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|Title:||Machine-Checked Formalisation and Verification of Cryptographic Protocols|
|Abstract:||Aiming for strong security assurance, researchers in academia and industry focus their interest on formal verification of cryptographic constructions. Automatising formal verification has proved itself to be a very difficult task, where the main challenge is to support generic constructions and theorems, and to carry out the mathematical proofs. This work focuses on machine-checked formalisation and automatic verification of cryptographic protocols. One aspect we covered is the novel support for generic schemes and real-world constructions among old and novel protocols: key exchange schemes (Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange, SPEKE), commitment schemes (with the popular Pedersen scheme), sigma protocols (with the Schnorr’s zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol), and searchable encryption protocols (Sophos). We also investigated aspects related to the reasoning of simulation based proofs, where indistinguishability of two different algorithms by any adversary is the crucial point to prove privacy-related properties. We embedded information-flow techniques into the EasyCrypt core language, then we show that our effort not only makes some proofs easier and (sometimes) fewer, but is also more powerful than other existing techniques in particular situations.|
|Appears in Collections:||School of Computing|
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|MetereR2020.pdf||Thesis||2.71 MB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
|dspacelicence.pdf||Licence||43.82 kB||Adobe PDF||View/Open|
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