponents, but Plutarch has presented them as the thoughts of the petitioners.

How Plutarch's account moves from Xenophon's may be tabulated as follows:

#### Xenophon

(ὥστε)	ὄχλος ἠκολούθει βασιλεύς ἐφαίνετο	statement Spartans' view of petitioners' action
(ὥς)	οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἐσίγων παράνομα ποιοίη	Spartans' reaction Spartans' complaint against Lysander
	ἔμηνε καὶ τὸν Ἀγησίλαον	Agesilaos' reaction to petitioners

#### Plutarch

(ὥς)	πάντων θεραπευόντων κύριον ὁπάντων μνημονεύοντες προσεῖχον χαλεπῶς ἔφερον ὑπηρέται ὄντες	statement petitioners' view of Lysander petitioners' reaction Spartans' reaction Spartans' complaint against Lysander
	Ἀγησίλαος ἐφοβεῖτο	Agesilaos' reaction to Lysander

Xenophon describes only the Spartans' subjective view of Lysander, which was a prejudiced view because they were being disadvantaged, while Plutarch describes the scene ὁμηρικῶς, so that the root of the problem can be seen by the reader objectively in the petitioners' exclusive consultation of Lysander; the Spartans' subjective reaction comes later. The change is brought about by replacing ὥστε with ὥς, so that the consequence clause becomes a causal clause, in which Plutarch explains how Lysander came to be involved in the activities which gave offence. In the end, while Xenophon's Agesilaos, like the Spartans, reacts to the petitioners' behaviour, Plutarch's

Agesilaos reacts to Lysander, and does so for his own reason, fearing to forfeit the chance of any glorious achievement. The effect of Plutarch's changes is not only to enliven the narrative but to give the impression that the issue here is primarily personal rivalry, an impression he has given even more strongly at *Lysander* 23, where the Spartiates play no part at all.

2 οὐδεὶς γὰρ δεινότερος οὐδὲ φοβερώτερος ἐκείνου τῶν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀποσταλέντων ἐγένετο στρατηγῶν, οὐδὲ μείζονα τοὺς φίλους τις ἀνὴρ ἄλλος εὐεργέτησεν οὐδὲ κακὰ τηλικοῦτα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐποίησεν. 3 ὧν ἔτι προσφάτων ὄντων οἱ ἄνθρωποι μνημονεύοντες.

Plutarch interrupts the account of the quarrel to give, in his own words, the reasons for Lysander's prominent position, based on Lysander's record in Ionia over a longer time, and expressed in terms like those of Plato's *Republic* I, already used at c.5. Plutarch refers to things as "recent", in that Lysander's dekarchies had been set up less than ten years ago, well within the memories of the petitioners now present. The views just presented, together with what follows, dispose the reader's mind to suppose that the complaints of the τριᾶκοντα about Lysander will be justified.

ἄλλως δὲ τὸν μὲν Ἀγησίλαον ἀφελῆ καὶ λιτὸν ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ δημοτικὸν ὁρῶντες, ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμοίως σφοδρότητα καὶ τραχύτητα καὶ βραχυλογίαν παροῦσαν, ὑπέπιπτον αὐτῷ παντάπασι καὶ μόνῳ προσεῖχον.

These attributes are in keeping with Plutarch's earlier character study of Agesilaos in cc.1, 2, where clearly he, as well as the Spartans, approved of them, but here the oligarchs' view of the same qualities is not complimentary. Not only was he not impressive in his bearing: his attitude to people rendered him less well-disposed to Lysander's aristocratic friends. By Spartan standards their view of Agesilaos would be offensive to his supporters, whose attitude is indicated in the scornful vocabulary which follows the contrasting assessment of Lysander's qualities. The verb ὑπέπιπτον, "fell down", is used of



cringing suppliants (ὕπονίπτοντα καὶ δεόμενον *Mor.* 540d) and fawning flatterers, and the verb προσέχω is used by Xenophon in a Persian context (*Cyr.* V.v.40) for "pay court to", attend on. Plutarch (*Lysander* 18) provides further illumination in quoting Douris of Samos as saying that Lysander was the first Greek in whose honour Greek cities erected altars and offered sacrifices as though he were a god. The Samians decreed that their festival in honour of Hera should be called the Lysandreia (D.G.J.Shipley (1987) pp.133-4, citing Homann-Wedeking, 'Samos 1964', *Archäologische Anzeiger* (1965), p.440). Resentment of Lysander's pomposity is made to seem more justified, in Plutarch's account, by reversing the clauses, so that the petitioners' attendance on Lysander, which in Xenophon makes Agesilaos appear humble, becomes the consequence of his humble appearance, expressed in exaggerated terms.

4 ἐκ δὲ τούτου πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λοιποὶ Σπαρτιᾶται χαλεπῶς ἔφερον ὑπηρεῖται Λυσάνδρου μᾶλλον ἢ σύμβουλοι βασιλέως ὄντες.

Plutarch does not distinguish any of the twenty-nine of the τριάκοντα who may have associated themselves with Lysander, but implies that they were all still loyal to Agesilaos. They were evidently not thought of as attending separately on Agesilaos and Lysander; when meeting together no doubt they would be conscious of the differences in their status.

ἔπειτα δ' αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, εἰ καὶ μὴ φθονερὸς ἦν μηδὲ ἤχθετο τοῖς τιμωμένοις, ἀλλὰ φιλότιμος ὢν σφόδρα καὶ φιλόναικος ἐφοβεῖτο μὴ, κἄν ἐνέγκωσί τι λαμπρὸν αἱ πράξεις, τοῦτο Λυσάνδρου γένηται διὰ τὴν δόξαν.

Taken literally, this dissociates Agesilaos' feelings completely from those of envy expressed at the start of the chapter. Since he was aware of the others' dissatisfaction with Lysander's behaviour, he had no reason for envy, or to be other than confident of support for his own position. The quarrel is still a personal one, but instead of envy,

which Xenophon, too, attributes only to the Spartiates, the adjectives used, φιλότιμος ὧν σφόδρα καὶ φιλόνεικος, are forms of the words that characterized Agesilaos at c.5.5 and elsewhere, introduced again here to indicate the ground for his challenge. The first, φιλότιμος, means "ambitious" in the sense of "desiring the achievements to be his own", not "desiring recognition of his achievements". The second is φιλόνεικος, with which Plutarch represents the anger (ἔμηνε) assigned to Agesilaos by Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.7), expressing Agesilaos' readiness to assert himself competitively. Only now does Xenophon introduce the personal dimension of the quarrel, and shows it on Lysander's side, with the phrase βαρέως δὲ φέρων τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ. In Plutarch, however, it is the reaction of Agesilaos that is personal, and, like that of the Spartiates, directed against Lysander.

5 πρῶτον ἀντέκρουε ταῖς συμβουλίαις αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρὸς δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἐσπουδᾷκει μάλιστα πράξεις ἔῳν χαίρειν καὶ παραμελῶν, ἕτερα πρὸ ἐκείνων ἔπραττεν· 6 ἔπειτα τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων καὶ δεομένων οὐς αἴσθοιτο Λυσάνδρῳ μάλιστα πεποιθότας, ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπε· 7 καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις ὁμοίως οἷς ἐκεῖνος ἐπηρεάζοι, τούτους ἔδει πλεον ἔχοντας ἀπελθεῖν, καὶ τοῦναντίον οὐς φανερός γένοιτο προθυμούμενος ὠφελεῖν, χαλεπὸν ἦν μὴ καὶ ζημιωθῆναι.

The metaphor, from boxing, suggests a vigorous reponse. Xenophon directs the retaliatory action only towards the petitioners supported by Lysander, whereas Plutarch suggests a personal reaction against Lysander, and, again using *amplificatio* to give details where Xenophon only summarizes, he mentions the rejection, first, of his advice and enterprises, then, of petitions, and finally, of legal cases, too. These were not vital military decisions, while the truce lasted, and in private matters, perhaps, inconsistency of policy and its consequences would be less serious. "People came and asked" - came to ask - contradicts the earlier statement that they went exclusively to Lysander, μόνῳ προσεῖχον, but is consistent with Xenophon's statement that Lysander was asked only to present their petitions to Agesilaos.



8 γινομένων δὲ τούτων οὐ κατὰ τύχην, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐκ παρασκευῆς καὶ ὁμαλῶς, αἰσθόμενος τὴν αἰτίαν ὁ Λύσανδρος οὐκ ἀπεκρύπτετο πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, ἀλλ' ἔλεγεν ὡς δι' αὐτὸν ἀτιμάζοιντο, καὶ παρεκάλει θεραπεύειν ἰόντας τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ δυναμένους.

For οὐ κατὰ τύχην Perrin has "not casually"; the Budé editor has "pas l'effet du hasard". The required sense, however, is "not at random", in order to contrast with the following "purposely, uniformly". Deliberately prepared conduct of cases would be more likely to succeed, than if he acted on the spur of the moment. Consistency was necessary so that Lysander would eventually see what was happening and "perceive that he was responsible". Lysander's remarks constitute a full confession and an attempt to restore Agesilaos' position in the regard of the petitioners, and is more than Xenophon records at *Hell.* III.iv.8, where Lysander, having put a stop to his own audiences, admits that his support is a handicap. Plutarch gives the impression that Lysander did not take offence, but was making a genuine effort to show, by his specific reference to the title of king and the reality of the king's power, that he accepted Agesilaos' superior position. There has been at this stage, apparently, no aggressive confrontation, but, although there are faults on both sides, the pendulum is swinging away from Agesilaos.

## CHAPTER 8

### Differences settled: Spithridates arrives

1 Ὡς οὖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ λέγειν ἔδοκει φθόνον ἐκείνῳ μηχανώμενος, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ καθάψασθαι βουλόμενος Ἀγησίλαος ἀπέδειξε κρεοδαίτην καὶ προσεῖπεν, ὥς λέγεται, πολλῶν ἀκουόντων. Νῦν οὖν θεραπευέτωσαν οὗτοι ἀπιόντες τὸν ἐμὸν κρεοδαίτην.

Plutarch now builds up a considerable rift between the two men, with Agesilaos imputing to Lysander deliberate provocation, which can be supported from his account only by supposing that the confession in c.7 was insincere. In Xenophon there is no further humiliation by Agesilaos, only the expression of Lysander's distress: βαρέως δὲ φέρων τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ, which Plutarch, or his source, may have taken as a reference to a further disgrace. The appointment of the king's carver in real life may have been, in origin, for regular protection against poisoning. Here it is presented as an insult or a piece of humour, yet Plutarch himself has explained the regular nature of the appointment:

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ κρεωδαίτας εἶχον οὐ τοὺς τυχόντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πρῶτους ἄνδρας· ὥστε καὶ Λύσανδρον ὑπ' Ἀγησιλάου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐν Ἀσίᾳ κρεωδαίτην ἀποδειχθῆναι (*Mor.* 644b).

In his account in *Lysander* 23, Plutarch records the continuing respect of the people for Lysander, and suggests that he continued to receive attention, which annoyed Agesilaos. He then details further insulting treatment by Agesilaos, and the new humiliation which serves the important purpose of motivating that work's climax, Lysander's attempted revenge in Sparta later.

Agesilaos' hostility to Lysander continues with the insulting remark in the dialogue which Plutarch, using an anonymous source, here introduces in public, πολλῶν ἀκουόντων, although in Xenophon the dialogue follows immediately on Lysander's original distress, and begins in an interview instigated by Lysander, apparently in private: προσελθὼν εἶπεν (*Hell.* III.iv.9). Humour may be intended again here by Plutarch, but it was not so in *Lysander*, οἷον ἐφουβρίζων, and Agesilaos' behaviour is presented at the start of the dialogue in a less favourable



light than the repentant Lysander was in at the end of the previous chapter.

2 ἀχθόμενος οὖν ὁ Λύσανδρος λέγει πρὸς αὐτόν· Ὡδεις ὅρα σαφῶς, Ἀγησίλαε, φίλους ἐλαττοῦν. Νῆ Δί', ἔφη, τοὺς γ' ἐμοῦ μεῖζον δύνασθαι βουλομένους. καὶ ὁ Λύσανδρος, Ἀλλ' ἴσως, ἔφη, ταῦτα σοὶ λέλεκται βέλτιον ἢ ἐμοὶ πέπρακται.

Xenophon's dialogue begins only at this point, immediately bringing to the surface a more personal, reproving element in the dispute. In all the versions of his speech Lysander manages both to concede Agesilaos' success and yet accuse him of disloyalty. Agesilaos' response is short but it is sufficient to correct Lysander's universal statement, and diverts the accusation to Lysander, casting doubt on his friendship. This suggests that the source for the dialogue was well disposed to Agesilaos, and that is confirmed by a supplementary statement in Xenophon which puts Agesilaos in an even more favourable light: τοὺς δέ γε αὔξοντας εἰ μὴ ἐπισταίμην ἀντιτιμᾶν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἄν. Plutarch has included this at *Lysander* 23 (τοὺς δ' αὔξοντας τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῆς δίκαιον), but he omits it here, although the omission weakens the motivation for Lysander's generous statement of approval. Lysander has already taken action with the petitioners to restore Agesilaos' authority in c.7, and now he confesses his error to Agesilaos in person. He has been taken to be making a comparison between his own unwise assistance in arranging the accession of Agesilaos and Agesilaos' more discerning humiliation of Lysander (J. Smits (1939) pp.221-2, following a comment of Breitenbach (1884), on the parallel passage in Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.9): Ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ μᾶλλον εἰκότα σὺ ποιεῖς ἢ ἐγὼ ἔπραττον). It has been rightly argued that this is to misunderstand Xenophon, for Agesilaos could not have taken Lysander's words to refer to his assistance over the accession without further explanation (I.Bos (1947) p.64). Rather, then, Xenophon presents a comparison between the reasonableness of two actions, one, the verbal confrontation by which Agesilaos has here re-established his

position, and the other, the seemingly arrogant behaviour of Lysander manifested in the gatherings of the petitioners. Plutarch represents this more clearly by changing the first verb: "What you have *said* . . . what I have *done*".

δὸς δέ μοι τινὰ τάξιν καὶ χώραν, ἔνθα μὴ λυπῶν ἔσομαι σοι  
χρήσιμος.

Lysander seems to be magnanimous in defeat - contrary to the character already drawn by Plutarch - and so earns the reader's sympathy, which in the earliest part of the narrative he was presented as not deserving. He acknowledges his subordinate position, and at the same time restores Agesilaos' status as commander.

3 ἐκ τούτου πέμπεται μὲν ἐφ' Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ Σπιθριδάτην, ἄνδρα Πέρσην, ἀπὸ τῆς Φαρναβάζου χώρας μετὰ χρημάτων συχνῶν καὶ διακοσίων ἱππέων ἡγάγε πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον.

Three significant aspects remain unexplained here: that such an important enterprise should develop casually from an argument; that after their quarrel there should be mutual trust for such a mission; that there should be no more precise briefing about what Lysander's mission was intended to achieve. Xenophon credits Agesilaos with the initiative (*Hell.* III.iv.10), again indicating the predilection of his source. Yet Lysander's superior knowledge of the satrapies would suggest that he was more likely to have been involved in originating the plan. Although Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.7) puts the quarrel after the truce with Tissaphernes had been agreed, and makes Lysander's expedition result from the quarrel, it may be that the forthcoming campaign in the north had already been in their minds, and the gathering of intelligence was a necessary preliminary. By placing the name of Spithridates prominently first, Plutarch highlights the achievement, though without indicating how it was done. This part of the episode reveals the value for Agesilaos of having acted as he did, and leaves him with immediate, tangible success - and the credit is



given to him. Valuable benefits accrued from the excursion, for money was vital for obtaining supplies in friendly territories, and cavalry was a major deficiency in the Spartan force in Asia, but Plutarch, unlike Xenophon, makes no mention of the more important benefit, the information that Agesilaos was able to obtain about Pharnabazos and his country, and no doubt other intelligence concerning routes and defending forces.

οὐκ ἔληγε δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ἀλλὰ βαρέως φέρων ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἐβούλευεν ὅπως τῶν δυεῖν οἴκων τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφελόμενος εἰς μέσον ἄσασιν ἀποδοίῃ Σπαρτιάταις. 4 καὶ ἔδόκει μεγάλην ἂν ἀπεργάσασθαι κίνησιν ἐκ ταύτης τῆς διαφορᾶς, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐτελεύτησεν εἰς Βοιωτίαν στρατεύσας.

Although he has made amends, Lysander is here presented in an unfavourable light. Plutarch has used an abridged version of Lysander's continuation of his anger mentioned at *Lysander* 23-4, and seems to have provided a strange conclusion for an episode which turned out advantageous to both men, an opportunity for Lysander to redeem himself by performing a useful service, and for Agesilaos to establish his commanding position. Xenophon ends the episode happily with the delight of Agesilaos on the arrival of Spithridates: ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἦσθη τε τῇ πράξει (*Hell.* III.iv.10), a delight which would be equally suitable for the success of a properly planned mission. The reason for this and other variations between the three versions lies, perhaps, in the apparent literary intentions of the respective authors. Xenophon at the start limited the personal animosity between the two men, particularly before the dialogue, and in the end found nothing to criticize Agesilaos for, but evidently wished rather to illustrate his sense of fairness. In *Lysander*, Plutarch was concerned to motivate Lysander's plan to reform the monarchy on his return to Greece. Here, since Plutarch was to present both men at fault in the conclusion of this chapter, he has included Agesilaos' unnecessary insults, has retained Lysander's persisting resentment, but has omitted to mention

the practice of rewarding loyal friends, which would have brought some mitigation of Agesilaos' conduct. Each author's account fulfills his apparent literary purpose, but Lysander was still in favour and acceptable at Sparta, for he was given command in the campaign that led to his death at Haliartos, and at his death the Spartans paid him many honours (*Lysander* 30). Plutarch does not mention either the end of his year of office or his departure from Asia Minor.

Plutarch's wording, incorporating a reminiscence of Xenophon's phrase from the start of the dialogue, βορέως δὲ φέρων (*Hell.* III.iv.9), suggests violent revolution, but at c.20.4 ἐν τῷ δήμῳ would indicate legitimate constitutional methods of reform. Lysander was killed at Haliartos in the autumn battle, having returned from Asia Minor in the spring. The "plot", which is not mentioned by Xenophon, was "discovered" after his death (Diodoros XIV.13.8) but as with all conspiracies, secrecy means that little reliable information is available and most of it comes from the winning side's point of view. In Diodoros' account, the late Lysander's house was being searched for some documents, and a speech was discovered, written for him by the rhetorician, Kleon of Halikarnassos, which Lysander had intended - he does not say how this intention was known - to deliver in the assembly (πρὸς τὰ πλῆθη). The similar, but not identical, version given by Plutarch at *Lysander* 30 is attributed to Ephoros. The speech outlined a plan to reform the monarchy, removing the exclusive prerogative of the two royal houses so as to make all Spartans eligible. If Lysander intended to attempt his reform by this means, it was hardly a conspiracy, and there was a need for some reform (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.407). King Pausanias is said to have written on the Spartan constitution (Aristotle *Pol.* 1301b, 1333b; E.David (1979) 94-116, P.A.Cartledge (1987) 163), and Lysander may have wished to respond to this or he may have provoked Pausanias to make a response. Also in doubt is the subversive reason given for Lysander's



visit to the oracle of Ammon in 403 (Diodoros XIV.13.5), the details of which would be known only from what the parties directly concerned were prepared to say in public. It has been suggested that he was engaged in diplomacy concerning Egypt rather than in purely religious matters (S.Hornblower (1983) p.190). A more appropriate time for change in the monarchy was before Agesilaos' reign began, and the later hostile tradition, which is, perhaps, more likely to have originated with King Pausanias, would incorporate much gossip. (For the royal lines of Sparta see W.G.Forrest (1971) pp.19-22; C.G.Thomas (1974) pp.257-70; J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.64ff. For full Spartan citizens see S.Hodkinson (1983) p.241. *Lak. Pol.* V.3 assumes their existence before the Lykourgan reform: Λυκοῦργος τοίνυν παραλαβὼν τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.)

5 οὕτως αἱ φιλότιμοι φύσεις ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, τὸ ἄγαν μὴ φυλαξόμεναι, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μείζον τὸ κακὸν ἔχουσι.

Some value is, of course, recognized in the quality of φιλοτιμία, but also the harm that comes from excess. This is the moral of the quarrel. Plutarch has already warned that the associated quality, excessive competition, endangers the state, at the end of c.5: αἱ γὰρ ὑπερβολαὶ τῶν φιλονεικιῶν χαλεπαὶ ταῖς πόλεσι. The two qualities were attributed to Agesilaos in c.2. and were mentioned together in c.5 as incentives to virtue introduced by the lawgiver. Each has now been recognized as a dangerous excess in the character of Agesilaos, who is here about to be criticized also for ineptitude. Although Plutarch criticizes Agesilaos and Lysander in this way, there is no immediate consequence detrimental to Sparta, but the reader's expectations have been pointed in that direction.

6 καὶ γὰρ εἰ Λύσανδρος ἦν φορτικός, ὥσπερ ἦν, ὑπερβάλλων τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τὸν καιρόν, οὐκ ἠγνόει δῆπουθεν Ἀγησίλαος ἑτέραν ἀμεμπτοτέραν ἐπανόρθωσιν οὔσαν ἀνδρὸς ἐνδόξου καὶ φιλοτίμου πλημμελοῦντος.

The Budé translators have "insupportable", and Perrin has "troublesome"; rather Lysander was "overbearing", as Menekrates is in

c.21:

τοῦ δ' ἰατροῦ Μενεκράτους, ἐπεὶ κατατυχὼν ἔν τισιν ἀπεγνωσμέναις θεραπείαις Ζεὺς ἐπεκλήθη, φορτικῶς ταύτῃ χρωμένου τῇ προσωυμῖα.

Plutarch may have intended τὸν καιρόν, not in a temporal sense, but with its moral meaning, "what is proper and right", which develops from "the seasonal". Agesilaos' inability to recognize it is an important failing again later (see cc.28, 36, 37, 39). The metaphor from music - striking a false note - gives "erring". At *Lysander* 23 Plutarch criticizes Agesilaos also for his ingratitude to Lysander, εὐεργέτην ἄνδρα καὶ φίλον, recalling perhaps that he had procured for him the kingship and the Asian command (cf. c.6).

ἀλλ' ἔοικε ταύτῳ πάθει μήτε ἐκεῖνος ὄρχοντος ἐξουσίαν γινῶναι μήτε οὗτος ἄνοιαν ἐνεγκεῖν συνήθους

Plutarch seems to recall Aristotle's answer (*NE* VII.2-3) to the Socratic doctrine that knowledge of the good precludes doing anything else, that a man does wrong only through ignorance: "A man can, from a variety of causes, fail to apply knowledge which he has". (See R.C.Cross and A.D.Woozley (1964) pp.54-5.) If Lysander had recognized Agesilaos' superior authority in office, he could not have failed to restrain his desire for achievement, but νόθος distorted his perception, just as it distorted Agesilaos' knowledge of a better way of dealing with him, making him intolerant of his friend's "failure to recognize him". Plutarch has already defined the νόθος as ὑπερβάλλον τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τὸν καιρόν, and it is now attributed to Agesilaos, too, but he has also indicated his belief that the ἀγωγή encouraged this quality. Clearly the Spartans had failed to acquire the means to control excess of it.

### Conclusion

That these disagreements would be discussed and settled only in public, particularly in the light of Xenophon's hint of a private



interview, and that they should have been allowed to be decided by such repartee, may be doubted. Nevertheless, although Lysander's expedition may have been planned, if there was a quarrel, it may well have been as Xenophon has it. Plutarch has largely accepted Xenophon's account, but he makes close-up enlargements of parts of the canvas so that readers see for themselves things as they were - ἐνόργεια. He abandons Xenophon's one-sided assessment favouring Agesilaos, although he does not transfer to Agesilaos the simple explanation, the jealousy of the Spartiates, specifically denying it in c.7, εἰ καὶ μὴ φθονερός ἦν. It would not fit his character here, though at *Lysander* 23 he reacted ὑπὸ φθόνου τῆς τιμῆς to the continued attentions paid to Lysander by the petitioners. In Xenophon, Lysander is alone at fault, but he redeems himself by accepting service as a subordinate, while Agesilaos is slow to take offence, more balanced in his treatment of people, and pleased with the exploit in the end. Xenophon makes no reference to Lysander's proposed constitutional reform, except, inadvertently perhaps, when at *Hell.* III.iv.7, in what may have been a function of the subconscious, he juxtaposed the two words, Λύσανδρος βασιλεύς.

Plutarch has read Xenophon's account carefully here, and has thoughtfully formed his own impression, drawing the conclusion that the two men shared a common fault, ταῦτ' ἴσθι, the limitation by φιλοτιμία of their powers of perception and tolerance. The Spartan ἀγωγή is not known to have included the study of philosophy as such, but Spartans visited Delphi, and if they took note of Apollo's injunction, μηδὲν ἄγαν, that might have been guidance enough. The writings of Aristotle, advocating the mean, which were available to Plutarch, were not available, of course, to these men in the early part of the fourth century. However, Aristotle himself criticized the Spartan constitution on similar grounds, its concentration on military virtue (*Pol.* 1333b19; 1333b41-1334a2). Plutarch's didactic purpose is

necessarily relevant to his own age, as already mentioned in c.5 above, but he presents it in the Spartan context. He has made of the quarrel a criticism of φιλοτιμία and φιλονεικία, having attributed excess of these qualities to Agesilaos in c.7, φιλότιμος ὧν σφόδρα καὶ φιλόνεικος. This is a significant effort on the part of Plutarch in interpreting his source independently to contribute to his analysis of Spartan society. He has not managed to rid himself of the method of the ancient historical writers of using the personal element in order to explain the causes of events, but his analysis has revealed the more rational issue, the danger to Sparta of two qualities deliberately developed in its citizens, without adequate safeguards against excess. This is indicated here in the failure of Lysander and Agesilaos to recognize or respond to τὸν καιρόν, and reveals the Spartans' lack of training in intellectual discrimination. Plutarch uses the same key word in making the point at cc.28, 36, 37, 39.

