Athenian politics from the victory of Salamis until the dispatch of aid to Inaros

Abstract

n this thesis I argue that an explanation of Themistokles' absence from the strategic of 479/8 can beat be found in his desire to be in a position to creates situation in nellas'in which the Athenians themselves would choose to follow what would otherwise have been the unpopular policy of abandoning interest in Ionia. This policy was the necessary corollary of Themistokles' aim of striving for Athenian hegemony in Hellas. The devious methods he'felt obliged to use illustrate the demos' independence-of its leaders' opinions. This background explains the sources for the transfer of hegemony. It is held that Themistokles was influential in Athens until his ostracism in 470. The success of leading politicians depended primarily on the intrinsic persuasiveness of their arguments, the reputation they could win from personal achievement, and on an attractive personality, ' and less on reputation deriving from family prestige and°pbiloi"connections. The influence of Themietokles can perhaps be seen in the record of military activity in the 470e. Until 470/69 when the anti-Persian drive which culminated at Eurymedon (465) 'began, actions were undertaken only against Eion, Skyros and Karystos. Conflict over foreign policy forms the background to, and immediate cause of the Ephialtic reforms, which were a practical attempt to secure the demos' sovereignty in the face of Kimon'a unconstitutional behaviour and of his manipulation of existing controls on magistrates. The decision to embark on a war on two fronts in 460 was a , 'serious blunder. The failure of Athenian leaders to prevent this course of action requires the assumption either that they were unable to diseuade the demos from adopting a popular course of action, or, more probably, that they dared not oppose the demos' Wishes.