The impact of interpersonal and institutional trust on secessionist support in established democracies: evidence from Scotland, Catalonia and Flanders

Abstract

The last two decades have seen a substantial increase in the number of secession attempts taking place. Secession has therefore become a more salient issue across a growing number of states, simply because it has become a more realistic possibility. As this is a fairly recent phenomenon, secession has also historically been somewhat neglected by researchers, both empirically and theoretically, and so the dynamics of support for secession have not been analysed in as granular detail as more regular forms of voting behaviour. In explaining the dynamics of secessionist support, this thesis will examine the impact of both interpersonal and institutional trust on an individual’s likelihood of supporting secession. The most commonly identified predictors of support for secession, national identity and secessionist party identification, are generally considered to be stable variables, or at least variables which cannot easily be affected by policy makers. Levels of trust meanwhile, have been found to be more malleable, both at the interpersonal level and the institutional level. Institutional trust and in particular trust in governments, has been found to be affected by a number of factors, including institutional performance relative to citizens’ expectations, transparency, and representation of citizens’ concerns. Levels of interpersonal trust meanwhile, which exist horizontally between individuals and groups of individuals, can be influenced by public policy measures, such as the promotion of civic engagement and community building projects. Understanding the role of trust in shaping support for secession is therefore extremely important to separatists and unionists alike, as it has the potential to provide valuable new information about the dynamics of secessionist support, as well as the potential measures which could be taken to address secessionist demands.