Plutarch punctuates the whole work by inserting this sort of analysis where it will make a significant impact - here it marks the point at which Agesilaos takes full and sole control of affairs. He is about to embark on accomplishing the second of the two objectives of his mission - the military campaign - apparently without Lysander. The conclusion of the first - the restoration of oligarchies in the cities, in which Lysander was especially interested - is not recorded, but its abandonment may, perhaps, be assumed from the rejection of the petitions of the oligarchs, which may indicate the true origin of the whole incident.



## CHAPTER 9

### The first campaign: recruiting of cavalry

There are unsatisfactory aspects in Xenophon's account of the events described here. He seems to have used a source at the subordinate command level, including an eye-witness account or official report in detail of a distant cavalry engagement, but some of his information may ultimately derive perhaps from Agesilaos himself, not necessarily more reliable. It is possible that the changes made by Plutarch were an attempt to make greater sense of what he read in Xenophon, and the areas of change contained real difficulties, even if the changes made only suggest where further interpretation is necessary.

Xenophon obscures the fact that he has left unexplained Agesilaos' reason for turning north. This seems to have puzzled Plutarch. His searches in Xenophon revealed a suggestion of deception and he used this as the motive. He seems to have seen a need for further motivation, and supplied it with φιλοτιμία, which, if restricted to the normal essential quality of a man of action and not exaggerated to excess, could be a valid interpretation in the circumstances. The restriction is necessary, because Agesilaos acted with appropriate discretion in not attacking Tissaphernes, though this raises the question of the reality of the expectations of the expedition: perhaps a new policy was formulated involving the northern border tribes.

Deception of this kind would have been appropriately credited by Xenophon and by Plutarch as a successful device for Agesilaos to use in extricating himself from a tight corner, but not as a means for afflicting harm on the enemy he was intending to destroy. Here Plutarch has used his interpretation with partial, though not complete, success, to improve understanding where Xenophon had drawn a veil.

1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ Τισσαφέρνης ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν φοβηθεὶς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἐποιήσατο σπονδάς, ὥς τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ τὰς Ἑλληνίδας ἀφήσοντος αὐτονόμους βασιλέως, ὕστερον δὲ πεισθεὶς ἔχειν δύναμιν ἱκανὴν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμον, ὅσμενος ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐδέξατο.

Having landed at Ephesos (c.7.1), Agesilaos' immediate Persian contact was with Tissaphernes, the satrap or governor with headquarters at Sardis but private residential estates in Karia, across the river Maiandros to the south. Tissaphernes had been appointed to be supreme commander in Asia Minor (Xen. *Hell.* III.i.3 and ii.13), and to recover the King of Persia's possessions in Asia Minor, following the end of Kyros' bid for the throne (see c.6). The task of collecting tribute from Athens' Ionian cities had much earlier been assigned by the King to Tissaphernes (Thuc. VIII.5; Xen. *Hell.* I.i.9), but they had revolted from him (Xen. *Anabasis* I.1) and then in 401 had risen with Kyros against the King. They now remained independent, having called on Sparta, the late Kyros' former ally, for support against Tissaphernes (S.Hornblower (1983) p.185).

Perhaps Plutarch has exaggerated in giving fear as Tissaphernes' reason for making the treaty with Agesilaos, retailing the hostile Greek view of the eastern character (Herodotos IX.122, Aristotle *Pol.* 1327b, Hippokrates *de Aer.* 12, 16, 24, and Isokrates IV.150-51). It appears from all the accounts that reports of the new Spartan expedition either had not come in time for Tissaphernes' preparations for defence to be completed, or were not acted upon until after its arrival. That Tissaphernes should immediately concede all that Sparta wanted - and without first consulting the King - seems unlikely. He is presented here with enhanced status of autonomy, perhaps to benefit that of Agesilaos. Xenophon reports Tissaphernes rather to have expected to obtain independence for the cities from the King, and to have violated his oath by asking him instead for reinforcements. However, if, as has been thought (D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.25, 80), Xenophon's digression on the Eleian War (*Hell.* III.2.21-31) has obscured the timing of the transfer of



command from Derkylidas to Agesilaos, Tissaphernes' consultations with the King were already in progress, having been started under his truce with Derkylidas. Since Derkylidas had undertaken to report the proposed settlement to Sparta, the dispatch of Agesilaos may have developed in part from this consultation, rather than only from Herodas' information. Agesilaos would have been bound by Derkylidas' truce, though he may have renewed or confirmed it.

Plutarch has not mentioned Tissaphernes' secret request for help from the King, but he has connected the declaration of war with the increased strength now available to him. He does not say specifically that Tissaphernes anticipated the ending of the truce, though this may be implied by the omission of any reference to its expiry, but there is a suggestion that the declaration reverses the promise of autonomy for the cities. Any one of these features would involve the perjury with which Tissaphernes is charged in Xenophon, but Plutarch's account seems to indicate a wish at this point to minimize it. No doubt Tissaphernes' report to the King would have asked for a decision about the cities' autonomy and at the same time for reinforcements, if he was to be required to refuse it, and this may not have constituted a breach of the truce (H.D.Westlake (1981) p.265). The arrival of reinforcements and the declaration of war indicate that the King's rejection of the proposal had now reached Tissaphernes, and that would end the truce.

That war should begin with a Persian aggressive initiative, even if it was perhaps only a bluff, is inconsistent with the propaganda of Agesilaos' visit to Aulis, which should rather have entailed Greek aggression, unless Agesilaos had in mind even then not a full-scale war on the King, but only the limited aim of liberating the Greek cities. The scale of the operation should be recognized at the start: it was not the full might of Persia that was immediately involved, any more than Agesilaos' force represented the full might of Greece. The King

had other affairs in his vast empire to attend to, including his especial pre-occupation with an independent Egypt (J.M.Cook 1962) pp.137, 140; D.M.Lewis (1977) pp.141-2), which now had an alliance with Sparta (Diodoros XIV.79.4). A border incident or a piratical raid would be nearer the truth from the Persian point of view: at any rate, one to be dealt with mainly by local resources. So far, the Spartan efforts under Thibron and his successor, Derkylidas, suffered from inadequate finance (H.D.Westlake (1981) p.259) and had achieved no permanent results before Agesilaos arrived. Xenophon seems to indicate the reality, in reporting stalemate resulting in a truce (*Hell.* III.ii.18-20).

Plutarch explains Agesilaos' delight with Tissaphernes' announcement, as if he had only now received an excuse for war. Xenophon uses the opportunity to bring out the contrast between Agesilaos' confidence in trusting the goodwill of the gods and the nervousness of the rest of the Spartans; Agesilaos receives the news *φαιδρῶ τῷ προσώπῳ* (see below on *φαιδρῶ*) and expresses his gratitude (*χόριν*) to Tissaphernes for putting the gods on the Greek side through his violation of his oath (*Hell.* III.iv.11, *Agesilaos* I.13). Plutarch has omitted the details which in Xenophon explain Agesilaos' reaction, and has recorded only the show of confidence, *τὸ εὐθυμον* (c.2), subsequently providing his own, different, explanation for it.

2 προσδοκία γὰρ ἦν μεγάλη τῆς στρατείας· καὶ δεινὸν ἠγεῖτο τοὺς μὲν σὺν Ξενοφῶντι μυρίους ἤκειν ἐπὶ θάλατταν, ὅσakis ἐβουλήθησαν αὐτοὶ τοσαυτάkis βασιλέα νενικηκότας, αὐτοῦ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ὄρχοντος ἡγουμένων γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης μηδὲν ἔργον ἄξιον μνήμης φανῆναι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

The pessimism expressed after the interruption of the sacrifice at Aulis (c.6) has been banished. Plutarch's explanation of Agesilaos' joy differs from the gratitude for Tissaphernes' alienation of the gods in Xenophon's account. He refers to Agesilaos' large expectations and to his thought of the danger that he might suffer from unfavourable comparison with Xenophon's success with the Ten Thousand. Here,



then, Plutarch portrays Agesilaos as again motivated by φιλοτιμία, as he displays a spirit of competitiveness, confidence, and optimism, despite having not long ago accepted a truce instead of taking the opportunity for immediate battle. Xenophon presents Agesilaos as a man who did not violate his oath, and valued the help and approval of the gods, though this does not necessarily prove him a religious man, for in the context he is responding pragmatically as the resourceful general, first, to the threat of the declaration of war if he did not depart from Asia and, next, to its immediate impact, the depressive effect on the Lakedaimonians, now beginning to think themselves an inferior force. Agesilaos, as presented by Xenophon, knew the means to restore the spirits of anxious troops, and considered the appeal to the favour of the gods to be an effective one, in the expectation that the men would believe that the gods were on their side, whether or not he believed this himself. Xenophon had made almost the same point in a speech to his men (*Anabasis* III.2).

The two portraits are, of course, not incompatible, but represent the divergent interests and approaches of the two authors at this point. On the one hand, in Plutarch, we have the moral character of Agesilaos, and on the other hand, in Xenophon, we have his military character. Plutarch is interested in motivation, and therefore attempts to penetrate the secret thoughts in Agesilaos' mind, while Xenophon, as a more practical man of action, is content here to record what is seen and heard. Xenophon's interest is in the qualities of a good general, especially in repairing deficiencies in his force (V.J.Gray (1979) p.188). The vocabularies of the two authors correspond to this difference, for the subjective ὁσμενος and ἠγεῖτο contrast with the objective παιδρῶ and ἐκέλευσεν. With the first pair, Plutarch records Agesilaos' inner, invisible, feelings, and the record may be true, but cannot be proved: the second pair, Xenophon's, was there for all to observe, but perhaps revealed nothing about the real inner feelings of the man, as opposed

to the outward, possibly cleverly feigned, appearance. It is especially significant for his methodology that Plutarch should have discarded, at a point like this, Xenophon's use of *φαιδρός*, which "is favoured" [by Plutarch] "in such emotional scenes, but normally of the encouraging commanders" (C.B.R.Pelling (1988) p.232). Plutarch's substitution of *ᾄσμενος* for Xenophon's *φαιδρῶ* confirms his present interest in the interpretation of Agesilaos' mind.

Agesilaos' rhetorical comparison with Xenophon's Ten Thousand, which is presented to the disadvantage of Xenophon, is understandably absent from Xenophon himself. It suits the rhetorical development of Agesilaos' argument well, but, as a motive for a military commander, it is inconsistent with the rational approach and the high value put on the lives of men attributed by Plutarch elsewhere to Agesilaos (cc.16, 17). It may have been introduced here from the stock of exercises for students in the schools of rhetoric; or it may have occurred to Plutarch as he used Xenophon as a source. Its form is that of a compendious comparison: the scornful reference to the large number of troops available to Xenophon, *τοὺς σὺν Ξενοφῶντι μυρίους*, omitting the quality of the leadership, is contrasted with a complimentary reference to his own powerful leadership, *αὐτοῦ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντος ἡγουμένων γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης*, omitting the smaller number of his troops. The claims are exaggerated, especially, on the one hand, in the conventional, all-inclusive polar expression, *γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης*, like *terra marique*, for the extent of the Spartan hegemony, even after Sparta's defeat of Athens in 404, and, on the other hand, in *ὁσάκις ἐβουλήθησαν αὐτοὶ τοσαυτάκις βασιλέα νενικηκότας*, for the achievements of the Ten Thousand. The exaggeration is in keeping with what Plutarch has already said of Agesilaos' character, and shows him to be light-hearted and cavalier in making favourable assessments of Greek superiority over Persia at this time, and, of course, it represents an encouraging thought to give to the troops. In mainland Greece, Sparta



was soon to be challenged in the Corinthian War, and while Agesilaos had crossed the Aegean unopposed, the report (c.6) of the building of a Persian fleet remained as a challenge still threatening for the future.

Xenophon's anecdote about resourcefulness in the face of the Spartiates' depression can readily be imagined to have been taken from Agesilaos' own repertoire or his diarist's, but the suspicion arises here that he has not penetrated to the true elucidation of Agesilaos' strategy. It would appear that Xenophon's account of these events, whatever his source, was designed to obscure the reality of Agesilaos' refusal of an immediate meeting with the enemy. His words led Plutarch to speak of Agesilaos' confident expectations. Plutarch was misled, perhaps because of the traditional, hostile judgement of Tissaphernes, and perhaps by a desire to moralize on his contempt for the gods. Nevertheless, Agesilaos was in Asia Minor for action, and his avoidance of it here needs explanation. If Plutarch had wished to excuse Agesilaos' postponement of action immediately on arrival, he could have credited him with discretion in not rushing into battle too soon, and with discounting the advantage of surprise. Similarly now, it would appear unwise for Agesilaos to have attacked the enemy, now more fully prepared, on unfavourable ground. Plutarch's discussion of a grand achievement is therefore appropriate as an explanation of Agesilaos' confidence in the face of the declaration of war, and the campaign in Phrygia, which he in fact chooses, also meets the requirement of wise and circumspect action which will damage the enemy.

In Xenophon, by contrast, the perceived requirement was for action against Tissaphernes, manifesting confidence in the support of the gods: yet Agesilaos does not choose to meet him. This is all the more surprising, since at Agesilaos I.10-12 Xenophon claims it as an achievement that Agesilaos has shown Tissaphernes to be a perjurer, not to be trusted, and has claimed it as a deliberate ploy, πῶτερ

πρᾶξις. Here is an early use of the terminology of the stratagem (Aristotle *NE* I.1.4: πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν τέχνην; E.L.Wheeler (1988) p.2), but Agesilaos could not have foreseen the outcome, and at *Hell.* III.iv.5 the initiative for the truce was Tissaphernes'. Plutarch was perhaps wise to ignore the ploy here, though he clearly recognized this quality in Agesilaos' generalship.

3 εὐθὺς οὖν ἀμυνόμενος ἀπάτη δικάζῃ τὴν Τισσαφέρνους ἐπιτορκίαν, ἐπέδειξεν ὡς ἐπὶ Κάρϊαν προάξων. ἐκεῖ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ βαρβάρου συναθροίσαντος, ὅρας εἰς Φρυγίαν ἐνέβαλε.

Plutarch has not used the word "perjury", until now, and he does not explain it at this point. There is an oxymoronic element in ἀπάτη δικάζῃ, "meeting Tissaphernes' perjury with a justifiable deception". Deception was acceptable as a virtue in a general, once war was being waged (cf. below and Xen. *Agesilaos* I.17). Indeed it was one of the chief qualifications for success (E.L.Wheeler (1988) pp.25-49) from Homer on, employed even by Zeus:

ἦδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή,  
πέμψαι ἐπ' Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι οὐλον Ὀνειρόν  
(*Iliad* II.5-6).

In contrast Tissaphernes' deception was unacceptable, regarded as perpetrated before the war had started, and, of course, while Tissaphernes had bound himself to the treaty by oath, Agesilaos had not sworn to go to Karia. In Xenophon's *Hellenika*, however, the first mention of deception is Agesilaos' fear that he may be deceived by Tissaphernes (ἐξαπατᾶσθαι III.iv.5), as he immediately is, but Agesilaos' surpassing of Tissaphernes, as it were in his own specialism (cf. *Anabasis* II.5), deception, was given prominence at *Agesilaos* I.17 (παῖδα ἀπέδειξε τὸν Τισσαφέρνην τῇ ἀπάτῃ). At *Hellenika* III.iv.11-12 Xenophon does not mention deception as part of Agesilaos' plan, which involved arranging not only for supplies to be available in the south, but also for troops, significantly from the north, to meet him at Ephesos,



though he did not wait for them there, and they eventually met him on the march, after he had set out towards Phrygia. When he gives Tissaphernes' grounds for expecting Karia to be invaded, Xenophon does not mention the announcement of Agesilaos' intentions, but records his two independent considerations, that Karian terrain was unsuited to cavalry, and that his own residence was there. He decided, therefore, that an invasion of Karia would be attractive to an army, like Agesilaos', deficient in cavalry, and would offer Agesilaos a chance of revenge for the deception over the truce. Only when he found that the enemy forces had been deployed there, did Agesilaos turn in the opposite direction (τάναντία ἀποστρέψας at *Hell.* III.iv.12; ἀντιστρέψας at *Agesilaos* I.16). Furthermore, Xenophon's reference to deception by Agesilaos comes only after the reduction of cities and the capture of booty - and only in *Agesilaos*. It is there, along with a reference to Agesilaos' generous treatment of his friends during the campaign, as proof of sound generalship once war had been declared, but deception is not said to have been in the original plan. At the start of the second campaign, when Xenophon attributes to Tissaphernes the thought (*Hell.* III.iv.21) that Agesilaos was wanting to deceive him again, and so indicates that he was misled before, too, it was not specifically by a trick that he was misled. These references to deception may have suggested to Plutarch a satisfying dramatic effect, which is important for his analysis of Agesilaos' character as a man able to exploit a situation to his own advantage. However, whether this deception by Agesilaos was deliberate and planned is open to doubt. Nepos makes Tissaphernes himself responsible for the wrong forecast of Agesilaos' intentions, and although his authority itself carries insufficient weight, his insight is here clearly compatible with Xenophon's account (*Agesilaos* 3). The stress on Agesilaos' intention to deceive seems to be Plutarch's.

4 καὶ πόλεις μὲν εἴλε συχνὰς καὶ χρημάτων ἀφθόνων ἐκυρίευσεν, ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς φίλοις ὅτι τὸ μὲν σπείσασθαι τῶν θεῶν ἐστὶ καταφρονεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παραλογίζεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους οὐ μόνον τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξα πολλή καὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς κερδαίνειν ἔνεστι.

The cities taken are not named or defined in importance, but they were evidently rich. Plutarch has given fewer details even than Xenophon, but has mentioned the main achievement of the campaign, the rich booty. He was more interested in drawing his moralizing conclusion that Agesilaos' piety and generalship were rewarded. Plutarch always seems wholehearted in his approval of Agesilaos as a soldier.

This sentence is clearly inspired by Xenophon's *Agesilaos* I.17, where Agesilaos' generalship is praised first: στρατηγικὸν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐδόκει διαπράξασθαι, and praise for the treatment of friends follows in a separate sentence: φρονίμως δὲ καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἐνταῦθα ἔδοξε πλουτίσαι. Xenophon's eulogizing becomes Plutarch's moralizing. The friends are made the recipients of guidance in both areas, and the guidance is exclusively moral. The two areas, however, are still quite distinct and the friends accordingly may be seen as two distinct groups. The moral about violation of a treaty is especially relevant to the Greeks and Persians in the cities of Ionia, while the qualities Agesilaos had displayed as a successful general provide an example for the τριάκοντα, the Spartiate advisers, to follow. At c.7, πρὸς τοὺς φίλους and at c.6, ἐπιθυμῶν . . . βοηθῆσαι τοῖς φίλοις, refer to friends in Asia Minor, but μετὰ τῶν φίλων at c.12 refers to the advisers: both senses are available. Chiefly, of course, the biographer's moralizing is intended for the reader, but, in Homeric fashion, it is presented within the literary context.

Plutarch now reveals more clearly his view of the nature of a general's use of deception. The verb used here, παραλογίζεσθαι, presents difficulties if it is taken as "cheat" or "reason falsely". Thucydides' similar phrase, τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον (I.78),



suggests "exploit the element of the unexpected". In this context, therefore, for Plutarch, deception by Agesilaos involves exploiting the element of surprise, as he explains to Nectanabis at c.38: αἱ γὰρ ἀπάνται τὸ παράδοξον ἐπάγουσι. Agesilaos simply did not do what Tissaphernes had indicated that he expected him to do.

5 τοῖς δὲ ἱππεῦσιν ἐλαττωθεῖς καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀλόβων φανέντων, ἀναχωρήσας εἰς Ἑφεσον ἱππικὸν συνῆγε, τοῖς εὐπόροις προειπὼν, εἰ μὴ βούλονται στρατεύεσθαι, παρασχεῖν ἕκαστον ἵππον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἄνδρα.

Xenophon neatly avoids mentioning this defeat in *Agesilaos* by using the phrase οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ φρυγίᾳ ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι διὰ τὴν φορναβάζου ἱππείαν, and for it Plutarch has therefore returned to the narrative of events in *Hellenika*, but he has enhanced its importance by omitting other details of the engagement, which in Xenophon involves only Agesilaos' scouts and an equal number of Persians (*Hell.* III.iv.13).

Plutarch, like Xenophon, who has ἄλοβα γίνεται τὰ ἱερά (*Hell.* III.iv.15), is interested in recording omens and signs. He implies that Agesilaos took serious note of them here, but he gives no overt clue to his own attitude, as he did after the episode at Aulis (c.6). The λοβός is frequently the lobe of the liver which was an important part of the sacrificial animal for the purpose of divination. In Homer, in the similar case of sacrifice, only perfect specimens were selected as victims: animals "ought to be without blemish" (*OCD* s.v. Sacrifice). Though this refers evidently to outward perfection, it is clear that missing parts of the victim would vitiate a sacrifice. Since extispicy involved the interpretation of colour, size, shape, and markings of vital organs, total absence of inner parts, besides precluding observation, would also be unfavourably interpreted.

Agesilaos clearly needed to call on wealthy men for the supply of cavalry, as was regular practice, but here, apparently knowing their reluctance and unsuitability, he used their wealth and influence to find

and equip more efficient substitutes; but most important of all, perhaps, he enforced prompt action by the threat of personal service if the substitute was not provided. The age of these wealthy people would also have to be taken into account, but the surface meaning of the edict suggests the threat of conscription at any age, though in the end Agesilaos seems clearly to have wanted to avoid having men who may not have been the most physically fit, one of the reasons to wish personally "to avoid military service". Certainly unwilling campaigners would not have added to the efficiency of Agesilaos' force, but if the horse has been provided, the rider may be drawn from the less wealthy citizens, and finding the recruit is part of the price of exemption to be paid by the rich man.

6 καὶ συνέβαινε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ ταχὺ πολλοὺς καὶ πολεμικοὺς ἔχειν ἱππεῖς ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀπλιτῶν. [ἐμισθοῦντο γὰρ οἱ μὴ βουλόμενοι στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς βουλομένους στρατεύεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ βουλόμενοι ἱππεύειν τοὺς βουλομένους ἱππεύειν.]

The verb ἐμισθοῦντο is not used at this point of the rich men by Xenophon, who has ὅστις παρέχοιτο ἵππον καὶ ὄπλα καὶ ἄνδρα δόκιμον. By choosing it, Plutarch shows that in his opinion they "were hiring" (Imperfect tense) mercenaries for Agesilaos. However, both Xenophon and Plutarch have made it clear that Agesilaos was at this point raising cavalry, but Plutarch - or someone else - has added that he obtained them ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀπλιτῶν. There is confusion here, for the choice is not between cavalry and infantry, since the perceived need was for cavalry alone. Agesilaos was of course neither recruiting infantry nor transforming existing infantry into cavalry, a transformation which would be neither quick nor simple - worthless hoplites are not likely to become warlike horsemen very readily. The phrase ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀπλιτῶν must therefore be considered dubious. It is clearly a contrived antithesis with πολεμικοὺς ἱππεῖς, which perhaps originated as a result of taking ἀποθανούμενον rather than ζητοίη to be qualified by προθύμως in Xenophon, who makes it clear, at *Hell.* III.iv.15



and *Agésilas* I.24, that the rich man eagerly finds a substitute for himself *who will risk his life*, serving presumably as a mercenary with equipment supplied by the beneficiary, not by *Agésilas*. Plutarch has not made explicit the distinction between willing and unwilling service, and it is not stated in the following sentence, ἐμισθοῦντο . . . ἱππεύειν, although it was worth stating. Here, another distinction is made, between στρατεύεσθαι and ἱππεύειν, as if the rich man would have made a feeble infantryman, and could avoid serving personally by contributing a willing cavalryman. There seems to be too limited an understanding on the part of Plutarch of the word στρατεύεσθαι in Xenophon (*Hell.* III.iv.15; *Agésilas* I.24), as meaning "serving as infantryman" rather than "taking part in the campaign", and, accordingly, the sentence ἐμισθοῦντο . . . ἱππεύειν was deleted by Sintenis (Teubner (1873-5)). Criticism may also be made on stylistic grounds of the clumsy sentence and clumsy thinking. In *Apophtheg. Lakon.* 12 (*Mor.* 209b) the sentence is wanting, which may suggest that it was not Plutarch's, but all these objections would be met by omitting ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀπλιτῶν and reading only:

καὶ συνέβαινε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ ταχὺ πολλοὺς καὶ πολεμικοὺς ἔχειν ἱππεῖς. ἐμισθοῦντο γὰρ οἱ μὴ βουλόμενοι στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς βουλομένους στρατεύεσθαι

or better, with Cobet:

καὶ συνέβαινε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ ταχὺ πολλοὺς καὶ πολεμικοὺς ἔχειν ἱππεῖς. ἐμισθοῦντο γὰρ οἱ μὴ βουλόμενοι στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς βουλομένους ἱππεύειν.

If Plutarch wrote this, the point he is making is that the substitutes were improving themselves socially, financially, and in service conditions, while the rich, giving the correct meaning to στρατεύεσθαι, avoided going on the campaign. This sentence also offers some explanation of πολεμικούς, which is helpful. There are two Homeric parallels in which the words κακός and δειλός may have suggested to the writer the phrase ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀπλιτῶν:

γνώση ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν  
ἦδ' ὅς κ' ἐσθλὸς ἔησι (*Iliad* II.365-6),

and ἐνθ' ὃ τε δειλὸς ἀνὴρ ὅς τ' ἄλκιμος ἐξεφάνθη  
(*Iliad* XIII.278).

Perhaps ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀηλιτῶν glossed Plutarch's πολεμικοὺς ἱππεῖς. It may have been Plutarch himself who misunderstood Xenophon in this way: or it may be a gloss on what Plutarch wrote. Again, the text may combine glosses, explaining πολεμικοὺς ἱππεῖς with ἀντὶ δειλῶν ὀηλιτῶν and then explaining that with the following sentence. Cobet's reading gives the required sense.

7 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιῆσαι καλῶς, ὅτι θήλειαν ἵππον ἀγαθὴν λαβὼν κακὸν ἄνδρα καὶ πλούσιον ἀπήλλαξε τῆς στρατείας.

The thought is not recorded by Xenophon. An example is drawn from literature to support an argument - Plutarch's argument, for Xenophon credits Agesilaos only with the efficient means (συντόμως πράττεσθαι) of raising cavalymen of approved ability (ἄνδρα δόκιμον). It is consistent with the interpretation of the text offered above that Plutarch had the parallel of Agamemnon again in mind, over the raising of cavalry and the unserviceable rich man freed from undertaking the expedition:

τὴν Ἀγαμέμνονι δῶκ' Ἀγχισιᾶδης Ἐχέπωλος  
δῶρ', ἵνα μὴ οἱ ἔποιθ' ὑπὸ Ἰλίων ἡνεμόεσαν  
(*Iliad* XXIII.296).

8 ἐπεὶ δὲ κελεύσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἀποδύοντες ἐπὶ πρᾶσκον οἱ λαφυροπῶλαι.

There is another anecdote about separating naked prisoners and their clothes, in which the general offers to his allies the choice of taking the one or the other as their share of the booty. The allies take the clothing, being the more valuable at first sight, but the slaves are sold more profitably later. Here the sale and the display of effeminate bodies are combined into a single event intended to strengthen the morale of Agesilaos' troops. At this point, Xenophon records how Agesilaos benefits his friends by allowing them to take



goods without paying until they have received a higher price later in a better market, and making sure that they are told where plunder is available. The one author commends τὸ φιλόνηθρον, the other, τὸ δημοτικόν and τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

Οὗτοι μὲν, εἶπεν, οἷς μάχεσθε, ταῦτα δ' ὑπὲρ ὧν μάχεσθε.

As in the other version of the anecdote, the clothes are regarded as the more valuable rewards. Here the low value of the men is not, for Agesilaos' purpose, in their saleability, but in their fighting qualities. The vendors of booty may not have obtained the best price for the slaves, in the circumstances of the sale imposed by Agesilaos. Plutarch frequently ends an anecdote with direct speech. Here ἡ ἰλαρότης has been displayed by Agesilaos (c.2).

On the proposed Karian expedition, see Endnote 2.

## CHAPTER 10

### The campaign against Tissaphernes

At the centre of this chapter are the succession of Tithraustes and the execution of Tissaphernes. On either side are two campaigns, one to Lydia, which includes the Battle of Sardis, and one to Phrygia, which is continued in the following chapters. The account of the second of these campaigns begins with the appointment of Agesilaos as commander of both land and sea forces.

1     Καιροῦ δ' ὄντος αὖθις ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν, προεῖπεν εἰς Λυδίαν ἀπάξειν, οὐκέτι ψευδόμενος ἐνταῦθα τὸν Τισσαφέρνην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἑαυτὸν ἐξηπάτησε, διὰ τὴν ἔμπροσθεν ἀπάτην ἀπιστῶν τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ, καὶ νῦν γοῦν αὐτὸν ᾤψεσθαι τῆς Καρίας νομίζων, οὔσης δυσίηπου, πολὺ τῷ ἰηπικῷ λειπόμενον.

The first campaign, in Lydia, is given in a straightforward narrative and bears some resemblance to the campaign of 396, as regards deception and plundering activity. Plutarch presents a second deception of Tissaphernes, this time by his own misjudgement of Agesilaos' plans. In Xenophon's accounts, too, at *Hell.* III.iv.21 and *Agesilaos* I.29, Tissaphernes attributes to Agesilaos an intention to deceive him again, which leads him to defend Karia as before. Plutarch's phrases, οὐκέτι ψευδόμενος and διὰ τὴν ἔμπροσθεν ἀπάτην, here clearly imply Agesilaos' previous deception. The strategic considerations given by Xenophon that led Tissaphernes to his decision to defend Karia in 396, but ignored then by Plutarch, are now introduced here. There, Tissaphernes was, of course, being made to respond only to Agesilaos' deceptive announcement: here, he deceives himself by his own reasoning. The argument was more relevant before the cavalry Agesilaos had started with had been augmented at Ephesos, but the Persian advantage in cavalry was not greatly affected, as indicated below, and by Xenophon:

τοὺς μὲν δὴ ἰηπέας ἐδέξαντο οἱ Πέρσαι (*Hell.* III.iv.24).

However, it is again to the north that Agesilaos went, though for other



reasons, which Plutarch does not mention: to prepare his troops physically and mentally for the fighting. It seems that because the source, Xenophon, was not considered to have given a satisfactory explanation for Agesilaos' decision and subsequent movement to the north, delaying the positive business of the mission, Plutarch has provided an explanation derived from Tissaphernes' own thoughts, including the double deception.

2 ἐπεὶ δ', ὥς προεῖπεν, ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἦκεν εἰς τὸ περὶ Σόρδεις πεδίον, ἡναγκάζετο κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐκεῖθεν αὖ βοηθεῖν ὁ Τισσαφέρνης· καὶ τῇ ἱππῶ διεξελαύνων διέφθειρε πολλοὺς τῶν ἀτάκτως τὸ πεδίον πορθούντων.

Plutarch has represented Xenophon's location, though he has not used either of Xenophon's less precise phrases, the first, ἐπὶ τὸ κράτιστα τῆς χώρας, expressing Agesilaos' announced destination, the second, εἰς τὸν Σαρδιανὸν τόπον, used when he invaded (*Hell.* III.20 and 21). At *Agesilaos* I.33, it was only after the battle that Agesilaos ἦγεν ἐπὶ Σόρδεις, plundering the area around the city. Plutarch has assumed that Tissaphernes was with the army in Karia, and has made it clear that the Persian cavalry now arrived in advance of the Persian infantry, still able to exploit its advantage, even over Agesilaos' enlarged squadrons. The compound verb's prefix, διό-, perhaps suggests a ride over the plain before reaching and attacking Agesilaos' plunderers, described by Xenophon as scattered εἰς ὀρηγὰν over the area (*Hell.* III.iv 22). It was for the purpose of plunder, and for the physical and mental preparation of the troops for combat, that this area was chosen by Agesilaos, according to Xenophon. No indication is given of further objectives.

3 ἐννοήσας οὖν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ὅτι τοῖς πολεμίοις οὕτω πάρεστι τὸ πεζόν, αὐτῷ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν ἄπεστιν, ἔσπευσε διαγωνίσασθαι. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἱππεῦσιν ἀναμίξας τὸ πελταστικόν, ἐλαύνειν ἐκέλευσεν ὥς τάχιστα καὶ προσβάλλειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, αὐτὸς δ' εὐθὺς τοὺς ὀηλίτας ἐπῆγε.

In Plutarch's brief account the Battle of Sardis was fought by Agesilaos, as Xenophon says, in order to take advantage of the

opportunity presented unexpectedly by the division of the enemy cavalry from the infantry, whereas Diodoros describes a premeditated engagement involving an ambush (XIV.80.2). Plutarch is not concerned with details of the fighting, and the episode is therefore treated here separately (see Endnote 3). He is concerned with Agesilaos' generalship and the final result of the incident, and concentrates on the successful management of the Greek forces. His use of the aorist participle seems to imply an act of thought at a lookout position on higher ground. Xenophon has four verbs of perception in the passage, the visual *κατιδόντες* and *ὥς εἶδον* of the Persians, when they sighted the Greek marauders on the plain and the arrival of their relief force, and, of Agesilaos, *αἰσθόμενος* and *γινώσκων*, denoting less visual perception, perhaps the receipt of reports of the killing of those marauders and the absence of Persian infantry. Plutarch uses direct narrative, *ἠναγκάζετο*, *διέφθειρε*, for the Persian movements, retaining only Agesilaos' mental perception of the absence of the Persian infantry, which determined his next action. Whereas Xenophon has presented both leaders' responses to perceptions, Plutarch has highlighted only Agesilaos' more inspired act of military analysis. Clearly the wish to take advantage of the absence of Persian infantry was sound, but in this case a victory could hardly be decisive, and therefore *διαγωνίσασθαι*, "decide a contest", may be too strong a word.

The well-known tombstone of Flavinus, standard bearer in the *ala Petriana*, now in Hexham Abbey (I.A.Richmond (1951) p.72; cf. p.198), apparently showing an infantryman attacking a cavalryman from below, suggests that a force that is wholly cavalry is vulnerable to determined infantry opposition, as at Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.5, where the Thessalians turned back, *νομίσαντες οὐκ ἐν καλῷ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἱππομαχεῖν*, and even more so to a mixed force such as this (J.K.Anderson (1974) p.51). If this phrase represents Plutarch's conflation of Xenophon's detailed account of the separate engagement of



units, τὴν φάλαγγα, τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἥβης, τοῖς πελτασταῖς, τοῖς ἵππεῦσιν and παντὸς τοῦ στρατεύματος, then it should not be taken as evidence of innovatory tactics. The hoplites would no doubt occupy ground won by the mixed force, and deal with wounded and unhorsed cavalymen left behind.

4 γενομένης δὲ τροπῆς τῶν βαρβάρων, ἐπακολουθήσαντες οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔλαβον τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ πολλοὺς ἀνείλον.

The capture of a camp is a feature common to all the accounts of the "Battle of Sardis", but there is no evidence to show where this camp was, or whether it was a temporary base or a permanent part of the defences of Sardis. Plutarch, like Xenophon, gives the impression that Agesilaos won a great victory.

5 ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μάχης οὐ μόνον ὑπῆρξεν αὐτοῖς ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν ἄδεῶς τὴν βασιλέως χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκην ἐπιδεῖν Τισσαφέρνην διδόντα, μοχθηρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τῷ γένει τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπεχθέστατον.

The interference experienced up to this point by Agesilaos had been from Persian cavalry, and this would continue to be the main source of danger to plunderers. Consequently even the modest success achieved in this engagement had significant value for the limited activities that Agesilaos was immediately engaged in now. A direct assault on the city of Sardis would be very different, for the massive hills east and west would provide impregnable refuge for long-term defenders.

The Oxyrhynchos Historian (XII) records three days of plundering around Sardis, followed by a march through the mountains that divided Lydia and Phrygia, to the plain of the River Maiandros, the further march intended being abandoned because of unfavourable sacrifices (cf. Diod. XIV.80.5). A glance at a map suggests that Agesilaos may possibly have been exploring a route through Karia to the Persian fleet base in the south, turning back on finding the difficulties too great. Anderson (1974) p.28, notes: "By conquering Caria, Agesilaos would

have deprived the Persian fleet of a base for the invasion of the Aegean", but he does not make the link on p.53. The Spartan naval base at Rhodes was now in the hands of Konon (Diodoros XIV.79.4-7; *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* X.1), and the appointment of Agesilaos as naval commander may indicate a long-term plan for operations south of the Maiandros. Until the new Spartan fleet was ready, operations would continue in the north. (Cf. Diodoros XIV.79.3; Xen. *Hell.* III.iv.29.) That Xenophon has omitted this march indicates his selective method, or that of his source, and it has been suggested that the reason for the omission was the lack of positive results from the march, which he may have wished to obscure (J.K.Anderson (1974) p.53). Nevertheless, both Plutarch and Xenophon attach great importance to the results of the victory at Sardis, linking it with the punishment of Tissaphernes by the King. For Plutarch it is a proper payment for his deception of Agesilaos and his hostility towards the Greeks of Asia Minor, which has earned him condemnation as *μοχθηρόν ἄνδρα*, following Xenophon's claim at *Agesilaos* I.10-12 that it was Agesilaos' *πρώτη πρᾶξις* to have revealed him as *ἐπίορκον*. This description may be based also on the seizure by Tissaphernes of the Greek generals of the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anabasis* II.5) and his prolonged efforts to recover the Ionian cities, rather than "a maliciously prejudiced tradition" (H.D.Westlake (1981) p.277): he may have suffered by contrast with Xenophon's more generous portraits of Kyros and Pharnabazos.

6 ἔπεμψε γὰρ εὐθέως ὁ βασιλεὺς Τιθραύστην ἐπ' αὐτόν, δς ἐκείνου μὲν τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπέτεμε, τὸν δ' Ἀγησίλαον ἡξίου διαλυσάμενον ἀποπλεῖν οἴκαδε, καὶ χρήματα διδοὺς αὐτῷ προσέπεμψεν. 7 ὁ δὲ τῆς μὲν εἰρήνης ἔφη τὴν πόλιν εἶναι κυρίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ πλουτίζων τοὺς στρατιώτας ἡδεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλουτῶν αὐτός· καὶ ἄλλως γε μέντοι νομίζειν Ἕλληνας καλὸν οὐ δῶρα λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ λάφυρα παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων.

The severe penalty for Tissaphernes' apparently minor defeat is here not thought inappropriate in the Persian monarchy. The timing, however, is confused, for if the execution was a punishment for the defeat, it cannot have been carried out immediately, as Xenophon



implies (*Hell.* III.iv.25) and as Plutarch's εὐθέως suggests, and at *Agesilaos* I.33-4 Xenophon indicates an interval before the execution. The King, however, may have held him responsible for the larger failure to stop the Spartan intervention in Asia Minor (H.D.Westlake (1981) p.270), and according to Diodoros, Kyros' mother, Parysatis, had now persuaded the King to avenge her son's death, for which she blamed his long-standing rival (Diodoros XIV.80.6). Plans for the succession of Tithraustes have been assumed to have been already made, perhaps at the further instigation of Pharnabazos, to whose satrapy Agesilaos' marauders had earlier been diverted (H.D.Westlake (1981) p.272), but if the King had approved the reinforcements that Tissaphernes had received, the plans may have been contingent upon the military outcome. Information about decisions of the King's advisers is not readily available. The interval will have been occupied by Agesilaos in the further operations mentioned above.

The victory is enhanced by the suggested modification of the King's earlier decision refusing any negotiation on autonomy which had presumably been communicated to Tissaphernes before he declared war (c.9; *Xen. Hell.* III.4.11). διαλυσόμενον is not in Xenophon, but even he allows that the victory in the battle of Sardis had not been decisive for the major issue of the status of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, and had no influence on the King's terms. In *Hellenika*, the offer of money is separated by Agesilaos' refusal of it from Tithraustes' demand for the recognition of the King's right to tribute, and the money is given to encourage him to transfer his activity to Pharnabazos' satrapy. Money and booty were no doubt now among Agesilaos' prime objectives, and Plutarch draws a moral from his refusal of this offer, illustrating the Spartans' lack of interest in private wealth, and the Greeks' preference for booty rather than gifts, which presumably stems from the imposition of terms, to which the seizure by force was not subject. Money from the same people had, however, been acceptable to the

Spartans of the fifth century, both in peacetime and as allies in war.

8 ὅμως δὲ τῷ Τιθραύστῃ χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος, ὅτι τὸν κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν Ἑλλήνων ἐτετιμώρητο Τισσαφέρνην, μετήγαγεν εἰς Φρυγίαν τὸ στράτευμα, λαβὼν ἐφόδιον παρ' αὐτοῦ τριάκοντα τάλαντα.

Plutarch continues to enhance the results of the battle. The phrase κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν seems to replace Xenophon's καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν σὸν ἐχθρον τετιμώρημαι (*Hell.* III.iv.26), which links Agesilaos and Tithraustes against both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, in a different sense of common foe. Agesilaos would wish, perhaps in the light of Spithridates' intelligence, to exploit the rivalry between the King's servants. He was also ready to move on to Pharnabazos' province, where Spithridates' local knowledge would be useful, having already completed the plundering of the Sardis area. Agesilaos here accepts the second offer of money on different terms, money for provisions on his journey, associated with Tithraustes' request for a favour, to which he can respond with dignity.

9 καὶ καθ' ὁδὸν ὧν σκυτάλην δέχεται παρὰ τῶν οἴκοι τελῶν κελεύουσιν αὐτὸν ὀρχεῖν ὅμα καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ.

This device has been described as a simple code using a dispatch-roll wound round a standard staff so that what was written across the joins could now be read (*Lys.* 19; Apollonius of Rhodes in *Athenaeus* 451d). If it is not a reference to the message itself rather than the material it was written on, there seems to be a better explanation of the security value, if it consisted of a stick whose broken end matches that of its pair already in the possession of the recipient, who may have brought several with him from home. Otherwise, it may have been notched as an *aide mémoire* for an oral message (S.West (1988) pp.42-7).

The unified command by land and sea perhaps indicates that Sparta had realized that decisive action in the circumstances could not be expected on land alone. However, it was clearly necessary to have



an admiral appointed for the fleet separately, but since he was to be under Agesilaos' supreme command, he would be carrying out the single policy. The instruction in Xenophon is "to exercise command and appoint an admiral":

ὄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ὅπως γινώσκει καὶ καταστήσασθαι ναύαρχον ὅντινα αὐτὸς βούλοιτο (*Hell.* III.iv.27).

τοῦτο μόνω πάντων ὑπῆρξεν Ἀγησιλάω. 10 καὶ μέγιστος μὲν ἦν ὁμολογουμένως καὶ τῶν τότε ζώντων ἐπιφανέστατος, ὡς εἴρηκε που καὶ Θεόπομπος.

Theopompos is quoted for reports of both favourable and unfavourable comments on Agesilaos (cc.31, 32, 33). Plutarch has, perhaps, improved on, but not quoted, Xenophon's assessment of Agesilaos at *Agesilaos* I.36, which is linked with the expectation of a campaign of conquest, prevented by the order to return home.

11 τότε δὲ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ καταστήσας ὄρχοντα Πείσανδρον ὁμορτεῖν ἔδοξεν, ὅτι πρεσβυτέρων καὶ φρονιμωτέρων παρόντων οὐ σκεψάμενος τὸ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκειότητα τιμῶν καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ χαριζόμενος, ἥς ἀδελφὸς ἦν ὁ Πείσανδρος, ἐκείνῳ παρέδωκε τὴν ναυαρχίαν.

The appointment of a relative had the advantages of a known character, a socially acceptable background and the expectation of freedom from rivalry or treachery. Xenophon mentions that a united command gives strength and efficiency - and reports the building of triremes (*Hell.* III.iv.27). Peisander is reported by Diodoros (XIV.83) to have died fighting bravely in the battle of Knidos and the criticism of the appointment seems unjust. Xenophon comments with a mixture of compliment and mild criticism:

Πείσανδρον δὲ τὸν τῆς γυναικὸς ἀδελφὸν ναύαρχον κατέστησε, φιλότιμον μὲν καὶ ἐρρωμένον τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀπειρότερον δὲ τοῦ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὥς δεῖ (*Hell.* III.iv.29).

This is not the only case of the appointment of a relative. There is another, highly successful, related nominee, Teleutias, at c.21. Plutarch follows Xenophon but adds the interpretation of Agesilaos' mind, taking the opportunity to repeat the strong sense of family already mentioned at c.4. Nevertheless, the comment on the disregard of the interests of

Sparta draws attention to a contradiction with what Agesilaos will later be seen to maintain as a principle of paramount importance (cc.23ff.).



**PART FOUR**

**DIPLOMACY IN ASIA MINOR**

**(Chapters 11-15)**

## CHAPTER 11

### The influence of personal relationships

The chapter is one of the longest in this *Life*. Agesilaos plunders successfully and wins the friendship of the Paphlagonian king, but these events seem to serve mainly to introduce the character study in the latter part of the chapter. Its length suggests its importance for Plutarch, though it consists almost entirely of his own interpretation of his reading of Xenophon.

1 Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν στρατὸν καταστήσας εἰς τὴν ὑπὸ Φαρναβάζῳ τεταγμένην χώραν, οὐ μόνον ἐν ὁφθόνοις διῆγε πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρήματα συνῆγε πολλά.

Plutarch resumes from c.10.8, now naming Pharnabazos but not the province, thus continuing the personal element involved in the rivalry between the satrapies, and in the favour Agesilaos had done Tithraustes. One aspect of Agesilaos' activity here is the procuring of money and provisions for the winter season: another aspect, the damage to Pharnabazos' territory, is not mentioned. No doubt the money would be required for the new fleet, among other things. After this summary account, Plutarch moves quickly on to the affair of Kotys.

καὶ προελθὼν ἄχρι Παφλαγονίας προσηγάγετο τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Παφλαγόνων Κότυν, ἐπιθυμήσαντα τῆς φιλίας αὐτοῦ δι' ἄρετὴν καὶ πίστιν.  
2 ὁ δὲ Σπιθριδάτης, ὡς ἀποστὰς τοῦ Φαρναβάζου τὸ πρῶτον ἦλθε πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον, αἰεὶ συναπεδήμει καὶ συνεστράτευεν αὐτῷ.

Plutarch will have found that Xenophon illustrated Agesilaos' trustworthiness with Kotys' confident (πιστεύσας) entry into his camp to make the alliance (*Agesilaos* III.2-4), but he does not repeat Xenophon's statement that Kotys' motivation was a quarrel he had had with the King. The area, in the north of Asia Minor, was familiar to Xenophon and the veterans of Kyros' expedition still with the Spartans now. It constitutes the hinterland of some of the Greek colonies on the southern shore of the Euxine, and also lies between Pharnabazos'



Daskyleion and more Greek colonies beyond the Halys. The existence of a power friendly to Sparta in this area would further the implementation of Spartan hegemony in mainland Greece by establishing control over the lines of communication with Asia Minor (S.Hornblower (1983) p.185; S.Perlman (1964) pp.76-7, 81). Agesilaos' policy concerning relations with peoples in the area now has a different purpose: τοῦ ἀφιστάναι τι ἔθνος ἀπὸ βασιλέως (Xen. *Hell.* IV.1.2). Whereas Spithridates was detached from Pharnabazos and remained with Agesilaos on campaign, Kotys is also detached, but he stays in his province with an agreed change of loyalty. News of this would add to the determination of the opponents of Sparta to prosecute the war in Greece, and that would lead to the recall of Agesilaos. Here, Plutarch gives personal, not political, motivation. Personality may have counted, as when Lysander's financial arrangement with Kyros was not passed on to his successor, Kallikratidas, in 407, though a change of Spartan policy is there also a possible reason, if Kallikratidas planned to reconcile the Greek states and oppose Persian intervention (*Lysander* VI).

κάλλιστον υἱὸν μὲν ἔχων, Μεγαβάτην, οὗ παιδὸς ὄντος ἦρα Ἀγησίλαος, καλὴν δὲ καὶ θυγατέρα παρθένον ἐν ἡλικίᾳ γάμου. 3 ταύτην ἔπεισε γῆμαι τὸν Κότυν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος.

Plutarch did not give details of Spithridates' movements and family in c.8. He gives them now, where they are relevant to the diplomacy. Xenophon, however, gave those details when Lysander's mission was completed, and now (*Hell.* IV.i.1) tells that it was on Spithridates' suggestion that Agesilaos had gone to Paphlagonia. It is Spithridates' actions that eventually allow Plutarch to introduce the chapter's main purpose, the character study of Agesilaos. The superlative κάλλιστον attached to υἱόν indicates where the interest lies for Plutarch. This aspect of character attributed to Agesilaos has been discussed above (see c.2), and is continued at the end of this chapter.

Xenophon is here concerned with the marriageable daughter: τοῦτου μέν φασι τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτῷ καλλίονα εἶναι (*Hell.* IV.i.6). What age Plutarch had in mind for a Persian bride is not known, and in the absence of birth certificates precise ages are not to be pressed. Xenophon's statement (*Agesilaos* III.4) that Pharnabazos was negotiating a marriage with the King's daughter, and wished to take Spithridates' daughter without marrying her, has apparently been taken as an indication that she was of marriageable age. Spartan practice is not precisely known, for Plutarch (*Lyk.* 15.4) merely describes Spartan brides as οὐ μικρὰς οὐδ' ὠρούς πρὸς γάμον, ἀλλ' [καὶ] ἀκμαζούσας καὶ πεπείρους. In Xenophon's *Oikonomikos* (III.13), when Kritoboulos was asked by Socrates: Ἐγνημας δὲ αὐτὴν παῖδα νέαν μάλιστα; he agreed that he married her as a child, while at VII.5, Ischomachos, thought to represent Xenophon himself and introduced as καλὸς τε κάγαθος ἀνὴρ, announced that his bride was fourteen: ἡ ἔτη μὲν οὐπω πεντεκαίδεκα γεγονυῖα ἦλθε πρὸς ἐμέ. The bride's age is said to be twelve in the Law of Gortyn 12.17-19 (D.M.MacDowell (1986) p.73).

Plutarch's sustained emphasis on personality is a departure from Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.i.1), who here gives a political interpretation of motivation. He points out that Otys (not Kotys) had refused a summons from the King, which suited Agesilaos, who wanted "to win some nation away from the Persian King". The proposed marriage cements the anti-Pharnabazos alliance. Xenophon also makes more of a romance out of the marriage proposal, although after Agesilaos had ordered a trireme to fetch the girl, he set off for Daskyleion without waiting for the arrival of the ship and the completion of the marriage proceedings. However, Xenophon is also illustrating Agesilaos' personality. He uses an elaborate structure of dialogue to portray the persuasive talent of Agesilaos, as, by subtle coercion, he makes Otys believe that the marriage would be in his own interest (V.J.Gray (1981) pp.321-34). Plutarch freely adapts, completing the marriage (not recorded by



Xenophon) in seven words.

καὶ λαβὼν παρ' αὐτοῦ χιλίους ἵππεῖς καὶ δισχιλίους πελταστὰς οὓθις ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Φρυγίαν, καὶ κακῶς ἐποίει τὴν Φαρναβάζου χώραν, οὐχ ὑπομένοντος οὐδὲ πιστεύοντος τοῖς ἐρύμασιν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀεὶ τὰ πλεῖστα σὺν ἑαυτῷ τῶν τιμίων καὶ ἀγαπητῶν ἐξεχώρει καὶ ὑπέφευγεν, ἄλλοτε ἀλλαχόσε τῆς χώρας μεθιδρυόμενος.

Xenophon presents the offer to arrange the marriage as a mark of gratitude for the 1,000 horsemen and the 2,000 peltasts that Spithridates had already persuaded Otys to leave for Agesilaos. Plutarch reverses the order by making the receipt of the troops a conclusion of the arrangement. In the tradition represented by the Oxyrhynchos Historian the troops are sent after the departure of Agesilaos (XXII; I.A.F.Bruce (1967) p.144), and this may have influenced Plutarch, although the marriage is not mentioned in the broken text. In Plutarch's narrative the marriage leads directly to the reinforcements, bringing him rapidly to the important opportunity for his moralizing in the second half of the chapter, after the departure of Spithridates.

Plutarch exaggerates the value of the furnishings in Xenophon's list, which explicitly says that it did not contain an extraordinary amount of baggage for Pharnabazos to have with him:

πολλὰ μὲν ἐκπώματα καὶ ἄλλα δὴ οἷα Φαρναβάζου κτήματα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκεύη πολλὰ καὶ ὑποζύγια σκευοφόρα (*Hell.* IV.1.24).

However, the Oxyrhynchos Historian records silver and gold stored at Daskyleion, and the dispatch of Agesilaos' valuable booty by sea to the region of Kyzikos (XXII). Plutarch's interpretation of the motive for Pharnabazos' movements brings forward the information contained later in Xenophon's episode (*Hell.* IV.i.20), where Pharnabazos is said to be encamped about 160 stadia (18.5 miles = 29.5 km.) away, with valuable possessions.

Xenophon tells that Agesilaos went to Daskyleion, where Pharnabazos' palace was situated, and ravaged the abundant stores in

the surrounding villages during his winter stay there, implying the absence of Pharnabazos from the palace, though he does not say that Agesilaos occupied it. According to Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.i.17), Pharnabazos was in the vicinity for part of the time at least, for he surprised Agesilaos' marauders in a damaging encounter with his cavalry before the successful attack on the Persians encamped in the village of Kaue. The soldiers were

"getting their provisions in disdainful and careless fashion, when Pharnabazos came upon them, scattered as they were over the plain, with two scythe-bearing chariots (ἄρματα μὲν ἔχων δύο δρεπανηφόρα) and about four hundred horsemen".

The 700 Greeks who assembled themselves were dispersed by a charge and 100 were struck down, while the rest fled to the protection of Agesilaos' hoplites nearby. It is interesting, and perhaps relevant to the battle of Sardis, to note the scale of the sort of engagement that Xenophon was prepared to record here, and, of course, that he was willing to record this setback, too, which Plutarch omits.

μέχρι οὗ παραφυλάξας αὐτὸν ὁ Σπιθριδάτης καὶ παραλαβὼν Ἑριππίδαν τὸν Σπαρτιάτην ἔλαβε τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπάντων ἐκράτησεν.

The details given of this seizure may usefully indicate that the scale of booty captured in the camp mentioned in the battle of Sardis was really modest by comparison.

4 ἔνθα δὴ πικρὸς ὦν ὁ Ἑριππίδας ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀναγκάζων ἀποτίθασθαι, καὶ πάντ' ἐφορῶν καὶ διερευνώμενος, παρώξυνε τὸν Σπιθριδάτην, ὥστε ἀπελθεῖν εὐθὺς εἰς Σάρδεις μετὰ τῶν Παφλαγόνων.

This personal scrutiny is not in Xenophon's account, which seems to present an unusual case only because the collection of booty by non-Greeks was being made subject to normal Spartan supervision of what was regarded as state property. However, self-enrichment was no doubt one of Spithridates' objectives in joining Agesilaos, and that he was likely regularly to be deprived of this expectation may have been



a sufficient reason for his departure. Xenophon says also that he went off to Ariaaios in Sardis because "he too had revolted from the King", which suggests that Spithridates was looking for the best connection to secure his long-term ambitions, and protection against reprisals by Pharnabazos. Plutarch's description of the departure is more brief, and so more dramatic and sudden than Xenophon's:

ἐκεῖνοι μέντοι ταῦτα παθόντες οὐκ ἤνεγκαν, ἀλλ' ὥς ὀδικοιθέντες καὶ ἀτιμασθέντες νυκτὸς συσκευασόμενοι ᾤχοντο ἀπιόντες εἰς Σάρδεις πρὸς Ἀριαῖον (*Hell.* IV.i.27).

5 τοῦτο λέγεται τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ γενέσθαι πάντων ἀνιαρότατον. ἤχθετο μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρα γενναῖον ἀποβεβληκῶς τὸν Σπιθριδάτην καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ δύναμιν οὐκ ὀλίγην, ἡσχύνετο δὲ τῇ διαβολῇ τῆς μικρολογίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας.

Plutarch first stresses the loss of both the man and the force, and also the damage done to the reputation of Sparta, reserving the boy for the next sentence. At *Hell.* IV.i.28 Xenophon is more restrained, and gives only a concise list of the three names, Spithridates, Megabates and the Paphlagonians, his one reference to the incident, before proceeding to the meeting with Pharnabazos:

Ἀγησιλάῳ μὲν δὴ τῆς ἀπολείψεως τοῦ Σπιθριδάτου καὶ τοῦ Μεγαβάτου καὶ τῶν Παφλαγόνων οὐδὲν ἐγένετο βαρύτερον ἐν τῇ στρατείᾳ.

In *Agesilaos* he omits this departure of Spithridates from the narrative in his first chapter, and also from the tribute to Agesilaos' control of his affections in the fifth chapter, on which Plutarch's account is clearly based. Part of Agesilaos' annoyance will also have been that the deprivation of the Paphlagonians of their reward will have offended their king, Kotys, too, with consequences for his allegiance. λέγεται may serve not to indicate a changed source at this point, but perhaps to prepare for the transfer of the focus of attention away from straightforward observation of external activities, towards the more difficult analysis of inner feelings, a process which is completed immediately in the opening phrase of the next sentence.

6 χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ἐμφανῶν τούτων ἔκνιζεν αὐτὸν οὐ μετρίως ὁ τοῦ παιδὸς ἔρως ἐνεσταγμένος, εἰ καὶ πάνυ παρόντος αὐτοῦ τῷ φιλονίκῳ χρώμενος ἐπειρᾶτο νεανικῶς ἀπομάχεσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. 7 καί ποτε τοῦ Μεγαβάτου προσιόντος ὥς ἀσπασομένου καὶ φιλήσοντος ἐξέκλινεν.

This is one of the areas where evidence cannot be easily corroborated, yet exploration of the landscape of the mind is a legitimate concern for the biographer. Modern biography has the advantage of letters and diaries (G. Lytton Strachey, *Eminent Victorians*); Robert Graves', *I, Claudius*, and M. Yourcenar's, *Memoirs of Hadrian*, are psychological novels using a variety of sources. An element of fiction is inevitable in such attempts to reconstruct, from fragments of the record, a continuous narrative of a lifetime occupying a few pages. Their concern is also "to identify the real personality behind the public persona", and it is said that, by contrast, Plutarch's "viewpoint is highly evaluative and "character-centred" (C.Gill (1983) pp.471-3). However, here, perhaps untypically, Plutarch attempts an equally difficult re-creation of Agesilaos' feelings and motivation, constructed from his recorded actions. His venture anticipates, on a small scale, the modern aims, methods, and achievements. He marks the movement in his interest with a reference to the visible antecedents, as if to persuade the reader that the following account of Agesilaos' feelings is on the same level of reality as his visual perceptions.

Xenophon makes no mention of the subject at *Hell.* III.iv.10, where he introduces Megabates only as the son of Spithridates without naming him, and later in *Hellenika* names him only at his departure, without detailing the distress this caused (IV.i.28). He describes the relationship, not in the narrative context of *Agesilaos* I, but when he comes to illustrate Agesilaos' control of affections in the list of his virtues (V.4). Xenophon makes it clear that Agesilaos was faced with a form of greeting from Megabates that merely followed the Persian custom (ἐπιχωρίου ὄντος τοῖς Πέρσαις φιλεῖν οὕς ἄν τιμῶσιν), and yet "struggled with all his might" to avoid being kissed. The affront to



the young man, which was no doubt potentially diplomatic as well as personal, though presented only as the latter, was later recognised by Agesilaos, and he tried to rectify his mistake with the request that Megabates should show his respect (τιμᾶν) to him again, though he insisted that it should not involve the kiss in future.

The formal "diplomatic" or friendly kiss in the Middle East and elsewhere at the present time passes without comment, but Agesilaos seems to indicate that among the Spartans it represented a demonstration of an unacceptable relationship. That there was indeed a risk of criticism for homosexuality, which Agesilaos, or Xenophon on his behalf, would wish to avoid, is indicated by the Oxyrhynchos Historian, who, having described Megabates as νέον ὄντα καὶ καλόν, suggests that Agesilaos accepted the friendship of Spithridates μάλιστα μὲν ἔνεκα τοῦ μετροκίου (XXI). For Xenophon, too, for whom Agesilaos' innocence was paramount, even the acceptance of this greeting was too much for anyone to see. Once a kiss had been attempted in public, Agesilaos was vulnerable to criticism. A mere disclaimer, that he was not ἐραστής, might not satisfy the critics, and would also miss the point. Instead, at *Agesilaos* V.4 Xenophon establishes that there is nothing admirable in restraint where there is no desire (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὄν μὴ ἐπεθύμησεν ἀπέχεσθαι ἀνθρώπινον ἄν τις φαίη εἶναι), and so, to illustrate Agesilaos' control of his affections, he admits that there was some affection, but only of the sort acceptable among Spartans, which he expresses in the philosophical form of the desire for the greatest good: ἐρασθέντα, ὥσπερ ἂν τοῦ καλλίστου ἢ σφοδροτάτη φύσις ἐρασθείη. Megabates' greeting was intended to demonstrate only what was appropriate to the friendly relations that Agesilaos clearly wanted to maintain with the defector from Pharnabazos, but the physical demonstration of the relationship would provide an opportunity for improper gratification, which Agesilaos was resisting successfully.

Whatever happened at the time, Xenophon in *Agesilaos* is making a

character portrait, and dramatically shows Agesilaos to have been at risk in real life in order to portray his powers of resistance and establish his innocence. Refusal of the greeting proves for Xenophon the strength not of the desire but of the self restraint. The threat to Agesilaos' reputation not only occurred on the occasion in real life at the time, but also was potentially likely to be repeated in any later interpretation of what Xenophon has here presented in fulfilling his literary purpose, and Xenophon will have felt bound to meet it. He has done this in rounding the passage off with further remarks which confirm his convictions about Agesilaos' character, and he reveals that he has had access to special knowledge which confirms the absence of any evidence of scandal.

Plutarch evidently did not wish to exonerate Agesilaos before he had made his moral point, and therefore there is a difference in his treatment of the episode. He may have had other evidence, although he does not mention his source, but he follows Xenophon so closely here as to suggest dependence. He records the initial fact of refusal, with ἐξέκλινεν, as unequivocally as Xenophon, but he uses a more dramatic expression for the struggle than Xenophon's διαμάχεσθαι ἀνὰ κρᾶτος τὸ μὴ φιληθῆναι, presenting the resistance as an internal struggle. Plutarch's variations and additions therefore indicate a significant element of interpretation on his part, and there can be no further substantiating evidence. Xenophon presents, in his non-chronological list of the virtues of Agesilaos, what was probably one of his first meetings with Megabates, but Plutarch mentions it in retrospect at the moment of their parting, suggesting the emotional context of a relationship which had developed over a period of time.

ὁ Ἀγησίλαος προσεποιεῖτο θαυμάζειν ὃ τι δὴ παθὼν αὐτὸν ὁ Μεγαβάτης ἀπὸ στόματος οὐ φιλοφρονοῖτο.

The subtle addition of pretence, perhaps Plutarch's own interpretation, imputes to Agesilaos more knowledge than he displayed



of the boy's reason for distress, and suggests the wish to portray him as really deeply emotionally involved. Indeed, Plutarch suggests that Agesilaos wants the offer of a kiss to be renewed, whereas in Xenophon, although he initiates the negotiation, he asks only about the undemonstrative τιμᾶν.

8 ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ἄν ἔλθοι σοι πεισθεὶς ἐκεῖνος ἐντὸς φιλήματος· ἀλλ' ὅπως αὖθις οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσεις.

The friend in Plutarch urges a more positive response; the question in Xenophon, εἰ φιλήσει, implies no urging (*Agesilaos* V.5). Xenophon's version at this point refers to a discussion, not of whether the friend is to try to persuade Megabates, but only of what response Agesilaos is willing to commit himself to making.

9 Οὐδέν, ἔφη, δεῖ (δεινὸν conj. Reiske) πείθειν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνον· ἐγὼ γάρ μοι δοκῶ τήναν τὰν μάχαν τὰν περὶ τοῦ φιλάματος ἄδιον ἄν μάχεσθαι πάλιν ἢ πάντα ὅσα τεθέσθαι χρυσία μοι γενέσθαι.

The conclusion of the dialogue in Xenophon's account is that Agesilaos would agree that the boy should be approached and a proper form of greeting arranged, but that no commitment to kissing was to be used to persuade him: the "battle" clearly is in resisting temptation when Megabates offers his greeting. The oath, Οὐ τὸ σιώ, uses the Lakonian dual of ὁ θεός, "the twin gods", the Dioskouri, twin brothers of Helen, who had cults in Lakedaimon, and who were associated with the dual kingship at Sparta, stemming from the two sons of Aristodemos, Eurysthenes and Prokles. This oath, and the rejection of the possibility of becoming "fairest, strongest, and fleetest of men", suggest a touch of humour - a fairy-tale reward for a kiss, which Plutarch has omitted. The second oath - ὁμνῶμι πάντας θεοὺς ἢ μὴν - seems to be more serious, and to reflect the political consequences of the breakdown of relations with Spithridates on the matter of cementing the friendship, appropriately measured in terms of gold (χρυσᾶ γενέσθαι), since booty was clearly one of the main aims of the

expedition: Agesilaos would rather forego both benefits than accept the kiss.

In Plutarch's account, the reading Οὐδέν, ἔφη, δεινόν gives the sense: "Persuade him to greet me, but I shall again win the fight against kissing." Plutarch does not necessarily wish to repeat Xenophon's sense, however. Οὐδέν, ἔφη, δεῖ: "Do not persuade him", suggests that Agesilaos prefers to fight a private battle against wanting the greeting.

10 τοιοῦτος μὲν ἦν τοῦ Μεγαβάτου παρόντος, ἀπελθόντος γε μὴν οὕτω περικαῶς ἔσχεν, ὥς χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν εἰ πάλιν αὖ μεταβαλομένου καὶ φανέντος ἐνεκαρτέρησε μὴ φιληθῆναι.

Plutarch, having incorporated into the description of the departure of the Paphlagonians Xenophon's account of an earlier meeting nearer the time of their arrival, now returns to the time of the departure. While Xenophon ends with a claim to authenticity, Plutarch ends with a device of rhetoric: to conjecture from what is known in one set of circumstances to what might be the case in other circumstances. He conjectures that Agesilaos might not do so well on a future occasion in resisting the strong emotions which have been attributed to him at Megabates' departure (ἔκνιζεν αὐτὸν οὐ μετρίως ὁ τοῦ παιδὸς ἔρως). Where Xenophon's notice established Agesilaos' strength in resisting emotional involvement, Plutarch is interested in the continuing strength of Agesilaos' affection. Both authors make Agesilaos think hard and long in silence when attempting to rectify his mistake in handling the affair. In Xenophon's account, Agesilaos was perhaps working out how to structure a greeting which would allow expression of Megabates' traditional respect while preserving Agesilaos' dignity and integrity, but in Plutarch's account, the silence seems to represent Agesilaos' inner struggle against his desire to respond emotionally to the emotional greeting. The outcome is therefore different in the two cases. The greeting without the kiss, in



Xenophon, represents a completely unemotional involvement. The required reading in Plutarch may therefore be the more positive one, perhaps to suggest that what Agesilaos would enjoy would be to experience the bitter-sweet struggle (ὄδιον ὃν μάχεσθαι πάλιν). Οὐδέν, ἔφη, δεινὸν πείθειν ὑμᾶς ἐκεῖνον: "It is not dangerous for you to persuade him: I can handle it." If there is any ambiguity of meaning in Plutarch's words, this may well suit his theme and method, but there is no doubt that he represents Agesilaos as likely to experience uncontrollable emotion, if Megabates returns. Agesilaos' moral reputation is untarnished in the accounts of both authors. In Plutarch's version victory is not yet assured and the inner struggle is intense.

## CHAPTER 12

### Ρωμιοσύνη

The parallel accounts of Xenophon and Plutarch provide an opportunity to compare two different moral approaches to the meeting of Agesilaos and Pharnabazos. V.J. Gray (1981) rightly points out Xenophon's purpose of portraying the political wisdom and diplomatic skills of Agesilaos, which he displayed in tempting Pharnabazos with the offer of independence, if he will come over to serve the interests of the Spartans in their struggle with the Persian King. However, his own words indicate a more vital purpose, too. By introducing and concluding *Hell.* IV.i with references to Agesilaos' wish to detach as many nations as possible from the King, he indicates how important he regarded it that the diplomacy should be seen to succeed. At IV.i.15 Otys appears to have been won: ἐκ τούτου δεξιὰς δόντες καὶ λαβόντες, but at IV.i.37 Pharnabazos does not commit himself, although Xenophon leads the reader to suppose that Sparta had gained two valued friends and allies, by reporting that Agesilaos kept his promises, immediately in leaving Pharnabazos' territory, and later in befriending his son. These successes were all the more important to Xenophon because they appear as the climax to the Asian expedition, which has to be abandoned immediately afterwards (*Hell.* IV.2.1). Plutarch, apparently not convinced by these diplomatic achievements, has not stressed their successful outcome, and has given the campaign a different climax. His account asserts the superiority of Agesilaos' Greek culture and credits Pharnabazos with recognition that this is so.

Differences appear in details, too. Plutarch has Agesilaos refuse to repay Pharnabazos' earlier services to Sparta without his commitment to abandon the King, while in Xenophon Agesilaos will, by withdrawing his army, concede his initial principle concerning his treatment of the King's subjects as enemies. Plutarch presents him as



true to the Panhellenist, anti-Persian, cause he professed to be serving, while Xenophon presents a simplistic pragmatism, the guarantee of autonomous possession of wealth and power, in exchange for an option to serve the interests of the Spartan cause. Plutarch describes a realistic offer, which will be fulfilled if Pharnabazos should realize his newly found potential for honourable friendship with Greece as a free man, and, like a Greek, value nothing more than freedom, so completing the development of his character, which starts when he reveals his sense of shame over the furnishing of the meeting-place.

1 ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΦΑΡΝΑΒΑΖΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΑΥΤῷ ΣΥΝΕΛΘΕῖΝ ΗΘΕΛΗΣΕ, ΚΑΙ ΣΥΝΗΓΑΓΕΝ ἈΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙΣ ὮΝ ΞΕΝΟΣ Ὁ ΚΥΖΙΚΗΝΟΣ ἈΠΟΛΛΟΦΑΝΗΣ.

Plutarch gives Pharnabazos the initiative in wanting the meeting, evidently to obtain justice from the Spartans, whereas in Xenophon Apollophanes of Kyzikos first mentioned to Agesilaos the offer to bring Pharnabazos to him to discuss friendly relations, though he may, of course, already have been in touch with Pharnabazos, since he said that he thought he could arrange the meeting with him. In selecting the point at which to begin the dialogue, the authors have given their own focus, for while Xenophon continues to present Agesilaos' friendly initiative based on his offer to help Pharnabazos establish his own independent empire among the King's subjects:

ἡμῖν συμμάχοις χρώμενον αὔξειν μὴ τὴν βασιλέως ἀλλὰ τὴν  
σαυτοῦ ἀρχήν, τοὺς νῦν ὁμοδούλους σοι καταστρεφόμενον, ὥστε σοὺς  
ὑπηκόους εἶναι (*Hell.* IV.i.36),

Plutarch, having put Pharnabazos' complaint in a brief reported speech, has made any relief from ravaging depend on his first proving himself friend and ally of the Greeks, and reveals the uncompromising sense of the superiority of Greek freedom over Persian slavery which seems to be uppermost in his mind here. He implies that Apollophanes was equally the ξένος of both sides, though Xenophon makes the link with Agesilaos the more recent. That Kyzikos should have a Spartan

ξένος indicates the far-ranging contacts of Spartans in general, and of Agesilaos in particular, who had not, of course, had a very long time as king before leaving Sparta in which to establish new connections. Spartan contacts can be traced back to the 420s (D.M.Lewis (1977) p.30), although information will have been accumulating at least since Aristagoras' interview with Kleomenes (Herodotus V.49), and Pharnabazos had used the diplomatic services of an exile from Kyzikos, Timagoras, at Thucydides VIII.5. Spithridates, with whom Xenophon had earlier clashed (*Anab.* VI.5) may have instigated the relationship (I.Bos (1947) p.86), for it was from Kyzikos, 40 miles west of Daskyleion, that he was brought by Lysander. Kyzikos had also been a base for the combined operations of Pharnabazos and the Spartan, Mindaros (Xen. *Hell.* I.i.11).

2 πρότερος δὲ μετὰ τῶν φίλων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐλθὼν εἰς τὸ χωρίον, ὑπὸ σκιᾷ τινι πόας οὔσης βαθείας καταβαλὼν ἑαυτόν, ἐνταῦθα περιέμενε τὸν φαρνάβαζον.

The friends are no doubt the advisers. Plutarch, having mentioned the appointment of τριάκοντα μὲν ἡγεμόνας καὶ συμβούλους Σπαρτιάτας at c.6, records Agesilaos' visit to Aulis μετὰ τῶν φίλων at c.6, and refers to the Spartiates' status as σύμβουλοι βασιλέως at c.7. These were at times, perhaps, not all acting together, but Xenophon has them all here with Agesilaos, οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν τριάκοντα (*Hell.* IV.i.30), awaiting Pharnabazos. However, in the quarrel, at c.7, when Lysander explained his position πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, the words stood for his friends, the petitioners.

An outdoor site would give neither side any advantage, would be less of a security risk to the foreigners and would open the negotiations to the observation of all those present, rather than keep them secret indoors: Pharnabazos, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.i.25), was concealing his encampments. It also allows the simplicity of



Agesilaos' usual life style to determine the absence of elaborate furnishing of the scene, since he was the first to arrive. That he imposed this on Pharnabazos, as he did later on Tachos in Egypt (c.36), seems likely to have been a deliberate intention in order both to avoid charges of being corrupted by service overseas (c.19) and, more immediately, to discomfort foreigners who were reputed to live in luxury (ἐντροφῆσαι Xen. *Hell.* IV.i.30).

3 ὁ δὲ ὡς ἐπῆλθεν, ὑποβεβλημένων αὐτῷ κωδίων τε μαλακῶν καὶ ποικίλων δορίδων, αἰδεσθεὶς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὕτω κατεκείμενον, κατεκλίνη καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἐπὶ τῆς πόας χαμᾶζε, καίπερ ἐσθῆτα θαυμαστὴν λεπτότητι καὶ βαφαῖς ἐνδεδυκώς.

It appears from both authors that Persian attendants arrived in advance of Pharnabazos, which allows them to introduce the contrasting elaborate Persian life style. The point is made more vividly in Plutarch, where their arrangements are completed, than in Xenophon, who has them only beginning to arrange the furnishings when they are stopped by Pharnabazos on his arrival. Plutarch can therefore reflect the elaboration in a neat chiasmus of the nouns and adjectives.

Pharnabazos' inner thought, which Xenophon represents with ἰσχύνθη, may be interpreted here not as shame, but as the more positive respect for and recognition of the superior moral stance of the Greek, adopted also by Plutarch himself above. (Cf. φοβηθεὶς c.9, which also flatters Greek opinion.) His polite gesture in declining the cushions restores the equality of the two sides, and this may be sufficient motivation without resorting to shame. It would have been more difficult to portray that respect if Pharnabazos had arrived before Agesilaos. Plutarch presents the gesture more strikingly than Xenophon, by placing it after the attendants have completed setting their things out. He has further enhanced it by giving a detailed description of the clothing, where Xenophon stated only the cost (στολὴν πολλοῦ χρυσοῦ ὀξίαν).

4 ἄσπασόμενοι δ' ἀλλήλους, ὁ μὲν Φαρνάβαζος οὐκ ἠπόρει λόγων δικαίων, ὅτε δὴ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα Λακεδαιμονίοις χρήσιμος γεγονώς ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμῳ, νῦν δὲ πορθούμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

Plutarch curtails Xenophon's account of the greeting and handshakes, using a participle and partitive apposition, and his use of indirect speech, summarizing the complaints given at length in direct form by Xenophon, again accelerates his narrative. It is consistent with Pharnabazos' initiation of the negotiations that he should here speak first about his grievances, whereas, less convincingly, in Xenophon, who perhaps wished to provide a reason more complimentary to Agesilaos, he speaks first because he is the elder. Pharnabazos had fought for the Spartans near Abydos (Xen. *Hell.* I.i.6, 16, 24) and had provided money for the fleet which was defeated by the Athenians at Arginousai. The change in relations had come about through the Spartan support, first for Kyros in his revolt from the King, and then for the Greeks resisting the attempt by Persia to recover the territories that had gone over to him.

5 ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος, ὁρῶν τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ Σπαρτιάτας ὑπ' αἰσχύνης κύπτοντας εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ διαποροῦντας (ἀδικούμενον γὰρ ἑώρων τὸν Φαρνάβαζον), . . . εἶπεν.

That Plutarch should introduce the awareness, also found in Xenophon, that the complaints were just, may indicate commendable detachment in recognizing the Persian point of view, but it does not represent the feelings of those in the Greek cities who were in danger of being subjected to Persian rule, and on whose behalf Agesilaos was engaged in the hostilities. He has given extra prominence to the Spartan advisers' sense of shame recorded by Xenophon, but Xenophon's ἐσιώπησαν and Plutarch's διαποροῦντας indicate that the main purpose of both authors here was to highlight Agesilaos' ability to justify the Spartan military action promptly, by contrasting it with their helplessness. The Spartans are aware that the harm is still going on - both ἀδικούμενον and βλάπτομεν are present tense. The



paradoxical praise of the enemy is clearly intended to enhance Agesilaos' diplomatic activity.

6 ἔν οὖν καὶ σὲ τῶν βασιλέως κτημάτων ὀρῶντες εἶναι βουλόμενον, εἰκότως διὰ σοῦ βλάπτομεν ἐκεῖνον.

In Xenophon, Agesilaos is said to have attacked Pharnabazos' possessions because he treats them as belonging to his enemy, the King. Plutarch has made an interesting change in having Agesilaos say that Pharnabazos is himself one of the King's possessions - a tactless remark for Agesilaos to make, unless it was made only in his report for home consumption. It is typical of one common Greek view of the barbarian monarchy (Aristotle *Pol.* 1285a17ff.), and may have been a familiar topic of rhetorical school exercises. cf. Artemisia:

σὸν τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δέσποτα, γίνεται. οἱ γὰρ σοὶ δοῦλοι κατεργάσαντο (Herodotus VIII.102).

7 ὅφ' ἥς δ' ἄν ἡμέρας σεαυτὸν ὀξιώσης Ἑλλήνων φίλον καὶ σύμμαχον μᾶλλον ἢ δοῦλον λέγεσθαι βασιλέως, ταύτην νόμιζε τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ τὰ ὄπλα καὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ πάντας ἡμᾶς τῶν σῶν κτημάτων φύλακας εἶναι καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἥς ἄνευ καλὸν ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ζηλωτόν ἐστιν.

It is as if Agesilaos is looking for an inner change that would make Pharnabazos more like a Greek, and worthy of consideration as no longer a chattel. This is a significant departure from the positive incentives offered in Xenophon's version, in which Pharnabazos is promised autonomy, wealth and power. Plutarch stresses the negative aspect of the Greek attitude, restricting Agesilaos to a defence of Sparta against the accusations of Pharnabazos, and a rejection of any obligation to relieve Pharnabazos from the effects of the war against the King, until he claims for himself his freedom. Agesilaos therefore avoids any charge of medism, though he offers hope of protection in the future, if Pharnabazos rebels against the King. Pharnabazos, as might be expected, does not announce any immediate intention to revolt from the King, but keeps open the chance to accept Agesilaos' offer of friendship if he is forced to change sides. His later operations as

commander of the King's fleet in association with Konon are reported by Xenophon at *Hell.* IV.iii.11.

9     ταῦτα δ' ἀκούσας ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἤσθη.

In Xenophon, for whom, of course, the answer represents rejection of Agesilaos' suggestion, Agesilaos shows his approval for Pharnabazos only by his wish that he may become the Spartans' friend. Plutarch can add Agesilaos' delight in the answer, because, although he had not solicited his friendship, the admirable qualities of loyalty and respect for Greek culture which Pharnabazos displayed would make him a valuable friend and ally, if and when he satisfied the conditions that had been set out.

Εἶθ', εἶπεν, ὦ Φαρνάβαζε, τοιοῦτος ὢν φίλος ἡμῖν γένοιο μᾶλλον ἢ πολέμιος.

Agesilaos is presented as having good insight into the man's character, regardless of race and status. In Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.i.38), Agesilaos' answer is more elaborate, as if premeditated. Attempting to detach the satrap from his loyalty to the King, and to resume the friendly relations with Pharnabazos enjoyed by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, he has urged the setting up of an empire to rival the King's, and so to form a friendly buffer-state between Persians and Greeks of Asia Minor, a policy of which later traces have been found in Isokrates IV.161-166 (D.M.Lewis (1977) p.154). His promises to leave Pharnabazos' territory as quickly as he can, and to refrain from attacking it, if there are other lands for him to attack, would discontinue the alleged injustice and would open the possibility that Pharnabazos might come over. This would give encouragement for future peaceful relations and keep open the possibility of an opportunity for closer co-operation. Xenophon sets out the advantages only on a personal level, neglecting the benefit to the Greek cities of having a possible end to the attempts to re-impose Persian control



over them in the area, in return, perhaps, for a Greek undertaking to suspend military expansion into Persian provinces, similar to Derkylidas' earlier agreement with Pharnabazos (*Hell.* III.ii.9). The rebel satrap or satraps would perhaps welcome foreign support as Kyros did. Xenophon reports the intended extension of this activity in Agesilaos' preparations for a march further into the interior, in hope of detaching others instead from the King: his account claims a diplomatic success for Agesilaos in this major policy, in Asia Minor, perhaps to compensate for the limited military success he has been able to record.

Plutarch proves consistent in his hostility to Pharnabazos by using only the simple name and abandoning Xenophon's form of address, the friendly  $\delta$  λῶστε σύ, which Socrates is represented as using in addressing Kallias, the host (*Xen. Symposium* IV.1). He is again consistent in adding the reference, not in Xenophon, to the real status of Pharnabazos, the enemy. He perhaps regarded his conclusion of the chapter in this way as leading more effectively on to the gesture of friendship made by Pharnabazos' son in his spontaneous response to Agesilaos' wish, the enemy having come to recognize the Greek ideal of freedom which he cannot achieve for himself. In Xenophon Agesilaos' promise to depart from the territory interrupts this transition.

## CHAPTER 13

### Agesilaos' equivocal attitude to the obligations of friendship

Plutarch, at the end of Agesilaos' contact with Pharnabazos, records further aspects of his relations with friends (cf. c.5). Two of the three instances here have specific sources in Xenophon's *Hellenika* (IV.i.39-40, V.iv.31), though the treatment is modified by Plutarch. The third is attributed to a third century philosopher, Hieronymos. For Agesilaos' attitude to friendship in general, evidence is available in Xenophon's *Agesilaos*: friends are given opportunities for enrichment from booty (I.17-19); friends benefit from his practice of deception on enemies (VI.4-8); he joins in pursuing all their needs (VIII.2); he does not fault the victims of deception by friends (XI.4); he is gentle with the errors of private people (XI.6); he is gentle with friends (XI.10); and it is very easy for friends to persuade him (XI.12). Xenophon eulogizes, and approves Agesilaos' pragmatism - the only question, it often seems, being in whose interest it is. If this is Plutarch's source for the general background, he apparently finds there evidence for a critical judgement, perhaps combining some of these statements (XI.6 and 10), perhaps even confusing them (XI.4), or putting the worst construction on the pragmatism (VIII.2), and his interpretation of the actions involves different criteria, for he applies more absolute ethical values.

1 Ἀπιδόντος δὲ τοῦ φαρναβάζου μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ὁ υἱὸς ὑπολειφθεὶς προσέδραμε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ καὶ μειδιῶν εἶπεν· Ἐγὼ σε ξένον, ὃ Ἀγησίλαε, ποιοῦμαι· καὶ παλτὸν ἔχων ἐν τῇ χειρὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ.

The incidents that took place during the departure of the son of Pharnabazos allow Plutarch to revert to the same theme of Agesilaos' affections that was introduced on the departure of the son of Spithridates (c.11). Plutarch recalls Xenophon's words closely (*Hell.* IV.i.39), but makes additions: μειδιῶν and ἐν τῇ χειρὶ here, and ἡσθεὶς τῇ τε ὄψει καὶ τῇ φιλοφροσύνῃ τοῦ παιδός and ταχὺ ταῦτα περισπᾶσας τῷ



μειρακίῳ below. Plutarch concentrates the attention on Agesilaos' reaction to the personal element rather than on the mutual interactions of the two people, since he changes Xenophon's account of Agesilaos' conversation from direct to indirect speech, changes his past tenses to the more vivid historic present, omits the boy's subsequent participatory actions, and also Xenophon's descriptions of the gifts exchanged (καλόν, πάγκαλα); and he changes the description of the youth, καλὸς ἔτι ὢν (*Hell.* IV.i.39), to καλῷ καὶ γενναίῳ, also transferring it from the introduction of the incident to the moment when Agesilaos seeks to give him a gift in return. The boy's pleasing smile (μειδιῶν), and the rapidity of the narrative created by his immediate offer of the javelin, and by Agesilaos' immediate acceptance of the gift (δεξόμενος, first word), reinforce the impression that the emphasis is on his personal relationship.

2 δεξόμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος καὶ ἡσθεὶς τῇ τε ὄψει καὶ τῇ φιλοφροσύνῃ τοῦ παιδός, ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς παρόντας, εἴ τις ἔχοι τι τοιοῦτον οἷον ἀντιδοῦναι καλῷ καὶ γενναίῳ δῶρον. ἰδὼν δ' ἱππον Ἰδαίου τοῦ γραφέως κεκοσμημένον φαλάροις, ταχὺ ταῦτα περισπάσας τῷ μειρακίῳ δίδωσι.

The participial phrase showing Agesilaos' delight is Plutarch's substitute for Xenophon's καλὸς ἔτι ὢν, and transfers the direct description of the son to an indirect description, in Homeric fashion, of Agesilaos' reaction, as if his inner thoughts could thus be shown. Plutarch adds the abstract "friendliness" to the concrete "appearance". Personal feelings, ἡσθεὶς, rather than diplomatic benefit, provide the motivation. Xenophon has nothing which might authenticate the suggestiveness of this expression. For his second reference to the boy, Plutarch borrows Xenophon's καλός, the concrete, but adds an abstract again in γενναίῳ. In Xenophon, Agesilaos simply takes his gift from the horse, but in Plutarch he takes care to find something especially suitable, for whereas Xenophon uses the pronoun αὐτῷ simply, Plutarch uses a noun, τῷ μειρακίῳ, which enriches the

expression, and stresses the age difference.

3 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκ ἐπαύετο μεμνημένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρόνῳ περιιόντι τὸν οἶκον ἀποστερηθέντος αὐτοῦ καὶ φυγόντος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφῶν εἰς Πελοπόννησον, ἰσχυρῶς ἐπεμελεῖτο.

The first instance of Agesilaos' treatment of friends develops immediately from his contact with Pharnabazos' son. Plutarch, again concentrating on Agesilaos' part, passes over the departure of the boy described by Xenophon, thus avoiding formal closure of the episode, and having omitted the boy's earlier injunction Μέμνησό νυν, now suggests by μεμνημένος that there was a significant lasting effect of Agesilaos' emotional involvement. Xenophon explains, slightly more fully, that it was while Pharnabazos was absent that this son was driven into exile, but he mentions only one brother (*Hell.* IV.i.40). Plutarch intensifies the expression by adding the adverb, ἰσχυρῶς, to Xenophon's verb, and introduces pathos by substituting τὸν οἶκον for Xenophon's τὴν ὀρχήν, which brings out the boy's distress in losing his home.

καί τι καὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν αὐτῷ συνέπραξεν. 4 ἡράσθη γὰρ ἀθλητοῦ παιδὸς ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν· ἐπεὶ δὲ μέγας ὢν καὶ σκληρὸς Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν ἐκινδύνευεν ἐκκριθῆναι, καταφεύγει πρὸς τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ὁ Πέρσης δεόμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ παιδός·

Plutarch omits the name of the boy but explains that he was an athlete. He enlarges on Xenophon's simple statement ἐρασθέντος αὐτοῦ τοῦ Εὐάλκου υἱέος Ἀθηναίου, so that what in Xenophon seems to be no more than the fulfilment of the obligation of a ξένος, becomes in Plutarch some sort of collusion in furthering a love affair. Indeed, it is in response to the request of the young Persian on behalf of his Athenian friend that Agesilaos intervenes, matching Agesilaos' alleged intervention in response to the request of his son, Archidamos, on behalf of his friend's father, Sphodrias, at c.25. Plutarch introduces a more significant factor in athleticism by his reference to the boy's strength, and emphasizes this by his use of two adjectives where



Xenophon has only one, although it is the superlative, μέγιστος ὢν τῶν παίδων. There is a double paradox or surprise, in that the "danger" to the athlete leads to the friend's seeking "refuge", the "danger" being *exclusion* from the Olympic games. Xenophon, more specifically, speaks of *admittance* to the sprint, ὅπως ὢν δι' ἐκεῖνον ἐγκριθείη τὸ στόδιον. If this refers to the men's race, Agesilaos obtained dispensation for the under-age but physically mature youth to compete (ἐγκριθείη) at the higher level (G.E.Underwood (1906) pp.121-2). According to Plutarch, he obtained dispensation for the youth to be allowed to run in the boys' race, despite his exclusion (ἐκκριθῆναι), presumably having been judged to be over the age limit on the ground that he was such a tall boy (M.I.Finley and H.W.Pleket (1976) p.62, but for "Spartan named Eualces" read "son of an Athenian named Eualces"). Exclusion would not accord with Xenophon's superlative - as if the tallest youth was always automatically debarred, and he does not mention it. Perhaps, by conjecture, Agesilaos overturned his disqualification following illegal entry as a boy.

ὁ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο βουλόμενος αὐτῷ χαρίζεσθαι, μάλα μόλις διεπράξατο σὺν πολλῇ πραγματείᾳ.

Plutarch implies that Agesilaos had given other help in this love affair, not specified by Xenophon, although he does mention other forms of attention: τά τ' ἄλλα ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτοῦ (*Hell.* IV.i.40). It is known that χαρίζεσθαι, "gratification", is the technical term for the physical element of homosexuality (K.J.Dover (1978) p.91 and *passim*), but, although the context may bring to mind that meaning of the word when it is used as a metaphor, here the sense is "wishing to do him even *this* service as a favour", in view of the almost identical phrase at c.25, τῷ παιδὶ χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος, "wishing to do his son the service as a favour". By the use of alliteration, a compound verb, and the prepositional phrase, Plutarch makes more of Agesilaos' intervention than Xenophon does in his phrase, πάντ'

ἐποίησεν ὅπως ἂν δι' ἐκεῖνον ἐγκριθείη τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ.

5 τᾶλλα μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀκριβὴς καὶ νόμιμος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φιλικοῖς πρόφασιν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὸ λίαν δίκαιον.

Plutarch only in retrospect explains (γάρ) the significance of the incidents just described, observing that Agesilaos distinguished the morality of friendship from that of other situations, so that while he was otherwise "strict" and "conformable to custom (normal, not different from other men)", in the case of friendship he believed that rules need not be strictly applied. Consequently, Plutarch implies that the youth was strictly ineligible, and that the rules were ignored. Xenophon does not require this assumption, only that Agesilaos was able eventually to convince the judges that the boy was eligible. Plutarch has recorded his view of Agesilaos' handling of political friends at c.5.1: ἐχθρὸς ἦν ἀμεμπτότερος ἢ φίλος; and at *Mor.* 807e:

Ἀγησίλαος δὲ περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων σπουδὰς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενος ἀσθενέστατος καὶ ταπεινότατος.

He now attributes this to an arbitrary disregard of principle. Perrin's "a mere pretext" surely misses the main point of πρόφασιν. Budé, too, has "n'était que prétexte à dérobade", but "only" is not in Plutarch's phrase. No doubt, if strict justice suited his own interests, Agesilaos would not ignore it, but the need to follow a strict interpretation of justice was, if necessary, to be used in excusing himself from gratification of a friend who has made an embarrassing request. Thus "was something to put forward", when one did not want to do what a friend had asked.

ἀναφέρεται γοῦν ἐπιστόλιον αὐτοῦ πρὸς Ἰδριέα τὸν Κῶρα τοιοῦτο· Νικίας εἰ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖ, ὄφες· εἰ δὲ ἀδικεῖ, ὅμιν ὄφες· πάντως δ' ὄφες.

The second instance is presented as Agesilaos' request for special consideration from a friend. The letter is hardly "in circulation" (Perrin) but is rather "mentioned in sources". "At any rate there is a letter mentioned in this connection," that is, in which Agesilaos showed



his disregard for strict justice. "Acquit him", that is, in accordance with strict interpretation of justice, "since he did no wrong", and it is also the verdict Agesilaos desired; "or as a favour to me", that is, disregarding strict justice for my friend's benefit, although he is guilty. "Just acquit him." Whether it was in the normal sense a just decision or an unjust one, Agesilaos required that Nikias should be acquitted. In order to make the anecdote relevant to the initial point, "πρόφασιν" should be what Agesilaos might have said in justifying his or Hidrieus' refusal to make this injunction. "Only if I had wished to desert my friend would I have appealed to the irrelevant concept of strict justice."

Plutarch has quoted in this case the grounds for the plea of Archidamos, recorded by Xenophon in the case of Sphodrias:

Ἄλλ' ὅτι μέν, ὦ πάτερ, εἰ μηδὲν ἡδίκηει Σφοδρίας, ἀπέλυσας ἂν αὐτὸν οἶδα· νῦν δέ, εἰ ἡδίκηκέ τι, ἡμῶν ἔνεκεν συγγνώμης ὑπὸ σοῦ τυχέτω (*Hell.* V.iv.31).

In his treatment of that case, at c.25, Plutarch does not mention this plea.

6 ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πλείστοις τοιοῦτος ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἔστι δ' ὅπου πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἐχρήτο τῷ καιρῷ μᾶλλον, ὥς ἐδήλωσεν, ἀναζυγῆς αὐτῷ θορυβωδεστέρας γενομένης, ἀσθενοῦντα καταλιπὼν τὸν ἐρώμενον. 7 ἐκείνου γὰρ δεομένου καὶ καλοῦντος αὐτὸν ἀπιόντα, μεταστραφεὶς εἶπεν ὥς χαλεπὸν ἐλεεῖν ὅμα καὶ φρονεῖν.

Plutarch implies confirmation that in the case of Nikias Agesilaos was ignoring the law for the benefit of his *guilty* friend, as usual. He has given two such cases, and they have been similar to Agesilaos' treatment of some of the petitioners in the quarrel with Lysander at c.7, where the disregard of strict justice allowed the guilty to escape. Disregard of strict justice for the other petitioners meant that the innocent suffered, and it was Agesilaos who benefited. The example presented now is of the latter kind, and the wounded friend, who thinks he has a right to be saved, suffers from the disregard of strict justice, and is denied this right. Plutarch's phrase, πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον,

may be intended to suggest that it was Agesilaos again who benefited ("for his own advantage", as Perrin translates it), and, if so, the example will stand. However, this is not a case of the simple miscarriage of justice, for other considerations are involved. Plutarch has presented Agesilaos with a conflict of obligations, and the effort of saving the innocent friend would endanger the safety of the rest of the army, involving the disregard of a stronger obligation: the general's duty to all his men. This, then, is not an exact counter-example to the disregard of strict justice, although that is not made evident. Plutarch himself explains that what was at stake was the reconciliation of two virtues, ἐλεεῖν ὅμα καὶ φρονεῖν, the emotional and the rational, ἐλεεῖν, to exercise the virtue of a friend and feel compassion for the wounded man, φρονεῖν, to exercise the virtue of a general and think of the safety of the whole state and all its army. Strict justice is relevant in both cases; on the one hand, in the sense of the normally accepted practice of caring for the injured (and, of course, taking up the dead), and, on the other hand, the relationship of the ἐραστής and the ἐρώμενος. Both considerations demanded more positive action from Agesilaos to save the man, but as commander, Agesilaos must consider the safety and interests of Sparta, and of the whole Spartan army. He preserved his reputation as a general by sacrificing his friend. It is part of the general's function to recognize ὁ καιρός, the proper moment for action (E.L.Wheeler (1988) pp.26, 48). This moment gave the choice between two obligations, and Agesilaos chose expediency: πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἐχρῆτο τῷ καιρῷ μᾶλλον. His gesture in turning back shows that he recognized his obligation to the wounded man, both as his friend and as his commander, and if the traditional view of a Spartan warrior is correct, the man would accept Agesilaos' resolution of the dilemma and, perhaps, welcome the treatment. Cf. *Sayings of Spartan Women* 10, 19.



τουτὶ μὲν οὖν Ἰερώνυμος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἱστόρηκεν.

This anecdote is not attributed in *Mor.* 191b, where it is also found. The context in a philosophical work seems likely to have been a discussion of a moral dilemma, what to do when there are conflicting duties. Plutarch shows that Agesilaos put the duty of the commander above that of the friend: the greatest good of the greatest number, or the interest of the state above the interest of the individual. He had, however, set out to illustrate Agesilaos' flexibility in interpretation of strict justice.

## CHAPTER 14

### Agesilaos exemplifies Lykourgan principles

Plutarch, having put an unfavourable construction on previous occasions, here and in the next chapter follows Xenophon's *Agesilaos* in approving the selected traits of Agesilaos' character. It is noticeable that these are the qualities thought especially to have been legislated for by Lykourgos, and developed in the ἀγωγή and in the συσσίτια (*Lyk.* 10, 13, 16, 19; *Lak. Pol.* 2). Plutarch evidently has distinguished what he regarded as these true Spartan characteristics from the individual Spartan's deviations from them.

1 Ἦδη δὲ περιϊόντος ἐνιαυτοῦ δευτέρου τῇ στρατηγίᾳ πολὺς ἄνω λόγος ἐχώρει τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ δόξα θαυμαστὴ κατεῖχε τῆς τε σωφροσύνης αὐτοῦ καὶ εὐτελείας καὶ μετριότητος.

Plutarch resumes the chronological narrative from c.13.1, having digressed to discuss the theme of Agesilaos' distorted sense of justice in regard to serving his friends. The temporal connection creates the impression of a narrative moving on in time towards the end of the campaign in Asia Minor, allowing the interval that was needed for these developments to take place. This so-called eidological passage is thus integrated into the "chronographic" (D.A.Russell (1973) p.115, citing A.Weiszäcker (1931)), and the qualities are first reported, not as Plutarch's intrusive assessment in his own words, but indirectly, in Homeric fashion, in the talk about Agesilaos' reputation currently circulating in the hinterland. In the abstract nouns Plutarch repeats two features of Agesilaos' life that have been displayed in previous chapters: chastity in recording his control of sensual desires regarding Spithridates' son, and thrift in recording the sparse furnishing of the meeting place with Pharnabazos. These two are now further explained in the following statements, and a third is added, introducing the new feature, "a middling disposition", illustrated later as adaptable to extreme climatic conditions.



2 ἔσκήνου μὲν γὰρ ἀποδημῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀγιωτάτοις ἱεροῖς, ἀ μὴ πολλοὶ καθορῶσιν ἄνθρωποι πράττοντας ἡμᾶς, τούτων τοὺς θεοὺς ποιούμενος ἐπόπτας καὶ μάρτυρας.

Plutarch relates, in the past tense, the biographical features which gave rise in the intervening two years to the opinion, now prevalent in Asia Minor, of his way of life. He has availed himself of a passage in Xenophon, following the story of Megabates, which proved the incredibility that any scandal should attach to Agesilaos, by describing how he lodged:

ἀεὶ δὲ ἦν ἢ ἐν ἱερῷ, ἔνθα δὴ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοιαῦτα πράττειν, ἢ ἐν φανερῷ, μάρτυρας τοὺς πάντων ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς σωφροσύνης ποιούμενος (*Agesilaos* V.7).

Plutarch omitted this proof at c.11, when he stressed the strength of Agesilaos' attachment to Megabates, and has introduced the choice of lodgings here as a separate illustration and proof of his chastity. What "few men see us doing" is not stated by Plutarch, but is clearly not to be equated with the story of Spithridates' son. Whereas Xenophon intended to prove that in that affair nothing discreditable took place, in public or in private, Plutarch makes the gods the arbiters of Agesilaos' private life away from home, based on the conviction, no doubt, that the deity of the shrine would have exacted instant punishment for sacrilege.

ἐν δὲ χιλιάσι στρατιωτῶν τοσαύταις οὐ ῥᾶδίως ἄν τις εἶδε φαυλοτέραν στιβάδα τῆς Ἀγησιλάου. 3 πρὸς τε θάλπος οὕτω καὶ ψυχὸς εἶχεν ὥσπερ μόνος ἀεὶ χρῆσθαι ταῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κεκραμέναις ὥραις πεφυκώς.

Plutarch moves on from morality to approve Agesilaos' economical way of life, as manifested in the sparsity of the king's bed, which humans could witness, suggesting the contrast with the Persian luxury described below. Xenophon uses the point about the humble bed to prove the superiority of the physical aspect of Agesilaos' powers, over his own men in endurance (*Agesilaos* V.2-3), and over the Persian in industry (*Agesilaos* IX.3-5). The general term μετριότητος above, suggesting a mean between any extremes, has allowed Plutarch to

consider the physical aspect of endurance, but he has omitted Xenophon's comparisons with the others.

4 ἡδιστον δὲ θέαμα τοῖς κατοικοῦσι τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἕλλησιν ἦσαν οἱ πάλαι βαρεῖς καὶ ἀφόρητοι καὶ διαρρέοντες ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ τρυφῆς ὕπαρχοι καὶ στρατηγοὶ δεδιότες καὶ θεραπεύοντες ἄνθρωπον ἐν τρίβωνι περιϋόντα λιτῶ.

For the concept of "Asiatic Greeks" see c.9 (cf. R.Seager and C.J.Tuplin (1980) pp.141ff.). Plutarch now reverts to the reputation of Agesilaos in Asia Minor with which he began the chapter, and shows that the qualities possessed by Agesilaos have made him the conqueror of the wealthy oppressors of the Greeks there. In Xenophon's context at *Agesilaos* I.34, τούτους ποιήσας μηδ' ἀντιβλέπειν τοῖς Ἕλλησι δύνασθαι clearly refers to non-Greek oppressors. The title, ὕπαρχοι, is given to Persian rulers by Thucydides at VIII.16.3, where Stages is called ὕπαρχος (τοῦ) Τισσαφέρνους, perhaps hyparch of Lydia; at 31.2, 81.7 of Tamos: Ἰωνίας ὕπαρχος ὢν; at 108.4: Ἀρσάκου . . . Τισσαφέρνους ὕπαρχου, where it may be "a general word (used by Herodotos for satrap) and need not be tied to an area" (A.Andrewes (1981) p.357). At VIII.5.4 Thucydides' first mention of Tissaphernes is as general: στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω, and the word is used also at Xen. *Anab.* I.i.2 of Kyros, who was satrap of Lydia, Phrygia Megale, and Kappadokia, and στρατηγὸς πάντων ὅσοι εἰς Καστωλλοῦ πεδῖον ἀθροίζονται, which indicates a higher ranking official, as does κόρανος at *Hell.* I.iv.3: Καταπέμνω Κῦρον κόρανον τῶν εἰς Καστωλὸν ἀθροιζομένων (A.Andrewes (1981) pp.12-16, 38, 356-7). But oppression by Greeks had also occurred, and Spartan support for the harmosts had been withdrawn in favour of "ancestral constitutions" (*Hell.* III.iv.2), no doubt because they were unpopular among those Greeks who were not in the richest class, from which the extreme oligarchs came. It was no doubt from the wealthy that Lysander had perhaps received divine honours at Samos, where the games in honour of Hera were renamed "Lysandreia", according to Douris (FGrHist 76 F76; Plut. *Lys.* 18; D.G.J.Shipley (1987) 133-4).



If Pharnabazos is intended to be included among the Persians who dreaded Agesilaos, it is an exaggeration (cf. φοβηθείς, used of Tissaphernes at c.9): he avoided battle, and his son exchanged gifts of friendship with Agesilaos, but there is no mention of fear: rather the intention to fight hard for the King (c.12 οὐδὲν ἐλλείψω προθυμίας ἀμυνόμενος ὑμῶς). The phrase ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ τρυφῆς might again suggest non-Greeks, but it would fit also the wealthy Greeks at Ephesos whom Agesilaos did not want as cavalrymen (c.9). Xenophon at *Agesilaos* I.37 describes Agesilaos' settlement of the factional unrest in Asia Minor consequent upon the defeat of Athens in terms which suggest that he now favoured a more moderate regime (c.6). It was Lysander of whom it was said by the petitioners at c.7 that none of the generals sent to Asia was δεινότερος καὶ φοβερώτερος. However, Plutarch's main concern is to show the superiority of Agesilaos' Spartan character over that of his countrymen and his opponents.

καὶ πρὸς ἓν ῥῆμα βραχὺ καὶ Λακωνικὸν ἀρμόζοντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ μετασχηματίζοντες, ὥστε πολλοῖς ἐπῆει τὰ τοῦ Τιμοθέου λέγειν,  
 Ἄρης τύραννος· χρυσὸν δὲ Ἑλλάς οὐ δέδοικε.

Plutarch adds the traditional Spartan quality of brevity as a further moral element in establishing Agesilaos' superiority and influence as a general. At *Agesilaos* IX.2 Xenophon contrasts Persian palace secrecy with Agesilaos' openness and the speed with which he dealt with suitors:

ὁ δὲ τότε μάλιστα ἔχαιρεν, ὅποτε τάχιστα τυχόντας ὧν δέοιντο ἀποπέμποι.

A rhetorical literary quotation is again used in support of an argument; here, however, not directly by Plutarch in support of his own argument, but more objectively presented within the context, in Homeric fashion, as a quotation which occurred to the Greeks of Asia Minor who were so impressed. The first part of the quotation is used differently at *Demetr.* c.42.3, where Plutarch tells how Demetrius rejected his subjects' petitions discourteously, but was moved by an

old woman, who shouted, "Then don't be king." There Plutarch goes on:

οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως βασιλεῖ προσῆκεν, ὥς τὸ τῆς δίκης ἔργον.  
Ἄρης μὲν γὰρ τύραννος, ὥς φησι Τιμόθεος, νόμος δὲ πάντων βασιλεὺς  
κατὰ Πίνδαρόν ἐστιν.

"Nothing so fits a king as the work of justice. For Mars is a tyrant, as Timotheus says, but law is the king of all, according to Pindar" (Pi. fr. 169.1). This sense of τύραννος is unfavourable, making the contrast with βασιλεὺς. Herodotos makes a similar statement about the Lakedaimonioi at VII.104:

ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἔόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γὰρ σφι νόμος δεσπότης.

The sense of both these words, τύραννος and δεσπότης, is strong, but it is not invariably pejorative. For Plutarch the quotation, though not directly his own, strengthens his argument proving the superiority of the Spartan character, as demonstrated by Agesilaos, who has established military supremacy and has provided that the Greeks in Asia are no longer ruled by wealthy oppressors:

"The War-god is Lord; Greece does not fear money."



## CHAPTER 15

### Obedience: the supreme Lykourgan virtue

Plutarch combines the account of the final stage of the Asia Minor campaigns with the illustration of the supreme Spartan virtues of Agesilaos presented at c.1, perhaps most importantly for him:

Ἀγησιλάῳ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὑπῆρξεν ἴδιον, ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρχειν μὴ ἀπαίδευτον τοῦ ὄρχεσθαι.

Plutarch's own regret for the interruption of his achievements, actual and planned, is expressed from a Panhellenist viewpoint, while reaction to his departure demonstrates the agreeable impression his personal qualities have made on people, also anticipated at c.1.

1 Κινουμένης δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ πολλαχοῦ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ὑπεικούσης, ὁρμοσάμενος τὰς αὐτόθι πόλεις, καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις δίχα φόνου καὶ φυγῆς ἀνθρώπων ἀποδοὺς τὸν προσήκοντα κόσμον, ἐγνώκει πρόσω χωρεῖν.

Plutarch's main verb preserves the correct chronological continuity of the *Life*, but he starts the sentence with two present participles defining the earlier situation which he had described at c.6.3, and has aorist participles for the actions which form the temporal bridge between the two. He is content now to present a summary, but he gives it his own neat, progressive structure, whereas Xenophon, in *Agesilaos*, surrounds the order for recall with his admiration of Agesilaos' military achievements, future hopes and honourable conduct, before giving, in retrospect, his achievements in civic administration, and the manifestations of sorrow and affection at his departure.

The unsettled state of Asia Minor is not a topic appropriate for Xenophon in *Agesilaos* I.36-8, and Plutarch refers to Xenophon's *Hellenika* for the situation consequent upon the apparent failure to re-instate Lysander's friends in accordance with the original plan:

ὅπως τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσειε μετ' Ἀγησιλάου (III.iv.2).

The removal of Lysander's Asia Minor dekarchies had been started

some time after 403/2 and was continuing perhaps as late as 397, for there is no record of any steps taken by Sparta to enforce this decision (A.Andrewes (1971); D.H.Kelly (1975) pp.71ff. See c.7). Xenophon provides the description of the situation which Plutarch seems to summarize here:

συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου (*Hell.* III.iv.7).

Agesilaos' policy of liberating the cities from Persian control was also another source of the change referred to by Plutarch: αὐτονόμους καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις εἶναι (*Xen. Hell.* III.iv.5). For the settlement Plutarch seems to have returned to Xenophon's Agesilaos, although the reference to Athens is surely too remote, since Persian control was being re-imposed:

παραλαβὼν πάσας πόλεις, ἐφ' ἃς ἄρξων ἐξέπλευσε, στασιαζούσας διὰ τὸ τὰς πολιτείας κινηθῆναι, ἐπεὶ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔληξαν, ἐποίησεν, ὥστ' ἄνευ φυγῆς καὶ θανάτων, ἕως αὐτὸς παρῆν, ὁμονόως πολιτευομένος καὶ εὐδαίμονας τὰς πόλεις διατέλεσαι (I.37).

His definition of the constitutional settlement, however: ἀποδοὺς τὸν προσήκοντα κόσμον, suggests that Agesilaos followed the form prescribed in the ephors' edict: οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας παρήγγειλαν (*Xen. Hell.* III.iv.2; see c.6).

καὶ τὸν πόλεμον διάρας ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάττης, περὶ τοῦ σώματος βασιλεῖ καὶ τῆς ἐν Ἑκβατάνοις καὶ Σούσοις εὐδαιμονίας διαμάχεσθαι, καὶ περισπᾶσαι πρῶτον αὐτοῦ τὴν σχολήν, ὥς μὴ καθέζοιτο τοὺς πολέμους βραβεύων τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ διαφθείρων τοὺς δημαγωγούς.

The plans for the future, introduced by the main verb, continue the chronological progression. Plutarch recalls one of the original aims of the expedition set out at c.6.2, προπολεμῆσαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπωτάτω διαβάντα (cf. πρόσω χωρεῖν above), just as Xenophon refers to the intention to march ὥς δύναιτο ἀνωτάτω (*Hell.* IV.i.41). This is perhaps a more realistic aim than those suggested in the rest of the sentence, which correspond to the emotionally expressed intention in Xenophon's



eulogy: καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχὴν (*Agesilaos* I.36). The representation of this phrase as the ambitious claim to be about to attack the King and his residences at Ekbatana and Susa, not mentioned elsewhere, may be Plutarch's attempt to stretch the imagination by implying a comparison with Alexander. The Oxyrhynchos Historian speaks only of the considerably less ambitious and possibly more feasible plan to march to Kappadokia (XXII), while Diodoros (XIV.83.1) briefly mentions the recall and departure without comment. The King had not been directly pressed by Agesilaos yet, only his satraps, and an extension of the activity would suit Plutarch in his Panhellenist mood, in which he introduces the striking verb, βροβεύων. He uses it frequently in the *Lives*, but it is otherwise found mainly in dramatists and fourth century orators, in the sense of arbiter, often in connection with athletic games.

The reference to bribery fits mainland Greece at the start of the Corinthian War. Polyainos has Konon persuading Pharnabazos to send the money to Greece, perhaps while they were both at Rhodes:

Κόνων φαρναβάζῳ συμμαχῶν Ἀγησιλάου τὴν Ἀσίαν πορθοῦντος ἔπεισε τὸν Πέρσην χρυσίον πέμψαι τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς τῶν πόλεων τῆς Ἑλλάδος (I.48.3).

The Oxyrhynchos Historian, however, allows this only minor importance as a cause of the war:

οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ταῖς προειρημέναις διὰ ταῦτα πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ διὰ φαρνάβαζον καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ἐπηρμένοι μισεῖν ἦσαν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους (VII.5).

Pausanias is more certain:

ὁ τε ὀνομαζόμενος Κορινθιακὸς πόλεμος ἀπὸ τούτων ἐξήφθη τῶν χρημάτων (IV.17.3).

He mentions no names, but places this after Agesilaos' "failure" in Asia, yet makes it a cause of the war. At *Hell.* III.v.1 Xenophon says it was Tithraustes who sent Timokrates with the money, after having replaced Tissaphernes. Either there is confusion here, or Timokrates was sent

on two missions, a year apart, only the second of which led to the outbreak of war (C.D.Hamilton (1979) pp.79, 207). There were, indeed, three "causes" of the Corinthian War, in reverse order of importance: (1) money distributed to Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and others, by the Rhodian, Timokrates (Ox. VII.2); (2) domestic enmities and impulses in the states concerned (Ox. VII.5); (3) Spartan expansion (S.Hornblower (1983) pp.183-95). The Oxyrhynchos Historian asserts that the main cause was long-standing hostility to Sparta, rather than the money, which he says was supplied by Pharnabazos. According to Xenophon the money was not accepted by the Athenians (*Hell.* III.v.1-2; see below).

2 ἐν τούτῳ δ' ἀφικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἐπικυδίδας ὁ Σπαρτιάτης, ἀπαγγέλλων ὅτι πολὺς περιέστηκε τὴν Σπάρτην πόλεμος Ἑλληνικός, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνον οἱ ἔφοροι καὶ κελεύουσι τοῖς οἴκοι βοηθεῖν.

Plutarch has raised expectations of future achievements, but he interrupts the plans dramatically, with the order of recall following immediately afterwards, including in the order a brief statement of the events in Greece that necessitated it. That he calls it a "Greek War" is a mark of the indignation he is about to express. The recall is issued by the ephors only here, but Plutarch may have seen this as the implication of Xenophon's observation that Agesilaos obeyed just as if he were standing before them in the Ephoreion (*Agesilaos* I.36).

3 Ὡ βόρβορ' ἐξευρόντες Ἕλληνες κακά.

The dramatic tension is heightened with Plutarch's own reaction, expressed in a (chiastic) quotation from Euripides, *Troades* 764 (OCT), where Andromache has just been told of the impending murder of her son by the Greeks. There the words are poignant, since the barbaric evils are done to barbarians, not by barbarians, but by Greeks. Here, however, there is another dimension, for although, if Agesilaos had been allowed to stay, barbaric evils would again have been done, but,



in the ordinary Greek view, more rightly, by Greeks to barbarians, now, instead, Greeks are inflicting them on themselves. Plutarch makes the point as a moralist in a narrowly Hellenic view: an effective attack on the King was clearly beyond Agesilaos' available resources.

τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο τὸν φθόνον ἐκεῖνον προσείποι καὶ τὴν τότε σύστασιν καὶ σύνταξιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ τῆς τύχης ἄνω φερομένης ἐπελόβοντο, καὶ τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους βλέποντα καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἤδη τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐξωκισμένον αὖθις εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἔτρεψαν;

The rhetorical question continues the chronological progression by commenting on the diversion of Agesilaos' forces to the Greek homeland. Plutarch is predicating barbarism of the malice, political association, and military organization, involved in the Corinthian War. He should not, perhaps, be taken as referring only to the anti-Spartan alliance, as if the war was motivated by the wish to deprive the Spartans of the glory of taking revenge on the King. There could rather be a broader condemnation of the inability of the Greek cities to find a more just distribution of wealth and power, and to avoid the divisive effect of the complicated web of defensive alliances and political alignments that led to conflicts. The terminology interestingly fits the current debate (1989-90) about finding a compromise for Europe between national sovereignty rights and the needs of the continental and world-wide community. Plutarch has not recognized the potential of the federal solution which was attempted by the Thebans in the Confederacy of his native Boiotia, but instead he approves the available alternative of a unifying crusade against a common enemy. The reality is that anti-Persian sentiments, and anticipated joy at the thought of a Persian downfall, occur in the intervals between periods of cooperation with and financial support from individual Kings or satraps. (D.M. Lewis, 1977). In his own day, perhaps, Plutarch would think the Roman achievement a successful fulfilment of this objective.

4... οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τῷ Κορινθίῳ Δημαράτῳ μεγάλης ἡδονῆς ἀπολελεῖσθαι φήσαντι τοὺς μὴ θεασαμένους Ἑλληνας Ἀλέξανδρον ἐν τῷ Δαρείου θρόνῳ καθήμενον, ἀλλ' εἰκότως ἂν οἴμαι δακρῦσαι, συννοήσαντος ὅτι ταῦτ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ Μακεδόσιν ἀπέλιπον οἱ τότε τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατ[ηγ]οὺς περὶ Λεῦκτρα καὶ Κορώνειαν καὶ Κόρινθον καὶ Ἀρκαδίαν κατανήλωσαντες.

For the first time in this *Life* Plutarch is speaking in the first person. Demaratos' remark, first made to Alexander, was recalled later, apparently to contrast the friendly treatment of a flatterer with that of Kallisthenes, who had refused obeisance. He had earlier confronted Philip with the contrast between his concern for Greek harmony and the disharmony in his own household, which might have been used as an analogy for the larger disunity (*Alexander* 9, 37, 56). Plutarch seems to regret two things, the first, that Agesilaos did not go on to achieve the triumph that Alexander later did achieve, and the second, that Alexander, who achieved it, was Macedonian, and not Greek. The generals who perished in the battles mentioned include the Spartan king, Kleombrotos, and the Boiotian, Epameinondas.

5 Ἀγησιλάῳ μέντοι οὐδὲν κρεῖσσον ἢ μείζον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως ἐκείνης διαπεπραγμένον, οὐδὲ γέγονε παράδειγμα πειθαρχίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἕτερον κάλλιον.

After his moralizing intervention, Plutarch continues the narrative progression with a comment on Agesilaos' response to the order he has just received. He hints that we have reached the zenith - οὐδὲν κρεῖσσον - having just referred, in anticipation, to what will, perhaps, be the nadir, in Leuktra and Mantinea. It is not a simple *peripateia*, however, for the traditional Spartan way of life retained Plutarch's admiration, and in this chapter he shows it at its best. Obedience was one of the important objectives of the Lykourgan upbringing of Spartans, and Plutarch here assigns the highest of his praises to Agesilaos on this account. Xenophon does not comment favourably at *Hell.* IV.ii.3, where Agesilaos shows his annoyance, χαλεπῶς μὲν ἤνεγκεν, ἐνθυμούμενος καὶ οἷων τιμῶν καὶ οἷων ἐλπίδων ἀπεστερεῖτο, but at *Agesilaos* I.36 he shows that Agesilaos' immediate reaction was



obedience simply, ἐπείθετο τῇ πόλει. He follows this with extravagant claims of Agesilaos' restraint in making his choice:

μάλα ἔνδηλον ποιῶν, ὥς οὔτε ἄν πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν δέξαιτο ἀντὶ τῆς πατρίδος οὔτε τοὺς ἐπικτήτους ἀντὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φίλων οὔτε αἰσχροῖα καὶ ἀκίνδυνα κέρδη μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ κινδύνων τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια.

Plutarch has selected the last item, justice, to couple with obedience, having already referred abundantly to the plans that were to be abandoned. Of the three comparative adjectives used here, κρεῖσσον, μεῖζόν and κάλλιον, the first two seem to refer to the importance of Agesilaos' obedience for Sparta's security and for Agesilaos' character. Only the last is a moral quality, as is appropriate in connection with πειθαρχίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης. Later it will emerge that, for Agesilaos, justice was to be defined as the best interest of Sparta.

6 ὅπου γὰρ Ἀννίβας ἤδη κακῶς πράττων καὶ περιωθούμενος . . . Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καὶ προσεπέσκηψε.

The distinguishing feature of the first of these two counter-examples is the lack of any positive prospect of success to be sacrificed by Hannibal. The distinguishing feature of the second is Alexander's refusal to return. These two examples exhaust the possibilities of the relevance of counter-examples to Agesilaos' obedience with sacrifice, namely, obedience without sacrifice and disobedience without sacrifice, since disobedience with sacrifice is meaningless. Alexander indicates his refusal to return by giving his answer in the form of a jest, to his further discredit. The anecdote is not included in *Alexander*, but Plutarch recorded there (cc.10-14) how mainland Greece had been secured before his Persian campaign (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.212).

πῶς οὐκ ἦν ἄξιον τὴν Σπάρτην μακαρίσαι τῆς Ἀγησιλάου τιμῆς πρὸς τ' αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς νόμους τῆς εὐλαβείας; 7 ὃς ἅμα τῷ τὴν σκυτάλην ἐλθεῖν εὐτυχίαν τοσαύτην καὶ δύναμιν παροῦσαν καὶ τηλικαύτως ἐλπίδας ὑψηλοῦς ἀφείς καὶ προέμενος, εὐθύς ἀπέπλευσεν "ἀτελευτήτῳ ἐπὶ ἔργῳ", πολὺν ἑαυτοῦ πόθον τοῖς συμμάχοις ἀπολιπών.

Plutarch's phrase recalls the opening sentence of Xenophon's

tribute at *Agesilaos* I.36: ἄξιόν γε μὴν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ὑπερβαλλόντως ἄγασθαι αὐτοῦ. After the two counter-examples have shown Agesilaos' superiority, Plutarch, again approving the qualities inculcated under Lykourgos' system, enlarges upon the two praiseworthy aspects of his actions, πειθαρχίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, and suggests now that this display of patriotism and respect for law brings credit on Sparta. The action involved in Agesilaos' obedience now advances the narrative, and is given in concrete terms, having been expressed so far only in abstract. The unfinished task is referred to in a quotation from *Iliad* IV.175: ἀτελευτήτῳ ἐπὶ ἔργῳ, the fulfilment of the fear expressed in c.6 at Aulis: ὥς ἀτελῶν αὐτῷ τῶν πράξεων γενησομένων. Plutarch here records, in the appropriate context, the hopes that Agesilaos gives up at his departure, while Xenophon at this point gives his retrospective account of the past achievements. However, both authors follow on with the record of the allies' attitude to Agesilaos, though Xenophon's expressions contrast Plutarch's restraint:

ὥς πατρός καὶ ἐταίρου ἀπιόντος αὐτοῦ ἐλυποῦντο (*Ages.*I.38)

ἀκούσαντες δὲ ταῦτα πολλοὶ μὲν ἐδάκρυσαν (*Hell.* IV.ii.4).

καὶ μάλιστα δὴ τὸν Ἐρασιστράτου τοῦ φαίακος ἐλέγξας λόγον εἰπόντος ὥς εἰσὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι βελτίονες, ἰδίᾳ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι. 8 βασιλέα γὰρ ἑαυτὸν καὶ στρατηγὸν ἄριστον ἐπιδειξάμενος, ἔτι βελτίονα καὶ ἡδίωνα τοῖς χρωμένοις ἰδίᾳ φίλον καὶ συνήθη παρέσχε.

Plutarch gives his judgement, at this stage, of Agesilaos as king, general, friend and companion, but he expresses it in the form of a vindication of the general character of Spartans. Agesilaos' successful combination of these functions renders them superior to the Athenians, not only in public life, which Erasistratos has conceded, but also in their private lives, guided, for Plutarch, by Lykourgan principles.

τοῦ δὲ Περσικοῦ νομίσματος χάραγμα τοξότην ἔχοντος, ἀναζευγνύων ἔφη <τρεις> μυρίοις τοξόταις ὑπὸ βασιλέως ἐξελαύνεσθαι τῆς Ἀσίας. τοσούτων γὰρ εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ Θήβας κομισθέντων καὶ διαδοθέντων τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς ἐξεπολεμώθησαν οἱ δῆμοι πρὸς τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

The anecdote showing Agesilaos' sense of humour, as he was



de-camping, appropriately rounds off the treatment of public and private qualities with an illustration of him as ἡδύονα συνήθη (cf. c.2: παίζοντα καὶ σκώπτοντα). In giving his explanation of Agesilaos' claim, Plutarch records details of the antecedents of the war in Greece which led to the order for his recall. Xenophon lists Thebes, Argos and Corinth as the recipients of the Persian money, omitting Athens, but Plutarch agrees with the Oxyrhynchos Historian (VII.2) in including Athens (see above), and he is thought to be right (P.A.Cartledge (1987) p.291).

PART FIVE

THE RETURN TO SPARTA

(Chapters 16-19)



## CHAPTER 16

### Verbal stratagems backed by force

1 Ὡς δὲ διαβάς τὸν Ἑλλησπόντον ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῆς Θράκης, ἐδεήθη μὲν οὐδενὸς τῶν βαρβάρων, πέμπων δὲ πρὸς ἑκάστους ἐπυνθάνετο πότερον ὡς φίλῳ ἢ ὡς πολεμίῳ διαπορεύηται τὴν χώραν.

For Spartan interest in the northern Greece see Endnote 4. Thrace, the first of the three countries to be passed through, is not mentioned by Xenophon, who omits detailed reference to Agesilaos' route from the Hellespont, until Derkylidas meets him at Amphipolis with the news of the Spartans' victory at Nemea, and he has not recorded any hostility at this point. Diodoros (XIV. 83.3-4) devotes only three sentences to this part of Agesilaos' journey, mentioning opposition in Thrace. His reference to the formation of the Council of Corinth, and to its recruitment of the Chalkidians of Thrace as allies among the northern cities (XIV.82), prepares the reader for the opposition met here by Agesilaos. Plutarch's reference to these peoples as barbarians perhaps sufficiently prepares the reader to expect a hostile reception here for the Greeks. He indicates that Agesilaos was confident that he could cope with either answer to his question, which, as it stands, suggests Agesilaos' threatened treatment of the countryside. A different expression, ὡς φίλος ἢ ὡς πολεμῖος, would perhaps have suggested treatment of people, as is clear from the parallel question: πότερον ὀρθοῖς τοῖς δόρασιν ἢ κεκλιμένοις διαπορεύεται τὴν χώραν (*Lysander* 22.4). The answer received below, ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐλέκευσεν ὡς φίλον προάγειν, equivalent to "I will treat you as a friend", is appropriate, for the king controls the territory.

The chapter contains a rhetorical series of six cases, in two sets of three, also found at *Apophthegm. Lak.* (Ages. 42-46; *Mor.* 211), illustrating Agesilaos' wit, laconic brevity, confidence and bluff. Agesilaos' question is asked in the first three cases, where peaceful passage is a possibility, since there is no initial state of conflict, but

it is not asked in the other three where it would be inappropriate, when, in the second part of the journey, Agesilaos faces peoples already committed to hostility towards Sparta, as allies of Sparta's enemies, as he would learn from Derkylidas at Amphipolis (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.1). There ensues either a peaceful passage or an enforced passage, resulting from the three possibilities: diplomatic agreement, resistance, aggression. The patterns are chiastic, the first three in the order peaceful, enforced, peaceful, and the second three in reverse order, enforced, peaceful, enforced. The first two peaceful passages represent Agesilaos' successful diplomacy, contrasting the rejection of his later diplomatic approach, while in the first two contested passages Agesilaos is the aggressor, contrasting the final conflict, started by his opponents.

2 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πάντες φιλικῶς ἐδέχοντο καὶ παρέπεμπον, ὡς ἕκαστος δυνάμεως εἶχεν· οἱ δὲ καλούμενοι Τράλλεις, οἷς καὶ Ξέρξης ἔδωκεν, ὡς λέγεται, δῶρα, τῆς διόδου μισθὸν ἦτουν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ἑκατὸν ἀργυρίου τάλαντα καὶ τοσαύτας γυναῖκας.

Plutarch records only briefly the first of the responses, made freely by the cities, granting a friendly passage, ὡς φιλίων, with the main consequence in a single word, παρέπεμπον, but allowing for differences according to the resources of each city. Plutarch alone names the Tralleis, as also the incident. Their identity is unknown, as is the people named alternatively Τρωχαεῖς, here and at *Apophthegm. Lak., Mor.* 211 (L.Robert (1935) 426-427). ὡς λέγεται, used when Plutarch does not mention his source, perhaps extends the uncertainty to the name of the people. The contrast with Xerxes shows Agesilaos' display of confidence in his military superiority: he did not resort to bribery. Plutarch may have been reminded of the story about Xerxes by Xenophon's statement that Agesilaos was travelling the same route as the King (*Hell.* IV.ii.8, *Agesilaos* II.1). Plutarch preserves details otherwise unknown. By coincidence, 100 talents is also the sum given to Delphi (c.19). The women demanded were no doubt expected to be



handed over from collected booty, but are not elsewhere mentioned.

3 ὁ δὲ κατειρωνεύσάμενος αὐτοὺς καὶ φήσας· Τί οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς ἦλθον ληψόμενοι; προῆγε. καὶ συμβαλὼν αὐτοῖς παρατεταγμένοις ἐτρέψατο καὶ διέφθειρε πολλούς.

The refusal of unconditional peaceful passage by this tribe has elicited from Agesilaos a suitable rhetorical challenge, εὐθὺς, "immediately", suggesting that they should have attacked him even before receiving his message, and should have taken the payment without even asking for it. Plutarch, here and in two cases following, has used direct speech to allow readers to see for themselves, in Homeric fashion, the audacious, quick-witted and humane character of Agesilaos in action. The consequent aggression imposed on Agesilaos corresponds to the second of the two possibilities anticipated in the list, ὡς πολεμίων.

*Apophthegm. Lak.* (Ages. 24; Mor. 210) attributes to the Thasians the episode recorded by Plutarch at c.36, in which Agesilaos rejects the gifts offered by the Egyptians. The following anecdote (Ages. 25) uniquely recounts his rejection also of the Thasians' offer of divine honours. There are doubts about the authenticity of this offer, but it has also been accepted and placed in 394BC (see M.A.Fowler (1988) pp.123-34). As a Greek colony Thasos does not belong either with the "barbarians" in Thrace or with their neighbours, the Makedonians, mentioned by Plutarch, and Agesilaos was in too much of a hurry to reach home to deal with problems on the way which might have led to the honour. Neither Xenophon nor Plutarch mentions it, although the rejection of divine honours would have been highly appropriate in c.19 below, where the adverse effect on Agesilaos of travel abroad is discounted, and also in several places in the list of his virtues in Xenophon's *Agesilaos*. Omission by Xenophon is not proof of his ignorance, and equally it gives little support for the occurrence of an event (ibid. p.127; cf. G.L.Cawkwell (1979) p.33). The name in the text

of the anecdote at *Apophthegm. Lak.* (Ages. 24; *Mor.* 210) is not secure and there may be positive grounds for accepting that it belongs to the Egyptian campaign (see c.36). The rejection of an ἀποθέωσις may be an echo of the rejection of a statue (c.2.4; *Xen. Agesilaos* XI.7).

4 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐρώτημα προσέπεμψε·  
φήσαντος δὲ βουλευέσθαι, Βουλευέσθω τοίνυν ἐκεῖνος, εἶπεν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἤδη  
πορευόμεθα. θαυμάσας οὖν τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ καὶ δείσας ὁ βασιλεὺς  
ἐκέλευσεν ὥς φίλον προάγειν.

The second country opens a third possible response, neither granting nor refusing passage. Again, however, the failure to offer unconditional passage elicits a rhetorical challenge. Agesilaos' reputation is shown, in Homeric fashion, to be formidable. Polyainos records another device used by Agesilaos in obtaining an agreed passage through Makedonia, bluffing the king into thinking that he had a large cavalry force by placing his cavalry behind his infantry in two lines, with asses, mules and old pack-horses mixed up with it (II.1.17). This second peaceful passage corresponds again to the first of the possibilities listed, ὥς φιλῖαν, but the friendly passage is exacted by Agesilaos' firmness, not freely granted. The two exacted cases are linked by the repetition of the verb, προῆγε and προάγειν.

5 τῶν δὲ Θετταλῶν τοῖς πολεμίοις συμμαχούντων ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν.

Plutarch here apparently attributes to Agesilaos knowledge of the situation created by the alliances of the Council of Corinth, the foundation of which was mentioned by Diodoros but ignored by Xenophon, who, however, shows that Agesilaos had an opportunity of being briefed by Derkylidas at Amphipolis. The already existing state of hostility introduces a new approach to the problem by Agesilaos, and new responses from the peoples he met, although, since Xenophon does not list Thessalians among the forces at the Nemea, there was evidently not an open war in the area. As Thucydides pointed out, however, "It was never an easy thing to go through Thessaly



unescorted and of course with an army it was harder still" (IV.78). Here, appropriately, there is no preliminary enquiry, but only immediate and aggressive action. The situation requires Agesilaos to fight a way through ὥς πολεμίαν. Xenophon, on the other hand, attributes the first aggression initially to the four named Thessalian cities, and uses the imperfect tense - "tried to, began to, continued to" cause him damage:

Λαρισσαῖοι μὲν οὖν καὶ Κραννώνιοι καὶ Σκοτουσσαῖοι καὶ Φαρσάλιοι, σύμμαχοι ὄντες Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ πάντες δὲ Θετταλοί, πλὴν ὅσοι αὐτῶν φυγάδες τότε ἐτύγγανον, ἐκακούργουν αὐτὸν ἐπακολουθοῦντες (*Hell* IV.iii.3).

These "allies" could not do more than protect their own property, apparently not attempting to prevent reinforcements reaching their enemies. To do more, they would no doubt have needed support from the Council of Corinth, but after Nemea this was not readily available. Medizing in the past had been in part due to the existence of the choice of passes through the mountains, and it would also be difficult to stop Agesilaos completely, once he had gained entry to the plain.

5 εἰς δὲ Λάρισσαν ἔπεμψε Ξενοκλέα καὶ Σκύθην περὶ φιλίας συλληφθέντων δὲ τούτων καὶ παραφυλασσομένων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι βορέως φέροντες ᾤοντο δεῖν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον περιστρατοπεδεύσαντα πολιορκεῖν τὴν Λάρισσαν, ὃ δὲ φήσας οὐκ ἂν ἐθελῆσαι Θεσσαλίαν ὅλην λαβεῖν ἀπολέσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ἕτερον, ὑποσπόνδους αὐτοὺς ἀπέλαβε.

Agesilaos' second reaction in enemy territory is to attempt to negotiate an unopposed way through. His negotiations were unsuccessful, contrasting the success of his previous belligerence, and the Larissaians' seizure of the envoys indicates the underlying potential for hostilities. The advisers' suggestion of violent action, juxtaposed with the violence of the Larissaians and Agesilaos' non-violence before and after, makes a chiastic pattern. The capture of the town by siege would be a blow to the anti-Spartan alliance, but Agesilaos had not been successful in besieging cities in Asia, and delay in his main mission would be unwelcome. Agesilaos persists with a non-violent suggestion, and the subsequent truce suggests a

willingness on the part of the Thessalians, too, to keep a low profile. The terms of the agreement may have been a guarantee of unobstructed passage, in return for an end to the plundering which marked the early stage. The two envoys may have been held as hostages for a time, and the Thessalian escort would ensure a passage free from incident.

6 καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ θαυμαστὸν οὐκ ἦν, ὃς πυθόμενος μάχην μεγάλην γεγονέναι περὶ Κόρινθον καὶ ἄνδρας τῶν πάνυ ἐνδόξων ὥς ἔνι μάλιστα αἰφνίδιον ἀπολωλέναι καὶ Σπαρτιατῶν μὲν ὀλίγους παντάπασι τεθνηκέναι, παμπόλλους δὲ τῶν πολεμίων, οὐκ ὤφθη περιχαρὴς οὐδ' ἐπηρμένος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ βαρὺ στενάξας, φεῖ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἔφη, τοσούτους ἄνδρας ἀπολωλεκυίας ὑφ' αὐτῆς, ὅσοι ζῶντες ἐδύναντο νικᾶν ὁμοῦ σύμπαντας τοὺς βαρβάρους μαχόμενοι.

The series of encounters is interrupted with a comment on the significance of the incident for Agesilaos' humane character, and for his Panhellenism (cf. Xen. *Agesilaos* VII.3, 6, 7). Plutarch also uses Agesilaos' respect for life, displayed here, as an opportunity to introduce news of the battle fought near Nemea, which took place before Agesilaos could reach Greece, but was, in Xenophon, reported to him at Amphipolis. The exclamation emphasizes also the Panhellenic nature of the sentiments that follow. Again, the incident ends with words spoken by Agesilaos. Cf. c.9 above.

The words ἄνδρας . . . καὶ are rejected by Sintenis and Bekker but the point, especially of τῶν πάνυ ἐνδόξων, seems to enhance Agesilaos' concern for a frustrated Panhellenic objective, not only for a small, purely Spartan, loss contrasted with heavy enemy losses.

7 τῶν δὲ Φαρσαλίων προσκειμένων αὐτῷ καὶ κακούντων τὸ στράτευμα, πεντακοσίοις ἵππεῦσιν ἐμβαλεῖν κελεύσας σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ τρεψόμενος ἔστησε τρόπαιον ὑπὸ τῷ Νορθακίῳ.

Plutarch resumes his narrative of the march, giving the impression that the harassment by the Pharsalians was a new development, whereas Xenophon says the Thessalians attacked continually, though, even there, the culmination is a confrontation in lines of battle in which Polycharmos and the Pharsalian cavalry are



prominent. It is not clear whether the Pharsalians or Agesilaos initiated the last minute demonstration of strength, but Xenophon indicates a more positive Spartan effort in using all reserves of cavalry to force the retreat, after the Thessalians had shown some hesitation in engaging in battle with hoplites. For Plutarch, the final encounter completes the two patterns of the six cases. In the second series of three, the first and last involve violent action, in the first case, from Agesilaos against the Thessalians, in the second case, reversing the positions, from the Pharsalians against Agesilaos. These frame the peaceful passage under the truce with the Larissaians. In the first series, by contrast, the pattern was the reverse, the two peaceful passages framing the violent action against the Tralleis. The first case in each series is given without complications, in a general form, as if to set a standard for the following contrasted pairs of consequences, in which peace can be broken or maintained, violence can be avoided or resumed. Agesilaos takes appropriate action, and achieves his desired passage in all possible situations. Rhetorical arrangement may have played a large part, portraying the complete character of the leader.

In Xenophon's account of Agesilaos' response to the harassment (*Hell.* IV.iii.4-8), he engaged initially the vanguard of his cavalry, πλὴν τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, and later, πέμπει τοὺς περὶ αὐτόν μάλα εὐρώστους ἱππέας, but there is no suggestion that Agesilaos went with them. Polycharmos, the Pharsalian leader, fell fighting σὺν τοῖς περὶ αὐτόν. Without the comma which Ziegler places after πεντακοσίοις ἱππεῦσιν, Plutarch seems to be suggesting that Agesilaos, too, led his horsemen in person, whether adding an illustration of his personal courage, or simply misinterpreting Xenophon.

For the Battle of NARTHAKION, see Endnote 5.

8 καὶ τὴν νίκην ὑπερηγάγησεν ἐκείνην, ὅτι συστησόμενος ἱππικὸν αὐτὸς δι' ἑαυτοῦ, τούτῳ μόνῳ τοὺς μέγιστον ἐφ' ἱππικῇ φρονοῦντας ἐκράτησεν.

The incident at the end of the series of events in Thessaly, like the previous one, leads to an account of an aspect of Agesilaos' character, this time, following Xenophon, recording his delight in his successful formation of the cavalry. The report of Agesilaos' own words again forms the conclusion.



## CHAPTER 17

### To the Boiotian border

1 Ἐνταῦθα Διφρίδας οἴκοθεν ἔφορος ὢν ἀήντησεν αὐτῷ κελεύων εὐθὺς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν.

If the ephor, Diphridas, met Agesilaos at the southern border of Thessaly, he may have avoided enemy territory in central Boiotia by crossing the Gulf of Corinth and using the pass via Amphissa to Gravia. In c.15 Epikydidias, who brought the instructions for recall from the ephors, was described simply as ὁ Σπορτιάτης. Apart from the greater distance, Asia Minor would involve travel outside mainland Greece, taking an ephor beyond the sphere of his duties (cf. Xen. *Hell.* III.ii.12). Plutarch has explained the outbreak of the war at c.15, and in c.16, after leaving Larissa, Agesilaos was told of the battle at the Nemea ("fought near Corinth"). Diodoros (XIV.82.6-10) and Xenophon (*Hell.* III.v.3) have given adequate notice of hostilities in Boiotia, and the Oxyrhynchos Historian (XVIII.2-5) describes in detail how the dispute was engineered by the anti-Spartan leaders of Thebes over the use of pasture on the border between Phokis and Lokris. Agesilaos was clearly kept informed, as Xenophon also indicates when he has Derkylidas bring the news of Nemea to Agesilaos at Amphipolis, before he entered even Makedonia (*Hell.* IV.iii.1), but Xenophon omits the order to invade Boiotia - he did not say that it was brought by Derkylidas. Xenophon's narrative suggests that it was the normal route for Agesilaos to be following that brought him to the Boiotian border, where he found the allied forces drawn up against him (*Hell.* IV.iii.9-10, 15).

2 ὁ δέ, καίπερ ἀπὸ μείζονος παρασκευῆς ὕστερον τοῦτο ποιῆσαι διανοούμενος, οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεῖν ἀπειθεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τε μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ προεῖπεν ἐγγὺς εἶναι τὴν ἡμέραν ἐφ' ἣν ἐξ Ἀσίας ἤκουσι, καὶ δύο μόρας μετεπέμψατο τῶν περὶ Κόρινθον στρατευομένων.

We do not hear of this prior intention anywhere else, but it is a

reasonable assumption, considering the route Agesilaos was taking. The obedience of Agesilaos to the commands of the ephors is illustrated for the second time. "Those with him" are probably the advisers, not the whole army. It is too early for the pre-battle exhortation, but not for a high-level briefing in preparation for the important engagement in view. At *Agesilaos* II.6 Xenophon claims that Agesilaos drew up his army for battle at once (οὐδὲν ἐμέλλετο), but Plutarch has turned to *Hellenika* IV.iii.15, where Xenophon records the Spartans' transfer to Agesilaos of one μόρα from Corinth, and half a μόρα from the garrison at Orchomenos, which had been there perhaps since Lysander had caused the city to revolt from Thebes before Haliartos. Plutarch's report of two μόραι seems to be a mistake.

3 οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ πόλει Λακεδαιμόνιοι τιμῶντες αὐτὸν ἐκήρυξαν τῶν νέων ἀπογράφεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον τῷ βασιλεῖ βοηθεῖν. ἀπογραψαμένων δὲ πάντων προθύμως, οἱ ἄρχοντες πεντήκοντα τοὺς ἀκμαιοτάτους καὶ ῥωμαλεωτάτους ἐκλέξαντες ἀπέστειλαν.

Voluntary enlistment or participation in a campaign "in the ranks" is not the same as the voluntary service of a mercenary, or of the officers in the contingent that had been in service with Kyros. The call for volunteers is strange, and it would not fit in with the normal call-up procedure with which the war had begun (Xen. *Hell.* III.v.6), even if there had been a partial stand-down after Nemea, though none is mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* IV.ii.23). The size of the contingent is significant. Spartiates were usually sent out in small numbers: a commander - Gylippos to Syracuse - or an advisory board - with Agesilaos to Asia: most of the troops were usually Lakedaimonians, Peloponnesians or emancipated Helots (Xen. *Hell.* III.i.4, IV.iii.15). Plutarch assigns these to Agesilaos' bodyguard (c.18). Following a suggestion by J.F.Lazenby, could it be a detachment of the unmounted ἱππεῖς (*Lak. Pol.* 4)? The dispatch would perhaps be in recognition of the need to increase the proportion of Spartiates in Agesilaos' force.



4     ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος εἶσω Πυλῶν παρελθὼν καὶ διοδεύσας τὴν Φωκίδα φίλην οὔσαν.

Since the Lokrian tribes are among the listed allies of Thebes, the route followed can hardly have taken Agesilaos into Lokris. After Koroneia, Gylis withdrew the army into Phokis and from there invaded Lokris (Xen. *Hell.* IV.iii.21), which was no place for casual entry, for Gylis was killed in the fighting there. Diodoros (XIV 82.3), like Plutarch, gives the route as passing through Thermopylai. Xenophon says, after describing the crossing of the Hellespont, that Agesilaos was following the same route as Xerxes (*Hell.* IV.ii.8), but this should, perhaps, not be pressed to include Thermopylai, for he mentions this, perhaps originally, at *Agesilaos* II.1, only in order to contrast the two armies' rates of progress. Although Diodoros makes the same statement, it is not at the point when Agesilaos crossed the Hellespont, but only later as he went through Makedonia, and then, after Thessaly, he immediately mentions the pass at Thermopylai. Anyone reading Xenophon's reference to Xerxes' route might suppose Thermopylai to be included, and if mention of the point is, as in Diodoros' version, postponed until later, then Thermopylai will be very much in mind. Plutarch presumably knew the area well, living at Chaironeia. Since Lokris was hostile territory, however, there is good reason to suppose that Agesilaos avoided entering it. From Nartakion the direct route to Boiotia goes south, but, even if he went to Thermopylai, he would still be able to avoid most of Lokris by using the Dhrimaia pass: either way he would have a mountain range to cross before reaching the Kephisos valley. Spartans had full opportunity to acquire topographical knowledge of the area when on garrison duty in the colony they established at Herakleia in 426 (Thuc. III.92), and subsequently when Herippidas was sent there in 400 (Diodoros XIV.38.4; see S.Hornblower (1983) p.186). Perhaps Xenophon's silence about Thermopylai may be significant. It would be natural for a later writer to seize the chance

to include a further reference to a famous name, for the same reason that Xenophon here included just the one, that of Xerxes. In Herodotos (VIII.31), Xerxes' main army marched through Trachis, Doris and Phokis after the battle of Thermopylai, as described by Grundy (W.W.How and J.Wells (1912) p.243) and illustrated in Maps 7 and 8 of *C.A.H.* Vol.IV. Doris was regarded as the early home of the Dorians. Xenophon, without naming Phocis, says that after crossing the mountains in Phthia from NARTHAKION AGESILAOS' route was now through friendly territory until he reached Boiotia, where he found the allies drawn up against him.

ἐπεὶ τῆς Βοιωτίας πρῶτον ἐπέβη καὶ περὶ τὴν Χαιρώνειαν κατεστρατοπέδευσεν, ἅμα μὲν τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα καὶ γινόμενον μηνόειδῃ κατεῖδεν, ἅμα δὲ ἤκουσε τεθνάναι Πείσανδρον ἡττημένον ναυμαχίᾳ περὶ Κνίδον ὑπὸ Φαρναβάζου καὶ Κόνωνος.

Plutarch takes the opportunity to mention his home town, not named elsewhere at this point - perhaps it was a piece of history locally preserved. He also enlarges on Xenophon's report that the moon appeared crescent-shaped (*Hell.* IV.iii.10), but the news of Peisander's death is given with laconic brevity, the effective word, the infinitive, placed first, the full significance being withheld until Peisander is named. Diodoros, who reports the battle at XIV.83.4-7, shows at some length that Peisander battled in a way worthy of Sparta, though both Plutarch and Xenophon seemed to doubt, with hindsight, the wisdom of Agesilaos' appointment of his brother-in-law, the young and inexperienced Peisander, as admiral, perhaps unjustly, when they reported it in Asia Minor (c.10.11; *Hell.* III.iv.29, IV.iii.11-12).

5 ἡχθέσθη μὲν οὖν, ὥς εἰκός, ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ διὰ τὴν πόλιν, ὅπως δὲ μὴ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ μάχην βαδίζουσιν ἀθυμία καὶ φόβος ἐμπέσῃ, τὰναντία λέγειν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἤκοντας, ὅτι νικῶσι τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ.

The personal distress, not mentioned by Xenophon, is clearly stated first, both as private grief for the brother of his wife, and for the city for which it meant the loss of a valuable young admiral of



aristocratic rank. Plutarch is thus establishing Agesilaos' humane character before he goes on to what might otherwise be the unfeeling concealment of the news. It was now impossible for Agesilaos to entertain, or profess to his friends from Asia Minor, his hope to resume his campaign there.

Xenophon has Agesilaos himself make the false announcement, which in Plutarch the messengers are said to have been ordered to do, exploiting a regular stratagem, ψευδοαγγελία or *salubre mendacium* (E.L.Wheeler (1988) pp.39-40 and *passim*). Neither Plutarch nor Xenophon comments on the morality or ingenuity of this action, or even on the risk of divine displeasure incurred in offering a thanksgiving to the gods for the good news. At *Hipparchikos* V.8 Xenophon recommends the commander to deceive the enemy with ψευδοαγγελία, though he does not say he should deceive his own men, and he adds the warning at V.14: σὺν τῷ θεῷ πράττειν συμβουλεύω. Here he seems to approve, for he attributes success in a skirmish to the ploy, and there are no other reported repercussions. One might have expected the truth perhaps to be withheld temporarily until after the battle, so that the troops would not be depressed by the bad news, and also to avoid a possible mass desertion of the Asia Minor contingent that had accompanied Agesilaos on the wave of enthusiasm following the promise of his return. The loyalty of these troops might have been put in doubt by the announcement of the truth, particularly because it bore on Agesilaos' ability to return to Asia. The arrival of the messengers by sea (τοὺς ἀπὸ θαλάττης ἤκοντος), perhaps difficult to hide, may have raised expectations necessitating some statement. The deception of his troops in this way was dangerous, in case, when next a victory was announced before a battle, the credibility of the general would be questioned. Agesilaos took a risk, and no doubt in retrospect the troops from mainland Greece would see the justification in the light of the outcome.

καὶ προελθὼν αὐτὸς ἐστεφανωμένος ἔθυσεν εὐαγγέλια καὶ διέπεμπε μερίδας τοῖς φίλοις ἀπὸ τῶν τεθυμένων.

The irony of sacrificing εὐαγγέλια after perpetrating ψευδαγγελία must be very close to the surface, though not explicit. The deception of the gods by Agesilaos is comparable with Tissaphernes' breaking of the truce under oath, yet it goes without comment and the criticism made of Agesilaos' attitude to strict justice in c.13 has not been repeated: perhaps the reader needs no reminder. The friends who received μερίδας may also have felt uncomfortable at having been involved in the deception.



## CHAPTER 18

### A disputed victory

1 Ἐπεὶ δὲ προϊὼν καὶ γενόμενος ἐν Κορωνείᾳ κατεῖδε τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατώφθῃ, παρετάξατο, δοὺς Ὀρχομενίοις τὸ εὐώνυμον κέρας, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν ἐπῆγεν.

Ancient Koroneia was in the foothills at the south-eastern end of Mt Helikon, on a low hill overlooking to the east and north the south-western part of the Kopaic basin (J.F.Lazenby (1985) Fig.11, Pl.12; W.K.Pritchett (1969) Chapter VII pp.85-95). At this place the shore of the then Lake Kopais was close to a spur of the eastern end of the Helikon Range, giving an obvious narrow gap suitable for the Boiotian attempt to block Agesilaos' progress towards Thebes. Beyond it, to the south-east, there is no further serious natural obstacle to the invader wishing to threaten Thebes. The Thebans, therefore, were clearly involved in the vital defence of their homeland, and no doubt were at full strength, although it may be suspected that, despite the silence of the authorities on this point, some troops may well have been stationed in position to offer a further barrier of resistance, for in the event the gap was not penetrated.

At *Agesilaos* II.6 and *Hell.* IV.iii.15 Xenophon gives details of Agesilaos' forces and also a list of the allies, whom he found already in position to oppose him, for, no doubt, they will have had reports of his progress from the north. The Orchomenians are given prominence, not only by Agesilaos in stationing them on the wing, but by Plutarch, who here mentions them alone among the Spartan allies, omitting the Phokians and the other contingents recorded by Xenophon. Plutarch may have been stirred by patriotism to show which side they were fighting on, for the Orchomenians had controlled Chaironeia, Plutarch's home, before 424 (Thuc. IV.76.3; Ox. *Hell.* XVI; R.J.Buck (1979) pp.97, 154f). Xenophon calls them specifically Sparta's "local" allies, and they may have seized the site for the Spartan camp here before Agesilaos'

arrival. They had been ancient rivals of Thebes for the leadership of the Boiotian League (J.A.O.Larsen (1955); id. (1968); also see C.Dull (1977) p.305), and had been encouraged to revolt from Thebes by Lysander (Xen. *Hell.* III.v.17). Their estrangement may explain their absence from the allies' force at the Nemea (Xen. *Hell.* IV.ii.17).

οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν εἶχον αὐτοί, τὸ δ' εὐώνυμον Ἀργεῖοι.

Of the Boiotians, Plutarch names only the Thebans, and although Xenophon names Βοιωτοί at *Hell.* IV.iii.15, he, too, refers only to οἱ σὺν τοῖς Θηβαίοις at IV.iii.16 and at *Agesilaos* II.9, giving the Thebans prominence. Of their allies, Plutarch mentions only the Argives, and his list highlights the forces on the wings, where the main actions took place. The allocation of stations meant that the Thebans and the Argives were each facing their traditional rivals in the Orchomenians and Spartans respectively. The choice of wings was also significant, for while the Spartans, perhaps, claimed the place of honour on the right, the Thebans, on their own right, were also covering the important gap between the high ground and the lake. Agesilaos' army would, of course, be an important reinforcement for the Lakedaimonians, if it reached the Peloponnese intact, but the Thebans were also defending the approach to their own territory.

2 λέγει δὲ τὴν μάχην ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐκείνην οἶαν οὐκ ἄλλην τῶν πώποτε γενέσθαι· καὶ παρῆν αὐτὸς τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ συναγωνιζόμενος, ἐξ Ἀσίας διαβεβηκώς.

Plutarch and Xenophon both mark this as a unique battle; Xenophon because it was somehow different from others *in his time*:

διηγῆσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην, καὶ πῶς ἐγένετο οἷα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ' ἐφ' ἡμῶν (*Hell.* IV.iii.16),

Plutarch, because it was somehow different from others "at any time", of necessity adjusting Xenophon's pronominal expression, and perhaps exaggerating because of his local interest and the importance of the event for Boiotia, rather than giving the simple substitute, τῶν τότε, a



conjecture followed by editors. No specific details are given to identify the special nature of this battle, but there are features that distinguish it. There were two distinct actions, and each side was in one part successful and in one part unsuccessful; the directions from which the two sides first approached and faced each other were reversed in the second action; but most importantly, perhaps, the Spartans, who failed in the end to achieve either their immediate objective of invading Boiotia, or their main aim of destroying the enemy, nevertheless remained in possession of the battleground and did manage to return home eventually, while the undefeated Thebans were unable to avoid asking permission to recover their dead.

Xenophon was mentioned in c.9 in a reference to Agesilaos' anxiety that he might be compared unfavourably with him, but his presence at the time in Asia was not then noticed. At *Anabasis* V.3.5, however, Xenophon records his return with Agesilaos, at least as far as Boiotia, and his offering to Apollo at Delphi mentioned there may have been made appropriately at this time. Plutarch's remark seems designed only to validate the judgement he has quoted, for while Xenophon's account makes use of ἐνόργεια, vivid description, exploiting his advantage as eye-witness, as earlier at Ephesos, Plutarch significantly ignores this detailed picture, and writes of Agesilaos himself, concentrating more on his actions and feelings than on the general sounds and sights of battle.

3 ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη σύρραξις οὐκ ἔσχεν ὄθισμὸν οὐδ' ἀγῶνα πολύν, ἀλλ' οἱ τε Θηβαῖοι ταχὺ τοὺς Ὀρχομενίους ἐτρέψαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ὁ Ἀγησίλαος.

Plutarch limits the action in the first engagement to the wings. Xenophon records in more detail that the initial charge was made, presumably in the centre, by Herippidas, from Agesilaos' phalanx, with the whole force joining it (*Hell.* IV.iii.17), but then he mentions only Agesilaos' success against the Argives. Plutarch, on the other hand,

has put the Theban success in routing the Orchomenians first, before mentioning the Spartan success to form a chiasmic pattern, and it is in its own context, whereas Xenophon mentions the Thebans only much later, when a man brought the news of them to Agesilaos, as he was already being garlanded by some mercenaries (*Hell.* IV.iii.18).

4 ἐπεὶ δ' ἀκούσαντες ἀμφότεροι τὰ εὐώνυμα πιέζεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν ἀνέστρεψαν, ἐνταῦθα τῆς νίκης ἀκινδύνου παρούσης, εἰ τῆς κατὰ στόμα μάχης ὑφέσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἠθέλησε καὶ παίειν ἐπόμενος παραλλάξαντας, ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ φιλονεικίας ἐναντίος ἐχώρει τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥσασθαι κατὰ κράτος βουλόμενος.

Plutarch's arrangement allows him to exploit this striking situation in a way that Xenophon was unable to do, perhaps because he was reluctant to reveal the Thebans' success. Indeed, Xenophon has shown this to be the case by reporting it, not in direct narrative in its own context, but in the form of the news delivered to Agesilaos during the premature rejoicing. The deliberate strengthening of the right wing was a frequent practice, but the confusion here is unusual, because the pronounced inequality between the opposing sections did not occur on only one wing, but occurred simultaneously on both wings.

In Xenophon's account (*Hell.* IV.iii.17) the Argives did not await the Spartan charge but fled to Mt Helikon immediately, and the Thebans' success against the Orchomenians carried them into the Spartan baggage area (*Hell.* IV.iii.18), which perhaps still contained the booty brought from Asia Minor. Plutarch has both sides now simply counter-marching to advance against the enemy, but while this may be true of Agesilaos, if, as Xenophon says, the Thebans were engaged already in plundering the treasure, then the re-organizing of their phalanx was a considerable achievement, in the face of the knowledge that they were cut off from their base and would have to penetrate, unaided, the main Spartan force. Plutarch has not at this point enlarged on the Theban success, but has concentrated on Agesilaos' generalship. With the phrase ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ φιλονεικίας, however, he



has introduced a cause of down-turn in a general's fortunes regularly found in other *Lives*, and also a reference to the hatred for Thebes that is regularly attributed to Agesilaos. This motivation shows that Plutarch is not seeking to eulogize him here, perhaps following Xenophon's lead, for although Xenophon presents the Thebans as wishing only to rejoin their defeated allies, as if to reach the safety of their base, he marks Agesilaos' next move as not the safest, but admits that it was a courageous one (*Hell.* IV.iii.19). Plutarch seems to require a further reason for this departure from Agesilaos' wise generalship. He might have attributed it to Agesilaos' φιλοτιμία here, in the sense, not of personal ambition, but of significant achievement, for, with sound logic, he was aiming for "annihilating victory", as has rightly been recognized (J.F.Lazenby (1985) p.146). Behind this aim, however, Plutarch has set an emotional trait which Xenophon abundantly shared with Agesilaos, his hostility to Thebes.

5 οἱ δ' οὐχ ἥττον ἐρρωμένως ἐδέξαντο, καὶ μάχη γίνεται δι' ὅλου μὲν ἰσχυρὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος, ἰσχυροτάτη δὲ κατ' ἐκείνον αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς πεντήκοντα τεταγμένον, ὧν εἰς καιρὸν ἔοικεν ἢ φιλοτιμία τῷ βασιλεῖ γενέσθαι σωτήριος.

Agesilaos' choice allows Plutarch to present greater honour for the Thebans, for he seems to imply that, just as Agesilaos preferred to attempt a convincing victory by direct force, so the Thebans welcomed the challenge, and would have felt that they had lost by trickery, if Agesilaos had chosen the other tactic. Indeed, Plutarch has used Xenophon's expression, ἐρρωμένως, not, as in his context, to describe the Thebans' efforts to reach their base, Helikon, and their friends, but transferring it to his own context, to describe their having "received Agesilaos' attack with no less vigour". The fifty who saved the king may be those chosen from the volunteers in c.17.3. Their φιλοτιμία seems to supply the "desire for achievement" which was not displayed here by Agesilaos, and they made good his deficiency with "a timely measure of safety", εἰς καιρὸν and σωτήριος being usually for

the general to ensure (cf. cc.8, 28, 36, 37, 39; and 16).

6 ἀγωνιζόμενοι γὰρ ἐκθύμως καὶ προκινδυνεύοντες, ἄτρωτον μὲν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐδυνήθησαν φυλάξαι, πολλὰς δὲ διὰ τῶν ὅπλων δεξάμενον εἰς τὸ σῶμα πληγὰς δόρασι καὶ ξίφεσι μόλις ἀνήρπασαν ζῶντα, καὶ συμφράξαντες πρὸ αὐτοῦ πολλοὺς μὲν ἀνήρουν, πολλοὶ δὲ ἔπιπτον.

The volunteers have compensated for the destructive motivation, ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ φιλονεικίας, of Agesilaos himself (see above), so mitigating and reducing the excess which might otherwise have been fatal, as in other *Lives*. Xenophon does not record Agesilaos' wound until he has assigned the victory to him. By placing it here, Plutarch indicates the intensity of the fighting and shows that the Thebans were taking the Spartans' ground. In this way rather than by repetition or imitation, he matches Xenophon's vivid description, ἐνόργεια, particularly his striking group of verbs, καὶ συμβαλόντες τὸς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον, ἀπέθνησκον. If the order of the verbs corresponds to the stages in the battle, Xenophon is suggesting that the thrust came before the decisive use of weaponry. The left wings here did not complete the first clash, but on the right wings, to judge by present scenes of violence (1980s), the pressure of deep phalanxes would appear likely to crush a man's ribs before long, a point which is not generally recognized in discussions of the nature of a hoplite battle (G.L.Cawkwell (1989) pp.375-89).

7 ὥς δὲ μέγα ἔργον ἦν ᾧσασθαι προτροπάδην τοὺς Θηβαίους, ἠναγκάσθησαν ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐκ ἐβούλοντο ποιῆσαι. 8 διέστησαν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ διέσχον, εἴτ' ἀτακτότερον ἤδη πορευομένους, ὥς διεξέπεσον, ἀκολουθοῦντες καὶ παραθέοντες ἐκ πλαγίων ἔπαιον.

Plutarch repeats the infinitive used above to express the aim Agesilaos wished for, highlighting his inability to achieve his wish. Xenophon, too, said at the start that Agesilaos "might have let them through and overcome them from behind". He had described the battle of the Nemea, in which the Spartans deliberately marched to their right (*Hell.* IV.ii.19) to create an overlap before turning into line to attack the Athenians from the flank (J.K.Anderson (1970); J.F.Lazenby (1985)



p.135). Although there is no overlap at Koroneia, the suggestion of Xenophon and Plutarch involves a similar attack from the flank on to the enemy rear. Strictly, neither author attributes the manoeuvre to the initial thinking of Agesilaos himself, but perhaps its successful use at Nemea had been reported to him from there through Derkylidas. At the start of the Theban return from the Spartan baggage, Xenophon had contemplated the possibility of the difficult manoeuvre which Agesilaos would have had to execute in order to allow them to pass him, after he had, as Xenophon and Plutarch both say, turned to face them, presumably blocking their line of advance. At the later stage, however, it would have involved a complicated change of formation in an already fierce battle, which would have been difficult even for the highly trained Spartans (J.F.Lazenby (1985) pp.146ff.), and Agesilaos had chosen not to attempt it even initially. The Thebans were among those who were at the "Nemea" and witnessed the successful move by Agesipolis' regent, and, with that experience, already now they had at least avoided being in a disorganized and straggling line a second time, for the return encounter. Xenophon allows the Lakedaimonian line to be pierced and a gap created sufficient for several thousand men to pour through. Such a gap would, as Lazenby points out, need to be a wide one, and, if forced by the Thebans, would surely involve more Spartan casualties than are mentioned by Diodoros (XIV.84.2): three hundred and fifty of the Lakedaimonians and their allies dead, and over six hundred Boiotians and their allies. Deliberate or feinted retreats - ὑποφεύγειν (E.L.Wheeler (1988) p.44) - are recorded, intended to cause disorder, and in a long drawn out engagement any temporary lull might allow trained men to change formation and tactics before the next attack. Plutarch seems to have developed his account from Xenophon's, but with, perhaps, an interpretation which helps to make better sense of the way the clearly described final positions came about (c.19 below). Frontinus and Polyainos do not wholly accord with

Xenophon's account, suggesting that the Spartans deliberately opened ranks to let the Thebans through (J.F.Lazenby p.146).

9 οὐ μὴν ἐτρέψαντό γ', ἀλλ' ἀπεχώρησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι πρὸς τὸν Ἑλικῶνα μέγα τῇ μάχῃ φρονοῦντες, ὡς ἀήττητοι καθ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότες.

By using exactly the same verb, ἐτρέψαντό, as above:

οἱ τε Θηβαῖοι ταχὺ τοὺς Ὀρχομενίους ἐτρέψαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους ὁ Ἀγησίλαος,

*Plutarch states categorically that the Thebans were far from defeated, showing clearly that he had made an assessment which differed from the Spartan success suggested by Xenophon. The final positions on the battlefield, one of the ways in which the battle was unusual, are the result of the chance course of the first action, in which the two sides, having each won on its own right wing, came to be relatively in the reverse of the positions they had originally occupied. The Thebans were cut off from base, the Spartans were still on the battlefield. That Plutarch believed in a Theban victory, however, also becomes clear in c.19.*

We may suppose fierce Theban pressure, and some orderly manoeuvre on Agesilaos' part to withdraw sections of the line, falling back perhaps like lock gates opening, in order to avoid being overwhelmed, and to let the enemy pass, yet maintaining sufficiently his own formation, so that in the end he could attack the Theban flank on its way to Helikon. It may be the case, however, that Xenophon mentioned the possibility of the initial manoeuvre at the beginning only to highlight by contrast what Agesilaos eventually did or chose to do. Plutarch may then have used the rhetorical device of having him do in the end what he had rejected at the start, interpreting for his own purpose the fact of the break through in Xenophon's account as the same rejected plan now forced on him. Plutarch has also enhanced the Theban success by making the purpose of their struggle the positive one of resisting the Spartan onslaught, rather than an attempt to



escape to base. Xenophon's account is not more impartial, however, for although he has allowed the Spartan line to be pierced, he has tried to obscure the Theban success, and has stressed their losses:

οἱ μὲν διαπίπτουσι πρὸς τὸν Ἑλικῶνα, πολλοὶ δ' ἀποχωροῦντες ἀπέθανον (*Hell.* IV.iii.19);

and Plutarch's attack in the flank (ἐκ πλαγίων) contrasts the frontal attack in Xenophon' (ἀντιμέτωπος συνέρραξε τοῖς Θηβαίοις). That Xenophon envisaged the same manoeuvre in the opening stages, and uses the same participle for the break-through in the end, suggests that Spartan drill was not thought incapable of opening a gap in their line during the engagement. At *Hell.* IV.ii.22 Xenophon suggested that similar manoeuvres were performed almost without proper commands:

λέγεται ὅρα τις ἀναβοῆσαι παρεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους. ὥς δὲ τοῦτ' ἐγένετο, παραθέοντας δὴ παίοντες εἰς τὰ γυμνά πολλοὺς ἀπέκτεινον αὐτῶν.

## CHAPTER 19

### (1) After the battle

1 Ἀγησίλαος δέ, καίπερ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων πολλῶν κακῶς τὸ σῶμα διακείμενος, οὐ πρότερον ἐπὶ σκηνὴν ἀπῆλθεν ἢ φοράδην ἐνεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἰδεῖν ἐντὸς τῶν ὅπλων συγκεκομισμένους.

Xenophon reports that Agesilaos was wounded only at the point where he attributes victory to him:

ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ νίκη Ἀγησιλάου ἐγεγένητο, τετρωμένος δ' αὐτὸς προσενήνεκτο πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα (*Hell.* IV.iii.20).

In the next sentence, Xenophon's second reference to the wounds is in recording that, despite them, Agesilaos still remembered his piety: καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων, ὅμως οὐκ ἐπελάθετο τοῦ θείου. Plutarch, who reported the wounds in c.18, and indirectly attributed victory to the Thebans in reporting there that they claimed to have been undefeated, has not accepted Xenophon's statement attributing the victory to Agesilaos, and links the wounds only with his reference to his return to the phalanx, and not with his piety. He makes one elaborate expression by combining Xenophon's two phrases, placed separately; the first, which is a simple participle, enhancing the self-denial of Agesilaos' return to the phalanx, the second, which is a prepositional phrase, enhancing Agesilaos' piety. Plutarch puts them in reverse order, and is interpreting the return to the phalanx as an indication of Agesilaos' regard for his troops and the collection of the dead, enhancing his standing as general, in respect of his courage and his endurance. This has involved Plutarch in an expansion of Xenophon's reference to the phalanx, which appears to signify only that, because Agesilaos' wounds had caused him temporarily to leave the battle line, he had to be re-united with the troops later. Xenophon may have used πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα to refer to the Spartan camp, but Plutarch takes it as the battle-line, and suggests that before the king went to his tent he was paraded in front the phalanx, perhaps to show that he was still alive. The reference to the



collection of the dead within the Spartan line, εἶσω φάλαγγος (*Agesilaos* II.15), is open to the same interpretations, and is unusual, but perhaps provides another reason why Xenophon regarded the battle as unlike others, in that Agesilaos was not confident that he could maintain his possession of the bodies without another battle, which would otherwise have to be fought on the field where the corpses lay, since he would have neither time nor opportunity to bury them beforehand. Polyainos, perhaps fancifully, explains that Agesilaos hid Spartan corpses with dust, not wishing the number of dead to be known. It was also his judgement that the battle was undecided (*Polyainos* II.1.19, 23).

2. ὅσοι μέντοι τῶν πολεμίων εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν κατέφυγον, πάντας ἐκέλευσεν ἀφεθῆναι. πλησίον γὰρ ὁ νεὼς ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς Ἰτωνίας Ἀθηνᾶς, καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τρόπαιον ἔστηκεν, ὃ πάλαι Βοιωτοὶ Σπάρτωνος στρατηγοῦντος ἐνταῦθα νικήσαντες Ἀθηναίους καὶ Τολμίδην ἀποκτείναντες ἔστησαν.

Plutarch elsewhere praises Agesilaos' piety, but does not follow Xenophon in doing so here, making without comment only a statement of the pious act. Xenophon gives the only mention of the presence of cavalry at this point, when horsemen rode up to report that about eighty of the enemy, still armed, were in the sanctuary. They could be the last few Thebans trying to pass through the Spartan lines who, finding themselves outnumbered and unable to follow the rest to Helikon, took refuge there, pursued by the cavalry. At *Agesilaos* II.13, they were given a cavalry escort to take them from the temple to safety.

Remains of an ancient temple are retained at the site around the modern chapel of Metamorphosis, now Sotera, in the modern village of Alalkomenai, formerly Mamoura, near Hagia Paraskevi. The release of the refugees by Agesilaos leads Plutarch to the mention of the temple, and so to recall the nearby monument. In his context of a Boiotian victory in the battle of Koroneia, Plutarch seems to have taken the opportunity for a patriotic reference to another victory, one which was undisputed, won by Boiotians, but over the Athenians, in 447 (*Perikles*

18). He thus temporarily diverts attention from Agesilaos, and adds another celebration to be savoured by his fellow-countrymen. This seems to be the reason for delaying the reference to Agesilaos' pious act, which was recorded earlier by Xenophon, linked with his wounds, and, with evident pride, Plutarch has introduced an ornamental style into the passage, making a chiasmic pattern of the participles and their direct objects.

3 ἅμα δ' ἡμέρα βουλόμενος ἐξελέγξει τοὺς Θηβαίους ὁ Ἀγησίλαος εἰ διαμαχοῦνται, στεφανοῦσθαι μὲν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς στρατιώτας, αὐλεῖν δὲ τοὺς αὐλητὰς, ἱστάναι δὲ καὶ κοσμεῖν τρόπαιον ὥς νενικηκότας.

The Thebans' first success in the battle had left the Spartans between them and their base. Now for the second time, as noted above (c.18), their success in fighting a way through the Spartan line had left the Spartans in command of the battlefield and of the dead. In order to recover both, which, in normal circumstances, the victory they claimed would immediately have put in their own possession, they would now, instead, have to fight another full-scale engagement, but starting with the initial disadvantage of having to meet the Spartans already occupying what had before been the neutral ground. Neither the Boiotians nor the Spartans were routed in the fighting, and the final issue was still undecided. The technicalities of deciding the victory were still to be settled. Xenophon, despite claiming that victory belonged to Agesilaos, nevertheless indicates that the Spartans could not assume that the Thebans accepted this decision, and staged the parade in battle formation as a challenge. Plutarch makes it Agesilaos' explicit purpose to challenge the Thebans, and further suggests, with ὥς νενικηκότας, that even in Agesilaos' mind his victory was not totally certain.

Xenophon, who perhaps represents the form in which Agesilaos' instructions were given, starts with the main business of the erection of the trophy, and then specifies minor matters of dress and



ceremonial, but Plutarch has arranged the activities in a more logical sequence, from the point of view of a privileged onlooker watching what was happening. Agesilaos' elaborate display of troops and trophy was intended, no doubt, to encourage his own men, as much as to intimidate the Thebans.

4 ὥς δ' ἔπεμψαν οἱ πολέμιοι νεκρῶν ἀναίρεσιν αἰτοῦντες, ἐσπείσατο, καὶ τὴν νίκην οὕτως ἐβεβαιώσάμενος, εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη, Πυθίων ἀγομένων, καὶ τὴν τε πομπὴν ἐπετέλει τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἀπέθυσσε τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας λαφύρων, ἑκατὸν ταλάντων γενομένην.

The Thebans clearly realized that they would have to fight again in order to recover their dead, and, like Agesilaos at Larissa, they showed discretion, and did not accept the Spartan challenge, but the request for the recovery of the dead is here more an acceptance of the difficulty of the chance situation than an admission of defeat. If Diodoros' figures are correct, and more than 600 Boiotians and 350 Lakedaimonians died, they can be expressed as a ratio of 1.7 to 1. At Nemea, the figures given are 2,800 and 1,100 respectively (Diod. 83.1), a ratio of 2.5 to 1, and when the Boiotians fought against the Phokians, they killed 1,000 and lost 500 (Diod. 82.9) giving a ratio of 2 to 1. The figures show the relative importance in this respect of these battles, and the differing prices of victory: for the Thebans the value of the battle of Koroneia lay in having averted the invasion of their territory.

For Agesilaos, the campaign ends with the journey to Delphi to deposit the tithe of the booty he had brought from Asia. Xenophon has been able to disguise some of the truth, but he has also retained some indications of the shortfall in Agesilaos' achievement, among them his return by sea: ἀπέπλευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐπ' οἴκου (*Hell.* IV.iv.1). Victory at Koroneia would have opened the way to Thebes, and helped to secure the Isthmus route, which might have been significant for the future conduct of the Corinthian War. The return across the Corinthian Gulf may have been the original intention, and the orders that came from Sparta for the invasion of Boiotia may have

been connected with the use of the Isthmus route. At the end of the campaign, the tangible results, it seems, were trophies near NARTHAKION and KORONEIA, and the booty, of which the tenth amounted to not less than 100 talents. AGESILAOS' army did not choose to drive home their advantage by making an outright attack on the Theban camp, or by attempting to enter Boiotia, which marks the real success of the Thebans at Koroneia. In *Hellenika* Xenophon brings Agesilaos home to Sparta in the rather sombre circumstances of Gylis' defeat and death in Lokris, after what he had presented as a glorious campaign in Asia Minor (IV.iii.21-23), and in *Agesilaos* he records the moral climax, that Agesilaos went home choosing, instead of pre-eminence in Asia, "to rule and be ruled" (II.16). Plutarch, however, despite recognizing the Theban achievement, has said nothing here that might detract from Agesilaos' own satisfaction at this point, but at *Comparatio* 3.1 he judges that Agesilaos' military achievement in general was limited. The omen of the interrupted sacrifice at Aulis seems to have been fulfilled.